THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 

L.erioer-Moss  Co. 


INTOXICATING 
LIQUORS 


The  Law  Relating  to  the  Traffic  in 

Intoxicating  Liquors  and 

Drunkenness 


BY 

W.  W.  \yOOLLEN 

(0£  the  Indianapolis  Bar) 

A.utkor  or  Indiana  Trial  Procedure,   Etc. 
AND 

W.  W.  THORNTON 

(Of  the  Indianapolis  Bar) 

A.utIior  ol  Oil  and   Gas,  Girts   and   A.dvancement8,  Etc. 


VOLUME  1 


CINCINNATI 

THE  W.  H.  ANDERSON  COMPANY 

1910 


T 


Copyright 

THE  W.   H.  ANDERSON  COMPANY 

1910 


s- 


PREFACE 


The  subject  of  Intoxicating  Liquors,  botli  socially  and 
legally,  has  greatly  gained  in  importance  in  the  last  quarter 
of  a  century.  Not  since  1892  has  the  law  relating  to  theui 
been  systematically  treated  in  a  work  devoted  entirely  to  their 
consideration.  Since  then  questions  relating  to  the  control 
of  the  liquor  traffic  have  been  repeatedly  before  the  courts, 
and  more  cases  have  been  reported  since  that  time  than  had 
been  reported  previouslj'  thereto  in  all  English-speaking 
countries.  It  would  seem  that  all  questions  that  can  possibly 
be  raised  concerning  the  traffic  and  control  of  intoxicating 
liquors  have  been  presented  to  the  courts  for  their  considera- 
tion. It  therefore  seems  that  the  time  is  ripe  for  a  work 
covering  the  entire  subject  of  Intoxicating  Liquors. 

Not  only  does  the  present  work  treat  of  the  Traffic  in  and 
Control  of  the  Manufacture  and  Sale  of  Intoxicating  Liquors, 
but  it  also  treats  of  all  questions  to  which  they  have  any  rela- 
tion, and  in  so  doing  it  covers  a  broader  field  than  has  ever 
been  undertaken  heretofore  in  any  legal  work.  Thus,  the 
subject  of  Drunkenness  is  treated  at  length — its  etfect  upon 
Contracts,  Wills,  Divorce,  as  a  defense  for  the  Commis- 
sion of  Crime,  Negligence,  Guardians  for  Drunkards,  Life 
Insurance,  and  similar  phases — as  it  has  never  before 
been  treated  in  one  work.  The  only  subject  omitted  is  that  of 
the  laws,  rules  and  regulations  of  the  United  States  for  the 
taxation  and  licensing  of  intoxicating  liquoi*s  as  a  source  of 
revenue.  Copies  of  these  rales  and  regulations  are  furnished 
gratuitously  by  the  United  States  Treasury  Department,  are 
frequently  changed  by  rulings  of  that  department,  and  con- 
stitute a  volume  of  several  hundred  pages. 

The  two  volumes  of  this  work  contain  nearly  27,000  cita- 
tions. 


iV  PREFACE. 

It  has  been  the  aim  of  th£  authors  to  cite  all  cases  bearing 
upon  the  subject  of  iMoxieating  Liq!u<»rs,  and  they  have 
assiduously  endeavored  to*  do  this,  and  tkey  belie-Ve  .that  very 
few  cases,  and  none  of  real  importance,  feave  eseapetJ  them. 
No  case,  however,  has  been  cited  that  has  been  reported  since 
January  1,  1910,  the  date  of  goin^g  to  press. 

In  their  endeavors  to  make  the'  Work  as  complete  as  poseib^^ 
they  have  aimed  to  cite  all  eases  re°p(Kted  in  Engfiand,  Irelaifikl, 
Scotland,  Quebec,  Ontario,  Briti^'  Columbia,  the  British 
Northwest  Territories,  Nova  Scotia,  Mew  BrunslVick,  New-- 
t'oundland,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  asti  in  the  British  Pos- 
sessions of  South  Africa.  In  their  exaraiiiation  of  the  reports 
of  these  countries,  and  especially  the  Isst  three,  they  have 
found  many  important  questions  discussed  and  decided. 

In  an  examination  of  the  cases  of  Engl'a.tid  the  autltOfi* 
have  been  greatly  aided  by  the  last  editioa'  (19  Ed.)  of 
Patterson's  Licensing  Acts  of  that  country,  a  wofk  noted  fOr' 
its  accuracy  and  comprehensiveness,  and  but  little  known  in> 
this  country.  The  authors  have  not  hesitated,  at  times,  to 
quote  extensively  from  this  most  excellent  work  wlifire  they 
thought  the  subject  treated  would  be  of  value  to  the  American 
practitioner. 

It  is  believed,  because  of  the  careful  examination  that  has 
been  made  of  the  Canadian  decisions,  that  this  work  will'  be 
of  value  to  the  Canadian  practitioner. 

In  the  citation  of  cases  it  has  been  the  constant  endeavor 
of  the  authors  to  give  reference  to  the  West  Publishing  Com-- 
pany's  Reporters  wherever  a  case  has  appeared  in  any  of' 
tliem,  and  they  have  also  endeavored  to  give  duplicate  refer-'- 
<mces  to  well  established  and  correct  systems  of  reported' 
<'ases  of  the  several  States  and  Territories. 

The  authors'  thanks  are  due  to  Mr.  Willitts  A.  Bastian  cf 
the  Indianapolis  Bar,  for  a  revision  of  the  proof  sheets  and 
valuable  suggestions  concerning  obscure  and  inaccurate  ex- 
pressions. 

W.  W.  Woollen, 

W.  W.  Thornton. 
Indianapolis,  Ind,,  July  1, 1910. 


TABJ.E  OF  CONTENTS. 


PART  I. 
INTOXICATING  LIQUORS. 


CHAPTER  I. 
Definitions — Judicial    Notice. 
Article  I. — Definitions. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1.  Liquor,    meaning    and    strength 1 

2.  Liquor,    continued 4 

3.  Mixed    liquors 5 

4.  "Intoxicating,"    statute    defining — Evidence — Statute    consti- 

tutional      6 

5.  Intoxicating   liquors — Use   as    a   beverage 8 

6.  Intoxicating  liquors — Amount  necessary  to  produce  intoxica- 

tion    13 

7.  Intoxicating  and  spirituous  liquors  distinguished 14 

i8.     Intoxicating    and    non-intoxicating,    how    distinguished 15 

9.     Alcohol  an  into::icant — Judicial  notice 15 

10.  Alcohol    continued }{) 

11.  Fermented    liquor — Cider 18 

12.  Compound    liquors — Mixtures 19 

13.  Distilled  liquors 21 

14.  Spirit   or   spirits — Judicial   notice 21 

15.  Spirituous    liquors    distinguished 22 

IQ.     Spirituous  and  intoxicating  liquors  distinguished 23 

17.  Wine  as  an  intoxicating  liquor 26 

18.  Wine,  intoxicating  quality  when  not  a  question 28 

19.  Wine  as  a  spirituous  or  fermented  liquor 28 

20.  Wine,  when  a  question  of  fact — Burden  of  proof 29 

21.  Port  wine   an  intoxicant 29 


VI  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

22.  Blackberry  wine  an  intoxicant 30 

23.  Champagne,  when  included  as  a  liquor 30 

24.  Sherry  wine 31 

25.  Spirits  and  wine   distinguished — Aqua  vita 31 

2G.  Malt  liquor  not  included  in  "vinous  and  spirituous  liquors".  .  31 

27.  Whiskey  an  intoxicant — IIow  made — Judicial  notice 32 

28.  Whiskey  cocktail — Sale,  when  a  violation  of  law 33 

29.  Gin  and  alcoholic  liquor — Judicial  notice 34 

30.  Brandy  an  intoxicant — Burden  of  proof 35 

31.  Brandy  peaches,  sale  of  not  prohibited 36 

32.  Malt  liquors — Judicial  notice 37 

33.  Beer  and   ale   distinguished — History 39 

34.  Beer  defined — Presumption — Judicial   notice 40 

35.  Lager  beer  a  malt  liquor  and  intoxicant 45 

36.  Schenk  beer,  intoxicating  quality  a  question  of  fact 45 

37.  Strong   and  spirituous  liquors — Beer 46 

38.  Ale   47 

39.  Cider    48 

40.  Medicines — Comf>ounds    51 

41.  Camphor  gum  not  an  intoxicant 54 

42.  Cinnamon   and   lemon   essence — Cologne 55 

43.  Common  cordial    a   spirituous   liquor — Godfrey's   Cordial....  56 

44.  Empire  Tonic   Bitters — Proprietary  medicines 57 

45.  Home    bitters — Medicines — Instructions — Evidence 58 

46.  Busby's   Bitters — Judicial    notice 59 

47.  Mead— Metheglin    60 

48.  Wilson's   Rocky  Mountiiin    Herb   Bitters 60 

49.  Intoxication — Drunkenness — Drunkard     61 

50.  Intemperate  habit 64 

51.  Habitual   drunkenness 84 

52.  Habitual    drunkard 64 

53.  Habitual    intemperance 66 

54.  Confirmed   drunkard 68 

55.  Saloon  defined — Limited   to   one   room 68 

56.  Saloon   keeper 70 

57.  Tippling    hou>'0 71 

58.  Liquor  shop 71 

59.  Tavern   keeper 71 

GO.     Sample  room 72 

(Jl.     Dramahop — Dramshop    keeper 72 

(i2.     Bar    defined ...    73 

63.  Barroom    73 

64.  Barroom    fixtures 75 

65.  Barkeeper    75 

66.  Dram   76 

67.  Dealer    76 


TABLE    OP    CONTENTS.  VU 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

68.  Wholesaler  and  retailer 76 

69.  Common   seller 77 

70.  Rectifier    77 

IBTICLE  11. — Judicial  Notice. 

71.  Distiller    78 

72.  Judicial  knowled<;;e — General   rule 78 

73.  Spirituous,  distilled  or  alcoholic  liquors 79 

74.  Vinous  liquors 82 

75.  Ale  82 

76.  Beer — Primary  and  secondary  meaning 83 

77.  Mead   or   metheglin 85 

78.  Proof  of  quality  of  liquor 85 


CHAPTER  II. 

Constitutionality  of  Statutes. 

79.     Control  of  liquor  traffic  falls  under  police  power 90 

SO.     Definition   and   extent   of    police    power 92 

81.  Police  power,   continued — Legislative  power 94 

82.  Police  power  not  the  power  of  eminent  domain 96 

83.  State  cannot  surrender  police   power 97 

84.  Police  power  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract 98 

85.  Police  power  limited  by  Federal  Constitution 99 

86.  Blackstone's  enumeration  of  police  powers 100 

87.  Sumptuary  argument  insufficient  to  defeat  liquor  legislation.  101 
8^8.     No  natural  right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors 102 

89.  Right  to  sell  liqiiors  at  common  law — Nuisance 103 

90.  Natural  right  not   a  judicial  question 105 

91.  Motive  for  passage  of  law  or  ordinances 106 

92.  Prohibitory    law,    basis    of    constitutionality 107 

93.  Prohibiting  manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors 110 

94.  Constitution  prohibiting  the  granting  of  a  license — Ohio  Con- 

stitution      120 

95.  Eff"ect  of  adopting  constitutional  prohibitory  measure  on  prior 

statute    121 

96.  Contracts    prohibiting 122 

97.  Past  contracts  for  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 123 

98.  Eff'ect   of   prohibition   upon   liquors   on   hand   at  time   of  its 

adoption    124 

99.  Keeping  liquors 127 

100.  Corporate  chiaters,   change — Police   power 12S 

101.  Prohibition  in  particular  places  and  localities 129 


Vlll  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

102.  Confining  liquor  sales  to  certain  districts 132 

103.  Agricultural   fairs 133 

104.  Educational  institutions 134 

105.  Religious  assemblies 136 

106.  License,  State  may  refuse 138 

107.  State  may  permit  sales  under  a  lic'fense — Biblical  prohibition.    140 

108.  Fourteenth   Amendment,  effect  of  or  power   to  rej^late  sale 

of   intoxicating    liquors ^        . . .  .  ,^^, 147 

109.  Fourteenth    Amendment — Keeping    saloon...;' 151 

110.  Privileges  and  immunities  of  other  States 152 

111.  "Import"  defined — Statute  in  violation  of  Constitution 153 

112.  Discrimination  against  liquors  of  other  States 155 

113.  Manufacture   for  shipment  out  of  State 159 

114.  Xon-intoxicating   liquors — Declaring   liquors   to   be   intoxicat- 

ing     1«2 

115.  Regulation   of   sales   and   saloons 163 

116.  Permitting  persons  to  go  into  saloon  at  prohibited  times.  .  .  .    165 

117.  Delegation  of  power  to  license  and  regulate  sales  of  liquors.  .    166 

118.  Compelling  towns  to  engage  in  liquor   traffic 171 

119.  Monopoly  of  sale 172 

120.  Territorial  power  to  enact  liquor  laws 173 

121.  State  engaging  in  liquor  traffic — Dispensary  laws 174 

122.  Carolina  dispensary  and  Wilson  laws  construed — Discrimina- 

tion       176 

123.  Ex  post  facto — Municipal  legislation 179 

124.  No  property  right  in  license — Annulling  a  license 180 

125.  Revocation  of  license 185 

126.  Amount  of  license  fees 186 

127.  Increasing  amount  of  fee  before  license  has  expired 187 

128.  License  for  and  sale  by  druggists 188 

129.  Limiting  license  to  certain  class  of  persons 188 

130.  Discrimination   in   granting  license.  . 190 

131.  Discretionary  power  to  grant  a  license 194 

132.  Appeal  to  courts  from  granting,  refusing  or  revoking  license.    195 

133.  Taxes    and    fees 198 

134.  Fees   must  be  uniform 201 

135.  Bell    Punch   law — Uniformity — Di.scrimination 203 

136.  Consent  of  voters  to  license— Validity  of  statutes  requiring..   204 

137.  Assent  of  neighbors  may  be  required 206 

138.  Indiana    statute — Remonstrance 206 

139.  Rales  to  minors,  drunkards,  insane  persons  and  Indians 210 

140.  Limiting  sales  to  certain  purposes 211 

141.  Screens — Validity  and  enforcement  of  law  requiring 211 

142.  Sunday    laws — Municipal    ordinance 214 

143.  Women  as  employes  and  visitors  in  saloons 217 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  IX 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1-14.     Record  of  sules 210 

145.  Restitution     of    internal     revenue — Licenses     and     receipts — 

Exposure  of  license 220 

146.  Minimum  quantity  that  may  be  sold  at  one  time 221 

147.  Owner  of  premises — Liability  under  statute 221 

148.  Civil   damages 223 

149.  Requiring  licensee  to  give  bond 224 

150.  Inspection  of  liquors — Ingredients 224 

151.  "Bling  Pig"  or  "Blind  Tiger"  law 225 

152.  Ex  post  facto  law — Change  of  remedy 225 

153.  Local  option — Its  two  phases 227 

154.  Local  option  not  special  legislation.  .    227 

155.  Local  option  laws — Delegated  power ., .  .  •  229 

156.  Local   option   laws — Constitutionality 234 

157.  Local  option  law,  why  not  unconstitutional 235 

158.  Local  option  laws,  why  not  unconstitutional — Continued. . . .  230 

159.  Local  option,  not  in  violation  of  Fourteenth  Amendment.  .  .  .  238 
IfiO.  Local    option — Alabama    Constitution — Notice    of    enactment 

of    law 241 

161.  Local  option  law  in  Territories 242 

162.  Local  option  not  destructive  of  property 242 

163.  Special   legislation   for   village 243 

104.     Local  option  constitutional  provisions 244 

1G5.     Local  proliibitory  laws,  when  con.stitutional 247 

1G6.     Special    legislation 249 

107.  Proceedings   in   rem 251 

108.  Search  and  seizure  of  liquors  illegally  kept 253 

1G9.     Destruction,  of  intoxicating  liquors 255 

170.  Nuisance — Abatement    256 

171.  Enjoining  the  maintenance  of  liquor  establishments 258 

172.  Amount  of  penalty — Unusual  punishment 259 

173.  Ex  post  facto  law  defined — Heavier  subsequent  punishment..  260 

174.  British-North    American    Act 262 

175.  Closing    saloons 263 

176.  Evidence,    statute    regulating 263 

177.  Jury  trial,  when  it  can  be  secured  by  appeal 269 

178.  Double  punishment — State  and  municipalities 270 

179.  Double  punishment — Conflict  of  jurisdiction 273 

180.  Imprisonment  for  debt 275 

181.  Support  of  penitentiary — Imitation  liquor 276 

182.  Removal  of  officers  for  drunkenness 276 

183.  Drunkenness     277 

184.  Inebriate    asylums 277 

1S5.     Misecllanenus     decisions .  .    278 

186.  When  courts  will  not  consider  constitutional  questiuu 271) 

187.  Title   of   statutes— Valid    statutes 283 


X  TABLE   OP    CONTENTS. 

SKCTION.                                                                                                                                  PAGE. 
1S8.     Title  of  statute — Invalid  statute 291 

189.  Statute  or  ordinance  only  in  part  valid 293 

190.  Confctruction  of  statute 295 


CHAPTER  III. 
Interstate  Commerce. 

191.  Statutes  drawn  in  general  terms,  how  construed 297 

192.  What  constitutes  interstate  commerce 29s 

193.  Original    packages 300 

194.  What  constitutes  original  packages — Size  of  packages 307 

195.  Original    packages — Illustrations 30S 

196.  Discrimination   against  citizens   of  other   States 311 

197.  Right  of  consignee  to  sell  imported  liquors 313 

198.  Right  of  importer  to  sell  in  original  packages 31fi 

U>9.     "Wilson  Law,"  origin  and  constitutionality 317 

200.  Wilson  Law  construed — "Arrival"  defined 321 

201.  Liquors  in   transit — ^Vhen   transit   ceases 325 

202.  Wilson  Law — Effect  upon  State  laws 327 

203.  Importing  liquors  for  private  use 32K 

204.  Leaving    liquor    unreasonable    length    of    time    in    carrier's 

possession    330 

205.  License — Tax — Regulating  sale 330 

206.  Prohibiting  solicitation  of  orders 333 

207.  Sales  beyond  State  lines 336 

208.  Sales  to  minors  and  drunkards 336 

209.  Burden  on  defendant  to  show  he  is  protected   by  the   inter- 

state commerce   law 33li 

210.  Liability  of   ofTleers   sening   warrant 337 

211.  Shipping  liquor  under  false  brand 337 

212.  Carrier  refusing  to  accept  liquors  for  transportation 337 

CHAPTER   IV. 
Regulating  Liqi^ob  Trafiic. 

213.  Extent  of  discussion   In  this  chapter 340 

214.  Statutory  requirements  as  to  location  of  barroom 340 

215.  Arrangement  of  room 343 

216.  Screens    and    curtjiins 344 

217.  Removal  of  saloon 347 

218.  Keeping  more  than  one  bar — Barroom 347 

219.  More  than  one  license 347 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XI 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

220.  Beneficial  interest  in  more  than  one  license 347 

221.  Lamp  burning  until  closing  time 347 

222.  Keeping  door  locked 348 

223.  List   of   employes 348 

224.  Music  in  saloon «j48 

225.  Obstruction  of  oflicer's  entrance  on  premises 349 

226.  Display   of   license 352 

227.  Signs     3o2 

228.  Sale  in  unmarked   measure 352 

229.  Registration    of    sales 354 

230.  Sales  on  credit 355 

231.  Entering  saloon  in  violation  of  orders  not  an  offense 356 

232.  Permitting  minors  to  "enter  and  remain"  in  a  saloon 357 

233.  Minor  willfully  misstating  his  age 358 

234.  Permitting  drunkennes  on  premises — Soiling  to  drunken  man.    350 

235.  Found  drunk  on  licensed  premises 361 

236.  Power  to  exclude  drunken  man  from  premises 362 

237.  Permitting  employe  to  drink  storage  liquoi-s — Premises oG'i 

238.  Women  in   saloons — Wine  rooms 3G4 

239.  Prostitutes   A'isiting   premises 365 

240.  Permitting   premises  to  be  a  brothel. 367 

241.  Knowingly  harboring  thief  on  premises 368 

242.  Gambling   on   premises 309 

243.  Suffering  gambling  or  betting  on  premises — English  statute.   378 

244.  Servant   permitting  gambling — Knowledge  of  gaming 375 

245.  Keeping  a  betting  house 37t) 

246.  Public    dispensary.  .    381 

247.  Sales  by  public  agents ;  . .  .  .    382 

248.  Agent's  liability  on  his  bond 385 

249.  Transportation  or  conveyance  of  liqiiors 3S5 

250.  Limiting  number  of  saloons 387 

251.  Saloon    for    negroes 388 

252.  Liquor  sales  carried  on  with  other  business 388 

253.  Criminal  liability  of  owner  and  landlords 388 

254     Police  regulations,  enforcement  by  mandamus 390 


CHAPTER  V. 

MUNICIPAT.    ReGLXATION. 

255.  Creation   of  public   corporations — Ordinances 393 

256.  Municipal  power,  how  conferred  and  construed 395 

257.  Municipal  control — Legislative  power — Police  power........  397 

2S8>  Discretionary  powers  of  municipal  corporations ; 398 

25d.  Exclusive  municipal  power,  effect 400 


Xii  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

260.  Powers  delegated  to  and  bj'  municipal  corporations 403 

261.  Municipal  regulations  beyond  corporate  limits 405 

262.  Keasonabhness  of  ordinance 408 

203.     Extent  of  power  of  municipality  to  grant  licenses 410 

264.  Power  to  license — Use  and  grant 411 

265.  Power  to  require  a  license — Instances 413 

266.  Power  to  grant  a  license,  what  includes 417 

267.  Ordinances  necessary  to  exaction  of  a  license 419 

268.  Delegation  by  city  of  power  to  require  a  license 420 

269.  Number   of   licenses 420 

270.  Restricting  saloons  to  specified  parts  of  the  city 421 

271.  License  ordinance,   when    not   invalid 425 

272.  Discriminating  ordinance,  when  not  unconstitutional 428 

273.  Exacting  license,  requirement  when  not  discriminating 429 

274.  Bond    of    licensee 430 

275.  Municipal   power   to   prohibit 430 

276.  Povver  to  prohibit  includes  power  to  license 434 

277.  Prohibitory  ordinance,  not  in  violation  of  common  law  rights.    435 

278.  Regulation   and   prohibition  distinguished 436 

279.  Limitation  on  power  of  city  to  enact  ordinance 437 

280.  Power  to  regulate  sale  of  liquor — Valid  ordinance 438 

281.  Power  to  regulate  sale  of   liquors — Invalid   ordinance 441 

282.  Amount   of  license  fees  or  taxes 442 

283.  License    fees,    limitation 446 

284.  Right  of  different  Jurisdictions  to  exact  license 447 

285.  License,  diflerent  jurisdictions  may  require 449 

286.  United   States  license,   effect 450 

287.  Keeping  liquors  for  sale  or  saloon  open   452 

2S8.  Ordinance,  when  not  conflicting  with  statute — Keeping  liquor 

for   unlawful   sale 453 

289.  Proliibiting  owner  to  enter  saloon  on  Sunday 454 

290.  Declaring  sale  of  liquors  a  nuisance 455 

291.  Regulating   da\s    and    hours 456 

292.  Sales  on  Sundays,  election  days  or  holidays 460 

293.  Sales  nt   prohibited   hours 460 

294.  Picnic  and  social  gatlierings 461 

295.  Physician's    ])rescriptions 462 

296.  Rales  to  minors  and  drunkards 462 

297.  Prohibiting  sales  in  State  having  local  option  laws 463 

298.  Women  not  licensing — Constitutional  law 464 

299.  Women    in    saloons 464 

.*iOO.     Wine  rooms 465 

.301.     Requiring  a   county  license 466 

302.  Repeal  of  statute  by  implication,  wlien  not  accomplished....    466 

303.  Regulation   of  saloon   room — Location  of  saloon 4G7 

304.  Lights  burning  in  saloon 468 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  XIU 

SECTIOJf.  PAGE. 

305.  Screens—  Exposure  of  room  to  viev 468 

306.  Proliibiting  the  carriage  of  liquors 469 

307.  Police  visiting  saloon 4C9 

30S.     Penalties  essential — Heavier  for  subsequent  oflense 469 

309.  Penalties,   greater   and   additional — Infliction 469 

310.  Revocation  of  license — Conditional  ordinance 471 

31 1.  Ordinance  annulled  by   subsequent   statute 473 

312.  Exceptions  to  prohibitory  ordinances 473 

313.  Ordinance  in  part  void 473 

314.  Ordinance  in  conflict  with  Constitution 474 

315.  City  conducting  a  dispensary 475 

316.  Appointment   of   liquor   agents 476 

317.  Duties  and  powers  of  liquor  agents 470 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Licenses. 

318.  Definition , 478 

319.  A   personal   trust 480 

320.  Imposes  no  public  duties — Purpose  of  license 481 

321.  Not   a   tax 481 

322.  License    distinguished    from    a    tax.  . 483 

323.  Inherent   and   common    law   right   to    sell    liquors   without   a 

license     485 

324.  License  to  sell  not  a  vested  right 487 

325.  License    not    property 488 

326.  Neither  a  contract  nor  property 489 

327.  Efl'ect  of  enactment  of  prohibition  and  a  license  law 491 

328.  Repeal  of  licensing  laws  after  license  issued 492 

329.  License    by    implication 492 

330.  Taken  subject  to  subsequent  legislation 494 

331.  Annulment  of  license  by  change  of  law 495 

332.  License   prospective,    not   retrospective 497 

333.  Retroactive   efTect   of   license 499 

334.  Impossibility  to  secure  a  license 501 

.335.  Neplect  or  improper  refusal  to  grant  a  license 504 

336.  Performance  of  reqviisites  to  obtain  a  license  not  a  license.  .  .   505 

337.  \\niat  a  license  does  and  does  not  authorize 507 

338.  Agent  or  servant,  when  protected  by  license  of  his  principal .  .   510 

339.  Sale  by  servant  when  his  master  holds  no  license — illegal  sales  ol2 

340.  Servant's  licen«p  no  protection  for  his  master 515 

341.  Partnership    license 516 

342.  Number  of  licenses  an  individual  may  or  is  required  to  hold.    520 

343.  City  may  require  license  in  addition  to  a  State  license 521 


Xiv  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

."44.  City  license  not  a  defense  to  a  State  violation 622 

345.  United    States    licenne — State    license 523 

346.  U.  S.  riovcrnmcnt  license  no  defense  to  the  State  license 524 

347.  Duration  of   license 525 

348.  Expired    license 526 

349.  "On"'  and  "oft"  license 527 

350.  Void   license — Collateral    attack 528 


CHAPTER  VIT 
Pkksons  Entitled  to  a  License. 

351.  Eligibility     530 

352.  Married    women — Female 536 

353.  Corporations    537 

354.  Joint  and   partnership   licenses 538 

355.  Manufacturers     539 

355a.  Wholesalers 544 

356.  Hotel   keeper — Innkeeper 544 

357.  Restaurant  in  capitol  building 546 

358.  Holder    of    house 546 

359.  Boat    license 547 

360.  Canteen — Street    railway    car i549 

361.  Who   must  have  a  license 549 

362.  Wholesalers 553 

363.  Native  or  domestic  wines 555 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Issuance  of  Licenses 

364.  Authority  to   grant 557 

365.  How   licenFC   law  construed 569 

366.  The  application,  its  form 560 

367.  Delegation    of    power    to    license 566 

368.  Oath   of  applicant 567 

369.  Notice   of   ai)plioation 567 

370.  Recommendation    of    applicant 573 

371.  Consent  to  granting  of  license 575 

372.  Consents  where  saloon  has  been  abandoned  or  discontinued..  579 

373.  Saloon  near  dwelling,  consent  of  owners 581 

374.  What  is  a  dwelling  requiring  consent  of  owners 583 

375.  Signers  to   consent  on   recommendation 584 

."76.     Saloon  nojir  church — Distance,  how   measured 589 

377      Saloon    near    schoolhousc 593 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XV 

SECTION.  P.\GE. 

378.  Saloon  near  fair  or  factory 596 

379.  Saloon  in  resident  part  of  city 596 

.380.     Moral  qualification  of  applicant   598 

381.     Residence  of  applicant 600 

3^2.     Remonstrance 601 

383.  Signatures    to    remonstrance — Power   of    attorney    to    sign — 

Revocation  605 

384.  Who  may  remonstrate 607 

385.  Withdrawal  of  signatures  from  remonstrance 609 

386.  A  majority  remonstrance 611 

387.  Day  for  liearing  application,  appointing 615 

388.  Hearing  application   617 

389.  Continuance  of  hearing — Adjourned  meeting 619 

390.  Evidence  at  hearing   621 

391.  Licensing  board  acting  ujwn  its  own  information 625 

392.  Discretion  of  licensing  board    627 

393.  Character  of  discretion   632 

394.  Discretion  of  municipalities  in  granting  licenses 634 

395.  Review  or  control  of  discretion  of  licensing  boards 635 

396.  Reasons  for  refusal    636 

397.  Unsuitable  buildinos  or  place 640 

398.  Limiting  number  of  saloons 643 

399.  Order  granting  or  refusing  the  license 645 

400.  Mandamus  to  secure  a  license 647 

401.  Mandamus  under  the  English  Licensing  Acts 653 

402.  Injunction  to  restrain  issuance  of  license 658 

403.  Liability  for  refusing  license 659 

404.  Appeal  from  order  granting  or  refusing  license 661 

405.  Writ  of  prohibition    667 

406.  From  what  orders  an  appeal  may  be  taken 668 

407.  Persons  entitled  to  appeal — Parties 668 

408.  Rights  of  licensee  pending  appeal 671 

409.  Sale  pending  appeal  to  Supreme  Court 672 

410.  Certiorari     673 

411.  Renewal  of  license 677 

412.  Collateral  attack  upon  a  license — Qno  warranto 682 

413.  Void  license   684 

414.  Member  of  licensing  board  a  prohibitionist — Interest 685 

415.  Criminal  liability  of  licensing  officer , 885 

CHAPTER    IX. 
The  Form  of  the  License. 

416.  The   form    687 

417.  Conditions   inserted   in   license 689 

418.  The  place  licensed 689 


XVi  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    X. 

Transfer  of  License. 
section.  page. 

419.  License  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  not  transferable 693 

420.  Statute    permitting   transfer 695 

42  L     Assignment  not  a  transfer   699 

4L2.     Death  of   licensee 699 

423.  Bankruptcy  or  insolvency — Receiver    701 

424.  Mortgage   of  license — Judicial  sale    703 

425.  Transfer  of  license  to  other  premises — Pennsylvania 705 

426.  Transfer  under  English  statutes   706 

427.  Transfer  under   English  and   Colonial   statutes — Cases 709 


CHAPTER    XL 
Revocation  of  License. 

427a.  State  may  authorize  a  revocation 713 

428.  Repeal    of   statute    715 

429.  Causes  for  revocation — Fraud  in  procuring  license 716 

430.  License  issued  for  a  prohibition  territory 717 

431.  Violation   of   the   law 717 

432.  Violation  of  statute  by  licensee's  agent  or  servant 721 

433.  Upon  conviction  of  an  offense  against  the  liquor  laws 721 

434.  Violation  of  tei  ms  of  bond 723 

435.  Conducting   place   disorderly 723 

436.  House  used  as  a  brothel 724 

437.  Ordinance  providing  for  a  revocation 726 

438.  New  York  statute — False  statements 727 

439.  False  statements  in  application  under  New  York  statute....    728 

440.  Erroneous  statements  as  to  place  in  application  for  a  license.   732 

441.  License    issued    by   mistake 732 

442.  The  license  to  be  revoked   733 

443.  Revocation  after  assignment  for  prior  illegal  acts 733 

444.  What  board  or  court  may  revoke  a  license 733 

445.  Mandamus  to  compel  a  revocation   734 

446.  Who  may  commence   proceedings 735 

447.  Who  to  be  made  defendant — Assignment  of  license 736 

448.  The  petition  for  revocation    737 

449.  Joint  proceedings  to  revoke  several  licenses 739 

450.  Notice  of  proceedings  for   revocation 740 

451.  The   answer    742 

452.  Trial    743 

453.  Dismissal  of  proceeding.s — Expiration  of  license 746 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XVll 

SKCTIOX.  PAGE. 

454.  Esfc()i)iK'l     to    revoke     740 

455.  Appeal — Certiorari    747 

456.  P-.Heet  of  revocation — Stay  of  proceedings 750 

4'57.     Costs    751 

458.  Rebate  of  fees   752 

459.  Liability  of  city  for  mistakenly  revoking  license 752 

460.  Action  on  bond  when  license  forfeited 753 


OHAPTER    XII. 

Bond  of  Licensee. 

46 L  Power  to  require  a  bond 754 

462.  No  statute  requiring  a  bond 755 

463.  Statute  unconstitutional — Local  option    755 

464.  Giving  bond  a  condition  precedent  to  granting  a  license 75!> 

465.  Retroactive  effect   757 

466.  Form    757 

467.  Who  may  be  sureties  thereon    761 

468.  Approval  and  filing   762 

469.  Void  license   765 

470.  Cancellation  nf  bond   765 

471.  Breach  of  conditions  of  bond 760 

472.  Breach  of  conditions — Offenses  as  to  minors 770 

473.  Liability  of   sureties    773 

474.  Transfer  of  license   776 

475.  Persons  entitled  to  sue  on  bond 776 

476.  A  civil   action — Agent    778 

477.  Judgment  of  forfeiture  on  conviction,  a  prerequisite  to  suit  778 

478.  Effect  of  judgment  against  principal  upon  surety — Evidence.  779 

479.  Attacling  validity  of  license  and  proceedings  thei'efor 770 

480.  Pleading    780 

481.  Evidence    782 

482.  Amount  of  damages  recoverable   on  bond 784 

48".  Compromise  of  liability    785 


CHAPTER    XIIL 
License  Fees  axd  Taxes. 

484.  Definition  of  license  fee 786 

485.  License  fee — Police  power — Restraint  of  trade 786 

486.  License  fee,  when  not  a  tax — Police  regulation 787 

487.  Uniformitv  of  taxation 790 


XVlll  TAbLE  OF   CONTENTS. 

srxTiox.  PAGE. 

488.  Liability  for  fee  or  tax 793 

489.  Amount  of  fee  or  tax 795 

490.  Payable   in  money 798 

491.  Payment   in   advance   799 

492.  To  what  officer  payable 800 

493.  Suit   to   collect 802 

494.  Tax   lien — Landlord's    property — Prosjiective   statute 802 

495.  Disposition  of  fees  and  taxes  collected 806 

496.  Refunding  fees  or  taxes  paid  under  void  or  illegal  ordinance 

or   statute 809 

498.     Refunding  fees  or  taxes,  continued — Xo  statute  requiring  it..  812 

498.  Refunding  fees  or  taxes,  continued — Cases  allowing 814 

499.  Refunding  fees  or  taxes,  continued — PavTnent  under  mistake 

of   fact 816 

500.  Rebate  of  fees  or  taxes  under  statute 817 


CHAPTER  XTV 
Dbuggist.s  and  Physicians. 

501.  Druggists'  exemption   from  liability 821 

502.  No  druggist  or  other  person  licensed 823 

503.  Statutes  requiring  druggists  to  have   licenses 824 

504.  Sales   by  employe  of   druggist 826 

505.  Good  faith  in  making   sales 827 

506.  Druggists  making  unlawful  sales. .  , 829 

507.  Druggists'  sales  in  prohibition  States 830 

508.  Sales  by  druggists  upon  prescriptions 831 

509.  Prescriptions  for  Sunday  and  holiday  sales 838 

510.  Kind   of  prescriptions 837 

511.  Registration  and  reports  of  sales 840 

512.  Sales  by  physicians 842 

513.  Physicians  illegally  giving  a  prescription 844 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Local  Option. 

Abt.     I.    Adoption  of  Local  Option. 
Art.  II.     Violation  of  Local  Option  Law. 

Art.   I.     Adoption   of   Local  Option. 

514.  Distinctive  feature  of  local  option  statutes 847 

515.  Sufficiency  of  petition  for  an  election 849 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS.  •  XlX 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

516.  Attorney  in  fact  under  Indiana  statute 854 

517.  Separate  petitions  and  remonstrances 856 

518.  Withdrawal  from  petition  or  remonstrance 85S 

519.  Qualitications   of   petitioners 860 

520.  Territory  embraced  in  petition — Description  of  territory....    862 

521.  Including  "dry"  territory  in  petition  or  order 864 

522.  To   whom    and   the   manner    in   which   the   petition    must   be 

presented — Filing 865 

523.  Notice  of  hearing 868 

524.  Order  for  election 868 

525.  Board  of  Supervisors  in  Michigan 876 

526.  Signing    record 877 

527.  Appeal  from  order  for  election 878 

528.  Petition  and  order  for  re-submission 879 

529.  Time  and  place  of  holding  an  election 882 

530.  Notice  of  time  and  place  of  holding  an  election 884 

531.  Time  of  holding  an  election 891 

532.  Conduct   of  th«  election 894 

533.  Qualifications  of  election  olficers 896 

534.  Ballots    897 

535.  Who  may   vote 901 

536.  Canva.ss  of  ballots  and  return  of  result 902 

537.  Majority  vote,  what  is — Wiien  not  defeated 904 

538.  Vote  necessary  to  adopt  local  option 905 

539.  Declaration  of  the  result  of  the  election 907 

540.  The  order  of  prohibition 911 

541.  Order  for  publication  concerning  prohibition  order 914 

542.  Publishing  notices  of  order  and  result  of  election 914 

543.  When  local  option  takes  effect 917 

544.  Contesting  validity  of  election 919 

545.  Mandamus,  when  not  a  local  option  remedy 925 

546.  Prior  laws,  how  affected  by  local  option 927 

547.  Former  laws,  when  not  repealed 930 

548.  Changing  boundary  of  district 932 

549.  Repeal  of  local  option  by  vote 939 

550.  Local  option  ordinance,  when  not  invalid 942 

551.  Eminent  domain,  power  of  not  involved 942 

552.  Cost   of   election 943 

553.  Consent  of   local   authorities 943 

554.  Juror's  qualiiication  in  local  option  case 944 

5.55.     Local  prohibitory  or  local  option  statutes 945 

Article  IT.     Viot-ation  of  Local  Option  Law. 

556.  Sale  of  liquors 948 

557.  Shipping  liquors  into  local  option  territory 940 


XX  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SF.CTIOX.  PAGE. 

558.  Bringing  liquors   within  local   option   territory 952 

.•559.  Soliciting  orders  in  local  option  district 952 

560.  Sale   under   license .    954 

5fil.  Time   for   license   expiring  or   lapsing 954 

562.  Transportation    of   intoxicating    liquors 955 

503.  Under  what  statute  prosecutions  to  be  brought 957 

564.  Proof  that  local  option  was  in  force 958 


CHAPTER  XVI. 
What  Liquobs  Ake  Prohibited. 

565.  Statutory   provisions 960 

566.  Intoxicating  liquors 961 

567.  Int^ixicating  liciuors,  continued 962 

568.  Spirituous     ....    905 

569.  Ale   and   beer — Malt   liquors 966 

670.     Wine — Vinous  liquors 9G7 

571.     Cider   . 9G7 

672.     Fruit  preserved  in  intoxicating  liquors 968 

573.  Drugs    or    medicines   969 

574.  Manufacture     972 

575.  Whether  liquor  is  intoxicating  a  question  for  the  jury 972 

CHAPTEPt  XVTI. 
Abatement  and  I^'Ju^"CTI03S■. 

576.  Statute  necessary  to  secure  an  injunction 974 

577.  Grounds    for    ab.ntement 975 

578.  Statutory   olFen^^e 97(j 

579.  t)ll<-nse   which    authorizes   an   abatement   or   granting  of   in- 

junction       977 

580.  Xo  intention  to  violate  tlie  statute 980 

581.  Grounds    for    injunction 980 

582.  Temporary  injunction 981 

583.  Process — Notice     982 

584.  Defenses    983 

585.  Parties    plaintifi' 984 

586.  Parties     defendant 986 

587.  Plen.ling — Comjdaint 98S 

588.  Plesuling — Answer     990 

589.  Evidence    991 

5!?0.     Trial    996 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  XXI 

SECTION,  PAGE. 

591.  Judgment , 997 

592.  Bond  for  continuance  of  use  of  premises 1000 

593.  Violation   of   injunction — Punishment 1000 

594.  Appeal — Review 1003 

595.  Costs— Attorney    fees 1004- 


CHAPTER  XVITI. 
Searches  and  SsjizimES. 

59G.     Constitutionality  of  searcU  and  seizure  laws 1007 

597.  Federal   and  State  jurisdictions,  conflict 1011 

598.  Due  process  of  \-\w,  statute  violating 1013 

599  Seizure,    power    to    make — Ministerial    and    judicial    power, 

distinguished     1013 

600.     Nature  of  search  and  seizure  proceedings 1015 

601       Jurisdiction  of  inferior  courts — Presumption 1017 

602.     Affidavit   based   ujxm  belief 1018 

603      What    seizable — Justification 1020 

604.  Search  and  seizure  laws  of  Elaine 1023 

605.  Municipal  power 1024 

606.  Permit  to  sell,  violation — Iowa  statute 1023 

607.  Replevin  of  liquors  after  seizure   1026 

608.  Officers,  seizure — When  from,  and  liability 1029 

609.  Seizure  of  liquors  in   Indian  country 1030 

610.  Statutes  forbidding  recovery  of  damages 1031 

611.  Complaint     1033 

612.  Complaint,  statutory  form  sufficient   1034 

613.  Videlicet,  use  and  limitations  in  co)nplaint 1035 

614.  Description  of  persons  and   liquors 1036 

615.  "Place"    and    "premises," — Meaning — Pleading 1037 

616.  Description  of  premises-  -Rules  of  construction 1038 

617.  Common    resort,   place — x\verment 1040 

618.  Place,    description — Pleading — Evidence — Variance 1041 

619.  Description  of  liquors,  what  sufficient 1042 

620.  Unlawful    intent,    averment 1044 

G21.     Affidavit  to   complaint,    sufficiency 1045 

622.  Power  to  search  without  a  warrant 1046 

622a.  Sufficiency    of   warrant 1047 

623.  Description  in  warrant  of  liquors  and  their  ownership 1048 

624.  Description  of  place  in  warrant,  sufficiency 1049 

625.  Place,  designation  of,  wlien  sufficient 1050 

626.  Adjoining  properties,  sudiciency  of  warrant  to  search 1052 

(127.     More  than  one  building  may  be  searched 1053 

628.     Complaint  and  warrant,  when  not  conflicting 1054 


XXll  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

629.     Variations  bfttweon  warrant  and  complaint 1056 

G30.     Search  warrants,  when  not  served 1057 

631.  Warrant    protects    otficer 1060 

632.  False   imprisonment — Evidence 1060 

633.  Eeturn   of  warrant,   sufficiency 1061 

634.  Officers'  return  of  warrant  as  evidence 1063 

•635.     Illegal    keeping — Evidence,    sufficiency 1063 

636.  Notice  to  claimants — Service  and   waiver 1066 

637.  Warehouseman  and  bailees,  liquors  in  their  possession 1069 

638.  Claims  to  property 1071 

639.  Onns  probandi — Prima  facie  case — Evidence 1071 

640.  Forfeiture  and  fine,  pleading  and  evidence 1073 

641.  Judgment— Eeview— Costs    1074 

642.  Disposition   of   property. 1076 

643.  Seizure  and  arn-st  without  warrant,  vvhen  justifiable 1076 

644.  Arrest  without  warrant,  when  not  jiistified 1078 

CHAPTEE  XIX. 

Keeping  Liquob  for  Unlawful  Saik — Kef.ping  Place  foe 
Sale  of  Liquor. 

646.  Keeping  liquor  for  unlawful  sale 1080 

647.  Unlawfully  keeping  liquor  for  sale,  continued 1082 

648.  Unlawfully  keeping  liquor  for  sale,  continued 1085 

649.  Unlawfully  keeping  liquor  for  sale,  continued 1088 

650.  Wife  of  defendant  keeping  liquors  for  sale 1090 

651.  Unlawful  sale  and  unlawful  keeping  di.stinct  ofi"enses 1091 

652.  Keeping  liquors  at  place  of  business 1092 

653.  Keeping   place   for   sale   of   liquors 1093 

654.  Keeping  place  for  sale  of  liquors,  continued 1097 

655.  Keeping    liquor    nuisance 1 100 

656.  Saloon  at  common  law  as  a  nuisance 1105 

657.  Nuisance  under  general  statute  on  nuisance 1107 

658.  Keeping  "blind  tiger' 1108 

059.     Keeping  disorderly  house 1108 

660.  Carrying  on  the  liquor  business 1111 

661.  A  common  seller  of  liquors 1114 

662.  Exposing  liquor  for  sale 1116 

603.     Keeping    tippling    house — Definition   11 17 

CHAPTER  XX. 
Keeping    PRi';Mists    Closed — Sales    to    Travelers. 

664.  Keeping   open   defined 1118 

665.  Keeping  opon  and  selling  distinguished 1120 


TABLE  OP   CONTENTS.  XXlll 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

666.  Legal  holidays   defined 1121 

667.  Keeping  saloon  open  at  prohibited  times 1122 

668.  Keeping  open  at  prohibited  times,  continued 1125 

669.  Keeping  open  at  prohibited  times,  continued 1131 

670.  Selling  or  exposing  liquor  for  sale  or  opening  premises  dur- 

ing closing  hours — English  cases 1135 

671.  Closing  premises 1141 

672.  Constable  demanding  visitor's  address 1142 

673.  Stranger  found  on  the  premises 1143 

674.  Permitting  persons  to  enter  saloon 1 146 

675.  Liability  of  servant   keeping  saloon  open 1148 

676.  Sales  to  travelers  at  prohibited  times  in  England 1148 

677.  Sales  to  travelers  at  prohibited  times  in  English  colonies..  1152 

678.  Sales  at  railway  stations  in  England  at  prohibited  times. .  .  .  1154 

679.  What  time  statute  adopts 1 155 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

Sales  and  Oifts. 

680.  Illegal  sale  a  .statutory  offense 115S 

681.  Sale   by   child 1158 

682.  Licensee  under  no  obligation  to  sell  liquor 1150 

683.  Sales  or  gifts  without  a  license 1159 

684.  Definition    of  .sales — Examples 1161 

685.  Executory  contract  of  sale 1164 

686.  Sale  wlicrc  statute  ^oes  not  forbid  a  barter  or  exchange.  .  . .  11G4 

687.  Barter  or  exchange 1 166 

688.  E.xchange  of  liquors — Loan 1167 

689.  "Otherwise   dispose   of"    liquors 1168 

690.  Furnishing   intoxicating  liquors 1169 

691.  Sale  of  saloon  business 1169 

692.  Sale    by    corporation 1170 

693.  Sale  on  credit 1171 

694.  Burden  on  defendant  to  show  he  was  not  the  salesman 1172 

095.     Gifts    1173 

696.  A  gift  of  liquor  as  an  act  of  hospitality  or  in  kindness 1174 

697.  Treating  guests  at  a  social  gathering 1176 

698.  Sale  neither  a  gift  nor  a  barter 1176 

699.  Delivery    1178 

700.  0\\Tiership  of  liquors 1180 

701.  Purchase  by  request  of  unlicensed  dealer 1181 

702.  Sale  by  restaurant  or  hotel  keeper 1182 

703.  Purposes  for  which  liquor  was  obtained 1183 

704.  Motive  in  making  sale 1183 


XXIV  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

705.  Mistake  in  selling  intoxicating  liquor — Intent 1184 

706.  Purchase  of  liquor  by  one  person  for  another 1186 

707.  Purchase  with  view  to  prosecute  seller 1187 

708.  In  what  quantities  sales  prohibited 1189 

709.  Sale    at    wholesale 1191 

710.  Sales  by  distillers  or  brewers 1194 

711.  Devices  to  avoid»charge  of  illegal  sales — Examples 1196 

712.  What  facts  show  a  sale 1199 

713.  What  facts  show  a  sale,  continued , 1202 

714.  What  facts  sho^v  a  sale,  continued 1206 

715.  What  evidence  shows  a  ?,a\e.  .    1210 

716.  What  facts  do  not  show  a  sale 1211 

717.  What  facts  do  not  show  a  sale,  continued 1213 

718.  What  facts  do  rot  show  a  sale,  continued 1216 

719.  Aiding  and  abetting  a  sale 1218 

7?0.  Purchaser  not  liable   to  prosecution 1220 

721.  Serving  police  officer  on  duty 1221 


CHAPTER  XXTl. 

Sales  and  Gifts  to  Minors,  Dkunkaeds,  Sieves,  Indians  and  Natives. 

Art.      I.     To  Minors. 

Art.     II.     To  Slaves. 

Art.  III.     To  Drunkards. 

Art.  IV.    To  Indians  and  Natives 

Article  I. — To  Minors 

722.  Sales  and  gifts  to   minors  proliibited 1222 

723.  Minor  need  not  drink  the  liquor 1226 

724.  Aiding  in   procuring  liquor 1227 

725.  Minor  acting  as  purchaser  or  messenger  for  adult 1227 

726.  Adult  acting  as  agent  for  minor 1229 

727.  Treating  a  minor 1230 

728.  Permitting  liquor  to  be  given  to  a  minor 1231 

729.  Sale  or  gift  with  consent  of  parent  or  guardian 1231 

730.  Furnishing  liquor  io  minor 1234 

731.  Knowledge  that  purchaser  is  a  minor  when  essential  to  com- 

mission of  offense 1235 

732.  Vendor's  ignorance  of  purchaser's  minoritj'  no  defense 1237 

733.  Vendor's  ignorance  of  purchaser's  minority  a  defense 1238 

734.  Sales  in  sealed  and  corked  bottles  or  vessels 1243 

735.  Sales  to  students 1244 


TABLE   OP   CONTENTS.  XXV 

SECTION. 

PAGE. 

Abticle  II.— To  Slaves. 

736.  Sales  or  gifts  to  slaves 1245 

Articie  ITI.~To  Dbunkabds. 

737.  Sales  to  intoxicated  persons 1247 

738.  Who  is  an  intoxe  U^d  person I249 

739.  No  knowledge  puichuser  is  intoxicated 1251 

740.  Civil    liability l^gg 

741.  Sales  or  gifts  to  habitual  drunkards  or  intemperate  persons.  1252 

742.  Who  is  an  habitual  drunkard  or  intemperate  person 1253 

743.  Knowledge  purcliaser  is  an  habitual  drunkard  or  intemperate 

P«""n     1255 

744.  Sale  to  drunkard  after  notice  not  to  sell  him 1256 

Sales  to  idiots  and  insane  persons I257 

Sale  to  convict 1253 


745 
746. 


Articie  IV. — To  Indians  and  Natives. 

747.  Introducing  liquor  into  the  Indian  country 1258 

748.  What  is  not  an  introduction  of  liquor  into  Indian  country. .  1260 

749.  Sales    to    Indians logj 

760.  State  legislation 1964 

761.  Sale  to  natives  under  British  Government 1264 


CHAPITER  XXIII. 
Sales  at  Prohibited  Places. 

752.  Sales  out  of  territory  for  which  license  is  issued 1266 

753.  License    for    premises , 1267 

754.  Sales   ofl"  premises 12(J7 

756.     Sales  off  premises — English  cases 1271 

756.  Selling  in  premises  which  have  been  enlarged 1276 

757.  Sales  near  church  or  schoolhouse 1277 

758.  Within  prohibited  dist^mce  of  another  saloon 1279 

759.  Sale  of  liquors  to  be  sent  by  common  carriers 1279 

760.  Place  of  order  taken  deemed  place  of  sale 1282 

761.  Place  order  taken  made  place  of  sale 1283 

762.  Sale  by  agent  subject  to  approval  by  principal 1284 

763.  Seller    taking   order    without    but    delivering    liquor   within 

prohibited  district 1284 


XXvi  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

764.  Seller  retaining  title  until  purchaser  actually  reecives  the 

liquor   1287 

765.  Seller   taking   order   in  but   delivering   liquor   without   pro- 

hibited   territory 1287 

766.  Soliciting  or  taking  orders  by  agent 1288 

767.  Liquors    shipped    into    prohibition    territory    without   order 

taken    1288 

768.  Sale  of  liquors  to  be  drunk  on  premises — American  decisions  1289 

769.  Sale  of  liquor  to  be  consumed  on  premises — English  decisions  1294 

770.  Sale  of  liquors  to  be  drunk  "about"  the  premises 1296 

771.  Refreshment  saloon  or  restaurant 1296 

772.  Sale  at  hotel 1297 

773.  Sale  at  military  canteen 1298 

774.  Sales  at   theaters 1298 

775.  Sales    at    dwelling   house 1299 

776.  Sales  on   boat 1299 

777.  Sales  of  native  wine  in  barroom 1300 

778.  Sales  a.i  public  place 1300 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 
Sales  and  Gifts  at  Prohibited  Times. 

779.  Public    policy 1302 

780.  Sunday,  election  and  holiday  violations 1303 

781.  Sales  or  gifts  on  Sundays   1305 

782.  Facts  sufficient  to  show  a  sale  on  Sunday 1308 

783.  Sunday  sales  or  gifts— Guests 1309 

784.  Sales  at  hotels  and  restaurants 1312 

785.  Trafficking   in   liquors   on   Sunday 1313 

786.  Sales  on   prohibited   hours 1314 

787.  Supplying  liquors   to  private  friends  and   lodges  after  clos- 

ing   hours 1316 

788.  Sales    on    holidays 1318 

789.  Election    days 1319 

790.  Under    what    statvite    prosecution    for    sales    at    prohibited 

times    brought 1322 

CHAPTER  XXV 

Club  Sales. 

791.  Incorporated  clubs  —Cases  iiolding  unist  have  licenses 1324 

792.  Incorporated    (iub.s — Cases    holding    need    not    have    licenses 

— Transactions    not    sales 1325 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXVll 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

793.  Club  in  existence  when  licensing  act  adopted 1331 

794.  Statute  expressly  applying  to  club 1332 

7P5.     Club  required  to  have  a  license — Dramshop  defined 1333 

796.  Club's  liability  for  occupation  tax   1338 

797.  Club  sales  in  prohibition   territory 1339 

798.  Schemes  to  evade  the  statute — Bona  fides  of  incorporation..  1339 

799.  Quasi  club  sales 1342 

800.  Sales  to  non-members 1344 

801.  Steward  or  servant  of  club  liable 1345 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 
Master's  Liahii.ity  Fou  Acts  of  Servant. 

802.  Agent  directed  to  make  sales  that  are  unlawful 1348 

803.  Agent's    authority 1351 

804.  Agent  in  charge  of  premises — Barkeeper 1353 

805.  Evidence    must    sliow   authority   to    bind    master— Sales    by 

bartender     1350 

806.  Statute  making  master  liable  for  illegal  sale  by  his  servant.  1357 

807.  Sale  bv  bartender  to  minor,  intoxicated  person  or  habitual 

drunkard 1359 

808.  Sale  out  of  hours  at  prohibited  times 1360 

809.  Evidence  suflicient  to  show  illegal  sale  was  authorized 1361 

810.  Keeping  saloon  open 1362 

811.  Neglect  of  servant  to  keep  records 1363 

812.  Permitting   persons   on   premises 1363 

813.  Sales  by  partners   1364 

814.  Sale  by  member  of  defendant's  family 1366 

815.  Sales  by  wife  of  husband's  liquor.* 1367 

816.  Husband's  liability  for  sale  of  wife's  liquors 1368 

817.  Liability   of   wife 1369 

818.  Joint  liability  of  husband  and  wife 1371 

S19.  Liability  of  agent  for  sales — Who  is  unprotected  by  a  license  1371 

820.  Lial)ility  of  agent  for  ants  in  violation  of  law 1374 

821.  Joint  or  several  liability  of  principal  and  agent 1S70 

822.  Sale  by  agents  in  local  option  territory 1378 

823.  Soliciting    in    interdicted    territory 1379 

824.  Agent  for  purchaser  participating  in  illegal  sale 1379 


XXVlll 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXVIi. 

Adui.tebation — Inspection. 

Art.    I.    State  Decisions. 

Abt.  II.    PuBE  Food  and  Drugs  Act. 

Article  I. — State  Decisions, 
section.  page. 

825.  Constitutionality    of    statute    foihidding    adulteration — In- 

spection      1382 

826.  01T<>nse  of  selling  adulterated  liquors 1383 

827.  Inspection     1384 

828.  Filing  affidavit  and  giving  bond  liquors  are  pure 1385 

Article  II. — Pure  Food  and  Drugs  Act. 

829.  United  States  Pure  Food  and  Drug  Act  of  1906 1386 

S30.     What  drugs  and  foods  covered  by  Act — Statute 1386 

831.     "Drug"  and  "Food"  defined 1387 

SS2.     Adulteration    and   misbranding — Statute 1388 

833.  Adulteration   of    drugs    defined — Statute 1389 

834.  Adulteration  of  confectionery  defined — Statute 1390 

S35.     Adulteration  of  food  defined — Statute 1390 

836.  Requisites    of    brand — Approval 1392 

837.  Name  and  address  of  manufacturer 1393 

838.  Mixtures  or  compounds  with  distinctive  names 1394 

839.  Substances  named  in  drugs  or  foods 1395 

840.  Statement  of  weight  or  measure 1397 

841.  Labeling   wine 1398 

842.  Labeling  whisky 1399 

843.  Misbranded   drugs   defined   1402 

844.  Misbranded  food  defined — Adulteration 1410 

845.  Misbr-inding 1411 

846.  Guaranteed    goods 1414 

847.  Exports  and  imports  of  foods  and  drugs 1416 

848.  Original    unbroken   packages 1423 


CHAPTER  XXVIIL 
Indictment. 


849.  Certainty 

850.  Following  ti  o  terms  of  the  statute. 


1441 
1443 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS.  Xxix 

SKCnON.  PAGE. 

851.  Duplicity    I444 

852.  Allegations  in  the  disjunctive 1450 

853.  Joinder    of    counts I45I 

854.  Verification  and  source  of  information 1454 

855.  Surplusage   I455 

856.  Referring  to  the  statute 145g 

857.  Character,  occupation  or  condition  of  accused 1457 

858.  Intent  of  vendor ^459 

859.  Knowledge — Notice       j  jgQ 

860.  Adoption  and  violation  of  local  option  laws 1462 

861.  Violation   of  local  option  laws 14gg 

862.  Violation  of  local  option  laws — Texas I47I 

863.  Violation  of   local   statute I474 

864.  Unlawful  nature  of  act , j^yg 

865.  Violation  of  nuinicipal  ordinance I477 

866.  Place  as  element  of  the  ofl'ense I478 

867.  Time  as  an  element  of  an  oJTense I483 

868.  Alleging  a  continuendo 24gg 

869.  Purpose  or  object  of  sale j48t 

870.  Description,  kind  and  properties  of  liquors I49O 

871.  Setting  out  name  of  liquors— Averments  as  to  properties.  .  .    1495 

872.  Charging  quantity  of  liquor  sold,  when  necessary 1497 

873.  Charging  sale  of  "less  than"  a  specified  quantity 1498 

874.  Charging  sale  of  a  '-drink"  or  "one  glass" 1500 

875.  When  quantity  sold  need  not  be  alleged 1500 

876.  Price  paid   for   liquor j^qj 

877.  Designating  purchaser   necessary , I5O2 

878.  Designating  purchaser  not  necessary I5O4 

S79.     How  purchaser  described — Name  unknown 1508 

880.  Negativing  defenses  and  exceptions I5O9 

881.  Negativing  authority  to  sell 151.2 

882.  Negativing   special    authority I514 

883.  Negativing    licenses 1515 

884.  Sufficiency  of  negation  of  license I517 

885.  Negation  of   legal   purpose   or   circumstances 1520 

886.  Sufficiency  of  negation  of  particular  licenses  or  licenses  for 

particular   purposes 1522 

.'887,  Negations  as  to  physicians  and  druggists 1523 

888.  Negative  averments  as  to  kind  of  liquor  or  package 1527 

889.  Manufacturing   liquor I527 

890.  Transportation   of   liquor I527 

891.  Keeping  liquor  for  illegal  sale 1529 

892.  Carrying  on  liquor  business — Common  seller 1532 

8f'3.  Scre<'n3  maintaining — Obstructing   view I535 

894.  Sale  without  first  giving  bond I537 

895.  Keeping  open  at  prohibited  times 1538 


XXX  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

SKCnOX.  PACE. 

896.  Keeping  place  for  unlawful  sale  of  liquors — Tippling  house.  1541 

897.  Maintaining  liquor  nuisance 1545 

898.  Description  of  house  or  place  constituting  the  nuisance  as 

illegally   kept    1550 

899.  Time  of  maintaining  nuisance lo5Q 

900.  Sale  of  liquor  to  be  drunk  on  premises 1552 

901.  Location  of  saloon  in  residence  part  of  city 1553 

902.  Sales    in    general 1553 

903.  Devices  or  evasions  to  conceal  sale 1559 

904.  Sale  or  gift  to  minor 1560 

905.  Sale  or  gift  to  minor  without  permit 1562 

906.  Sale  to  drunkard  or  intoxicated  person 1564 

907.  Sale  to  drunkard  after  notice  given 1564 

908.  Sale  or  gift  on   Sunday 1566 

909.  Sale  or  gift  on  election  day 1568 

910.  Sale  or  gift  within  prohibited  area 1570 

911.  Second    oflense 1571 

912.  Physicians"    prescription 1573 

913.  Music  in   saloon .    1573 

914.  Emploj'ing  women  in  saloon 1573 

915.  Sale  of  liquors  from  iinstamped  cask 1574 

916.  Failure  to  exhibit  license  or  tax  receipt 1574 

917.  Gambling  in  saloon 1573 

918.  Miscellaneous     1576 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

EVIDENCK. 

919.  Competency  of  witness 1578 

920.  Spies   and    informers 1579 

921.  Admissions  and  declarations  of  accused 1581 

922.  "Confessions  of   accused — Accused   intoxicated 1583 

923.  Prima  facie  evidence — Power  of  Legislature  to  declare 1584 

924.  Burden  of  proof  in  general 1586 

925.  Presumption     1590 

926.  Connecting  accused  with  unlawful   acts  shown 1593 

927.  Incriminating   or   exculpatory   circumstances 1594 

928.  Effort  to  avoid  detection 1596 

929.  Sales    1597 

930.  Evidence  to  show  sale — Incriminating  evidence 1601 

931.  Other    sales— Other    crimes 1608 

932.  Refusal  to  so'.l  +o  others  incompetent  evidence 1614 

933.  Sale  by  or  to  agi'nt  or  servant — Sale  l»y  wife 1614 

934.  Sale  or  gift— Variance 1621 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XXX  L 

SECTION, 

PAGE. 

935.  Proof  who  was  purchaser — Variance 1^23 

936.  Sales  to  two  or  more  persons 1Q04 

937.  Joint   liability ,po- 

J  oio 

938.  Sale  to   "person   un'known" 162'tj 

939.  Sale  to  minor ,  „27 

940.  Sale  to  intoxicated  person 2t!*5() 

941.  Sale  to  habikial  dr-unkird lyo, 

942.  Sundiay  sales , g2„ 

943.  Sale  of  liquors  to  be  drunk  on  premises Ig34 

944.  Club    sales ,od- 

lo3o 

945.  Quantity  of   liquor    sold igoa 

946.  Proof  of   license jgoy 

947.  Sale    unauthorized! — License \Q42 

948.  Special  authority  to  make  the  sale 1^45 

949.  Documentary    evidence 224^ 

950.  Time  of  violation  of  statute '  1649 

951.  Proof  of  time  in  a  continuing  offense I655 

952.  Ownership  and  possession  of  liquors I655 

953.  Keeping    for    unlawful    sale 1658 

954.  Carrying  on  business   of   liquor  selling 1665 

955.  Common    seller Igg? 

956.  Exposing    liquors Iggg 

957.  Keeping  place  for  unlawful  sale  of  liquors— Nuisance 1669 

958.  Liquor    nuisance igyc 

959.  Local  option — Proof  of  adoption I679 

960.  Local  option  law— Evidence  to  show  violation 1688 

961.  Intoxicating    quality    of    liquors — Proof 1694 

962.  Chemical  analysis  of  liquors— Kxpert  testimony 1706 

963.  Proof  as  to  kind  of  liquor I^Iq 

964.  Place   of  otfense 1714 

965.  Persons  jointly  indicted 1^ j5 

966.  Prior  conviction  or  acquittal I7I6 

9G7.  Second  offense j-^a 

968.  Permitting  females  in  saloon— Keeping  a  wine  room 1724 

969.  Illegal  transportation  of  liquors I7.75 

970.  "C.    0.   D."— Express   agent's   liability 1726 

971.  Keeping  saloon  open l^.,y 

972.  United  States  license,  probative  effect  as  evidence 1728 

972a.  Proof  of  intoxication — Opinion  of  witness I733 

973.  Miscellaneous j-„^ 

CHA*»TER  XXX. 
Trial  and  Judgment. 

1738 


974.  Jurisdiction    ....... 

975.  Statute   of    limitations 


1739 


XXXll  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

SKCTION.  PAGE. 

976.  Repeal  of  statute 1740 

977.  Form    of    proceedings 1741 

978.  Preliminary  proceedings 1742 

979.  Who  may  institute  proceeding* 1743 

980.  Defendant's  plea 1744 

981.  Election  between  offenses 1744 

982.  Jury  trial 1747 

983.  Juror's    competency 1749 

984.  Juror's  qualifications  in  criminal  prosecutions 1749 

985.  Question  for  the  jurj' 1751 

986.  Qualifications  of  judge 1755 

987.  Verdict    1755 

988.  Sentence    and   punishment 1759 

989.  Excessive    punishment 1762 

9P0.     Separate   sentences — Separate   counts 1764 

991.  Joint    defendants 1765 

992.  Second  offense — Excessive  penalty 1765 

993.  Informer — When  entitled  to  part  of  penalty 1766 

994.  Double    liability 1767 

995.  Lien  of  tine  and  costs  on  premises  used 1767 


CHAPTER    XXXI. 

Rights  in  and  Contracts  Conceening  Intoxicating  Liquobs. 

996.     At  common  law 1771 

9S7.     Property   in    intoxicating  liquors 1771 

998.  Attachment  of  liquors — When  not  maintainable 1772 

999.  Larceny  of  intoxicating   liquors 1773 

1000.  Mortgage  or  pledge  of  intoxicating  liquors 1774 

1001.  Mortgage  of  license  to  sell  liquors 1775 

1002.  Statutes    forbidding    recovery    of    possession    or    value    of 

liquors    1776 

1003.  Wrongful   conversion   of   intoxicating  liquors 1776 

1004.  Insurance   of  liquors 1777 

1005.  Sales  without  license — Liquors  illegally  sold 1779 

1006.  Divisible  and  entire  contract 1781 

1007.  Payment?  upon  amounts  partly  illegal 1783 

1008.  Contracts  violating  policy  of  liquor  laws 1783 

1009.  Repudiation   of  executory  contract 1785 

1010.  Validity  of  contract  determined  by  law  of  place 1785 

1011.  Place  of  sale  in  determining  its  legality 1788 

1012.  Sale  of  liquors  to  be  illegally  resold 1789 

1013.  Sales  to  unlicensed  dealers 1791 

1014.  Sale  to  insane  person 1793 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS,  XXXlll 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1015.  Sale  of  liquor  to  be  shipped  into  prohibition  State 1793 

1016.  Soliciting   orders   forbidden . 1798 

1017.  Recovery  on  foreign  sales  forbidden  by  statutes 1800 

1018.  Sale  to  house  of  prostitution 1800 

1019.  Recovering  back  money  paid  on  illegal  sales 1801 

1020.  Burden  to  show  illegality  of  sale 1805 

1021.  Bills    and    notes 1806 

1022.  Contract  in  restraint  of  trade — Pleasure  of  damages 1808 

1023.  Covenants  in  deed  not  to  use  premises  for  sale  of  intoxi- 

cating  liquors 1808 

1024.  Avoiding  leases 1810 

1025.  Covenant  not  to  build  public  house  on  land 1812 

1026.  Covenant  to  take  all  beer  from  landlord 1815 

1027.  Miscellaneous  covenants  as  to  public  houses  and  servants.  .  1819 

1028.  Contracts  of  sale  of  licensed  premises 1830 


PART  II. 
DRUNKENNESS. 


CHAPTER    XXXII. 

Civil  Damages. 

I.  Right  of  Action. 

II.  Grounds  of  Action. 

III.  Defenses. 

IV.  Persons  Entitled  to  Sue. 
V.  Persons  Liable. 

VI.  Actions. 

VII.  Evidence. 

VIII.  Damages. 

IX.  Trial  and  Review. 

Article  I. — Right  of  Action. 

1029.  Remedy  under  common    law 1S37 

1030.  Remedy  under  statute    1839 

1031.  Constitutionality    of   statute 1840 


XXXIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

Article    II. — Grounds   of   Actiox. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1032.  Construction  of   statute 1843 

1032a.  Right  of  action  in  general 1844 

1033.  Illegality   of   sale 1847 

1034.  Sale   contrary  to   notice 1850 

1035.  Injuries    to    person — Mental    suflering 1853 

1036.  Injuries   to   property 185(5 

1037.  Injuries  to  means  of  support 1859 

1038.  Proximate  cause  of  injury 1863 

1039.  Injuries  produced  bj"  an  intoxicated  person 1863 

1040.  Injuries  produced  by  reason  of  intoxication  of  any  person.  .  1866 

1041.  Sales  causing  death  of  purchaser 1869 

1042.  Commission  of  crimes  by  intoxicated  person 1875 

1043.  Injury    to    person    and    property    by    reason    of    crime    of 

drunken    person 1875 

1044.  Injury   to  means  of  support  by   reason   of  punishment   of 

drunken  person 1879 

Article  III. — Defenses. 

1045.  In    general 1881 

1046.  License    or    authority 1885 

1047.  Contributory   act  or   negligence 1886 

1046.     Release  or   discharge 1891 

Article  IV. — Persons   Entitled  to   Sue. 

1049.  In    general 1892 

1050.  Husbands    1895 

1051.  Wives— Death  of  Husband— Divorce 1896 

1052.  Parents    1898 

1053.  Children    1904 

1054.  Postliumous    cliild 1906 

Article  V. — Persons  Liable. 

1055.  In  general — Sales  by   s-ervants 1907 

1056.  Joint  tortfeasors 1912 

1057.  Sureties  on  dealer's  bonds 1920 

1058.  Owners  or  lessors  of  premises 1924 

Article  VI. — Actions. 

lO.'O.     Time  to   sue — Statute  of   limitations 1931 

1060.  Parties     1932 

1061.  Pleadings  1936 

1062.  Issues — Proof — Variance     1942 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXXV 

.^RTlCLt;    VII. — EVIDEKCK. 

SECTION.  PACK. 

1062a.  Presumption  and  burden  of  proof 194i) 

1062b.  Admissibility    in    general 1950 

1062c.  Sale  or  particijiation  therein  by  defendant 1955 

1063.  Nature  and  extent  of  injury 1962 

1064.  Character  and   habits  of  plaintifl" 19G9 

1065.  Charactor    and    habits    of    intoxicated     person — Mortality 

tables    1970 

106<3.     Pecuniary  condition;-;  of  persons  or  parties 1973 

1067.  Weight  and  sutlitiency  of  evidence 1974 

1068.  Nature  and  properties  of  liquors.    ...    1975 


Artici.k  VIII. — Damages. 

1069.  General  Rule — Cost  of  medical  services 1977 

1070.  Injury  to  means  of  support 1978 

1071.  Mental    suJlering 1982 

1072.  Exemplary    damages 1983 

1073.  Excessive    damages 1992 

1074.  Mitigation  of  damages 1994 


Article  IX. — Trial  and  Review. 

1075.  Questions  for  jury 1998 

1076.  Who  made  the  sales 1999 

1077.  Proximate  cause  of  the  injury 1999 

1078.  Plaintifi'  contributing  to  the  injury 2001 

1079.  Plaintifi's  injury  to  property  or  support 2002 

1080.  Instructions  in  general 2003, 

1081.  Instructions  invading  province  of  jury 2004 

1082.  Hypothetical    instructions 2005 

1083.  Instructions  on  exemplary  damages 2005 

1084.  Intoxication  cause  of  injury 2006 

10S5.     Instructions  on  measure  of   damages 2006 

1086.  What  constitutes  intoxication 2007 

1087.  Injuiy    to   property 2007 

1088.  Unlawful    sales 2008 

1C89.     Judgment  against  principal,  when  binding  on  surety 2008 

1090.  Lien  of  judgment  on  premises  used 2010 

1091.  Costs    . . .  , 2014 


XXXVl  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    XXXIII. 

Guardians  and  Asylums  fob  Drunkards. 
SECTION.                                                                                                page. 
1(02.     Constitutionality  of  statutes  for  the  appointment  of  guar- 
dians  for    drunkards 2015 

1093.  The   inquisition 2017 

1094.  Revocation  of  guardianship 201S 

1095.  Sale  of  ward's  property  by  his  guardian 2020 

1096.  Contracts—Statute   of   limitations — Suits 2020 

1097.  Inebriate    asylums 2021 


CHAPTER    XXXIV. 
Drunkenness  as  a  Crime. 

1098.  Drunk  in  a   public  place 2024 

1099.  Drunkenness  at  a  private  residence 2020 

1100.  Permitting  drunkenness  on  licensed  premises 2027 

1101.  Found  drunk  on  licensed  premises 2030 

1102.  Being  a   common  drunkard 2030 

1103.  Drunkenness    in   office 2031 

1104.  What  intoxication  by  statute  is  made  criminal 2031 

1105.  Arrest   for    drunkenness 2032 

1106.  Arrest  without  warrant  for  liquor  offenses 2035 

1107.  Miscellaneous       2036 


CHAPTER    XXXV. 

Drunkenness  as  a  Defesse  in   CRiiriNAX  Prosecutions. 

IIOR.     Voluntary    intoxication   no   excuse    for   the   commission   of 

crime — Reasons    for    rule 2045 

IK'9.     Voluntary    drunkenness    as   an   excuse — Continued 2045 

1 1 10.  Involuntary    intoxication 2046 

1111.  Evidence  of  physical  incapacity 2048 

1112.  Aggravating    crime 2048 

1113.  Assault    and    battery 2049 

1114.  Drunkenness  producing  permanent  disability  or  insanity — 

Delirium    tremens 2049 

1115.  Wliat  degree  of  insanity  is  a  defense 2054 

1110.     Dipsomania — Oenomania     2058 

1117.  Instructions  to  jury — Cases  of  delirium  tremens 2058 

1118.  Provocation 2059 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XXXVll 

SKCTION.  PAGE. 

1119.  Intoxication  reducing  the  grade  of  homicide — Evidence....   2060 

1120.  Intoxication  reducing  tl)e  grade  of  lioniicide — Malice — Pre- 

meditation        2064 

1121.  Extent  of  intoxication  to  reduce  the  degree  of  the  offense.  .    206d 

1122.  Incapacity   to   deliberate,   reducing   homicide   below   second 

degree    2072 

1123.  Specific  intent — Assault  with  intent 2073 

1124.  Assault  with  intent  to  commit  rape 2075 

1125.  Conspiracy  to  commit  murder 2076 

1126.  Attempt  to  commit  suicide 2077 

1127.  Burglary    2077 

1128.  Forgery  2078 

1129.  Larceny  and  robbery 2078 

1130.  Self-defense     2080 

1131.  Willful   drvmkenness — Previously   formed   intent 2081 

1132.  Burden  to  show  the  incapacity  to  form  a  criminal  intent.  .  2081 

1133.  Instructions  concerning  the  reduction  of  the  degree  of  the 

offense     .    2083 

1 134.  Drunken  insane  person 208G 

1135.  Voluntary    use    of    drugs 2086 

1136.  Texas    statute 2087 

1137.  Miscellaneous     2091 


CHAPTER    XXXVI. 
Contracts  of  a  Drunken  Man. 

1138.  Mere  drunkenness  as  a  ground  for   a   rescission  of  a  con- 

tract       2092 

1139.  Voluntary   intoxication 2097 

1140.  Intoxication  produced  by  the  other  party 2099 

1141.  Taking  advantage  of  intoxicated  party 2101 

1142.  Fraud  of  other  party 2103 

,J43.     Habitual    drunkards 2104 

1144.  Habitual   drunkenness 2105 

1145.  Knowledge   of  drunken  condition  of   party 2106 

1146.  Inadequacy  of  consideration — Unfair  conti-act 2107 

1147.  Wluxt  kind  of  contracts  may  be  avoided 2108 

1148.  Implied    contracts 2109 

1149.  Intoxication  of  maker  of  note 2110 

1150.  Marriage     2113 

1151.  Family    settlements . 2115 

1152.  Replevin  bail  or  bail  bond 2115 

1153.  Contract  void  or  voidable _  . .  .  .   2116' 

1154.  Rfltihcation    .  -  -  -  - 2117 


XXXViii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1155.  Inquisition — Prior  contracts — Finding  a.^   evidence 2118 

1156.  Time  of  drunkenness 2121 

1157.  Burden  to  show  drunkenness 2122 

1158.  Rescinding  contract  and  restoring  consideration 2123 

1159.  Who  may  show  intoxication  of  party 2127 

1160.  Obtaining    relief 2128 


CHAPTER    XXXVII. 
VVrLLS. 

1161.  Present    intoxication 2132 

1162.  Habits  of  intoxication — Habitual   drunkard 2135 

1163.  Drunkenness  as  evidence  of  incapacity 2137 

1104.     Drunkenness   in   connection   with    conduct   and   condition — 

Sufficiency  of  evidence 2139 

1165.  Drunkenness  in  connection  with  the  nature  of  the  act 2142 

1166.  Drunkenness  in  connection  with  undue  influence 2145 

1167.  Point  of  time  under  investigation 2147 

1168.  Presumption — Burden    of    proof 2149 

1169.  Inquisition   of   drunkenness 2150 

1170.  Ratification  of  a  previously  executed  will 2151 

1171.  Gift    2152 


CHAPTER    XXXVITI. 
Divorce. 

1172.  Drunkenness  as  a  ground  for  divorce 2153 

1173.  Degree  of  drunkenness  necessary  to  autliorize  the  granting 

of    a    divorce 2155 

1174.  Pleadings    2159 

1175.  Wasting    his    estate 2160 

1176.  Proof   2160 

1177.  Defenses    2161 

1178.  Custody   of    eJ;ildren 2163 

1179.  Drunkenness  as   cruelty 2164 

1180.  Drunkenness  connected  witli  cruelty 21G5 

1181.  Drunkenness  as  evidence  of  cruelty 21fi7 

1182.  Drunkenness  as  oiTecting  desertion 2167 

1183.  Judicial   separation — English   statute 2167 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXXIX 

CHAPTER    XXXIX. 

Negligence. 
section.  page. 

1184.  Intoxicated  person  may  recover  when  negligently  injured..    2170 

1185.  Contributory  negligence  of  a   drunken   man 2172 

1186.  Contrilmtory    negligence   of    a   drunkard — \Vlien    rule    does 

not  apply -1"5 

11S7.  What  is  contributory  negligence  in  a  drunken  man 2176 

1188.  Concurring  negligence  of  both  parties 2178 

1189.  Trespassing   drunken   man 2180 

1190.  Drunken  person  on  railroad  crossing 2185 

1191.  Defective    highway 2186 

1192.  Drunken  physician  or  surgeon 2187 

1 193.  Miscellaneous    instances 2188 

1194.  Sale  of  poison  to  drunken  man 2189 

1195.  Drunken  man  liable  for  injuries  he  indicts 2189 

1196.  Burden   of    proof — Presuniption 2190 

1197.  Intoxication  only  evidence  of  contributory  negligence — Ques- 

tion   for    jury 2191 

1198.  Weight  of  evidence  and  its  sufficiency 2195 

]  199.     Question    for    jury 2197 

1200.  Master's    liability    to    his    servant    for    drunken    servant's 

negligence 2198 

1201.  Proof  of  notice  of  servant's  drunken  habits 2200 

1202.  Drunken    passengers 2201 

1203.  Expelling    drunken    passengers 2205 

1204.  Passenger   forfeiting   right   to   carriage   by   boisterous   con- 

duct      2208 

1205.  Carrier  leaving  dnudven  passenger  in  dangerous   place....  2208 

1206.  Greater  care  due  to  a  drunken  man  in  a  dangerous  place.  .  2213 

1207.  Assaults  by  drunken  passengers  upon  other  passengers....  2215 

1208.  Notice  of  intoxication  of  passenger 2217 

CHAPTEH    XL. 
Life  Insurance. 

1209.  No  representation  made  by  insured  concerning  his  use  of 

intoxicating   liquors 2219 

1210.  Statements  in  application  not  made  part  of   policy  issued 

thereon    2220 

1211.  Statements   amounting   to   warranties   concerning   drinking 

liabiis     ' 

1212.  Statements  that  applicant  is  "temperate"  or  of  "temperate 

habits"    2222 


Xl  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1213.  Death   resulting  from  intemperate  habits 222S 

1214.  Promises  concerning  f  iture   habits 2229 

1215.  Statutes  limiting  legal  effect  of  statements 2231 

1216.  Express  clause?  concerning  use  of  intoxicating  liquors 2232 

1217.  Cancellation    of    policy 2232 

1218.  Various   clauses  concerning  intoxicating  liquors 223'1 

1219.  Delirium  tremens 2236 

1220.  Death  or  injury  while  under  tlie  influence  of  intoxicating 

liquors    2237 

1221.  Connection   with   liquor   traffic 2240 

1222.  Condition  against  engaging  in  liquor  traffic 2240 

1223.  Waiver  by  insurer 2241 

1224.  Physician  of  insurer  to  determine  cause  of   death 2243 

1225.  Province   of  jury  and   court 2243 

1226.  Burden  to  show  intoxication 2244 

1227.  Evidence  to  show  intemperate  habits 2244 

CHAPTER    XLI. 
Miscellaneous. 

1228.  Jurors  in  a  criminal  case  using  intoxicating  liquors 2246 

1229.  Jurors  in  civil  cases  using  intoxicating  liquors 2252 

1230.  Treating    jurors 2255 

1231.  Prohibitionist  as  a  juror 2256 

1232.  Jury  on  trial  of  a  liquor  nuisance 2257 

1233.  Drunken    counsel    at   trial 2257 

1234.  Defendant  in  criminal  prosecution  drunk 2257 

1235.  Intoxicated   witness 2258 

1236.  Presumption  a  person  is  sober 2200 

1237.  Pardon     2260 

1238.  Drunken  officer 2261 

1239.  Drunken  pupil — Suspending  from  school 2262 

1240.  Drunken    seaman 2262 

1241.  Bankruptcy     2262 

1242.  Sland<>r    2263 

1243.  Trade    niark 2263 

1244.  C.  0.  D.  interstate  shipments — U.  S.  statute 2263 

1245.  Labeling  packages  of  liquor   shipped  into  another   State — 

U.    S.    statute 2264 

1246.  Agent  of  common  carrier   delivering   liquor   to   person  not 

consignee — U.    S.    statute 2265 

Appendix  A 2267-2275 

Appendix  B 2277,  2278 

Index    2279 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Aaron  v.  State   (34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

103;  29  S.  W.  267),  876,  931, 

933. 
Abel  V.  State   (90  Ala.  631;  8  So. 

760),  513,  1372. 
Abbot  V.  Inman  (35  Ind.  App.  262; 

72  N.  E.  284),  937. 
Abbott  V.  Pike  (33  Me.  204),  1039. 
Abbott    V.    Inman    (35    Ind.    App. 

262;  72  N.  E.  284),  614. 
Abbott  V.  Sartori    (57  Iowa,  656; 

11  N.  W.  626),  354,  841. 
Abbott  V.  State   (42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

8;  57  S.  W.  97),  1687. 
Abel  V.  State  (90  Ala.  631;  —  So. 

760),  1112. 
Aberdeen  v.  Sanderson   (8  S.  &  M. 

663),  807. 
Ableman   v.   Booth    (21   How.    [U. 

S.]  506),  1012. 
Abrams,  Ex  parte    ( [Tex.]   120  S. 

W.   883),   279,   291,  387,   634. 
Abrams   v.    Sandholm    (119    Iowa, 

583;  93  N.  W.  563),  989. 
Abrams  v.   State      ([Ala.]    46   So. 

464),  1609,  1612. 
Acker   v.    Acker    (22    App.    D.    C. 

353),  2158. 
Acken   v.   Tinglehoff    ([Neb.]    119 

N.  W.  456),  1845,  1882,  1973. 
Acme  Brewing  Co.  v.  Fletcher  ( 109 

Ga.  463;   34   S.  E.  558),  333, 

551. 
Acree  v.  Commonwealth  ( 13  Bush, 

353),  519,  1365,  1366. 
Adair  v.  Commonwealth  ( [Kj'.]  56 

S.  W.  530),  554,  1755. 


Adair  v.  Commonwealth  { [Ky.]  89 

S.  W.   1132;    28   Ky.  L.  Rep. 

659),  1195. 
Adamek  In  re    (82  Neb.  448;    118 

N.  W.  109),  622,  637,  644,663. 
Adams  v.  Albany  ( 29  Ga.  56 ) ,  394. 
Adams  v.  Allen    (99  Me.  249;    59 

Atl.  62),  1047,  1048. 
Adams    v.    Couillard     (102    Mass. 

467),    790,    1771,    1795,    1796, 

1798,  1799. 
Adams  v.  Cox    (80  Miss.  561;   32 

So.  117),  785 
Adams  t.  Cronin  (29  Colo.  488;  69 

Pac.  590),  219. 
Adams  v.  Gormley    (69  Ga.  743), 

627. 
Adams  V.  Hackett   (27  N.  H.  289; 

59  Am.  Dec.  376),  492,  495. 
Adams  v.  Kelley  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

44  S.  W.  529),  881,  927. 
Adams    v.    Kelley     (17    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  479;  45  S.  W.  859),  234 

246,  954. 
Adams  v.  Hickett   (27  N.  H.  289 

59  Am.  Dec.  376),  183,  186. 
Adams  v.  Johnson   (72  Miss.  896 

17  S.  E.  682),  1839. 
Adams  v.  McGlinchy  (66  Me.  474), 

1047. 
Adams  v.  Miller  (81  Miss.  613;  33 

So.  489),  774,  783. 
Adams   v.    Ryerson    (4   Halst.    Eq. 

[N.    J.]    814;     1    Stockt.    Eq. 

[N.  J.]  816),  2094,  2104,  2107, 

2108. 
Adams   v.    Ryerson    (6   N.   J.   Eq. 

328),  2102. 

xli 


xlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Adams  V.  State  ([Ark.]  41  S.  W. 
423),  1479. 

Adams  v.  State  (25  Ohio  St.  584), 
1G32. 

Adams  v.  Stephens  (88  Ky.  443; 
11  S.  W.  427),  473. 

Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth 
(124  Ky.  100;  92  S.  W.  932; 
29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  224;  92  S.  W. 
935;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  230,  231; 
92  S.  W.  036;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
231),  298.  299. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth (124  Ky.  160;  92  S. 
W.  932,  935,  936;  29  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  224,  230,  231),  307,  955. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth ([Ky.]  96  S.  W.  593; 
29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  904),  325, 
1280. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth (  [Ky.]  103  S.  W.  353; 
31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  811  to  813), 
320,  1558,  1G89,  1726. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth ( [Ky.]  103  S.  W.  721 ; 
31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  813),  1218. 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth ([Ky.]  112  S.  W.  577; 
33  Ky.  L.  Rep.  967),  956, 
1529. 

Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Iowa  ( 196  U. 
S.  147;  25  Sup.  Ct.  185;  49 
L.  Ed.  424  [reversing  95  N. 
W.  1129]),  307,324,320. 

Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth 
(206  U.  S.  129;  51  L.  Ed. 
987;  27  Sup.  Ct.  006  [revers- 
ing 87  S.  W.  1111;  27  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  1096];  206  U.  S.  138; 
27  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  608;  51  L. 
Ed.  992  [reversing  92  S.  W. 
932;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  224;  5 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  030]  200  U. 
S.  139;  51  L.  1x1.  993;  27  Sup. 
Ct.  609  [reversing  97  S.  W. 
807;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  207,  and 
103  S.  W.  353;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
811  to  813]),  307. 


Adams    Express    Co.    v.    Common- 
wealth    (206    U.    S.    129;    27 

Sup.   Ct.   600;   51   L.  Ed.  987 

[reversing  87  S.  W.   1111 ;  27 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  1096]  ;   206  U.  S. 

138 ;  27  Sup.  Ct.  608 ;  51  L.  Ed. 

992    [reversing    (Ky.);    92   S. 

W.  932;   29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  224; 

5  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  630]),  324, 

326. 
Adams    Express    Co.    v.    Kentucky 

(206  U.   S.   129;   27   Sup.  Ct. 

606;  51  L.  Ed.  897;  reversing 

[Ky.]   96  S.  W.  1104;  29  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  947),  1289. 
Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth 

(200  U.   S.    129;    27    Sup.   Ct. 

606;  51  L.  Ed.  897   [Ky.]    103 

S.   W.   353;    31    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

811,  813;   reversing   [Ky.]   87 

S.  W.    1111;    27   Ky.  L.   Rep. 

1096),   1726. 
Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Kentucky  (206 

U.  S.   129;   27   Sup.  Ct.  600), 

955. 
Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Commonwealtli 

(206  U.   S.   138;   27   Sup.   Ct. 

008;  51  L.  Ed.  992;  reversing 

[Ky.]   92   S.  W.  932;   29  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  224;   5  L.  R.  A.    [N. 

S.]  030),  1720. 
Adams    Express    Co.    v.    Common- 
wealth    (214    U.    S.    218;    29 

Sup.  Ct.  033),  330. 
Addis  V.  Campbell    (4  Beav.  401), 

2099. 
Addy  V.  Blake  ( 19  Q.  B.  Div.  478 ; 

"Sl  J.  P.  599;  50  L.  T.  711;  35 

W.  R.  719),  353. 
Aden  v.  Cruse    (21  111.  App.  391), 

1909. 
Adkins  v.  State   (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

524;   95  S.  W.  506),  1340. 
Adler  v.   State    (55   Ala.    16),  28, 

38.   S3.   367,   966,   1233,    1240. 

1030,  1755. 
Adler   v.    Whitbeck    (44   Ohio    St. 

5.39;    9  N.  E.  672),   121,   147, 
199,    200,    202,   262,   479,   788, 

790. 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 


xliii 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Advance,  In  re  (59  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

440;  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  314),  578. 
A.   E.   Hollcy    Sl   Co.    v.    Simmons 

(['J  ex,    Cr.    App.]    85    S.    W. 

325),   1238, 
Aetna   L.   Ins.  Co.   v.   Davej^    (123 

U.   S.   739;    8   Sup.   Ct.  331), 

2234,  2235,  2243. 
Aetna    Life    Ins.    Co     v.    Deming 

(123    Ind.   384;    24   N.   E.   80, 

375),  2235,2237. 
Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hanna    (81 

Tex.  487;   17  S.  W.  35),  2241, 

2243.      • 
Aetna   L.   Ins.   Co.   v.   Ward    (140 

U.   S.   76;    11   Sup.   Ct.   720), 

2234,  2243. 
Agee  V.  State   (25  Ala.  07).  1514. 
Ahlers  v.  Estlierville   ([Iowa]    104 

N.  W.  453),  813,  816. 
Aiken   v.    Blaisdell    (41   Vt.   655), 

1791.  1797. 
Aiken  v.  Harbers   (0  Rich.  L.  90), 

774. 
Aiken  v.  State  (14  Tex.  App.  142), 

850,  854,  883,  1760. 
Ailstock    V.    Page     (77    Va.    386), 

628,  636,  400,  671. 
Aimo    V.    People     (122     111.     App. 

398),   1320,   1540. 
Aitkin,  Ex  parte  ( 1  S.  E.  N.  S.  W. 

214;    18  W.  N.  Cas.  X.  S.  W. 

279),   670,   1170. 
Aken    v.    TinglehofT    ([Neb.]     119 

N.  W.  456),  1968. 
Akerman  v.   Lima    (7   Ohio  N.   P. 

92;    8    Ohio   S.   &   C.    P.   Doc. 

430),  473. 
Akerman  v.  Lima   (8  Ohio  S.  «t  C. 

P.  Dec.  430),  1478. 
Alabama  Lumber  Co.  v.  Cross  (1.^2 

Ala.  562;  44  So.  563),  2253. 
Albany    Brewing    Co.    v.    Barckley 

(42  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  335;    59 

N.  Y.  Supp.  65),  699,  703. 
Albertson    v.    Wallace    (81    N.    C. 

479),  794. 
Albia   V.    O'Hara    (64    Iowa,   297; 

20  N.  W.  444),  1278,  1715. 


Albion   V.   BoMt    (145   ivlich.   285; 

108    N,    W.    703;     13    Detroit 

Leg.  N.  430),  419. 
Albrecht   v.   People    (78   111.  510), 

1175,  1248,  1252. 
Albrecht    v.    State     (8    Tex,    App. 

215;   34  Am.   Rep.  737),   198, 

199,  202,  203,  291,  790. 
Albrecht  v.  State   (62  Miss.  516), 

779. 
Albrecht   v.   Walker    (73   111.   69), 

1847,  1854,  1989,  1990. 
Albright  v.  Commonwealth   (7  Ky. 

L    Rep.   [abstract]   762),  945. 
Allchorn    v.    Hopkins     (69    J.    P. 

355), 1355. 
Alcock  V.  Royal,  etc.,  Corp.   (13  Q. 

B.  292;  18  L.  J.  Q.  B.  [N.  S.] 

121;   13  Jur.  445),  2191. 
Alder  v.  State   (55  Ala.  16),  27. 
Alderson     v.     State     ([Tex.     Civ. 

App.]  Ill  S.  W.  412),  1066. 
Alderson     v.     State      (  [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  Ill  S.  W.  738),  1609. 
Aldrich   v.   Aldrich    (49   Mass.    [8 

Met]  106),  1058. 
Aldrich   v.   Harvey    (50   Vt,   162), 

1894, 
Aldrich    v.     Purnell     (147    Mass. 

409;   10  N.  E.  170),  1891. 
Aldrich    v.    Sager    (9    Hun,    537), 

1844,   1894. 
Alexander  v.  Atlanta   ([Ga.]  64  S. 

E.   1105),  4.52. 
Alexander  V.  Humber  (86  Ky.  565; 

6  S.  W.  453),  2191,  2192. 
Alexander  v.   O'Donnell    ( 12   Kan. 

608),   1780. 
Alexander  v.  State   (77  Ark.  294; 

91  S.  W.   181),  527,  750,  752, 

799,   1161. 
Alexander  v.  State   (48  Ind.  394), 

1509, 
Alexander  v.  State  (42  Miss.  316), 

400. 
Alexander  v.  State   (29  Tex.  495), 

1442,  1554. 
Alexander     v.     State     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    60   S.   W.   763),    1171, 

1217, 


xliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Alexander  v.    State    (51   Tex.   Cr. 

App.   506;    102   S.   W.    1122), 

1448,  1557. 
Alexander  v.  State  (53  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  504;  111  S.  W.  145), 

922. 
Alexander   v.   State    (53   Tex.   Cr. 

App.    553;     110    S.    W.    918), 

1723. 
Alexander  v.  State   ( [Tex.]   120  S. 

W.  998),   1463. 
Alford    V.    Hicks     ([Ala.]    38    So. 

752),  241. 
Alford  V.  State    (37  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

386;     35    S.    \V.    657),    1464, 

1474. 
Alger   V.    Lowell    (3    Allen,    406), 

2171,  2175,   2177,  2186,  2187, 

2191. 
Alger  V.  Seaver    (138  Mass.  331), 

391. 
Alger   V.   Weston    ( 14   Johns.    [N. 

Y.]  231),  694. 
Allen  V.  Allen  (31  Mo.  479),  2167. 
Allen  V.  Armstrong   (16  la.  508), 

508,  1585. 
Allen   V.   Carew    (14  K   Y.   L.   R. 

569),  682. 
Allen   V.    Commonwealth    ( 10   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  272),  109*6, 

1117. 
Allen   V.   Commonwealth    ( 10    Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]    280),  95*7, 

1545. 
Allen  V.  Drew  (44  Vt.  174),  791. 
Allen  V.  Houck    ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

92  S.  W.  993),  755,  757,  763, 

765,  770. 
Allen  V.  Lamb  ( 57  J.  P.  377 ) ,  1368. 
Allen    V.    Staples    (6    Gray,    491), 

253,  1008,  1021,  1027,  1029, 

1046.  1048,  1049. 
Allen  V.  State    (52  Ind.  486),  210. 
Allen  V.  State  (14  Tex.  633),  1158, 

1224,  1246. 
Allen  V.  State    (17  Tex.  App.  637 

11888]),  2247. 
Allen   V.    State    ([Tex.]    13    S.   W. 

998),  15.35,  1557,  1758,  1759. 


Allen   V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

59  S.  W.  264),  959,  118.5,  1683. 
Allen   V.    State    ([Tex.  -Cr.   App.) 

98  S.  W.  869 ) ,  958. 
Allen  V.  State  (5  Wis.  329),  1488, 

1500. 
Allen  V.  TinglehoflF  ([Neb.]  119  N". 

W.  495),   1955. 
Allentown   v.    Saoger    (20   Pa.   St. 

421),  811. 
Allison    V.    State     (47    Ind.    140), 

1631. 
Allman    v.    State    (69    Ind.    387), 

1489. 
Allode    V.    Nylin     (139    111.    App. 

527),  408. 
Allor  V.  W'ayne  Co.  Auditors    (43 

Mich.  73;  4  N.  W.  492),  1015. 
Allport  V.  Nutt    (1  C.  B.  975;    14 

L.  J.  C.  P.  272),  374. 
Allred  v.  State  (89  Ala.  112;  8  So. 

56),    12,    15,    24.    27,    28,    38, 

39,  49,  59,  86,  1532,  1753. 
Allyn's  Appeal    (81  Conn.  534;   71 

Atl.  794;  68  Cent.  L.  Jr.  449), 

104,  105,  142,  480,  484,  486. 
Allsman  v.  Oklahoma  City  ([Okl.] 

95  Pac.  468),  812. 
Altenburg  v.  Commonwealth    (126 

Pa.  St.  602;  17  Atl.  799),  210, 

1121,   1175,   1248,   1252. 
Altoona  v.  Stehle   (21  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.    395;    8    Pa.    Dist.    Rep. 

25),  413. 
Alvon   V.    Pawtucket    ([R.   I.]    16 

Atl.  1047),  593. 
Amador  County  v.  Isaacs  (11  Pac. 

758),  170,"  187,  800. 
Amador    County    v.    Kennedy    ( 70 

Cal.   458:   'll   Pac.  757)',    170, 

187,  428,  800. 
Ambrose    v.   .State    (6    Ind.    351), 

216,  271,  448. 
American  v.  Kail  (34  Hun  [N.  Y.] 

126),  1353,  1616. 
American,    etc.,    Bank    v.    Gueder 

( 50  111.  336 :  37  N.  E.  227 ) ,  264. 
American  Brewing  Co.,  Appeal  of 

(161    Pa.    378;    29    Atl.    22). 

589,  628,  629,  632. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


xlv 


[Referencws    are    to    pages.] 


American  Express  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth  ([Ky.]   97  S.  W.  807; 
30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  207 ) ,  1288. 
American    Exp.    Co.    v.    Common- 
wealth    (206    U.    S.    139;    27 
Sup.  Ct.  609;   51  L.  Ed.  993; 
reversing  [Ky.]  97  S.  W.  807 ; 
30   Ky.   207),  326,  955,   1229, 
1726. 
American   Express   Co.   v.   Mullins 
(212   U.   S.  311;   29   Sup.  Ct. 
381;  53  L.Ed.),  326,  338. 
American  Exp.   Co.   v.  Schier    (55 

111.  140),  1727. 
American  Exp.   Co.  v.   State    ( 190 
U.   S.    133;    25    Sup.   Ct.    182; 
49  L.  Ed.  417;    reversing  118 
Iowa,  447;  92  S.  W.  66),  298, 
307,  324,  326. 
American    Fire    Ins.    Co.   v.    First 
Nat.  Bank    (73  ]\Iiss.  469;    18 
So.  931),  1779,  2220,  2226. 
American  Fur  Co.  v.  United  States 
(2  Pet.  358),  210,  1030,  1073, 
1259. 
Amerker  v.  Taylor   (81  S.  C.  163; 

62  S.  E.  7),  938. 
Amery  v.  Royal   (117  Ind.  299;  20 

N.  E.  150),  1018. 
Amesbury  Insurance  Co.    (6  Gray 

[Mass.],  596),  294. 
Amio    V.    People     (122    111.    App. 

398),   1320,   1540. 
Amite   City   v.    Clements    (24   La. 

Ann.  27),  802. 
Ammon   v.   Chicago    (26   111.   App. 

641),  414. 
Andery    v.    Smith    (35    Ind.    App. 

94;    73  N.  E.  840),  606. 
Amperse  v.  Kalamazoo    (59  Mich. 
78;   26  N.  W.  222),  537,  763, 
764,  765. 
Amperse    v.    Winslow     (75    Mich. 

234;  42  N.  W.  123),  763. 
Anderson,  Ex  parte    (51   Tex.   Cr. 
App.    239;    102    S.   W.    727), 
897,  898,  900. 
Anderson,    In    re     ( 14    Manitoba, 
535),  938. 


Anderson  v.  Brewster  (44  Ohio  St. 

576;    9  N.  E.   683),   121,   138, 

147,    199,    200,   222,   479,    484, 

792,  804. 
Anderson  v.   Chicago,  etc.,   R.   Co. 

(87   Wis.   195;    58  N.  W.  79; 

23  L.  R.  A.  203),  2180,  2184, 

2185. 
Anderson     v.     Commonwealth      (9 

Bush,  569),  11,  553. 
Anderson    v.    Commonwealth     ( 13 

Bush    [Ky.],    485),    110,   228, 

232,  234,  240. 
Anderson   v.   Commonwealth    ( 105 

Va.  533;  54  S.  E.  305),  757. 
Anderson    v.    Galesburg    (118    111. 

App.  525),  714,  718,  741,  813, 

817. 
Anderson  v.   Kerns,   etc.,   Co.    ( 14 

Ind.  199),  789. 
Anderson   v.   People    (63   111.   53), 

1487,   1554. 
Anderson  v.   State    (82  Ark.  405; 

101  S.  W.  1152),  951.  1287. 
Anderson   v.    State    (32    Fla.   242; 

13  So.  435),  1111,  1379,  1615, 

1666. 
Anderson  v.  State    (39  Ind.  553), 

1352,  1357,  1302. 
Anderson    v.    State    (22    Ohio    St. 

305),  1350,  1354. 
Anderson  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

37  S.  W.  859),  1730. 
Anderson    v.    State     (39    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  34;  44  S.  W.  824),  869. 
Anderson    v.    State     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  195;   92  S.  W.  39),  863. 
Anderson    v.    Van    Buren    Circuit 

Judge    (130  Mich.  695;   90  N. 
W.    692 ;    9    Detroit    Leg.    N. 

222),  832,  1467,  1542,  1544. 
Anderson  v.  Weber    (39  Ind.  App. 
443;  79  N.  E.  1055),  612,  668. 
Anderson    v.     Wellington     ([Kan. 

Sup.]   19  P.  719),  461. 
Andler  v.  Whitbeck    (44   Ohio  St. 

539),  484. 
Andreas  v.  Beaumont    ( [Tex.  Civ. 
App.]    113    S.    W.    614),    158, 
165,  279,  424,  429,  597. 


xlvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[rieferences    are    to    pages.] 


Andress   v.   Weller    (2    Green   Eq. 

[N.  J.]  004),  2137,  2147,  2149. 
Andreveno  v.  Mut.,  etc.,  Ass'n  ( 19 

Ins.  L.  Jr.  6G8),  2233,  2242. 
Andrews,  Ex  parte   (18  Cal.  079), 

215. 
Andrews  v.   Denton    ([1897]    2  Q. 

B.  37;  €0  L.  J.  Q.  B.  520;  76 

L.  T.  423;   45   \Y.  B.  500;   61 

J.  P.  326),  711. 
Andrews  v.  Fry   (104  Mass.  234), 

1779. 
Andrews  v.  Frye   (109  Mass.  234), 

1806. 
Andrews    v.     Russell      (7     Blackf. 

llnd.]  474),  200. 
Androscoggin   R.    Co.   v.    Richards 

(41  Me.  233),  1029,  1058. 
Angel  V.  Keith  (24  Vt.  371),  1027. 
AngerhofTer  v.  State  ( 15  Tex.  App. 

613),  448.  1307. 
Anglea     v.      Commonwealth      ( 10 

Gratt.  G96),  1767. 
Angelin  v.   State    ([Miss.]    50  So. 

492),  1179,  1206,  1214,  1267. 
Anheuser-Busch     Brewing    Co.     v. 

Fullcrton    (83   Iowa,   760;    50 

N.  VV.  56),  1028. 
Anheuser-Busch     Brewing    Co.     v. 

Hammond    (93  Iowa.  520;   61 

N.  VV.  1052),  1031,  1033. 
Anheuser-Busch   Brewing  Ass'n   v. 

Mason    (44  Minn.  318;   46  N. 

VV.  558;  9  L.  R.  A.  506),  1801. 
Anna,  The   (47  Fed.  525),  2195. 
Annapolis  v.  State    (30  Md.   112), 

929. 
Anniston,  Ex  parte   (90  Ala.  516; 

7  So.  779),  431,  432. 
Anonymous   ([1695]  3  Salk.*  25), 

104. 
Anonymous    (17  Abb.  N.  C.  231), 

2164. 
Anthers,  In  re  (58  L.  ,T.  M.  C.  62; 

22   Q.   B.   Div.   345;    60   L.   T. 

454 ;  37  W.  R.  320 ;  16  Cox  C. 

C.   588;    53   J.   P.    116),   722, 
1572. 


Anthoness   v.   Anderson    (14   Vict. 

L.  R.  127;  9  Austr.  L.  T.  175), 

701. 
Anthony  v.   Krey    (70  Mich.   629; 

38    N.    VV.    603),    778,    1921, 

1941. 
Anthony    v.    State     (41    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  393;  55  S.  W.  61),  1321. 
Applegate     v.     Wlnebrenner      (67 

Iowa,    235;    25    N.    W.    148), 

1960,    1908. 
Appling    V.    McWilliams    (69    Ga. 

840),  798,   799. 
Appling   V.   State    ([Ark.]    114    S. 

VV.    927),    1608,    1659,    1731, 

1733. 
Arberger    v.    Marrin     ( 102    Mass. 

70),  1787. 
Arbintrode  v.  State   (67  Ind.  267; 

b3  Am.  Rep.  86),   1498,   1500, 
Arbuckle  Bros.  v.  Blackburn   (113 

Fed.  616),   1438. 
Arbuthnot    v.    State     ([Tex.    Civ. 

App.]  120  S.  VV.  478),  52. 
Archer  v.  State   (45  Mr.  33),  114, 

1198,  1010,  1611,  1614,  1754. 
Archer    v.    State     ( 10    Tex.    App. 

482),  1619. 
Archibold's   Crim.    Prac.    &   Plead. 

(8th  i^M.).  p.  361,  1509. 
Areola    v.    Williamson     (233    111. 

250;   84  N.  E.  264),  260,  433, 

463. 
Ardery  v.  State  (35  Ind.  App.  94; 

73  N.  E.  840),  605,  617. 
Arey   v.    Rowan    Co.     (138    N.    C. 

500;   51  S.  E.  41),  797. 
Arfield  v.   Tate    (7   Ired.  L.  259), 

1801. 
Arie  v.  Dixon   ([Iowa]   123  N.  W. 

173),  1774. 
Arie   v.   State    (1    Okla.    Cr.   666; 

100  Pac.   233),   121,   183. 
Arizona  Prince  Copper  Co.  v.  Cop- 
per Queen  Mining  Co.   (7  Pac. 

718),  2253,  2555. 
Arkadclphia    v.    Lumber    Co.     (56 

Ark.  370),  426. 
Arkell,  In,  re   (38  Up.  Can.  594), 

453,  468,  1258. 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


xlvii 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Arkenau,    Appeal    of     (73    N.    E. 

1122;   18  N.  Y.  527),  745. 
Armour,   In  re    ([1907]    14   App. 

Ont.  L.  R.   606),  921. 
Armour  v.    Meridian    ( [Miss.]    24 

So.  533),  965. 
Armstrong,    Ex    parte    (30    X.    B. 

423),    1218. 
Armstrong  v.  State   (14  Ind.  App. 

566;  43  N.  E    142),  1147. 
Armstrong    v.     State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]     47    S.    VV.    981),    958, 

1181,  1182,   1186,   1187,   1684, 
1690,   1696. 

Arm.strong    v.    State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 
App.]    47    S.    W.    1006),    909, 

1182,  1683,  1723. 
Armstrong  v.   Taylor    (11   Wheat. 

271;  6  L.  Ed.  472),  1777. 
Armstrong    v.    Toler     (11    Wheat. 

258;    6  L.  Ed.  468),   1800. 
Army  and  Navy   Club  v.   District 

of    Columbia     (8    App.    Cas. 

[D.  C]   544),  75,   1325,   1333. 
Arnett  v.  Wright    (18  Okla.   337; 

89  Pac.    1116),   694,  703. 
Arnold,   In   re   30   Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

93),  718,  745,  899. 
Arnold    v.    Barkalow     (72    Iowa, 

183;    34    N.    W.    807),    1846, 

1912,  1917,  1943,  2011. 
Arnold  v.  Hickman    (Munf.   [Va.] 

15),  2095. 
Arnold  v.  Radford    ([1901]    17   T. 

L.  R.  301),   1817. 
Arnold  v.  State   (38  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

1;  40  S.  W.  734),  1607,  1636. 
Arnold  v.  State   (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

110;   79  S.  W.  547),   1209. 
Arnold  v.  State   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

556;   85  S.  W.  18),  1623. 
Arrington    v.    Commonwealth    (87 

Va.  96;    12   S.   E.   224;    10  L. 

R.  A.  242),  1121,   1314,   1322, 

1478,   1483,   1554,   1557,   1720, 

1721. 
Arroyo  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

69  S.  W.  503),  229,  230,  398. 
Arthur  v.  Flanders   (76  Mass.  [10 

Gray]   107),  1020. 


Arszman,  In  re  (40  Ind.  App.  218; 

218;   81  N.  E.  680),  594,  663. 
Ash    V.    People     (11    Mich.    347), 

200,  788. 
Ashembauch   v.    Carry    ( [Pa.]    73 

Atl.  436),  183,  481,  701. 
Asher   v.   Texas    (128   U.   S.    129; 

9  Sup.  Ct.   1),   157. 
Asherst   v.    State    (79   Ala.    276), 

131,  247,   938. 
Askew    V.    State     ([Ala.]    46    So. 

751),   1258. 
Askew  V.  State    (4  Ga.  App.  446; 

61  S.  E.  737),  1241,  1706. 
Askwith,  In  re    (3   Can.   Cr.   Cas. 

78),  1322,  1579. 
Ashley    v.    State     (92    Ind.    559), 

1508. 
Ashley  v.  State   (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

471;  80  S.  \\.  1015),  1210. 
Ashton  V.  Ellsworth   (48  111.  299), 

419. 
Ashurst   V.    State    (79   Ala.    276), 

596. 
Aston  V.  State    ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

49  S.  W.  385),  80,  1682. 
A.storia   v.    Wells    (68    Kan.    787; 

75  Pac.  1026),  470. 
Aszman   v.   State    (123    Ind.   347; 

24  N.  E.  123;  8  L.  R.  A.  33), 

2040,  2044,  2045,  2061,  2066, 

2067,  2072,  2073,  2084. 
Atchinson  v.  Bartholow  (4  Kan. 

124),  394. 
Atchison,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Hardy 

(94  Fed.  294;  37  C.  C.  A. 

359),  2185. 
Atchison  R.  Co.  v.  Weber  (33  Kan. 

554;  6  Pac.  877;  52  Am.  Rep. 

543),  2202,  2203,  2212,  2215. 
Athens    v.    Atlanta     ( [Ga.    App.] 

64  S.  E.  71),  452. 
Atkins  V.  Randolph   (31  Vt.  226), 

476. 
Atkins  V.  State  (60  Ala.  45),  1461, 

1032,  1646. 
Atkins   V.   State    ( [Tenn.]    105    S. 

W.  353;    13  L.  R.  A.   [N.  S.] 

1031),  2038,  2068,  2069,  2070. 


xlviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Atkins  V.  Town  of  Randolph    (31 

Vt.  226),   172. 
Atkinson   v.   People    (46   Tex.   Cr. 

App.  229;  7'J  S.  W.  31),  1232. 
Atkinson  v.   Sellers    (5   C.   B.    [N. 

S.]  442;  28  L.  J.  M.  C.  12;  23 

J.  P.  71),  1149. 
Atkinson  v.   State    (33   Ind.  App. 

8;  70  N.  E.  560),  1147,  1539, 

1540. 
Attorney    General    v.    Bailey     ( 1 

Welsh  H.   &  G.  281),  23,   29, 

53. 
Attorney  General  v.  Ball  (66  J.  P. 

553),  762. 
Attorney  General   v.  Huebner    (91 

Mich.  436;    51   N.   W.    1072), 

763. 
Attorney    General    v.    Justices    (5 

Ired.  315),  626,  628,  629,  686. 
Attorney  General  v.  Manitoba  Li- 
cense Holders'  Ass'n    ([1902] 

App.  Cas.  73),  263. 
Attorney    General    v.    Van    Buren 

Circuit  Court  (143  Mich.  366; 

106   N.   W.   1113;    12   Detroit 

Leg.  N.   1016),  853,  868,  869, 

870,  877,  883. 
Atwell  V.  Lucas  (3  K  S.  W.  L.  R. 

193),  1154. 
Auburn   v.   Mayer    (58   Neb.    161; 

78  N.  W.  462),  752. 
Auburn    Excise    Commissioners    v. 

Merchant    (34    Hun,    19;    af- 
firmed,   103   N.  Y.    143;    8   N. 

E.  484),  1178,  1598. 
Auberbach,  In  re   (31  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  46 ;  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  603 ) , 

729,  750,  751. 
AugerhofF  v.  State    (15  Tex.  App. 

613),  395. 
Auglanier    v.    Governor     ( 1     Tex. 

653),  802. 
August  Busch  &  Co.  v.  Webb  ( 122 

Fed.  655),   110,   120,  230,  233, 

249,  281,  295. 
Aulanier  v.  Governor  (1  Tex.  653), 

788. 
Aultfather   v.    State    (4    Ohio    St. 

467),   1241,   1461,  1551. 


Aurora   v.    Hillman    (90   HI.   61), 

1735,   2171,  2191,  2193,  2195 
Austin  V.  Atlantic  City    (48  X.  J. 

L.  118;   3  Atl.  65),  586,  676. 
Austin  V.  Davis  (7  Ont.  Rep.  478), 

1352,   1354,   1362,   1907. 
Austin  V.   Murray    (33   Mass.    [16 

Pick.]   121),  436. 
Austin    V.    State     (22    Ind.    App. 

221;   53  N.  E.  481),  1175. 
Austin  V.  State  (10  Mo.  591),  110, 

151,  311,  521,  627,  1459. 
Austin    V.    Tennessee    (179    U.    S. 

343;    45  L.  Ed.   224;    21   Sup. 

Ct.     132),     310,     1337,     1432, 

1434. 
Austin  V.  Viraqua    (67  Wis.  314; 

30  N.  W.  515),  812. 
Avardo  v.  Dance    (26  J.  P.  437), 

375. 
Aj'res   V.   State    ( [Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

26  S.  W.  396),  2074. 
Ayrey  v.  Hill    (2  Add.  Eccl.  Rep. 

206),  2133,  2136,  2148,  2150. 
Azbill  V.  Azbill    (14  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

105),   2160. 


Babb  V.  Taylor    (2  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

38;    30    W.   N.   C.  440),   534. 
Bach  V.  Smith   (2  Wash.  Ty.  145; 

3  Pac.  831),  1780. 
Bachellor  v.  State    (10  Tex.  260), 

369. 
Baches    v.    Dant     (55    Ind.     181), 

1870. 
Backhaus  v.  People    (87   111.  App. 

173),   799,    1184. 
Backman   v.    Charlestown    (42    N. 

H.   125),   384. 
Backman  v.  Mussey   (31  Vt.  547), 

1787. 
Backman    v.    Phillipsburg    (68   N. 

J.  L.  552;    53  Atl.  620),  576, 

586,  587,  676. 
Backman  v.  Wright  (27  Vt.  187), 

1790,    1798. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


xlix 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Backus   V.    People    (87    111.    App. 

173),  419. 
Bacon    v.    Hunt    (72    Vt.    98;    47 

Atl.  394),   1787,  1788. 
Bacon    v.    Jacobs     (63    Hun,    51; 
17    N.    Y.    Supp.    323),    1864, 
1877. 
Bacon  v.  New  tng.  Order  of  Prot. 

(123  Fed.  152),  2226,  2227. 
Backus  V.  County  Supervisors   (99 
Mich.  221;  58  N.  W.  62),  877. 
Badgett   v.    State    (157    Ala.    20; 

48  So.  54),  492,  559. 
Baecher    v.    State    (19    Ind.    App. 
100;   49  N.  E.  42),  296,  1849, 
1869. 
Baehner   v.    State    (25    Ind.    App. 
597;     58    N.    E.    741),    1187, 
1579. 
Baer  v.  Commonwealth    ( 10  Bush, 

8),  1238,  1458,  1764. 
Baer   v.    Commonwealth    (13    Ky. 
Law    Rep.     [abstiract]     396), 
1305,   1568. 
Baeumel    v.    State     (26    Fla.    71; 

7  So.  371),  82S. 
Bagby   v.   Commonwealth    (4   Ky. 
L.  Rep.   [abstract]   537),  826, 
1096,  1117. 
Bagby   v.    State    (82   Ga.    786;    9 

S.   E.   721),   1280,   1285. 
Bage  V.  State   (50  Ark.  20;   6   S. 

W.  15),  137. 
Bageard  v.  Consolidated  Tr.  Co. 
(64  X.  J.  U  316;  45  Atl. 
620;  49  L.  R.  A.  424;  81 
Am.  St.  498),  2204,  2173, 
2174. 
Bagley  v.  Mason   (69  Vt.  179;   37 

Atl.  287),  1736,  2049. 
Bagley   v.    Peddie    (5    Sandf.    [N. 

Y.]    192),   1808. 
Bagley    v.    State     (103    Ga.    388; 

29  S.  E.  123),  249. 
Bailey,  In  re  (64  Kan.  887;  68 
Pac.  53),  416,  564,  637,  639. 
Bailey  v.  Briggs  (143  Mich.  303; 
105  X.  W.  863;  12  Det.  Leg. 
N.  982),  1994. 


Bailey    v.   ConinionweaUh    {[Ky.] 

64  S.  W.  095;  23  Tly.  L.  Rep. 

1223),  945,  957. 
Bailey    v.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

92  S.  \V.  545,  29  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

105),  1369. 
Bailey  v.  Opelika    (146   Ala.   171; 

48   So.   968),  417. 
Bailey  v.  Raleigh   (130  X.  C.  269; 

41  S.  E.  281),  817. 
Bailey    v.    State     (26    Ind.    422), 

2040,    2051,   2054. 
Bailey    v.    State     (67    Miss.    333; 

7  So.  348),   1608. 
Bailey  v.   State   (30  Xeb.  855;  47 

X.  W.  208),  448. 
Bailey  v.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

66  S.  W.  780),  973,  1708. 
Bailey  Liquor   Co.  v.   Austin    (82 

Fed.   785),  381,  483. 
Bain  v.   Bain    (79  Xeb.  711;    113 

X.  W.  141),  2158. 
Bain  v.  State    (61  Ala.  75),  837, 

1240,   1241,   1461. 
Baird,  Ex  parte    (34  X.  B.  213), 

1070,    1359. 
Baird  v.  Howard  (51  Ohio  St.  57; 

36    X.   E.    732;    22   L.   R.   A. 

846),  2124. 
Baird  v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  (41  Fed. 

.    Rep.  492),   156. 
Baird  v.   State    (52  Ark.  326;    12 

S.   VV.   566),   513,    1372. 
Baker,   In  re    (29   How.   R.  485), 

2023. 
Baker   v.    Beckwith    (29    Ohio   St. 

314),  1848. 
Baker  v.  Boucicault   (1  Daly,  23), 

1283. 
Baker  v.  Branan    (6  Hill   [X.  Y.] 

47),   280. 
Baker  v.  Bucklin   (43  X.  Y^  App. 
Div.     336;     60    X.    Y.     Supp. 

294 ;  affirming  22  X.  Y.  Supp. 

560;    50    X.    Y.    Supp.    739), 
739,   811,  817. 
Baker  v.  Cincinnati    (11   Ohio  St. 
534),  811,  815, 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Baker    v.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

€4  S.  W.  657 ;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

898),   1380,   1381. 
Baker  v.   Griffith    ( [N.   C]    66   S. 

E.  565),   440,  648. 
Baker  v.  Jacobs    (64  Vt.   197;   23 

Atl.   588),   2256. 
Baker  v.  Panola  Co.   (30  Tex.  &6), 

426,  794. 
Baker  v.  Paris   (10  Up.  Can.  21), 

472. 
Baker  v.  Pope   (2  Hun,  556),  183, 

184,  223,   1840,  1842. 
Baker   v.   Portland    (58   Me.    199; 

4  Am.  Rep.  274),  2171. 
Baker     v.     Portland     (5     Sawyer, 

566),   189. 
Baker  v.  State    (117  Ga.  428;   43 

S.   E.   744),    1112. 
Baker    v.    State     (34    Ind.     104), 

1714. 
Baker  v.  State   (2  Ind.  App.  517; 

28  N.  E.  735),   1621. 
Baker  v.  State    (8  Ohio  St.  391), 

1527. 
Baker  v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

47   S.  W.  980),  963. 
Baker  v.   Summers    (201    111.    52; 

66    X.    E.    302),    1844,    1877, 

1954,   2003,    2004. 
Baker  v.   Ziegler    (56   Hun,  40o), 

2126. 
Baldwin  v.  Chicago    (68  111.  418), 

456,   1122. 
Baldwin  v.  Coburn    (39  Vt.  441), 

477. 
Baldwin  v.  Dover,  J.  J.   ([1892]  2 

Q.   B.  421;    56  J.  P.   423;    61 

L.  J.  M.  C.  215),  710. 
Baldwin   v.    Smith    (82   111.    162), 

474,  494,  751. 
Baldwin    County    v.    Milledgeville 

(42  Ga.  325),  494. 
Ball   V.   Commonwealth    ([Ky]    91 

S.   W.    1123;    28   Ky.   L.    Rep. 

1344),  1343,  1381. 
Ball  V.   Commonwealth    ([Ky.]    99 

S.    W.    326;    30    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

600),  948,  959,   1741,   1762. 


Ball  V.  Kane   ( 1  Pennewill  [Del.] 

90;   39  Atl.  77'8),  2135,  2138, 

2147. 
Ball  V.  State    (50  Ind.  595),  821. 
Ballam    v.    Wiltshire     (44    J.    P. 

72),  1276. 
Ballentine  v.   State    ( 48   Ark.  45 ; 

2  S.  W.  340),  722. 
Ballew  V.   State    (84  Ga.   138;    10 

vS.  E.  623),  578,  585. 
Ballew    V.    State     (26    Tex.    App. 

483;     9     S.     W.     765),     1575, 

1576. 
Ballhausen,  In  re    (19  Vict.  L.  R. 

'66;     14    Austr.    L.    R.     185), 

701. 
Balling  v.   Board    ([X.  J.  L.]    74 

Atl.    277),    740. 
Ballinger  v.  Griffith    (23   Ohio  St. 

619),  2013. 
Ballinger    v.    Wilson     (76    Minn. 

262;    79  N.  W.   109),    1788. 
Balogh  V.  Lyman    (6  N.   Y.  App. 

Div.    271;     39    N.    Y.    Supp. 

7'80),   807. 
Ballowe  v.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.] 

44  S.  W.  646;   19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1867),  1720,  1737. 
Baltimore  v.  Clunet  (23  Md.  440), 

182. 
Baltimore  v.  Keeley  Institute   (81 

Md.   106;    31   Atl.  437;    27   L. 

R.   A.  646),  2016,  2022. 
Baltimore    v.    Lefferman     (4    Gill 

[Md.]    425),  811. 
Baltimore  v.  State    (15  Md.  37-6), 

106. 
Baltimore,   etc.,  R.   Co.  v.   Boteler 

(38    Md.    568),     2171,     2191, 

2192. 
Baltimore,   etc.,   R.    Co.   v.   Cham- 
bers    (81    Md.    371;     32    Atl. 

201),  2185. 
Baltimore,   etc.,  R.   Go.  v.  Hamil- 
ton (16  Fed.  Rep.  181),  1027. 
Baltimore,    etc.,    R.     Co.   v.   Hen- 

thorne  ( 73  Fed.  634 ;  43  U.  S. 

App.    113;    19  C.  C.  A.   623), 

2192,  2194,  2198,  2200. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


li 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Bamke,  Ex  parte  ( 1  S.  C.  X.  S.  W. 

177),  1359. 
Banchor   v.   Mansel    (47   Me.   58), 

1790,   1797,   1801. 
Banchor    v.    Warren     (33    N.    H. 

183),    1114,    1161,   1164,    1280. 
Bancroft  v.  Duma»   (21  Vt.  450), 

91,   97,    228,   233,   240. 
Bandalow  v.  People   (90  111.  218), 

1096. 
Bank  v.   Dudley    (2    Pet.    [U.   S.] 

526),    294. 
Bank  v.  State   (12  Ga.  475),  924. 
Banks,  Ex  parte   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

103  S.  W.  1156),  864. 
Banks    v.    State    (136    Ala.    106; 

34  So.  350),  1380. 
Banks   v.   Sargent    (104  Ky.   843; 

48  S.  W.  149),  922. 
Bannister    v.    Jackson     (45    N.    J. 

Eq.  702;   17  Atl.  692;  affirmed 

4.8    N.    J.    Eq.    5'93;    21    Atl. 

753),    2136,   2137,   2142. 
Bannon   v.   Adams    (76    111.   331), 

1846. 
Banty  v.  Barnes   (40  Ohio  St.  43), 

1912. 
Barber  v.   Barber    ([Conn.]    14  L. 

Rep.     375),     07,     2154,    2155, 

2156. 
Barbee   v.    Reese    (60    Miss.    906), 

2048. 
Barber    v.    Brennan    ([Iowa]    119 

N.  W.  142),   1002,   1003. 
Barber  v.  Griffith    ([N.   C]   06   S. 

E.  565),   162. 
Barber     v.     Savage     ( 1     Sweeney, 

288),  2191,  2193. 
Barber  v.  State  (39  Ohio  St.  660), 

2067. 
Barber   v.   Sullivan    (78   111.   App. 

298),   1133. 
Barbier    v.    Connelly     (113    U.    S. 

27;    5    S.    C.    357),    109,    116, 

239. 
Barclay,  In  re   (11  Up.  Can.  470), 

415. 
Barclay,  In  re    (12  Up.  Can.  86), 

453,  462,  644,  849,  1225,  1249, 

1258. 


Barckell  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

106  S.  W.  190),  982. 
Bardwell   v.   State    (77   Ark.    161; 

91  S.  W.  555),  902. 
Barger   v.   State    (50   Ark.    20;    6 

S.  W.  15),  1578. 
Barham  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

53  S.  W.   109),   1684. 
Barker,  Ex  parte   (30  N.  B.  406), 

1218. 
Barker  v.  Pearce  (30  Pa.  St.  173), 

1906. 
Barker  v.  State   (117  Ga.  428;   43 

S.  E.  744),  1114,  1557. 
Barker  v.   State    (118  Ga.  35;   44 

S.  E.  874),  1475. 
Barker  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

47  S.  VV.  980),  909,  958,  968. 
Barkley    v.    Cannon    (4    Rich.    L, 

[S.  C]   136),  2103. 
Barlow  v.   State    (127  Ga.  58;    56 

S.  E.  131),  1620. 
Barlow  v.  State    (5  Ga.  App.  21; 

62  S.  E.  574),  1700. 
Barnaby  v.  Wood    (50   Ind.  405), 

1350,   1351,    1871,    1907,    1908, 

1925. 
Barnard  v.  Graham  (120  Ind.  135; 

22  N.  E.  112),  572. 
Barnard  v.  Houghton's  Estate   (34 

Vt.  264),  355,  1792. 
Barnard    v.    State    ( [La.]    48    So. 

438),  515. 
Barnegat,  etc.,  Ass'n  v.  Busby   (44 

N.  J.  L.  627),  638. 
Barnes  v.  Commonwealth  ( 2  Dana, 

388),  510,  511. 
Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia  (91 

U.  S.  510),  393. 
Barnes  v.  People   (113  Mich.  213; 

71  N.  W.  504),  1375,  1378. 
Barnes    v.    State     (49    Ala.    342), 

509,  691,  1267. 
Barnes   v.   State    (19   Conn.   398), 

1253,  1255,  1620,  1632,  1764. 
Barnes   v.   State    (20   Conn.   232), 

1446,   1632. 
Barnes   v.   State    (20   Conn.   254), 

1607,   1614. 


lii 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Barnes  v.  State   ( [Tex.]   44  S.  W. 
491),    12,    1692,    1697,     1704, 
1730,   1733. 
Barnes  v.  State   (40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

473;  72  S.  W.  177),  166G. 
Barnes  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 
88    S.    W.    805),    1167,    1168, 
1372,   1621. 
Barnes  v.  Wagoner  (169  Ind.  511; 

82  N.  E.  1037),  668. 
Barnes  v.  Wilson  Co.    (135  N.  E, 

27;  47  S.  E.  737),  648. 
Barnesville    v.    Means    ( [Ga.]    57 

S.  E.  422),  933,  1935. 
Barnesville   v.  Murphey    (113   Ga. 

779;   39  S.  E.  413),  475. 
Barnhardt  v.  State   (171  Ind.  428; 
86    N.    E.    481),    1100,    1532, 
1545. 
Barnett  v.  Pemiscott  Co.  Ct.   (Ill 
Mo.  App.  693;  86  S.  W.  575), 
714,  733,  747,  748. 
Barnett    v.    State     (36    Me.    198), 

1530. 
Barrett,  In  re  ( 28  Up.  Can.  559 ) , 

1643. 
Barrett  v.  Buxton   (2  Aiken,  167; 
16  Am.  Dec.  691),  2094,  2097. 
Barrett  v.  Delano    (  [Me.]    14  Atl. 

288),    122. 
Barrett  v.  Rickard   (  [Neb.]  124  X. 

W.  153),  387,  413. 
Barrier  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

103  S.  W.  1196),  1473. 
Barron  v.  Arnold  (16  R.  I.  22;   11 
Atl.    298),    1031,    1772,    1773, 
1776. 
Barrose  v.  State  ( 1  Clarke  [Iowa] 

374),    1711. 
Barry  v.  Bretlin    (2  Moore,  P.  C. 

482),  2146. 
Barry   v.   Butin    (2   Moore,   P.    C. 

482),  2146. 
Barry  v.  Little    ([X.  H.]   68  Atl. 

40),  748,  749. 
Bartcl  V.  Hobson    (107  Iowa,  644; 
78  N.  W.  699),  341,  343,  850, 
1270. 
Barter  v.  Commonwealth    (3  P.  «Si 
W.  [Pa.]  253),  270. 


Bartemeyer    v.    Iowa     (18    Wall. 

[U.  S.]    129;   21  L.  Ed.  929), 

91,    109,    119,    124,    148,    315, 

427. 
Barter    v.    Commonwealth    (3    Pa. 

260),    470. 
Barth    v.    State    (18    Conn.    432), 

1493,   1541. 
Bartholomew   v.    People    ( 104    111. 

605;    44  Am.  Rep.  97),  2047, 

2078. 
Barto  V.  Himrod    (4  Sel.  ]N.  Y.] 

483),  231. 
Barton  v.  Gadsden   (79  Ala.  495), 

467. 
Barton  v.  Mahasker  Co.  (90  Iowa, 

749;  57  N.  W.  611),  1002. 
Barton  v.  State   (43  Fla.  477;   31 

So.  361),  924,  1682. 
Barton  v.  State   (99  Ind.  89),  832, 

1305,   1306. 
Bartman  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

43  S.  W.  984),  1231. 
Barver    v.    Brenner     ([Iowa]    119 

N.  W.   142),  842. 
Bascot   V.    State    ( [Miss.]    48    So. 

228),  965. 
Bashinski  v.  State  (5  Ga.  App.  3; 

62  S.  E.  577),  1092,  1093. 
Bass  V.  Nashville,  Meigs   ( [Tenn.] 

421;  63  Am.  Dec.  154),  182. 
Bass   V.    State    (1    Ga.    App.    728, 

790;   57  S.  E.  1054),  959. 
Bassett     v.     Goodchild     (3     Wils. 

121),  623,  657. 
Bassett  v.  Howwith  (224),  1058. 
Batchelder   v.    Batchelder    (14   N. 

H.  380),  2153,  2154,  2160. 
Bateman  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

44  S.  W^  290),   1474. 

Bates,  Ex  parte   (37  Tex.  Cr.  Rep, 

548;   40  S.  W.  269),  259. 
Bates  V.  Davis  (76  111.  222),  1994, 

2094,  2096,  2103,  2116. 
Bates  V.   State    (81   Ark.   336;    9P 

S.  W.  388),950. 
Bath  V.  Wliite   (3  C.  P.  Div.  175; 

42  J.  P.  375;  26  W.  R.  617), 

1295. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


liii 


[References   are    to    pages. 


Batley  v.   Cullon    (6  N.  Z.   L.   R. 

755),    1215. 
Baton   Rouge   v.   Butler    (118   La. 

73;  42  So.  (350),  107,  400,  578. 
Batt  V.   Cullcn    (10   N.   Y.   L.    R. 

17),  1310. 
Batters    v.     Dunning     (49     Conn. 

479),  400,  035,  048. 
Battle   V.   State    (51   Ark.   97;    10 

S.  W.  12),  844. 
Batty   V.   State    (114   Ga.    79;    39 

S.  E.  918),  957. 
Bauer  v.   Board    ([Mich.]    122   N. 

W.   121),  891. 
Bauman     v.     Commonwealth     ( 14 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    [abstract]    174), 

514. 
Baxter,  In  re    (12  Up.  Can.   139), 

048. 
Baxter  v.  Ellis  (57  Me.  178),  1807. 
Baxter   v.   Leche    (02    J.   P.    030; 

79  L.  T.  138;  14  T.  L.  R.  352), 

019,  679. 
Baxter  v.  State    (49   Ore.  353;   88 

Pac.  677;    89   Pac.   369),  235, 

934,  935. 
Bayless,  In  re   (15  Ont.   13),  644. 
Bayles    v.    Newton    (50    N.    J.    L. 

549;    14  Atl.  604),  163. 
Bayless  v.  State    ( [Tenn.]    113   S. 

W.  1039),  1733. 
Beach  v.   Stanstead    (8   Quebec   S. 

C.   178),  627. 
Beall   V.   State    (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

105;     86    S.    W.    334),    1107, 

1207. 
Bean  v.  Barton  Co.   (33  Mo.  App. 

035),  650,  662,  885,  887. 
Bean  v.  Bean  (11  Lane.  Bar.  138), 

2153,  2158. 
Bean  v.  Green   (33  Ohio  St.  444), 

1960. 
Beane  v.   State    (72   Ark.  368;    80 

S.  W.  573),  1130,  1132. 
Beard  v.  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.   ([W. 

Va.]  64  S.  E.  'll9),  239,  2245. 
Beard  v.  State   ([Tex.]   115  S.  W. 

592),  950,  951. 
Beardsley  v.  State   (49  Ind.  240), 

1307. 


Bearley  v.  Morley  ([1899]  2  Q.  B. 

121;  63  J.  P.  582;  68  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  722;    47  VV.  R.  474;    15  T. 

L.  R.  392),  349. 
Beasley  v.  Beckley  (28  W.  Va.  81), 

278. 
Beasley  v.  State   (50  Ala.  149;  20 

Am.    Rep.    292),    2041,    2046, 

2051,  2054. 
Beatty  v.  Roberts   (125  Iowa  619; 

101  N.  W.  462),  1002,  1004. 
Beaty,    Ex    parte    (21    Tex.    App. 

426;    1  S.  W.  451),  875. 
Beaty  v.  State    (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

432;    110  S.  W.  449),  80,  87, 

449,  973,  1082. 
Beauchamp    v.    State     (0    Blackf. 

[Ind.]   299),  95. 
Beaumel  v.   State    (20   Fla.   71;    7 

So.  371),   1524,   1525,   1703. 
Beauvoir  Club  v.  State    (148  Ala. 

64;    40    So.    1040),    251,    285, 

1133,  1333,  1338. 
Beavers    v.    Godwin     ( [Tex.    Civ. 

App.]    90    S.    W.    930),    254, 

1032,   1046. 
Bechtle   v.    Lewis    ( 123   Mo.   App. 

673;    100  S.  W.  1107),  780. 
Beck  V.  State   (76  Ga.  452),  2041, 

2045,  2054. 
Beck  V.   State    (69   Miss.  217;    13 

So.  835),   1181. 
Beck    V.   Vaughn    (134    Iowa   331; 

111    N.    W.    994),    982,    983, 

999,  1005. 
Becker  v.   Betten    (39   Iowa   668), 

1803. 
Becker    v.    Lafayette    County    Ct. 

[Mo.]   119  S".  W.  985),  884. 
Becker    v.    State     (32    Ind.    480), 

1166. 
Becker  v.  State   (8  Ohio  St.  391), 

1511. 
Becker  v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

50  S.  W.  949).  1380.  1603. 
Beckerle  v.  Brandon   ( 133  111.  App. 

114;    229    111.    180;    82   N.    E. 

283),  1928.  1991. 
Beckham  v.  Howard  (83  Ga.  89;  9 

So.  784),  658,  067,  1159,  1696. 


Hv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Beddek  v.  Bowdle  (2G  N.  Z.  884), 

1134. 
Bedell,    Ex    parte    (20    Mo.    App. 

125),  1764. 
Bedore  v.  Newton   {54  N.  H.  117), 

223,  224,  1840,  1841. 
Beebe    v.    State    (6    Ind.    501;    63 

Am.  Dec.  391),  104,  175. 
Beebee  v.  Wilkins  ( [N.  H.]  29  Atl. 

693),   976. 
Beekhana    v.    State     (54    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    28;    111    S.    W.    1017), 

1167. 
Beem  v.  Chestnut  (120  Ind.  390; 

22  N.  E.  315;  1849,  1864, 

1938. 
Beer's  Case   (5  Gratt.  674),   1519. 
Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts    (97  U. 

S.    25),    91,    94,    95,    97,    99, 

109,    120,    124,    129,    179,    181, 

184,   211,   315,   427,   488,   489, 

490,  743. 
Beers  v.  Beers  (4  Conn.  535),  270, 

1748. 
Beers  v.  Walhizer    (43  Hun  254), 

1864,  1878,  1880,  1881. 
Behler  v.  Achley   ([Ind.]  88  N.  E. 

877),  604,  607. 
Behler  v.  State   (112  Ind.  140;   13 

N.  E.  272),   1242,  1627,  1628. 
Behrens  v.  State  (42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

629;  62  S.  W.  568),  1568 
Beigen,  In  re  (115  Fed.  339),  335. 
Beine,  In  re    (42  Fed.  545),   1433, 

1434. 
Beine,  In  re    (42   Fed.   545),    112, 

154,   307,   308,   313,   327,   337. 
Beiser  v.  State   (79  Ga.  326;  4  S. 

E.  257),  75,  410,  1300. 
Belasco  v.  Hannant,  3  B.  &  S.  13; 

26  J.  P.  823;   31   L.  J.  M.  C. 

225;    6  L.   T.  577;    10  W.  R. 

S(i7),  367,  726. 
Bclclior  V.  Belcher  (10  Yerg.  121). 

2093,  2094,  2099,   2108,  2134, 

2143. 
Belding  v.   Johnson    (86   Ga.    177; 

12    S.    E.    304;     11    L.    R.    A. 

53),  1878. 


Bell,  In  re    ([1907]    13  App.   Ont. 

L.  R.  80),  894. 
Bell,  Ex  parte  ( 24  Tex.  App.  428 ; 

6   S.   W.    197),   110,   164,   221, 

755. 
Bell    V.    Cassem    (158    111.    45;    41 

N.  E.   1089;   29  L.  R.  A.  571, 

aflhminy    56    III.    App.    260), 

2012. 
Bell  V.  Glaseker   (82  Iowa  736;  47 

N.  W.  1042),  987,  993. 
Bell    V.    Hamm     (127    Iowa    343; 

101   N.  W.  475),  342. 
Bell  V.  Lott   ([1905]   9  Ont.  L.  R. 

114),  1047. 
Bell  V.  State   (140  Ala.  57;  37  So. 

281),  2038,  2045. 
Bell  V.  State    (91   Ga.  227;    18   S. 

E.  288),  8,  85,  104,   162,  931. 
Bell  V.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  96;  12 

S.    W.    410),    164,    194,    224, 

1842. 
Bell  V.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.]   78 

S.  W.  933),  1612. 
Bell  V.  Thompson.  ([Iowa]    106  N. 

W.  949),  1103. 
Bell  V.  Walters    (14  W.  N.   [N.  S. 

W.]    190),    1128,    1124,    1131, 

1134. 
Bell  V.  Zelmer  (75  Mich.  66;  42  N. 

W.  606),  1848,   1869. 
Bellamy  v.  Pow   (60  J.  P.  712;   12 

T.  L.  R.  527),  354. 
Belle    Center   v.   Welsh    (11    Ohio 

Dee.    41;    24    Wkly.    L.    Bull. 

176).  1095. 
Bellison  v.  Apland  (115  Iowa  599; 

89  N.  W.  22),  1969,  1980. 
Belt    V.    Paul     ([Ark.]    91    S.    W. 

301),  718,  723,  740. 
Belton   V.  Busby    ([1899]    2  Q.   B. 

380;    68   L.   J.   Q.   B.   859;    63 

J.  P.  709;   47  W.  R.  636;    81 

L.  T.    196;    15  T.  L.  R.  458), 

379. 
I'x'lton    V.    London    Countj'^    Coun- 
cil   ([18931    68   L.  T.  411;   54 

J.    P.    1S5:    62    L.    J.    Q.    B. 

222;    41    W.   R.  315;    9   T.   L. 

232),  1834. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ly 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Benalleck    v.    People     (31     Mich. 

200),  1442,  1456. 
Bence   v.   State    ( [Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

35    S.    W.    383),    907. 
Bender  v.  Bueher   (8  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  344),  2255. 
Benge  v.  State   (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

3G1;    107    S.    W.    832),    1465, 

1473. 
Bengler  v.  Lilly   (26  Ohio  St.  48), 

1920. 
Benhoff    v.    Weaver     (6    0.    C.    D. 

361),  2012. 
Benjamin,     Eos     parte      (65     Cal. 

310;    40   Pac.   23),   802. 
Bennett,    In    re    (Clark   v.    White 

[1899]    1    Ch.    316;    68    L.    J. 

Ch.  104;  47  Vi.  R.  406),  1831. 
Bennett     v.     Commonwealth      (11 

Ky.   L.   Rep.   [abstract]   370), 

888,    910,    950,    1682. 
Bennett    v.     Commissioners     (125 

N.    C.    408;    34    S.    E.    632), 

1476. 
Bennett  v.  Levi  ( 19  N.  Y.  Supp. 

226),  1924,  1926,  1987,  1993. 
Bennett  v.  Otto  (68  Neb.  652; 

94  X.  W.  807),  586,  666. 
Bennett  v.  People  (16  111.  160), 

1189,  1652. 
Bennett  v.  People  (30  111.  389), 

16,  17,  18,  81,  400,  402,  443, 

522. 
Bennett    v.    Pulaski     ( [Tenn.    Ch. 

App.]  52  S.  W.  913;  47  L.  R. 

A.    278),   214,   432,   461,   469, 

1129. 
Bennett   v.    State    (87   Miss.   803; 

40  So.  554),  1201. 
Bennett   v.    State    (Mart.    &   Yerg. 

133),  2040,  2053. 
Bennett  v.  State  ( 40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

445;    50    S.    W.    947),    1556, 

1611. 
Bennett  v.  State  ( 49  Tox.  Cr.  App. 

294;   92  S.  W.  415),  1323. 
Bennett  v.  Talbois    (1   Ld.  Raym. 

149),   1455. 
Benning   v.    State    (123    Ga.   546; 

ol  S.  E.  632),  249. 


Benninger,     Ex    parte     (64     Cal. 

291;    30  Pac.  846),    170,   187, 

444. 
Benson    v.     McFadden     (50     Ind. 

431),   1242. 
Benson  v.  Mayor    (10   Barb.  223), 

98. 
Benson  v.  Moore   (15  Wend.  260), 

72,  508. 
Benson  v.   State    ( [Ky.]   44  S.   W. 

168),   1720. 
Benson    v.     State     (30    Tex.     Cr. 

App.  56;  44  S.  W.  167,  1091), 

958,    1690. 
Benson  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

44  S.  W.   163),   1693,   1715. 
Benson  v.  State   (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

367;    101  S.  W.  224),  1691. 
Benson  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

109  S.  W.   168),  1473. 
Benson  v.  United  States   (44  Fed. 

178),    1260. 
Benton  v.  Skylter    (  [Xeb.]    122  N. 

W.     61),     2095,     2108,     2116, 

2117. 
Benton  v.  State  (99  Ind.  89),  836. 
Berchwold  v.  People   (21  111.  App. 

213),   1280. 
Berg,  In  re    (139  Pa.  St.  354;   21 

Atl.   77),   664. 
Berger,    In    re     (115    Fed.    339), 

323. 
Berger    v.    DeLeach     (121    S.    W. 

591),  631,  667. 
Berger   v     State    (50    Ark.    20;    6 

S.   W.   15),   1285. 
Berger  v.  State   ([Ark.)    11  S.  W. 

765),  49,  50. 
Berger    v.    Williams     (4    McLeiin, 

377;     Fed.     Cas.    Xo.     1341), 

2008. 
Bergeron    v.    Floury    ( 7    Rev.   Leg. 

^183),   1781. 
Bergman    v.    Cleveland     (39    Ohio 

St.  651),  189,  218. 
Bergmeyer    v.    Commonwealth     (3 

Ky.  L.   Rep.    [abstract]    823), 

946. 
Bergmeyer    v.    Commonwealth     ;  3 

Ky^  L.  Rep.  823),  1764. 


Ivi 


TABLB   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Bergmever  v.  Greenup  Co.    (  [Ky.] 

44  S.  W.  82 ) ,  400. 
Berkemeir  v.  State   ([Ind.],  88  X. 

E.  t)34),  44,  1849,  1S50,  1937, 

1938,    1941,    1951,    1962. 
Berkley   v.   Cannon    (Rich.   L.    [S. 

C]   136),  2094,  2099,  2136. 
Bernard    v.    Feild    (46    Me.    526), 

1800. 
Bernhardt  v.   State    (82  Wis.   23; 

51  S.  W.  1009),  2085. 
Berning   v.    State    (51    Ark.    550; 

11    S.    W.    882),    513,    1372, 

1644. 
Berry  v.   Baltimore,   etc.,   R.    Co. 

(41  Md.  446),  294. 
Berry    v.    Cramer     (58    N.    J.    L. 

278;    33   Atl.   201),   229,   795, 

797. 
Berry  v.  DeMaris  ( [X.  J.]  70  Atl. 

337),  125,  127. 
Berry    v.    State     (67    Ind.    222), 

1252,   1500,   1564. 
Berryman  v.  Berryman    (59  Mich. 

G05;  26  X.  W.  789),  68,  2155, 

2157,  2162. 
Bert    V.    People     (113    111.    645), 

1622. 
Bertha,  The   (111  Fed.  550),  2262. 
Bertholf    v.    O'Reilly     (74    X.    Y. 

509),    223,    312,    1303,    1840, 

1841,    1859,    1863,    1864. 
Bertrand,   In  re    (40  X^.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    536;     82    X.    Y.    Supp. 

940),  867,  879,  903,  908,  971. 
Bertzel  v.  Court  of  Common  Pleas 

( [X.  J.  L.]  48  Atl.  1013) ,  736. 
Bertzell    v.    District    of    Columbia 

(21  App.  D.  C.  49),  543. 
Bessemeir     v.     Edge     ( [Al^a.]     50 

So.  270),  254. 
Best  V.  Best  (11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  215), 

2134. 
Betting   v.   Hobbitt    (142   111.   72; 

30   X.   E.    1048;    affirming   42 

111.    App.    174),    1994. 
Betts  V.  Armstead    (20  Q.  R.  Div. 

771;    52   J.   P.   471;    51   L.   J. 

M.  C.   109;    58  L.  T.  811;    38 

W.  R.  720),  1383. 


Betts    V.    Divine    (3    Conn.    107), 

1014. 
Beverage,  Ex  parte  (26  Tex.  App. 

35),  913. 
Beverley's    Case    (4    Coke,    125a), 

2039,    2095. 
Bevery  Brewing  Co.  v.  Oliver    (69 

Vt.  323;   37  Atl.  1110),  1789. 
Bew  V.  Harston  ( 3  Q.  B.  Div.  454 ; 

42  J.  P.  808;   47  L.  J.  M.  C. 

121;    26  W.  R.  915),  374. 
Bew  V.  State   (71  Miss.  1;   13  So. 

868),  861. 
Bowen    v.    Clark     (1     Biss.     128; 

Fed.  Cas  Xo.   1721),  2109. 
Beyers    v.    Willowmore    Licensing 

Board    (17   Juta,   254),    1264. 
Bhstedt    V.    Terefel     ([Iowa]     106 

X.  W.  513),  991. 
Bickerstaff,  In  re    (70  Cal.  35;   11 

Pac.  393),  189,  200,  471,  566. 
Bickford  v.  Xew  York   State  Life 

Ins.   Co.    (Bliss    on    Ins.    [2d 

ed.]  366),  2224. 
Biddv  v.  State  (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

412;  107  S.  W.  814),  1732, 

1733. 
Biddv   V.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

108    S.    W.    689),    914,    1580, 

1584,  1602,  1731. 
Biederman,    In    re     (3    Pennewill 

[Del.]  284;  51  AtL  602),  552. 
Biese  v.   State    (79  Ga.  326;   4  S. 

E.  257),  1192. 
Bieser   v.    State    (79    Ga.    326;    4 

S.  E.  257),  73,  76. 
Bigelow     V.     Crerquellochie,     etc., 

Co.   (37  Can.  S.  C.  55;  affirm- 
ing 37  X.  S.  482),  1281,  1284, 

1792. 
Biggins,   In   re    (19    X.    Z.    L.    R. 

630),   1116,   1669. 
Biggs     V.     Cunningham      ([1909] 

Vict.    L.    R.    344;    29    Austr. 

L.   T.    14),    1311. 
Biggs  V.  Lamley    ([1907]   Vict.  L. 

R.    300),    il31. 
Biggs  v.  McCarthy   (56  Ind.  352), 

1906. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ivii 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Eight,  In  re   (12  Can.  Prac.  433), 

410,  420. 
Bilbro  V.  State    (7   Humph.  534), 

1450,    1488,   1489. 
Billinghurst   v.    Vickers    ( 1    Phil- 

lim  Eccl.  Rep.  193),  2140. 
Eillings    V.     State     (41     Tex.     Cr. 

App.    253;     53     S.     \V.    851), 

l'(J51. 
Billingsley  v.  State    (96  Ala.  114; 

11  So.  408),  1196. 
Bills    V.    State     ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

G4   S.   W.    1047),    1204,    1543. 
Bills    V.    State    ( [Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

86  S.  W.  1012),  1380. 
Bilups  V.  State    (107  Ga.  766;   33 

S.   E.    659),    1182. 
Bing  V.  Bank  of  Kingston    (5  Ga. 

App.    578;     65    S.    E.     652), 

2094,  2095,  2108,  2112. 
Bingliam  Co.  v.  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co. 

(Idaho,      13;      88      Pac.    829, 

560,    767,   793,    799,    802. 
Benoth,  Ex  parte    ( 1  S.  C.   [X.  S. 

VV.]    122),    1371. 
Bird,  Ex  parte  (19  Cal.  130),  215. 
Bird  V.  State   (104  Ind.  384;  3  N. 

E.  827),   1242. 
Bird  V.  United  States    ( 187  U.  S. 

118,    124    [23    Sup.    Ct.    42]), 

1421. 
Birdsong    v.    Birdsong     ( 2    Head. 

280),   2094,  2098,   2099,  2102, 

2106,   2107,   2115. 
Birkman    v.     Fahrenthold     ( [Tex. 

Civ.    App.]    114    S.    W.    428), 

1850,    1852,    1853,    1955,    1956, 

1961,  1962,  1969. 
Birley    v.    McDonald     (48    C.    [N. 

Y.]    427),    1279. 
Birmingham  v.  People  ([Colo.]  90 

Pac.  1121),  1128,  1134. 
Birmingham     Breweries,     Limited 

V.  Jameson    ([1898]   67   L.  J. 

Ch.  403;    78  L.  T.  512;    14  T. 

L.  R.  396),  1817. 
Birr  v.  People   (24  111.  App.  380), 

1254. 
Bishop    V.    Honey    (34    Tex.   245), 

1801. 


Bishop    V.    Tripp    (15    R.    I.    466; 

8   Atl.   692),    792. 
Bissell    V.    fetarzinger     (112    Iowa 

2:66;    73    N.   W.    1065),   1939. 
Bittix  V.  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

232;    87    S.    VV.  348),    1214, 
Bivens  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

43  S.  W.   1007),  1237. 
Bixler   v.   Gilleland    (4    Pa.    156), 

2119. 
Bizer  v.  Bizer    (110  Iowa  248;   81 

N.   W.   4G5),   65. 
Black's    Estate     (8    Pa.    Ct.    Rep. 

266),    2120. 
Black  V.  Ellis    (3   Hill  L.   [S.  C] 

68),   2137,   2149. 
Black  V.  McGilvery   (38  Me.  287), 

1021. 
Black    V.    State     (60    Ala.    493), 

1500. 
Black   V.   State    (112   Ga.    29;    37 

,S.  E.   108),   1217,  1371,   1379, 

1615. 
Black  Diamond  Distilling   Co.,  In 

re    (33   Pa.    Super.    Ct.    649), 

664. 
Blackburn   v.    Commonwealth    ( 15 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    [abstract]    239), 

945. 
Blackeny   v.    Green    (9    Ohio    Dec. 

570),    2008. 
Blackmar  v.  Nickerson   (188  Mass. 

399;  74  N.  E.  932),  1022. 
Blackwell         v.        Commonwealth 

([Ky.]   54  S.  W.  843;   21  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  240),  909,  1467,  1680, 

1683. 
Blackwell  v.  State   (36  Ark.  178), 

135,   136,  247,  594,  862,  1278, 

1570. 
Blackwell  v.  State   (42  Ark.  275), 

1285. 
Blackwell  v.  State    (45   Ark.  90), 

1113. 
Blahut    V.    State    (54    Ark.    538; 

16  S.  W.  582),  1233. 
Blain    v.    Bailey     (25    Ind.    165), 

467. 
Blair,  Ex  parte   (12  Ch.  Div.  522, 

533),   539. 


Iviii 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Blair  v.  Kilpatrick  (40  Ind.  312), 

6G3. 
Blair  v.  Rutenfranz  (40  ind.  312), 

190,  662,  663. 
Blair  v.  Kilpatrick    (40  Ind  312), 

189,    190,    662,    «71. 
Blair    v.    State     (81    Ga.    628;     7 

S.   E.  855),   1224,   1233. 
Blair  v.   Vierling    (33    Ind.   260), 

662. 
Blake  v.  State    (118   Ga.  333;   43 

S.   E.   249),    945. 
Blaine,  Ex  parte  (11  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

193),  685. 
Blakeley   v.   State    (73   Ark.   218; 

83   S.   W.   948),   845. 
Blakely  v.  State    (57   Miss.    680), 

1497,    1498. 
Blaney     v.     Blaney      (126     Mass. 

205),    67,    2153,    2154,    2155, 

2157. 
Blankenship  v.  State  (93  Ga.  814; 

21  S.  E.  130),  22,   1217,  1711. 
Blasdell  v.  Hewit  (3  Cuines  157), 

1497,   1553. 
Blasingame  v.  State    (47  Tex.  Cr. 

App.    582;     85     S.    W.    275), 

949,  953,  1213,  1596,  1609, 

1696. 
Blatz  V.  Rohrback  (116  X.  Y. 

450;  22  N.  E.  1049;  6  L.  R. 

A.  669),  42.  43,  47,  48,  82, 

S3,  1753,  1873. 
Blaylock  v.  State  (108  Tenn.  185; 

65  N.  VV.  398),  1129,  1131, 

1363. 
Bleich  V.  People    (227  111.  80;   81 

N.   E.   36),   2038,    2069,   2085. 
Blencome  &  Co.  v.  Hatlieiton    (71 

J.    P.    210;     96    L.    '!'.    817), 

C79. 
Blessing    v.    Galveston     ( 42    Tex. 

641),  394. 
Blessley   v.  John    (Times,  May    1, 

1899),  1822. 
Blevins  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.l 

2:j   S.   W    688),    1515 
Bligh    V.    .Jame>»     [U    Allen    570), 
1800. 


Blimm  v.  Commonwealth   (7  Buah 

320),  2041,  2061,  2062,  2081. 
Bliss  V.  Beck    (80  Neb.   290;    114 

N.  VV.   162),  2258. 
Block     V.     Jacksonville      (36     III. 

301),  451,  489,  523,  525. 
Block    V.    State     (66    Ala.    414), 

1571. 
Blodgett    V.    State     (97    Ga.    351; 

23   S.   E.  830),    1223. 
Blodgett    V.    State    (37    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  70;  38  S.  VV.  783),  1203. 
Bloom  V.  Richards    (2  Ohio  387), 

215,   216. 
Bloomer  v.  Glendy  (70  Iowa,  757; 

30  !N.  VV.  486),  990,  991. 
Bloomfield  v.  State  (10  Mo.  556), 

1457,    1502,    1509. 
Bloomfield    v.    Trumble     (54    la. 

399),    216,    2026. 
Bloomhoff     V.     State      (8     Blackf. 

205),    1107,    1109,    1716. 
Bloomingdale,  In  re  ( 72  N.  Y.  St. 

350;    38    N.    Y.    Supp.    162), 

636. 
Bloomington    v.    Strehl     (47     111. 

72),    1645. 
Blordel    v.    Zimmerman    (41    Neb. 

695:   60  N.  VV.  6),   1904. 
Blough   V.    State    (121    Ind.    355; 

18  N.  E.  682),  1488. 
Blum    v.    Ansley     ([1900]     64    J. 

P.    184),   1827. 
Blumenthal,    In    re    (125    Pa.    St. 

412;    18    Atl.   395;    23    Wkly. 

N.    C.    493),    552,    694,    695, 

700. 
Blunchi  v.  Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

64    S.    VV.    971;     23    Ky.    L. 

Rep.   1185),   1571. 
Bluthentbal  v.  Headland  ( 132  Ala. 

249;   31   So.  87),  1780. 
Bluthentbal    v.    McVVborter     (131 

Ala.    642;    31    So.   559),    1785, 
17^19,    179S,    1806. 
Board,  Appeal  of    (64  Conn.  526; 

30   Atl.    /75),   662,  669. 
Board   V.  Barri'.-    (34  N.  Y.   657). 
743. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


lis 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Board  v.  Buchanan    (36  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  411;  82  S.  W.  194),  &G3. 
Board  v.  Churchill    (21  Fla.  578), 

662. 
Board   v.    Forman    (102    Ky.   496; 

43  S.  W.  682;   19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1553),  831. 
Board  v.  Krueger    (88  Ind.  231), 

672. 
Board    v.    Lease     (22    Ind.    261), 

662. 
Board  v.  Mayor   (31  Colo.  173;  74 

Pac.  458),  478,  718,  720,  733. 
Board    v.    Merchant    (103    N.    Y. 

143;  8  N.  E.  484),  264,  1585. 
Board  v.  Renfro  ([Ky.J  58  S.  W. 

795;   22   Ky.  L.  Rep.   806;    51 

L.  R.  A.  897),  191. 
Board    v.    Sackrider     (35    N.    Y. 

154),  1743. 
Board  v.  Scott  (125  Ky.  545;   101 

S.   W.    944;    30   Ky.   L.    Rep. 

804),  91,  849,  942. 
Board  v.   South   Carolina   Ry.   Co. 

(57  Fed.  485),  1017. 
Board   v.    Taylor    (21   N.   Y.    173, 

177),  4,  15,  46,  1592. 
Board  v.   Watson    (5   Bush    [Ky.] 

660),  406. 
Boatright  v.  State    (77  Ga.  717), 

1227,   1233,   1357. 
Bobier  v   Clay   (27  Up.  Can.  438), 

2239. 
Bode  V.  State    (7   Gill,  320),  91, 

307,  316,  1457,  1511. 
Bodge  V.  Hughes   (53  N.  H.  4)14), 

1350,   1855,   1882,   1893,   1907. 
Bodgett   V.   State    ([Ala.]    48    So. 

54),  945. 
Boericke  &   Runyan   Co.  v.  U.   S. 

(126  Fed.   1018).  18. 
Bogan,  Ex  parte    (8   N.   S.  W.  L. 

R.  409),   548. 
Bogan   V.   State    (84    Ala.   449;    4 

So.  255),   1469,   1518,   1523. 
Bogel  V.  State    (42  Tex.  Cr.   App. 

389;     55    S.    W.    830).    1378, 

1380. 
Bogg   V.   Jerome    (7    Mich.    145), 

1775. 


Boggess  V.  Boggess  ( 4  Dana,  308 ) , 

2166. 
Bohler  v.  Schneider   ( 49  Ga.  195 ) , 

198,    201,    796,   797. 
Bohstedt    v.    Shanks     (136    Iowa, 

686;    116  N.  W.  812),  979. 
Bohstedt  v.   Tempel    ([Iowa]    106 

N.  W.  513),  1084,  1085. 
Boisblanc  v.  Louisiana  Eq.  L.  Ins, 

Co.   (34  La.  Ann.  1167),  2244. 
Bolder  v.  Schneider   (49  Ga.  195), 

787. 
Boldt    V.    State    (72    Wis.    7;    38 

N.  W.  177),  1445,  1446,  1614, 

1650,   1653,   1739. 
Bolduc     V.     Randall     (107     Mass. 

121),  498,  499,  501,   503. 
Boles  V.  McCarty  (6  Blackf.  427), 

780. 
Bollen   V.   State    (26    Texas    App. 

483;    9   S.   W.   765),   369. 
Bollinger    v.    Wilson     (76    Minn. 

262;    79    N.    W.    109),    1780, 

1787,  1803. 
Bolt   V.    State    (60    Ark.    600;    31 

S.  W.  460),  930. 
Bolton   V.    Becker    (82   Neb.    772; 

119  N.  W.   14),  599. 
Bolton    V.   Hegmsr    (82   Neb.   772; 

118  N.  W.   1096),  598,  600. 
Bolton  V.  McKay    ([Iowa]    102  N. 

W.   1131),   199,  223,  790. 
Boltze  V.  State  (24  Ala.  89),  1245. 
Bolun    V.    People     (73    HL    488), 

1763,    1764. 
Bonaker   v.    State    (42    Fla.    348; 

29  So.  321),  933. 

Bond  V.  Evans  (21  Q.  B.  Div.  249; 

52  J.  P.  613;    57  L.  J.  M.  C. 

105;   59  L.  T.  411;   36  W.  R. 

767)^   375.   376,   1152. 
Bond   V.   Plumb    ([1894]    1    Q.   B. 

169;    58  J.  P.    168),   377. 
Bond  V.  State   (13  Sm.  &  M.  265), 

1246. 
Bonds    V.    sStatc     (1.30    Ala.     106; 

30  So.  413).   1744. 

Bonds  V.  State    (130  Ala.   117;    30 
So.  427),  1379. 


Ix 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Boner    v.   Meyer    (11    York     Leg. 

Rec.  [Pa.]   58),  2117,  2121. 
Bonesteel  v.  Downs  (73  Iowa,  685; 

35  X.  W.  924),  1767. 
Boniface  v.  Scott   (3  S.  &  R.  351), 

75. 
Bonner  v.  State   (2  Ga.  App.  711; 

58  S.  E.  1123),  1172. 
Bonner  v.  Wellborn   (7   Ga.  296), 

72. 
Bonner  v.  State   (2  Ga.  App.  711; 

58  N.  E.   1123),   1701. 
Bonser    v.    State     (Smith     [Ind.] 

408),  1570. 
Boodle   V.   Birmingham    (J.   J.   45 

J.  P.  P.   636),  701,  709,  711. 
Booher    v.    State    (156    Ind.   435; 

60   N.   E.    156;    54    L.   R.    A. 

391),   2039,   2076,   2083. 
Book  V.  Commonwealth    (107   Ky. 

605;    55   S.   W.   7;   21  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  1342),  929. 
Boomer  shine    v.    Uline    ( 159    Ind. 

503;    65   N.  E.  513),  94,   144, 

189,    209,   855,    604,   611. 
Boon,  In  re    (24    Up.   Can.   361), 

907. 
Boon  V.  State  (69  Ala.  226),  1491, 

1517. 
Boone  v.  State  (10  Tex.  App.  418; 

38  S.  W.  641),  833. 

Boone  v.  State  (12  Tex.  App.  184), 

929,  933,  1740. 
Boos  V.  State  (11  Ind.  App.  257; 

39  N.  E.  197),  767,  771,  1844, 
1849.  1870,  1907,  1924. 

Boothby  v.  Plaisted  (51  N.  H. 

436),  1288,  1787. 
Borch  V.  State  ([Ala.]  3»  So. 

580),  1311. 
Borches  v.  State  ( 33  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

96;  25  S.  W.  423),  1569,  1737. 
Borck  V.  State  ([Okla.]  30  So. 

580),  289,  714,  1188,  1579. 
Borden  v.  ^lontana  Club  ( 10  Mont. 

330;  25  Pac.  1042;  11  L.  R. 

A.  .593;  47  Am.  St.  35),  1330. 
Bordwoll    V.    State    (77   Ark.    161; 

91  S.  W.  555),  672,  859,  910, 

047. 


Bormann,    Appeal    of     (81    Conn; 

458;    71   Atl.   502),  662,  667. 
Born  V,  Hopper    (110  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  218;  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  671; 

48  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.   177;   96 

K  Y.  Supp.  671),  751. 
Borne    v.    Mayor,    etc.,    of    Liver- 
pool   ([1863]    32   L.   J.   Q.   B. 

15),   1834. 
Bosley    v.    Davies    (1    Q.    B.    Div. 

84;    45  L.  J.  M.  C.  27;   33  L. 

T.    528;     24    W.    R.    140;    40 

J.  P.  550),  376. 
Boswell   V.   State    (70   Miss.    395; 

12  So.  446),  932,  2039,  2045, 

2051,  2067. 
Botkins    v.    State    (36    Ind.    App. 

179;     75     N.     E.    298),    356, 

1147,   1540. 
Bothwell,  In  re  (44  Mo.  App.  215), 

910. 
Bottle  V.   State    (51    Ark.   97;    10 

S.   W.    12),   835. 
Bottoms  V.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

73   .S.    W.    16,    20,   963),   958, 

1621. 
Botts    V.    State     (26    Miss.    108), 

1714. 
Boucher    v.    Capital    Brewing   Co. 

([1905]     9     Ont.    Rep.    266), 

1779,    1812. 
Boulter    v.    Kent.    J.    J.     ([1897] 

App.  Cas.  569;   61  J.  P.  532; 

66    L.    J.    Q.    B.    787;    77    L. 

T.    288;     46    W.    R.    114;     13 

T.  L.  R.  538).  669,  679,  681. 
Bound  V.  South   Carolina  Ry.  Co. 

(57  Fed.  485),  1021,  1046. 
Bour John's  Application    (2  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  Rep.  33).  598,  599. 
Bourland    v.     Hildreth     (26    Cal. 

162),   227. 
Bourman    v.    Com.     ( 14    Ky.   Law 

Rep.   174),   1615. 
Boutwell  V.   P^oster    (24  Vt.  485), 

1780. 
Bowden   v.   People    (12  Hun,  85), 

2059. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixi 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Bowden    v.    Voorhis     (135    Mich. 

648;    95   N.   W.   406;    10  Del. 

Leg.     N.     908),     1918,     1985, 

2003. 
Bowen    v.    Clark     (1    Biss.    128; 

Fed.    Cas.    No.    1721),    2093, 

2104,   2106. 
Bowen  v.  Hale   (4   Clarke   [Iowa] 

430),   990,   991,    1771. 
Bowen  v.   Lease    (5   Hill    [N.   Y.] 

221),  467. 
Bowen  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  103; 

12  S.  W.  413),  1486. 
Bower  v.  State    ( [Ark.]   57   S.  W. 

800),   1201. 
Bowerman   v.   Commonwealth    ( 1 4 

Ky.  E.  Rep.    [abstract]    174), 

1182. 
Bowie  V.   Bowie    (3   ild.   Ch.   51), 

2164,   2165. 
Bowie  V.   Gilmour    (24   Ont.  App. 

254),  1792. 
Bowles    V.    State     (13    Ind.    427), 

1443. 
Bowling      Green      v.      McMullen 

([Ky.]   122  S.  W.  823),  11. 
Bowman!  In  re    (167  Pa.  644;    31 

Atl.   932),  616,   617,   664. 
Bowman  v.  Cliicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.    (125   U.   S.   465;    8   Sup. 

Ct.  689,  1062;  31  L.  Ed.  700), 

154,   304,   313,   315,   318,   323, 

335,  1427,  1433, 
Bowman  v.    State    (16  Tex.   App. 

513),   1575. 
Bowman  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

35  S.  W.  382),  1615. 
Bowman    v.    State     (14   Tex.    Cr. 

App.    38;    40    S.    W.    796;    41 

S.  W.   635),  890. 
Bowman    v.    State    (38    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  14;  40  S.  W.  7«6;  41  S. 

W.   635).   211.  245    251,  872, 

935,  1680,  1681.  1^683. 
Bows  V.  Fenwiek   (L.  R.  9;   C.  P. 

339;     43    L.    J.    M.    C.    107; 

30  L.  T.  524;   22  W.  R.  804; 

38  J.  P.  440),  380. 


Bowyer    v.     Percy     Supply    Club 

([1893]    2    Q.    B.    154;    5    R. 

472;   69  L.  T.  447;   42  W.  R. 

29;    17    Cox,    C.    C.    669;    57 

J.  P.   470),   1342,   1345. 
Boyd  V.  Alabama   (94  U.  S.  645), 

94,    95,    97,     129,    489. 
Boyd  V.  Bryant    (35   Ark.  69;   37 
"  Am.   Rep.    6),    134,    136,   232, 

234,   240,    247,    248. 
Boyd    V.    Bryant     (35    Kan.    69), 

228. 
Boyd  V.  State  (12  Lea,  687),  1300. 
Boyd  V.  State   (49   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

399;    92   S.   W.   845),    1212. 
Boyd  V.   State    (49  Tex.   Cr.   App. 

197;    92   S.  W.  845),   1202. 
Boyd  V.  State  (80  Tenn.  [12  Lea] 

687),  247. 
Boyd  V.  Watt   (27   Ohio  St.  259), 

1882,    1912,    1917. 
Boyden      v.      Hal)erstumpf      ( 129 
"  Mich.    138;    88    N.    W.    386), 

1985. 
Boyer  v.  Barr    (8  Neb.  68),  1991. 
Boylan,  In  re    (15  Ont.   13),  420. 
Boyle,   In  re    (190    Pa.    St.    577; 

42    Atl.    1025;    45    L.    R.    A. 

399),   139. 
Boyle     V.      Commonwealth       ( 14 

Gratt.  <374),  1497,  lo57. 
Boyle    V.    Phoenix    Mut.    L.    Ins. 

Co.      ( Ramsey  s     App.      Cas. 

[Low.  Can.]),  379),  2229. 
Boyle  V.   Smith    ([1906]    1   K.   B. 

432;    70   J.  P.   115;    75  L.   J. 

K.  B.   282;    94   L.    I.   30;   54 

W.  R.  519;  22   £.  L.  R.  200), 

513,  1352,  1355. 
Braconier  v.  Packard    (136  Mass. 

50),  648. 
Bradford  v.  Boley   (167  Penn.  St. 

506;  31  Atl.  751),  1858,  1880, 

1881. 
Bradford    v.    Dawson     ([1887]     1 

Q.   B.  307;   61   J.  P.  134;   66 

L.  J.  Q.  B.  191;  76  L,.  T.  54; 

45  W.  R.  347;   18  Cox  O.  C. 

4^3),  377. 


Ixii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


fReferences   are   to   pages.] 


Bradford  v.  Jellico    (1   Tenn.  Ch. 

App.  700),  461,  1316. 
Bradford    v.    State     (5    Ga.    App. 

49i;  63  S.  E.  530),  1583. 
Bradford    v.     Stevens     ( 10    Gray, 

379),  306,  307,  313,   314. 
Bradgett   v.  State    ([Ala.]   48   So. 

54),  1696. 
Bradley    v.    Second    Ave.    R.    Co. 

(8  Daly,  289),  2177,  2195. 
Bradley    v.    State    (121    Ga.    201; 

40  S.  E.  981),  829,  969. 
Bradley    v.    State    (31    Ind.    492), 

2040,   2051. 
Bradley  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.J 

75  S.  W.  32),   1377.   1396. 
Bradley    v.    Thurston    (7    Hawaii, 

523),   627. 
Bradshaw  v.  State    (76   Ai'k.  562; 

89  S.  W.  1051),  970. 
Bradshaw  v.  Omaha    (1  Neb.  16), 

106,    394. 
Bradley,   In    re    (22   X.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    301;     49    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1109),   697,   743. 
Brady,    Ex   parte    (70    Ark.    376; 

68  S.  W.  34),  2261. 
Brady,   In   re    (106    X.    Y.    Supp. 

961),   103,  594. 
Brag,!?  v.   State    (126  Ga.  442;    55 

S.  E.  232),   1C51. 
Braisted   v.   People    (38   Colo.    49; 

88  Pac.  150,   151),  842,  1477. 
Brame    v.    State     ( [Ala.]    38    So. 

1031),  1470. 
Bramlette  v.  State    (21  Tex.  App. 

611;    2  S.  W.  765),  2075. 
Branch,   In   re    (164   Pa.   427;    30 

Atl.   296;    35   W.  N.   C.   310), 

664,  763. 
Branch  v.  Sceats  (20  W.  X.  [X. 

S.  W.]  41),  1265. 
Brand  v.  Schenectady,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(8  Barb.  368)"  2177,  2185, 

2195. 
Brandlingor,  In  re   (11  Montg.  Co. 

L.  Rep.  93).  639. 
Brandon  v.  Brandon  (14  Kan. 

342),  2163. 


Brandon  v.  Old  (3  C.  &  P.  440), 

2101. 
Brandt  v.  State  (17  Ind.  App. 

311;  46  X.  E.  682),  1849, 

1908,  1910,  1921,  1941,  1964, 
Brannan  v.  Adams  (76  111.  331), 

1844. 
Brannen  v.  Kokonio,  etc.,  Co.  (115 

Ind.  115;   17  X.  E.  202), 

2187. 
Brannon     v.    Silvernail      (81     111. 

484),    1943.    1989,    1990. 
Brant    v.    Fowler     (7    Cow.    562), 

2254. 
Brantigan  v.  White   (73  111.  561), 

1847,    1908,    1892,    1994. 
Brantley    v.    State    (91    Ala.    47; 

8   So.  816),   1494,    1586.    1699. 
Brantley    v.    State     (42    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  293;  59  S.  W,  892),  852. 
Branton     v.     Branton      (23     Ark. 

580),   1906. 
Brashears        v.        Commonwealth 

([Ky.]    57   S.   W.   475),   1380. 
Brass    v."    State     (45    Fla.    1;     34 

So.  307),  4,  286,  1495. 
BraswcU     v.     Commonwealth      (5 

Bush,  544),  72,  1542. 
Braun,   Ex   parte    (141    Cal.   204; 

74  Pac.  780),  789. 
Braunstein  v.  People   ([Colo.]   105 

Pac.   857),  413,   434. 
Bray   v.   Commerce    ([Ga.]    63    S. 

'e.  596),   1172,   1181. 
Breck    v.    Adams     (69    Mass.     [3 

Gray]   569),  1031. 
Breconier   v.   Packard    ( 136   Mass. 

50),  572. 
Brecourt    v.    State    (5    Ind.   499), 

1102. 
Breeding    v.    Jordan     (115     Iowa, 

566:    8S    X.    W.    1090),    1923, 

1924. 
Breek    v.    Adams    ( 3    Gray,    5<j9 ) , 

1777. 
Breeland     v.      State      ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   50  S.  W.  722),  1634. 
Breen.    In   re    (2    Pa.    Dist.    Rep. 

652),  695,  701. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


Ixiii 


[Peferenccs   are   to    pages.] 


Bremen  v.  Michigan,  etc.,   R.   Co. 
(93     Mich.     15G;     53    N.    W. 
358),  2191. 
Bremmer  v.  Thompson    ( 15  N.   S. 

W    L.  R.  345),  1298. 
Brennan,  Ex  parte   («0  X.  B.  91), 

938. 
Brennan  v.  People    (37  Colo.  256; 

86  Pac.  79),  2038,  2060,  2062, 

2068,  2070,  2084. 
Brennan    v.    Roberts     ( 125    Iowa, 

615;    101    N.    W.   460),    1000, 

1001,  1003,  1004.  1318. 
Brenner    v.    State    ([Ala.]    38    So. 

1031),  243. 
Brentley    v.    State     (91    Ala.    47; 

8  So.  816),  87. 
Breslin,  In  re  (45  Hun,  210),  680, 

1300. 
Breubaker  v.  State   (89  Ind.  577), 

734. 
Brevaldo  v.   State    (21    Fla.   789), 

1655. 
Brewer  v.  Commonwealth    (14  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   270),  936. 
Brewer    v.    Nutt     (118    Ga.    257; 

45  S.  E.  269),  802. 
Brewer    v.    Shepherd     (37    J.    P. 

102),  1137. 
Brewer  v.  Stagpoole   (13  N.  Z.  L. 

R.    134).    1313. 
Brewer  v.  State  (75  Tenn.  [7  Lea] 

682),   135,  247,  1279. 
Brewer,   etc.,   Co.    v.   Boddie    (181 

111.    622;    55    X.    E.    49),    69, 

70. 
Brewing  Co.  In  re   (14  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.    188),  640,   1270. 
Brewing   Co.   v.   Mass.    (97    U.    S. 

25).  398. 
Brewster,   In   re    (39   X.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    609;     80    X.    Y.     Supp. 

666),  544. 
Brewster,   In   re    (85   X.   Y.   App. 

Div.  235;  83  X.  Y.  Supp.  235; 

13   X.   Y.   Ann.   Cas.   250,   re- 
versing 80  X.  Y.  Supp.  066), 

730. 
Breyer   v.   State    (102   Tenn.    110; 
'so   S.  W.   769),  454. 


Brezger,   In  re    (34   Pa.   Sup.    Ct. 

469),  622,  625. 
Brice    v.    State    ( [Ga.]    34    S.    E. 

202),    1088. 
Brickner    v.    Xew    York,    etc.,    R. 

Co.   (2  Lans,  506;  affirmed  49 

X.  Y.  072),  2199,  2200. 
Bridewell  v.  Ward    (72  Ark.   187; 

79  S.  W.  762),  947. 
Bridge,  In  re   (36  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 

533;  25  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  213; 

55  X.  Y.  Supp.  54;   56  X.  Y. 

Supp.   1105),  576,  580,  582. 
Bridge,    In    re    (56    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1105;     36    X.    Y.    App.     Div. 

533;    55  X'.   Y.   Supp.   54;    af- 
firming  25   X.   Y.   Misc.   Rep. 

213),  565,  742,  743,  745. 
Bridge    v.    Ford     (4    Mass.    641), 

1018. 
Bridges   v.    State    (37   Ark.   224), 

1452. 
Bridgeford    v.     Lexing'on     (7    B. 

Mon.  47),  1441,  1765. 
Bridgeford    v.    State    (7    B.    Mon. 

47),  1556. 
Bridgen  v.  Ileighes    (1  Q.  B.  Div. 

330;    40   J.   P.   661;    45   L.  J. 

M.    C.    58;    34   L.   T.   242;    24 

W.   R.    272),   1142,    1145. 
Bridgeport    v.    Railroad    Company 

(15    Conn.   475),   904. 
Briintt  V.  State    (58   Wis.   39;    16 

X.   W.   39;    46   Am.   St.  621), 

41,  42,  83,  84,  1592,  1764. 
Brigan     v.     Horlock     ( [Tex.    Civ. 

App.]   97  S.  W.  1060),  900. 
Briggs  v.  Campbell    (25  Vt.  704), 

1780. 
Briggs    v.    McKinley     (131    Mich. 

154;    91    X.    W.    156;    9    De- 
troit  Leg.   X^.    273).    764. 
Briggs    V.    Xoonan     ( 27    Vict.    L. 

R.  580;    23  Au.str.  L.  T.   138; 

7   Austr.  L.  R.  274),  371. 
Briggs  V.  RatVerty  (14  Gray,  525), 

1606,    1641,    1792. 
Bright,   Ex  parte    (1   Utah,   145), 

2034. 


Ixiv 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Bright.    In  re    (12    C.    P.    [Ont.] 

433),  452,  468,   472. 
Bright    V.    McCullough     (27    Ind. 

223),  789,  793. 
Bright  V.  Patton   (5  Mackey,  534; 

8  Cent.  Rep.  711),  2033. 
Brighton  v.  Miles   (153   Ala.  673; 

44  So.  160),  1003,  1698. 
Brighton  v.  Miles    (151   Ala.  479; 

44  So.  394),  1607,  1699. 
Brigham  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

39   S.  W.   572),   1210. 
Brignac   v.   Pacific,  etc.,    Ins.   Co. 

(112    La.    574;    36    So.    595; 

66  L.  R.  A.  322),  2222. 
Brignon    v.    State     (37    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  71;  38  S.  W.  786).  1186. 
Brimhall  v.  Van  Campen  ( 8  Minn. 

13),    215. 
Brinkley  v.  State   ( 108  Tenn.  475 ; 

67  S.  W.   796),  404. 
Brinkman   v.  State    (57  Ind.   76), 

1560,   1562. 
Brinkworth  v.  Shembeck   (77  Neb. 

71;   108  N.  W.   150),  621. 
Brinson   v.    State    (89    Ala.    105; 

8  So.  527),  247,  843,   1278. 
Bristol   V.    Wilsmore    (2   Dowl.   & 

R.    755),    2125. 
Bristust  V.  Parsons   (54  Ala.  393; 

25  Am.  Rep.  688),  660. 
Britnor,  In  re    (46  L.  J.   Bk.  85; 

25  W.  R.  560),  702,  1832. 
Brittain    v.    Bethany     (31     Miss. 

331),  355. 
Britton    V.    Guy    ([S.    D.]    97    N. 

W.    1045),   986. 
Broad'head,    Ex    parte    (23    N.    S. 

W.    46),    1301. 
Broadwater     v.     Doane     ( 10     Mo. 

277),  2116,  2128. 
Brock       V.       'Commonwealth        ( 6 

Leigh.  634),   1498. 
Brock  V.  State   ('65  Ga.  437),  503, 

504,  505,   506,  649,   1159. 
Brockway  v.   Jewell    (52  Ohio  St. 

187;    39    N.    E.    470),    2109, 

2117,  2120. 


Brockway  v.  Maloney    ( 102  Mass. 

308),    1787. 
Brockway    v.    Mutual,    etc.,    Ins. 

Co.  "(9    Fed.  249),   2223. 
Brockway  v.  Patterson    (72  Mich. 

122;    40  N.   W.    192;    1   L.  R. 

A.  70S),  1864,  1868,  1876, 

1897,  1950,  1971,  1972,  2006. 
Brockway  v.  Petted  (79  Mich. 

620;'   45    N.    W.   61;    7    L.   R. 

A.    740),    757,    763.    774. 
Brockway  v.  State   (36  Ark.  629), 

73,  719. 
Brodbine,    In    re    (93    Fed.    643), 

2263. 
Brodie,   In  re    (38   Up.   Can.  Rep. 

580),  347,  453,  462,  468,  644, 

1110,    1225. 
Bronson  v.   Dunn    (124   Ind.   252; 

24  N.  E.  749 ) ,  598,  639. 
Bronson   v.   Oberlin    (41    Ohio   St. 

476;    52    Am.    Rep.    90),   243, 

244,  291,   394,   395,   397,   433, 

436. 
Brooke  v.  Morrilton  ( 86  Ark.  304 ; 

111  S.  W.  471),  2025. 
Brooke  V.  State  (86  Ark.  364;  111 

S.  W.  471),  2032. 
Brookes  v.  Drysdale  ([1877]  3 

C.  P.  D.  52;  37  L.  T.  467; 

26  W.  R.  331),   1820,  1832. 
Brookhaven    Lumber    &    Mfg.    Co. 

V.   Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co.    (68 

Miss.  432;    10   So.   66),  2253, 

2256. 
Brooking   v.   Crawford    (24   N.   Y. 

738),   1154. 
Brooklyn    v.    Toynebee    (31    Barb. 

[N.   Y.]    282),    216,    271. 
Brookman   v.    State    (50   Tex.  Cr. 

App.    277;     96    S.    W.    928), 

94«. 
Brooks    V.    Cook    (44    Mich.    617; 

7  N.  W.  216),  1858,   1893. 
Brooks  V.  Ellis   ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

'98  S.  W.  936).  771,  889. 
Brooks   V.    Hyde     (37    Cal.    366), 

227. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixv 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Brooks    V.    Mason    ([1902]    2    K. 

B.   743;    72   L.   J.   K.   B.    19; 

67   J.  P.   47;    51    W.    R.   224; 

88    L.    T.    24;     19    T.    L.    R. 

4),     1243. 
Brooks   V.    State    (105    Ala.    133; 

16  So.  698),   1285. 
Brooks    V.    State     (65    Miss.    445; 

4  So.  343),  827,  1752. 
Broomfield  v.  State    (10  Mo.  556), 

521,   558. 
Bi-ophy,   In   re    (26    C.   P.    [Can.] 

290),  889. 
Brosee  v.  State   (5  Ind.  75),  1223. 
Brosnahan,   In   re    (IS    Fed.    Rep. 

62),    109. 
Brother  v.  State    (2   Cold   [Tenn.] 

201),    929. 
Brow    V.    State     (103    Ind.     127; 

2    N.    E.    321),     1250,     1252, 

1253,    1566,    1630,    1631. 
Brower    v.    Pass     (60    Neb.    590; 

83    N.    W.    832),    1785,    1790. 
Brown,  In  re    (18   Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

409),   625. 
Brown  Ex  parte  ( 30  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

295;    42   S.   W.   554),   473. 
Brown,  Appeal   of,    (2  Pa.   Super. 

Ct.  63),   664. 
Brown,  In  re    (18   Pa.  Super.   Ct. 

409),    664. 
Brown,    In    re     (38    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    157;     77    N.    Y.    Supp. 

261),  911. 
Brown,  Ex  parte  ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

42  S.   W.   554),   127. 
Brown,  Ex  parte  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

61   S.  W.  396),  217. 
Brown,    Ex    parte     (35    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.  443;  34  S.  W.  131),  174, 

933. 
Brown  v.   Aberdeen    (4  Dak.  402; 

31  N.  W.   735),  806. 
Brown  v.  Alderman  (74  Atl.  230). 

1744. 
Brown  v.  Bowden    (19  N.  J.  98), 

1251,    1631,    1633. 


Brown   v.   Brown    (38    Ark.   324), 

65,     68,     2154,     2156,     2159, 

2166. 
Brown  v.   Brown    (L.   R.    1    Prob. 

&  Div.  46),  2166. 
Brown    v.    Butler     ( 66    III.    App. 

86),    1962,    1974,    1992,    1993. 
Brown    v.    Burns     (67    Me.    535), 

1782. 
Brown  v.  Chicago    (110  111.   186), 

200. 
Brown    v.    Chicago,    etc.,    R.    Co. 

(51  Iowa  238;    1  N.  W.  487), 

2212,   2215. 
Brown  v.  Commonwealth    (98  Ky. 

652;    34   S.   W.    12),   121. 
Brown  v.  Commonwealth   (114  Pa. 

335;    6  Atl.   152),  774. 
Bro^vn  v.  Commonwealth   ( 32  Leg. 

Int.    [Pa.]    320),   2058. 
Brown  v.  Dudley   (33  X.  H.  514), 

1058. 
Brown    v.    Duncan    (10    B.    &.    C. 

93,    95,    98),    1794. 
Brown   v.    Fitz    (13    N.   H.    283), 

1162. 
Brown  v.  Foot    (56  J.  P.  581;   61 

L.    J.    M.    C.    110;    66    L.    T. 

649;      17     Cox     C.     C.     509), 

1383. 
Brown  v.   Hilton    (23   Pick.   319), 

1191. 
Brown    v.    Houston     (114    U.     S. 

622;    5    Slip.    Ct.    1091),    315, 

331. 
Brown     v.     Lawrence      (40     Nova 

Scotia    370),    1033. 
Brown   v.   Louisville,    etc.,   R.   Co. 

103  Ky.  211;   44  C.  W.  648), 

2204. 
Brown  v.   Lutz    (36  Neb.   527;   54 

N.  W.  860),  343,  364,  568. 
Brown    v.    Maryland     (12    Wheat. 

419;  6  L.  Ed.  678),  302,  313, 

315,    331,    790,    1425. 
Brown   v.  Mathews    (51   N.   J.   L. 

253;    17   Atl.    154),  617. 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OP    CAS3S. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Brown    v.    Moore    (33    Nov.    Rco. 

381;     32    S.    C.     [Nov.    Sco.] 

93),  263,   13^5,   1779,   1792. 
Brown   v.  Patch    ([1899]    1   Q.   B. 

892;    68  L.  J.  Q.   B.  588;    63 

J.    P.    421;    47    W.    R.    623; 

80   L.   T.   716),   380. 
Brown   v.   Perkins    (12   Gray  89), 

974,   986,    1771. 
Brown   v.   Porter    (37    Ind.   206), 

«62. 
Brown    v.    Probate    Court    (28    R. 

I.  370;   67  Atl.  527),  2018. 
Brown   v.   Social   Circle    ( 105   Ga. 

834;   32  S.  E.   141),   127,  452. 
Brown    v.    State    (31    Ala.    353), 

1293,    1296. 
Brown  v.  State   ( 142  Ala.  287 ;   38 

So.  268),   2038,   2069. 
Brown  v.  State  (73  Ga.  38),  198. 
Brown  v.  State  (79  Ga.  473),  443. 
Brown   v.    State    (82    Ga.   224;    7 

S.  E.  915),  124,  125,  182,  184, 

185,   488,   490,   495,    714. 
Brown  v.  State    (104  Ga.  525;   30 

S.  E.  837),   1571. 
Brown  v.  State    (4   Ga.  App.   73; 

60  S.  E.  805),  80,  1161,  1598, 

1700. 
Brown    v.    State     (24    Ind.    113), 

1240,    1628. 
Brown    v.    State     (48    Ind.    38), 

1625. 
Brown    v.    State     (103    Ind.    133; 

2  N.  E.  296),  1499,  1500. 
Brown    v.    State    (137    Ind.    240; 

36    X.    E.    1108;    45    Am.    St. 

180),  2249,  2250. 
Brown   v.    State    (9    Neb.    189;    2 

N.  W.  214),  549,  822. 
Brown  v.  State    (16  Neb.  658;   21 

N.    W.    454),    1566. 
Brown  v.  State    (49  N.  J.  L.  61; 

7   Atl.   340),    369. 
Brown    v.    State    (2    Head     180), 

1246,   1457,   1759. 
Brown   v.    State    ([Tenn.]    114   S. 

VV.   198),  484. 
Brown    v.    State     (27    Tex.    335), 

498,    501,    526. 


Brown  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

39  S.  W.  578),  1210,  147L 
Brown  v.  State   (45  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

139;   75  S.  W.  33),  2247. 
Brown  v.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

76    S.   W.    475),    1209. 
Brown     v.     State     (47     Tex.     Cr. 

App.    326;     83     S.    W.    378), 

1158. 
Brown  v.  State  (4  Tex.  App.  275), 

2039,   2063,   2067. 
Brown  v.  Van  Wert    (4  Oliio  Cir. 

Ct.  Rep.  407),   1477. 
Brown  v.  Wieland   (116  Iowa  711; 

89  N.  W.  17),  1787,  18U3. 
Brtown-Forman    Co.     v.    Common- 
wealth     ([Ky.]     101     S.     W. 

321;    30    Ky.    L.    Rep.    793), 

151,  198,  290. 
Brownell,   In  re    (11    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

Rep.  404),  622. 
Brownlow  v.  State   (112  Ga.  405; 

37  S.  E.  733),   1311,  1321. 
Brownville  v.  Cook   (4  Neb.   101), 

216,    271. 
Brua   V.   State    (8  Mo.   496),   509. 
Bruce  v.  Schuyler    (4  Gilni.   [III. J 

221),    467. 
Bruce    v.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.    App.] 

35  S.  W.  383),  878,  908,  911, 

1287. 
Bruce  v.  State    (36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

53;   39  S.   W.  683),  958,   167. 
Bruce  v.   State    (39   Tex  Cr.  App. 

26;    44    S.    W.    852).    1181. 
Bruce    v.    State    ( [Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

53   S.  W.  867),   1181. 
Bruce   v.    State    (  [Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

92   S.   W.    1092).    1«91. 
Bruen  v.  Ogden   (11  N.  J.  L.  370; 

20  Am.  Dec.  593),  1027. 
Brugier  v.  State   ( 1  Dak.  5 ;  46  N. 

W.  502),   1494,  1755. 
Bruison    v.    State    (89    Ala.    105; 

8  So.  527),   1279. 
Brumley   v.    State    ( 1 1    Tex.    App. 

114),    23,    293,   295. 
Brunker   v.   Tp.   of   Mariposa    (22 

Ont.  Rep.    120),  434. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ix-vai 


[Iloferences    are    to    pages.] 


Brunson  v.  Dunn    (124  Ind.  252; 

24    N,    E.    740),    599. 
Brunswick    v.    Villcau     {50    Iowa 

120),    1801. 
Bruttor    v.    State     (4    Ind.    601), 

1510,    1521. 
Bryan  v.  Bates   {15  111.  87),  2034. 
Bdyan  v.  De  Moss    (34  Ind.  App. 

473;  73  N.  E.  156),  557,  604, 

608. 
Bryan    v.    Jones     (34    Ind.    App. 

703;     73    N.    E.    1135),    557, 

601,    604,   608. 
Bryant  v.  Hancock    ([1899]   A.  C. 

442;     68    L.    J.    Q.     B.    889; 

64    J.    P.    84;    81    L.    T.    96; 

15  T.  L.  490),  1823. 
Bryant  v.  Bobbins  (70  Wis.  258), 

97. 
Bryant  v.  State  (46  Ala.  302), 

1111,  1666. 
Bryant  v.  State  (82  Ala.  51;  2 

So.  670),  1230,  1379,  1615. 
Bryant  v.  State  ( 65  Miss.  435 ; 

4  So.  343),  1680. 
Bryant  v.  State  (89  Tenn.  581; 

15  S.  W.  353),  1281,  1285, 

1286. 
Bryant    v.    Tidgwell     (133    Mass. 

86),  1882,  1912,  1919,  1955. 
Bryden     v.     Northrupp      (58     111. 

App.  233),   73. 
Bryson  v.   Haley    (68  X.   H.   337; 

38  Atl.    1006),   1784. 
Buck's.  Estate,  In  re   (185  Pa.  St. 

57;   39   Atl.  821;    64  Am.   St. 

816),  480. 
Buck  V.  Albee   (27  Vt.  184),  1784. 
Buck    V.    Colbath     (3    Wall.     [U. 

S.]    334),    1012. 
Buck  V.  Ellenbolt    (84  Iowa   394; 

51    N.    W.    22;    15    L.    R.    A. 

187),  988. 
Buck   V.   Maddock    (167    HI.   219; 

47    N.    E.    208;    affirming    67 

111.    App.    460),    1971,     1981, 

1983,  1991,  2007. 
Buck  V.  State  (61  N.  J.  L.  525; 

39  Atl.  919),  1478,  1482. 


Buckliam  v.  Grape  (65  Iowa  535; 

17    N.    W.    755),    1927,   2013. 
Buckhannon      v.      Commonwealth 

(86    Ky.    110;    5    S.    W.    358; 

9    Ky.    L.    Rep.    411),    2041, 

2056,  204)1,  2065,  2067. 
Buckle  V.  Fredericks  ([1890]  44 

Ch.  D.  244;  62  L.  T.  884; 

55  J.  P.  165;  38  W.  R.  742), 

1821. 
Buckler    v.    Turbeville     ( 17    Tex. 

Civ.     App.     120;     43     S.     W. 

810),  925. 
Buckley  v.   Buckley   (9  Nev.  373), 

1027. 
Buckman    v.    Commonwealth     ( 1 1 

Ky.  L.   Rep.   [abstract]   526), 

951. 
Buckmaster  v.   McElroy    (20  Neb. 

557;    31    N.    W.  76),  1890. 
Buckner   v.    State    (56   Ind.   207), 

1168,    1649. 
Buckworth    v.    Crawford    (24    111. 

App.   603),    1912. 
Buddington,  In  re  (29  Mich.  472), 

1738,    1766. 
Buell  V.  State  (72  Ind.  523),  1248, 

1256,    1491. 
Buesching   v.   St.   Louis,   etc.,   Co. 

(6   Mo.  App.  85),  2178. 
Buford   V.   Commonwealth    ( 14   B. 

Mon.   24),   369,    1575. 
Bugbee  v.   Union   R.   Co.    ([R.  I.] 

59  Atl.  165),  2180. 
Buhlman   v.   Humphrey    ('86   Iowa 

597;     53    N.    W.    318),    998, 

1001. 
Bull    V.    Licensing    Justices     ( 12 

Austr.  L.   T.   82),  644. 
Bullard,   In   re    (113   N.   Y.    App. 

Div.     159;     98    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1011),  578,  588. 
Bunch  V.  State   ([Ark.]   114  S.  W. 

239),    77. 
Bunker  v.  Maripose   (22  Ont.  Rep. 

120),   1193. 
Bunyan  v.  Loftus    (90  Iowa   122; 

'57  N.   W.  685),   1993. 
Burch   V.   Ocilla    (5   Ga.  App.  65; 

62   S.   E.   666),   682. 


Ixviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Burch  V.  yiny,  etc.   (42  Ga.  598), 

787. 
Burch    V.    Republic    of    Texas     ( 1 

Tex.   608),    1554. 
Burch  V.  Savannah   (42  Ga.  576), 

163,   426,  483,   520,   553,   788, 

791. 
Burch    V.    United   States    (7    Ind. 

T.  294;   104  S.  W.  619),  1260. 
Burckliolter      v.      ]\IcConnellsville 

(20   Ohio   St.   308),   395. 
Burdet   v.  Hopewood    ( 1   P.  Wnis. 

486),    1906. 
Burfiend   v.    Hamilton    ( 20    Mont. 

343;    51    Pac.    161),    805. 
Burgamy  v.   State    (114   Ga.  852; 

40  S.  E.  991),   1759. 
Burge,  Ex  parte    (32  Tex.   Cr.   R. 

459;     24     S.     W.     289),     911, 

1684. 
Burk    V.    Piatt     (172    Fed.    777), 

337. 
Burke    v.    Chicago,    etc.,    R.     Co. 

108  111.  App.  5{>5),  2174. 
Burke   v.  Collins    (18  S.   D.    190; 

99    N.    W.     1112),    195,    626, 

650. 
Burke    v.    State     ( 52    Ind.    522 ) , 

1442,    1488,    1522,    1552,    1553. 
Burkarth    v.    Stephens     (117    Mo. 

App.    425;     94    S.    W.    720), 

676. 
Burkett    v.    Loed     ([Ind.]     88    X. 

E.    346),     1811. 
Burkhalter   v.  ilcConnelsville    { 20 

Ohio  St.    309),   397,   433. 
Burkhard  v.   State    (18  Tex.  App. 

599 ) .    2090. 
Burknian  v.   Jamieson    (25  Wash. 

6(>();    66    Pac.   48),   2009. 
Burks  V.  State   ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

103   S.  W.  950),  924. 
Burnby,    Ex    parte    ([1901]    2    K. 

B.  458;    70  L.  J.   K.   B.   739 : 

•85  L.  T,  168),  368,  725. 
Burner      v.     Commonwealth       ( 13 

Gratt.  778),  1182,  1544. 
Burnett,  Ex  parte    (30  Ala.  461), 

436,    444,    447. 


Burnett    v.    Berry     ([1896]     1    Q. 

B.   641;    60  J.   P.  375;    65  L. 

J.  M.  C.   118;    44  W.  R.  512; 

74    L.    T.    494;     12    T.    L.    R. 

362),   380. 
Burnett    v.    State     (92    Ga.    474; 

17  S.   E.  858),    1235. 
Burnett  v.    State    (72   Miss.   994; 

18  So.   432),   1729,   1732. 
Burnett    v.    State     (42    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    600;     62    S.    W.    1063), 

'512,   514,    1375,    1620. 
Burlington     v.     Bumgardner     (42 

la.    102),   412,    435. 
Burlington  v.    Insurance   Co.    (31 

Iowa    102),    200. 
Burlington  v.  Kellar   (18  la.  59), 

404,  413. 
Burlington    v.     Putnam     (31     la. 

102),   411,   483. 
Burnham   v.    Burnham    ( 1 19    Wis. 

509;   97  N.  W.  176),  2094. 
Burns,  Appeal  of    ( 76  Conn.  395 ; 

56   Atl.    611),  535,    565,  '737, 

748,    1297. 
Burns,    In    re    ([Ind.]    87    N.    E. 

1028),  561,  601. 
Burns,  In  re   (14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

174;    3    Pa.    Dist.    Rep.    429), 

696. 
Burns    v.    Burns     (13    Fla.    369), 

65,      67,     2154,     2155,     2156, 

2159. 
Burns    v.    Elba     (32    Wis.    605), 

2190. 
Burnside,  Ex  parte    (86  Ky.  423; 

6    S.   W.   276),   91,    in,    125, 

126,    149,    182,   243,  281,   291. 
Burnside  v.   Lincoln   Co.    (86  Ky. 

423;    7    S.   W.  276;    9  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   635),    450,   490. 
Burr,  In  re  (3  Lack.  Leg.  X.  162). 

2017. 
Burrage.  Ex  parte    (26  Tex.  App. 

35;    9  S.   W.  72),  908,  911. 
Burrell,  In  re    (X.  Y.  Misc.   Rep. 

261;    100  X.  Y.   Supp.  470), 

902,  9n. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixix; 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Burrell    v.    State     (25    Neb.    581; 

41    N.    W.    399),    1712,    1713, 

17G4. 
Burrell  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

65  S.  VV.  914),  908,  1216. 
Burrit     v.      Silliman      (16     Barb. 

198),   2150. 
Burrouglis  v.  Richman    (13   N.  J. 

Law.    [1    J.    S.    Green]    233; 

23  Am.  Dec.  717),  2094,  2095. 
Burrow's    Case     ( 1    Lewin    C.    C. 

75),  2039,   2054. 
Bursinger  v.  Bank  of  Watertown, 

(67   Wis.   75;    30   N.  W.  290; 

58  Am.  Eep.  848),  2098,  211(5, 

2125,  2131. 
Burt    V.    Burt     ( 1'68    Mass.    204; 

46  N.    E.    622),    63,    67,    08, 
1735,    1736,   2154,    2158. 

Burton  v.  State  (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
493;  '81  S.  W.  742),  2084. 

Bush  V.  Breing  (113  Pa.  St.  310; 
6  Atl.  8<5;  57  Am.  Rep.  469), 
2093,   2098,   2099,   2131. 

Bush     V.     Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

47  S.  W.  585),  1703. 

Bush    V.    Indianapolis     ( 120    Ind. 

476;   22  X.  E.  422),   144. 
Bush    V.    Lisle    (89    Ky.    393;     12 

S.  W.  762),  2135,  2138,  2141. 
Bush    V.    Murray     (&6    Me.    472), 

1910. 
Bush    V.    Republic    of    Texas     ( 1 

Tex.  455),   1541. 
Bush  V.  Seabury    (18  Johns.  41S), 

448. 
Bushell    V.    Hammond     ([1904]    2 

K.    B.    5ti3;    68    J.    P.    370; 

73   L.   J.   K.   B.    1005;    91    L. 

T.    1;   52    W.   R.    453;    20    T. 

L.  R.  413),  641. 
Butcher's  Union   v.   Crescent  City 

Co.    (Ill    U.  ,S.   746;    5    Sup. 

Ct.    652),    98. 
Butler  V.   Augusta    (100   Ga.   370; 

28    S.    E.    164),    1372,    1374, 

1376. 
Butler   V.    Fiscal    Court    ( 12'6    Ky. 

146;    103  S.  W.  251;   31   Ky. 

L.    Rep.    597),    943. 


Butler   V.   Mercer    (14  Ind.   479), 

1989. 
Butler    V.    Merrit    (113    Ga.    238; 

38   S.   E.   751),   175. 
Butler     V.     Mulvihill      (1     Bligh. 

137),  2099,  2103. 
Butler  V.  Northumberland   (50  N. 

H.    33),    384,    1792. 
Butler   V.   State    (25   Fla.   347;    6 

So.    67),    86,   928,   934,    1453, 

1496,  1680. 
Butler  V.  State  (89  Ga.  821;  15 

S.  E.  763),  134,  1278,  1453, 

1479. 
Butler    V.    State    ([Miss.]    39    So. 

1005),  2038. 
Butler    V.    Thompson     (92    U.    S. 

412;    23  L.  Ed.   684),   1162. 
Butman,   In   re    (8   Greenl.    [Me.] 

113),    1755. 
Button    V.    Hudson   River    R.    Co. 

(18    .,.   Y.    248),    2185. 
Button  V.   State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

100   S.  W.   148),   1217. 
Buttons    V.    Justice    ( 16    Vict.    L. 

R.  '604;    12   Austr.  L.  T.  83), 

351. 
Butzman    v.    Whitbeck     (42    Ohio 

St.    223),    120,    121,    147. 
Buttrick  v.  Lowell   (1  Allen  172), 

1026,   1047. 
Byars  v.  Mt.  Vernon   (78  111.  11), 

1477. 
Byford,  In  re  (69  J.  P.  152),  620. 
Bynes  v.  Stilwell  (103  N.  Y.  453), 

1906. 
Bynum's    Case     (101-  N.    C.    412; 

8    S.    E.    136),    925. 
Byrd,    Ex    parte    (  [Tex.]     105    S. 

W.  496),  127,  251,  254. 
Byrd  v.   State    (76   Ark.  286;    68 

S.  W.  974),  2038. 
Byrd  v.   State    (51   Tex.  Cr.  App. 

539;    103    S.    W.   863),    1680. 
Byrd  v.   State    (51   Tex.  Cr.   App. 

539;     103    S.    W.    863),    940, 

1218. 
Byrd  v.  State    (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

507;     111    S.    VV.    149),    888,. 

915,    1597. 


Ixs, 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages 


Byram  v.  Polk  Coiintv  ( 7G  Iowa 
73;  40  N.  W.  102),  1068, 
1075. 

Byrum  v.  Peterson  (34  Neb.  237; 
51   N.   W.   829),   671. 


C V.  C ( 28  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 

603),   2166. 
Cabel   V.  Houston    (20   Tex.   335), 

457. 
Cabellero  v.  Henty    ([1874]   L.  II. 

9  Ch.  447),  1831. 
Cable   V.    State    (8    Blackf.    531), 

1096,   1106,   1109. 
Cable    V.    State     ([Miss.]     38    So. 

98),    1207. 
Caesar   v.   State    (50    Fla.    1;    39 

So.  470),  286,   1495,   1557. 
Cagle    V.    State     (87    Ala.    38;    6 

■So.     300),     514,     1158,     1219, 

1223,   1226,   1349. 
Cahen   v,   Jarrett    (42    Md.   571), 

787. 
Cahill    V.     Campbell     (105    Mass. 

40),  70. 
Cahill  V.  Millett   ([1907]  Vict.  L. 

R.  605;   29  Austr.  L.  T.   16), 

1311. 
Cahill    V.    State     (36    Ind.    App. 

507;     76    N.    E.    142),    1498, 

_573. 
Cahn  V.  Reid    (18  Mo.  App.   115), 

2127. 
Cain,  Ex  parte   (20  Okla.  125;   93 

Pac.  974),  111,   121,   122. 
Cain    V.    Allen    (168    Ind.    8;    79 

N.    E.    201,    896),    206,    209. 

286,   606,   611.   612,   614,    618. 
Cairns  v.  Peterson    (2  Vict.  L.  R. 

143),    1209. 
Cairo   v.    Feuchter    Bros.    (59    111. 

App.     112;     afTirmed     159    111. 

155;   42  N.  E.  :!08),   190. 
Cakins    v.     State     (14     Ohio     St. 

222),  029. 
Calder    v.    ]5nl!     (.'!    Dull.    [U.    S.J 

386),  261,   267. 


Calder    v.   Kurby    (5    Gray  597), 

124,    182,    184,    185,   488,  489, 

490,  495,  714. 
Calder  v.  Slieppard  (61  Ind.  219), 

531,   599. 
Calderwood  v.   Jos.   Schlitz   Brew- 
ing  Co.    ([Minn.]    121   N.   W. 

221),    820. 
Caldwell  v.  Barrett   (73  Ga.  604), 

232,    235. 
Caldwell    v.    Fullerton     (7    Casey 

[Pa.]  475;   72  Am.  Dec.  760)', 

479. 
Caldwell  v.  Grider    (88  Ala.  421; 

7    So.    203),    939. 
Caldwell    v.    Grimes     (7    Ky.    L. 

Rep.     [abstract]     601),     537, 

802,     966. 
Caldwell   v.   State    (55   Ala.   1.33), 

276. 
Caldwell    v.    State    (43    Fla.    545; 

30   So.   814),  82. 
Caldwell    v.    State    ( [Ga.]    29    S. 

E.  263),  249. 
Caldwell    v.    State    (18   Ind.    App. 

48;   46  N.  E.  697),  837,  838. 
Caldwell  v.   State    (87   Miss.  420; 

39  S.  896),  1761. 
Calhoun    v.    Spencer     (177    Mass. 

473;   59  N.  E.  78),  1867. 
Callahan    v.    State     (2    Ind.    App. 

418;   28  K  E.  717),  SO,  1491, 

1492,   1561. 
Callander  v.  Allen   (6  N.  Z.  L.  R. 

436),  536. 
Callaway    v.    Mims     (5    Ga.    App. 

9;  62  S.  E.    654),  1085,  1092, 

1108. 
Calloway     x.    Laydon     (47     Iowa 

456"),   1854. 
Calloway  v.  Milledgeville   (48  Ga. 

309"),    814. 
Calloway  v.  Witherspoon   (3  Ired. 

Eq."l2S).  2099,  2103,  2130. 
Cambridge  Springs  Co.,  hi  re  (20 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  564),  537. 
Camden    v.    Allen    (2    Dutch    [X. 

J.    L.]    398),   276. 
Cameron,  Ex  parte    (23  N.  S.  W. 

24;   6  S.  11.   132),  365. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxi 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Cameron  v.  Fellows  ( 109  Iowa 
534;  80  N.  W.  567),  944, 
1104,   1270. 

Cameron  v.  Guindor  (89  Iowa 
298;   50  N.  W.  502),  1005. 

Cameron  v.  Kepinos  (89  Iowa 
501;   50  N.   W.  077),   1000. 

Cameron  v.  Tucker  (  104  Iowa 
211;   73  N.  W.  601),  999. 

Cameron-Barkley  Co.  v.  Thorn- 
ton, etc.,  Co.   (138  N.  C.  365; 

50  S.  E.  695),  2093,  2116. 
Camp,  Appeal  of    (80   Conn.   272; 

68  Atl.  444),  643. 
Camp    V.    Camp     (18    Tex.    528), 

2165,    2166,    2108. 
Camp  V.  State   (27  Ala.  53),  400, 

1456,  1474. 
Campbell,  Ex  parte    (74   Cal.  20; 

15  Pac.  318;  5  Am.  St.  518), 

109,    149. 
Campbell,    In    re    (71    Ind.    512), 

355. 
Campbell,  In  re   (8  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

524),  745. 
Campbell    v.    Amer.    Popular    Life 

Ins.  Co.    (1   MacArthur  471), 

2243. 
Campbell    v.    Fidelity    &     C.    Co. 

(109  Ky.  661;  60  S.  W.  492), 

1736. 
Campbell  v.  Harmon    (96  :\Ie.  87; 

51  A.  801),  1983,  1984. 
Campbell       v.       Jackman       Bros. 

([Iowa]     118     N.     W.     755), 

104,    142,    152,    163,   480,   486. 
Campbell    v.    Jones    (2    Tev.    Civ. 

App.    263;     21     S.    W.    723), 

06,  1254,  1779,  1807. 
ampbell    v.    Ketcham     ( 1     Bibb, 

406),  2103. 
Campbell  v.  Manderscheid    (74  la. 

708;   39  N.  W.  92),  226,  311, 

1004. 
Campbell  v.  Moran   (71   Xeb.  615; 

99   N.   W.   498),   587. 
Campbell    v.    New    Ens.    Mut.    L. 

Ins.     Co.      (98     Mass.     oSd  > , 

2220. 


Campbell  v.  Schlesinger    (48  Hun 

428;  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  220),  1961. 

Campbell    v.    Schofield     (29    Leg. 

Int.    325),    980. 
Campbell  v.   State    (79  Ala.  271), 

1374,    1379,    1578. 
Campbell  v.  State   (171  Ind.  702; 

87    N.    E.    212),    1011,    1066, 
1068. 
Campbell  v.  State    (62  X.  J.  402; 

41   Atl.  717),   1547,  1552. 
Campbell    v.    State    (37    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    572;     40     S.    W.    282), 

1225,    1379,    1694. 
Campbell    v.    State    (55    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    277;     116    S.    W.    581), 

1630. 
Campbell  v.   Strangways    (3  S.  P. 

Div.    105),    501. 
Campbell    v.    Thomasville     ( [Ga.] 

64   S.   E.   815),   74,    151,    162, 

168,  270,   .358,   388,   425,   430, 

432,   440,   441,   442,   465,   551, 

560,   579,    629. 
Campbell  v.  Union  Bank   (6  How. 

[Miss.]    625),    294. 
Campbell    v.    Wing     (5    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    431;     24    S.    W.    360), 

2199. 
Candill,    In  re    ( [Ky.]    66    S.    W. 

723;    23    Ky.   L.    Rep.   2139), 

534. 
Canfield     v.     Leadville      (7     Colo. 

App.  453;   43  Pac.  910),  825. 
Cann,  Ex  parte   (1  S.  R.  N.  S.  W. 

262;   18  W.  X.  N.  S.  W.  180), 

670. 
Cannon   v.   Merry    (116    Ga.   291; 

42   S.   E.   274),   978. 
Cannon  City  v.  Manning  (43  Colo. 

144;   95  Pac.  537),   1332. 
Canova  v.  Williams    (41  Fla.  509; 

27   So.   30),  419,   447. 
Cantini  v.  Tillman   (54  Fed.  969), 

110,    139,   149,    152,   174,   321. 
Cantrell   v.   Sainer    (59   Iowa   26; 

12  X^.  W.  753),  244,  291.  436, 

474. 
Cantvvell    v.    State     (47    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  511;  S5  S.  W.  19),  1372. 


Ixxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Cantwell    v.    State    (47    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  521;   85  S.  W.  18),  865, 

870,  958,   1184,   1207,   1082. 
Canvass,  In  re   ([Iowa]   95  N.  \Y. 

194),  875. 
Cape  Girardeau  v.  Riley    (72   ^lo. 

220),    409. 
Capritz    v.    State     (1    Md.    oG9), 

1502,   1508. 
Capron    v.    State     (11    Ind.    App. 

95;   38  N.  E.  491),  1628. 
Carbondale     v.     Wade      (106     III. 

App.  654),  734. 
Cardillo  v.  People   (26  Colo.  355; 

58  Pac.  678),  69,  70,  259. 
Carelton  v.  Rugg  (149  Mass.  550; 

22  X.  E.  55;  55  L.  R.  A.  193; 

14  Am.  St.  446),  604,  982. 
Carey  v.  State    (70  Ohio  St.   121; 

70    N.    E.     955),    864>,     883, 

1765. 
Cargo  of  Aurora  v.  United  States 

7   Cranch    [U.   S.]    382),   252. 
Carico  v.  Wilmore   (51  Fed.  196), 

2035. 
Carrico  v.   Commonwealth    (5  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   605),  512. 
Carl  V.  State    (87  Ala.   17;   6  So. 

118;   4  L.  R.  A.  380),  21,  52, 

86,    87,    137,    822,    96'9,    1185, 

1699,    1701. 
Carleton  v.  Regg   (149  Mass.  550: 

22  X.  E.  55),  258. 
Carleton  v.    State    (43   Xeb.    373; 

61  X.  VV.  699).  2251. 
Carleton    v.    Woods     (28    X.    H. 

290),   1782. 
Carlin    v.   Heller    (34   Iowa   256), 

1804. 
Carlisle   v.    State    (42    Ala.   523), 

929. 
Carlisle   v.    State    (91    Ala.    1;    8 

So.  3'86),   131,   137,   247,  593, 

1278. 
Carlisle   v.   Town   of   Sheldon    (38 

Vt.  440),  2-256. 
Carlson,  In  re    (127   Pa.   St.   330; 

18  Atl.  8;   24  W.  X.  C.   184), 

747,  1237. 


Carlton   v.   Kreigher    ([Tex.]    115 

S.   W.   619),    1235,    1904, 
Carolina    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Anthracite 

Beer   Co.    (25   Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

94),  1788. 
Carmody  v.  People  (17  111.  158), 

1505. 
Carmon  v.  State  (18  Ind.  450), 

12,  32,  1496,  1561. 
Carnes  v.  State  ( 18  Tex.  App. 

375),  1680. 
Carnes  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App. 

449;  5  S.  W.  133),  1588, 

1680. 
Carnes  v.  State   (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

437;     103     S.    W.    934),    958, 

1465,  1473,  1611,  1689. 
Carnes  v.  State  (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

490;  110  S.  W.  750),  1623, 

1624. 
Carnes  v.  State   (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

509;     111    S.    W.    402),    1211. 
Carnes  v.  State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

103  S.  W.  934),  916. 
Carnes  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

10    S.    W.    928),    913,    1682, 

1684. 
Carney   a-.   United   States    (7   Ind. 

Ty.    247;     104    S.    W.    606), 

2038,    2091. 
Carpeau  v.  Loiseau   ( 12  Rev.  Leg. 

1309),   352. 
Carpenter.    In   re    (71   Vt.   91;    41 

Atl.    1042),    2036. 
Carpenter    v.    Commonwealth    (92 

Ky.  452;    18  S.  W.  9;    13  Ky. 

L."  Rep.  658),  2056,  2074. 
Carpenter    v.    Commonwealth    (92 

Ky.   452;    18   S.   W.  9),   2041, 

2056. 
Carpenter  v.  Innes  (16  Col.  1(55; 

26  Pac.  140),  1027. 
Carpenter  v.  Rogers  (61  Mich. 

384;  28  X.  W.  156),  2094, 

2108,   2116,   2123. 
Carr,   In  re    (3    Sawy.   316;    Fed. 

Cas.  Xo.  2432),   1263. 
Carr  v.  Augusta   (124  Ga.  11    ;  52 

S.    E.    300),    472,    715,    718, 

734,    740,    748,    749,   750. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxiii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Carr  v.   Boone    (108   Ind.  241;    9 

N.  E.  110),  610,  860. 
Carr    v.    Fowler     (74    Ind.    590), 

397,   313. 
'Carr  v.  State    (5  Tex.  App.  153), 

198,    1532. 
Carrier    v.    Bernstein     ( 104    Iowa 

572;    73   N.   W.    1076),    1711, 

1882,   1'8S5,   1939. 
Carrier   v.   Bernstein    ( [Iowa]    76 

N.   W.    1076),    1845. 
Carrier    v.    Bernstein    (78    N.    W. 

1076),   1848. 
Carrigan  v.  Carrigan   ( 15  Gr.  Eq. 

[N.  J.]   341),  2152. 
Carrigan  v.  Lycoming  F.  Ins.  Co. 

(53    Vt.    418;    48    Am.    Rep. 

687),  177'S. 
Carrington  v.   Commonwealth    (78 

Ky.    83),   837. 
Carroll    v.    State     (63    Md.    551; 

3  Atl.  29),   135'8. 
Carroll   v.   .State    (80    Miss.    349; 

31    So.    742),    1608. 
Carroll   v.   Wright    (131  Ga.   728; 

63  S.  E.  260),   140,  276,  499, 

526. 
Can-oil  Co.  v.  Lee   ( 127  Iowa  230 ; 

103  N.   W.    101),   802,  806. 
Carry  v.  State    (28  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

477;    13  S.  W.  773),   1160. 
Carter   v.   Bartel    (110   Iowa  211; 

81    N.    W.    462),    997,     1004, 

1270. 
Carter   v.    Clark    (28    Conn.   512), 

1800,    1802. 
Carter   v.   Fischer    (127    Ala.    52; 

28    So.    376),    1805. 
Carter  v.  Ford,  etc.,  Co.    (85  Ind. 

180),  2250,  2253. 
Carter  v.  Fred  Miller  Brewing  Co. 

(Ill     Iowa    457;     82    N.    W. 

930),   1270. 
Carter    v.    Nicol     (116    Iowa    519; 

i90  N.  W.  352),  770,  774,  778, 

1269. 
Carter   v.   State    (87   Ala.    113;    6 

So.   356),  2042,   2049. 
Carter  v.   State    (81    Ark.   37;    98 

S.  W.  704),  953. 


Carter    v.    State     (68    Ga.    826), 

1505. 
Carter  v.  State    (12  Tex.  500;   62 

Am.    Dec.    539),    2040,    2047, 

2051,    2052. 
Carter  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

40   S.  W.  267),   1379. 
Carter  v.  State    ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

92    S.    W.     1093),    336,    953, 

1280. 
Carter   v.    Steyer    (93   Iowa,   533; 

61   N.   W.   956),  983,  994. 
Carter    v.    Williams     ([1870]     L. 

E.   9    Eq.   678;    39   L.   J.   Ch. 

560;    23    L.    T.    183;     18    W. 

R.   593),    1813. 
Carthage    v.    Block     ( [Mo.    App.] 

123  C.  W.  482),  442. 
Carthage  v.  Buckner    (4  111.  App. 

317),    462,    845. 
Carthage  v.  Carlton   (99  111.  App. 

338),    434,   826,    844. 
Carthage  v.  Duvall    (202  111.  234; 

66   N.  E.    1099),   1280. 
Carthage     v.     Munsell      (203     111. 

474;    67   N.  E.  831;   affirming 

105  111.  App.  119),  969,  1280, 

1281. 
Cartright  v.  McElden    ( [Ky.]    116 

S.  W.  297),  372. 
Cartwright  v.  State    (8  Lea    376), 

2060,  2067,  2069,  2072. 
Carson    v.     Devault     (12     L.      K 

[Can.]  20),   1235. 
Carson   v.    State     (69    Ala.    235), 

85,   86,   822,   842,    928. 
Carstairs     v.    Cochran     (95     Md. 

488;    52    Atl.  601),    199,   200. 
Carstairs  v.  O'Donnell   ( 154  Mass. 

357;   28  X.  E.  271),  300,  308, 

310,   313,   327,    1799. 
Carswell,     In     re     ( 15     Manitoba 

620),  857,  896. 
Carswell  v.  State   ([Ga.  App.]   66 

S.   E.   488),  4.   1708. 
Carwile  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

72  S.  W.  376),   1235,   1629. 
Casat    V.    State     (40    Ark.    511), 

2041,  2054,  2070. 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


fReferences  are   to  pages.] 


Casey    v.    Painter     (50    Ohio    St. 

527;     38     X.     E.     24),     1850, 

1852. 
Casey  v.  State   (6  Mo.  640),  1590. 
Casey   v.   State    {[Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

59    S.    W.    884),    1473,    1681, 

1684. 
Casey   v.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

67  S.  W.  415),  1375. 
Caskey  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

108    S.    W.    6«o),    1717. 
Casou    V.     State     (37     Fla.     332; 

20   S.   547),   934. 
Cassady      v.     Magher      (85      Ind. 

22S),  2190. 
Cassedy    v.    Stockridge     (21     Vt. 

391),  2172,  2186. 
Cassel    V.    Scott     (17    Ind.    514), 

755. 
Cassens    v.     State     (48     Tex.    Cr. 

App.     186;     88    S.    W.    229), 

1694. 
Cassiday   v.   Macon    (  [Ga.]    64    S. 

E.  941),  91,  103,  162,  182. 
Castellano  v.  Marks   (37  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    273;    83    S.    W.    729), 

683,  761. 
Castle    V.    Bell     (145    Ind.    8;    44 

N.  E.  2),   196,   599,  606,  854. 
Castle    V.    Fogerty     (19    111.    App. 

619    [Bradw.]    442),   1925. 
Castleman    v.    State     ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    44    S.   W.    494),    1693. 
Castner    v.    Sliker     (33    N.    J.    L. 

95),  1736. 
Caswell  V.  Hundred  House  [J.  J.] 

54    J.    P.    87),    350. 
Caswell  V.  State   (2  Humph.  402), 

25,   26,   28,   967. 
Cates    V.    South     (23    J.    P.    739; 

1   L.  T.  365),  1136. 
Cathcart    v.    Hardy    (2    M.    &    S. 

534),   824,    1643,    1644. 
Catherwood  v.  Collins    (12  Wright 

[Pa.]    480),    1384. 
Caton    V.    State    [Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

95  S.  W.  540),   1202,  1286. 
Catoir  v.   Waterson    (38   Ohio  St. 

319),  815. 


Catt   V.   Tourle    ([1869]    L.    R.   4 

Ch.    654;    38    L.   J,    Ch.   665; 

21  L.  T.   188;    17  W.  R.  662; 

32  J.  P.   659),   1815. 
Caulkins  v.   Fry    (35   Conn.    170), 

2093,  2094,'  2110,  2111. 
Cavanaugh  v.  Iowa  Beer  Co.   ( 136 

Iowa   276;    113   N.    VV.    856), 

1812. 
Cavaness  v.  State    (43  Ark.  331), 

2041,    2051,    2054. 
Cavender  v.  Waddingham    (2  Mo. 

App.   551),    2&94,    2098,   2116. 
Cavender  v.   Waddingham    ( 5  Mo. 

App.     457),     64,    2093,    2094, 

2099. 
Cawthorne  v.  Campbell    ( 1   Austr. 

212),   1027. 
Cayionette  v.  Girard   (28  L.  C.  J. 

177;    1    Mon.    Sup.    Ct.    182), 

1257,   1853,   1942. 
Cayuga    County    v.     Freeoflf     (17 

How.  Prac."  442),  24,  46,  966. 
Cazet    v.     Field     (9    Gray    329), 

1807. 
C.     B.     George     &     Bro.     v.     Win- 
chester   (118   Ky.   429;    80   S. 

W.  1158;  26  Ky.  L.  Rep.  170), 

630,   649,   935. 
C.    D.    Smith    Drug    Co.    v.    First 

Nat.   Bank    (60  Kan.   184;   55 

Pac.  851),   1774. 
Cearfoss   v.    State    (42  Md.   403). 

1175,  1304,   1306,  1321. 
Center  Co.  Licenses   (9  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  376),  628,  632. 
Centerville   v.    Gayken    (20    S.   D. 

82;      104     N.     W.     910),     446, 

626. 
Central    Ry.    Co.   v.    Maekey    (103 

111.    App.    15),    2206. 
Central,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Phinazee    (93 

Ga.  488;    21   S.  E.  66),  2177, 

2201.    2202,    2203. 
Chaba   v.    Burnett    (34  Ala.   400), 

812. 
Chaddick  v.   Haley    (81  Tex.   617; 

17  8.  W.  233),  2152. 
Chailes  v.  Bones    (22  Austr.  L.  T. 

97;   6  Austr.  L.  R.  209),  536. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


Ixxv 


*       [References  are  to  pages.] 


Chalmers  v.  Funk    (76  Va.  717), 

885,  906. 
Chamberlain     v.     Tecumseh      (43 

Neb.    221;    61    N.    W.    632), 

814. 
Chambers,    In    re    (18    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.   413),  025,   664. 
Charabers  v.  Groencastle  (138  Ind. 

330;  35  N.  E.  14),  395. 
Chambers    v.    Northwestern,    etc.. 

Ins.    Co.    (64    Minn.   495;    67 

N.   W.  367;   58  Am.  St.   Rep. 

540),   2222. 
Chambers  v.  Smith    (12  M.  &  W. 

2),   569. 
Chamlee   v.   Davis    (115   Ga.   266; 

41   S.  E.   691),   175,  288,  382. 

906.  910,  921. 
Champer      v.      Greencastle       (138 

Ind.    339),   408,   468. 
Champion  v.   Board    (5   Dak.  416; 

41  N,W.  379),  867,  878. 
Champion   v.   State    (5   Dak.  416; 

41   N.   W.   739),  868. 
Chandler    v.     Ruelwlt     (8l3     Ind. 

139),   599,   621,   662. 
Chandler's  Wiltshire  Brewery  Co., 

In   re    ([1903]    1    K.   B.    569; 

72  L.  J.  K.  B.  250;   67  J.  P. 

119;    51   W.  R.  573;   88  L.  T. 

271;    19  T.  L.  R.  268),   1834. 
Channey  v.  State    (146   Ala.   136; 

41  So.   172),  288. 
Chapleau    v.     Cliapleaii     (1     Leg. 

News.  473),  2152. 
Chapman.  In  re    (  [N.  Y.]    110  N. 

Y.   Supp.  352),   720. 
Chapman   v.   Erie   R.   Co.    (55   N. 

Y.     579),     352,     2100,     2191, 

2202. 
Chapman   v.   State    (100  Ga.   311; 

27  S.  E.  789),  25,  969,  1711. 
Chapman    v.    State    (37    Te.\.    Cr. 

App.  137;  39  S.  W.  113),  868, 

912,  916. 
Chappel   V.    State    ([Ala.]    47    So. 

329),  1454. 
Charge  to  Grand  Jury.  In  re   (10 

N.     J.    Law    J.     116),     1108, 

1109,  1110. 


I'  Charles   v.    Bones    (22    Austr.    L. 

T.  97;    6   Austr.   L.   R.  209), 

1134. 
Charles  v.  Grierson    (29  Austr.  L. 

T.  222),   1147. 
Charles    v.    State    (13    Tex.    App. 

€58),    2061. 
Charleston  v.  Ahrens   (4  Strob.  L. 

[S.  C]   241),  111,   139. 
Charleston  v.  Benjamin    (2  Strob. 

[S.  C]   508),  216. 
'Charleston    v.    Corleis     (2    Bailey 

[S.  C]    186),  499,  501. 
Charleston    v.    Feckman    (3    Rich. 

L.   385),    498. 
Charleston    v.    Payne    (2    Nott.   & 

Mc€.  475),   2034. 
Charleston   v.    Schmidt    (11    Rich. 

L.  343),   409,  501. 
Charleston    v.     State     (4     Strobh. 

241),  307. 
Charlton    v.    Donncll     (100    Mass. 

229),    1800. 
Charrington    &    Co.,    Limited,    v. 

Camp.     ([1902]     1     Ch.    386; 

71  L.   J.   Ch.    196;    8<)   L.    T. 
15;   18  T.  L.  R.  152),  1829. 

Chase  v.   Keniston    (76   Me.  209), 

1944,    1974. 
Chase  v.  Van  Buren  Circuit  Judge 

(148    Mich.    149;    111    N.    W. 

750;     14    Detroit   L.    N.    73), 

S40,  841. 
Chason  v.   City  of  Milwaukee   (30 

Wis.  316),  408. 
Chastain  v.  Calhoun   (29  Ga.  333), 

522. 
Chatham    v.    State    (92    Ala.    47; 

9  So.  607),  2042,  2079. 
Cheadle     v.     State     (4     Ohio     St. 

477),   1384,   1590. 
Chemlir  v.  Sawyer   (42  Neb.  362; 

60    N.    W.  "547),    1859,    1999, 

2001. 
Cheney,  In  re  (35  Misc.  Rep.  598; 

72  N.  Y.  Supp.  134),  582,  583, 
592. 

Cheney    v.    Duke     (10    Gill    &    J. 
11),   1801. 


Ixxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Chenowith,   In  re    (56   Neb.  688; 

77  N.  W.  63),   1739. 
Chenowith   v.   State    (50  Tex.   Cr. 

App.  238;  96  S.  W.  19),  914, 

915,  916,  117'6. 
Cheny  V.  Shelbyville   (18  Ind.  84), 

418. 
Cherry  v.  Commonwealth    ( 78  Va. 

375),  715,  737,  743,  744. 
Cherry    v.    Shelbyville     (19     Ind. 

84),  795. 
Chesapeake  Club  v.  Stale   (63  Md. 

446),    1325,   1339. 
Chesapeake,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Sauls- 
berry    (112    Ky.    915;    66    N. 
•    W.    1051;     23     Ky.    L.    Rep. 

2341;  56  L.  R.  A.  680),  2206, 

2208,  2213,  2214. 
Chew  V.  State   (43  Ark.  361),  822, 

834. 
Chicago  V.   Collins    (175   111.   445; 

51    N.    E.  '907;    49    L.   R.    A. 

408;   67  Am.  Rep.  224),  479. 
Chicago  V.   Enright    (27   111.  App. 

■559),  793,  802. 
Chicago  V.  Malken   (119  111.  App. 

542;     affirmed    217    lU.    471; 

75  N.  W.   548),  691. 
Chicago  V.  Netcher    (183  111.   104; 

55  N.  E.  307),  454,  469,  1337. 
Chicago  V.  O'Hara    (124  111.   App. 

290),   578,  649,  800. 
Chicago    V.    Slack    (121    111.    App. 

131),  409,  415. 
Chicago  V.  Stratton   (162  111.  494; 

45  N.  E.  116),  204. 
Chicago   City  R.   Co.   v.  Lewis    (5 

111.   App.   242),  2174,  2177. 
Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wall    (93 

111.   App.    441),    1736. 
Chicago,   etc.,   R.    Co.   v.   Bell    (70 

111.   102),  2172,  2180,  2185. 
Chicago,  etc.,   Ob.  v.   Chicago    (88 

111.    221;    30    Am.   Rep.    545), 

167. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle   (18 

Kan.  58),  2200. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Drake    (33 

111.  App.  114),  2176. 


Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Jones  ( 149 

111.  361;  37  N.  E.  247),  264, 

1585. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.   Co.  v.  Randolph 

(199  111.  126;   65  X.  E.  142), 

1736,   2208. 
Chicago,   etc.,   R.   Co.   v.    Sullivan 

(63     111.     293),     2192,     2194, 

2198,  2109,  2201. 
Child  V.  Hudson's  Bay  €0.    (2  P. 

Williams,  207),  438. 
Childers   v.    Shepherd    ([Ala.]    39 

So.    235),    174,    233. 
Chilvers  v.  People    (11   Mich.  43), 

479,    788. 
Chinn  v.  Russell   (2  Blackf.  [Ind.] 

172),  1027. 
Chipman  v.  People   (24  Colo.  520; 

52    Pac.    677),    1609,    1697. 
Chisholm  v.  Strickland  ( 9  N.  S.  W. 

L.  R.   391),   1325,   1343. 
Chittenden    Co.    v.    Mitchell     (23 

Vt.   131),   1743. 
Chivers  v.   People    (11   Mich.  43), 

479,   788. 
Choate  v.  State   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App, 

297;   S3  S.   W.   377),    1380. 
Choice    V.    State     (31    Cia.    424), 

1735,  2041,  2058,  2086. 
Choran  v.  State  (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

301;    92   S.   W.   422),    1202. 
Chrisman  v.  State    (54  Ark.  283), 

2041. 
Christ  Diehl  Brewing  Co.  v.  Spen- 
cer    (29    Ohio    Cir.    Ct.    Rep, 

ol2),   541. 
Christ  Deal   Brewing   Co.  v.   Beck 

(30   Ohio  'Cr.  Ct.   Rep.   226), 

544. 
Christian  v.  State    (40  Ala.  376), 

1290. 
Christian     v.     State      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  39  S.  W.  682),  1098, 
I'hristian    Moer.    Brewing    Co.    v. 

Hill     (166    Fed.     1140),    259, 

293. 
C  hristie  v.  Britnell  (21  Vict.  L.  R. 

71;     17    Austr.    L.    T.    59;    1 

Austr,  L.  R.  59),  1571, 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxvii 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Christensen,  In  re    (43  Fed.  243), 

206. 
•Christensen,    Ex    parte     (85     Cal. 

208;    24   Pac.   747),   191,   195, 

206,  208. 
Christensen   v.    Kellogg,    etc.,    Co. 

(110   111.   App.   61),    974. 
Chung  Sing  v.   United  States    (36 

Pac.  205),    1629. 
Church  V.  Higliam  (44  Iowa,  482), 

1242,    1251,    1252,    1255. 
Church    V.    Northern    Pac.    R.    Co. 

(31  Fed.  529),  2197. 
Church  V.  Territory    ([X.  M.]    91 

Pac.  720),  358. 
Church   v.    Weeks    ( 38    Mo.    App. 

om),  887. 
Churchill  v.  Alpena  Ct.  Judge  (50 

Mich.  536;    23    N.    W.    211), 

2255. 
Churchill    v.    Detroit    (153    Mich. 

93;    116   X.   W.  558),   424. 
Churcliill    V.    Herrick     (32    Wis. 

357),  808. 
Chute  V.  Van  Camp    ([Wis.]    117 

N.  W.  1012),  441. 
Chuya,  In   re    (20   Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

410),  626,  628,  629,  635,  604. 
Cincinnati  v.  Rice   (15  Ohio,  225), 

216. 
Cincinnati,    etc.,    R.   Co.    v.    Com- 
missioners,   etc.     ( 1    Ohio    St. 

77),  240,   1014. 
Cincinnati,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Com- 
monwealth (126  Ky.  563;   104 

S.    W.    394;    31    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

954),  955,  1289. 
Cincinnati,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper 

(120  Ind.  469;   22  N.  E.  340; 

6  L.  R.  A.  241),  2191,  2193, 

2202,    2209,    2210. 
Cincinnati,   etc.,   R.   Co.   v.   Marvs 

(119  Ky.  954;   85  S.  W.   l'S8; 

70  L.  R.  A.  291),  2183,  2213, 

2217. 
Cipperley,  In  re    (50  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    266;     100    X.    Y.    Supp. 

473),   852. 
City  Council  v.  Ahrens   (4  Strobh. 

241),   189. 


City     Council     v.     HoUenback     (3 

Strobh.  355),  529. 
City  Council  v.  Talck   (3  Rich.  L. 

[S.     C.J      299),     1124,     1309, 

1669. 
City    Council    v.    Van    Roven     (2 

McCord  [S.  C]   465),  1370. 
City  Tattersall's  Club,   In  re    (29 

Vict.  L.  R.  257;   25  Austr.  L. 

T.    85;    '9    Austr.   L.   R.    165), 

1345. 
Citizens,    etc.,    v.    Board    (49    La. 

Ann.  641;  21  So.  742),  939. 
Clancy,  In  re  (58  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

258;    109    X.   Y.   Supp.    044), 

881. 
Clapton  V,  Commonwealth   ([Va.] 

63  S.    E.    1022),    1650,    1652. 
Clare   v.   State    (5   Clarke    [Iowa] 

509),  1501. 
Clark,    Ex    parte    (69    Ark.    435; 

64  S.  W.   223),  635. 

Clark,    Ex   parte    ( [Tex.]     120    S. 

W.   892),  279,   291,   387,   419, 

635. 
Clark    V.   Adams    (80    Miss.    219; 

31   So.   746),    1098,   1761. 
Clark    V.    Carter     (40    Ind.    190), 

355. 
Clark  V.  Coldwell   (6  Watts,  139), 

2119,   2120. 
Clark    V.    Daniel     (77    Ark.     122; 

91  S.  W.  9),  859. 
Clark   V.    Ellis    (2    Blackf.    [Ind.] 

248),   294. 
Clark    V.    Pratt    ([Miss.]     11    So. 

631),  669. 
Clark    V.    Railroad    Company     (4 

Allen    [Mass.]    231),    1070. 
Clark  V.  Riddle    (101   Iowa,  270; 

70     X.    W.     207),     932,     978, 

1005. 
Clark  V.  Rogers   (81  Ky.  43),  233. 
Clark  V.  Sheehan    (22  X.  Z.  707), 

1153. 
Clark    V.    Skinner    (20    John    [N. 

Y.]    465;    11    Am.   Dec.    302), 

1027. 
Clark    V.    State    ( [Ga.]    63    S.    E. 

606),  1602. 


Ixxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  aie  to  pages.] 


Clark    V.    (State     (34    Ind.    311), 

1442,     1483,     1484,     1566. 
Clark    V.    State     (24    Xeb.    263; 

38  N.  W.  752),  6H;. 
Clark  V.   State    (32  Xeb.  246;    49 

N.  W.  367  ) ,  2056. 
Clark   V.   State    (8   Humph.   671), 

2040. 
Clark  V.  State   (40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

127;     49    S.    W.    85),     1612, 

1613,  1691,  1732,  1733. 
Clark  V.  State  ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

107  S.  W.  1198),  1465,  1473. 
Clark  V.  State  (53  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

529;   111  S.  W.  659),  86, 

2032. 
<:iark   V.   Tower    (65   Atl.   3;    104 

Md.   175),   120,   286,   864. 
Clark  V,   Tuckett    (2   \'eiit.    1'82), 

294. 
Clark  V.   Wilmington,  etc.,  E.  Co. 

(109  X.  C.  430)  :   14  S.  E.  43; 

14  L.  R.  A.  749),  2183,  2197. 
Clarke  v.  Blake   (2  Ves.  Jr.  673), 

1906. 
Clarke    v.    Philadelphia,    etc.,    Co. 

92    Minn.    418;     100    X.    W. 

231),   1736,  218-6. 
Clarke  v.  Rochester   (5  Abb.  Prac. 

107),  233. 
Clarke  Co.  v.  Herrington   (113  Ga. 

234;    38  S.  E.  852),  476. 
Class,  Appeal  of  (6  Pa.  Super.  Co. 

130),  697,  705. 
Claus    V.    Hardy     (31     Xeb.     35; 

47  X.  VV.  418),  661. 
Claussen   v.    Luverne    ( 103    ]\linn. 

491;     115    N.    W.    643),    7.52, 

788. 
Clay,  hi  re   (1  L.  C.  pi.  II,  300), 

491. 
Claydon  v.  Green  ([1868]  L.  R. 

3  C.  P.  oil;  37  L.  J.  C.  P. 

226;  18  L.  T.  607;  16  W.  R. 

1126),   1S30. 
Clayton,  Kx  parte   (03  J.  P.  688), 

567,  570. 
Clearof,    In    re    ([1907]    14    App. 

Ont.  L.  R.  392),  921. 


Clears    v.    Stanley    (34    111.    App. 

338),    1909,    1973. 
Clegg   V.    Hands    ([1890]    44    Ch. 

D.  503;   55  J.  P.   180),   1816. 
Cleghorn   v.    Xew   York,   etc.,    Co. 

(56    X.    Y.    44),    2172,    2102, 

2194,  2198. 
Clement,   In   re    (29    X.   Y.    Misc. 

Rep.  29 ;  60  X.  Y.  Supp.  328 ) , 

852. 
Clements,   In  re    (52   X.   Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    325;    102    X.    Y.    Supp. 

178;   affirmed  118  X.  Y,  App. 

Div.    5/5;     103    X.    Y.    Supp. 

157),  580,  730. 
Clement,    In    re    54    X.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    362;    105    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1054),  103. 
Clement,   In    re    (55    X.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    615;     105    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1085),    706,    733,    736,    741. 
Clement,   In    re    (57    X.    Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    47;     107    X.    Y.    Supp. 

205),    731,    752. 
Clement,   In    re    (58   X.   Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    257;     110    X.   Y.    Supp. 

893),    723. 
Clement,   In    re    (58    X.   Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    638;    111    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1073),  584. 
Clement,   In    re    (59    X.    Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    367;     112    X.    Z.    Supp. 

126),  718,  742,  746,  751. 
Clement,   In    re    ( 62    X.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    512;     116    X.    Y.   Supp. 

1070),  742,  746,  751. 
Clement,   In  re    (116   X.  Y.   App. 

Div.    148;     101    X.    Y.    Supp. 

683;   affirmed  118  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.    575;     103    X.    Y.    Supp. 

157),   729,   739,   745. 
Clement,  In   re    (1 18   X.   Y.   App. 

Div.    575;     103    X.    Y.    Supp. 

157;      affirming     103     X.     Y. 

Supp.  447),  584,   732. 
Clement,   In   re    (119   X.   Y.   App. 

Div.    622;     104    X.    Y.    Supp. 

25;   53  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  358; 

104  X.  Y.  Supp.  »05),  730. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxix 


fReferences  are  to  pages] 


Clement,   In  re    (125  N.   Y.   App. 

Div.    676;     110    N.    Y.   ,Supp. 

o7,   50),   534,   54-6,   732. 
Clement,   In   re    (187   N.  Y.    274; 

79    N.   E.    1003),   745,   932. 
Clement,  In  re    (190   N.    Y.   523; 

S3  N.  E.   1123;   affirming  119 

N.  Y.  App.  Div.  '622;   104  N. 

Y.  Supp.  25),  370,  719. 
Clement  v.  Beers  (110  N.  Y.  Supp. 

•99),   1312. 
Clement   v.   Empire    State    Surety 

Co.   (110  N.  Y.  S.  418),  li924. 
Clement  v.   Federal  Union   Surety 

Co.   ( 122  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  18 ; 

106   N.  Y.   Supp.    1061),   769. 
Clement    v.     Harden     (62    N.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.     31;     114    X.     Y. 

Supp.   751),   1016,  1075. 
Clement  v.  Martin  ( 117  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  5;   102  N.  Y.  Supp.  37), 

1188,   1268,    1312. 
Clement  v.   Mattison    (3   Rich.  L. 

[S.    C]    93),    2109,    2114. 
Clement   v.    Moore    ( [N.    Y.    App. 

Div.]    119   N.  Y.   Supp.  883), 

751. 
Clement    v.    Rafbech     (62    N.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.    27;     115    N.    Y. 

Supp.  162),   1074. 
Clement  v.  Smith   (60  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    395;    112    N.    Y.    Supp. 

955),  757. 
Clement  v.  Viscosi   (63  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    514;     118    N.    Y.    Supp. 

613),  698,  750,  818. 
Clemmens    v.    Commonwealth     ( 6 

Rand.  681),  540. 
Cleveland  v.  Rogers   (0  Wend.   [N. 

Y.]   438),   1018. 
Cleveland  v.   State    (86   Ala.    1;    5 

So.  426),  2062,  2003,  2068. 
Cleveland    v.    State    (4    Ga.    App. 

62;  60  S.  E.  801).  2024,  2035. 
Cleveland  v.  Tripp   (13  R.  I.  50), 

792. 
Cleveland     v.     State      ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    66    S.    W.    550),    1235, 

1237,   1627. 


Cleveland,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Harring- 
ton   (131   Ind.  426;   30  N.   E. 

37),  98. 
Clevenger    v.    Rushville     (90    Ind. 

258),  403. 
Clifford  v.  O'Donnell   (24  N.  S.  W. 

8),  1129,  1134. 
Clifford    V.    Smith    (24    N.    S.    W. 

192),   1255. 
Clifford   V.   State    (29   Wis.   327), 

12,  15,  23,  26,  29. 
Clifton  V.  Davis   ( 1  Pars.  Eq.  Cas. 

31),  2094,  2097,  2103,  2130. 
Clifton  Cook  Brewery  v.  Ryan  (19 

N.  Y.  595),  1819. 
Cline  V.   State    (43  Ohio  St.  332; 

1  N.  E.  22),  2040,  2048,  2067, 

2073. 
Cline  v.  Cline  (10  Ore.  474),  2164. 
Clinton  v.  Gruesendorf    (79   Iowa, 

117;    45   N.   W.  407),   69,  70, 

1315. 
Clinton  v.  Laming  (61  Mich.  355; 

28    N.    W.    125),    1899,    1900, 

1978. 
Clinton  v.   Phillips    (58   111.   102), 

840. 
Clinton  v.  State  (58  111.  102),  211, 

220. 
Clinton  v.  State   (33  Ohio  St.  27), 

1655. 
Clintonville   v.   Keating    (4   Denio 

[N.   Y.]    341),   401,   410,   414, 

470. 
Clipperly,   In  re    (50   N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    266;     100    N.    Y.    Supp. 

473),  880,  881,  882,  922. 
Clisham,    In    re     (105    Cal.    674; 

39  Pac.  37),   1532,   1533. 
Clohessy    v.    Roedelheim     (99    Pa. 

St."  56),   1806. 
Clopton  V.  Commonwealth    ([Va.] 

63    S.    E.    1022),    264,    1653, 

1654. 
Clore    &   Berry,    In    re    (2    B.    C. 

131),   627,  631. 
Clore  V.  State   (26  Tex.  App.  624; 

10    S.    W.    242),    2039,    2088, 

2090. 


Ixxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


"Close   V.   Burkholder    (18   Pa.    St. 

48),  1782. 
Close  V.  O'Brien    (135  Iowa,  305; 

112  N.  W.  800),  589. 
Cluck    V.    State     (40    Ind.    2G3), 

2040. 
Cloud    V.    State     (36    Ark.    151), 

513,   1357,  1358,  1372. 
Clutch    V.    Clutch     (1    N.    J.    Eq. 

474),   2167. 
Clyde,  In  re  (82  Neb.  537;   118  N. 

W.  90),  761. 
Coates  V.  New  York    (7  Cow.  [N. 

Y.]    585,   604,   606),    129. 
Coats  V.  State    (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

553;  89  S.  W.  838),  1280. 
Cobb  V,  Billings  (23  Me.  470), 

1191,  1780. 
Cobb  V.  Cobb  ([1900]  P.  294;  64 

L.  J.  P.  125;  83  L.  T.  716), 

2169. 
Cobb  V.  People   (84  111.  511),  784. 
Cobb    V.    Tarr     (16    Gray,    597), 

1775. 
Cobleigh    v.    McBride     (45    Iowa, 

116),  1223,  1661,  2011. 
Coburn  v.  Gill    ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

60  S.  W.  974),  772,  785. 
Cochell  V.  Reynolds    (156  Ind.  14; 

58  N.  E.  1029),  855. 
Cockerell    v.    Commonwealth    (115 

Ky.  296 ;  24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  449 ; 

72  S.  W.  760),   1493,   1494. 
Cochin  V.  Reynolds   (156  Ind.  14; 

58  N.  E.   1029),  606. 
Cochrane  v.  Clough    (38  Me.  25), 

1782. 
Cochran's    Will,    In    re    (1    T.    B. 

Mon.  263;    15  Am.  Dec.   116), 

21;;6,  2150. 
Cochran  v.  State  (26  Tex.  678), 

1290,  1491,  1505,  1554,  1590. 
Cocker  v.  McMullen  (64  J.  P. 

245;  81  L.  T.  784),  690,  1271, 

1285. 
Cockerell    v.    Commonwealth     (115 

Ky.    296;    73    S.    W.    760;    24 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  2149),  1698,  1699. 
Cockrill  V.  Cockrill   (79  Fed.  143), 

2019,  2117. 


Cockrill  V.  Cockrill   (92  Fed.  811; 

34  C.  C.  A.  254),  2019,  2117. 

Cocks    V.    Lady    Henry    Somerset 

([1895]     11    T.    L.    R.    567), 

]£30. 
Coe,  In  re  (24  Up.  Can.  439),  914. 
Coe  V.   Errol    (116   U.   S.  517;    42 

L.  Ed.  1088;  6  Sup.  Ct.  475), 

325. 
Coe    V.    State     (  [Okla.]     104    Pac. 

1074),  38,  83. 
Cofer  V.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.]  87 

S.   W.    264;    27    Ky.   L.   Rep. 

934),  415,  543. 
Coffee    V.    Ruffiji     (4    Cold.    487), 

2126. 
Coffeen    v.    Huber     (78    111.    App. 

455),  1280. 
Coffer  V.  Elizabethtown   ( [Ky.]  99 

S.   W.    608;    36   Ky.   L.    Rep. 

706),  186. 
Cofield     V.     Britton      ([Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    109    S.    W.    493),    245, 

865,   921,   938. 
Coffin,  In  re   (41  N.  Y.  Misc.  131; 

83  N.  Y.  Supp.  941),  2017. 
Cogdell  V.  Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

130  N.  C.  313;   41  S.  E.  541), 

2189. 
Coggeshall    v.    Groves     ( 16    R.    I. 

18;     11    Atl.    296),    123,    491, 

1194. 
Coggeshall    v.    Pallett     (15    R.    I. 

168;   1  Atl.  413),  762,  778. 
Coggins    V.    Griffith     (5    Ga.    App. 

1;    62   S.   E.    659),   441,    1089, 

1090. 
Coghill    V.    State     (37    Ind.    Ill), 

407. 
Cogill    V.    Queenstown     (21    Juta, 

262),  604. 
Cohaba  v.  Burnett    (34  Ala.  400), 

811. 
Cohely    v.    State    (4    Iowa,    477), 

1484. 
Cohen,    In    re    (5    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

224),  666. 
Colien    V.    Jarrett    (42    Md.    571), 

101,    138,    195,   574. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxi 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Cohen  v.  King  Knob  Club   (55  W. 

Va.   108;   46   S.  E.  799),  977, 

990. 
Cohen   v.    Rice    ( [Tex.   Civ.   App.] 

101  S.  W.  1052),  167,  424. 
Cohen   v.    State    ( [Ga.]    65    S.   E. 

1096),  1530. 
Cohen  v.  State    (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

422;    110  S.  W.  66),  364. 
Cohens  v.  State   ([Tex.]  116  S.  W. 

571),   937. 
Cohn,   In    re    ([Neb.]    121    X.    W. 

107),  574. 
Cohn   V.   Melcher    (29    Fed.    433), 

152. 
Cohn  V.  State   (120  Tenn.  61;   109 

S.  W.  1149),  254,  1602. 
Cohoes    V.    Moian     (25    How.    Pr. 

385),  448,  449. 
Coker  v.  State   (91  Ala.  92;   8  So. 

874),   1166,   1223,   1224,   1754. 
Colchester     v.     Godwin      (Carter, 

121),  294. 
Colbath  V.  State  (4  Tex.  App.  76), 

2039,  2067. 
Colburn    v.    Spencer     ( 177    Mass. 

743;   59  N.  E.  78),  1974. 
Colby  V.  Fitzgerald  ( [Iowa]  94  N. 

W.  491),  1661. 
Colby  V.  State   (  [Iowa]   94  N.  W. 

491),  1731. 
Coldwell  V.  Guider    (88   Ala.   421; 

7  So.  203),  941. 
Cole,  Appeal  of  ( 79  Conn.  679 ;  66 

Atl.  508),  750. 
Cole  V.  Cole   (5  Sneed  [Tenn.]  57; 

70  Am.  Dec.  275),  2114. 
Cole   V.   Commonwealth    (101    Ky. 

151;   39   S.  W.   1029;    19  Ky.. 

L.   Eep.   324),    934. 
Cole  V.  Commonwealth    (  [Ky.]   98 

S.   W.   1002;    30   Ky.   L.   Rep. 

385),    923. 
Cole  V.  Coulton    (24  J.  P.  596;    2 

E.  &  E.   695;    29  L.  J.  M.  C. 

125;    2    L.    T.    216;    8    W.    R. 

412),  367,  726,  2026. 
Cole  V.  McClcndler   (109  La.   183; 

34  S.  E.  384),  865. 


Cole     V.     Robbins     (Bull.     N.     P. 

172a),  2092,  2098,  2106. 
Cole  V.  State   (120  Ga.  485;  48  S. 

E.  156),  1602,  1650. 
Cole   V.    State    (9    Tex.   42),   369, 

370. 
Colee  V.  State  (75  Ind.  oil),  2040. 
Coleman   v.   People    (78   111.   App. 

210),   1912,   1923,   1974,   1980, 
Coleman   v.    State    (145   Ala.    13; 

40  So.  715),  1479. 
Coleman  v.  State  (150  Ala.  64;  43 

So.  715),  1443,  1484,  1505. 
Coleman    v.    State     (3    Ga.    App. 

298;  59  S.  E.  829),  2032. 
Coleman    v.    State     (53    Tex.    Cr. 

App.   578;    111    S.   W.    1011), 

916,  1168,  1181,  1339,  1343, 

1692,  1694,  1696,  1729. 
Coleman  v.  State  (54  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  396;  112  S.  W.  1072), 

913,  1599,  1703. 
Colglazier  v.  McClary    ([Neb.]   98 

N.  W.  670),  586,  618. 
Colglazier  v.  Salem  (61  Ind.  445), 

811. 
Collarn,  In  re    (134  Pa.   St.   551; 

19  Atl.  775),  635,  648. 
Collender  v.  Densmore    (55  N.  Y. 

206),  1727. 
Collian,  In  re  (82  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

445;  81  N.  Y.  Supp.  567),  186. 
Collier    v.    Early    (54    Ind.    559), 

1870,  1871. 
Collins  V.  Barrier   (64  Miss.  21;  8 

So.   164),  577,  603,  669. 
Collins  V.  Hills   (77  Iowa,  181;  41 

N.  W.  571;   3  L.  R.  A.   110), 

309,  310. 
Collins  V.  Noyes    (66  N.  H.   619; 

27  Atl.  225),  1021. 
Collins  V,  State    (152  Ala.  90;   44 

So.  571),  1607,  1645. 
Collins  V.   State    (114  Ga.   70;   39 

S.  E.  916),  946. 
Collins  V.  State  ( 38  Ind.  App.  625 ; 

78  N.  E.  851),  1573. 
Collins  V.  State  (34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

95;  29  S.  W.  274),  1351,  1361. 


bocxii 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Collins  T.  State  (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

497;   84  S.  W.  585),  1695. 
Collins  V.  State  ( 115  Wis.  596;  92 

N.  W.  266),  2078,  2079. 
Colon  V.  Lisk   (153  N.  Y.  188;  47 

N.  E.  302),  743. 
Colter  V.  Cooper    (15  N.  Z.  L.  R. 

186),   1727. 
Columbus    City    v.    Cutconip     (61 

Iowa,  672),  488,  490. 
Columbus   V.   Schaerr    (5    Ohio    S. 

&  C.  P.  100),  211,  295,  442. 
Columbus    City    v.    Cutcomp     (61 
Iowa,  672;  17  N.  W.  47),  168, 
183,  184,  185. 
Columbus,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Wood 
(86    Ala.     164),    2182,    2184, 
2185,  2190. 
Colusa    County    v.    Seube     (  [Cal.] 
53  Pac.  li28;  affirming  [Cal.] 
53  Pac.  654),  412,  447. 
Colvin  V.  Finch   (75  Ark.   154;   87 

S.  W.  443),  859. 
Colwell  V.  State    (112  Ga.  75;   37 

S.  E.  129),  965,  969,  971. 
Combe  v.  Carthew    (  [N.  J.  L.]  43 

Atl.  1057),  2121. 
Combs   V.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 
104  S.  W.  270;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
822),    959,    1158,    1465,    1467, 
1470. 
Combs   V.    State    (81    Ga.    780;    8 

S.  E.  318),  1405,  1469. 
Commagere  v.  Brown  (27  La.  Ann. 

314),  1811. 
Commissioners      v.      Backus      (29 

How.  Prac.  33),  783,  1188. 
Commissioners   v.   Beall    (98   Tex. 

104;  81  S.  W.  526),  863. 
Commissioners  v.  Cartman  ( [  1896] 
1  Q.  B.  655;  60  J.  P.  357;  65 
L.  J.  M.  C.  113;  74  L.  T.  726; 
44  W.  R.  631;  12  T.  L.  R. 
334),  361,  1253,  1352,  1355. 
Commissioners   v.    Daugherty    ( 55 

Barb.  332),  513,  1372. 
Commissioners      v.       Dennis       ( 1 
Cheves,  229),  508. 


Commissioner  v.  Donovan  ([1903] 

1  K.  B.  895 ;  67  J.  P.  147 ;  72 

L,  J.  K.  B.  545;  52  W,  R.  14; 

88  L.  T.  555;  19  T.  L.  R.  392), 

744. 
Commissioners  v.  Freeoff  ( 17  How. 

Pr.  442),  48,  82. 
Commissioner  v.  Gas  Co.   (2  Grant 

[Pa.],  291),  408. 
Commissioners     v.     Patterson      (8 

Jones  [N.  C]  Law,  182),  443. 
Commissioner  v.   Roberts    ([1904] 

1  K.  B.  369;   68  J.  P.  39;   73 

L.  J.  K.  B.  231;  52  W.  R.  560; 

20  T.  L.  R.  105),  1140. 
Commissioners  v.  Taylor  (21  N.  Y. 

173),  14,  48,  82,  85. 
Commissioners    v.     Trimble     ( 150 

Mass.  89;  22  K.  E.  239),  62. 
Commonwealth     v.     Aaron      (114 

Mass.   255),   1097,   1674. 
Commonwealth     v.     Acton      ( 165 

Mass.     11;     42    N.     E.     329  S 

1596. 
Commonwealth    v.    Adair    (6    Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  306),  1681. 
Commonwealth  v.  Adair   ( 121   Ky. 

689;    89   S.  W.   1130;    28  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  657),  950. 
Commonwealth  v.  Adams   ( 1  Gray, 

481),   1483,   1485. 
Commonwealth  v.  Adams  (6  Gray, 

3o9),    1744. 
Commonwealth     v.     Ahrens     ( 150 

Mass.    393;     23    N.    E.    53), 

1166. 
Commonwealth    v.    Alexander     ( 1 

Va.    Cas.    156;    4    Hen.   &   M. 

522),   2031. 
Commonwealth  v.  Alger    (7  Cush. 

53),  92,  97,  1009. 
Commonwealth    v.    Allen     ( 15    B. 

Mon.   1),   1516,   1517. 
Commonwealth  v.  Alpa  (24  Super. 

Ct.  454),  1342,  1344. 
Commonwealth    v.    Anderson     ( 10 

Ky.   L.    Rep.   307),    946,    957, 

1463,   1682,   1729. 
Commonwealth    v.    Andrews     ( 143 

Mass.  23;  8  N.  E.  643),  1672. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


Ixxxiii 


[References  are  to  pagres.] 


Commonwealth      v.      Anthes      ( 12 

Gray,   29),   8,   85,    1592. 
Commonwealth    v.    Armstrong     (7 

Gray,  494),    16o0,   1U55. 
Commonwealth  v.  Arnold   (4  Pick. 

251),    369,    1575. 
Commonwealth     v.     Asbury      ( 104 

Ky.    320;    47    S.    W.    217;    20 

Ky.   L.  Rep.  574),  541,   1269. 
Commonwealth     v.     Atkins      ( 136 

Mass.   160),   1081,   1089,  1116, 

1669. 
Commonwealth   v.    Auberton    (133 

Mass.     404),    213,    "214,     344, 

347. 
Commonwealth    v.    Ault    ( 10    Pa. 

Super.    Ct.    651),    2079. 
Commonwealth      v.      Austin      (97 

Mass.  595),   1647,  1719,  1730. 
Commonwealth    v.    Baird    ( 4    S.    & 

K.   141),  1505. 
Commonwealth  v.  Baker  ( 10  Cash. 

405),   1516,  1518. 
Commonwealth  v.  Baker    (2  Gray, 

78),  1534. 
Commonwealth     v.      Baker      ( 152 

Mass.    337;    25    N.    E.    718), 

1103. 
Commonwealth      v.       Baker       ( 1 1 

Phila.  631;   33  Leg.  Int.  367), 

2040,   2051,   2060,   2068. 
Commonwealth    v.    Barbour     (121 

Ky.   689;    89    S.   W.    479;    28 

Ky.    L.    Rep.    433),    057. 
Commonwealth      v.      Barker      ( 14 

Gray,  412),   1113,  1115,   1666, 

1668. 
Commonwealth      v.      Barley      (97 

Mass.  597),  1614. 
Commonwealth     v.     Barlow      (97 

Mass.  597),   1595. 
Commonwealth     v.     Barnes      (138 

Mass.    511),    546,    1126,    1238, 

1265. 
Commonwealth      v.      Barnes    (140 

Mass.   447),  213,   344. 
Commonwealth     v.      Barry      (115 

Mass.    146),   1090,    1368. 
Commonwealth     v.      Bartholomew 

([Ky.]   33  S.  W.  840),   1499. 


Commonwealth    v.    Bartley     (138 

Mass.  181),   1543. 
Commonwealth     v.     Bathrick      (6 

Cush.    247),    22,   965. 
Commonwealth     v.     Baumler     (20 

Pa.   Super.   Ct.   273),    1237. 
Commonwealth      v.      Baward^      (6 

Gray,  488),  1479. 
Commonwealth     v.     Bearce      (150 

Mass.     380;     23     N.     E.    99), 

572,    730,    740,    1452. 
Commonwealth  v.  Beck   ( 187  Mass. 

15;    72   N.   E.   357),  056. 
Commonwealth    v.     Beckum     ( 153 

Mass.    386;    26   N.   E.    1003), 

1746. 
Commonwealth    v.    Beldham     ( 15 

Pa.   Super.   Ct.   33),  972. 
Commonwealth  v.   Bell    ( 14   Bush, 

433),   1461,    1564. 
CommonwealtJi     v.      Below      ( 1 15 

Mass.    130),    1643. 
Commonwealth   v.   Benge    ( 13  Ky. 

L.   Rep.   591),    1.502. 
Commonwealth    v.     Bennett     ( 108 

Mass.  27 ) ,  228,  232,  235,  240, 

1035,  1009,  1741. 
Commonwealth    v.     Bennett     ( 108 

Mass.  30;    11  Am.  Rep.  304), 

1401,    1514. 
Commonwealth      v.      Bently      (97 

Mass.  '551),  87,   1702,  1709. 
Commonwealth  v.  Berghman   ( 129 

Pa.     644;     18     Atl.     570;     25 

Wkly.  N.  C.   151),  522. 
Commonwealth      v.      Berry      ( 109 

Mass.   366),    1658,    1659. 
Commonwealth    v.    Bickum     (153 

Mass.    3S6;    26    N.    E.    1003), 

1595,  1614. 
Commonwealth    v.    Bishman    (138 

Pa.  639;    12  Atl.  12),  1752. 
Commonwealth        v.        Blackburn 

([Ky.]    122  S.  W.  818),  648. 
Commonwealth  v.  Blackington  ( 24 

Pick.  352),  111,  139,  503,  504, 

1159. 
Commonwealth  v.  Blanchard   ( 105 

Mass.  173),  1460. 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth    v.    Blair     (5    Pa. 

Dist.  Rep.  488),  647. 
Commonwealth  v.  Blood    (4  Gray, 

31),    1623,    1G26,    1647,    1656. 
Commonwealth  v.  Bios   (116  Mass. 

56),    8,    11,    44,   46,    85,    962, 

973,    1704. 
Commonwealth  v.  Bogie   ( 1  S.  W. 

532;     8    Ky.    L.    Rep.    350), 

931. 
Commonwealth    v.    Bogie     ( 7    Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]  601),  946. 
Commonwealth  v.  Bolkom  ( 3  Pick. 

251),  369,   1575,   1640. 
Commonwealth   v.   Boon    (2   Gray, 

74),  2031. 
Commonwealth  v.  Boyd    ( [Ky.]  32 

S.  W.   132),   1467,   1468. 
Commonwealth     v.     Boyden      ( 14 

Gray,  101),   1656,   1667,  1715, 

1672. 
Commonwealth    v.     Boyden     ( 183 

Mass.     1;     66     N.     E.     202), 

1195. 
Commonwealth  v.  Boyle  ( 14  Gray, 

3),    1513. 
Commonwealth      v.      Boyle      ( 145 

Mass.    373;     14    N.    E.    155), 

1670. 
Commonwealth  v.  Bottoms   ([Ky.] 

50  S.  W.  684 ;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1929),  939. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Bottoms   (  [Ky.] 

57  S.  VV.  493;   20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1829 ;  reversing  57  S,  W.  495 ) , 

940. 
Commonwealth  v.  Bottoms   ([Ky.] 

22    Ky.    L.    Rep,    410;    57 's, 

W.  493),  234. 
Commonwealtli    v.    Boutwell    ( 162 

Mass.    230;    38    N.    E.    441), 

1082. 
Commonwealth   v.   Boyton    (2   Al- 
len, 160),  1112,  nio. 
Commonwealth      v.      Bradley       (3 

Gray,    456),    1115. 
Commonwealth     v.     Brady      (147 

Mass,    683;     18    N.    E.    568), 

1375,  1675,  1676. 


Commonwealth   v.   Brelsford    (161 

Mass.    61;     36    N.    E.    677), 

709,    1698. 
Commonwealth    v.    Bi-em     (5    Pa. 

Super.    Ct.    104),    1342,    1343, 
Commonwealth  v.  Brenaman  ( 8  B. 

Mon.  374),  511,  694. 
Commonwealth    v.    Brennan     ( 103 

Mass.   70),  95,   129,   182,   184, 

186,  488,  489,  714,   1374, 
Commonwealth  v.  Briggs   (11  Met, 

573),  1655. 
Commonwealth     v.      Briant     (142 

Mass.   463;    8   N.   E.   338;    50 

Am.    Rep.    707),    1591,    1615, 

1629. 
Commonwealth     v.     Broker      ( 151 

Mass.   355;    23   N.    E.    1137), 

1445,  1449,  1452. 
Commonwealth     v.     Brooks      ( 150 

Mass.     59;     22    N,    E,    436), 

1615. 
Commonwealth    v.    Brothers     ( 158 

Mass.    200;     33    N.    E.    386), 

259,   345,    1536,    1595. 
Commonwealth  v.  Brown    ( 10  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   407),  884, 

936. 
Commonwealth  v.  Brown  (2  Gray, 

358),    1623. 
Commonwealth      v.      Brown       ( 12 

Gray,  135),   1765. 
Commonwealth  v.  Brown   ( 12  Met, 

522),  1500. 
Commonwealth     v.     Brown      ( 124 

Mass.   318),   1729,   1732. 
Commonwealth     v.     Brown      ( 136 

Mass.  171),   1672. 
Commonwealtli     v.     Brown      ( 154 

Mass.   55;    27   X.   E.   776;    13 

L.  R.  A.  195),  1374. 
Commonwealth     v.     Brusie      ( 145 

Mass.    117;     13    N.    E.    378), 

988,    1513. 
Commonwealth  v.  Bryan    (9  Dana 

[Ky.]    310),   694,    1783. 
Commonwealth      v.      Bryan      ( 148 

Mass.    455;    19    N,    E.    555), 

1671. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxv 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Bryden    (9  Met. 

137),  1487. 
Commonwealth   v.   Buck    ( 12  Met. 

524),   1G37. 
Commonwealth      v.      Budser      ( 14 

Gray,  83),  85. 
Commonwealth    v.    Bulkley     (147 
Mass.    581;     IS    X.    E.    571), 
1671. 
Commonwealtli     v.     Binding     ( 12 

Cush.    500),    1510,    1521. 
Commonwealth  v.  Burk   (11  Gray, 

437),   13G0. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Burk   ( 15  Gray, 

404),    1651. 
Commonwealth  v.  Burke  ( 14  Gray, 

81),    L626. 
Commonwealth  v.  Burke  ( 15  Gray, 

408),  23. 
Commonwealth      a\      Burke     (114 

Mass.  261),   1094.   1099,   1102. 
Commonwealth     v.      Burke      (121 

Mass.   39),    1516. 
Commonwealtli     v.      Burke      (114 

Mass.  261),   1375. 
Commonwealth  v.  Burns   (8  Gray, 

482),   1171. 
Commonwealth  v.  Burns    (9  Gray, 

287),   1711. 
Commonwealth      v.      Burns      ( 167 

Mass.    374;     45    X.    E.    755), 

1101. 
Commonwealth   v.   Burns    ( 38   Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  514),  10,   14,  1697. 
Commonwealth   v.    Bushman    ( 138 

Pa.  St.  639;  21  Atl.  12),  337. 
Commonwealth    v.    Byers     ( [Ky.] 

109    S.    W.    895;     33    Ky.    L. 

Rep.   252),   825,   826,  '834. 
Commonwealth     v.     Byrnes      ( 126 

Mass.  248),   1516,*^  1530,   1531. 
Commonwealth       v.      Bj^rne       (20 

Gratt.     165),    200,  ""201,    7'88, 

'801,  802. 
Commonwealth      v.      Cagne      ( 153 

Mass.    205;     26    X.    E.    449; 

10  L.  R.  A.  442).  300. 
Commonwealth    v.    Calhome     ( 154 

Mass.    115:    27    X.    E.    881), 

321,    328. 


Commonwealth    v.    Callahan    ( 108 

Mass.  421),  1582. 
Commonwealth     v.    Callone     ( 154 
Mass.    115;    27    X.    E.    881), 
514. 
Commonwealth  v.  Campbell  (  [Ky.] 
107    S.    W.    797;    32    Ky.    L. 
Rep.    1131),   749. 
Commonwealth   v.    Campbell    (116 

Mass.  32),  1587,  1601. 
Commonwealth    v.    Cameron    ( 141 
Mass.    83;     63    X.    E.    547), 
1640. 
Commonwealth     v.     Canny      (158 
Mass.    210;     33    X.    E.    340), 
1088,    1089,    1660,    1754. 
Commonwealth  v.  Carey    (151   Pa. 

St.  368;  25  Atl.  140),  1175. 
Commonwealth     v.     Carney     (108 

Mass.  417),   1670. 
Commonwealth     v.     Carney      ( l.'>2 
Mass.     566;     26     X.   *E.    94), 
1655. 
Commonwealth     v.     Carney     ( 153 
Mass.  444;   27  X\  E.  9),  1739. 
Commonwealth  v.  Carolina    (2  Al- 
len, 169),   1099. 
Commonwealth  v.   Carpenter    ( 100 

Mass.  204),  1643. 
Commonwealth  v.  Carr    ( 1 1  Gray, 

463),    1738. 
Commonwealth     v.      Carroll      ( 15 
Gray,   809,   412),    1601,    1651. 
Commonwealth     v.     Carroll      (124 

Mass.   30),    1368. 
Commonwealth  v.  Casey  ( 12  Allen, 

214),   524.. 
Commonwealth      v.      Casey       ( 134 
Mass.     194),     212,    214,     344, 
345. 
Commonwealth     v.     Cauley      ( 150 
Mass.    272;    22    X.    E.    909), 
687,   688,  090,    1639. 
Commonwealth    v.    Cavanaugh    (2 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  344),  247. 
Commonwealth    v.    Certain    Intox- 
icating    Liquors      (97     Mass. 
63).  1055. 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liqnois  (97  Mass. 
92),   10«0. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  (97  Mass. 
334),   1068. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  (97  Mass. 
mi),  10G2. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 103  Mass. 
448),   1018,   1034. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 105  Mass. 
181),   1038. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 107  Mass. 
21fi),  1041. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 107  Mass. 
386;  107  Mass.  392,  note), 
1023,  1066,  1075,  1664. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  (108  Mass. 
19),   1023. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 1 10  Mass. 
182),   1066,   1068. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  (113  Mass. 
13),    1034. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  (117  Mass. 
427),   1038. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 1 16  Mass. 
21),    1089. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  (116  Mass. 
24;     116    Mass.    27),    1066. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  (116  Mass. 
27),    1055,    l(w9. 

Commonwealtli  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 122  Mass. 
36),  1052. 

Commonwealth  v.  Certain  Intox- 
icating Liquors  ( 128  Mass. 
72),   1034. 


Commonwealth   v.   Certain    Intox- 
icating   Liquors     ( 138    Mass. 

506),    1529. 
Commonwealth    v.    Certain    Intox- 
icating    Liquors     ( 142    Mass. 

470;    8    N.    E.    421),    1503. 
Commonwealth    v.    Chisholm    ( 103 

Mass.  213),  1513. 
Commonwealth  v.  Chadwick    ( 142 

Mass.    595;     8    N.    E.    589), 

1513,    1'616,    1672. 
Commonwealth    v.     Chancy     ( 148 

Mass.  6;   18  N.  E.  572),  1578, 

1677. 
Commonwealth     v.     Cheney     ( 141 

Mass.  102;  6  N.  E.  724),  203L 
Commonwealth    v.    Chapjiel     (116 

Mass.  7),  8,   10,   11,   12. 
Commonwealth    v.     Churchill      (2 

Met.    118),   L605. 
Commonwealth    v.   Churchill    (136 

Mass.  148,  150),  1796. 
Commonwealth  v.  Clapp    (5   Gray 

[Mass.]    97),    110,   307,    1483, 

1513. 
Commonwealth  v.  Clark  ( 14  Gray, 

367),   1113,   1115,   1165,   1167, 

1452,    1500,    1501,    1513,   1527, 

1598,     1604,     L607,     1666. 
Commonwealth      v.      Clark      ( 145 

Mass.    251;     13    N.    E.    888), 

I486,   1547. 
Commonwealth  v.  Clary    (8  Mass. 

72),    1070. 
Commonwealtli     v.     Cleary      ( 105 

Mass.  384),   1089,   1658,   16.59. 
Commonwealth     v.     Cleary      (152 

Mass.    491;     25    N.    E.    834), 

1590. 
Commonwealth     v.     Cleary      ( 135 

Pa.     St.    64;     19    Atl.     1017; 

8  L.  R.  A.  301),  2032. 
Commonwealth     v.     Cleary      ( 148 

Pa.  St.  20;    23  Atl.   1110;    30 

Wkly.    Notes    Cas.    1),    2040, 

2247'. 
Commonwealth     v.     Clymer      ( 150 

Mass.    71;     22    N.    E.    436), 

1673,   1747. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxvii 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Coffee   (9  Gray, 

139),  1774. 
Commonwealth     v.     Cogan      ( 107 

Mass.  212),   1090. 
Commonwealth     v.     Collier      (134 

Mass.  203),   1701. 
Commonwealth      v.      Collins      ( IG 

Gray,  29),   1581,    1602. 
Commonwealth  v.  Colter  (97  Mass. 

336),   1113,   1115. 
Commonwealth      v.      Colton      ( 1 1 

Gray,   1),   1535. 
Commonwealth     v.     Colton      (138 

Mass.    500),    1610. 
Commonwealth    v.    Commesky    ( 13 

Allen,    585),    1610,    1725. 
Commonwealth      v.      Conant       (6 

Gray,   482),   1500,   1513. 
Commonwealth    v.    Conley    ( 1    Al- 
len, 6),   2027. 
Commonwealth      v.      Conlin      ( 184 

Mass.     195;     68    X.    E.    207), 

2027. 
Commonwealth    v.    Connolly     ( 108 

Mass.  480),   1099,   1665,  1671. 
Commonwealth    v.    Conway     (112 

S.    W.   575;    33    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

996),  38<). 
Commonwealth  v.  Cook    ( 12  Allen, 

542),   1758. 
Commonwealth    v.    CooliJge     ( 138 

Mass.   193),   1665. 
Commonwealth  v.  Cope   ([Ky.]   53 

S.    W.    272;    21    Ky.    L.   Rep. 

845),  1467. 
Commonwealth    v.     Costello     ( 133 

Mass.     192),    212,    213,    344, 

1111,  1536,   1537,   1737. 
Commonwealth  v.  Costello   ( 1  Wil- 
cox [Pa.]   182),  1367. 
Commonwealth      v.      Cotter       (97 

Mass.  336)    1667. 
Commonwealth     v.     Cotton      (138 

Mass.    500),     1664,     1619. 
Commonwealth     v.     Couglilin     (14 

Gray,   389),   1616,    1>)17. 
Commonwealtli    v.    Couohiin     (123 

Mass.   436),  2033/2035. 


Commonwealth    v.   Coughlin    ( 182 

Mass.    558;    66    N.    E.    207), 

1083,   1086,   1491,   1610,   1654. 
Commonwealth     v.     Crawford     (9 

Gray,    129),  1454. 
Commonwealth    v.    Cro.sley     ( 162 

Mass.    515;     39    N.    E.    278), 

1513. 
Commonwealth      v.      Crozier       ( ] 

Brewster,    349),    2068,    2069, 

2072. 
Commonwealth    v.    Cummings     (6 

Gray,  487),   1479. 
Commonwealth   v.   Cummins    (121 

Mass.  63),  1661,  1752. 
Commonwealth    v.    Curran     (119 

Mass.    206),    47,    1116,    1446, 

1447,    1643. 
Commonwealtli     v.     Current      (11 

Ky.  L.   Rep.    [abstract]    764), 

950. 
Commonwealth    v.    Currier     ( 164 

Mass.     544;     42     N.     E.     96), 

1725. 
Commonwealth  v.  Cutler   (9  Allen, 

486),    1719. 
Commonwealtli  v.   Dady    (7   Allen 

531),    1115,    1667,    1668. 
Commonwealth  v.  Dady   (14  Gray, 

412,    531),    1113. 
Commonwealth      v.      Daily       ( 133 

Mass.  577),   1099,    1596. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Daly  ( 148  Mass. 

428;     19    X.    E.    209),     1185, 

1368,    1369. 
Commonwealth    v.    Davenport     (2 

Allen  299),   1595. 
Commonwealtli       v.       Davis       (12 

Bush,  240),   1162,  1165,   1166, 

1173,   1233,    1235,   1238,    1561. 
Commonwealth    v.    Dav     (95    Ky. 

120;    23    S.   W.   952;    15    Ky. 

L.  Rep.  466),  837. 
Commonwealth  v.  Dean    (21  Pick. 

334),    1488,    1497,    1502. 
Commonwealth  v.  Dean   (14  Gray, 

99),  7,  10,  11,  49,  968. 
Commonwealth  v.  Dean  ( 109  Mass, 

340),    1746. 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth      v.      Dean      (110 

Mass.    357),    232,    235,    240, 

1643. 
Commonwealth    v.   Dearborn    ( 109 

Mass.  3t)8),   1594,   1660,   1672, 

1673. 
Common wealtli  v.  Deibert   ( 12  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  504;   2  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.    446),    756. 
Commonwealth    v.    Desmond    (103 

Mass.  445),   1478. 
Commonwealth  v.  Dickerson  [Ky.] 

76   -S.    W.    1084;    25    Ky.    L. 

Rep.   1043),   949,    1158,    1178. 
Commonwealth  v.   Dilbo    (29  Leg. 

Int.  150),  1643. 
Commonwealth      v.      Dillane       (1 

Gray,  483),   1591,  1623,   1649. 
Commonwealth     v.      Dillane      (11 

Gray,   67),    1479,    1637,   1650. 
Commonwealth  a'.   Dixon    ( 1    Wil- 
cox   [Pa.]    211),    1581. 
Commonwealtli     v.     Dobbyn      ( 14 

Gray,  44),  1701. 
Commonwealth  v.  Doe    ( 108  Mass. 

418),  898,  1656,  1670. 
Commonwealth     v.     Dolan      (121 

Mass.   374),   1446,   1447. 
Commonwealth    v.    Donahue     (149 

Pa.  St.   104;    24  Atl.   188;   30 

Wkly.   N.   C.    124),   488,   495. 
Commonwealth    v.    Donnelly     ( 14 

Gray,  86,  note),  1486. 
Commonwealth  v.  Dooly   (6  Gray, 

360),    1757. 
Commonwealth     v.     Dorsey      ( 103 

Mass.  412),  20(>7. 
Commonwealth     v.     Dovicey      ( 126 

Mass.  269),  165,  171.  ^ 
Commonwealth    v.    Dougherty     ( 1 

Browne         [Pa.]  Appendix 

xviii),    2040. 
Commonwealth    v.    Vkive     (2    Va. 

Cas.    26),    1505. 
Commonwealth  v.  Dosv    ( 12  Gray, 

133),     1007,     1658. 
Commonwealtli    v.    Dow    (10    ^let. 

[Mass.]      506),     294. 
Commonwealth   v.   Dowdican    (114 

Mass.  257),   1587,  1701,  1735. 


Commonwealth    v.    Dowling     (114- 

Mass.    259),     1375. 
Commonwealth    v.    Downey     ( 148 

Mass.     14;     18    N.     E.    584), 

1678. 
Commonwealth     v.     Downing      (4 

Gray,    29),    1188. 
Commonwealth      v.      Doyle      ( 132 

Mass.     244),     1647. 
Commonwealth   v.   Drew    (3   Cush. 

279),    514,     1219. 
Commonwealth    v.     Dudash     (204 

Pa.   124;    53   Atl.   756),  2038, 

2044,   2047. 
Commonwealth     v.      Ducey      ( 126 

Mass.  269),  469. 
Commonwealth   v.  Dun    ( 14  Gray, 

401),    1520. 
Commonwealth      v.      Dunbar       (9 

Gray,  298),   1097,  1658,  1671. 
Commonwealth     v.     Duncan      ( 1 1 

Ky.     Rep.      [abstract]      402), 

945. 
Commonwealth       v.      Dunn       ( 14 

Gray,    401),    1035,    1513. 
Commonwealth      v.      Dunn      (111 

Mass.     425),     1513. 
Commonwealth     v.     Duprej'     ( 180 

Mass.    523;     62    N.    E.    726), 

1649. 
Commonwealth     v.     Eagan      ( 151 

Mass.    45;     23    N.    E.    494), 

1677. 
Commonwealth      v.      Early      (161 

Mass.    186;     36    X.    E.    794), 

1508. 
Common w-ealth  v.  Eaton    (9  Pick. 

165),    1499. 
Commonwealth      v.      Ea.ton       ( 15 

Pick.    273),    144C. 
Commonwealth  v.  Edds   ( 14  Gray, 

406),    1513,    1544,    1615,    1619, 

1675. 
Commonwealth      v.      Edinger       (7 

Ky.   L.   Rep.    [abstract]   442), 

946. 
Commonwealth     v.     Edwards      (4 

Gray,     1),     1527.    1533,     1534. 
<'ommonwealth   v.   Eggleston    ( 128 

Mass.    408),    1283,    1284. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


Ixxxis: 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commomvealth     v.     Elger      (217 

Pa.    512;     GQ    Atl.    740;     11 

L.  R.  A.   [N.  S.J   i)3)9),   1734. 
Commonwealth      v.      Elliott       ( 1 

Lack.    Leg.    N.    140;     16    Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  122;   4  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.    89),    724. 
Commomvealth   v.  Elmoie    ([Ky.  1 

58     S.    VV.    369;     22    Ky.  'l. 

Rep.    510),    576. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Elwell   ( 1  Gray, 

403),    1050,    1055,    1740. 
Commonwealth    v.    Emerson     ( 140 

Mass.    434;     5    X.    E.     155), 

130. 
Commonwealth     v.     Emmons      (98 

Mass.    6),    1353. 
Commonwealth    v.    Estabrook    ( 10 

Pick.  293),  69,  509,  691,  1207. 
Commonwealth    v.    Evei-man    ( 140 

Mass.    434;     5    N,    E.     155), 

247,   1752. 
Commonwealth    v.    Everson     ( 140 

Mass.     292;     2    N.    E.    839), 

592,    1182,    1071,    1675. 
Commonwealth    v.    Everson     ( 140 

Mass.    572;     5    N.    E.     155), 

135. 
Commonwealth       v.       Ewing       ( 7 

Bush,   105),   1560. 
Commonwealth     v.     Ewing      ( 145 

Mass.    121;     13    X.    E.    365), 

1341. 
Commonwealth      v.      Faher      ( 126 

Mass.    56),    1088. 
Commonwealth     v.     Farrand     ( 12 

■Gray,   177),   1070,   1671,  1076. 
Commonwealth     v.     Farrell      ( 137 

Mass.    579),    1581,    1604. 
Commonwealth   v.    Farren    (9    Al- 
len,   489),    1555. 
Commonwealth    v.    Fell     ( 144    Pa. 

426;    22    Atl.   915;    28   W.   X. 

C.    429),    648. 
Commonwealth    v.    Fernden     (141 

Mass.  28;    6  X.  E.  239),  213, 

345,    1548. 
Commonwealth    v.    Finnegan    ( 109 

Mass.   303),    1099. 


Commonwealth   v.    Finnegan    (124 

Mass.   324),    1233. 
Commonwealth    v.    Finnerty    ( 148 

Mass.    162;     19    X.    E.    215), 

1594,   1595,   1657. 
Commonwealth   v.   Fischer    (17    S. 

&    R.    [Pa.  J    160),    210. 
Commonwealth      v.     Fisher      (138 

Mass.    504),   380,    1059,    1073. 
Commonwealth   v.   Fisher    ( 1   Leg. 

Opinion,    50),    2034. 
Commonwealth    v.    Fitzgerald    ( 14 

Gray,     14),     1058. 
Commonwealth       v.       Fitzpatrick 

(140     Mass.     455;     5     X.     E. 

272),    1612. 
Commonwealth    v.    Flaherty    ( 140 

Mass.    454;     5     X.    E.    258), 

1368. 
Commonwealth    v.    Fleckner     ( 107 

Mass.    13;     44    X.    E.    1053), 

1098. 
Commonwealth    v.    Fleece    (5    Ky. 

Rep.    429),    1449. 
Commonwealth    v.    Fleming     (130 

Pa.     138;     18    AtL    •622;     25 

W.    X.    C.    122;    5    L.   R.    A. 

470;    17   Am.   St.   763),   1280. 
Commonwealth     v.     Fletcher     (33 

Phila.    Leg.    Int.    13;    8    Leg. 

Gaz.    13),    2068. 
Commonwealth       v.      Foley       (99 

Mass.    499),   2031. 
Commonwealth      v.      Fontz      ( 135 

Pa.    St.    389;     19    Atl.    1025), 

1159. 
Commonwealth     v.      Foran      (110 

Mass.    179),    1580. 
Commonwealth  v.  Foss    ( 14  Gray, 

50),    1446,    1447,    1641. 
Commonwealth     v.     Foster      ( 182 

Mass.    270;    05    X.    E.    391), 

1083. 
Commonwealth      v.      Fowler      (90 

Ky.    166;    28    S.   W.    786;    33 

L.  R.  A.  839),   112,   186.  221. 
Commonwealth  v.  Fowler  (98  Ky. 

648;   34  .S.  W.  31),   186,   188, 

625,    829, 


zc 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Tleferences  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth    v.     Fowler     (145 

Mass.    3{>8;     14    N.    E.    457), 

1226,   1560. 
Commonwealth     v.     Fralicr      (126 

Mass.   56),    1081,    1094.    1103, 

1717. 
Commonwealth    v.     Francis     ( 152 

Mass.    508;    25    X.    E.    836), 

1121,    1310,    1318. 
Commonwealth  v.   Fredericks  ( 119 

Mass.     199),     139,     167,    397, 

402,     1513. 
Commonwealth  v.  French    (Thach- 

er   Cr.    Cas.    163),   205,   2048. 
Commonwealth      v.      Frost      ( 155 

Mass.    273;     34    X.    E.    334), 

508. 
Commonwealth     v.      Funai      ( 146 

Mass.    570;     16    X.    E.    458), 

1584. 
Commonwealth     v.     Gaffey      (122 

Mass.  334),  1670,  1671,  1674. 
Commonwealth     v.     Gagne      ( 153 

Mass.    205;     26    X.    E.    449; 

10   L.   R.   A.   442),    111,   298, 

307,  327,  1527,  1664. 
Commonwealth   v.   Gallagher    (124 

Mass.   29),    1080,    1659. 
Commonwealth  v.   Gallagher    ( 143 

Mass.    104;     13    X.    E.    359), 

989,    1543. 
Commonwealth    v.    Galligan     ( 156 

Mass.    270;    30    X.    E.    1142), 

1605,   1650.   1651. 
Commonwealth    v.    Galligan     (144 

Mass.    171;     10    X.    E.    788), 

1375. 
Commonwealth    v.    Galligan     (155 

Mass.    54;    28    X.    E.    1129), 

1452. 
Commonwealth     v.     Garvin      ( 148 

Mass.    449;     19    X.    E.    554), 

1758. 
Commonwealth      v.      Gavin      (148 

Mass.    449;     19    X.    E.    554), 

1098,     1659. 
Commonwealth     v.      Gavin      (160 

Mass.    523;     3o    X.    E.    484), 

1712. 


Commonwealth  v.  Gay   ( 153  Mass. 

211;  26  X.  E.  852),  111,  2t^8, 

300,    307,     1527,    1677. 
Commonwealth     v.     Geary      ( 146 

Mass.    139;     15    X.    E.    363), 

1663. 
Commonwealth    v.    Gedikoh     ( 101 

Pa.     St.     354),     1304,     1307, 

1308. 
Commonwealth    v.    Gibbons     ( 134 

Mass.    197),   213,    1447,    1480, 

1537. 
Commonwealth     v.     Gilbert     ( 165 

Mass.  45;  72  X.  E.  336),  2041, 

2047,  2058,  2069,  2085. 
Commonwealth   v.   Giles    ( 1   Gray, 

460),  1608,   1609,   1711. 
Commonwealth    v.    Gillon     (2    Al- 
len, 505),   1452. 
Commonwealth     v.      Gillon      ( 148 

Mass.  15;  18  X.  E.  308),  1460, 

1530,  1595,  1615. 
Commonwealth    v.    Gillaland     (95 

Mass.  [9  Gray]  3),  1035,  152. 
Commonwealth    v.    Glennan     (116 

Mass.  46),   1670. 
Commonwealth      v.      Godley      (11 

Gray,  454),  1071. 
Commonwealth    v.    Goodman     (97 

Mass.   117).  1081,  1082,   1185, 

1700. 
Commonwealth    v.    Gormley     ( 133 

Mass.  580),  1368,  1624. 
Commonwealth     v.      Gould      ( 158 

Mass.    499;     33    X.    E.    656), 

828,  832,  1629. 
Commonwealth    v.    Gourdier     ( 14 

Gray,  390),  43,  369,   1701. 
Commonwealth      v.      Grady      (108 

Mass.  412),  1035,  1513. 
Commonwealth    v.    Graves    ( 18    B. 

Mon.  33),  528,  683. 
Commonwealth  v.  Graves   (16  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  272),  1096, 

1117,    1545. 
Commonwealth  v.  Gray   ( 13  Gray, 

26),   1541. 
Conimunwealtli      v.      Graves       (97 

Mass.   114),   1112,  1115,   1660. 


TAJJLE   OF    CASES. 


XCl 


[Refeifiices  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Gray    (2  Gray, 

501;  01  Am.  Dec.  476),   1451, 

1493. 

Commonwealth      v.      Gray       (150 

Mass.  327;  23  N.  E.  47),  103. 

Commonwealth   v.   Green    (80   Ky. 

178;  3  Ky.  L.  Rep.  059),  1520. 

Commonwealth   v.   Green    ('J8   Ky. 

21;    32  S.  W.   109),  87.5,  895, 

1403,   1407. 

Commonwealth  v.  Greenfield    ( 121 

Mass.  40),  1285. 
Commonwealth  v.  Greenan   (11  Al- 
len, 241),  1670. 
Commonwealth  v.  Greness   (11  Al- 
len, 241),  1071. 
Commonwealth    v.     Greenwell     (8 
Ky.   L.   Rep.   009    [abstract]), 
1500,   1510. 
Cominonwealth   v.   Grey    (2   Gray, 
501;    01    Am.    Dec.    470),    14, 
23,  26,  29. 
Commonwealth  v.  Griirin   (3  Cush. 

523),  1484,  1705. 
Commonwealth     v.     Griffin      ( 105 

Mass.  175),  1508. 
Commonwealth    v.    Guja     (28    Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  58),   1283. 
Commonwealth  v.  Guy   ( 153  Mass. 
211;  20  N.  E.  571,  852),  1743. 
Commonwealth     v.     Iladcraft      (0 

Bush,  91),  1450,  1503. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hadley  (11  Met. 
00),  513,  514,  095,  1372,  1375. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hadley  (11  Met. 

71),  094. 
Commonwealth      v.      Ilaelir      (113 

Mass.  207),  1672. 
Commonwealth  v.  HalVner    (8  Leg. 

Gaz.    160),   IISO. 
Commonwealth     v.     Ilagan      ( 140 
Mass.  289;  3  N.  E.  207),  1310, 
1362. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hagan      ( 152 
Mass.  505;  26  N.  E.  95),  1071. 
Commonwealth  v.  Ilagenlock    (140 
Mass.  125;  3  N.  E.  30),  2009, 
2073,  2075. 
Commonwealth    v.    Hagernian     ( 10 
Allen;  401),  1487. 


Commonwealth    v.    Halback     (101 
Ky.  166;  40  S.  W.  245;  19  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  278),  1553. 
Commonwealth   v.   Hall    (8   Gratt. 

588),  510. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hallett     ( 103 
Mass.  452),  49,  53,  1185,  1705. 
Commonwealth  v.  Ham  ( 150  Mass. 

22;   22  N.  E.  704),  1000. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hamer      ( 128 

Mass.  70),  740,    1641. 
Commonwealth   v.    Hamilton    ( 120 

Mass.  383),   189. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hamor  ( 8  Gratt. 

698),  1371. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hampton      (3 

Gratt.  590),  1516. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hanley     ( 121 

Mass.  377),  1510. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hanley      ( 140 
Mass.  457  ;  5  N.  E.  408 ) ,  1722. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hardman     (9 

Gray,  130),  11. 
Commonwealth    v.    Hardiman     (9 

Gray,   136),  83. 

Commonwealth  v.  Hardin  Co.    (99 

Ky.  188;   35  S.  W.  275),  932. 

Commonwealth  v.  Hardy  ( 124  Ky. 

375;    99    S.    W.   239;    30   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  532),  1458. 

Commonwealth     v.     Harper      ( 145 

Mass.  100;  13  N.  E.  459),  950. 

Commonwealth    v.    Harrington    (3 

Pick.  20),  1797. 
Commonwealth  v.  Harrington  ( 130 

Mass.  35),   1572. 
Commonwealth     v.     Harrison     (11 
Gray      [Mass.]      308),      1121, 
1600. 
Commonwealth  v.  Harris  (7  Gratt. 

000),  1765. 
Commonwealth    v.    Harrison     (11 

Gray,  310),  1306. 
Commonwealth    v.    Harrison     ( 13 

Allen,  559),  1323. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hart   (11  Cush. 

130),  1527,  1533. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hart  (2  Rrewst. 
[Pa.]   540),  2040,  2068,  2009. 


sen 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[I.'eferences  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Harvey    (16  B. 

Mon.  1),  1516,  1517. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hastings      (9 

Met.  259),  2034. 
Commonwealth      v.      Hatcher      (0 

Gratt.  667),  1556. 
Commonwealth   v.   Hatton    ( 15   B. 

Mon.  537),  1246. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hawkins      (3 

Gray,  463 ) ,  2043,  2060. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hayes      ( 125 

Mass.  209),  1516. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hayes      ( 149 

Mass.  32;  20  N.  E.  456),  558. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hayes      (114 

Mass.  282),  1065,   1089,  1658, 

1059. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hayes      ( 145 

Mass.    289;     14    N.    E.    151), 

1100. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hayes      ( 150 

Mass.    506;     23    N.    E.    216), 

1670. 
Commonwealth     v.      Hayes      ( 167 

Mass.  167;  45  N.  E.  82),  1100, 

1105. 
Commonwealth    v.    Haj'wood    ( 105 

Mass.   187),  46. 
Commonwealth   v.    Hazeltine    ( 108 

Mass.  479),  1064. 
Commonwealth  v.  Head  (11  Gratt. 

819),  1478. 
Commonwealth   v.   Heaganey    ( 137 

Mass.  574),  592,  595. 
Commonwealth  v.  Heasey  (  [Mass.] 

9  N.  E.  837).  1.531. 
Commonwealth    v.    Heckler     ( 168 

Pa.   St.   575;    32   Atl.  52;    36 

W.    N.    C.    363;    reversing    14 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  465),  1307. 
Commonwealth    v.     Heffron      ( 102 

Mass.  148),  1715. 
Commonwealth    v.    Helbeck     (101 

Ky.  166;  40  S.  W.  245),  401. 
Commonwealth    v.    Helbeck     (101 

Ky.  166;   40  R.  W.  245),  448. 
CJommonwealth  v.  Henderson    (140 

Mass.  303;  5  X.  E.  832),  1081, 
1088,   1089,   1491,   1662,   1664, 

1669. 


Commonwealth      v.      Hendrie      (2 

Gray,  503),   1626. 
Commonwealth  v.  Heney   (  [IMass.] 

9  N.  E.  837),  1487. 
Commonwealth     v.     Henley      ( 158 

Mass.    159;     33    N.    E.    342), 

1596. 
Commonwealth      v.      Herriek       (0 

Cush.    465),     12,    14,    15,    23, 

1626. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hersey      ( 144 

Mass.    297;     11    N.    E.    116), 

1543,   1055,   1671,   1676. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hessey  ( [Mass.] 

9  N.  E.  837),   1738. 
Commonwealth    v.    Hess    ( 148   Pa. 

98;  23  Atl.  977),  1283. 
Commonwealth    v.    Heywood     ( 105 

Mass.  187),  10,  1671. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hickey      ( 126 

Mass.  250),  1544. 
Commonwealth     v.     Higgins      ( 1(> 

Gray,  19),  1595,  1650,  1070. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hildreth      (11 

Gra}%  327),   1582,   1594,   1668. 
Commonwealth   v.  Hill    ( 14   Gray, 

24),  1550,  1551. 
Commonwealth    v.    Hill     (4    Allen, 

589),    1547,    1548. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hill    ( 145  Mass. 

385;     14    N.    E.     124),     1091, 

1369. 
Commonwealth    v.    Hill     (127    Pa. 

St.    540;     19    Atl.    141),    291, 

558. 
Commonwealtli    v.    Hill    (5    Gratt. 

682),  1509,  1510. 
Commonwealth      v.     Hinds      ( 145 

Mass.    182;     13    N.    E.    397), 

1058. 
CtjmmDnwealth     v.     Hitchings     (5 

Gray  f:\lass.]  482),  294,  1508, 

1740. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hoar  (121  IMass. 

375),  1089.  1658. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Hogan  (11  Gray, 

315),   1673. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Hogan  (97  Mass. 

120),  1172,  1722. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


XClll 


[lleferences  axe  to  iiages.] 


Commonwealth   v.   Hoge    (9   Gray, 

292),    148(i. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hoke    ( 14  Bush 

[Ky.]  485),  234. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hoke    ( 14  Bush 

[Ky.]  mS).  23U,  882,  9U7,  929, 

93G. 
Commonwealth     v.     Holbrook    (92 

Mass.  [10  Allen]  200),  451. 
Commonwealth    v.     Holland     (104 

Ky.    323;    47    S.    W.    21G;    20 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  581),  541,   1268, 

1269. 
Commonwealth  v.  Holland   (7  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   299),  513. 
Commonwealth      v.      HoUey       (69 

Mass.   [3  Gray]  458),  262. 
Commonwealth     v.     Holmes     (119 

Mass.   195),  1354. 
Commonwealth    v.     Holsapple     (9 

Ky.  L.  Rep.   [abstract]    437), 

543. 
Commonwealth    v.    Holstine     ( 132 

Pa.  357;    19  Atl.  273;    25  W. 

N.  C.  423),   1186,   1267,   1285. 
Commonwealth   v.   Hornbrook    ( 10 

Allen,  200),  523. 
Commonwealth      v.      Houle      { 147 

Mass.    380;     17    N.    E.    896), 

1361. 
Commonwealth  v.  Howe    (9  Gray, 

110),  1583. 
Commonwealth  v.  Howe  ( 13  Gray, 

26),  110,  256,  1547,  1549. 
Commonwealth    v.    Howe     ( [Ky.] 

32  S.  W.  133),  1463. 
Commonwealth   v.   Hoye    (9   Gray, 

292),  1097,   1552,"  16oS. 
Commonwealth  v.  Hoye    ( 1 1  Gray, 

462),    1534. 
Commonwealth     v,     Hoyer      ( 125 

Mass.  209),  1640. 
Commonwealth    v.     Hughes     (165 

Mass.  7:  42  X.  E.  121),  1097, 
1657,  1658,  1670,   1673. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hurley      (160 

Mass.  10;  35  N.  E.  89),  1349, 
1361,   1657. 
Commonwealth      v.     Hurley      ( 14 
Gray,  411),  1617,  1659. 


Commonwealth    v.    Hurst     ( [Ky.] 

62  S.  W.  1024 ;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

365),  84,  936,  1344,  1697. 
Commonwealth    v.   Hutchinson    (6 

Allen,  595),   1528. 
Commonwealth     v.     Hyland     ( 155 

Mass.  7;  28  N.  E.  1055),  1091, 

1368    1615,  1617. 
Commonwealth   v.    Hyneman    (101 

Mass.  30),   1306. 
Commonwealth  v.  lies   ( 13  Ky.  L. 

Rep.    [abstract]   236),  554. 
Commonwealth       v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors    (79  INlass.   [13  Gray] 

52),   1045. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors   (14  Gray,  375),  1016, 

1075. 
Commonwealth      v.      Stebbins      (8 

Gray,  492),   1063. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors    (88   Mass.    [6   Gray] 

596),   1060. 
Commonwealth       v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors    (86   ]\Iass.    [4   Allen] 

593),    1044,    1060,    1062,   1068, 

1074. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors    (86   Mass.    [4  Allen] 

601),  1035,  1065. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors    (6  Allen,  596),   1040, 

1057,   1060,   1061,   1067. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors    (6  Allen,  599),  1048, 

1068. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors    (88   Mass.    [9   Allen] 

596),  1049. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors   (95  Mass.   [13  Allen] 

52),  1035,  1043,  1056,  1057. 
Commonwealth       v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors  (13  Allen,  561),  1016, 
1049,  1067. 
Commonwealth       v.       Intoxicating 
Liquors    (97  Mass.  63),   1043, 
1043,  1059,  1062,  1739. 


XCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


fKeferenoes  are   to  pages.] 


Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors  (97  Mass.  332),  1018, 

1041,  1054. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors  (97  Mass.  001),  1007. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (103  Mass.     448), 

1739. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (105  Mass.      175), 

1739. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (105  Mass.      178), 

1018,  1048. 

Commonwealtli      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (105  Mass.      181), 

1039,  1045,  1046. 

Commonwealth       v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors  105  Mass.  595),  lOlG, 

1045,   1064. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (107  Mass.      216), 

1016,   1056. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (107  Mass.     390), 

255,  1008,  1021,  1038. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors  (108  Mass.  19),  1048, 

1068. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors  (109  Mass.  371,  373), 

1039,  1054. 
Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (110  Mass.      182), 

1040,  1041. 
Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (110  Mass.      187). 

1067. 

Commonwealth       v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (110  Mass.      188), 

1074. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (110  IMass.      416), 

1043. 

Commonwealth      v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (110  Mass.      499), 

10.39. 

Commonwealth       v.  Intoxicating 

Liquors      (110  Mass.      500), 

1065. 


Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors  (113  Mass.  13),  1018, 

1021,    1033,   1040,   1078,   1759. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors       (113      Mass.      23), 

1016,  1065. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors      (113     Mass.     208), 

1040. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors      (113     Mass.     455), 

1040. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors      (115      Mass.      142), 

1064. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors      (115     Mass.      145), 

1039,  1056. 
Commonwealth   v.   Certain   Intoxi- 
cating    Liquors      (115     Macs. 

153),   110,   129,  972. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors      (115     Mass.      159), 

91. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors   (116  Mass.  21),  1037. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors   (116  Mass.  24),  1587, 

1659. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors  (116  Mass.  27),  1035, 

1041,  1587. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors      (116     Mass.      342), 
1049. 
Commonwealtli       v.       Intoxicating 
Liquors  (117  Mass.  427),  1040, 

1042,  1057. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors    (122  Mass.  8),   1014, 

1016,  1039,  1071. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors  (122  Mass.  14),  1041, 

1056. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors   (122  Mass.  36),  1039, 

1057,  1065.  1071,  1072. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors  (128  Mass.  72),  1055, 

1067,  1008. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


xcv 


[References  are  to  images.] 


Commonwealth   v.   Certain   Intoxi- 
cating    Liquors      ( 130     Mass. 

29),   1062. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors  ( 135  Mass.  519 ) ,  1048. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors  (138  Mass.  506),  1528. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors     (140    Mass.    287;     3 

N.  E.  4),   1040,  1053. 
Commonwealtli      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors   (142  Mass.  470;  8  >'. 

E.  421),  1045,  1046. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors    (146    Mass.    509;    16 

N.  E.  298),  1039,   1054,   1067, 

1068. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors    (148    Mass.    124;     19 

N.  E.  23),  1756,  1757. 
Commonwealth      v.       Intoxicating 

Liquors    (150    Mass.    164;    22 

N.  E.  628),  1049,  1071. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors     (163    Mass.    42;     39 

N.  E.  348),  1021. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors    (172    Mass.    311;    52 

N.  E.  389),  220,  257. 
Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating 

Liquors   (89  N.  E.  918),  1059, 

1062. 
Commonwealth     v.     Jacobs      ( 152 

Mass.    276;     25    X.    E.    463), 

1545,    1595,    1636. 
Commonwealth      v.      James       (98 

Ky.    30;    32   S.    W.    219;     17 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  588),  518,   1364. 
Commonwealth   v.   Jarrell    (8   Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]    783),  543. 
Commonwealth   v.  Jan-ell    (9   Ky. 

Law,    572;     5     S.     W.     563), 

030. 
Commonwealth  v.  Jarvis    ( 120  Ky. 

334;    86   S.    W.   556;    27    Ky. 

Law    Rep.    712),    1493,    1494. 
Commonwealth    v.    Jenkins     ( 137 

Mass.   572),   592. 
Commonwealth    v.    Jenkins     (137 

Mass.   572),   247. 


Commonwealth  v.  Jenks   ( 1  Gray, 

490),    1746. 
Commonwealth    v.    Jennings    (107 

Mass.  488),  1097. 
Commonwealth  v.  Jessup    (63  Pa. 

34),    1223,    1237. 
Commonwealth  v.  Johnson   (8  Pa. 

Co.    Ct.    Rep.    378),    774. 
Commonwealth  v.  Johnston   (5  Pa. 

Super.     Ct.     585;     28    Pittsb. 

L.   J.    [X.   S.]    141;    44   W.  N. 

C.  92),    1371. 
Commonwealth    v.    Jones     ( [Ky.] 

84    y.     W.    305;     27     Ky.    L. 

Rep.    16),    870,    924. 
Commonwealth  v.  Jones    ( 7  Gray, 

415),     1535. 
Commonwealth   v.  Jones    ( 8   Gray, 

415),     1534. 
Commonwealth      v.      Jones      ( 142 

Mass.    573;     3     X.     E.    603), 

130,    134,    247,    592,    1278. 
Commonwealth    v.   Jones    ( 10    Pa. 

Co.   Ct.   Rep.  611),   714,   715, 

716. 
Commonwealth  v.  Jones    (1  Leigh, 

598),   2039. 
Commonwealtli      v.      Jordan      ( 18 

Pick.    228),    29,    43,    48,    508. 
Commonwealth   v.   Joseph   Kohlne 

Brewing    Co.     ( 1    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  627),  720. 
Commonwealth     v.     Joslin      ( 158 

Mass.    482;     33    X.    E.    653; 

21    L.    R.    A.    44'9),    53,    ^"28, 

832,  1227,  1228,  1237,  1359, 

1360,    1759. 
Commonwealtli    v.    Joyce    (22    Pa. 

Co.   Ct.   Rep.   397;    30   Pittsb. 

Leg.    J.     [X.    S.]    28),    1298. 
Commonwealth     v.     Julius      ( 143 

Mass.     132;     8     X.     E.     898), 

1251,     1255. 
Commonwealth  v.  Kahlmeyer  ( 124 

Mass.     322),     1065. 
Commonwealth      v.      Kane      (143 

Mass.     92;     8     X.     E.     880), 

213,   344,   345. 


XCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth      v.      Kane       ( 150 

Mass.    294:    22    N.    E.    903), 

995,     1754. 
Commonwealth  v.  Keefe    (7  Gray, 

332),    1456,    1740. 
Commonwealth  v.  Keefe    (9  Gray, 

290),    1487,     1513,     1552. 
Commonwealth      v.      Keefe       (143 

Mass.    467:     9     X.    E.    840). 

1528,  1537. 
Commonwealth      v.      Keefe      ( 150 

Mass.    272:    22    N.    E.    910), 

688,  690,   1639. 
Commonwealth     v.     Keenan      (11 

Allen,  262),  523,  525. 
Commonwealth     V.     Keenan      ( 148 

Mass.    470;    20    N.    E.    101), 

loss,     1594,     1595,     1664. 
Commonwealth    v.     Keenan     ( 152 

Mass.     12;     25     N.     E.     32), 

1615,     1619. 
Commonwealth     v.     Kelley      (116 

Mass.    341),    1582. 
Commonwealth     v.     Kelley      ( 140 

Mass.    441),    214,    345,    1533. 
Commonwealth     v.     Kelley      (152 

Mass.    486;    25    N.    E.    835), 

1593,   1670,   1671. 
Commonwealth   v.   Kelly    ( 10   Ky. 

L.      Rep.      [abstract]       721), 

1559. 
Commonwealth      v.      Kelly       (12 

Gray,   175),   1547,   1548. 
Commonwealth  v.  Kelly   (10  Cnsh. 

69),    1643,    1650. 
Commonwealth   v.  Kelly    (7   Gray. 

332,   note),    1547. 
Commonwealth      v.      Kelly      (177 

Mass.    221;     58    X.    E.    691), 
1308. 
Commonwealth    v.    Kemp     (14    B. 

Mon.  385  1,  72,  50S. 
Commonwealth  v.  Kenan  ( 148 
Mass.  470;  20  X.  E.  101), 
1754. 
Commonweal  til  v.  Kendall  ( 12 
Cush.  414),  110  1487,  1533, 
1534. 


Commonwealth     v.     Kennan      ( 10 

Ky.  L.   Rep.   [abstract]    723), 

1490. 
Commonwealth     v.     Keimedy     (97 

Mass.   224),    1595. 
Commonwealth    v.    Kennedy    ( 108 

Mass.   292),    1754. 
Commonwealth    v.    Kennedy     (119 

Mass.   211),    1368. 
Commonwealth  v.   Keuner    (11   B. 

Mon.    1),    1514. 
Commonwealth     v.     Kenney     (115 

Mass.   149),    1610,   1725. 
Commonwealth      v.      Kern       (147 

Mass.    595;     18    X.    E.    566), 

1531. 
Commonwealth    v.    Kerns     ( 2    Pa. 

Super.    Ct.    59),    648,    064. 
Commonwealth    v.    Kerrisey    ( 141 

Mass.     110;     4    X.    E.    820), 

1655,  1677. 
Commonwealth     v.     Kervill     ( 108 

Mass.   422),   932. 
Commonwealth   v.   Kevin    ( 18   Pa. 

Super.    Ct.    414),    1384. 
Commonwealth      v.      Keyes       (11 

Gray,   323),   1604,   1607. 
Commonwealth      v.      Kiley      ( 150 

Mass.    325;     23    X.    E.    55), 

722. 
Commonwealth     v.     Kimball      (24 

Pick.  359;   35  Am.  Dec.  326), 

53,    294,    313,    314,    316,    328, 

824,    1189,    1581. 
Commonwef.lth      v.      Kimball      (7 

Met.    304),    1533,    1554,    1555, 

1640,     1642. 
Commonwealth      v.      Kimball      (7 

Gray,  328),   1540,   1543. 
Commonwealth      v.     Kimball      (7 

Gray,  332,  note),  1541. 
Commonwealth    v.    Kimball     ( 105 

Mass.  465),   1099,  1101,  1375. 

Commonwealth    v.    King    (86    Ky. 

436;   6  S.  W.   124),  897,  938. 

Commonwealth    v.    King     (8    Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   608),  936. 

Commonwealth    v.    Kingman     ( 14 

Gray,   85),    1479,    1486,   1535. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


iCVU 


[References  are   to  pages.] 


Commonwealth    v.    Kingsbury     (5 

Mass.  496),   1566. 
Commonwealth    v.     Kinsley     ( 108 

Mass.    24),    1671. 
Commonwealth   v.   Kirk    (7    Gray, 

496),    1112,    1115,    1666,    1668. 
Commonwealtli   v.   Knoerr    (3   Ky. 

L.      Rep.       [abstract]       694), 

1495,  1559. 
Commonwealth  v.  Kolilmeyer  (124 

Mass.  322),    1596,   1670. 
Commonwealth   v.   Lafayette    (148 

Mass.     130;     19    N.    E.    26), 

1354,   1357,   1363,   1368,   1615. 
Commonwealth    v.    Lafontaine     (3 

Gray,  479),   1513. 
Commonwealth  v.   Lahy    ( 8   Gray, 

459),    1643,    1645,   1717. 
Commonwealth     v.     Lamere      ( 1 1 

Gray,  319),   1112,   1655,   1656, 

1666,    1667. 
Commonwealth  v.  Lattinville  ( 120 

Mass.    385),    1227,    1516. 
Commonwealth        v.        Lattinville 

([Mass.]     25     X.     E.     972), 

1595,  1670. 
Commonwealth    v.    Lawrence     (11 

Gray,  319),  1115. 
Commonwealth     v.     Leddy      ( 105 

Mass.  381),   1019,  1041,  1048, 

1052. 
Commonwealth  v.  Ledford   ( [Ky.] 

110    S.    W.    889;    33    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    p.    624),    755. 
Commonwealth   v.   Leeds    (9Phila. 

569),  1219. 
Commonwealth  v.  Lee    ( 148  Mass. 

G;   18  N.  E.  586),  1547,  1551, 

1671,  1752. 
Commonwealth    v.    Leighton    ( 140 

Mass.    305;     6    N.    E.    221), 

1123,    1660,    1728. 
Commonwealth   v.    Lemon    ([Ky.] 

76  S.  W.  40;   25   Ky.  L.  Rep. 

522),  932. 
Commonwealth   v.   Leo    ( 12   Gray, 

33),    1614. 
Commonwealth  v.  Jjeo    (110  Mass. 

414),    1643,   1645,    1712. 


Commonwealtli     v.     Leonard      (8 

Met.   529),    15.34,    1556,    1711. 
Commonwealth      v.      Levy       ( 126 

Mass.  240),   1089,   1659. 
Commonwealth  v.  Lillard    ( 10  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  561;   9  S.  VV.  710), 

917,   920. 
Commonwealth      v.      Lincoln       (4 

Gray,    288),     1656,     1660. 
Commonwealth      v.      Line       ( 149 

Mass.    65;     20     N.     E.     697), 

1674,   1723. 
Commonwealth    v.    Livermore     (2 

Allen,  292),  1586,  1587,  1668. 
Commonwealth    v.    Livermore     ( 4 

Gray,    18),    12,    15,    23,   29. 
Commonwealth      v.      Locke      (114 

Mass.    288),    386,    413,    966, 

1514,   1529,   1725. 
Commonwealth      v.      Locke      ( 145 

Mass.    401;     14    N.    E.    621), 

1596,    1675. 
Commonwealth      v.      Locke      ( 148 

Mass.     125;     19    N.    E.    24), 

1095,    1679. 
Commonwealth  v.  Locke    (29  Leg. 

Int.   172;   affirmed  72  Pa.  St. 

491),    233. 
Commonwealth      v.      Logan       ( 12 

Gray,   136),    1160,   1550. 
Commonwealth  v.   Louisville,  etc., 

Co.    (117   Ky.  936;   80   S.  W. 

154;    25    Ky.    L.    Rep.    2098), 

1300. 
Commonwealth     v.     Lowry      ( 145 

Mass.    212;     13    N.    E.    611), 

1753. 
Commonwealth     v.     Luck     (2     B. 

Mon.   [Ky.]   296).  395,  400. 
Commonwealth     v.     Luddy      ( 143 

Mass.    563;     10    N.    E.    448), 

1026,   1027,   1035,   1289,   1459, 

1488,  1516. 
Commonwealth     v.     Lufkin      ( 167 

Mass.    553;     46    X.    E.    109), 

1086,   1098,   1697. 
Commonwealth  v.  Luken   ( 7  Lack. 

Leg.  N.  4;    10  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 

95),   1759. 


XCVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth     v.     Lynch      (151 
Mass.    35«;    23    N.    E.    1137), 

1595,  16tiO. 
Commonwealth     v.     Lynch      (164 

Mass.    541;     42     N.     E.     95), 

1090,  1660. 
Commonwealth      v.      Lynn      ( 107 

Mass.   214),   1035,   1513. 
Commonwealth      v.     Lyons      (160 

Mass.    174;     35    X.    E.    312), 

1057. 
Commonwealth     v.     McAnany      ( 3 

Brewster,  292),  2093,  2098. 
Commonwealth     v.     McArty      ( 1 1 

Gray,   45<3),    1671. 
Commonwealth      v.      McAtee       (8 

Dana,  28),   1455. 
Commonwealth    v.    McCabe     ( 163 

Mass.    98;     39    N.    E.    777), 

1596,  1679. 
Commonwealth  v.  MeCann   ( [Ky.] 

29     Ky.     L.     Rep.     707;      94 

S.   W.    645),    217,    263,    1128. 
Commonwealth  v.  McCarty  ( [Ky.] 

76    S.    W.     173;    25    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    585),    868,    871. 
Commonwealth    v.   MoCaughey    (9 

Gray,    296),    1670,    1722. 
Commonwealth        v.        ilcCloskey 

(123  Mass.  401).   1066,   1670. 
Commonwealth    v.    McClure     ( 204 

Pa.    196;    53    Atl.    759),    GriS. 
Commonwealth  v.  McCluskey  ( 116 

Mass.  64),    1725. 
Commonwealth   v.    McConnell    (11 

Gray,  204),   1087,   1306,   1323, 

1725. 
Commonwealth   v.  MeCormick  ( 150 

Mass.    270;    22    N.    E.    911), 

683,    688,    690,    1267. 
Commonwealth     v.     ^IcCne      ( 121 

Mass.    358),    116,    1081,    1088, 

1675. 
Commonwealth  v.  McCullow    ( 140 

Mass.    370;     5    X.    E.     165), 

1657,  1<)75. 
Commonwealtli    v.    MoCurdy    ( 109 

Mass.   364),   1099,   1671. 


Commonwealth       v.       McDermott 

([Ky.]     06    S.    W.    475;     29 

Ky.  L.  Rep.   752),  948,    1288. 
Commonwealth  v.  McDonald    ( 147 

Mass.    527;     18    X.    E.    402), 

1605. 
Commonwealth  v.  McDonald    ( 187 

:\[ass.    581;     73    X.    E.    852), 

2079. 
Commonwealth   v.  McDonough  ( 13 

Allen    581),     104,     105,     486, 

1082,    1101,    1106,    1109. 
Commonwealth       v.       McDonough 

(150    Mass.    504;     23    X.    E. 

112),   213,   345,   346. 
Commonwealth    v.    McGrath     (185 

Mass.  1;   69  X.  E.  340),  964, 

908. 
Commonwealth    v.    'McGregor     (9 

B.    Mon.    3),    71. 
Commonwealth        v.        IMcGroerty 

148    Pa.    606;     24    Atl.    91), 

797. 
Commonwealth    v.     McGrorty     ( 5 

Ky.  L.   Rep.    [abstract]    605), 

826,    836. 
Commonwealth     v.    McGuire     (11 

Gray,  460),    1503,    1555. 
Commonwealth    v.    McHugh     (147 

Mass.     401;     18     X.    E.     74), 

1596,    1597. 
Commonwealth     v.     Mclvor      (117 

Mass.   118),    1487,   1672. 
Commonwealth    v.    McKenna     ( 158 

Mass.    207;     33    X.    E.    389), 

1089,   1060. 
Commonwealth       v.       McKiernan 

(128    Mass.    414),    1567. 
Commonwealth       v.       McLaughlin 

(108   Mass.   477),    1529. 
Commonwealth   v.   McManus    (161 

Mass.     04;     36     X.     E.     075), 

1754. 
Commonwealth  v.  McXamara  (110 

Mass.  340),  2031. 
Commonwealth   v.   McXamee    (112 

Mass.    286),    65,    1253,    2030, 

2085,   2260. 
Commonwealth  v.   McXamee    (113 

Mass.   12),  451,  523. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


xeis. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth    v.    McNeese     ( 156 

Mass.    231;    30   N.    E.    1021), 

1309,    l(i34,    1728. 
Commonwealth     v.     McXoir      ( 145 

Mass.    406;     14    X.    E.    G16), 

1096,    1097,    1679,    1747. 
Commonwealth    v.    McSherry     ( 3 

Gray,  481,  note),  1513. 
Commonwealth      v.      ^Madden      ( 1 

Gray,  486),   1668,   1674. 
Commonwealth     v.     Magee      {141 

Mass.     Ill;     4     N.     E.    819), 

87,    1709,    1753. 
Commonwealth     v.     Mahony      ( 14 

Gray,   46),    1113,    1115,    1374, 

1667,  1668. 
Commonwealth  v.  Major   ( 6  Dana, 

293),   1349,   1377. 
Commonwealth     v.     Malone     (114 

Mass.   295),   2041,   2049. 
Commonwealth     v.     Maloney     ( 16 

Gray,   20),    1595,    1650,    1651, 

1678. 
Commonwealth    v.    Maloney     (113 

Mass.  211),  1084. 
Commonwealtli    v.    Maloney     ( 152 

Mass.    493;     25    X.    E.    833), 

968. 
Commonwealth  v.  Mandeville  ( 142 

Mass.     469;     8    N.    E.     327), 

608. 
Commonwealth    v.    Mann     ( 1    Va. 

Cas.   308),   2031. 
Commonwealth    v.    Manning    (164 

Mass.    547;     42    X.    E.    95), 

1487. 
Commonwealth  v.  Marchand    ( 155 

Miss.  8;  29  N.  E.  578),  1572. 
Commonwealth     v.     Markoe      ( 17 

Pick.    465),    508,   559. 
Commonwealth    v.    Maroney     ( 105 

Mass.  467,  note),   1099,   1101, 

1375. 
Commonwealth     v.     Martin      ( 108 

Mass.    29),    229,    1480,    1513. 
Commonwealth     v.     Martin      ( 1'62 

Mass.    402;    38    N.    E.    708), 

1090,    1791. 


Commonwealth     v.    Martin     (170 

Pa.    St.    118;    32    Atl.    624), 

807. 
Commonwealth  v.  Marzynski   (149 

Mass.    849;    21    XT.    E.    228), 

73. 
Commonwealth     v.     Maskill      165 

Mass.    142;    42    X.    E.    562), 

1085. 
Commonwealth     v.     Mason      (116 

Mass.    66),    1672. 
Commonwealth     v.     Mason      (135 

Mass.     555 ) ,     1580. 
Commonwealth     v.     Matthews     (3 

Ky.   L.  Rep.   [abstract]    473), 

833. 
Commonwealth  v.   Matthews    ( 129 

Mass.    487),    452,    493,    1660, 

1661. 
Commonwealth    v.    Mead     ( 10    Al- 
len,  398),   1158,   1744. 
Commonwealth      v.      Mead      ( 140 

Mass.     300;     3     N.     E.     39), 

1090,   1660,   1661. 
Commonwealth      v.      Mead      ( 153 

Mass.    284;     26    N.    E.    855), 

1672,    1673. 
Commonwealth    v.     Meaney     (151 

Mass.    55;     23    N.    E.    730), 

1632,    1677. 
Commonwealth     v.     Melling      ( 14 

Gray,  388),  1503. 
Commonwealth    v.    Merriam    ( 136 

Muss.    433),   688,    1267. 
Commonwealth    v.    Merriam     (148 

Mass.    425;     19    N.    E.    405), 

1354,    1374,   1377,   1097,   1658. 
Commonwealth    v.    Middleton     (8 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  264),  1554,  1555. 
Commonwealth  v.  Miller   ( 107  Pa. 

St.   276),   1446. 
Commonwealth  v.  Miller    ( 126  Pa. 

St.    137;    17    Atl.    623),    186, 

796. 
Commonwealth  v.  Miller   (131  Pa. 

St.  118),  163. 
Commonwealth  v.  Miller   (4  Phila. 

195;    affirmed,    4    Phila.    210; 

17  Leg.  Int.  276,  285),  2069, 

2079. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth 

484),  262, 
Commonwealth 

405;   32  N. 
Commonwealth 

422;   11  S. 

Rep.  1008) 
Commonwealth 

Mass.  141) 
Commonwealth 

Mass.    533 

1310. 
Commonwealth 

Mass.  463; 

1708. 
Commonwealth 

Mass.  136; 
Commonwealth 

Mass.    244 

1126,  1303, 
Commonwealth 

Mass.    324; 

1663. 
Commonwealth 

Mass.    244; 

1310. 
Commonwealth 

Gray  470), 
Commonwealth 

Mass.    453; 

55'8. 
Commonwealth 

Mass.  314; 

10.  18,  32, 
Commonwealth 

Mass.    314; 

1490,    1491. 
Commonwealth 

440;  112  S. 

Rep.  987), 
Commonwealth 

]\lass.  471 ; 
Commonwealth 

Mass.    402 

1660. 
Commonwealth 

Cush.    404) 
Commonwealth 

Mass.   109) 


V.  Miller   (8  Gray, 

2027,  2031. 

V.  Mills  ( 157  Mass. 

E.  360),  1664. 

V.  Minor  (88  Ky. 
W.  472;  10  Ky.  L. 
,  267,  269,  843,  844. 

V.  Mitchell  (115 
,  1670,  1671. 

V.  Molter  ( 142 
;     8     N.     E.     428), 

V.    Monahan    ( 140 
5  N.  E,  259),  86, 

V.  Moore  ( 143 
9  N.  E.  25).  1749. 

V.  Moore  ( 145 
),  214,  214,  345, 
1655,  1670. 

V.     Moore      (157 

31    N.    E.    1070), 

V.  Moore  ( 145 
;     13    N.    E.    893), 

V.   Moorehouse    ( 1 
1451,  1452. 
V.     Moran      ( 148 
19    N.    E.    554), 

V.  Morgan  (149 
21  N.  E.  369),  6, 
1708. 

V.    Morgan     ( 149 
21    N.    E.    369), 

V.  Morris  ( 129  Ky. 

W.  580;  33  Ky.  L. 

1810. 

V.  Morrisey  ( 157 
32  N.  E.  664),  277. 

V.  Morten  (162 
;    38    N.    E.    708), 

V.  Moulton  { 10 
,    1488,    1489. 

V.  Moylan  (119 
,   1641.  ' 


Commonwealth  v.  Mueller   (81  Pa. 

«t.   127),  930,  933. 
Commonwealth   v.   Muir    ( 180   Pa. 

St.     47 ) ,    426. 
C'onmionwealth     v.     Mullen      ( 166 

Mass.    377;    44    N.    E.    343), 

1103,   1105. 
Commonwealth  v.  Munn  ( 14  Gray, 

361),    1112,    1115,    1666,   1667, 

1758. 
Commonwealth     v.    Munsey     (112 

Mass.  287),  1601. 
Commonwealth     v.     Murphy      (96 

Ky.  38;   23  ,S.  W.  655),  1319. 
Commonwealth      v.      ]\Iurphy      (2 

Gray,  510),  1509,  1513. 
Commonwealth     v.      ]\Iurphy      (2 

Gray,  560),  1369. 
Commonwealth    v.    Murphy     ( 155 

Mass.    284;    29    X.    E.    469), 

1490. 
Commonwealth  v.  Murphy  (95  Ky. 

38;   23  S.  W.  655), 'l  125. 
Commonwealth     v.     Murphy      ( 10 

Gray,   1),  112,   1586,   1590. 
Commonwealth     v.     Murphy      ( 1 1 

Gray,  53),   1739. 
Commonwealth    v.    Murphy     ( 147 

Mass.    525;     18    N.    E.    403), 

1594. 
Commonwealth    v.    Murphy     ( 147 

Mass.    577;     18    N.    E.    418), 

1743. 
Commonwealth    v.    Murphy     ( 153 

Mass.    290;     26    N.    E.    860), 

1656. 
Commonwealth    v.    Murphy     ( 155 

Mass.    284;     29    N.    E.    469), 

1223. 
Commonwealth    v.    Murray     ( 144 

Mass.    170;     10    X.    E.    802), 

1739. 
Commonwealth  v.   Myrick    (6  Ky. 

L.      Rep.      [abstract]      520K 

1464. 
Commonwealth      v. 

:^Iiiss.    554;     32 

1629. 
Commonwealth      v.      Nally      (151 

Mass.  63;  23  N.  E.  660),  1597. 


Nagle      ( 157 
N.    E.    861), 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CI 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Naylor   (34  Pa. 

St.  86),  215,  1304,  1309,  1310. 
Commonwealth  v.  Nazarko   ([Pa.] 

73  Atl.  210),  2039,  20G3,  2068. 
Commonwealth  v.  Neal   ( 1 1  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   [abstract]   678),  844. 
Commonwealth    v.   Neason    ( [Ky.] 

50  S.  W.  6ii;   20  Ky.  L.  Pvep. 

1825),  233,   1409,  1470. 
Commonwealth  v.  Nefl"    (9  Ky.  L. 

Eep.      [abstract]      442),     548, 

1545. 
Commonwealth   v.    Nelson    ( [Ky.] 

57  S.  W.  495;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

414),  939. 
Commonwealth    v.    Newhall     ( 1(54 

Mass.  338;  41  N.  E.  647),  331. 
Commonwealth  v.  Newhard  (3  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  215),  1368. 
Commonwealth    v.     Newton     (123 

Mass.  420),  1051,  1052. 
Commonwealth   v.   Ney    ( 12   Gray, 

124),   1191. 
Commonwealth      v.  Neylon      ( 159 

Mass.    241;    34   K    E.    1078), 

1657. 
Commonwealth     v.     Nichols      ( 10 

Met.  259;   43  Am.  Dec.  432), 

1349,  1353,  1361. 
Commonwealth  v.  Nichols   ( 10  Al- 
len,  199),   1446. 
Commonwealth    v.    Nilson    ( [Ky.] 

50  S.  W.  60;   20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1825),  229. 
Commonwealth    v.   Nunan    ( [Ky.] 

104  S.  W.  731;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1090),  540,  543. 
Commonwealth     v.     O'Brien     ( 134 

Mass.  198),  1560,  1628. 
Commonwealth    v.    O'Connor     (11 

Gray,  94),  1660,  1661. 
Commonwealth  v.  O'Connor   (7  Al- 
len, 583),  2033. 
Commonwealth  v.  Odlin   (23  Pick. 

275),  23,  25,  1112,  1114,  1492, 

1499,  1500,  1533. 
Commonwealth  v.  O'Donnell  (8  Al- 
len, 548),  451,  523. 


Commonwealth   V.   O'Donnell    (143 

Mass.   178;   9  N.  E.  509),  86, 

1702. 
Commonwealth   v.   O'Hanlon    ( 155 

Mass.    198;    29    N.    E.    518), 

1652,   1745. 
Commonwealth    v.    O'Hearn     ( 132 

Mass.  553),  1623. 
Commonwealth     v.     O'Kean      ( 152 

Mass.  584;   26  N.  E.  97),  44, 

1185, 
Commonwealth    v.     O'Leary     ( 143 

Mass.  95;  8  N.  E.  887),  1226, 

1229,  1490,  1503. 
Commonwealth  v.  O'Neal    (11  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  678),  1526. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Overby  ( 107  Ky. 

169;   53  S.  W.  36;   21   Ky.  L. 

Rep.  843),  928. 
Commonwealtli     v.     Owens      (114 

Mass.  252),   1587._ 
Commonwealth      v.     Packard      (5 

Gray,   101),   1161,   1177,   1621. 
Commonwealth    v.    Packard     ( 136 

Mass.  50),  683. 
Commonwealth   v.   Page    (6   Gray, 

361),  1656. 
Commonwealth   v.  Park    ( 1   Gray, 

553),  1353,  1615. 
Commonwealth    v.    Parsons     ( 195 

Mass.    560;     81    N.    E.    291), 

2038,  2051. 
Commonwealth  v.  Pattee  ( 12  Cush. 

[Mass.]   501),  929. 
Commonwealth     v.     Patten      (151 

Mass.  536;  25  N.  E.  20),  1647, 

1660. 
Commonwealth   v.   Patter.son    ( 138 

Mass.  498),  1100,  1670. 
Commonwealtli   v.   Patterson    ( 153 

Mass.  5;  26  N.  E.  136),  1671. 
Commonwealth     v.     Paulin      ( 187 

Mass.    568;     73    N.    E.    655), 

1192,  1755. 
Commonwealth     v.     Pearson      (23 

Pick.  280,  note),  1499. 
Commonwealth  v.  Pearson   (3  Met. 

449),   1459. 
Commonwealth      v.      Pease       (110 

Mass.   412),   1702,   1708. 


en 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


fReferences  are  to  poyes.] 


Commonwealth     v.     Peckham      (2 

Gray,  514),  11,  34,  79,  81. 
Commonwealth    v.    Petlerman    ( 12 

Pa.  Super.  Ct.  202),  1330. 
C-ommonwealth  v.  Pendeigast   ( 138 

Pa.  St.  633;  21  Atl.  12),  337. 
Commonwealth    v.    Penniman     (8 

Met.  519),  1455. 
Commonwealth     v.      Pennsylvania 

Coal  Co.  (66  Pa.  St.  4l'),  99. 
Commonwealth  v.  People's  Express 

Bureau     ([Mass.]     88    Is.    E. 

420,  820),  386,  387. 
Commonwealth   v.    Peppin    ( [Ky.] 

40  S.   W.  252),   14«7. 
•Commomvealth  v.  Perley    (2  Cush. 

559),  1112,  1115. 
Commonwealth  v.  Perrier  ( 3  Phila. 

229),  2040,  2008,  2009. 
Commonwealth      v.      Perry      ( 148 

Mass.     160;     19    N.    E.    212), 

828,  1361,  1646. 
Commonwealth      v.       Peto       ( 1S6 

Mass.    155),    87,    1081,    1699, 

1712. 
Commonwealth  v,  Petranich    ( 183 

Mass.    217;    66    N.    E.    807), 

158,  967,   1512. 
Commonwealth   v.   Petrie   Co.    (90 

S.   W.   987;    28    Ky.    L.   Rep. 

940),  190. 
Commonwealth  v.   Petri    ( 122  Ky. 

20;    90    S.    W.    987;    25    Ky. 

L.    Rep.    940),    557. 
Cx)mmonwealth    v.    PfafT     (17    Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  302;  5  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.     59;     26     Pitts.     L.     J. 

[N.  -S.]    254).    1.308. 
Commonwealth      v.      Phelps      (11 

Gray  73).   1013,   1675. 
Commonwealth     v.      Pierce      ( 107 

Mass.    487),    1656,    1667. 
Commonwealth     v.     Pierce      (147 

Mass.    161;     10    N.    E.    705), 

822,    832. 
(.Commonwealth    v.    Pillsbury     (12 

Gray    127),   384.  47«,    i008. 
Commonwealth     v.     Pine      (|Ky.] 

94     S.     W.     32;     29     Ky.   "l. 

Rep.  593),  218. 


Commonwealth      v.      Piatt       (11 

Phila.      415),      2063,      2068, 

2072. 
Commonwealth   v.    Powderly    ( 148 

Mass.    457;     19    N.    E.    781), 

1093,    1113,    1667. 
Commonwealth    v.    Powell    ( [Ky.] 

62     S.     W.     19;     22     Ky.    L. 

Rep.      1932),     824,     934. 
Commonwealth     v.     Powell      ( 148 

Mass.    457;     19    X.    E.    781), 

1115. 
Commonwealth     v.     Powers     ( 123 

Mass.    244).    1064,    1660. 
Commonwealth  v.  Powers   (17  Pa. 

Co.   Ct.   Rep.  304),   1508. 
Commonwealth  v.  Pollak    ( 33   Pa. 

Super.    Ct.   600),    1608,    1611. 
Commonwealth  v.  Pomplaret   ( 137 

Mass.      564;      50      Am.     Rep. 

340),    1166.    1329. 
Commonwealth    v.    Pool     ( 16    Ky. 

L.      Rep.      [abstract]      351), 

559. 
Commonwealth  v.  Porter   ( 4  Gray 

426),    1116. 
Commonwealth      v.      Porter       ( 10 

Phila.  217),  822. 
Commonwealth  v.  Porter   (31  Leg. 

Int.    398).    1474],    1489,    1524. 
Commonwealth      v.      Pratt      ( 126 

Mass.   462),   1368. 
Commonwealth      v.      Pratt      ( 145 

Mass.    248;     13    N.    E.    886 [, 

1626. 
Commonwealth  v.  Pray    (13  Pick. 

359),    1480,   1533. 
Commonwealth      v.      Presby      ( 14 

Gray    65),    2033,    2034. 
Commonwealth     v.     Price     ( [Ky.] 

94  S.  W.  32;   29  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

593),   219,    357. 
Commonwealth   v.   Price,   etc.,   Co. 

([Ky.]     105    S.    W.    102;    31 

Ky.    L.     Rep.     1350),    949. 
Commonwealth    v.    Price     (5    Pa. 

Co.    Ct.    Rep.     175;    4    Kulp. 

289),  1447. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


cm 


[References  are  lo  pages.] 


Commonwealth     v.    Purcell     (154 

Mass.    388;    28    N.    E.    288), 

978,    1103. 
Commonwealth     v.     Purdy      ( 14G 

Mass.    138;     15    N.    E.    tJ64), 

1655. 
Commonwealth     v.     Purdy      (147 

Mass.   29),    1484,    1541,    15'82, 

1661. 
Commonwealth      v.      Purtlc       (77 

Mass.    [11    Gray]    78),    1035, 

1527,    1530,    1659. 
Commonwealth      v.      Putnam      (4 

Gray    16),    1353,    1359,    1639. 
Commonwealth      v.      Quinn       ( 12 

Gray   178),    1547. 
Commonwealth    v.    Quinlan     ( 153 

Mass.     483;     27     N.     E.     8), 

1547,    1550. 
Commonwealth    v.    RalTerty     ( 133 

Mass.   574),    1644. 
Commonwealth   v.    Ramsdell    (130 

Mass.    68),    20,    51,    55,    79, 

822,    1088. 
Commonwealth    v.    Redman     (121 

Ky.    158;   88   S.  W.    1073;    28 

Ky.    L.    Rep.    117),    569. 
Commonwealth      v.      Reed!      ( 162 

Mass.    215;    38    N.    E.    364), 

1074,    1075. 
Commonwealth     v.     Regan      ( 182 

Mass.    22;     64    N.     E.    407), 

1084,    1086,    1312. 
Commonwealth   v.   Reily    (9   Gray 

1),   1528. 
Commonwealth  v.  Remby   (2  Gray 

508),    1624,    1653,    1747. 
Commonwealth    v.    Reyburg     ( 122 

Pa.    St.    299;     16    Atl.     351; 

2    L.    R.     A.    415),    24,    48, 

49,    50,    87,   965,    1699,    1712. 
Commonwealth    v.    Reynolds     (89 

Ky.    147;    12   S.    W.    132;    20 

S.  W.   167),   112,  832.  835. 
Commonwealth     v.     Reynolds      (4 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  623),  1467,  1463. 
Commonwealth     v.     Reynolds      (6 

Ky.  L.   Rep.    [abstract]    520), 

836. 


Commonwealth    v.   Reynolds    (114 

Mass.   306),    1367. 
Commonwealth      v.     Rhoades      ( 1 

Pa.   Co.    Ct.    Rep.    639),   821, 

1487. 
Commonweultli      v.      Rhodes       ( I 

Pittsb.  499),  76. 
Commonwealth  v.  Riley   ( 14  Bush 

44),    1442,    1542,    1545. 
Commonwealth      v.      Riley       ( 157 

Mass.     89;     31     N.    E.     708), 

1752. 
Commonwealth      v.      Riley      ( 196 

Mass.    60;     81     X.     E.     881; 

10    L.    R.   A.    [X.   S.]    1122), 

1726. 
Commonwealth    v.    Risner    ( [Ky.] 

47    S.   W.   213),    1498. 
Commonwealth      v.      Roberts      ( 1 

Cush.    505),    1520,    1556. 
Commonwealth    v.     Robertson     (5 

Cush.    [Mass.]    438),    408. 
Commonwealth     v.     Robinson      (9 

Pa.   Super.  Ct.  569),  796. 
Commonwealth  v.  Roby    ( 12  Pick. 

496),    2252. 
Commonwealth    v.   Roese    ( 1    Wil- 
cox   [Pa.]    253),   967. 
Commonwealth   v.   Rogers    ( 1   Del. 

Cr.    Rep.    517),    1125,    1319. 
Commonwealth     v.     Rogers      ( 135 

Mass.    536),    1095. 
Commonwealth      v.      Roland      ( 12 

Gray,  132),  1101,  1513. 
Commonwealth  v.  Rome   ( 14  Gray 

[Mass.]    47),   264. 
Commonwealtli      v.     Rooks      ( 150 

Mass.    59;     22    N.    E.    436), 

1354,   1362,    1629. 
Commonwealth     v.     Rooney     ( 142 

Mass.    474;     8    N.    E.    411), 

1671. 
Commonwealth    v.    Rosenbaum     (6 

Ky.    L.    Rep.    [abstract]    365, 

575),   553. 
Commonwealth     v.      Rourke      ( 10 

Cush.    397).    1774. 
Comnionweaitli     \.     ILuuike      (lil 

Mass.    321;     6     N.    E.     383), 

213,    345,    1679. 


<av 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Rowe  (14  Gray 

47),  265,   1554,   1585. 
Commonwealth   v.   Rucker    ( 14   B. 

Mon.    228),    1459. 
Commonwealth      v.      Rumrill      ( 1 

Gray  388),   1112,   1115,   16«7. 
Commonwealth     v.     Russdl      ( 1 1 

Ky.  L.   Rep.   [abstract]    576), 

950,    1187. 
Commonwealth   v.   Ryan    (9   Gray 

137),    1491,    1500,    1643. 
Commonwealth  v.  Ryan    ( 14  Gray 

307),   1491. 
Commonwealth      v.      Ryan       (136 

Mass.  436),   1547,   1671. 
Commonwealth  v.   Ryan    ( [Mass.] 

25  N.  E.  465),  1636. 
Commonwealth      v.      Ryan       (160 

Mass.    172;    35    N.    E.    (373), 

1088,    1112,    1619. 
Commonwealth  v.  Saal    ( 10  Phila. 

490),    1748. 
Commonwealth     v.     Salmon      ( 136 

Mass.  431),   344,   345. 
Commonwealth    v.    Salyards     ( [0. 

&    T.]     13    Pa.     Co.    Ct.    R. 

470),   2247. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sampson    (113 

Mass.    191),    1543. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sanborn     (110 

Mass.    61),    451,    523,    525. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sansville     ( 140 

Mass.    450;     5    X.    E.    254), 

344. 
Commonwealth     v.    "Sassaman     (2 

Del.  Co.   Rep.   333),   1307. 
Commonwealth     v.     Savery      (145 

Mass.    212;     13    N,    E.    611), 

1185. 
Commonwealth    v.    Savings    Bank 

(5    Allen    [Mass.]    428),    791. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sawtelle     ( 150 

Mass.     320;     23     X.     E.     54), 

213,    345. 
Commonwealth     v.     Schadt      (214 

Ra.    .592;    64    Atl.    320),    445. 
Commonwealth    v.    Scheckles     (78 

Va.   .36),   452. 
Commonwealth    v.    Schoenhult     ( 3 

Ohio   20),   1505. 


Commonwealth     v.     Schoenthaler 

([Ky.]    122   S.  W.  828),  566. 
Commonwealth  v,  Schowenhutt   (3 

Phila.  20),    139,    140,   1504, 
Commonwealth    v.    Scranton    (214 

Pa.    595;    64    Atl.    321),    445. 
Commonwealth     v.     Scruggs      ( 10 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    [abstract]    446), 

1483. 
Commonwealth     v.     Sellers      ( 130 

Pa.   St.   32;    18   Atl.   541;    15 

Atl.     891;     25     Wkly    X.     C. 

154),      165,     289,     488,     494, 

1460. 
Commonwealth     v.     Shaffer     ( 128 

Pa.     St.     575;     L8    Atl.    390; 

24  W.  X.  C.  539 ) ,  153. 
Commonwealth  v.   Shaw    (5   Cush. 

522),   1516. 
Commonwealth      v,      Shaw      (116 

Mass.    8),    1089,    1097,    1658, 

1659,    1660. 
Commonwealth      v.      Shaw       (152 

Mass.    510;     25    N.    E.    837; 

1310,    1318. 
Commonwealth  v.   Shea    ( 14  Gray 

386),  8,  961,   1655,   1697. 
Commonwealth      v.      Shea       ( 185 

Mass.    89;    69    X.    E.    1066), 

387. 
Commonwealth  v.  Shea  (115  Mass. 

102),    1493,    1693. 
Commonwealth      v.      Shea       ( 160 

Mass.     6;      35     X.     E.     S3), 

1089,    1099,    1660. 
Commonwealth     v.     Sheckler      (78 

Va.    36).    523,    525. 
Commonwealth    v.     Sheehan     ( 105 

Mass.    174),    1460. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sheehan     ( 143 

Mass.    468;     9    X.    E.    839), 

1552. 
Commonwealth     v.     iShelton      (99 

Ky.     120;     35     S.     W.     128), 

1463,    1467. 
Commonwealth    v.    Shoup    (9    Pa. 

Co.   Ct.    Rep.   289).    796. 
Commonwealth   v.   Shuck    ( 10  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  874),  911. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


cv 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth     v.     Shultz      (129 

Pa.     644;     18     Atl.     571;     25 

VVkly.   N.   S.    151),  522. 
Commonwealth  v.  ISilvermati    ( 138 

Pa.    fcjt.     642;     22    Atl.     13), 

336. 
Commonwealth     v.     Simmons      (4 

Pa.   Dist.   Rep.   35),   720. 
Comnionwealtli    v.    Sinclair     ( 138 

Mass.  493),   1180,   1372,  1375, 

1600. 
Commonwealth     v.     Sisson      ( 126 

Mass.   48),    1097,    1658,    1673. 
Commonwealth     v.      Skelley      ( 10 

Gray  464),   1550,  1551. 
Commonwealth    v.    Slaughter    ( 12 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  893),   824,   1518, 

1570,     1765. 
Commonwealth     v.     Slavery     (145 

Mass.    212;     13    N.    E.    611), 

1081. 
Commonwealth  v.  Sloan   (4  Cush. 

52),   53. 
Commonwealth     v.     Slosson     ( 152 

Mass.    489;    25    N.    E.    835), 

1582,    1655. 
Commonwealth     v.      Smith      ( 127 

Ky.     171;     105    S.    W.    397; 

32    Ky.    L.    Rep.    35),    1365. 
Commonwealth     v.      Smith      ( 102 

Mass.   144),   11,   19,  49,   1329, 

1340,    1752. 
Commonwealth      v.      Smith      (129 

Mass.   104),    127. 
Commonwealtli   v.   Smith    ( 1   Leg. 

Gaz.     196),    2068. 
Commonwealth    \.    Smith    (2    Pa. 

Super.   Ct.   474),    1330. 
Commonwealtli   v.   Smith    ( 16   Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  644),  1111,  1280. 
Commonwealth  v.  Smith   ( 1  Gratt. 

553),    1505,    1507. 
Commonwealth    v.   Smoulter    (126 

Pa.     137;     17     Atl.     532;     24 

W.  N.  C.   48),   186,   796. 
Commonwealth  v.  Snow   ( 14  Gray 

20),    1486,    1535. 
Commonwealth      v.      iSnow       ( 133 

Mass.   575),   8,    10,   85,    15S8. 


Commonwealth   v.   Snyder    ( [Pa.] 

73   Atl.   910),   2039,   2083. 
Commonwealth    v.    Southern    Exp. 

Co.      (103     S.     W.     339;     31 

Ky.   L.   Rep.   813),  307. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sprague     ( 128 

Mass.   75),   1081,   1530. 
Commonwealth      v.      Spring      ( 19 

•Pick.    396),   687. 
Commonwealth     v.     Stamper      (8 

Ky.   L.  Rep.    [abstract]    787), 

1464,   1467. 
Commonwealth      v.      StefTee       (7 

Bush    [Ky.]    161),  408. 
Commonwealth  v.  Steil'ner    (2  Pa. 

Dist.   Rep.    152),    1330. 
Commonwealth  v.  Stegala   (3  Ky. 

L.      Rep.      [abstract]      687), 

1516. 
Commonwealth     v.     Stevens     ( 153 

Mass   4;    26   N.   E.  96),   1599, 

1728. 
Commonwealth    v.    Stevens     ( 153 

Mass.    421;     26    N.    E.    992), 

1354,    1360,    1362,    1630. 
Commonwealth    v.    Stevens     ( 155 

Mass.    291;    29    N.    E.    508), 

1648. 
Commonwealth  v.  Stevenson    ( 142 

Mass.    466;     8    N.    E.    341), 

1615,    1629. 
Commonwealth     v.     Stoehr      ( 109 

Mass.  365),   1672,   1673. 
Commonwealth      v.      Stowell       (9 

Met.    569),    1447,    14S0,    1483, 

1516. 
Commonwealth    v.    Stratton    ( 150 

Mass.    188;    22    N.    E.    893)', 

690,    1267. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sullivan     ( 150 

Mass.     315;     23    N.    E.    47), 

1722. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sullivan     ( 156 

Mass.    229;    30    N.    E.    1023), 

1099,   1560,   1619,   1656,   1672, 

1074. 
Commonwealth    v.    Sullivan     ( 156 

Mass.    487;    31    N.    E.    647), 

1596. 


CVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth    v.    Sweitzer     ( 129 

Pa.    St.    644;     K    Atl.    569; 

25    Wkly.    N.    C.    151),    449, 

522. 
Commonwealth      v.      Tabor      { 138 

Mass.   496),    1099,    1224. 
Commonwealth      v.      Taggart      (8 

Gratt.  647),   1623. 
Commonwealth  v.  Tarver    (8  Met. 

527),    1534. 
Commonwealth      v.      Tate       ( 178 

Mass.    121;    59    X.    E.    646), 

1086. 
Commonwealth  v.  Tay   (146  Mass. 

146;     15    N.    E.    503),    1081, 

1089,    1169. 
Commonwealth   v.    Taylor    ( [Ky.] 

116  S.  W.  6S2),  793. 
Commonwealth      v.      Taylor       ( 14 

Gray   26),   369,   1712. 
Commonwealth     v.     Tenney      ( 148 

Mass.    452;     19    X.    E.    556), 

1657. 
Commonwealth    v.    Terry     ( 15    Pa. 

Super.   Ct.   608),    1223,    1241, 

1242. 
Commonwealth  v.  Thajer    (5  Met. 

246),    25,    26,    1522. 
Commonwealth      v.      Thayer       (8 

Mete.  525),   1196,   1198,   1516, 

1554,    1556,   1559. 
Commonwealth    v.    Thompson     (2 

Gray    82),    778,    1742. 
Commonwealth    v.    Thornley     (88 

Mass.     [6    Allen]     445),    451, 

523. 
Commonwealth    v.    Thornton     (14 

Gray    41),    1587,    1593,    1626. 
Commonwealth    v.    Tierney     (148 

Pa.     St.     552;     24    Atl.    64), 

1341. 
Commonwealth     v.     Timothy      (8 

Gray     480),    7,     34,     81,     87, 

1491,.   1656,    1660. 
Commonwealth    v.    Tinkliam     (14 

Gray    12),    1578,    1595,    1620. 
Commonwealtli    v.    Trainor     ( 123 

Mass.  414),   1504,   1580,   1581. 
Commonwealth     v.    Traverse     (11 

Allen  260),   1484. 


Commonwealth  v.  Traylor   ( [Ky.] 

45    S.    W.    356),    1491. 
Commonwealth     v.     Trickey      ( 13 

Allen    559),    1306. 
Commonwealth    v.    Trimble     ( 150 

Mass.     89;     22     N.     E.     439), 

1250,    1754. 
Commonwealth      v.      Tryou       ( 39 

Mass.  442),   1371. 
Commonwealth  v.  Tubbs   ( 1  Cush. 

2),    1112,    1115,    1667. 
Commonwealth     v.     Tuney      ( 148 

Mass.    452;     19    X.    E.    556), 

1659. 
Commonwealth    v.    Turner     (4    B. 

Mon.    4),    1542. 
Commonwealth  v.  Turner   ( 1  Ciish. 

493),   414. 
Commonwealth      v.      Tuttle       ( 12 

Cush.  502),   1451,   1512,   1641, 

1643,    1745. 
Commonwealth    v.    Twombly    (119 

Mass.    104),    1582,    1674. 
Commonwealth    v.    Tynnauer     (33 

Pa.   Super.   Ct.  604),    1605. 
Commonwealth      v.      Uhrig      ( 138 

Ma.ss.    492),    1238,    1353. 
Commonwealth      v.      Uhrig      ( 146 

Mass.    132;     15    X.    E.    156), 

1729,    1732. 
Commonwealth     v.     Vahey      (151 

Mass.    57;     23    X.    E.    659), 

1065,    1657,    1670. 
Commonwealth   v.  Van  Stone    (97 

Mass.  548),   1113,   1115,   1667. 
Commonwealth  v.  Very    (12  Gray 

124),   1555,   1563. 
Commonwealth     v.    Voorhies     ( 12 

B.   :*Ion.   361),   396,   413. 
Commonwealth       v.       Waohendorf 

(141     Mass.     270;     4     X.     E. 

817),    1353,    1361. 
Commonwealth      v.      Wall       ( 145 

Mass.    216;     13    X.    E.    486), 

740,     749. 
Commonwealth     v.     Wallace      (73 

Mass.    [7   Gray]    22),    1585. 
Commonwealth    v.    Wallace     ( 123 

Mass.  400),  1065,   1596,  1656, 

1660. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


evil 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth    v.    Wallace     ( 143 

Mass.   88;    9   N.   E.   5),   1675. 
Commonwealth     v.     Walters      (11 

Gray    81),   386,   956,    1726. 
Commonwealth     v.     Walton      (11 

Allen   238),    14S7. 
Commonwealth     v.     Warren      ( 10 

Ky.  L.   Rep.    [abstract]    490), 

945. 
Commonwealth      v.      Waters      (11 

Gray    81),    1527,    1528. 
Commonwealth  v.  Watson    (2   Pa. 

Dist.    Rep.    526),     1700. 
Commonwealth      v.      Webster       (0 

Allen,  593),    1667. 
Commonwealth     v.      Weisenburgh 

(126   Ky.   8;    102  S.  W.   846; 

31    Ky.    L.     Rep.    449),    924, 

941. 
Commonwealth  v.  Welch    (1  Allen 

1),   1550,   1552,   1670,   1671. 
Commonwealth      v.      Weleli       (97 

Mass.    593),    1370,    1722. 
Commonwealth     v.     Welch      (110 

Mass.  360),   1006,   1103,   1656. 
Commonwealth     v.      Welch      (140 

Mass.    372;     5    N.    E.     166), 

1081,    10&9,    1116,    1069. 
Commonwealth     v.     Welch      ( 142 

Mass.     473;     8     N.     E.     342), 

1648,    1659. 
Commonwealth     v.      Welch      (144 

Mass.    356;     11    N.    E.    423), 

497,    499,    502,    506,    1039. 
Commonwealth  v.  Weller   (77  Ky. 

[14  Bush]    218;    29   Am.  Rep. 

407),   232, 
Commonwealth      v.      Weller       (14 

Bush,  218;  29  Am.  Rep.  407), 

234,    240,    931,    945,    957. 
Commonwealth        v.        Wellington 
(146    Mass.    56*6;     16    N.    E. 

446),  830,   1596. 
Commonwealth       v.       Wentwortli 
(146     Mass.     36;      15     N.     K. 

138),    389. 
Commonwealth  v.  Wenzol    ( 24  Pa. 

Super.    Ct.    467),    904,    1643. 


Commonwealth     v.     Whalen      ( 16 

Gray    23),    1371,    1656,    1666, 

1607,    106«. 
Commonwealth     v.     Whalen     (131 

Mass.    419),    70. 
Commonwealth     v.     Wheeler      ( 79 

Ky.    284),   552. 
Commonwealth     v.     Whelan      (134 

Mass.    206),    247,    5«9,    592, 

595,   083,    1278. 
Commonwealth    v.    Whitcomb    ( 12 

Gray   126),   1580. 
Commonwealth    v.    White    (18    B. 

Mon.   492),    1442,    1554,    1555. 
Commonwealth      v.      White       (15 

Gray  407),   87,   169fl,   1701. 
Commonwealth      v.      White       ( 10 

Met.    14),    24,    1711. 
Commonwealth     v.      Whitney      (5 

Gray     S5),     05,     2030,     2031, 

2032. 
Commonwealth     v.     Whitney     (11 

Cush.  447),  01,  2086,  2154. 
Commonwealth      v.      Wilcox       ( 1 

Cush.  503),   1446,   1447,   1534. 
■Commonwealth     v.     Willard      (22 

Pick.  476),   1219,   1221,   1578. 
Commonwealth    v.    Williams    ( 120 

Ky.    314;    S6    S.    W.    553;    27 

Ky.   L.    Rep.    695),   844. 
Commonwealth     v.     Williams     (6 

Gray    [Mass.]     1),    264,    265, 

1586,    1605. 
Commonwealth     v.     Williams      (4 

Allen,  587),   1180,   1375. 
Commonwealth      v.      Wilson       ( 1 1 

Cush.    412),    1513,    1520. 
Commonwealth     v.     Wilson      ( 127 

Pa.     542;     18     Atl.     601;     25 

W.    X.    C.    148),    763,   704. 
Commonwealth  v.  Wolf   (3  S.  and 

R.    [Pa.]    50),   216. 
Commonwealtli  v.  Wood    (116  Ky. 

748;    76    S.    W.    842;    25    Ky. 

L.   Rep.    1019),   685. 
Commonwealth  v.   Wood    ( 4   Gray 

11),    1533,    1534,    1050,    1655. 
Commonwealth   v.    Woods    (4    Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   262),  546, 

550. 


CVIU 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Woods   (9  Gray 

131),   1535. 
Commonwealth     v.     Woods      ( 165 

Mass.    145;    42    N.    E.    565), 

1624,    1754. 
Commonwealth  v.  Worcester    ( 126 

Mass.   256),    1163,    1621. 
Commonwealth  v.  Worcester    (141 

Mass.  58;   6  N.  E.  700),  213, 

344. 
Commonwealth     v.     Wright      (79 

Ky.    22),   280. 
Commonwealth     v.      Wright      ( 12 

Allen    190),    1547. 
Commonwealth      v.      Young      ( 15 

Gratt.      664),       1488,       1510, 

1520. 
Commonwealth    v.    Zelt    (138    Pa. 

.St.    615;     21    Atl.    7;     11    L. 

Pv.    A.    602),    210,    336,    1255, 

1589,    1761. 
Compler   v.    State    (18    Ind.    447), 

1635. 
Componovo    v.    State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]    39    S.    W.    1114),    344 

1646. 
Conipton    V.    Simoneau     (21    Rev. 

Leg.    265),    434. 
Compton  V.  State   (95  Ala.  25;   11 

So.    69),    970,    1185. 
Comstock   V.      Drohan       (8      Hun 

373),   2008. 
Conant  v.  Jackson    (16  Vt.   335), 

2093,  2104,  2106. 
Concord    v.    Patterson    (53    N.    C. 

182),  432. 
Condell    v.    Price     (1    Hans.     [X. 

B.]   333),  1048. 
Confer    v.    Elizabethtown     (  [Ky.] 

99  S.  W.  608;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

706),  415. 
Conforti    v.    Romano     (50    N.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.     148;     98    X.    Y. 

Hupp.   194),   1769. 
Confrcy    v.    Stark     (73    HI.    137), 

1839,  1847. 
Conlan    v.    Roemer    (52    N.    J.    L. 

53;    18  Atl.   858),  2126. 


Conlee  v.  Clay  City  ( [Ky.]  102  S. 

W.  802;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  533), 

653 
Conley,  Ex  parte  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

75   S.   W.  301),  889. 
Conley  v.  Nailor    (118  U.  S.  127; 

6    Sup.    Ct.    1001;    30    L.   ed. 

112),  2099,  2122. 
Conley  v.  Rushville   (60  Ind.  327), 

397. 
Conley  v.   State    (5   W.  Va.  522), 

1445. 
Conley   v.    Zerber    (74   Iowa    699; 

39  N.  W.  113),  985. 
Conlon   V.    Muldowney    ([1904]    2 

Irish  Rep.  498),  1355,  1357. 
Conly  V.   Commonwealth    (98   Ky. 

125;     32    S.    W.    285),    2041, 

2045. 
Conner    &    Co.,    In    re    (171    Fed. 

261),  703. 
Conner   v.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

16  S.  W.  454;    13  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

403),  749,  1760. 
Conner  v.  Elliott    (18  How.  591), 

311. 
Connecticut       Breweries      Co.      v. 

Murphy     (81    Conn.    145;     70 

Atl.  450),  480,  537,  538,  646, 

647,  687. 
Connecticut    Mut.    L.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Bear   (26  Fed.  582),  2233. 
Connell    v.    State     (46    Ind.    446), 

1491. 
Conner    &    Co.,    In    re    (171    Fed. 

261),  480. 
Connolly,    In    re    ([X.    Y.]    403), 

2134. 
Connolly  v.  Atlanta    (79  Ga.  064; 

4  S.  E.  263),  44,  171. 
Connolly  v.   Crescent   City  R.   Co. 

(41  La.  57;   5  So.  259;  0  So. 

52C;    3    L.   R.   A.    133),   2205 

2207,  2212.  2215. 
<'onnollv  V.   McConnell    ( 1   Penne- 

will  [Del.]   133;  39  Atl.  773), 

1802. 
Connolly   v.   People    (42   111.   App. 

30),   1232. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


eix 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Connolly  v.  Scarr   (72  Iowa,  227; 

33  N.  W.  641),  1802,   1804. 
Connolly    v.    Steuniker     (22    Vict. 
L.   R.   257;    IS    Austr.    L.   T. 

60;    2   Austr.   L.    R.    [C.    N.] 
322),  360,  1134. 
Connolly  v.  Whitty    (1   Austr.   L. 

R,  "l05),  1672. 
Connors,      In     re     Temp.      Wood 

([Manitoba]  284,  993),  611. 
Conover  v.  Atlantic  City   (73  N.  J. 

L.  596;  64  Atl.  146,  reversing 

[N.  J.  L.]   6  Atl.  31),  403. 
Conover  v.  Gregson    (72  N.   J.  L. 

103;    60    Atl.    31),    415. 
Conover    v.    Mass.    Mut.    L.    Ins. 

Co.    (1    Cent.    L.    Jr.    597;    4 

Bigelow,   etc.   Ins.   Rep.    189), 

2221,  2231. 
Conrad  v.  State  (70  Miss.  733;   12 

So.  851),  1087. 
Conservative    Realty    Co.     v.     St. 

Louis  Brewing  Ass'n  ( 133  Mo. 

201;   113  S.  W.  229),  1812. 
Consumers     Brewing    Co.,    In    re 

(4  Lack.  Legg.  N.  165;  20  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  597;   7  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.  193),  536,  540. 
Consumers    Brewing    Co.    v.    Nor- 
folk   (101   Va.    171;    43   S.  E. 

336),   1196. 
Consumers    Co.    v.    Harless     (131 

Ind.  440;  29  N.  E.  1062),  243. 
Continental   Life   Ins.   Co.   v.   Tho- 

ena   (26  111.  App.  495),  2221, 

2241. 
Converse     v.     Damariscotta     Bank 

(15  Me.   433),   1058. 
Converse  v.   Foster    (32  Vt.   828), 

1807. 
Converse   v.    Railway   Co.    (2   J\Ie- 

Arthur  564),  2208. 
Convey,   In   re    (52    Iowa    197;    2 

N.  W.  1084),  2134. 
Conway  ([Pa.]  In  re,  1  Atl.  727), 

635. 
Conway  v.  Favette  Co.    (132  Iowa 

5l"0;    109    N.   W.    1074),    578 

Conwell    V.    Overmever    ( 145    Ind. 

689;  44  N.  E.  548),  601,  610. 


Conwell  V.  Sears   (65  Ohio  St.  49; 

61   N.   E.    155),  794. 
Cook    V.    Boston     (9    Allen    393), 

811. 
Cook  V.  Marshall  County   ([Iowa] 
196   U.    S.    261    [25    Sup.    Ct. 
233]),  1436. 
Cook  V.  Mercer  Co.    (51  N.   J.  L. 

85;   16  Atl.  176),  400. 
Cook  V.  Newton    (14  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

[abstract]   860),  2004. 
Cook    V.   Pennsylvania    (97    U.    S. 

566),  316,  1426. 
Cook  V.  State   (25  Fla.  698;  6  So. 

451),    1463,    1467,    1469. 

Cook    V.    Standard    Life,   etc.    Ins. 

Co.    (84  Mich.   12;   47   N.  W. 

568),  2242,  2244,  2245. 

Cook  V.  State  (46  Fla.  20;  35  So. 

665),  2038,  2062,  2068,  2084. 

Cook  V.  State  (100  Ga.  72;  25  S. 

E.   919),   1199. 
Cook  V.  State  (124  Ga.  053;  53  S. 

W.  104),  1163. 
Cook   V.   State    (81   Miss.   140,    32 

So.   312),    1300,   1602. 
Cook   V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

89  S.  W.  641),  1691. 
Cook   V.   Territory    (3   Wyo.    110; 

4  Pac.   887),   2062,   2072. 
Cook    County   v.   McCrea    (93    III. 

236),  396. 
Cooke  v.   Clayworth    (18  Ves.   Jr. 

17),  2152. 
Cooke    v.    Common    Pleas     (51    N. 

J.  L.  85;   16  Atl.  176),  558. 
Cooke   V.   Loper    (151    Ala.    546); 

44    So.    78),    559. 
Cool  V.  State   (16  Ind.  355),  1500, 

1501. 
Cooley    V.   Davis    (34    Iowa    128), 

1027. 
Cooley  V.  Port  Wardens    {II  How. 

[U.   S.]    208),  303. 
Coombe  v.  Carthew   [N.  J.  L.]   43 
Atl.    1057),   2094,   2105,   2106, 
2108. 
Coombs   v.    State    (81    Ga.   780;    8 
S.  E.  318),   1679,  1680. 


ex 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Cooper    V.    Anderson     (22    X.    Z. 

1010),  1154. 
Cooper   V.    Dickinson    (uurepjited 

English  case,  January,  1877), 

1297. 
Cooper  V.  Greenfield  (169  Ind.  14; 

81  N.  E.  56),  171. 
Cooper    V.   Hot    Springs    ( 87   Ark. 

12;    HI  S.  W.  997),  91,   192, 

4  J  5. 
Cooper  V.  Hunt   (103  ilo.  App    9; 

77  S.  W.  483),  57G,  (>■ll^,  <i45, 

646,  658,  675. 
Cooper    V.    McMuUen     (16    X.    Z. 

L.   R.   560),    1257. 
Cooper   V.   Osborne    (34   L.   T.    [X. 

S.]    347;    40   J.   V.   759),   374, 

1145,    1318. 
Cooper    V.    Shelton    (97    Ky.    282; 

30  S.  W.  623 ) ,  932,  938. 
Cooper    V.    State    (37    Ark.    412), 

1162,   1224. 
Cooper  V.   State    (88   Ga.   441;    14 

S.  E.   592),   1120,    1126. 
Cooper  V.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

65   S.   W.  916),   908. 
Cooper  V.  Turbill  ([1808]  3  Camp. 

286),  1818. 
Cope  V.  Landles  (13  T.  L.  R.  18), 

1316,    1317. 
Cope   V.    Somers   Point    (73   X.   J. 

L.  376;    64  Atl.    156),  588. 
Copeland    v.    Sheridan    ( 152    Ind. 

107;   51  X.  E.  474),  411. 
Copley  V.   Burton    (L.   R.  5   C.   P. 

489;  22  L.  T.  888;  39  L.  J.  M. 

C.    141),    1151,    1155. 
Coppen  V.  Moore   (Xo.  2   [1898]  2 

Q.   B.   306;    62   J.  P.  453;    ()7 

L.  J.  Q.  B.  689;  78  L.  T.  520; 

46    W.    R.    620;    14    T.    L.    R. 

414),    1352,    1355. 
Corbet   v.   Duncan    (63   Miss.   84), 

561,   564,   574,   674. 
Corbett   v.    Haigh     (5    C.    P.    Div 

50;  44  J.  P.  39;  42  L.  T.   [X. 

S.]   185;  28  W.  R.  430),  1145, 

1175,  1313,  1317. 
Corbett  v.  Territory    ( 1   Wash.  Tr. 

431),    395,    402. 


Corbin  v.  Houlehan  (100  Me.  246; 

61    Atl.    131),    122,    123,    193, 

1798,    1799. 
Corbin    v.    McConnell     (71    X.    H. 

350;   52  Atl.  447),  335. 
Cordes  v.   State    (37   Kan.  48;    14 

Pac.  Rep.  493),  222,  390,  1768, 
Corley  v.  State   (87  Ga.  332;   13  S. 

E.  550),   1595,   1614. 
Corman   v.   St.   Margaret's    (J.   J. 

64  J.  P.  648),  G78. 
Cornelius    v.    Holtman     (44    Xeb. 

441;    62    X.    W.    891),    1882, 

1999,   2001. 
Cornett   v.   Commonwealth     [Ky.] 

64  S.  W.  415;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

773),   1503,   1623. 
Cornwell    v.    State     (Mart.    &    Y. 

147).   2040,  2051,  2053,  2055, 

2007. 
Corson    v.    State     (57    Md.    251), 

791. 
Cortland  v.  Howard  ( 1  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.     131;     37    X.    Y.    Supp. 

843),  1476. 
Cory  V.  Cory  (1  Ves.  Sr.  19),  2099, 

2103,  2115,  2129. 
Cory  V.  Plymouth  Breweries  Lim- 
'ited,  C.  A.   [July  24,   1906]), 

1823. 
Cost  V.  State   (96  Ala.  60;   11  So. 

435),    1474,    1493,    1532. 
Costello  V.  Keeler    (20  R.  I.  298; 

38  Atl.  927),  703. 
Costello   V.    State    (130   Ala.    143; 

30    So.   376),   964,   973,    1698, 

1699. 
Cotant   V.   Hobson    (98   Iowa   318; 

67  X.  W.  255),   1002. 
Corthell   v.   Holmer    (87    Me.    24; 

32  Atl.   715),  986. 
Cotter    V.    Cooper     (15    X.    J.    L. 

R.    186),    1701. 
Cotterill    v.   Lempriere    (24    Q.    B. 

Div.  634;  59  L.  J.  M.  C.  133; 

54  J.  P.  583),  1540. 
Cottle   V.    Cleavesi    (70   Me.    250), 

1807. 
Cotton  V.  State    (62  Ark.  585;    37 

S.  W.  48),  946. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXI 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Cotton    V.    State    ([Tex.]    120    S. 

W.  432),  844,  965,  1191,  1714. 

Cottonwood    V.    H.    M.    Austin    & 

Co.    {[La.]   48   So.  345),   176. 

Couchman  v.  Prather  (161  Ind. 

25U;  70  N.  E.  240),  1893, 

1894. 

Coulbert   v.   Troke    (1    Q.   B.   Div. 

1 ;   40  J.  P.  533 ;   45  L.  J-  M. 

C.  7;  33  L.  T.  340;  24  W.  P. 

41),   1151. 

Coulson,  Ex  parte  (33  N.  B.  341; 

1  Can.  Cr.  Cas.  31),   1346. 
Coulson  V.  Harris   (43  Miss.  728), 

183. 
Coulter  V.  Portland    (20  Ore.  469; 

26  Pac.  565),  1162. 
Coulterville    v.    Gillam      (72     111. 
599),  395,  402,  420,  430,  443. 
County  of  Cass  v.  Johnson   (95  U. 

S.   360),   904. 
County  of  Kossuth  v.  Wallace   (60 
Iowa,    508;     15    N.    W.    305), 
225. 
County  of  Mobile  v.  Kimball   ( 102 

U.  S.  691),  156. 
Coursey  v.  Coursey   (60  111.   186), 

2167. 
Courtright  v.  Newaygo    (96  Mich. 
290;  55  N.  W.  808),  484,  761, 
763,   764. 
Cousineau  v.  Slate    (10  Mo.  501), 

1502,  1541. 
Cousins  V.  State  (46  Tex.  Cr.  A"p. 
87;  79  S.  VV.  549),  1481,  1495, 
1498,   1714. 
Covel  V.  Heyman   (111  U.  S.  176, 

4  Sup.  Ct.  355),  1012. 
Coverdale   v.    Edwards    (155    Ind. 

374;   58  N.  E.  495),  106. 
Coverdale  v.  State    (60  Ind.  307), 

1518. 
Covert  V.  Munson   (93  Mich.  603; 

53  N.  W.  733).  869,  878. 
Covey,  Ex  parte  (21  Low.  Can.  Jr. 

182),    168. 
Covington  v.  Lee   ( [Ky.]  89  S.  W. 
493;    28    Ky.    L.    Rep.    492), 
2186. 


Covington   v.    State    (51   Tex.   Cr. 
App.    48;     100    S.    W.    368), 
917,  1465,  1473,  1696,  1706. 
Cowap  v.   Atherton    ([1893]    1   Q. 
B.  49;    68  L.  T.  88;   57  J.  P. 
8;    41   W.   R.    158;    5   R.  86), 
1150. 
Cowert,    Ex    parte    (92    Ala.    94; 
9  So.  225),  169,  232,  402,  447, 
474. 
Cowdery  v.  State  (71  Kan.  450;  80 

Pac.    953),   975,   996,   2257. 
Cowles,  In  re  (34  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
447;  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  756),  581, 
586. 
Cowles  V.  Gale    (L.   R.   7  Ch.  12; 
41    L.    J.    Ch.    14;    25    L.    T. 
524;  20  W.  R.  70),  678,  700, 
1830. 
Cowley  V.  Rushville,  60  Ind.  327), 

413. 
Cox,  Ex  parte  (19  Ark.  688),  573, 

576. 
Cox,  Ex  parte  (28  Tex.  App.  537; 

13  S.  W.  862),  933. 
Cox   V.    Burnham    ( 120    Iowa   43 ; 
94  N.  VV.  265),  295,  296,  616. 
Cox  V.  Common  Council  ( 152  Mich. 
630;     116    N.    W.    456),    648, 
650,  651. 
Cox   V.   Jackson    (152   Mich.    630; 
116  N.  W.  456),  627,  714,  727, 
734. 
Cox  V.  Newkirk    (73  Iowa  42;   34 
N.  W.  492),  1846,  1912,  1916, 
1931. 
Cox  V.  State    ([Miss.]   3  So.  373), 

1230. 
Cox    V.    State    ( [Okla.]     104    Pac. 

1074),   1907. 
Cox  V.  State  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  85 

S.  W.  1199),  562. 
Cox  V.   State    (202  U.  S.  446;    26 
Sup.  Ct.   71;   50  L.  Ed.   1099, 
affirming    37    Tex.    Civ.    App. 
607;   85  S.  W.  34),  159. 
Cox  V.  Thompson  (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

73  S.  W.  950),  771,  772. 
Cox    v.    Thompson    (32    Tex.    Civ. 
App.  572;  75  S.  W.  819),  772. 


CXll 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


[References  are   to  pages.] 


Cox  V.  Thompson  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App] 

85  S.  W.  34),  562. 
Coxfield  V.  Coryell   (4  Wash.  C.  C. 

371),  311.' 
Coyne,  In  re    (9   Upp.   Can.  44S), 

687. 
Crabb   v.    State    (47    Fla.   24;    30 

So.  169),  268,  1322. 
Crabb  v.  State   (88  Ga.  584),  291, 

931,  1281,   1283,   1727. 
Crabtree  v.  Hale    (43  J.  P.  499), 

376. 
Crabtree    v.    Reed    (50    111.    20G), 

1974. 
Crabtree    v.    State     (30    Ohio    St. 

382),   1633,   1752. 
Craddick    v.    State     (48    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  385;  88  S.  W.  347),  958. 
Craddock   v.   State    (18   Tex.  App. 

567).  395,  448,  1307. 
Craft,    In  re    (17    Ont.   App.   21), 

902. 
Craig   V.    Boyan    ([1901]    2    Irish 

Rep.  429) ,  369,  374. 
Craig  V.   Burnett    (32   Ala.   728), 

444,  447. 
Craig  V.  Fenn    (1  C.  &  M.  43;   il 

E.  C.  L.  29),  2244. 
Craig  V.  Hasselman   (  74  Iowa  538 ; 

.38  X.   W.   402),  985,   991. 
Craig    V.    ]\IcPhee     (10    Ct.    Sess. 

Cas.    [4th    series]    51;    48    J. 

P.  115),  353. 
Craig  V.  Plunkett    (82  Iowa  474; 

48  N.  W.  984),  993. 
Craig    V.    Smith     (31    Mo.    App.), 

799. 
Craig  V.   Werthmueller    ( 78   Iowa 

598;   43  N.  W.  606),  70,  148, 

153,  255,  258,  978,  1004,  1074. 
Craigellacliie      Distilling      Co.      v. 

Bigelow    (36   Nov.   Sco.   482), 

1786,   1787,   1788. 
Cramer,  In  re    (23  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

596),  635. 
Cramer    v.    Burlington     (42    Iowa 

315),   1946,  2171,  2177.  2186, 

2190. 


Cramer    v.    Danielson     (99    Mich. 

531;    58    N.    W.     476),     224, 

1840,   1965. 
Crampton    v.    Starr    (24    Vict.    L. 

R.    537;    5    Austr.   L.    R.    2), 

1359. 
Crampton  v.  State    (37  Ark.  108), 

1237,    1239. 
Crane   v.    Camp    (12    Conn.    463), 

1014. 
Crane  v.  Conklin  ( 1  N.  J.  Eq.  346; 

22  Am.  Dec.  519),  2094,  2099, 

2102,   2108,   2128,   2129,   2130. 
Crane  v.  Hunt  (26  Ont.  Rep.  641), 

1915. 
Cranfield    v.    State     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    397;    92    S.     W.     846), 

1131,  1481. 
Cranor   v.   Albany    (43    Ore.    144; 

71  Pac.  1042),  460,  945,  1446. 
Craven    v.    Craven     ( 1    Rev.    Leg. 

508),  2155. 
Cravens   v.   Adair   Co.   Ct.    ( [Ky.] 

17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  71;   30  S.  W. 

414),  563. 
Craw  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (20 

Fed.   87),   2198,  2199. 
Crawford,    In    re    (33    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  338),  619. 
Crawford  v.  State    (69   Ark.  360; 

63  S.  W.  801),  973. 
Crawford  v.   State    (155  Ind.  592; 

57  N.   E.   931),    1509. 
Crawford  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

58  S.  W.  1006),  1217. 
Crawford  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

76  S.  W.  576)     1187. 
Crawford  v.  State,  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

89   S.  W.   1079),   1311. 
Crawford  Co.  v.  Laub    (110  Iowa, 

355;    81    X.   W.   590)  ;    806. 
Crawfordsville    v.    Lutz,    109    Ind. 

466;   10  N.  E.  411),  397. 
Crawley  v.  Christensen   (137  U.  S. 

86*;   11  Sup.  Ct.  13),  102,  103. 
Crawley    v.    Commonwealth     ( 123 

Pa.  275;    16  Atl.  416;    23  W. 

N.  C.  148),  767. 


TABLE  OP  CASES. 


cxni 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Creasy   v.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

76  S.  W.  50!);  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

893),  1215. 
Creaton  v.  Savory   ([1879]   10  Ch. 

D.  736),  1833. 
Creek  v.  State  (24  Ind.  151),  2346, 

2248,  2249,  2250. 
Creekmore        v.        Commonwealth 

([Ky.]   12  S.  W.  628;   11  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  566),  249,  1268. 
Creekmore    v.    Commonwealth,    1 1 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  813),  662. 
Creel  v.  Cordon  (44  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

367;    98    S.    W.    387),    1241, 

1242. 
Creighton  v.  People  (36  Colo.  315; 

83  Pac.  1057),  1345. 
Crescent  Liquor  Co.  v.  Piatt   ( 148 

Fed.  894),  307,  324,  325,  326, 

335,   1289. 
Cress,  In  re    (15   Manitoba   528), 

896. 
Cress    V.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

37  S.  W.  493;   18  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

633),  866,  910,  918,  1467. 
Crestin  v.  Viroqua    (67  Wis.  314; 

30  N,  W.  515),  795. 
Crew  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.    (20 

Fed.  87),  2191. 
Crew  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Crim.  Rep.] 

23  S.  W.  14),  2040. 
Cribb  V.   State    (118   Ga.   316;    45 

S.  E.  396),  2038,  2044. 
Crichton  v.  Crichton    (73  Wis.  59; 

40  N.  W.  638),  2161,  2167. 
Crigler   v.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

83    S.    W.    587),    1465,    1470, 

1680. 
Crigler  v.  Commonwealth  ( 120  Ky. 

512;  87  S.  W.  276;  27  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   918;    87    S.   W.   280;    27 

Ky.    L.    Rep.    925,    927,    281), 

325,  932,  959. 
Cripe  v.   State    (4   Ga.   App.   832; 

62  S.  E.  567), 1696. 
Crittenden    v.    Lingel    (14    0.    St. 

182;   84  Am.  Dec.  370),   1027. 
Croak  v.  Cowan    (64  N.   C.   743), 

1280. 


Crocker  v.  Moore  (140  N.  C.  429; 

53  S.  E.  229),  382. 
Crocker  v.  State  (49  Ark.  60;  4 

S.  W.  Rep.  197),  389. 
Crockett  v.  State  ( 45  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

173;  49  S.  W.  392),  1684, 

1688. 
Croell  v.  State   (25  Tex.  App.  755; 

9  S.  W^  68,  reversing  25  Tex. 

App.  596;  8  S.  W.  816),  1125. 
Crofton  V.  State  (25  Ohio  St.  249) , 

389. 
Crofts   V.    Taylor    (19   Q.    B.   Div. 

•524;    51   J.   P.   782;   56   L.  J. 

M.  C.   137;   57  L.  T.  310;   36 

W.   R.   47),    1383. 
Croix   V.   Fairfield   Co.    (50   Conn. 

321;  47  Am.  Rep.  648),  714. 
Croker  v.   Board    (  [N.  J.  Ch.]    63 

Atl.  901),  452,  453,  467,  468, 

469. 
Cromwell  v.  Dwings   (7  Har.  &  J. 

([Md.]  55),  1027. 
Cromwell    v.     Stephens      (3      Abb. 

Prac.    [N.   S.]    26),  544. 
Cronin     v.     Adams      ( 192     U.     S. 

108;    48   L.   ed.    365;    24   Sup. 

Ct.  219,  affirming  29  Colo.  488, 

503;    69    Pac.    500,    1125;    48 

L.  ed.  368;   24  Sup.  Ct.  220), 

147,  464,  465. 
Cronin  v.  Denver   (192  U.  S.  115; 

24  Sup.  Ct.  22;  48  L.  ed.  368), 

466. 
Cronin  v.  People    (82  N.  Y.  318), 

437. 
Cronin   v.    Sharp    ( 16    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.   76),   697,   699. 
Cronin    v.     Stoddard     (99    N.    Y. 

271),  682,  684,  687. 
Croom    V.     State     (25    Tex.    App. 

556;  8  S.  W.  661),  1464,  1471. 
Croone,  In  re    (6  Ont.  Rep.   188), 

468. 
Croot    V.    Board     (20    Colo.    App. 

254;    78  Pac.  313),  674. 
■Crosby  v.  People   (137  111.  325;  27 

N.  E.  49),  2041,  2075. 
Crosby    v.    Snow     (16    Me.    121), 

767. 


CXIV 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Cross  V.  Commonwealth   (  [Ky.]  56 

S.  W.  981),  1269. 
Cross  V.  People  (66  111.  App.  170), 

73,    1597. 
Cross  V.   State    ([Ark.]    87    S.  W. 

1026),  1268. 
Cross  V.  State    (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

437;   94  S.  W.  1015),  1629. 
Cross  V.  State    (55   Wis.  261;    12 

N.  W.  425),  2056,  2075. 
Cross  V.  Watts   ( 13  C.  B.   [N.  S.] 

239;  27  J.  P.  7;  32  L.J.  M.  C. 

73;    7    L.    T.    463;    11    W.   R. 

210),   692,    1294. 
Crossman   v.   Lurmaii    ( 192   U.   S. 

189),  1438. 
Crotliers  v.  Monteith  ( 1 1  Manitoba 

373;    Young  v.   Blaisdell,   138 

Mass.  344),  499,  526,  715,  739, 

740. 
Crotty  V.  People   (3  Bradw.  465), 

650. 
Grouse  v.  Commonwealth    (87  Pa. 

168),  767. 
Crouse    v.    State     (57    Md.    327), 

1646,  1682. 
Crow  V.  State   ( [Tex.  Crim.  App.] 

23  S.  W.  14),  2076. 
Crowder  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

49  S.  W.  375),  1680,  1681, 
Crowley    v.    Commonwealth     (123 

Pa.  275;    16  Atl.  416;   23  W. 

N.  C.  148),  758. 
Crowley  v.  Crowley    ( [Ky.]   40  S. 

W.  380),  3153. 
Crowley  v.  Christensen   (137  U.  S. 

86;  34  L.  ed.  620;   11  Sup.  Ct. 

Rep.    13),    91,    99,    110,    138, 

147,    148,   149,    163,    191,   206, 

208. 
Crown   Point   v.   W'arner    (3    Hill 

150),  104,  550. 
Croxton    v.     Truesdale    (75    S.    C. 

418;  56  S.  E.  45),  476. 
Croy  V.   Busenbark    (72   Ind.  48), 

605. 
Cruse   V.   Aden    (127    III.   231;    20 

N.   E.   73;    3   L.    R.   A.   327), 

1838,   1909. 
Cuirczak    v.    Keron     ( [N.    J,    L.] 

70  Atl.  366),  719,  739. 


Cullen   V.   Ware    (3   Austr.  L.   R. 

[C.  N.]  65),  367. 
CuUinan,   In  re    (73   N.   E.    1122; 

181  N.  Y.  527,  530),  745. 
Culler    V.    State     (42    Conn.    55), 

492. 
Cullinan,  In  re    (185   N.   Y.   546; 

77   N.   E.    1184,   affirming   104 

N.   Y.   App.   Div.   205;    93   N. 

Y.  Supp.  492),  733. 
Cullinan,   In   re    (68   N.    Y.   App. 

Div.  119;  74  N.  Y.  Supp.  182), 

719,  741,  1130. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (75    N.   Y.   App. 

Div.  301;  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  118), 

719,   1130. 
Cullinan,   In   re    (76   N.    Y.   App. 

Div.  362;  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  466; 

12    N.    Y.   Ann.    Cas.    68;    af- 
firmed   173  N.  Y.   610;    66  N. 

E.   1106),  738. 
Cullinan,    In  re    (82   N.    Y.   App. 

Div.  445;  81  N.  Y.  Supp.  567; 

40  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  423 ;  82  N. 
Y.  Supp.  337),  282,  1579. 

Cullinan,   hi   re    (85    N.    Y.    App. 

Div.  620,  621;   83  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  643;  82  N.  Y.  Sup.  1098, 

affirming  39  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

636;     80    N.    Y.    Supp.    607), 

721. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (87    N.    Y.    App. 

Div.  47;  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  1025), 

732,  747,  752. 
Cullinan,    In   re    (88    N.   Y,    App. 

Div.  6;   84  N.  Y.  Supp.  492), 

721. 
Cullinan,    In   re    (89    N.   Y.   App. 

Div.    613;     85    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1129,  affirming  41  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    392;     84    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1075),  738,  739. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (90    N.   Y.   App. 

Div.    607;     86    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1046),    1129. 
Cullinan,   In   re    (93    N.    Y    App. 

Div.  427;  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  660; 

41  N.    Y.    Misc.    Rep.    3;    83 
N.  Y.  Supp.  581),  1310,  1312. 


TABLE  OP  CASES. 


cxv 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Cullinan,   In  re    (94  N,    Y.   App. 

Div.  445;  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  164), 

737,  1129,   1297,   1579. 
Cullinan   v.   O'Connor    (100  N.   Y. 

App.  Div.  142;  91  N.  Y.  Supp. 

628),   1312. 
Cullinan,  In  re    ( 109   N.   Y.   App. 

Div.  816;  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  751; 

order  [1904]  89  N.  Y.  S.  083; 

97    App.    Div.     122,    630,    af- 
firmed), 745. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (39   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    354;     79    N.    Y.    Supp. 

840),   738,  743. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (39   N.   Y.   JNIisc. 

Rep.    558;     79    N.     Y.     Supp. 

582),  746. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (39   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    646;    80    N.     Y.     Supp. 

626),   730,  743. 
Cullinan,.  In  re    (40   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.  423 ;  82  N.  Y.  Supp.  337 ) , 

738. 
Cullinan,   In   re    (41   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.  3;    S3  N.  Y.  Supp.  581; 

affirmed   93   N.   Y.   App.    Div. 

427;    87    N.    Y.    Supp.    600), 

1183,  1312 
Cullinan,   In   re    (41    N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.     392;     84    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1075;   affirmed  89  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    613;    85    N.     Y.     Supp. 

1129),   743. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (41    N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.  583;   83  K  Y.  Supp.  9), 

743. 
Cullinan,   In  re    (45   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep. 497 ;  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  802 ; 

90  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  607 :  86  N. 

Y.    Supp.     1046),     718,     742, 

1312. 
Cullinan  v.  Bowker  (88  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  170;  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  696, 

reversing  40  Misc.   Rep.   439 ; 

82  N.  Y.  Supp.  707),  759. 
Cullinan   v.   Burkhard    (93   N.   Y. 

App.  Div.  31;  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1003,  reversing  41  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  321 ;  84  N.  Y.  Supp. 825), 

754,  756,  767,  709,  778,  784. 


Cullinan  v.  Criterion  Club   (39  N. 

Y.   Misc.   Rep.   270;    79   N.   Y. 

App.   482),    1343. 
Cullinan  v.  Devito   (IN.  Y.]  99  N. 

Y.  Supp.  970),  750. 
Cullinan  v.   Fidelity,  etc.   Co.    (41 

N.  Y.  Misc.   Rep.   119;   83  X. 

Y.  Supp.  969),  761,  782. 
Cullinan  v.   Fidelity,  etc.  Co.    (84 

N.    Y.   App.    Div.   292;    82    N. 

Y.  Supp.  695;  affirmed,  177  N. 

Y.  574;   69  N.  E.  1122),  769. 
Cullinan   v.  Garfinkle    (114  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  509 ;  99  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1119),    1160,    1202. 
Cullinan  v.  Horan  ( 116  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    711 J    102    N.    Y.    Supp. 

132),  783. 
Cullinan    v.    Hosmer    (100    N.    Y. 

App.  Div.  148;  91  N.  Y.  Supp, 

607),   1754. 
Cullinan  v.  Kuch   (177  N.  Y.  303; 

69  N.  E.  597;  affirming  84  X. 

Y.   App.   Div.   642;    82   N.   Y. 

Supp.   1098),  698,  736,  776. 
Cullinan   v.   McGovern    (94  N.   Y. 

Supp.  525),  964,  1710. 
Cullinan  v.   O'Connor    (100  N.   Y. 

App.  Div.  142;  91  N.  Y.  Supp. 

628),   765,  780,   1183,   1313. 
Cullinan  v.  Parker  (177  N.  Y.  573; 

69  N.  E.  1122;  affirming  84  N, 

Y.   App.    Div.    296;    82   K    Y. 

Supp.  827 ;  affirming  39  N.  Y. 

Misc.  Rep.  446;  80  X.  Y.  187), 

776,  783. 
Cullinan  v.  Quinn   (95  X'^.  Y.  App. 

Div.    429;     88    X.     Y.     Supp. 

963),  783. 
Cullinan    v.    Sabating    (49    X.    Y. 

Misc.  Rep.  442;  99  X.  Y.  Supp. 

977),  745. 
Cullinan   v.   Trolley   Club    (65    N. 

Y.   App.    Div.  "^202 ;    72   N.   Y. 

Supp.  629),   1129,  1188,  1310, 

1344. 
Culver   V.    People    (11    Mich.   43), 

787. 
Cummings  v.  Henry  (10  Ind.  109), 

2092,   2116. 


CXVl 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[Ttefcrences  are  to  pages.] 


Cundy  v.  LeCocq    (13  Q.  B.   Div. 

207;  48  J.  P.  599;  53  L.  J.  M. 

C.  125;    51   L.  T.  265;    32  W. 

R.  769),  361,  1251. 
Cunningham,  In  re  (21  Can.  Prac. 

459),  938. 
Cunningham    v.    Berry     ( 17     Ore. 

622;    22   Pac.    115),    1477. 
Cunningham  v.  Buekey  ( 42  W.  Va. 

671;  26  S.  E.  442;  35  L.  R.  A. 

850),  2187. 
Cunningliam    v.    Davis     ( 105    Ga. 

676;  31  S.  E.  585),  1165. 
Cunningham  v.   Gaynor    ( 87   Iowa 

449;  54  N.  W.'248),  997. 
Cunningham    v.    Griffin    ( 107    Ga. 

690;  33  S.  E.  664),  452. 
Cunningham   v.   Porchet    (23   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  80;   56  S.  W.  574), 

365,  768,  783. 
Cunningham    v.    State     ( 105     Ga. 

676;     31     S.    E.    585),    1378, 

1493,  1615. 
Cunningham  v.  State  (52  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  522;  108  S.  W.  678),  87. 
Curd    v.    Commonwealth     ( 14    B. 

Mon.  386),  508,  1192. 
Cur  lee.    Ex    parte     (51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    614;     103    S.    W.    896), 

874,  939. 
Curlee  v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

101  S.  W.   1197),  1473. 
Cure   V.    Feuehter    Bros.     ( 54    111. 

App.    112;     affirmed    159    111. 

155;  42  N.  E.  308),  194. 
Curran  v.  Percival    (21  Xeb.  434; 

32    N.    W.    213),    1873,    1948, 

1957. 
Currant  v.  Percival   (21  Neb.  434; 

32  N.  W.  213),  1994. 
Current  v.  Commonwealth   ( 1 1  Kj' . 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]    764),  952. 
Currie  v.  Lamb  ( 17  Rev.  Leg.  251 ) , 

1267. 
Currier  v.  Elliott    (141  Ind.  394), 

280. 
Currier  v.  McKee  (99  Me.  364;  59 

A.    442),    1843,     1865,     1866, 

1867,  1999,  2001. 


Curry  v.  Commonwealth   (2  Bush, 

67),  2041,  2060. 
Curry  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  475; 

13  S.  W.  752),  505,  893,  920. 
Curry    v.    State     (35    Tex.    364), 

1639. 
Curry    v.    Tarvas    Tp.     (81    Mich. 

355;  45  N.  W.  831),  813. 
Curtin,  In  re    (19  Vict.  L.  R.  12; 

14  Austr.  L.  T.  228),  594. 
Curtin  v.  Atkinson   (36  Neb.  110; 

54  N.  W.  131),  1847,  1890. 
Curtis,  In  re  (173  Pa.  27;  34  Atl. 

214),  665. 
Curtis    V.    Hall      (4     N.    J.    Law 

[1     Southard]     412     [1832]), 
2093,  2100,  2101. 
Curtis   V.   Kirkpatrick     (9     Idaho 

629;  75  Pac.  760),  2105. 
Curtis  V.  March   (23  J.  P.  033;  3 

H.  &  N.   866;    28  L.  J.  Exch. 

36),  1156. 
Curtis  V.  State   (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

606;  108  S.  W.  380),  87,1285, 

1689. 
Curtz  V.  State    (4  Ind.  385),  762. 
Cuthbert  v.  Conley    (32  Ga.  211), 

448,  496,  521. 


Dale  V.  Irvin  (78  111.  170),  894 
Dale  V.  State  (27  Ala.  31),  370. 
D'Amato,  Appeal  of  (SO  Conn.  357; 

68    Atl.    445),    534,    530,    638, 

639,  644,  705,  706. 
Dahlaun    v.    Gaugeiste     (238     111. 

222;     88    N.    E.    287),    2095, 

2099,  2108. 
Dahmer  v.  State    (56  Miss.   787), 

1622,   1639. 
Dallas    Brewing    Co.     v.     Holmes 

([Tex.   Civ.  App.]    112   S.   W. 

122),  80,  83,  1789,  1790. 
Dalley  v.  Phillips  &  Marriott,  Lim- 
ited  ([1901]   18  T.  L.  R.  18), 

1822. 


TABLE  OF   CASES, 


CXVll 


[Heforences  are  to  pages.] 


Dallimore  v.  Fulton  (78  L.  T.  469; 

62  J.  P.  423;  10  Cox  C.  C.  31), 

363. 
Dallimore  v.  Sutton  (62  J.  T.  423; 

78  L.  T.  469 ) ,  2028,  202!). 
Dallis  V.  Griffin    (117  Ga.  408;   43 

S.   E.  758),  382. 
Dalryniple  v.  State    (26  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  Rep.  562),  869,  872,  1531, 

1759. 
Dalton,  Ex  parte   (27  N.  B.  426), 

938. 
Dalton  V.  Bowden   (23  N.  Y.  165), 

1176. 
Daly   V.   Hinz    (113   Cal.   366;    45 

Pac.  693),  2195. 
Daly  V.  State   (33  Ala.  431),  1290, 

1296. 
Dames  v.   Bonds    (55   J.   P.   503), 

1149. 
Dammeree's  Case  (15  How.  St.  Tr. 

522),  2039. 
Danaher,  Ex  parte   (27  N.  B.  554; 

17  N.  B.  44),  620. 
Dane  v.   State    (30  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

84;  35  S.  W.  661),  1611. 
Danford  v.  Taylor   (20  L.  T.  483; 

33  J.  P.  612),  373. 
Daniel  v.  State    (149  Ala.  44;   43 

So.    22),    83,    87,    964,    1359, 

1491,  1493,  1704. 
Daniel  v.  State   (32  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

16;  21  S.  W.  68),  911. 
Daniels,    In   re    (8    Hawaii    746), 

1779,   1798. 
Daniels  v.   Burford    (10  Up.   Can. 

478),  453. 
Daniels    v.    Grayson    College     (20 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  562;   50  S.  W. 

205),  767,  777,   1245. 
Daniels  v.  People    (6   Mich.   381), 

1014. 
Daniels  v.  State   (150  Ind.  438;  50 

K  E.  74),   144,  280. 
Danner  v.  Hotz    (74  Iowa  389;  37 

N.  W.  969),  987,  998. 
Danrel,  In  re    (31   Pa.   Super   Ct. 

156),  696,  705. 


Dansey  v.   State    (23   Fla.   316;    2 

So.  692),  1491,  1505,  1111, 

1533,  1552,  1650. 
Dant  V.  State  (83  Ind.  GO),  13, 

1200,  1587,  1598,  1618,  1622, 

1637,  1700,  1701. 
Danville  v.  Hatcher  (101  Va.  523; 

44  S.  E.  727),  91,  99,  148, 

149. 
Darbourne    v.    Oberlin     (121     La. 

641;   46  So.  679),  920. 
Darby    v.    Cabanne     ( 1    Mo.    App. 

126),  2109. 
Darling  v.  Boesch    (67   Iowa  702; 

25  N.  W.  887),  573,  576,  607, 

676,  944. 
Darling  v.   Kogers    (7   Kan.   592), 

228. 
Darling    v.    St.    Paul     (19    Minn. 

389),    405,   420. 
Darr  v.  Howard  (6  Ark.  641),  270. 
Darrach's  Appeal  (62  Pa.  St.  491 ) , 

793. 
Darst  v.  People  (51  111.  286;  2  Am. 

Rep.  301),  256,  1013. 
Darter  v.  Earl  (3  Gray  489),  1795, 

1797. 
Dartford  Brewing  Co.,  Limited  v. 

Till    ([1906]   70  J.  P.  519;  95 

L.  T.  836;    22  T.  L.  R.  792), 

623,   1826. 
Dash  v.  United  States  Express  Co. 

([lowal   99  N.  W.  298),  998. 
Dater  v.  Earl   (3  Gray  482),  1790, 

1801. 
Daughter,  In  re  (27  Vt.  325),  110, 

1748. 
Davanney  v.   Hanson    (60   W.  Va. 

3;  53  S.  E.  603),  576. 
Davenport  v.  Bird   (34  Iowa  524), 

271. 
Davenport  v.   Kelly    (7   Iowa   103; 

Burlington  v.  — ;    18   la.  59), 

448. 
Davey  v.  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.    (38 

Fed.  650),  2245. 
David    V.    Hardin    Co.    ( 104    Iowa 

204;  73  N.  W.  576),  797,  805. 


CXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


David  Mayer  Brewing  Co.  v.  Mack 

(59    N.    Y.    Misc.    Rep.    202; 

110    N.    Y.    Supp.    245),    697, 

699,  703. 
Davidge  v.  Crandall    (23  III.  App. 

360),  2099. 
Davidson  v.   State    (27   Tex.   App. 

262;  11  S.  W.  371),  513,  1372, 

1759. 
Davidson    v.    State     (44    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  586;  73  S.  W.  SOS),  878, 

1285. 
Davies  v.  Burnett   (71  L.  J.  K.  B. 

355    [1902];    1   K.  B.  666;   86 

L.  T.  565;    50  W.  R.  391;   66 

J.  P.  406),  1332. 
Davis,  Ejo  parte   (2  H.  &  N.  149; 

26  L.  J.  M.  C.   178;   5  W.  R. 
522;  21  J.  P.  280),  1301. 

Davis  V.  Affleck    (34  Ind.  572;   73 

N.  E.  283),  606,  610,  611,  612. 
Davis   V.    Auld    (96    Mo.    559;    53 

Atl.  118),  976,  991,  1000. 
Davis  V.  Board    (7  Cal.  App.  571; 

95   Pac.    170),    611. 
Davis  V.   Borland    ([Neb.]    119   JJ. 

W.   454),    1955,    1973. 
Davis   V.   Bronsou    (6   Iowa   410), 

1790. 
Davis  V.  Burnett    (71  L.  J.  K.  B. 

355    [1902];    1  K.  B.  666;    86 

L.  T.  565;    50  W.  R.  391;   66 

J.  P.  406),  690,   1347. 
Davis  V.  Commonwealth  (82  S.  W. 

277;    26    Ky.    L.    Rep.    597), 

1194. 
Davis  V.  Dashiel    (62  X.  C.   114), 

313. 
Davis  V.  Evans    (62  J.  P.  120;   77 

L.  T.  088;    14  T.  L.  R.   163), 

710. 
Davis    V.    Fasig     (128    Ind.    271; 

27  N.  E.  726),  166,  1315,  1457. 
Davis  V.  Henderson    (127   Ky.   13; 

104    S.    W.    1009;    31    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    1252),   853,  859. 
Davies  v.  McKniglit  ( 146  Pa.  610; 

23  A.  320),   1891,   1999,  2001. 
Davis   V.    Oregon,   etc.    R.    Co.    (8 

Ore.  172),  2177. 


Davis  V.  Patterson  ( 12  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  479),  801. 
Davis  V.  People   ( 19  111.  [9  Peck.] 

74),  2247. 
Davis    V.    Slater    (17    Iowa    250), 

1784. 
Davis  v.  Standish  (26  Hun  [N.  Y.] 

608),    1869,    1871,   1873,    1984, 

1985,   1988. 
Davis    v.    State     (4    Stew.     &     P. 

[Ala.]   83),  521,  523. 
Davis  V.  State    (145  Ala.  247;   40 

So.  663),  382. 
Davis   V.    State    (152   Ala.   86;    44 

So.   561),    2038. 
Davis  V.  State  ( [Ala.]  o:i  So.  561), 

2070. 
Davis  V.  State    (50  Ark.  17;   6  Z. 

W.   388),   53,   969,   970,   144G. 
Davis  V.   State    (105   Ga.   783;   32 

S.  E.  130),  1651. 
Davis  V.   State    (4  Ga.  App.  274; 

61  S.  E.  132),  1599. 
Davis   V.    State    (35    Ind.    496;    9 

Am.    Rep.    760),    2247,    2250. 
Davis    V.    State     (100    Ind.     154), 

1444,  1446. 
Davis  V.   State    (7  Md.   151),  294. 
Davis  V.  State    (25  Ohio  St.  369), 

2063,    2067,    2072. 
Davis  V.  State   (2  Tex.  App.  425), 

397,  402. 
Davis  V.  State    (36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

393;     37    S.    W.    435),    964, 

1699. 
Davis    V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

107   S.  W.  832,  839),  958. 
Davis  V.  State    (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

373;    109  S.  W.  938),   1186. 
Davis  V.  Stephenson  (24  Q.  B.  Div. 

529 ;  54  J.  P.  565 ;  59  L.  J.  M. 

C.  73;  62  L.  T.  436;  38  W.  R. 

492),  379. 
Davis    v.    Wentworth     (17    N.    H. 

567),   1783. 
Davis  Hotel  Co.  v.  Piatt   (172  Fed. 

175),  ,338. 
Dawson  v.  State    (16  Ind.  428;   79 

Am.  Dec.  439 ) ,  2080. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CXIX 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Dawson  v.  Dawson    (23  Mo.  App. 

169),   63,   68,   2154,   2164. 
Dawson    v.    State    (25    Tex.    App. 

670;    8  S.  W.  820),  492,  929, 

941. 
Dawson  v.  State  ( 55  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

315;   117  S.  W.  136),  1651. 
Day,  In  re  (38  Up.  Can.  528),  914. 
Day,   Ex  parte    (15   X.   S.   W.   L. 

R.  420),  537. 
Day   V.   Frank    (127    :\lass.    497), 

784. 
Day  V.  Luhke   ([1868]  L.  R.  5  Eq. 

336;  37  L.  J.  Ch.  330;    16  W. 

R.  719;  32  J.  P.  499),  1830. 
Daykin  v.  Pr.rker   ([1894]  2  Q.  B. 

273,  556;   58  J.  P.  835;   67  L. 

J.  II.   C.   246;    71   L.  T.   379; 

42  W.  R.  625),  680. 
Dayton  v.   Quigley    (29   X.   J.   Eq. 

77),  408. 
Daxanbeklar    v.    People     (93    111. 

App.   553),    1481,    1184,    1551. 
Deadwiller    v.    State     ([Tex.    Civ. 

App.]     121    S.    W.    864),    44, 

965,   1751. 
Dcakia  v.  Deakin    (33  J.  P.  805), 

2169. 
Deal  V.   Schofield    (L.   R.  3   Q.   B. 

8;   32  J.  P.   181;   27  L.  J.  M. 

C.    15;    17   L.   T.    143;    IG   W. 

R.  77;   8  B.  &  S.  760),  1294. 
Deal  V.  Singletory    (105  Ga.   466; 

30  S.  E.  765),   172,   175,   176, 

259,  659. 
De  Albert  v.  State    (34  Tex.  Crim. 

Rep.  508;  31  S.  W.  391),  2051, 

2052,  2089. 
Deammon  v.  Blackburn    ( 1   Sneed. 

([Tenn.]    390;     60    Am.    Doc. 

160),   1027. 
Dean  v.   State    (100  Ala.    102;    14 

So.  762),  1524. 
Dean  v.   State    (49   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

249 ;  92  S.  W.  38 ) ,  929,  1343, 

1379,   1381. 
Dean  v.   Wilmington,   etc.    R.   Co. 
(107    N.    C.    686;     12    S.    E. 

77),   217«,   2179,    2183,    2198. 


Dearborn   v.    Iloit    (41    Me.    120), 

1800. 
Dearen  v.  Taylor  Co.  (98  Ky.  135; 

32  S.  W.  402),  553,  933. 
DeArmon  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

97  S.  W.  479),  1651. 
Deberry  v.  Holly  Springs  (35  Miss. 

385),   676. 
DeBlanc   v.   Xew   Iberia    ( 106   La. 

680;  31  So.  311),  981. 
DeBois  V.  State  (34  Ark.  381),  135 

247,  424. 
Decamp  v.  Eveland  (19  Barn.  81), 

793. 
DeCamp  v.   Xew  Jersey,  etc.   Ins. 

Co.    (3   Ins.  L.  Jr.  89),  2223, 

2225. 
DeCamp   v.  X.   J.   L.   Ins.   Co.    (4 

Bigelow   L.   &   Ace.   Ins.   Rep. 

287),  2234. 
Decie   v.   Brown    (167   Mass.   290; 

45  X.  E.  765),  172. 
Deck  V.  State  (47  Ind.  245),  1714. 
Deckard  v.  Drewery   ( 64  Ark.  599 ; 

44  S.  W.  351),  762. 
Decker  v.  Board  ( 57  X.  J.  L.  603 ; 

31  Atl.  235),  716,  727,  743. 
Decker  v.  McGowan   (59  Ga.  805), 

491,  522. 
Decker  v.  Sargeant  (125  Ind.  404; 

25  X.  E.  458),  144,   166,  263, 

456,  458,  459,   1315. 
Decker  v.  State    (39  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

20,  44  S.  W.  845),  8,  19,  941, 

1705. 
Deehan  v.  Johnson   (141  Mass.  23; 

0  X.  E.  240),  649. 
Deer  v.  Bell    (58  J.  P.  513),  1277. 
Deggender  v.  Seattle,  etc.  Co.    (41 

Wash.  385;  83   Pac.  898),  491, 

698,  699. 
DeGrafl"  v.  State  ( [Okla.]  103  Pac. 

538),  1450,  1452,  1491,  1492), 

1740. 
DeGrazier  v.  Stephens   ( [Tex.]  105 

S.    W.    992),     103,    123,    191, 

208. 
DeHaven,  In  re  (31  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

335),  664. 


cxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Deignan  v.  Providence  License 
Com'rs.  (16  R.  I.  727;  19  Atl. 
332),  744,  749. 

Deisher  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

96  S.  W.  28),  1224,  1606. 
Deitz  V.  City  of  Central    ( 1   Colo. 

323),  409,  470,  1760. 
Delameter   v.    South    Dakota    (205 

U.    S.    93;    27    Sup.    Ct.   447; 

51   L.  Ed.  724),  329. 
Delaplain      v.      Cook       (7      Wis. 

43,  264,    1505. 
Delavina   v.   Hill    (65   N.   H.   94), 

1801. 
Delfel  V.  Hanson  (2  Wash  St.  194; 

26  Pac.   220),   1932. 
Delgado  v.  State  ( 34  Tex.  Cr.  Pvep. 

157;    29    S.    W.    1070),   2056, 

2058,  20S9. 
DeLesdernier  v.  DeLesdernier    (45 

La.   Ann.    1364;    14   So.    191), 

64,  2155,  2156. 
DeMery,    In    re    (20    Vict.    L.    K 

95;   15  Austr.  L.  T.  232),  682. 
Demarco,   Ex  parte    (77   Vt.   445; 

61  Atl.  36),    1762. 
Den  v.  DuBois   (16  N.  J.  L.  285), 

929. 
Denby  v.   Fie    (106   Iowa   299;    70 

N.   W.    702),   998. 
Denman   v.   St.   Paul,   etc.   R.   Co. 

(26  Minn.  357),  2180,  2184. 
Dennehy  v.  Chicago   ( 120  111.  627 ; 

12 'n.  E.  227),   186,  347,  414, 

428,  440,   443,  448,   755. 
Dennis  v.  Dennis    (68   Conn.   186; 

36  Atl.  34;    34  L.  R.   A.  449; 

57  Am.  St.  95),  67,  2159,  2161. 
Dennison  v.  Collins   (1  Cow.  Ill), 

2255. 
Dennison    v.    Van    Wormer     (107 

Mich.    461;    65    N.    W.    274), 

1879,    1880. 
Denton  v.  Logan    (3   Met.    ( [Ky.] 

434),  1805. 
Denton  v.  State   (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

58;  105  S.  W.  199),  1729. 
Denton  v.  Vann   (8  Cal.  App.  677; 

97  Pac.  675),  235. 


Denver  v.  Domedian  ( 15  Colo.  App. 

36;  60  Pac.  1107),  364,  365. 
Denver   Tramway   Co.   v.   Reid    ( 4 

Colo.  App.   53;   36  Pac.  500), 

2174,  2191,  2194. 
Deposit  V.  Devereux   (8  Hun  317), 

807. 
Depree  v.  State   ([Tex.]  119  S.  W. 

301),  974. 
D'Eresby,  Ex  parte   ( [1881]  44  L. 

T.  781;  29  W.  R.  527),  1834. 
Dermott  v.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.] 

90  S.  W.  474;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

750),   950. 
Derrel,  In  re   (55  N.  Y.  Misc  Rep. 

618;    106   N.   Y.   Supp.    1030), 

729. 
Deselms  v.  Baltimore,  etc.   R.  Co. 

(149   Pa.   432;    24   Atl.    283), 

2196. 
Deshazo  v.  State    (65  Ark.  38;  44 

S.  W.   453),    1653. 
Des  Moines  Union  Ry.  Co.,  In  re 

(137    Iowa    730;    115    K    W. 

740,  743),  794,  795. 
Desroches   v.   Cole    ( 1 1   Rev.   Leg. 

386),  922. 
DeTarr  v.  State  (37  Ind.  App.  323; 

76  N.  E.  897),  825,  832,  833, 

834. 
Detroit  Realty  Co.  v.  Barnett  ( 156 

Mich.    385;    120   X.    W.    804; 

16  Let.  L.  N.  107),  975. 
Deuel,  In  re   (55  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

618;    106   N.   Y.  Supp.    1030), 

744. 
Deutschman    v.    Charlestown     (40 

Ind.  449),  412. 
DeVancene,   In  re    (31   How.   Pro. 

289,  337),  291. 
DeVan  v.  Commercial  Travel,  etc. 

Ins.   Co.    (157   N.   Y.   690;    51 

N.  E.   1090;  affirming  92  Hun 

250;     36    N.    Y.    Supp.    931), 

2239. 
Devanney  v.   Hanson    ( 60  W.  Va. 

3;    53    S.    E.    603),    652,    976, 

985. 
Deveney  v.  State  (47  Ind.  208), 

1253,  1256,  1455,  1566,  1586. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CXXl 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Devin  v.  Belt  (70  Md.  352;  17  Atl. 

375),  (i22.  035,  048. 
Devin  v.  Scott    (34  Ind.  67),  277, 

2016,  2020,  2110,  2119. 
Devine  v.  Board    (121   Mich.   433; 

80  N.  W.  109),  650. 
Devine  v.  Coinmonwealtli  ( 107  Va. 

800;  CO  S.  K.  37),  1G09,  1702, 

1707. 
Devine  v.   Fallon    (3  Austr.  L.  K. 

[C.   N.J    42),    1314. 
Devine  v.  O'Sullivan    (23  Vict.  L. 

R.    75;     19    Austr.    L.    T.    3; 

3   Austr.   L.   R.    [C.   N.]    33), 

351. 
Devine  v.  State    (4  Clarke    [Iowa] 

443),  lino,  1559. 
Deverry  v.  Holly  Springs  ( 35  Miss. 

385),   674. 
DeWalt,   In   re    (186    Pa.    204:    42 

W.   K    C.    114;    40   Atl.    470), 

139. 
Dewant    v.    Neilsen     (2    F.    [Just 

Cas.]    57),    1113. 
Dewar   v.   People    (40   Mich.   401; 

29    Am.    Rep.    545),    70,    169, 

419,  474. 
DeWitt  v.  LaCotts    (76  Ark.  250; 

88  S.  W.  877),  2025,  2033. 
Dexter   v.    Cumberland    (17    R.    I. 

222;    21    Atl.   347),   572,   669, 

674,  677. 
Dexter  v.   Sprague    (22  R.  T.  324; 

47  Atl.  889 ) ,  589. 
Dial  v.  State   ([Ala.]  49  So.  230), 

1164,    1186. 
Dice    V.    Slieiberneau     ( 152    Mich. 

601;    116  X.  W.  416;    15  Det. 

L.  N.  255),  1869,  1907. 
Dichett  V.  Spuyten  Duyvil,  etc.,  R. 

Co.  (5  Hun  165),  2171,  2177. 
Dick,   Ex   parte    (141    Fed.    5;    72 

C.   C.  A.  667),    1260. 
Dick  V.  People   (47  111.  App.  223), 

1629. 
Dick  V.  United  States    (208  U.   S. 

340;    28   Sup.   Ct.    399;    52   L. 

ed.),  1258,  1259. 
Dickey  v.  Hurlburt    (5   Cal.   343), 

882,  883. 


Dickinson    v.    Eichorn     (78    Iowa 

710;    43   N.   W.   620;    6  L.   R. 

A.  721),  983. 
Dickson,  Ea;  parte   (3  N.  S.  W.  L. 

R.  358),  1299. 
Dickson  v.  Gamble    (16  Fla.  687), 

798. 
Dickson    v.     Holt     (30    Tex.     Civ. 

App.  297;  70  S.  W.  342),  772. 
Dickson  v.  State    (89  Ga.  785:    15 

S.  E.  684),  1227. 
Diehl   V.  State    (157   Ind.   549;    62 

N.   E.   51),    1444. 
Dienstag  v.   Fagan    (74   N.   J.    L. 

418;   65  Atl.   1021),  559. 
Dikeman    v.    Harrison     (38    Mich. 

617),  2014. 
Dilkes   v.   Pancoast    (53   N.   J.   L. 

553;   22  Atl.  122),  617. 
Dillard  v.  State    (152  Ala.  80;   44 

So.  537),  1651. 
Dillard  v.  State   (31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

470;     20    S.    W.    1106),    851, 

876. 
Dillman  v.  People   (4  N.  Y.  Wkly. 

Dig.  251),  24,  46. 
Dills  v.   State    ([Tex.]    117   S.  W. 

835),  1680. 
Diltz  v.  State    ([Tex.]    119    S.   W. 

92),  1197. 
Dimond's  Estate   (3  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 

554),  2134,  2147,  2148. 
Dimond,  Ex  parte   (2  N.  S.  W.  L. 

R.  207),  521,  529. 
Dinkins    v.    State     (149    Ala.    49; 

43  So.  114),  967. 
Di    Nubile,   In   re    (  1 1    Pa.   Super. 

Ct.  571),  664. 
Dinuzo  V.  State    (  [Xeb.]    123  Pac. 

310),   291,    1764. 
Disbrow  v.  Sanders  (1  Denio  149), 

525. 
Dispensary    Com'rs     v.     Thornton, 

106  Ga.    106;    31    S.   E.   733), 

476,  790. 
Dispensary  Commissioners  v.  Hoop- 
er (128  Ga.  99;  56  S.  E.  997), 

175,  382. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Renter  ( 15 

App.  D.  C.  237),  1311. 


cxxn 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
fReferenoes    are    to    pages.] 


District  Tp.  v,   Frahm    (102  Iowa 

5;    70   N.    W.    721),    808. 
Dittforth    V.    State     (4(5    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  424;  80  S.  W.  628),  1627. 
Ditton    V.   lUorgan    (56    Ind.    60), 

1937. 
Dival    V.    Mowry    (6    R.    1.    479), 

2127. 
Divine  v.  State  (4  Ind.  240),  1501. 
Dixon  V.  Dixon    (22  N.  J.  Eq.  91; 

7  Green.  Eq.  [N.  J.]  91),  2106, 

2108. 
Dixon  V.   State    (67  Arlc.  495;    55 

S.  W.  850),   1201,   1651. 
Dixon   V.   State    (86   Ga.    754;    1.3 

S.  E.  87),   1232. 
Dixon   V.   State    (89   Ga.    785;    15 

S.  E.  684),  1228,  1646. 
Dixon  V.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  517; 

1  S.  W.  448),  1502,  1503,  1508, 

1509. 
Doan  V.  Doan    (3  Clark.  7:   4  Pa. 

Law  J.  332),  2158,  2165. 
Doane  v.  Lockwood  (115  111.  490), 

2127. 
Dorr,  Ex  parte    (3   How.    [U.   S.] 

104),  1012. 
Dobbins   v.   Erie   County    (16    Pet. 

[U.    S.]    435),    790. 
Doberneck,  Appeal  of  ( 1  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.    637),   600,    628,   632,    664, 

665. 
Dollina  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

38  S.  W.  775),  1471. 
Dobson    V.    State     (57    Ind.    69), 

1190. 
Dobson  V.  State  (5  T^a  271 ) ,  1713. 
Dod    V.    Monger     (6     ]\[od.     215), 

1020. 
Dodd  V.  Dodd    ([1906],  p.  189;   70 

J.  P.  163;   75  L.  J.  P.  49;   94 

L.  T.  709;   54  W.  Pt.  541;   22 

T.  L.  R.  484),  2169. 
Doe  V.  Burnham    (31  X.  II.  426), 

1807. 
Doe  V.  Douglass   (8  Blackf.  [Ind.] 

10),  95. 
Doe  V.  Ilarter    (1    Tiid.    127).  2116, 

2118,  2128. 


Doherty,  Ex  parte   (33  N.  B.   15), 

1663. 
Doherty,  Ex  parte  (27  N.  B.  292), 

1681. 
Doherty  v.   Colter    (68  N.   H.  37; 

38*Atl.  499),   1799,  1807. 
Dolan's  Appeal   (108  Pa.  St.  564), 

733,  747. 
Dolan    V.    Buzzcll     (41    Me.    473), 

1776. 
Dolan  V.  Green    (110  Mass.  322), 

1787. 
Dolan    V.    McLaughlin     (46    Neb. 

449;  64  N.  W.  1076),  5,  1948, 
Dolan    V.    State     (40    Ark.    454), 

2249. 
Dolan  V.  State    (122  Ind.   141;   23 

N.  E.  761),   1257,   1564,  1565, 

1633,  1749,  1751. 
Dolson  V.  Hope  (7  Kan.  161),  553, 

1780. 
Dominick  v.   State    (27    Ohio   Cir. 

Ct.    Rep.     305),     1129,     1487, 

1738. 
Donaghue,    In    re     (5    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  1 ;  40  W.  N.  C.  448 ) ,  640, 

664. 
Donalier,  Ex  parte   (27  N.  B.  554; 

17  N.  B.  44),  649. 
Donahue,  Ex  parte    ( 1   W.  N.   [N. 

S.  W.]    101),   1572. 
Donahue    v.    Coleman     (46    Conn. 

319),   1800. 
Donahue    v.    Maloney     (49    Conn. 

163),    1777. 
Donald  v.  Seott  (67  Fed.  854),  179, 

1325. 
Donald    v.    Scott    (74    Fed.    859), 

307. 
Donald    v.    Scott     (76    Fed.    554), 

1098. 
Donald   v.    State    ([Miss.]    41    So. 

4),  1605. 
Donaldson   v.    State    (3    Ga.    App. 

451:     60    S.     E.     115),     1614, 

1707. 
Donaldson  v.  State   (15  Tex.  App. 

25),  928,   1588,   1680. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CXXIH 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Donavan  v.  State    (170  Ind.   123; 

83  N.  E.  744),  288,  1450,  1478, 

1491,  1507. 
Donehoo's   Appeal    (2   IMon.    [Pa.] 

213;    15  Atl.  924),  2121. 
Donelson  v.  Posey    (13  Ala.  752), 

2094,  2098,  2128,  2130. 
Doner  v.  People   (92  111.  App.  43), 

1710. 
Donley  v.  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

567;  89  S.  W.  553),  334,  1280, 

1282. 
Donnell    v.    State     (2    Ind.    658), 

822. 
Donnelly,  In  re  (38  Up.  Can.  599), 

429. 
Donnelly  v.  Decker   (58  \Yis.  461), 

97. 
Donnelly  v.  Smith   (128  Iowa  257; 

103    X.    W.    776),    979,    982, 

1004. 
Donner  v.  Hotz    (74  Iowa  389;  27 

N,  W.  969),  981. 
Donaho  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 

(30  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  433;   62 

N.  Y.  Supp.  523),   1735. 
Donnmoyer,  In  re    (9  Pa.   Co.  Ct. 

Rep".    303),    561,    563. 
Donovan,  hi  re    (9  Pa.  Super.  Ct, 

647;    44   W.   N.   C.   34),   664, 

666. 
Donovan,   In   re    (72   L.   J.   K.   B. 

545    [1903]    1   K.   B.   13,  895; 

88   L.   T.  555;    52   W.   R.    14; 

67   J.   P.    147;    20   Cox,   C.   C. 

435),  2018. 
Donovan  v.  Fairfield  Co.  ( 60  Conn. 

339;  22  Atl.  847).  896,  898. 
Donovan  v.   State    (170   Ind.    123; 

83  N.  E.  744),  1549. 
Dooley  v.  State    (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

491;     108    S.    W.    676),    1216, 

1580. 
Doolittle  V.  Lucerne  Co.    (6  Kulp. 

495),  815. 
Doorcs   V.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

76   S.  W.   2;   25  Ky,  L.  Rep. 

459),  1378. 


Doores    v.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

109  S.  W.  302 ;  33  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

69),  307,  308. 
Doores  v.  Commonwealth  (121  Ky, 

226;    89    S.   W,    161;    28   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  192;  89  S.  W.  164;  28 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  196),  949,  950. 
Doran'v.  Phillips   (47  Mich.  228; 

10  N.  W.  350),  481,  484,  798, 

799,  800,  801. 
Dorbeneck,  Appeal  of  (1  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  99;  38  W.  N.  C.  90),  638. 
Dorman   v.    State    (34   Ala.    210), 

110,  132,  135,  1502. 
Dorr  V.   Munsel    (13   Johns.  430), 

2093. 
Dorrian    v.    McHugh     ([1907]     2 

Irish  Rep.  564),  1322. 
Dor  sett  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr,  App.] 

58  S.  W.  1003),  1187. 
Dosh   V.    United    States    Exp.    Co, 

([Iowa]  93  N.  W.  571),  1104. 
Doss  V,  Commonwealth  ( 14  Ky.  L. 

Rep.     [abstract]     334),   '911, 

913. 
Doss  V.  Moore    (69   Ark.  258;    63 

S.  W.  66),  934. 
Doster  v.  State   (93  Ga.  43;   18  S, 

E.  997),   1285. 
Doty  V.  Postal    (87  Mich.  143;  49 
'n.  W.  434),  1864,  1876,  1972, 

1999,  2001. 
Dougdale  v.  The  Queen  (1  El.  and 

B.  435),  1080. 
Dougherty  v.  Commonwealth    ( 143 

]\Ion."  239 ) ,   627. 
Dougherty    v.    Richmond     ( [R.    I. 

74   Atl.    625),  563. 
Doughty  V.  Doughty  (3  Halst.  [N. 

J.]   643),  2093,  2098. 
Douglass,  Ex  parte  (1  Utah,  108), 

216,  271. 
Douglass  V.  Camj)bell    ([Ark.]   116 

S,  W.  211),  2262. 
Douglass  V.  Commonwealth  ( [Ky.] 

47  S.  W.  329;   20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

653 ) ,  403, 
Douglass  V.  Douglass    ( 1  Del.   Ch. 

465),  311, 


CXXIV 


TABLE   OP    CASES, 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Douglass  V.  Hamilton   ( [Ark.]   120 

S.  W.  387 ) ,  923,  926,  947. 
Douglass   V.   State    (21    Iiid.   App. 

302 ;  52  X.  E.  302 ) ,  10,  42,  82, 

84,  964,  1681. 
Douglassville    v.    Johns     (62    Ga. 

423),  413,  443,  814. 
Dousey   v.    State    (23    Fla.    310;    2 

So.   692),   1487. 
Douthitt,     Ex    parte     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  63  S.  W.  131),  908,  934. 
Douthit  V.  State   (98  Tex.  344:  83 

S.  W.  795:  modifying  82  S.  W. 

352),  158,  562. 
Douthit    V.    State     (36    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  396;    82    S.  W.   352;    83 

S.  W.  795),  759,  784. 
Douthitt     V.      State      ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   61  S.  W.  404),  973. 
Douthitt     V.     State      (  [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    87    S.    W.    190),    784, 

1253,    1268. 
Dover  v.  Twombly   (42  K.  H.  59), 

385. 
Dowdell    V.   State    (58   Ind.    333), 

1489,    1567. 
Dowdy   V.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

101    S.    W.    338;    31    Ky.    L. 

Rep.   33),   1470,    1690. 
Dowiat    V.    People     (92    111.    App. 

433;    affirmed,    193    111.    264; 

61  X.  E.  1059),  755,  759,  770. 
Do^vner   v.    Smith    (32   Vt.    1;    76 

Am.   Dec.    148),   2126. 
Downey  v.  Charles  F.  S.  Gove  Co. 
(201    Mass.    251;     87    X.    E. 

597),   1806,   1807. 
Downey    v.    State     (20    Ind.    82), 

1491. 
Downing   v.   Porter    (74   Mass.    [8 

Gray]   539).  1043,  1046,  1048, 
1049,  1060. 
Downman  v.  State    (14  Ala.  242), 

1290. 
Downs  V.  Jackson   ([1895]  2  Q.  B. 

203:  59  J.  P.  487;  64  L.  J.  :\I. 
C.  238;    72  L.  T.  728;    43  W. 
E.  566;    15  Rep.  466),  378. 
Downs    V.    State     (19    Md.    571), 
1742. 


Doyal  V.  State  Tex.  Cr.  App.   ( 102 

S.  W.  1123),  1465,  1473. 
Doyle,  In  re  ( 6  Kulp  356 ) ,  695. 
Doyle  V.  Continental  Ins.  Co.    (94 

U.  S.  535;,  106. 
Doyle    V.    Dufferien     (8    Manitoba 

286),  939,  940. 
Doylestown  Distillery   Co.,   Appeal 
'of    (41    W.    X.    C.    313),    630, 

647. 
Dozier  v.   State    (130  Ala.  57;    30 

So.  396),  1735. 
Dr.    C.    Bouvier    Specialty    Co.    v. 

James  ( [Ky.]  118  S.  W.  381), 

12. 
Drady  v.  Polk  Co.   (126  Iowa  345; 

102  X.  W.  115),  1000. 
Drake   v.   Drewry    (112    Ga.   308; 

37  S.  E.  432),  922,  923. 
Drake   v.    Freelan    (80   Iowa   768; 

45  X.  W.  576),  1003. 
Drake    v.    Jordan    ( 73    Iowa    707 ; 

36  X.  W.  653),  125,  225,  220. 
Drake    v.    Kingsbaker     (72    Iowa 

441;  34  X.  W.  199),  981. 
Drake  v.  Xewton   (3  Zab.   [X.  J.] 

Ill),  2255. 
Drake  v.  State    (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

23  S.  W.  398),  781. 
Draper  v.   State    (6  Ga.  App.    12; 

64  S.  E.  117),  121.  1740. 
Draper  v.  Fitzgerald   (30  Mo.  App. 

518),    1358. 
Drapert    v.    State    (14    Ind.    123), 

669. 
Drechsel    v.    State     (35    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.     580;     34    S.    W.    934), 

1502,    1623,    1689. 
Drew    Co.    v.     Bennett     (43    Ark. 

364),  795. 
Drewrey  v.  Drewrey  (64  Ark.  599; 

44   S.  W.  351),  763. 
Dryden,  Ex  parte    (32  X.   B.  98), 

1724. 
Dreyfuss    v.    Goss     (67    Kan.    57; 

72  Pac.   537),   1779,   1807. 
Dryer   v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

55    S.    W.    05),    1689,    1698, 

1701. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxxv 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Drysdale  v.  Pradot  ( 45  Miss.  445 ) , 
Driggs  V.  State    (52  Ohio  St.  37; 

38  N.  E.  882),  131,  1648. 
Driscoll,  Ex  parte   (27  N.  B.  210), 

1159,    1755. 
Druggists'   Cases    (85   Tenn.   449; 

3  S.  W.  490),  793,  822,  824. 
Drummond    v.    Hopper     (4    Harr. 

327),  2093,  2098. 
Drummond    v.     Prestmairs     Ex'rs 
(12    Wheat.    515;     G    L.    ed. 

712),   2008. 
Drummond  v.  Richhmd  City  Drug 

Co.     (133    Iowa    206;     110    N. 

VV.  471),  984,  1004 
Dtorer   v.   Haskell    (50   Vt.    341), 

1803. 
Duay  V.  Shepard   ( 150  Mich.  547 ; 

114    N.    VV.    238;     14    Detroit 

Leg.   N.   700),    195. 
Dubois  V.  Boivin  ( 14  L.  C.  J.  203), 

688. 
Dubois    V,    Miller     (5    Hun    332), 

1844. 
Du  Bois  V.  State   (87  Ala.   101;    6 

So.  381),   1379,    1015. 
Du  Boistown  v.  Rochester    (9  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  442),  201. 
Duckwall  V.  New  Albany   (25  Ind. 

283).  436. 
Dudley,  Ex  parte    ( 1  S.  C.   [N.  S. 

W.]    63),   1371. 
Dudley  v.  Buekfield  (51  Me.  254), 

1788. 
Dudley  v.  Parker    (55  Hun  29;   8 

N,  Y.  Supp.  600),   1910. 
Dudley  v.  Sautbine   (49  Iowa  650; 

31  Am.  Rep.  165),  1253,  1255. 
Dudley    v.    State    (91    Ind.    312), 

500,   505,    1161. 
Duffield     V.     Roberson      (2     Harr. 

[Del.]    375).   2149. 
Dufford    V,    Nolan     (46    N.    J.    L. 

87),  617. 
DuflFord    V.    Staats    (54    N.    J.    L. 

286;  23  Atl.  667),  674,  676. 
Dugan,    Ex    parte     (13    C.    L.    T. 

249),   1724. 
Dugan's  Estate,  In  re  (6  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.    222),    2135,    2151. 


Dugan    V.    Neville     (49    Ohio    St. 

462;    31  N.  E.   1080),  2012. 
Duke  V.  Marston   ( [X.  H.]   15  Atl. 

222),  1548. 
Dulce  V.   State    (146  Ala.    138;    41 

So.  170),  1190. 
Dukes  V.  State  (77  Ca.  738),  1177, 

1278. 
Dukes  V.  State   (79  Ga.  795;  4  S. 

E.  870),   1624. 
Dulany   v.   Green    (4    Harr.   285), 

2094,  2108,  2123. 
Dulin  V.  State    (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

442;   108  S.  W.  696),  1624. 
Duluth    V.    Abraliamsou    ( [Minn.] 

104  N.  W.   682),  289. 
Dulutli    Brewing    Co.    v.    Superior 

(123   Fed.   353),  333,  427. 
Dunage  v.  White  ( 1  Swan  St.  137), 

2107,  2152. 
Dunaway  v.  State    (9  Yerg.  350), 

1096. 
Dunbar  v.  Boston  (101  Mass  317), 

1771. 
Dunbar  v.   Frazer    (78  Ala.  538), 

635,  648, 
Dunbar    v.    Garrity     (58    N.    H. 

575),  1783. 
Dunbar  v.  Locke    (62  N.  H.  442), 

122,   334,    1799,    1800. 
Dunbar  v.  State   (34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

596;    31    S.   W.   401),   369. 
Duncan  [1909]  In  re  (16  App.  Ont. 

L.  R.   132),  889. 
Duncan    v.    Clement     (119    N.    Y. 

Supp.   375),   264,  267,   820. 
Duncan  v.   Clement    ([A.   Y.]    119 

N.  Y.  Supp.  374),  491. 
Duncan    v.    Commonwealth    (2    B. 

Mon.  [Ky.]  281;  38  Am.  Dec. 

152),  510,  511. 
Duncan  v.  Dowding    ([1897]    1   Q. 

B.   575;    61   J.   P.   280;    66   L. 

J.   Q.   B.   36?;    76   L.   T.   294; 

45    W.    R.    383;    13    T.    L.    R. 

290;    18  Cox  C.  C.  527),  350. 
Dunham  v.  Hough   (80  Mich.  648; 

45  N,  W.  497),  755. 


cxsvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Dunlap,   In  re    (171   Pa.   454;    32 

Atl.   1128;   37  W.  N.  C.  245), 

G65. 
Dunlap   V.   Keith    ( 1    Leigh    [Va.] 

430),  276. 
Dunlap  V.  Wagner    (85  Ind.  529; 

44  Am.  Rep.  42),   1856,   1857, 

1864,  1868,  1870,  2000,  2187. 
Dunlevey    v.     Watson     (38     Iowa 

898),   1971. 
Dunlop   V.   Uhr    (14   X.   S.  W.   L. 

R.  430),  701. 
Dunn,  Ex  parte  ( 14  Ind.  122),  662, 

668. 
Dunn    V.    Amos     (14    W^is.     107), 

2101,   2103,   2120,   2130. 
Dunn  V.  State  (82  Ga.  27;  8  S.  E. 

806;    3   L.   R.   A.    199),    1280. 
Dunn  V.  State    (48   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

107;    86   S.   W.  326),    1208. 
Dunne  v.  Kretzman   ( 130  111.  App. 

469;    228    III.    31;    81    N.    E. 

790),    631,    634,    640. 
Dunning   v.    Owen    ([1907]    2    K. 

B.   237;    76   L.   J.  K.   B.   796; 

97    L.   T.   241;    71   J.  P.   383; 

21   Cox   C.   C.   485;    23   T.   L. 

R.   494),   516,    1372. 
Dunnoway  v.  State   (9  Yerg.  350), 

1109,    1110. 
Dupree    [Tex.]    Ex  parte    (105    S. 

W,   493),    127,   251,  254,  295. 
Dupree  v.  State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

91   S.   W.  578),    1380. 
Dupree  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

107  S.  W.  926),  1029. 
Dupree    v.    State    ([Tex.]    119    S. 

W.  301,  answering  [Tex.]   107 

S.    W.    926),    110,    122,    253, 

255. 
Dupree    v.    State    ([Tex.]    120    S. 

W.  871,  875),    1723. 
DuPuy   V.   Cook    (35  N  Y.   Supp. 

6.32;   90  Hun  43),  1860,  1902. 
Duquesne  Distilling  Co.   v.  Green- 

baum    ([Ky.]    121   S.  W.   19), 

2263. 
Durach's  Apju-al   (62  Pa.  St.  491), 

198,   790. 


Duren  v.  Stephens   (126  Ga.  496; 

54  S.  E.  1045),  159,  168,  432, 

452. 
Durein  v.  Pontious   (34  Kan.  353; 

8   Pac.   428),    1932,   1933. 
Durein  v,  Kansas   (208  U.  S.  226; 

28  Sup.  Ct.  567 ;  52  L.  ed.  — , 

affirming  70  Kan.   1 ;   78  Pac. 

152;    80   Pac.   987),    139,   211, 

1525,    1598,    1652. 
Durfee  v.  State    (53  Neb.  214;    73 

N.  W.  676),   1083. 
Durkee  v.  Moses    (67   N.  H.   115; 

23  Atl.   793),   122,  334,    1800. 
Durling  v.  Loveland  (2  Curt.  Eccl. 

Rep.  225),  2150. 
Duroy  v.  Blinn  (11  Ohio  St.  .331), 

1862,    1893. 
Durr  V.  ConimoiiWfalth    ( [Pa.]    12 

Atl.   507),    1739. 
Dutton  V.  State   (2  Ind.  App.  488; 

28  X.  E.  995),  1509. 
Dwight   V.   Germania   L.   Tins.   Co. 

(103  X.  Y.  341;  57  Am.  Rep. 

729),   2240,   2244. 
Dwinnels    v.    Paisons     (98    Mass. 

470),  384. 
Dwyer    v.     Hermann     (19     N.    Y. 

'209),    1249. 
Dye   V.    Posen    (79   Xeb.    149;    112 

X.  W.  332),  586. 
Dyer  v.  Augur  ([Iowa]  110  X.  W. 

323),  860,  922. 
Dyke   v.   Gower    ([1892]    1    Q.    B. 

220;    56   J.   P.    168;    61    L.  J. 

M.  C.  70;  65  L.  T.  760),  1383. 
Dyson    v.    Mason    (22    Q.    B.   Div. 

351;    53   J.   P.   262;    58   L.   J. 

M.     C.     55;     60    L.    T.    285), 

373,   374. 
Dziok    V.    Board     (28    R.    I.    526; 

68  Atl.  479),  734,  743. 


Eagan    v.    State     (53    Ind.    162), 

12,  80,   1502,   1553. 
Earl    V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

66  S.  W.  839).  1237.  1627. 
Earl   V.   State    (33   Tex.   Civ.   App. 

161;   76  S.  W.  207),  782. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXVll 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Earle  v,  Latonia,  etc.  Ass'n  [Ky.] 

106  S.  W.  312;  32  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

469,  586),   133. 
Early  v.  Rains    (121   Ky.  439;   89 

S.    W.    289;    28   Ky.    L.    Rep. 

415),  867,  922. 
Early  v.  State  ( 23  Tex.  App.  364 ; 

5    S.    W.    122),    70. 
Earnmoor  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Union  Ins. 

Co.    (44  Fed.  374),  2198. 
Earp  V.  Lilly    (120  111.  App.  123; 

affirmed    217    111.    582;    75    N. 

E.    552),     1888,     1912,     1982, 

1983,    1991. 
Easley  v.   Pegg    (63    S.   C.   98;    41 

S,  E.   18),  476,  1087. 
East  End  Social  Club,  In  re  ( 8  Pa. 

Dist.   Rep.   272),    1342. 
Eastham  v.  Commonwealth   (  [Ky.] 

49  S.  \V.  795 ;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1639),  934,  1467. 
Eastman  v.  Commonwealtli   (  [Ky.] 

20    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1639;    49 '  S. 

W.   795),  550. 
East   Feliciana   v.   Gurth    (26   La. 

Ann.   140),  202. 
East  Saginaw  v.  Saginaw  Co.    (44 

Mich.    273;    6    X.    W.    684), 

806, 
East    St.    Louis    v.    Trustee,    etc. 

102  III.  489),  787. 
East  St.  Louis  v.  Wehrung  (40  III. 

392),    191,   420,  428,  799. 
East    St.    Louis    v.    Wehring     (50 

111.  28),  405. 
Easterling  v.   State    (30  Ala.  46), 

1293. 
Easterling     v.     State      (35     Miss. 

210),   1643. 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Win- 
ters   (P5   Tenn.   240;    1    S.  W. 

790),  2185. 
Eastwood  V.  Klann  ( [Xeb.]   120  X. 

W.   149),    1981. 
Eastwood  V.  Miller    (L.   R.   9;    Q. 

B.   440;    43  L.  J.  :M.   C.   13!); 

30  L.  T.  716;   22  W.  R.  799; 
38  J.  P.  647),  380. 
Eastwood   V.   People    (3   Park   Cr. 
Rep.  25),   2061,  2067. 


Eaton   V.    Eaton    (37   N.    J.  Law 

108;   18  Am.  Rep.  716),  2095. 
Eaton  V.  Perry  (29  Mo.  96),  2099, 

2106,  2128. 
Eaves  v.   State    (113  Ga.   749;   39 

S.  E.   318),  83,   964,  973. 
Eberstadt  v.   Jones    ( 19   Tex.  Civ. 

App.    480;     48     S.    W.    558), 

1781,    1807. 
Eckart  v.  State    (5   W.  Va.  515), 

1739. 
Eckersly    v.    Abbott     ([X.    J.    L.] 

74  Atl.  314),  692. 
Eckert    v.    David     (75    Iowa    302; 

39  N.  W.  513),  981. 
Eckert  v.   State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

68  S.  W.  682),  1237. 
Eddens  v.  State   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

327;  84  S.  W.  828),  1219. 
Eddy  V.  Courtright  (91  Mich.  264; 

51    X.    W.    887),    1868,    1900, 

1901,  2006. 
Edgar,  Ex  jmrte   (31  N.  B.   128), 

1571. 
Edgar    v.    ^McDonald     (  [Tex.    Civ. 

App.]    106   S.  W.   1135),   111, 

120,    126. 
Edgar  v.  State   (37  Ark.  219),  12, 

32,   80.    1237,    1628,   1645. 
Edgar    v.    State    (45    Ark.     356), 

1348,  1349,  1754. 
Edgar  v.  State   (46  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

171;  102  S.  VV.  439),  188,  760, 

767,  768,  782. 
Edge  V.  Edge   (38  X.  J.  Eq.  211), 

2144. 
Edgerly  v.  Union  St.  Ry.  Co.   ( [N. 

IL]   36  Atl.  558),  2202,  2206, 

2207,  2208,  2213. 
Edgerton,  Ex  parte  (59  Fed.  115), 

321. 
Edgett  v.  Finn    ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

36   S.   W.   830),   777. 
Edinburg    v.    Hackney     (54    Ind. 

83),   811. 
Edis    V.    Butler     (8    Ohio    X.    P. 

183;     11    Ohio    St.    &    C.    P. 

Dec.  245 ) .  460,  473. 


CXXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Edmonson  v.  Commonwealth  (110 
Ky.  510;  62  S.  W.  1018;  22 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1902),  400,  1469, 
1759. 

Edmunds  v.  James  ([1892]  1  Q. 
B.  18;  56  J.  P.  40;  61  L.  J. 
M.  C.  56;  40  W.  R.  140;  65 
L.    T.    675),    359,    2028. 

Edson  V.  Hatley  (27  L.  C.  J.  312), 
649. 

Edwards,  Ex  parte  (31  N.  B.  118), 
1571. 

Edwardes    v.    Barrington    ([1902] 

50  W.  R.  358;   85  L.  T.  650; 
18  T.  L.  R.  169),  1830. 

Edwards  v.  Brown    (67  Mo.  377), 

1358,  1937. 
Edwards  v.  Jagers    (19  Ind.  407), 

99. 
Edwards  v.  State    (22  Ark.  253), 

497,  500. 
Edwards  v.   State    (123   Ga.    542; 

51  S.    E.   030),   249,   957. 
Edwards    v.    State    (124   Ga.    100; 

52  S.  E.  319),  1697,  1698. 
Edwards  v.   State    (121   Ind.  450; 

23  N.  E.  277 ) ,  837,  838,  1305, 

1306. 
Edwards  v.  Hanna   (5  J.  J.  Marsh 

18),  2126. 
Edwards    v.    State     (38    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.   386;    43   S.   W.    112;    39 

L.    R.    A.    262),    2086,    2087, 

2090. 
Edwards  v.  Woodbury   ( 156  Mass. 

21;  30  N.  E.  175),  1650,1943. 
Edwards  v.  Worcester   ( 172  Mass. 

104;   51  N.  E.  447),   1735. 
Edwick  V.  Hawkes   ([1881]   18  Ch. 

D.    199;    50   L.   J.  577;    45   L. 

T.    168),    1815. 
Effinger    v.    State     (47    Ind.    235, 

256,   262),    1486,    1566. 
Effinger  v.  State    (9  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  376),   1128. 
Bfird  V.  State    (44  Tex.   Cr.   App. 

447;  71  N.  W.  957),  911,  912, 

1582.  1584,  1610,  1613. 
Efird  V.  State  (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

582;  80  S.  W.  529),  863. 


Egan  V.  State  (53  Ind.  162),  32 

33. 
Eggen  V.  OfTutt  (128  Ky.  314; 

108  S.  W.  333;  32  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1350),  864,  939. 
Eggleston  v.  Board  (51  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  38;  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  471), 

867,  888,  890. 
Eldert  v.  State  (93  Ind.  76),  1628. 
Ehrenfied    v.    Kenney     (14    N.    Y. 

19),  602. 
Eick,  In  re    (17  Pa.  Co.   Ct.  Rep. 

50;   4  Pa.  Dist.  R.  461),  720. 
Eilenbreker  v.  District  Court   ( 134 

U.    S.   31;    10    Sup.    Ct.   424), 

1748. 
Eilke  V.  McGrath    (38   S.   W.  877 

[Ky.]     100    Ky.    537),     1850, 

1852,  1853. 
Einstein,  In  re   (17  Atl.   1100;   24 

W.  N.  C.  184),  675. 
Eisenman  v.  State   (49  Ind.  507), 

1292,  1488,  1489,  1635. 
Eisenmonger,  Ex  parte    (21  N.   S. 

W.  L.  R.  387),  1192. 
Eisenmonger,  Ex  parte    (21  L.  R. 

Pt.  iv.,   17  W.  N.   [N.  S.  W.] 

160),   1075,   1076. 
Elam  V.  State   (25  Ala.  53),  1517, 

1633,  1736,  1747,  1752. 
Elba  V.  Rhodes   (142  Ala.  689;   38 

So.    807),    174,    241. 
Elbow  Lake  v.  Holt    (  [Minn.]    72 

N.  W.  564),  1518. 
Eldora    v.    Burlingame    (62    Iowa 

32:  17  N.  W.  148).  294,  474. 
Eldridge   v.    State    (27    Fla.    162; 

9    So.   448),   2258,   2259. 
Eli  V.  Thompson   (3  A.  K.  Marsh. 

[Ky.]    70),   294. 
Elias  V.  Dunlop    ([1906]    1   K.   B. 

266;    70   J.   P.    183;    75   L.   J. 

K.   B.   168;    94  L.  T.    164;    22 

T.  L.   R.    162),   1275. 
Elk  Point  V.  Vaughn   (1  Dak.  113; 

46  N.  W.  577 ) ,  275,  404,  443, 

444,    448,    449,   521,   488,    491, 

495. 
Elken    v.    State    (63    Miss.    129), 

215. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXIX 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Elkin  V.  Buschner    ([Pa.]    IG  Atl. 

102),   61,   64,    1250. 
Elkius    V.    State     (13    Ga.     4o5), 

1641. 
Elkinton   v.   Buiek    (44  X.   J.  Eq. 

154;    15  Atl.  391;    1  L.  R.  A. 

161),   2122,   2137,   2149. 
Ellington  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

86    S.    W.    330),    1214,    1502, 

1726. 
Elliott,    Ex    parte     (44    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  575;  72  S.  W.  837),  863, 

935,  941. 
Elliott,    Ex    parte     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.     108;     91     S.    W.    570), 

764. 
Elliott  V.  Barry   (34  Hun  129   [X. 

Y.]),   1886. 
Elliott  V.  Levy    (19  W.  N.   [X.  S. 

W.]  2),  1642. 
Elliott    V.    State     (73    Ind.     10), 

1751. 
Elliott  V.  Totnes  Union   (57  J.  V. 

151),  2169. 
Ellis,  Ex  parte   (76  Kan.  368;    91 

Pac.  81),  291. 
Ellis  V.  Board    (59  X.  J.  L.   151; 

35  Atl.  795),  559. 
Ellis    V.    Brooks    (101    Tex.    591; 

102    S.    W.    94;     103    S.    W. 

1196),  1838. 
Ellis   V.   Dempster    (12   Austr.    L. 

T.  216),  351. 
Ellis  V.  People    (38  Colo.  516;   88 

Pac.   461),  364,   1725. 
Ellis    V.    State     ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

89  S.  W.  974),  914. 
Ellison   V.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

69  S.  W.  765;  24  Ky.  'l. 

Rep.  657),  1365. 
Elmore  v.  Overton  ( 104  Ind.  548 ; 

4  X.  E.  197;  54  Am.  Rep. 

343),  480,  660. 
Elrod  V.  State   (72  Ind.  292),  822. 
Elshire  v.  Schuyler   (15  Xeb.  651; 

20    X.    W.    29),     1848,     1854, 

1862. 
Eisner    v.    State    (30    Tex.    524), 

1444. 


Elston   V.    Chicago    (40   111.   514), 

811. 
Ehvood  V.  Bullock    (6  Q.  B.  386), 

294. 
Ehvood  V.  Price   ( 75  Iowa  228 ;  39 

X.  W.  281),  975,  996. 
Ellsworth    V.    Cummins     ( 134    111. 

App.   397),   1903. 
Ellsworth     V.     Mitchell     (31     Me. 

247),  1802. 
Ely,  In  re    (16   X.  Y.  Misc.   Rep. 

228),  2145. 
Ely  V.   Webster    (102  Mass.   304), 

1771,   1798,   1799. 
Elzey   V.   Elzey    (1    Houst.    [Del.] 

308),   2109,   2115,   2154. 
Embry  v.  State   (110  Ga.  311;   35 

S.  E.   116),  230. 
Embury  v.  Conner   (3  X.  Y.  511), 

280. 
Emerick  v.  Indianapolis   (118  Ind. 

279;  20  X\  E.  795),  144,  168, 

187,   198,   406,   443,   450,   521, 

522. 
Emerson  v.   State    (43   Ark   372), 

9,   17. 
Emmerson  v.  Xoble   (32  Me.  380), 

1171,  1598. 
Emert    v.    Missouri     (156    U.    S. 

296;    15    Sup.    Ct.    367),   321. 
Emery  v.  Lowell   (127  Mass.  138), 

812. 
Emery  v.  Xolloth   (72  L.  J.  K.  B. 

620    [1903]    2   K.   B.   264;    89 

L.  T.   100;   52  W.  R.   107;'  67 

J.  P.  354;  20  Cox  C.  C.  507), 

1355,   1357. 
Eminence  v.  Wilson,  103  Ky.  326; 

45  S.  W.  81;   20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

20),   809, 
Emmert  v.   Grill    (39   Iowa   690), 

1932. 
Emmons  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.l 

97  S.  W.   1044),  1472. 
Emory  v.  Addis  (71  III.  273),  1882, 

1012. 
Emporia  v.  Volmer  (12  Kan.  622), 

71,    270,    291,    412,    416,    430, 

569,  1748. 


cxxx 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are    to   pages.] 


Empson,  In  re  (3  N.  S.  VV.  L.  R. 

206),  701. 
Endelraan    v.    United    State     (80 

Fed.  450),  174,  1203. 
Engelhardt    (88    Ala.    100;    7    So. 

154),  2042,  2049,  2002. 
Engelthaler  v.  Linu  Co.   (104  Iowa 

293;  73  N.  W.  578),  797. 
England  v.  Cox  (89  111.  App.  551), 

1983. 
England  v.  Johnson  (86  Iowa  751; 

53  X.  W.  208),  1001. 
England   v.    State    (82   Ark.   488; 

102  S.  W.  373),  1206. 
Engle's  Estate,  In  re    ( 14  Montg. 

Co.  Law  Rep.  74),  2020. 
Engle  V.  Commonwealth    ( 1  S.  VV. 

593),  931. 
Engle  V.  Commonwealth   (7  Kj'.  L. 

Rep.     [abstract]     830),     553, 

554. 
Engle  V.  State  (97  Ind.  122),  1257, 

1565. 
Englehardt    v.    Delaware,    etc.    R. 

Co.    (78   Hun    588;    29    N.    Y. 

Supp.   425),    2199. 
Engleken  v.  Hilger  (43  Iowa  503), 

1886,  2002. 
Engleken  v.  Webber   (47  Iowa  558 

558),  1989,   1908,  2013. 
Engles  V.   Baker    (13   Allen   449), 

1772. 
English   V.   Beard    (51    Ind.   489), 

1855,    1871,    1893. 
English    V.    State     (7    Tex.    App. 

171),  1125,  1040. 
English    V.    Young     ( 10    B.    Mon. 

141),  2116. 
Ennis   v.    Shiley    (47    Iowa    552), 

1846,    1861,    1916,    1968,    19S9. 
Enright  v.  Atlanta    (78  Ga.  2S8), 

2141,  2193. 
Enterprising      Brewing      Co.      v. 

Grimes     (173    IMass.    252;    53 

N.  E.  855),  .537,  538,  1171. 
Eppenheinier  v.  Commonwealth    (7 

Ky.   L.   Rep,    [abstract]   223), 

448. 
Eppstein  v.   State    (11    Tex.   App. 

480),  1502,  1532. 


Equitable    Life,    etc.    Co.    v.    Ed- 

wardsville   (143  Ala.   162;   38 

So.    1016),    110. 
Equitable  Life  Assurn.  Soc.  v.  Lid- 
dell    (32  Tex.   Civ.  App.   2.52; 

74  S.  VV.  87  ) ,  2228. 
Erb  V.  German-American  Ins.  Co. 

(98  Iowa  006;  67  N.  VV.  583; 

40  L.  R.  A.  845),  1778. 
Erb  V.  State    (35  Ark.  638),  906. 
Erie  Licenses,  hi  re    (4  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.   167),  639. 
Erlinger   v.   Bonean    (51    111.   94), 

228,  233. 
Erwin   v.   Benton    (120    Ky.   536; 

87  S.  VV.  191;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

909),  873,  895,  898,  905. 
Erwin    v.    Cartersville     ( 120    Ga. 

150;  41  S.  E.  512),  1084. 
Erwin   v.   Stafford    (45   Vt.   390), 

1787,   1790. 
Erwin  v.  State    (121  Ga.  580;   49 

S.  E.  689),  1651. 
Erwin  v.  State  ( 10  Tex.  App.  700), 

2051,  2055,  2058. 
E.  S.  Bonnie  &  Co.  v.  Perry   (117 

Ky.    459;    78    S.    VV.    208;    25 

Ky.  L.  Rep.   1500),  702. 
E.  S.  Shelby  Vinegar  Co.  v.  C.  L. 

Hawn  &  Son   (149  N.  C.  355; 

63  S.  E.  78),   1788. 
Escanaba  Co.  v.  Chicago    (107   U. 

S.  678;   2  Sup.  Ct.  185),  315. 
Eshridge    v.    State    (25   Ala.   30), 

1583. 
Eslinger  v.   East    (100  Ind.  434), 

594,  598,  622. 
Espy  V.  State  (47  Ala.  533),  1189. 
Essex  County  v.  Barber   (2  Halst. 

[N.  J.  ]"  64),  809. 
Ess  V.  Bonton   (64  Mo.   105),  264, 

1585. 
Estes  V.  State    (55  Ga.  30),  2041, 

2071. 
Ethelstane,  Ex  parte  (40  .J.  P.  39; 

33   L.   T.  339),  359,  2028. 
Eureka   v.   Davis    (21   Kan.   578), 

573. 
Eureka  v.  Diaz    (89   Cal.  467;   26 

Pac.  961),  780. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CXXXl 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Eureka  v.  Jackson    (8  Kan.  App. 

49;  54  Pac.  5),  403,  438,  454. 
Eureka     Club     v.     Coniiiionwealth 

105   Va.   564;    54    S.   E.  470), 

1332. 
Eureka    Vinegar    Co.     v.     Gazette 

Printing   Co.    (35    Fed.   570), 

18,  49,  50,  907. 
Evans  v.   Commonwealth    (95  Ky. 

231;  24  S.  W.  032),  508,  037, 

799. 
Evans  v.  Commonwealth    ( 10   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  681),  1464, 

1467,   1764. 
Evans   v.    Conway,   J.   J.    ([1900] 

2  Q.  B.  224,  229;   69  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  636;    64  J.  P.  467;   48  W. 

R.  577;    82  L.  T.  704;    10  T. 

L.  R.  425),  679,  681. 
Evans  v.  Hall   (45  Pa.  235),  1158. 
Evans    v.    Heming-way     (52    J.    P. 

134),   1247,   1248^   1295. 
Evans  v.  Police  Jury  (114  La.  771; 

38  So.  555),  650,  934. 
Evans    v.      Redwood     Falls     (103 

Minn.   314;    115   N.   W.   200), 

417. 
Evans  v.  State    (52  Ark.  227;    15 

S.  W.  360),  1619. 
Evans  v.   State    (54  Ark.  227;    15 

S.  W.  360),  1180. 
Evans  v.   State    (101  Ga.  780;   29 

S.  E.  40),  1379,  1615. 
Evans  v.  State  ( 59  Ind.  563  ) ,  2026. 
Evans  v.  State    (150  Ind.  651;   50 

N.  E.  820 ) ,  262. 
Evans  v.  State   ([Tex.]   117  S.  W. 

167),  233,  249. 
Evansville  Bank  v.  Button  ( 105  U. 

S.  322),  355. 
Evers,    Ex    parte     (29    Tex.    App. 

539;     16    S.    W.    343),    2039, 

2088,  2090. 
Evers  v.   Hudson    (36  Mont.   135; 

92  Pac.  462),  232. 
Evers  v.  State    (31   Tex.  Cr.  App. 

318;    20  S.  W.  744;    18  L.  R. 

A.  421;  37  Am.  St.  811),  2040, 

2053,  2054,  2065,  2086,  2088, 

2089. 


Ewart    v.    Fryer     ([1901]     1    Ch. 

499),  1818. 
Ewing  V.  Lunu  (21  So.  66;  115  N, 

W.  527),  2253. 
Ewings   V.    Walker    (9   Gray    95), 

1033. 
Exchange  Bank  v.  Hines   (3  Ohio 

1),  294. 
Excise  License,  /u  re   ( [N.  Y.]   38 

N.  Y.   Supp.   425),  635 
Ezzell  v.  State  (29  Tex.  App.  521; 

16  S.  W.  782),  851,  852,  914, 

917,  928,  1752. 


F.  W.  Cook  Brewing  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth   ([Ky.]    9i)   S.    W. 

354;     355;     30    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

598,   600),   948,    1280. 
F.      W.     Cook     Brewing     Co.     v. 

Garber    (168    Fed.   942),    103, 

110,     122,    491,    494. 
Faber,    In    re     ( 1 15    N.    Y.    App. 

Div.    451;     101    N.    Y.    Supp. 

429),   746,   752. 
Faber    v.    Dwyer    (3    Gray,   471), 

2030. 
Faber    v.    Wilder     (70    Ark.    449; 

69    Ark.    260),    606. 
Fabor   v.   Green    (72   Vt.    117;    47 

Atl.   391),    17,  53. 
Fagan    v.    State    ([Del.]    74    AtL 

692),   498,   500. 
Fagg    V.    Louisville,    etc.,    R.    Co. 

(Ill   Ky.   30;   63   S.  W.  580; 

54  L.  R.  A.  919),  2183,  2213. 
Faher    v.     State     (27     Tex.    App. 

146;    11  S.  W\  108),  792. 
Fahey    v.    State    (62    Miss.    402), 

1358. 
Fahnestock     v.     State     (102     Ind. 

156;     1     N.     E.     372),     1444, 

1446. 
Fairchild    v.     Snyder     (43    Iowa, 

23),  2254. 


CXXXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


LRefei-ences    are    to    pages.] 


Fairclough    v.   Roberts    (24    Q.   B. 

Div.   350;    54    J.    P.    421;    59 

L.    J.    M.    C.    54;     62    L.    T. 

700;     38    W.    R.    330;     54    J. 

P.   421),   572,    1190.    1192. 
Fairclough    v.    Whitmore     (64    L. 

J.   'Ch.    386;    72    L.    T.    354; 

43  VV.  Pv.  421;    13   Rep.  402), 

374. 
Paircloth   v.  State    (73  Ga.   426), 

1368. 
Fairly   v.    State    (63    Miss.    333), 

87,    1753. 
Faiitnont     v.     Meyer      (83     Miun. 

456;    86   N.  VV.  457),  2026. 
Faivre      v.      Manderscliied       (117 

Iowa    724;     90    X.    W.    76), 

1912. 
Falconer   v.    Williams    ( 14    N.    Z. 

L.   R.   502),  649. 
F'alk   V.    Ferd   Heim   Brewing   Co. 

(10   Kan.  App.   248;    62  Pac. 

716),   1789. 
Fall,   In  re    (2<)   Misc.   Rep.   611; 

.57   N.   Y.  :Supp.   858),   731. 
Falmoutli     v.     Watson     (5     Busli 

•660),    168,    200,    405,    788. 
Falp  V.  Roanoke,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (120 

N.  C.  525;  27  S.  E.  74),  2178. 
Fanning,    In    re     (23    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.    «22),    62'8,    638. 
Fant    V.     People     (45     111.     259). 

71,    1538. 
Farback    v.    State    (24    Ind.    77), 

1240,    1241,    1628. 
Farenthold    v.    Tell     ([Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    113   S.    W.  635),    1962, 

1968,    1969. 
Faribault    v.    Hulett     (10    Minn. 

30),    1509. 
Farley     v.     Geislieker     (78     Iowa 

453;    43    N.    W.    279;     O.    L. 

R.  A  533),   1004 
Farley     v.     O'Malley      (77     Iowa 

531;     42     N.    W.     435),    992, 

1004. 
Farmer    v.    People    (77    111.    322), 

1237. 
Farmer   v.    State    (3    R.    I.    107), 

1077. 


Farmville    v.     Walker     (101     Va. 

323;    43   S.  E.   558),  91,   148, 

198. 
F^arndale   v.   Dillon    ([1907]    2   K. 

B.    513;     71     J.    P.    379;     76 

L.     J.     K.     B.     922),      1243, 

1244. 
Farr     v.     Anderson      (135     Mich. 

485;   98  N.   W.  6;    10  Detroit 

Leg.    N.    843),    764. 
F^arr    v.    Seward     (82    Iowa    221; 

48  N.  W.  67),   1004. 
Farr    v.    Waterman     ( [Tex.    Civ. 

App.]  95  S.  W.  65),  771. 
Farrell,  Ex  parte   (23  X.  B.  467), 

919. 
Farrell    v.    State     (3    Ind.    573), 

1716. 
Farrell    v.   State     (45    Ind.    371), 

1253,    1256,    1257,    1484,    1501, 

1517,    1742. 
Farrell    v.     State     (32     Ohio     St. 

456;   30  Am.  Rep.  614),  1290. 
Farrell     v.     United     States      (110 

Fed.   942;    49    C.  C.  A.    183), 

1259,    1262. 
Farrington    v.    Turner     ( 53    Mich. 

27),    894. 
Farris     v.     Commonwealth      (111 

Ky.    236;    63    S.    W.    615;    23 

Ky.   L.    Rep.   580),   931,   936, 

1469,    1493. 
Farris     v.     Commonwealth      ( 126 

Ky.    463;     104     S.     W.    281: 

290;     31     Ky.     L.     Rep.     847, 

850),    1194. 
Farroll    v.    State    (32    Ala.    557), 

1245,    1645. 
Farwell    v.    Brown     ( 12    Can.    L. 

J.    216),    1321. 
Farwell     v.     Hanchett      (19      111. 

App.  620),  2127. 
Fassett    v.    State    (16    Tex.    App. 

375),   1576. 
Fassinow  v.  State    (89   Ind.  235), 

1613. 
Faulkner's  Case   ([1670]   1  Saund. 

'•249 ),  104,  488,  1106. 
Faulkner,    In   re    (2    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

Rep.    86),   586. 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


CXXXIU 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Faulkner     v.    Cassidy     (39     Tex. 

Civ,     App.     415;     87     S.     W. 

904),    7JG,    7ii4,    77(5. 
Paulks   V.   People    (39  Mich.   200; 

33     Am.     Rep.     374),      1240, 

2141,   1628. 
Fawcett     v.      State      ( [Tex.      Cr. 

App.]    73   S.  W.  807),   964. 
Fay    V.    Barber     (72    Vt.    55 ;    47 

Atl.    1'80),    1075. 
Fay    V.    Williams     ([Tex.]    41    S. 

\V.   497),    1850,    1983. 
Fearn,  Ex  parte    (69   J.  P.    177), 

647. 
Fears    v.    State     (102    Ga.     274; 

29    S.    E.    463),    979. 
Fears    v.     State     (125     Ga.     740; 

54   S.  E.   661),  80. 
Featherstone   v.   Lambertville    (50 

N.    J.    L.    [21    Vroom]    507; 

14    Atl.    599),    401,    420. 
Febur      Sterling     Music     Co.      v. 

Weizz    (121   Pac.    1099),   349. 
Feddern   v.    State    (79    Xeb.    651; 

113   X.   W.    127),    1698,   1707. 
Fedderwitz,    Ex    parte    (130    Cal. 

xviii;      62     Pac.     935),      188, 

1510,    1512. 
Feek    v.     Bloomingdale    Tp.      (82 

Mich.    393;     47    N.    W.     37; 

10    L.    R.    A.    69),    171,    233, 

234,    235,    237,   238,    909. 
Feese    v.     Tripp      (70     III.     496), 

296. 
Fehn  v.  State    (3   Ind.  App.  568; 

29    N.    E.    1137),    1241. 
Feibelman     v.     State      (130     Ala. 

122;    30    So.    384),    111,    162. 
Feige  v.  State    (49   Tex.  Cr.   Ai)p. 

513;     95    S.    VV.    506),     1341, 

1342,  1343. 
Feige  v.  State  (59  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

513;  95  S.  W.  506),  1346, 

1347. 
Feigenspan    v.    Mulligan     (63    X. 

J.     E.     179;      51      Atl.      191; 

affirmed    [X.    J.    L.]    53    Atl. 

1124),    1775,    1776. 


Feil    V.   Kitchen   Bros.   Hotel    (57 

Xeb.    2)4;     77    X.    VV.    344), 

568,    608. 
Feineman     v.     Sachs      (33     Kann 

621;      7      Pac.      222),      1790, 

1797,  1798,  1801. 
Feist    V,    Tower,    JJ.     (68    J.    P. 

264),   670,   681. 
Felchin,   Ex  parte    (96   Cal.    360; 

31     Pac.     224;     31     Am.     St. 

223),   218,    795. 
Feldman  v.  Morrison    ( 1  111.  App. 

460),     27,     29,     48,     49,     50, 

73,  967,   1586. 
Fell    V.    State     (42    Md.    71;     20 

Am.   Rep.    83),    71,    124,    182, 

184,    185,   232,   235,   240,   4-88, 

489,    490,    714. 
Felska  v.  Xew  York,  etc.,  R,  Co. 

152    X.    Y.    339;     46    N.    E. 

613),    1736. 
Felton    V.    United    States    (96    U. 

S.   699),    1235,  2161. 
Fennick  v.   CKvings    (70   Md.  246; 

16  Atl.   719),  905. 
Fenton     v.     Holloway     ( 1     Stark. 

126),   2093,  2106. 
Fenton    v.    State    (100    Ind.   59«), 

35,   80,  81,   1561. 
Fentz   V.   Meadows    (72    111.   540), 

296,  1350,  1843,  1847,  1908, 

1987,    1994. 
Ferch,   In  re    (27    Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

92),    540. 
Ferenthold     v.     Tell      ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    113   S.  W.   635),   1850, 

1853. 
Ferguson     v.     Brown      ( 75     Miss. 

214;    21    So.    603),    559,    568, 

587,   589,   662,   664,   666,   670, 

685. 
Ferguson    v.   Josey    ( 70   Ark.    94 ; 

66    S.   W.   345),   295,    1003. 
Ferguson    v.    Monroe    County    ( 7 1 

Miss.    524;    14    So.    81),    S.).i. 

861,    879. 
Ferguson     v.     Riendeau     (2     ^lon. 

[Can.]   S.   C.   136),   1152. 
Ferguson  v.  State   (71  Miss.  524; 

14    So.    81),    861. 


CXXXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Ileferences    are    to    pages.] 


Ferguson    v.    State    (50    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    155;     95    S.    \V.    Ill), 

1242,  1461,  1462. 
Ferndale  v.  Dillon  ([1907]  2  K. 

B.  513;  76  L.  J.  K.  B. 

922;  97  L.  T.  284;  71  J. 

P.  374;  21  Cox  C.  C.  500), 

354. 
Ferron   v.   Board    (28    R.   I.   529; 

68    Atl.    480),    743. 
Ferrell    v.    State     (43    Tex.    503), 

2040,    2048,    2067,    2073. 
Ferry  v.  Deneen    (110   Iowa   290; 

82  N.  W.  424),  805 
Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park    (97 

U.   S.   659),    117,    181,   398. 
Fessenden     v.     Bossa     (69     Conn. 

335;    37    Atl.    977),   903. 
Fetter    v.    State     (18    Ind.    388), 

1491. 
Fetter  v.  Wilt    (40   Pa.   St.   457), 

138,    247. 
Fidelity,   etc.,    Ins.    Co.   v.    Cham- 
bers   (93    Va.    1?8;    24    S.    E. 

896;      40     L.     P.     A.     432), 

2189,   2238. 
Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Jenness   ( 138 

Iowa    725;    116   N.    W.   709), 

766. 
Fiegenston  v.  Mulligan    (63  N.  J. 

Eq.    179;    51    Atl.    191),    480. 
Fieldea   v.    Alater    ([1869]    L.    R. 

7     Eq.     523;     38     L.    J.    Ch. 

379;    20    L.    T.    485;     17    W. 

R,   485),    1813, 
Field    V.    libbetts     (57    Me.    358; 

39    Am.    Dec.    779),    1807. 
Fielding  v.   La  Grange    ( 104   Iowa 

530;    73   X.    W.    1038),    1237, 

1759. 
Fielding    v.    State    (135    Ala.   56; 

33  So.   677),  2038,  2091. 
Fielding     v.      State      ([Tex.      Cr. 

App.]  52  S.  \V.  09).  1237. 
Fielding  v.  Turner    ([1903]    1    K. 

B.    867;     67    J.    P.    252;     72 

L.   J.    K.    B.    542;    51    W.    K. 

643;     89    L.    T.    273;     10    T. 

L.  R.   404),  3S1. 


Fields,    Ex    parte     (39    Tex,    Cr. 

App.    50';     46    S.    VV.    1127), 

934. 
Fields,  Ex  parte   (  [Tex,  Cr.  App.] 

86  S.  W.   1022),  938,  943. 
Fields   V.   State    ( [Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

98    S.    W.    867),    1372. 
Fields     V,     State      (52     Tex.     Cr, 

App,    451;    107    S,    W,    857), 

1206,    1682, 
Fike   V.   State    (25    Ohl,»   Cir,    Ct, 

Rep,    554),   921. 
Financial  Ass'n  v.  State    ( 6   Kan. 

App,     206;      49     Pac,      696), 

1768,    1769. 
Fineannon  v.   State    (93  Ga.   418; 

21    S,    E,    53),    333, 
Finch   V,   Blundell    (26   J.   P.    71; 

5   L.   T.   672),    1141, 
Finch  V.  Mansfield    (97   Mass.   89, 

92),    1280,    1795,    1799,    1800. 
Finch     V.     State     (120    Ga,     1.'4; 

47  S.  E,  504),  1701. 
Fink    V.    Coe    (4   G,    Greene    555; 

61    Am,    Dec.    141),    2198. 
Fink    V.    Garman     (40    Penn.    St. 

95),     1252,     1869. 
Finley,    In    re     (58    N,    Y.    Misc. 

639;     110    N.    Y.    Supp.    71), 

295,  591,  592, 
Finley   v.   Commonwealth    ( 6    Ky. 

L.      Rep.      [abstract]       443), 

2039, 
Finley  v.   State    ([Tex,   Cr,  App,] 

47   S,    W.    1015),    1599,    1603. 
Finn    v.    Haynes     (37    Mich,    63), 

804, 
Finnegan,  Ex  parte    (27   Nev,  57; 

71    Pac.   642),    1576. 
Finnegan     v,     Lucy      ( 157     Mass. 

439;     32    N,    E.    656),     1850. 

1851. 
Fire     Department    v.     Ilelfenstein 

(16    Wis.    136),    426, 
Fish    V.    Manning    (31    Fed.    340). 

1484. 
Fisher   v.    Cass   County    (75    Iowa 

232;    39    N.    W.  ^283),    1000, 

1001. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXV 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Fisher   v.   Howard    (34   L.   J.   M. 

C.     42;     11     L.     T.     373;     29 

J.    P.    24{);     13    VV.    K.    145), 

1155. 
Fisher  v.  Lord  («3  N.  H.  514; 

3  Atl.  927),  1790,  1791,  1794, 

1797,  1798. 
Fisher  v.  McGirr  (1  Gray  1; 

61  Am.  Dec.  381),  254,  255, 
264,  1007,  1013,  1031,  1033, 
1072. 

Fisher  v.  State  (64  Ind.  435), 

2040,  2045,  2050,  2053,  2054, 

2055,  2080. 
Fisher  v.  State  (55  Fla.  17;  46 

So.  422),  1172,  1205. 
Fisher  v.  State  (20  Tex.  App. 

502),  2090. 
Fisher  v.  West  Virginia,  etc.,  R. 

Co.  (39  W.  Va.  266;  19  S. 

E.  578;  23  L.  K.  A.  758), 

2177,  2179,   2197,  2201,  2202, 

2217. 
Fisher   v.   West  Virginia,   etc.,   R. 

Co.    (42    W.   Va.    183;    24    S. 

E.    570),    2174. 
Fisk  V.  Townsend    (7   Yerg.    140), 

21%,    2106. 
Fitch  V.  Commonwealth   ( 4  Ky.  L. 

Rep.    339),     1463,     1545. 
Fitch   V.   Lewiston    (137   111.   App. 

570),    463. 
Fitz    V.    Ilea    ([1893]     1    Ch.    77; 

62  L.  J.  Ch.  258;  68  L. 
T.    108;    2    R.    132),    1815. 

Fitze     V.     State     (13     Tex.     App. 

372),    929. 
Fitze   V.    State    ( [Tex.   Cr.    App. J 

85    S.    W.     1156),    872,    896, 

908,   1207,   1680. 
Fitzenrider     v.     State      (30     Ind. 

238),    1240,    1248,    1252. 
Fitzgerald    v.    Donoher     (48    Neb. 

852;    67    W.    880),    1902. 
Fitzgerald   v.    Hurley    (180    Mass. 

151;    61    N.    E.    815),    930. 
Fitzgerald    v.     Weston     ( 52    Wis. 

354),     2173,     2177. 
Fitzgerald     v.     Witchard      ( [Ga.] 

61   S.   E.   227),   182,   814. 


Fitzgibbon    v.    Macy     (118    Iowa 

440;    92   N.    W.   78),   573. 
Flack    V.    Fry    (32    W.    Va.    364; 

9  S.  E.  240),   167. 
Flack    V.    State    ([Tex.    App.]     18 

S.    W.    414),    1464,    1471. 
Flaherty     v.     Longley      ( 62     Me. 

423),   1051,   1053. 
Flancher    v.    Camden     (50    N.    J. 

L.  244;    28   Atl.  82),   682. 
Flanagan,   In   re    (49   N.   Y.   App. 

99;     63     X.     Y.     Supp.    531), 

1269. 
Flanagan  v.   Plainlield    (44   X.   J. 

L.    118i,    1508. 
Flanigan    v.     People     (86    X.     Y. 

554;  40  Am.  Rep.  556),  2040, 

2043,    2046. 
Flannagan,    Ex   parte    (34    X.    B. 

577),    1717,    1755. 
Flannigan     v.     Wilkesbarre      ( 10 

Kulp.  100),  808. 
Fleeks  v.  State   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

327;    83    S.    W.    381),    1510, 

1525. 
Fleischman    Co.    v.    Murray    (lol 

Fed.    152),    381. 
Fleming    v.    X"ew    Brunswick     (41 

X.  J.  L.  231),  24,  26,  98. 
Fleming    v.    Xew    Brunswick     (47 

X.    J.    L.    231),    1522. 
Fleming    v.    State    (106    Ga.    359; 

32   S.  E.   338),   1211,   1599. 
Fleming     v.     State      (5     Humph. 

564),   2258,   2260. 
Fleming     v.      State      ( [Tex.      Cr. 

App.]    22  S.   W.   1038),   1743. 
Flers.heim  v.  Cary    (39  Ken.   178; 

17    Pac.    825),     1774. 
Fletcher    v.    Commonwealth     ( 106 

Va.   850;    56    S.    E.    149),    21, 

1491,    1505,    1763. 
Fletcher   v.  Crist    (139   Ind.    121; 

38     X.     E.     472),     602,    <308, 

1749. 
Fletcher     v.     Fowler      (83     Mich. 

52;    46    X.    W.    1023;     10    L. 

IL    A.    SD),    11)37,    19 '5. 
Fletcher   v.   Peck    (6   Cranch    LU. 

S.]   87),  261. 


CXXXVl 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


rietchcr  v.  People    (81   111.   116), 

1764. 
rietcher  v.   State    (54   In<l.   462), 

1109. 
Fleetwood     v.     Hull     ([1889]     23 

Q.    B.    D.    35;    58    L.    J.    g. 

B.    341;     54    J.    P.    229;     60 

L.    T.    790;    37    W.    R.    714), 

1821. 
Flinn,    Ex    parte     (68    L.    J.    Q. 

B.     1025     [1899];     2     Q.     B. 

607;    81    L.    T.    221;     48    W. 

R.    29;    63    J.    P.    743),    630. 
Flint    V.    Ganer     (66    Iowa    696; 

24    X.    W.    513),    1916,    1917, 

1989. 
Flint,    etc.,    Woodhull     (25    Mich. 

103),    106. 
Flora    V.    Sachs     (64    Ind.     155), 

276. 
Florence,  Ex  parte   (78  Ala.  419), 

432. 
Florence  v.  Berry    (61   S.  C.  237; 

39  S.  E,  247),   1677. 
Florence    v.    Brown     ( [S.    C]    26 

S.  E.  880),   168,   170,  246. 
Flosser,  In  re   (8  Kulp.  343),  735. 
Flourney    v.     City     of     Jefferson- 

ville    (17    Ind.    169;    79    Am. 

Dec.    468),    1014. 
Flournoy  v.   Grady    (25  La.  Ann. 

591),    553. 
Flower    v.    State    (39    Ark.    209), 

822,    1643, 
Flower    v.    Witkovsky     (69    Mich. 

371;     37    N.    W.*  364),    1'890, 

1893,    1937. 
Floyd   V.   Anderson    (12   X.    Z.   L. 

R.    567),    1247. 
Floyd   V.    Commissioners    ( 14    Ga. 

354),    1748. 
Fluck  V.  Rea    (51   X.  J.  Eq.  233; 

affirming  51  W.  J.   Eq.  539), 

2148,    2149. 
Fludd    V.    Equitable,    etc.,    of    U. 

S.     (75     S.     C.     315;     55     S. 

E.    762),    2223. 
Fly  V.  Webster    (102  Mass.   304), 

1790. 


Flynn  v.  Forgarty   (106  111.  263), 

1947,    1963. 
Flynn    v.    Galesburg     ( 12    Bradw. 

[111.]    200),  1237. 
Flynn   v.    Taylor    ( 145    Ind.    533 ; 

44     X.     E.     546),     144,     601, 

603,    613,    857. 
Foerkter    v.    United    States     (116 

Fed.    860),    1263. 
Foley,  Ex  parte    (29   X.  B.   113), 

649. 
Foley  V.  Leisy  Brewing  Co.    (116 

Iowa    176;    89    X.    W.    230), 

1792,    1803,    1804. 
Foley  V.   State    (42  Xeb.   233;    60 

X.  W.  574),   1477. 
Follis   V.   U.   S.   Mut.   Ace.  Acc'n. 

(94    Iowa     435;     62    X.     W. 

807),   2243. 
Foltyn,  In  re    ([Xeb.]    118  X.  W. 

119),    671. 
Foltz    V.     State     (33    Ind.    215), 

215. 
Fonney,    In    re     (28    Pa.    Super. 

€t.    71),   565. 
Fontain  v.  Draper   (49  Ind.  441), 

1253,    1256,    1882,    1912. 
Fontana   v.   Grant    ( 6    Kan.   App. 

462;    50  Pac.    104),   433,   452. 
Fonville    v.    State     (91    Ala.    39; 

8  So.  688),  2042,  2051,  2057, 

2060. 
Fooks   V.    Purnell    (101    Md.   321; 

61    Atl.    582),    658. 
Foot    V.    Baker     (6    Scott    X.    R. 

301:   5  Man.  L  Gr.  335),  374. 
Foot    V.    Tewksbury    (2    Vt.    97), 

2093,    2094,    2098. 
Foote   V.    Butler    (41    J.    P.    792), 

378. 
Foote    V.    Foote     (71    X.    J.    Eq. 

273;    61    Atl.   90),   2153. 
Foote    V.    People    (56    X.   Y.    321: 

reversing    2    T.    &    C.    216). 

1759. 
Foppiano  v.  Speed  (199  U.  S. 

501;  26  Sup.  Ct.  13S;  50  L. 

Ed.    —    [affirming    113    Tenn. 

167;    82    S.    W.    222]),    329, 

331,   427,  548. 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


CXXXVll 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Forbes    v.     Edinburgh,    etc.,    Co. 
(10    S.    C.    Sess.    Cas.     [1st. 

series]  451),  2220. 
i'ord    V.    Ames     (30    Hun    571), 

1936. 
Ford  V.  Cheever    (105  Mich.  685; 

63   N.    W.    975),    1882,    1955, 

1985,   1986. 
Ford    V.    Denver     ( 10    Colo.    App. 

500;   51   Pac.   1015),   1188. 
Ford   V.  Moss    (12-i   Ky.   288;    98 

S.   W.    1015;    30   Ky.   L.   Rep. 

428),   1320. 
Ford  V.  State    (79  Neb.  309;    112 

N.    W.    606),    1087. 
Ford    V.    State     (71     Ala.    385), 

2041,  2061. 
Ford  V.  State    (82  Ark.  603;    102 

S.   W.    1196),   951,    1287. 
Ford  V.   State    (45   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

288;    77   S.  W.  800),   1196. 
Ford    V.    Umatilla    Co.     (15    Or. 

313;   16  Pac.  33),  2177,  219'), 

2191,  2192,  2193. 
Foreman,    In    re    (20    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  98),  664,  666,  668. 
Foreman  v.  Hennepin  County   (64 

Minn.    371;    67    N.    W.    207), 

197,  278,  2016,  2023. 
Foreman     v.     Hunter      (59     Iowa 

550;     13    N.    W.    659),    1491. 
Forest,   In   re    (23   Pa.   Super   Ct. 

600;     affirmed     208     Pa.     St. 

578;    57   Atl.   991),   576,   587. 
Forest     v.     Tolman      (117     Mass. 

109),   1844. 
Forfeter  v.  Moore   (67  N.  H.  460; 

36     Atl.     369),     1855,     1869, 

1896,    1941. 
Forkner   v.    State    (95    Iml.   406), 

1166,    1501,    1564. 
Formby     v.     Barker      ([1903]      2 

Ch.    539;    72   L.   J.   Ch.    710; 

51     W.     R.     646;     89     L.     T. 

249),    1814. 
Forney   v.    Forney    (80   Cal.    528; 

22    Pac.    294),    2159,    2160. 
Forrester  v.   State    (63   Ga.   349), 

1349,    1353. 


Forst,  In  re  (208  Pa.  St.  678; 
67  Atl.  991;  affirming  23 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  600),  576. 

Forteer  v.  Moore    (67  N.  H.  460; 

36  A.    369),    1876. 
Fortner  v.  Duncan    (91   Ky.    171; 

15    S.    VV.   55),   411. 
Ft.   Scott  V.  Dunkerton    (78  Kan. 

189;   90  Pae.  50),  990. 
Ft.  Smith  V.  Hunt   (72  Ark.  556; 

82   S.    W.    163;    60   L.   R.   A. 

238),    479. 
Fort    Worth    v.    Davis     (57    Tex. 

225),  925. 
Ft.     Worth     Fair     Ass'n.     v.     Ft. 

Worth   Driving  Club    ([Tex.] 

121   S.  W\  213),   1812. 
Forwood   V.   State    (49   Md.   531), 

1169. 
Foshee  v.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

87   S.  W.   820),  950. 
Foss   v.   Hildreth    (10   Allen   76), 

2103. 
Fossdahl   v.   State    (89   Wis.   482; 

62   N.   W.    185),    1657. 
Foster,    In    re     (bl    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    676;     108    X.    Y.    Supp. 

788),    889. 
Foster    v.    Board     (102   Cal.    483; 

37  Pac.     763;     41     Am.     St. 
194),    532. 

Foster   v.    Brown    (55    Iowa    680; 

8  N.  W.  654),  273,  395,  403. 
Foster    v.    Burt     (76    Ala.    229), 

186,  445,  796,  797. 
Foster    v.    Haines    (13    Me.    307), 

1115. 
Foster  v.   Hazen    (12   Barb.   547), 

1509. 
Foster     v.     Kansas      (112     U.     S. 

201;    5    S.    C.    8;    28    L.    Ed. 

629),    109,   315. 
Foster    v.    Lambe     (3    Quebec,    S. 

C.   328),   798. 
Foster     v.     San     Francisco      (102 

Cal.    483;     37    Pac.    763;     41 

Am.   St.    194),   218,   414. 
Foster   v.   Speed    ( [Tenn.]    Ill    S. 

W.    925),    590. 


CXXXVlll 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Foster    v.    State    (38    Ala,    425), 

1649. 
Foster    v.    State     (36    Ark.    258), 

55,    60. 
Foster    v.    State    (45    Ark.    361), 

1219,    1227,    1578,    1615. 
Foster     v.     Ihurston      (11     Cush. 

322),   1791,   1798. 
Fountain  v.  Drajx^r  (49  Ind.  441), 

1871. 
Fotheringham      v.      George       ( 19 

Juta   532)  J    615. 
Fouraker    v.    State      4    Ga.    App. 

692;     62     S.    E.     116),     1579. 
Fourment    v.     State     ([Ala.]     46 

So.    26C],    284,    291. 
Fonts    V.    Hood    River     (46    Ore. 

-,.._;      hi      Pac.      370),     228, 

233. 
Fowle    V.    Blake     (38    Mo.    528), 

1782. 
Fowler    v.    Meadow    Brook    Water 

■Co.     (208    Pa.    473;     57    Atl. 

959),   2095. 
Fowler   v.    Morton     ([1905]    Viet. 

L.    R.    76;    26    Austr.    L.    T. 

143;    10   Aust.    L.    Rep.    267), 

1281. 
Fowler    v.    Rome     Dispensary     (5 

Ga.   App.   36;    62   S.   E.   66 J), 

382,   1839,   1869,   1907. 
Fowler    v.    State     (85    Ind.    538), 

1649. 
Fowler      v.      United      States      ( 1 

Wash.   T.    3),    1261. 
Fox    V.    Michigan    Cent.     R.    Co. 

(138    Mich.   433;    101    N.    W. 

624;    68  L.  R.  A.  336),  2191, 

2214. 
Fox    V.    State    of    Oliio     ( 5    How. 

410),   273. 
Fox   V.    State    (53    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

150;     109    S.    W.    370),    935, 

1188,    1218,    1219,    1731. 
Fox    V.    Territory     (2    Wash.    T. 

297;    5   Pac.  "603),   2260. 
Fox  V.  Wunderlich    ( 04   Iowa  87 ; 

20   N.   W.   7),    1974. 
Foxcroft  V.  Croker   ( 40  Me.  308 ) , 

476. 


Fox  Lake  v.  Village  of  Fox  Lake 

(62  Wis.  486;  22  N.  W.  584), 

806. 
Foylton    ([Neb.]    118  N.  W.   119), 

663. 
Frae,    In    re    (33    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

34'8),  664. 
Frame  v.  State    (53  Ohio  St.  311; 

45   X.   E.   5),  809. 
France,    In    re     ( 36    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    693;     74    N.    Y.    Supp. 

379),   '889. 
Francis    v.    Hay  ward    ([1882]    22 

Ch.   D.    177;    47    J.    P.    517), 

1834. 
Francis    v.    Smith     (2    W.    N.    C. 

[N.    I.    W.]    82),    375. 
Francis     v.     State      ([Tex.]      119 

S.  W.  97),  7. 
Francis   v.    State    ([Tex.]    119    S. 

W.  97),   1304. 
Frank,  In  re    (.52  Cal.  o06),  40S. 
P'rank    v.   'Commonwealth    (  [Ky.] 

15    ,S.    W.    877;     13    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    833),    1524. 
Frank    v.    Forgotston    (61    X.    Y. 

Supp.    1118),    491 
Frank  v.   Hoey    (128   Mass.  263), 

1280,    1284. 
Frank  v.  O'Neil    (125  Mass.  473), 

1800. 
Frank    W'arr    &,    Co.    Limited    v. 

London         County        Council 

([1903]     67    J.    P.    403;     88 

L.   T.  689;    19   T.   L.   R.   436; 

affirmed    C.    A.    20    T.    L.    R. 

340  1.    1834. 
Frankfort     v.     Auglie      (114     Ind. 

77,  600;    15  N.  E.  802,  804), 

414,    443,    450,    1477. 
Franklin      v.      Schermerhorn       (S 

Hun     112),      183,      184.     223, 

1840,    1864. 
Franklin    Co.    v.    State     (24    Fla. 

55;    3    So.    471;     12    Am.    St. 

183),    904. 
Franklin    v.    State    (85    Ind.    99), 

1019. 
Franklin   v.   State    (12   Md.   236), 

1516. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXIX 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Franklin    v.     Stringam     (5G     111. 

App.    194),  506. 
Franklin    v.     Westfall     (27     Kan. 

614),  258,  491,   1194. 
Fraser,  In  re    ( 1  Can.  Law   Jour. 

327),    1723. 
Frasier    v.     State     (5     Mo.    536), 

1538,    1566,    1634. 
Frawley,    //*    re     ([1907]    14    Ont. 

App.    L.    R.    99),    432. 
Fraser  v.   South,  etc.,  R.   Co.    (81 

Ala.   185;    60   Am.   Rep.   145), 

2182,    2183. 
Frazier    v.     State     (52     Tex.     Cr. 

App.    131;     105    S.    \V.    508), 

1584. 
Fred     Miller      Brewing      Co.      v. 

Stevens     (102    Iowa    60;     70 

N.   W.   1'86),    1792,   1800. 
Fredericks   v.    Passaic    (42    X.    J. 

L.    87),    1516,    1643. 
Freedman   v.    State    (37    Tex.  Cr. 

App.     115;     38    S.    W.    993), 

1357. 
Freeman    v.     Dwiggins     (2    Jones 

Eq.       [X.      C.J       162),      2094, 

2099. 
Freeman    v.    Howe    (24    How.    [U. 

S.]     450),    1012. 
Freeman     v.     Lazarus     (61     Ark. 

247;    32    S.    W.    680;    31    So. 

361),    92U. 
Freeman   v.    Staats    (9    X.    J.    Eq. 

818),     2104,     2123. 
Freeman   v.    Staats    (4   Ilalst.    Eq. 

[X.    J.]    814;     1    Stwkt.    Eq. 

[X.     J.]      816),     2096,     2106 
2108,  2121. 
Freeman      v.      State       (II!)      Ind. 

501;    21    X.    E.    1101),    1716. 
Freeman     v.      Commonwealth      (8 

Bush      139),     521. 
Freeport    v.     Mark     (59    Pa.    St. 

253),   107. 
Freese    v.    Tripp     (70    111.     496), 

1843,    1908,    1982,    19S7,    1990. 
Freese  v.  State  (14  Tex.  App.  31), 

492. 
Freiberg    v.    State     (94    Ala.    91; 
10  So.  703),  80,  1514,  1645. 


Freleigh    v.    State     (8    Mo.    606), 

95,   129,   182,  489. 
French   v.   Xoel    (22   Gratt.   454), 

635,  664. 
French    v.    People    (3    Parker    Cr. 

Rep.    114),    1372,    1377. 
Freshman    v.    State    (37    Tex.   Cr. 

App.    126;    38    S.    W.    1007), 

949. 
French    v.    French     (8    Ohio    214; 

31  Am.  Dee.  441),  2093,  2094, 

2098,  2128,  2130. 
French    v.    State     (93    Wis    325; 

67    X.    W.    706),    2051,    2052. 
Frese   v.    State    (23    Fla.    267;    2 

So.     1),     25,     32,     79,     1111, 

1740,    1763. 
Fretwell   v.   Troy    (18   Kan.   27i), 

793. 
Frickie    v.    .State     (39     Tex.     Cr. 

App.    254;     45    S.    W.    810), 

872,    888,    1491. 
Frickie    v.    State     ( 40    Tex.    Civ. 

App.     626;     51     S.    W.    394), 

9,   962,   963. 
Fried     v.     Xelson      ( 30     App.     1 ; 

65  X.  E.  216),  606,  854. 
Friedman,    In    re     ( 7    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  639),  635. 
Friedman         v.        Commonwealth 

([Ky.]     S3    S.    W.    1040;    26 

Ky.    L.    Rep.    1276),        1163, 

1193. 
Friend    v.    Dunks    (37    Mich.   25), 

1883,    1973,    1965. 
Friend  v.  Dunks    (39  Mich.   733), 

1862,    1955,    1971,    1972. 
Friery  v.  People    (54   Barb.   319), 

2040. 
Fries    v.    Porch     (49    Iowa,    351), 

1016,     1028,     1074. 
Frisbie    v.    State     (1     Ore.    248), 

1491,    1713. 
Friesner   v.   Common  Council    (91 

Mich.    504;     52    X.    VV.    IS), 

233,    852,    877. 
Fritz  V.   State    (1    Baxt.    15),   24, 

26,   43,   965. 


cxl 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References    are    to   pages.] 


Frobese     v.     Peary      ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    43    S.    W.    900),    1903. 
Frohlich    v.     Alexander     (36     111. 

App.  428),  1280. 
Froliclisiein    v.    Mobile     (40    Ala. 

725),   214,   215. 
Frost's    Case     (22    How.    St.    Tr. 

472),   2039. 
Frost    V.    State     (64    Miss.    iS8; 

1    So.   49),    182. 
Frost  V.    Wheeler    (43    N.   J.    Eq. 

573;     12    Atl.    612),    2137. 
Frudie    v.    State     (66    Neb.    244; 

92    N.    W.    320),    1730,    1731. 
Fry    V.    Kaessner     (48    Neb.    133; 

66   N.   W.    1126),   799. 
Fryer    v.    Ewart     ([1902]     A.    C. 

187;    71    L.    J.    Ch.    433;    86 

L.     T.     242;      18     T.     L.     R. 

426;    9    Mans.    281),    1818. 
Fulds  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

107    S.    W.    857),    1202. 
Fuller  V.   Fouhy    (24  N.   Z.   753), 

369. 
Fuller    V.    Fuller     (108    Ga.    256; 

33  S.  E.  865),  68. 
Fuller  V.   Hunt    (182   Mass.   299; 

65    N.    E.    390),    1790. 
Fuller    V.    Leet    (59    N.    H.    163), 

1788. 
Fuller    V.    McDonnell     (75     Iowa 

220;   39  N.  W.  277),  985. 
Fuller    V.    State     (122    Ala.    32; 

45    L.    R.    A.     502;     25     So. 

146),    2261. 
Fullwood  V.  State   (67  Miss.  554), 

882,  907,  1361. 
Fulp    V.     Roanoke,     etc.,     R.     Co. 

(120    X.    C.    525;     27    S.    E. 

74),   2184.   2195. 
Fulton    V.    Blj-the     ( [Ky.]    30    S. 

A.    1018),    796.    798. 
Funk    V.    Israel     (5    Iowa    438), 

1028. 
Furlong    v.     Russell     (24     X.     B. 

478),     1789. 
Furman     v.     Knapp      ( 19     Johns 

248),    449,    521. 
Furman,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Loner    (11.3 

Ala.    203;    21    So.    339),    480. 


Fumis    V.    Mutual    L.    Ins,     Co. 

[X.  Y.]   *6  X.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

467),  2245. 
Fuselier    v.    St.    Laundry    Parish 

(107    La.    221;    31    So.    678), 

798. 
Futrill   V.    Futrill    (5    Jones    Eq. 

61),   2103. 


Gabel  v.   Houston    (29   Tex.  355), 

216,  407,  433,  475. 
Gable  v.  Grant   (3  X.  J.  Eq.  629), 

2147,  2148. 
Gable  v.  State    (42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

501;   60  S.  VV.  960),  1680. 
Gaertner  v.  Fond-du-Lac   (34  Wis. 

497),  740,  747. 
Gafford   v.   Busch    (60   Cal.    149), 

1739. 
Gage  V.  Caraher   (125  111.  447;   17 

X.  E.  777),  264,  1585. 
Gage    V.    Elsey    (52    L.   J.    M.    C. 

44;    10  Q.  B.  Div.  518;   48  L. 

T.  226;    31   W.  R.  500;   47  J. 

P.   391),    1384. 
Gage  V.  Harvey    (66  Ark.  68;   48 

S.  W.  898;   43  L.  R.  A.   143; 

74  Am.  St.  Rep.  70),   1867. 
Gage   V.    State    ( [Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

76  S.  W.  459),  1570. 
Gahagan  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.    ( 1 

Allen  189;  79  Am.  Dec.  724), 

2198. 
Gaillard  v.  Cantini   (76  Fed.  699; 

22  C.  C.  A.  493 ) ,  1046. 
Gaines  v.   State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

21  S.  W.  367),  1627. 
Gaines  v.  State   (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

73;  38  S.  W.  774),  1471. 
Gaiocehio   v.    State    (9    Tex.   App. 

387),  202,  204.   1353,   1359. 
Gaiten    v.    State     (11    Tex.    App. 

544),  2090. 
Galbreath  v.  State   (36  Tex.  200). 

370. 
Gale  V.  Moscow   (15  Idaho  332;  97 

Pac.   828),   414,  441. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxli 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Galindo   v.    Walter    (8    Cal.    App. 

234;    96  Pac.  505),  849. 
Gallagher     v.     Bishop      ( 15     Wis. 

276),    1027. 
Gallagher  v.  Meek   (5  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

[abstract]  424),  847. 
Gallagher  v.  People   (120  111.  179; 

11  N.  E.  335,  affirming  29  111. 

App.  397),  64,  67,  1254,  1633, 

1735,   1736,   1754. 
Gallagher  v.  Rudd   ( 67  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

65    [1898];    1    Q.   B.    114;    77 

L.  T.  367;   46  W.  R.   108;    61 

J.  P.  789 ;   18  Cox  C.  C.  654 ) , 

1142. 
Gallatin  v.  Tarwater   (143  Mo.  40; 

44   S.   W.    750),   2026. 
Galligan  v.  Fannan  (7  Allen  255), 

1780. 
Galliher     v.      Commonwealth      (2 

Duv.  164),  2061. 
Gallimore    v.    Goodall     (38    J.    P. 

597),  1150. 
Galloway  v.   State    (23   Tex.   App. 

398;  5  S.  W.  246),  33,  80,  81, 

380. 
Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis   (4 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  468;  22  S.  W. 

659),  2198,  2199. 
Galveston,   etc.    R.    Co.   v.    Harris 

(22  Tex.  Civ.  App.    16;   53  S. 

W.  599),  2185. 
Gambill  v.  Erdrich   (143  Ala.  506; 

39  So.  297),  795,  797. 
Gambill  v.  Schunck  (131  Ala.  321; 

31   So.  604),   1114. 
Gamble  v.  State   (44  Fla.  429;   33 

So.    471;    60    L.   R.    A.    647), 

2248,  2249,  2251    2252. 
Gamble  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

57  S.  W.  95),  1524. 
Gandy  v.  State   (86  Ala.  20;  5  So. 

420),  291. 
Ganssly  v.  Perkins  (30  Mich.  492), 

1984. 
Garbrecht   v.    Commonwealth    (90 

Pa.   449;    42    Am.    Rep.   550), 

1284. 
Garbrough    v.    Harper     (25    Miss. 
112),  1027. 


Gardner    v.    Campbell    (15   Johns. 

[N.  Y.]  401),  1027. 
Gardner  v.  Day    (95  Me.  558;   50 

A.  892),    1839,    1843,    1844. 
Gardner    v.    Gardner     (22    Wend. 

526;  499  Am.  Dec.  340),  2115, 

2122,  2135,  2136,  2149. 
Gardner   v.   Morris    (20   HI.   431), 

394. 
Gardner  v.  Parr    (2  R.  &  G.  255; 

S.  C.  1  Can.  L.  T.  710),  824. 
Gardner   v.   People    (20   111.   430), 

402,  466. 
Garey,    In    re    (  ( 1    Pa.    Co.    Rep. 

468),    720. 
Garland  v.   Derir    (20   W.  N.    [N. 

S.  W.]   1),  1363. 
Garner  v.   State    (28   Fla.    113;    9 

So.    835),    2041,    2045,    2048, 

2062,  2081,  2085. 
Garner  v.  State    (8  Blackf.   [Ind.] 

368),  928. 
Garner    v.    State     (28    Tex.    .4  pp. 

561;     13    S.    W.    1004),    1236, 

1628. 
Garrett  v.  Aby  (47  La.  Ann.  618), 

232,  933. 
Garrett  v.   Bishop    (113   Iowa  23; 

84  N.  W.  923),  341. 
Garrett   v.    Mayor    (47    La.    Ann. 

618;   17  So.  238),  938. 
Garrett  v.  Middlesex    (J.  J.   12  Q. 

B.  Div.  620;  48  J.  P.  358; 
53  L.  J.  M.  C.  81;  32  W.  R. 
646),  671,  681,  704. 

Garrett  v.  Polk  County  (78  Iowa 
108;  42  N.  W.  618),  1057, 
1060,  1075. 

Garrety  v.  Potts  (L.  R.  6  Q.  B. 
86;  35  J.  P.  168;  40  L.  J.  M. 

C.  1;  23  L.  T.  554;  10  W.  R. 
127),  547. 

Garrigan  v.  Eggleston    (17  So.  D. 

258;  101  N.  W.  1081),  1873. 
Garrigan  v.  Kennedy  (19  S.  D.  11; 

101    S.    W.    1081),   283,    1842, 

1868,   1979. 
Garrigan   v.   Thompson    (17    S.   D. 

132;   95  N.  W.  294),  1986. 


cxlii 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are    to   pages.] 


Garrigan  v.  Thompson  ( [S.  D.]  101 

]\.   W.   1135;,    J^3. 
Garrigue's  Case  ( 28  Pa.  9 ;  70  Am. 

Dec.   103),  925. 
Garrison  v.   State    (14   Ind.   287), 

1109. 
Garrison  v.  Steele    (46  Mich.  98; 

8  N.  W.  G9(j),  758,  763,  765. 
Garsed  v.   Greensboro    ( 126   N.   C. 

159;  35  S.  E.  254),   175,  475, 

1476. 
Garst  V.  State   (68  Ind.  37),  1714. 
Garten    v.    State     ( 1 1    Tex.    App. 

544),   2060. 
Gartenstein  v.  Sindel's  License,  In 

re   (15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  612; 

4  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  37),  1298. 
Gartside    v.    Conn.    Mnt.    L.    Ins. 

Co.   ( 8  Mo.  App.  593  ) ,  2226. 
Garvey  v.  Commonwealth   (8  Gray 

382),  262,  1765. 
Garzonzick  v.   State    (50  Tex.   Cr. 

App.    533;     100    S.    W.    374), 

425. 
Gascoyne  v.  Riley  (36  W.  R.  605)', 

679. 
Gaskins  v.  State   (127  Ga.  51;  55 

S.   E.    1045),    1380,    1381. 
Gassenheimer  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia  (6  App.  D.  C.  108),  1739. 
Gaston  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

102  S.  W.  116).  1696. 
Gastorf   v.    State    (39   Ark.   450), 

21. 
Gates  V.  Hern    (150  Ind.  370;   50 

N.  E.  299),  602,  642. 
Gates  V.  Lansing  (5  Johns  [N.  Y.] 

282),    1014. 
Gates  V.  Neal  (23  Pick.  308),  660. 
Gater  v.   State    (141   Ala.   10;    37 

So.   692),   2086. 
Gathings  v.  State   (44  Miss.  343), 

1358. 
Gattin    v.    Tarboro     (78    N.    Car. 

119),  793. 
Gault  V.  State    (34  Ga.  533),  32, 

33,  822,  827,  835,  969. 
Gayle  v.  Owen  County  Court    (83 

Ky.  61;   6  Ky.  L.  Rep.  789), 

230,  291,  899,  901, 


Gaylord  v.   Soragen    (32  Vt.   110; 

76  Am.  Dec.  154),  1790,  1791, 

1794,  1797,  1798,  1801. 
Gears  v.  State    (35  'lex.   Cr.   Rep. 

442;   34  S.  VV.  124),  1218. 
Gebhart    v.    Shindle    (15    Serg.    & 

R.   235),   2259. 
Gee  V.  State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.]   89 

S.  VV.  1078),  1380,  1381,  1621. 
Geebric  v.  State  (59a,  491),  231. 
Gelber  v.  State   ([Tex.]   120  S.  VV. 

863),  1747. 
Gemas,  Appeal  of   (169  Pa.  43;  32 

Atl.   88;    36   VV.   N.   C.   367), 

638. 
Genning  v.  State   (1  McCord  573), 

1642. 
Genkinker   v.    Commonwealth    (32 

Pa.  99),  929. 
Genoa    v.    Van    Alstine     (108    111. 

555),  683. 
G«ntile    v.    State    (29    Ind.    499), 

227,   248. 
Geo  V.  Board    ( [N.  J.  L.]   63  Atl. 

870),  590,  592. 
Geo.  Scalpi  &  Co.  v.  State   (  [Tex, 

Civ.  App.]   73  S.  VV.  441;   74 

S.  VV.  754 ) ,  1359. 
George  v.  Gobey    (128  Ma.ss.  289; 

35  Am.  Rep.  376),  1350,  1358, 

}907. 
George  v.  Township  (16  Kan.  72), 

886. 
George   H.   Goodman   Co.   v.   Com- 
monwealth   ( [Ky.]    99    S.   VV. 

252;    30    Ky.    L.    Rep.    519), 

1170,  1285. 
George  Wiedemann  Brewing  Co.  v. 

Commonwealth    (  [Ky.]    96   S. 

VV.  834;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1026), 

1286. 
Geraghtv  v.  State    (110  Ind.   103; 

11  N.  E.  1),  1257,  1565,  1566. 
Gerding  v.  Board    (15  Idaho  444; 

99  Pac.  826),  293. 
Gierke    Brewing    Co.,    In     re     (23 

Pittsb.  L.  Jr.  420),  695. 
Gerlach  v.  Skinner    (34  Kan.  68; 

8  Pac.  257),  1774. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxliii 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Gerlau  v.  Bacon  (65  Vt.  51G;   27 

Atl.  198),  1805. 
G€rman-American    F.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Minden   (51  Neb.  870),  42G. 
German   Srewing  Co.   v.   Rutledge 

([S.  C]  65  S.  E.  230),  798. 
Germantown  Brewing  Co.  v.  Booth 

(162  Pa.  St.  100;  29  Atl.  386; 

34  W.  N.  C.  340;  reversing  14 

Pa.   Co.  Ct.   Tlep,    189;   3   Pa. 

Dist.   143),  .J9,   1784. 
Gersteman   v.   State    (35   Tex.   Cr. 

App.    318;     33    S.    W.    359), 

1732. 
Gerstenkorn  v.  State   (38  Tex.  Cr. 

App.     621;     44     S.     W.     501; 

1616,  1692,  1732. 
G«rstlauer,  In  re  ( 5  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 

97),  639,  723. 
Gerty  v.  Monticello  (118  Ind.  600; 

19  N.  E.  735),  415. 
Gerver,    In   re    (7    North    Co.    B. 

[Pa.]   382),  723. 
Getchell    v.    Page    (103    Me.    387; 

69  Atl.  624),  1022,  1059,  1062, 

1066. 
Getman,   In   re    (28    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    451;     59    N.    S.    Supp. 

1013),  853,  880. 
Getty  V.   Devlin    (54   N.   Y.   403), 

2136. 
Geyer  v.  Douglass  ( 85  Iowa  93 ;  52 

N.  W.  Ill),  996,  1934. 
Gharky,  In  re  (5^  Cal.  274),  2138. 
Ghio  V.  Stephens  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

78  S.  W.  1084),  357,  772. 
Gibbons  v.    Ogden    (9   Wheat.    1), 

298,  301. 
Gibboney,  Appeal  of  (6  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.   26),    669. 
Gibbs  v.  State  ( [Vt.]  74  Atl.  228), 

103,   183. 
Gibson,  Ex  parte  ( 2  N.  S.  W.  L.  R. 

203),  648. 
Gibson,  In  re   ( [N.  Y.]   108  N.  Y. 

Supp.   485),   900. 
Gibson    v.    Gibson    (24   Mo.   227), 

2147. 
Gibson  v.  Manley    (11  Juta   191), 
587. 


Gibson  v.  State   (34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

218;  29  S.  W.  1085),  550.  552, 

934. 
Gibson  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

97   S.  W.  468),   1620. 
Gibson    v.     Templeton      (62     Tex. 

556),  925. 
Giddings  v.  Wells  (99  Mich.  221) ; 

58  N.  W.  64),  876,  905,  &07, 

918. 
Gieb   v.    State    (31    Tex.   Cr.    Rep. 

514;    21    S.   W.    190),    1539. 
Gifford,  In  re   (35  Up.  Can.  285), 

420. 
Gifford  v.  Commonwealth    (2   Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   437),  946. 
Gignoux    V.    Bilbruck     (63    N.    H. 

22),  552. 
Gilbert  v.  Commonwealth  (3  Lack. 

Jur.  374),  1538. 
Gilbert    v.    State     (81    Ind.    565), 

1538,  1567,  1740. 
Gilbert  v.  State   (32  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

596;  25  S.  W.  632),  876,  911. 
Gilbreath    v.    State     ( [Tex.    Civ. 

App.]  82  S.  W.  807),  771. 
Gilday  v.  Warren   (09  Conn.  237; 

37  Atl.  494),  694,  697,  699. 
Gilham  v.  Wells  (64  Ga.  192)  263, 

459,  495. 
Gill   V.   Kaufman    (16   Kan.  571), 

310,  951,   1288,   1787. 
Gill  V.  Parker    (31   Vt.   610),   110 

293,  1008,  1035. 
Gill  V.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.    (37 

Hun  109),  2206,  2207. 
Gill  V.  State  (80  Ga.  751;  13  S.  E. 

86;   12  L.  R.  A.  433),  1232. 
Gill    V.    State    (48    Tex.   Cr.   App. 

517;   89  S.  W.  272),  915. 
Gillan  v.  State   (47  Ark.  555;  2  S. 

W.    185),     1166,     1176,     1177, 

1224,   1229,   1621. 
Gillen  v.   Riley    (27  Neb.    158;   42 

N.  W.   1054),  521,  1288. 
Gillespie  v.  Palmtfr  (20  Wis.  544), 

904. 
Gillham    ([Iowa]  In  re  99  N.  W. 

179),    532. 


cxliv 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Gillooley  v.   State    (58   Ind.    182), 

2040,  2057. 
Oilman  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.    (13  Al- 
len   433;    90    Am.    Dec.    210), 

2192,   2194,  2198,   2199,  2201. 
Gilmanton  v.  Ham  (38  N.  H.  108), 

2253. 
Gilmer   v.    Cameron    ( 1    Ga.    Dec. 

142,  Pt.  1),2253. 
Gilmore  v.  Matthew   (67  Me.  517), 

1847,    1987. 
Gilmore  v.  State   (125  Ala.  59;  28 

So.  382),  1479. 
Gilmore  v.  State   (126  Ala.  20;  28 

So.  382),   381,   1755. 
Gilmore  v.  State  (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

178;    39    S.    W.    105),    118o, 

1009,    1611. 
Gilt  V.  Parker   (31  Vt.  610),  1007. 
Ging   V.    Sherry    (32   N.    Y.    App. 

Div.    354;     52    N.    Y.     Supp. 

1003),  820. 
Ginnochio  v.  State    (30  Tex.  App. 

584;  18  S.  W.  82),  402. 
Ginterrez,  Ex  parte  ( 45  Cal.  429 ) , 

261. 
Ginz  V.  State    (42  Ind.  218),  232, 

1516. 
Giozza  V.  Tiernan  ( 148  U.  S.  657 ; 

13  Sup.  Ct.  721;  37  L.  ed. 

599).  91,  99,  148,  150,  191, 

210,  1779. 
Gipps  Brewing  Co.  v.   Her   &   Co. 

(91  Iowa  108;  58  N.  W.  1087; 

28  L.  R.  A.  396),  1709,  1782. 
Giroux   V.    People    ( 132    111.    App. 

562),  1254. 
Givens  v.  State   (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

267;    91    S.    W.    1090,    1091), 

941,  1380. 
Glanty   v.    State    (38    Wis.    549), 

395,  420. 
Glasgow  V.  Rowse    (43  Mo.   479), 

789. 
Glass  V.  Alt   (17  Kan.  444),  1806, 

1807. 
Glass  V.  Commonwealth   (33  Gratt. 

827),  1458. 
Glass  V.  State  (45  Ark.  173),  1517. 


Glass  V.   State    (68   Ark.   266;    57 

S.  W.  793),  950,  1179,  1181. 
Glasson  v.  Whitly    (2  X.  Z.  L.  R. 

118),  372. 
Glasscock     v.     .State      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  43  S.  W.  989),  1700. 
Gleason,  In  re  (7  W.  N.  C.  [N.  S. 

W.]  140),  670. 
Gleason   v.   Hobson    ([1907]    Vict. 

L.  R.  148)   53 
Gleason    v.    Williams     (27    C.    P. 

[Can.]    93),    1257. 
Glenn  v.  Glenn  (87  Mo.  App.  377), 

2159. 
Glenn  v.  Lynn  ( 89  Ala.  608 ;  7  So. 

924),  574. 
Glenn  v.  State   (25  Ala.  53),  1461. 
Glenn  v.  State  (1  Swan.  19),  1741. 
Glentz    V.    State     (28    Wis.    549), 

397. 
Glockner's   W'ill,   In   re    (2   N.   Y. 

Supp.  97),  2136. 
Glover  v.   State    (126  Ga.  594;   .'iS 

S.  E.  592),  158,  159,  286,  790. 
Glover  v.  State    ( 4  Ga.  App.  455 ; 

61  S.  E.  862),  1558. 
Gloversville  v.   Howell    (70   N.   Y. 

287),  232,  235. 
Goad  V.  State   (73  Ark.  625;  83  S. 

W.   935),    1695,    1738. 
Goad  V.  State    (52   Tex.  Cr.   App. 

444;   108  S.  W.  680),  1378. 
Gober   v.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

123  S.  W.  427 ) ,  228. 
Goble  V.  State    (42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

501;   60  S.  W.  966),  863,  872. 
Goddard  v.   Burnham    ( 124   Mass. 

578),  1844. 
Goddard    v.    Jacksonville    ( 15    111. 

588),  91,  101,  258. 
Godfrey    v.    St.    Felix    (14    L.    X. 

[Can].  297),  649. 
Godfrey  v.  State   (5  Blackf.  [Ind.] 

151),  694. 
Godfriedson     v.     People     (88     III. 

284),  12,  32,  85,  1711. 
Godson,  In  re  (16  Ont.  App.  452), 

658. 
Goetcheus   v.   Matthewson    (61   N. 

Y.  420),  660. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxlv 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Goetzv.  State  (41  Tnd.  1G2),  1240, 

1241,   1242,   1400,   1628. 
Goetz  V.  Stutsman   (73  Iowa  603; 

36  N.  W.   644),   1000. 
Goff  V.  Fowler  ( 3  Pick.  300 ) ,  528, 

683. 
Goff    V.    Frederick    (44    Md.    67), 

394. 
Goforth  V.   State    (60  Miss.   756), 

688,  690,  1267. 
Golden  v.  Bingham   (61  Ind.  198), 

531,   534,  598. 
Golden  v.  Maupin   (2  J.  J.  Marsh. 

236), 2126. 
Golden    v.    State     (25    Ga.    527), 

2041. 
Golding   V.   Golding    (6   Mo.   App. 

602),    64,    2153,    2155,    2156, 

2160. 
Goldman,  In  re   ( 138  Pa.  St.  321 ; 

22  Atl.  23),   196,  664. 
Goldman    v.    Goodrum     (77     Ark. 

580;  92  S.  W.  865),  751,  1792. 
Goldsmith  v.  New  Orleans   (31  La. 

Ann.  646),  796,  797. 
Goldsticker  v.  Ford  (62  Tex.  385), 

210. 
Goldstein  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

35  S.  W.  289),  1576. 
Golightly   V.    State    (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  44;   90  S.  W.  26),  1280, 

1380,   1381. 
Gonzales  v.   State    (31   Tex.   Crim. 

Rep.     508;     21     S.     W.    253), 

2090. 
Gooch    V.    Commonwealth     ( 8    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  [abstract]  437),  23, 

24. 
Good   V.    Commonwealth     ( 12    Ky. 

Law     Rep.     [abstract]     468), 

1359. 
Good   V.    Towns    (56   Vt.   410;    48 

Am.   Rep.   799),   1949. 
Goodall  V.  Brewing  Co.    (56  Ohio 

St.  257;  46  N.  E.  983),  1792, 

1810. 
Goode   V.    State    (50    Fla.   45;    39 

So.  461),   1695. 


Goode  V.  State   (87  Miss.  618;  40 

So.    12),    963,   969,   971,    833, 

1184. 
Goode  V.  State   (39  So.  461),  1379. 
Goodell   V.    Woodbury    (71    N.    H. 

378;    52   Atl.    855),   416,   419. 
Goodenough  v.  McGrew    (44  Iowa 

670),    1989,    2012. 
Goodhue  v.  Commonwealth  ( 5  Met. 

553),  1533. 
Goodhue    v.    People    (94    111.   37), 

1746. 
Goodman   v.   Hailes    (59   Ohio   St. 

342;   52  N.  E.  829),  2011. 
Goodman    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

([Ky.]  99  S.  W.  252;  30  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  519),   1649. 
Goodrich   v.   Fritz    (4   Ark.    525), 

1027. 
Goodrich  v.  Wheeler   ( [lowaj   123 

N.  W\  950),  1179. 
Goods   V.   State    (3   Green    [Iowa] 

566),   1353. 
Goodwin   v.   Clark    (65   Me.   280), 

1784. 
Goodwin    v.    Kerr    (80    Mo.    276), 

1162. 
Goodwin    v.    Savannah      (53     Ga. 

414),  793. 
Goodwin  v.   Smith    (72  Ind.   113), 

196,  599,  621. 
Goodwin   v.   State    (96   Ind.   550), 

2040,  2044. 
Goodwin  v.  Young   (34  Hun  252), 

1843. 
Goodwine  v.   Flint    (28   Ind.  App. 

36;   60  N.  E.   1102),  567,  571. 
Goozen   v.   Phillips    (48   Mich.    7; 

12  X.  W.  889),  69. 
Gorbracht    v.    Commonwealth     (90 

Pa.   449;    42   Am.    Rep.    550), 

1280. 
Gordon,  In  re  ( 16  Montg.  Co.  Law 

Rep.  25),  718,  721,  723. 
Gordon   v.   Louisville,   etc.   R.    Co. 

(29  S.  W.  321),  2253. 
Gordon  v.  State   (46  Ohio  St.  607; 

23  N.  E.  63;  6  L.  R.  A.  749), 

110,  121,  232,  235,  237. 


cxlvi 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Gordon  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.App.] 

73  S.  W.  398),  834. 
Gore  V.  Gibson   (13  M,  &  W.  623; 

14    L.    J.    Exch.    152),    2002, 

2104,  2106,  2110,  2117. 
Gorey  v.  Kelley   (66  Neb.  605;   90 

N.  W.  554),  1993. 
Gorman     ([1897]    Ex   parte    App. 

Cas.  23;   58  J.  P.  310;   63  L. 

J.   M.    C.    84;    70    L.    T.    46), 

681. 
Gorman,  Ex  parte  (34  Can.  Tj.  Jr. 

175),  1755. 
Gorman  v.  Keough    (22  II.  I.  47; 

40  Atl.  37),  1804. 
Gorman   v.    State    (38   Tex.    165), 

801. 
Gorman    v.    State     (52    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    327;    106    S.    W.    384), 

1648. 
Gorman    v.    State     (52    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    24;     105    S.    W.    200), 

1679,  1691,  1694,  1701. 
Gorman  v.  State  (52  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  327;  106  S.  W.  384), 

1602,    1603,    1604,   1611,   1649. 
Gorman  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

106  S.  W.  384),  1733. 
Gorman    v.    Williams     (117    Iowa 

560;  91  N.  W.  819),  755,  1785. 
Gorrcll  v.  Newport    ( 1   Tenn.   Ch. 

App.  120),  424. 
Gorsuth    V.    Butterfield     (2    Wis. 

237),    1192. 
Goss    V.    Vermontville     (44    Mich. 

319;   6  N.  W.  684),  764. 
Gostorf  V.  State  (39  Ark.  450),  52, 

55,  59,  60,  86,  970. 
Gouin  V.  State    (8  Mo.  493),  509. 
Gouldon,  In  re  (28  Ont.  387),  420. 
Goulding  v.  Phillips   ( [Iowa]    100 

N.  W.  516),   1904. 
Gough  V.  State   (32  Ind.  App.  22; 

08  N.  E.   1045),  1995. 
Gould  V.  Crawford    (2  Pa.   [Barr] 

89),  2259. 
Gonrlay  v.  Gourlay  (16  R.  I.  705; 

19  Atl.   142),  64,  2159,  2158. 
Gover  v.  Agee  (128  Mo.  App.  427; 

107  S.  W.  999),  168,  408. 


Gowan  v.  Smith    ([Mich.]    122  N. 

W.  286;    12  Det.  L.  N.  365), 

975,  1120. 
Gowell    V.    State    (41    Ark.    355), 

247. 
Gower  v.  Agee  ( 128  Mo.  App.  427 ; 

107  S.  W^  999),  167,  168. 
Grabbs  v.   Danville    (63   111.  App. 

590),  413. 
Grady   v.   Ragan    (2   Wlllson   Civ. 

Cas.  Ct.  App.,  Sec.  259),  767, 

781. 
Graf    V.    State     ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

102  S.  W.  1133),  1465,  1473. 
Graff  V.   Evans    (51    L.   J.    M.   C. 

25;   8  Q.  B.  Div.  373),   1220, 

1328,  1346. 
Grafty  v.  Rushville  (107  Ind.  502; 

8  N.  E.  609),  157. 
Graham  v.  Fulford,(73  111.  596), 

1847. 
Graham  v.  Gubbins  ( 26  Aust.  L.  T. 

181;    11  Aust.  L.  R.  81),  348. 
Graham  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.   ( 149 

N.    Y.    336;    43    N.    E.    917), 

2217. 
Graham     v.     McDougall      (6     F. 

[Just.]  57),  1151,  1152. 
Graham  v.  State  (121  Ga.  590;  49 

S.  E.  678),  1234. 
Gran  v.  Houston  (45  Neb.  813;  64 

N.  W.  245 ) ,  773,  1964. 
Granbury   v.   Thurston    (23   Conn. 

416),  393. 
Grand,   In  re    (27   Up.    Can.   46), 

429. 
Grand  Lodge,  etc.  of  United  Work- 
men V.  Belcham   ( 145  111.  308; 

33  N.  E.  886),  2223. 
Grand   Lodge   v.   Brand    (29   Neb. 

644),  2241. 
Grand   Lodge   A.    P.    0.   U.    W   v. 

Oetzel  ( 139  111.  App.  4),  2241. 
Granger  v.  Hayden   (17  R.  I.  179; 

20  Atl.  833),  777,  778. 
Granger    v.    Knipper     (2    Cin.    R. 

480),  1848. 
Granite    Bank    v.    Treat    (18    Me. 

340),    1018. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxlvii 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Grant,  In  re  (2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

87),  586. 
Grant  v.  Coulter    (24  Barb.  232), 

233. 
Grant  v.  State  (73  Ala.  13),  1666. 
Grant   v.    State    (87    Ga.   265;    13 

S.  E.  554),  1180. 
Grant  v.  State    (33  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 
527;     27     S.    W.     127),    373, 
1G37. 
Grantham  v.   State    (89   Ga.    121; 

14  S.  E.  892),  931,  1493. 
Graves  v.  Bet  Jong   (26  Austr.  L. 
T.  101;   10  Austr.  L.  R.  217), 
1067. 
Graves  v.  Johnson  ( 156  Mass.  211 ; 
30   N.    E.    818;    15    L.    R.   A. 
836),  1797. 
Graves  v.  Johnson   ( 179  Mass.  53 ; 

60  N.  E.  383),   1798. 
Graves  v.  McHugli    (58  Mo.  499), 

762. 
Graves  v.  Panam   ([1905]  Vict.  L. 
R.  297;    26  Austr.  L.  T.  232; 
11  Austr.  L.  R.  180),  1215. 
Graves   v.    Ranger    ( 52    Vt.    424 ) , 

1782. 

Graves   v.    Roth    (29    Vict.    L.    R. 

841;    26    Austr.    L.   T.   58;    10 

Austr.  L.  R.  158),  1114,  1178. 

Graves  v.  Williams    ([1905]   Vict. 

L.    R.    215;    26    Austr.    L.    T. 

189;  11  Austr.  L.  R.  98),  1347. 

Graw  V.  Houston  (45  Met.  813;  64 

N.  W.  245),   1890,   1945. 
Gray,  Ex-  parte   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

83  S.  W.  828),  971. 
Gray    v.    Baker     (31     Ind.     151), 

1020. 
Gray  v.  Baltimore  ( 100  U.  S.  434), 

156,   157. 
Gray   v.   Commonwealth    (9   Dana 

300;  35  Am.  Dec.  136),  343. 
Gray   v.    Connecticut    (159    U.    S. 
74;    15    Sup.    Ct.    985;    40    L. 
Ed.  80),  150,  195. 
Gray    v.    Davis     (27    Conn.    447), 

1021,  1047.  1048,  1053. 
Gray    v.    Kimball     (42    Me.    299, 
307),  253,  255,  1007. 


Gray  v.  State    (44  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

470;    72   S.   W.    169),   1235. 
Gray  v.  Stiens    (69  Iowa  124;    28 

N.  W.  475),  988. 
Graziano  v.  New  Orleans   (121  La. 

440;  46  So.  566),  / 14. 
Great   Falls    Bank   v.   Farmington 

41  N.  H.  32),  383,   1807. 
Green    v.    Collins    (3    Clifl.    494), 

1795,  1790,  1801. 
Green  v.   Commonwealth    ( 15   Ky. 
L.  Rep.  [abstract]   297),  957, 
1466. 
Green    v.    Russell     (5    Hill    183), 

2125. 
Green  v.   Sklara    (188  Mass.   363; 

74  N.  E.  595),  260. 

Green   v.    Smith    (111    Iowa    183; 

82  N.  W.  448),  205,  209,  859, 

Green  v.   Southard    (94  Tex.  470; 

61  S.  W.  705,  reversing  59  S. 

W.  839),  560,  561,  562,  765. 

Green  v.  State   (114  Ga.  918;    115 

Ga.  254;  41   S.  E.  64'J),  i623. 

Greene    v.    State     (79    Ind.    537), 

1443. 
Green    v.    State     (59    Miss.    501), 

2247. 
Green   v.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

102  S.  W.  416),  1465,  1473. 
Green   v.   State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

87  S.  W.  1043),  949. 
Green  v.  State    (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
466;     110    S.    VV.    919),    919, 
1681. 
Green  v.  State    (54  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

3;   111  S.  W.  933),  1378. 
Green  v.  State   ([Tex.]   120  S.  W. 

425),  1601. 
Green  County  v.  Wilhite    (29  Mo. 

App.  459),  758,  778,  1358. 
Greene  v.  James    (2  Curtis  C.  C. 

187),  254. 
Greencastle  v.  Thompson  ( 168  Ind. 

493;  81  N.  E.  497),  144. 
Greener  v.  Nilehaus   ([Ind.]  89  N. 

E.  377),  1937. 
Greenlee    v.    Schoenheit    (23    Xeb. 
669;   37  N.  W.  600),   1857. 


cslviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Greenough   v.   Board    ( [R.   I.]    74 

Atl.   785),  538. 
Greenough   v.   Greenough    (11    Pa. 

St.  494),   1014. 
Greenough    v.    Xarragansett    ( [K. 

L]  71  Atl.  594),  388,  526. 
Greentree    v.    Wallace     (77    Kan. 

149;    93   Pac.   598),    1028. 
Greenwood     v.     State      (6     Baxt. 

[Tenn.]  409),  216,  271. 
Greer  v.  Severson   (119  Iowa,  84; 

93    N.    W.    72),    1784. 
Greer  v.  State   (22  Tex.  588),  929. 
Gregory   v.    State    (140    Ala.    16; 

37  So.  259),  2081. 
Gregory     v.     United     States     (17 

Blatchf.    325),    356,    1364. 
Greig    v.    Bendeuo     (E.    B.    &    E. 

133;    27    L.    J.    M.    C.    294), 

367,  368,  535,  724. 
Greig  v.   Macleod    ([1908]    S.   C. 

C.    J.    14),    1355. 
Greiner    v.   Hoboken    ( [X.   J.    L.] 

53  Atl.  693),  365,  464. 
Greiner-Kelley  Drug  Co.  v.  Triiett 

([Tex.   Civ.    App.]    75    S.   W. 

536),      17,      834,      949,      963, 

964. 
Grepel    v.     State     (32     Ohio    St. 

167),    1232. 
Greystock,  In  re    (12  U.  C.  458), 

420,   452,   462,   533,   575,   756. 
Grier   v.   Johnson    (88    Iowa,    99; 

55   N.   W.   80),    1000. 
Griesbach     v.     People      (226     111. 

65;    80   X.   E.   734;    affirming 

127  111.  App.  462),  578. 
Grieves,  Ex  parte   ( 29  N.  B.  543 ) , 

1084. 
Griffin,    In    re     (56    X.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    21;     106    X.    Y.    Supp. 

24),   588. 
Griffin   v.    Atlanta    (78    Ga.    679; 

4  S.  E.   154),  492,  931,   1081, 

1083,     1087,     1091. 
Griffin    v.    Commonwealth    (7    Ky. 

L.      Rep.      [abstract]      300), 

1464,  1467,    1509. 


Griffin    v.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

66    S.    W.    1034;    23    Ky.    L. 

Rep.  2205),  1193,   1195,   1199, 

1600. 
Griffin    v.     Eaves     (114    Ga.     05; 

39    S.   E.   913),   229. 
Griffin    v.    State     (115    Ga.    577; 

41    S.    E.    997),    1164,    1456, 

1465,    1469,    1475. 
Griffin  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

87  S.  W.  155),  OlGo 
Griffin   v.   Tucker    ([Tex.]    118   S. 

W.   CZJ),    849. 
Griffin     v.     Tucker      ([Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    ]]0    S.   W.   338),    363, 

900,    901,    926. 
Griffin   v.   Wilcox    (21    Ind.    370), 

2033. 
Griffith     v.     Commonwealth      ( 14 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    [absiract]    303), 

494,    521. 
Griffith  v.   Fred.  Co.   Bk.    (6  Gill 

&   J.    424),    2099. 
Griffith   V.    Smith    (22    Wis.   646; 

99   Am.  Dec.   90),   10i;7. 
Griffith  V.   Wells  ^t3   Denio,  226), 

1780. 
Grigg,    Ex    parte    (4   Vict.   L.    R. 

146),    1531. 
Grills     V.      Jonesboro      ('8      Baxt. 

247),    453,    459,    461. 
Grim,   In   re    (181    Pa.    St.    233), 

694. 
Grime    v.    Commonwealth     ( 5    B. 

Mon.    263),    1478,    1479. 
Grimes   v.   Jersey  City    (29   X.   J. 

L.    320),    1669. 
Grimes     v.     State     (37     Tex.    Cr. 

App.     73;     38     S.    W.    774), 

1171. 
Grimes     v.     State     (44    Tex.    Cr. 

App.     503;     72    S.    W.    589), 

1609,     1690. 
Grinnell    v.    Adams    (34    Ohio    St. 

44),    860. 
Groesch   v.    State    (42    Ind.    547), 

208,    232,    236,   237,   238,    240, 

243. 
Grom    V.    People     (135    111.    App. 

453),    1481,    1550. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxlix 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Groom  v.  Grimes    (80  L.  T.  129; 

67   J.   P.   345;    20    Cox   C.   C. 

515),  1241,  1335,  1355,  1357. 
Groome,  In  re  (6  Ont.  188),  420. 
Groscop  V.  Rainer    (111   Ind.  361; 

39   N.   E.   47),   196,   532,   598, 

599,    602,    637,    662,    663. 
Gross,    In    re     (161    Pa.    344;    29 

Atl.   25;    34    W.   N.   C.   404), 

664. 
Gross,    Appeal    of    (1    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  640),  6C5. 
Gross   V.   Allentowu    (132   Pa.   St. 

319;      19     Atl.     269),     428. 
Gross  V.  Feehan    (110   Iowa,   163; 

81    N.    W.    235),    1779,    17S1, 

1785. 
Gross    V,    Scarr     (71    Iowa,    656; 

33  N.  W.  223),  1283,  1284. 
Grosse    v.    Wayne    Co.    ('85    Mich. 

44;     48    N.    VV.    153),    806. 
Grottkaw  v.   State    (70  Wis.   462; 

36   N.   W.    31),   2252. 
Grover     v.     Huckins      (2'6     Mich. 

47C),  470. 
Groves    v.    Panam     ([1905]    Vict. 

L,    R.   297;    26    Austr.    L.   T. 

232;    11    Austr.    L.    R.    180), 

1204. 
Grubbs  v.  Griffin    ([Miss.]    25   So. 

003),    900,    909. 
Grumbauch   v.   Lelande    ( 154    Cal. 

679;     98     Pac.      1059),      125, 

127,  172,  559. 
Grumman     v.     Holmes      (76     Ind. 

585),   532,    598,    002. 
Grupe    V.    State     (67    Ind.    327), 

1498,    1500. 
Grusenmeyer    v.    Logansport     (76 

Ind.    549),    1714. 
Grunkemeyer    v.    State     (25    Ohio 

St.    548),    1561. 
Guadinger   v.     Commonwealth      ( 4 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  514),  24,  26,  43, 

44. 
Guaereno     v.     State      ( 148      Ala. 

637;   42  So.  833),  1368,  1474, 

1479,    1523,    1609,    1653. 
Guckavan     v.     Kenny      (4     Kulp. 

411),   2094,  2106,   2122. 


Guckenheimer  v.  Sellers    (81  Fed. 

997),    1433,    1434,    1435. 
Gue     V.      Eugene      ([Ore.]      100 

Pac.    254),    1680. 
Guedert      v.      Emmet      Co.      (116 

Iowa,     40;     89     N.     W.    85), 

805,   806. 
Guenther   v.   Day    (6   Gray,   490), 

1047,    1048. 
Guernsey  v.   McHaley    ( [Ore.]    03 

Pac.    158),    892. 
Guerrero,   Ex  parte    (69  Cal.  88; 

10   Pac.   261),    186,   426,   427, 

444,   470,   795. 
Guild    V,    Chicago     (82    111.    492), 

233. 
Guinn     v.     Cumberland     Co.     Ct. 

([Ky.]     99     S.    W.    274;     28 

Ky.   L.    Rep.    759),    615,   670. 
Guild   V.   Freeman    (36   Sc.   L.   R. 

6),    1272,    1285. 
Gulf   Brewing  Co.,  In  re    (11   Pa. 

Co.   Ct.    Rep.    346),   537,   564. 
Gulf     Port     V.     Martin      ([Miss.] 

50    So.    502),    1532. 
Gulick    V.    State     (50    X.    J.    L. 

468;     14    Atl.     751),     1635. 
Gullickson    v.    Gjoiud     (89    Mich. 

8;    50  iS\   W.   751),   773,   779, 

780,    1350,    1885,    1907. 
Gunn    V.    Ohio    River   R.    Co.    (42 

W.   Va.    070;    26    S.    E.    546; 

36    L.    R.    A.    575),    2182. 
Gunnerssohn   v.    Sterling    (92    111. 

569),     168,     395,     431,     1589. 
Gunning     v.      State      (  [Tex.      Cr. 

App.]   98  S.  W.   1057),   1473. 
Gunter    v.     State     (83    Ala.     96; 

3  So.  600),  2042,  2046,  2051. 
Guptill    v.     Richardson     (62     Me. 

257),    49,    968,    1018,    1047. 
Gurding     v.     Board      ( 13     Idaho, 

444;    90  Pac.   357),  291. 
Gurley    v.    State     (65    Ga.     157), 

682. 
Gustafson     v.     Wind      (62     Iowa, 

281;     17    N.    W.    523),    1940, 

1941,    1943. 


el 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Gustavensen   v.    State    (10    Wyo. 

300;     68     Pac.     1000),     2039, 

2060,   2062,   2068,   2069. 
Gutzweller     v.     People      (14     111. 

142),     170,      183,     184,     185, 

402. 
Guy    V.   Board    (122    N.    C.    471; 

29    S.    E.    771),    1476. 
Guy    V.    Commissioners     ( 122    N. 

C.   471;    29  S.   E.    771),    103, 

172,    183,   249. 
Guy   V.   McDaniel    (51   S.  C.   436; 

29   S.  E.    196),   381. 
Guy    V.    New    York,    etc.,    R.    Co. 

(30  Hun,  399),  2197. 
Guy    V.    State     (90    Md.    29;     44 

Atl.    997),    1729. 
Guy    V.    State    (96    Md.    692;    54 

Atl.    879),    1G61,    1731. 
Gwatkin     v.     Commonwealth      (9 

Leigh  678;  33  Am.  Dec.  264), 

2062,  2085. 


Haas     V.     Neosho      ( [Mo.     App.] 

123  S.   W.  473),  920. 
Haase  v.  Mitchell    (58   Ind.   213), 

2127. 
Hack  V.  State    (44   Oliio  St.  536; 

9   N.    E.   305),    792. 
Hackett  v.  Linsley    (77   111.    109), 

1859,   1882,   1886,    1887,   1912, 

1942. 
Hackney,    Ex    parte     ([Tex.    Cr. 

App.]    92    S.    W.    1092),    278, 

336,    953,    1280. 
Hadley    v.    Musselman     ( 104    Ind. 

459;     3     N.     E.     122),     1121, 

1378. 
Hadtner      v.      Williamsport      (15 

W.    N.    C.     138),     183,     184, 

188. 
Haddox     v.     Clarke     County     (79 

Va.   677),    662,    884,    885. 
Haelilne     Brc\vjn<^     '"Jo.    v.     Board 

([Mich.]      121     X.     W.     202; 

16   Detroit  L.   N.    184),   911. 


Hafter    v.    State     (51    Ala.    37), 

1478,  1532. 

Hagan  v.   Boonton    (62   N.   J.   L. 

150;    40    Atl.    688),    714. 
Hagan  v.  Lucas    (10  Pet.   [U.  S.] 

400),    1012. 
Hagan     v.    State     ( 4     Kan.    89 ) , 

1479,  1481. 

Hagens    v.     Police     Jury      ([La.] 

46    So.    676),    865,    890,    894, 

920. 
Hager      v.      Jung      Brewing      Co. 

([Ky.]     92     S.    W.    573;     29 

Ky.   L.   Rep.    176),   9S3. 
Hagerty    v.    Tuxbury    (181    Mass. 

126;    63   N.   E.   333),    1114. 
Haggard   v.    State    (26    Ind.   App. 

695;    59    N.    E.    1135),    1340. 
Haggart     v.     Stehlin      (137     Ind. 

43;    29  N.  E.   1073;    22  L.  X 

A.  577),  98,  144,  183,  496, 
594,   944,   975,    1105. 

Hague.    Ex    parte    (3    Low.    Can. 

94),    1444,    1451. 
Hague  V.  Ashland    (91    Wis.   629; 

65   N.    W.    508),   813. 
Haigh   V.    Sheffield    (L.    R.    10    Q. 

B.  102;  44  L.  J.  M.  C.  17; 
31  L.  T.  536;  23  W.  R.  547; 
39    J.    P.    230),    380. 

Haight,    In   re     (33    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    544;     68    N.    Y.    Supp. 

920),    580,    729. 
Hail   V.   State    (48   Tex.  €r.   App. 

514;    90    S.    W.    503),    945. 
Haile  v.  State    (11   Humph.   154), 

2048,  2067,   2072. 
Hainer  v.   Burton    (75   Kan.   281; 

89  Pac.  697),  665. 
Haines    v.    Allen     (78    Ind.    100; 

41    Am.    Rep.    555),    1785. 
Haines     v.     Einwachter     ( [N.     J. 

Ch.]    55    Atl.    38),    1809. 
Haines    v.    Hanrahan    ( 105    Mass. 

480),     10,    48,    82,    87,     1706, 

1975. 
Haines    v.     State     (7    Tex.     App. 

30).    1125,    1319,    1741. 
Hainline     v.     Commonwealth     (13 

Bush,   35),   821,   825,    1457. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Cli 


IReferences   are   to    pp.ges.] 


Halbert,   In   re    (15   N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    308;    37    N.    Y.    Supp. 

757),  2134,  2135,  2136,   2145, 

2149. 
Halcher    v.    State    (80    Teiin.    [12 

Lea]     3iJ8 ) ,    247. 
Hale    V.     Brown     (11     Ala.    87), 

2104. 
Hale     V.    State     (30     Ark.     150), 

1237,    1739,    1751. 
Hale    V.     Story     (7     Colo.     App. 

165;    42    Pac.    598),    2098. 
Haley  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (21 

Iowa,    15),   2210. 
Haley  v.   State    (42  Neb.   556;    60 

N.  W.  9«2;   47  Am.  St.  718), 

308. 
Halfin     V.    State     (5     Tex.     App. 

212),    929. 
Halford    v.    Kirkland    ([Ark.]    71 

S.    W.    264),    670. 
Half  man     v.     Spreen      (75     Iowa, 

309;     39    N.    W.    517),    981, 

991. 
Hall,    Ex    parte     ([Ala.]     47    So. 

199),   382. 
Hall,    Ex    parte     ([Ala.]     47    So. 

199),   175. 
Hall     V.    Barnes     (82     111.     228), 

1974. 
Hall    V.    Bastrop     ( 1 1     La.    Ann. 

603),   802,    1739. 
Hall    V.    Box     ([18701     18    W.    R. 

820),    1813. 
Hall     V.     Bray      (51     JIo.     288), 

228. 
Hall    V.    Coffin     (108    Iowa,    466; 

79    N.    W.   274),    992,    993. 
Hall    V.    Commonwealth     ( 13    Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   399),  950. 
Hall    V.    Dunn     ([Ore.]    97    Pac. 

811),  235,   936. 
Hall     V.     Germain      (131     N.     Y. 

536;   30  N.  E.  591;   affirming 

59      Hun,      626;      14      N.      Y. 

Supp.    5),    1924,    1925,    1928, 

1961. 
Hall     V.     McKecknie      (22     Barb. 

244),    1615,    1353. 


Hall   V.    Moreman    (3    MoCord   L. 
[S.    C]     477;     4    McCord    L, 

283),    2103. 
Hall   V.   Solomon    (61   Conn,  476; 

23    Atl.    876;     29    Am.    Rep. 

218),    1809. 
Hall   V.   South  Norfolk    (8   Mani- 
toba,   430),    1681. 
Hall    V.    State     (4    Harr.     [DeL] 

132),    215,    1303,    1309. 
Hall     V.     State     (3     Kelly     [Ga.J 

18),    1124,    1126. 
Hall   V.    State    (87    Ga.    233;     13 

S.     E.     634),     1503,     1624. 
Hall   V.   State    (122   Ga.    142;    50 

S.    E.    59),    972,    973. 
Hall    V.    State     (125    Ga.    31;    53 

S.   E.   807),    1372. 
Hall  V.  State    (8  Ind.  439),   1716. 
Hall  V.  State    (9  Lea,  574),   1385. 
Hall  V.  State   (31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep. 

565;   21  S.  W.  368),  2090. 
Hall    V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

34  S.  W.   122),  309. 
Hall    V.    State     ([Tex.    Cr.    App.J 

39  S.  VV.  578),  1471. 
Hallett,    Ex    parte     (15     W.     N. 

[N.     S.     W.]     234),     2025. 
Halloran   v.   McCullough    (68   Ind. 

479),    659,    660,    854. 
Halpin    v.    State     (18    Tex.    App. 

410),    1111. 
Halls  V.  Cartwright   ( 18  La.  Ann. 

414),   2156. 
Halstead     v.     Commonwealth      (5 

Leigh,   724),   1505. 
Halstead    v.    Horton    (38    W.    Va. 

727;    18   S.   E.   9.53),   63. 
Halverstadt    v.    Berger     (72    Neb. 

462;     100    N.    W.    934),    666. 
Ham   V.   Delaware,   etc.,  Co.    ( 142 

Pa.  617;   21  Atl.  1012),  2207. 
Hamel    v.    St.    Jean    Deschaillons 

Rap.    .Tud.    Que.     (20    C.     S. 

301).    413,    44f). 
Hamer    v.     Eldridge     (171     Mass. 

250;    50   N.   E.   611),   1358. 
Hamer    v.    People    ( 104    111.    App, 

555;     affirmed    205    111.    570; 

68  N.  E.  1061),  1232. 


clii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References    are    to    pages.] 


Hamilton,    In    re     (41    Up.    Can. 

253),  889. 
Hamilton  Ck).  v.  Bailey    (12   Xeb. 

56;    10  X.  W.  539),  628,  635. 
Hamilton  v.  Baker  (91  Iowa,  100; 

58  X.  W.  1080),  994,  1004. 
Hamilton  v.  Carthage  (24  111.  22), 

1739. 
Hamilton  v.  Goding  (55  Me.  419), 

1031,  1162,  1773,  1777. 
Hamilton  v.  Grainger   ('5  H.  &  N. 

4),  2092,  2101,  2106. 
Hamilton  v.  Jos.  Schlitz  Brewing 

Co.    (129    Iowa,    172;    lOo    X. 

W.   438),   1802,   1803. 
Hamilton  v.  McKinney    ( [Ky.]   65 

S.  W.  2;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1341), 

667. 
Hamilton  v.   State    (103   Ind.   96; 

53  Am.  Rep.  491),  605,  1637. 
Hamilton   v.   State    (78    Ohio   .St. 

76;  84  X.  E.  601),  1531,  1544. 
Hamilton  v.    State    (3   Tex.   App. 

643),  270,  271. 
Hamman     v.    State      ([Tex.     Cr. 

Rep.]   33  S.  W.  538),   1646. 
Hammer  v.  Dunlav-y   ( [Iowa]    121 

X.    W.    1024),    976. 
Hammock   v.    State    ( [Ga.]    05    S. 

E.  1096),  1656. 
Hammond  v.  Hanes   (25  Md.  541; 

90   Am.   Dec.   77),   235. 
Hammond    v.    Hobson    (23    X.    Z. 

395,    1102),    1152,    1153. 
Hammond    v.     King     (137     Iowa, 

548;    114  X.  W.   1062),   1320. 
Hampson  v.  Taylor   (15  R.  I.  83; 

8    Atl.    331;     23    Atl.    732), 

2191,  2193. 
Hampton  v.  State  (78  Ohio  St.  76; 

.84  X.  E.  601),  1761. 
Hampton  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

65  S.  W.  526),  1548. 
Hanbury  v.   Cundy    ([1888]    58  L. 

T.  "l55),   1816. 
Hancock  v.   Bingham    ( [Ky.]    102 

S.    W.    341;    31    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

427),  939,  941. 
Hancock  v.  Bowman  (49  Cal.  413) 

605. 


Hancock   v.   Singer   Mfg.   Co.    (62 

X.    J.    L.    289;    41    Atl.    846; 

42  L.  R.  A.  852),  789. 
Hancock   v.   State    (114   Ga,   439; 

40  S.  E.  317),  230,  251,  295, 

965,   1497,   1505,  1512. 
Hand   v.   Ballon    (12   X.   Y.   541), 

264. 
Handcock  v.  Rushe   ([1896]   60  J. 

P.   633),    1818. 
Haney,    Ex    parte    (48    Ore.    621; 

85  Pac.  332),  867. 
Haney,  Ex  parte  (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

634;   103  S.  W.  1155),  864. 
Haney  v.  Mann   (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

81    S.   W.  66),    1256,    1949. 
Haney  v.  State   ([Tex.]   122  S.  W. 

34),  1583. 
Handler,  Ex  parte    (176  Mo.  383; 

75  S.  W.  920),  229,  233. 
Handley  v.   Stacey    (1    Fost.  &  F. 

574),  2136. 
Handy  v.  People,  29  111.  App.  99 ) , 

683,  688,  799. 
Haneklau  v.  Felchlin  (57  Mo.  App. 

602),  2109. 
Hanewacker    v.    Ferman     (47    III. 

App.   17),  1957,  1984. 
Hanington  v.   Xew   York,   etc.,   R. 

Co.    (19   X.   Y.   St.   Rep.  20), 

2198,  2199. 
Hankinson    v.   Charlotte,    etc..    R. 

Co.     (41    S.    C.    1;     19    S.    E. 

206),  2185,  2191. 
Hanks   v.   Packett    ([Mo.]    119   S. 

W.   25),   627. 
Hanks    v.    People     (39    111.    App. 

223),   428. 
Hanley  v.  Kentucky  Cent.   R.   Co. 
(187    U.    S.   617;    47    L.    Ed. 

333;   23  Sup.  Ct.  214),  298. 
Hanlon    v.    State     (51    Ark.    186; 

10  S.  W.  265),   1665,   1791. 
Hann  v.  Bedell    (61  X.  J.  L.  148; 

50  Atl.  564),  292. 
Hanna    v.    Conn.    L.    Ins.    Co.     (S 

X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  431;    28  X. 

Y.   Supp.    661),   2236 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cliii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Hanna  v.  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

269;  87  S.  W.  702),  873,  899, 

916,    1380,    1381. 
Hannan    v.    District    of    Columbia 

(12   App.   Cas.    [D.   C]    265), 

1119,   1137. 
Hannibal  v.  Guyott   (18  Mo.  515), 

495,  508. 
Hannon  v.  Chicago    (140  111.  398; 

29  N.  E.  732),  426. 
Hannun    v.    Worrell     (2    Del.    Co. 

Rep.  49),   2137. 
Hanrahan    v.    Ayers     ( 10    N.    Y. 

Misc.     Rep.    435;     31     N.    Y. 

Supp.   458),    2253. 
Hanrahan  v.  State   ( 57  Ind.  527 ) , 

358, 
Hans   V.  State    (50   Neb.    150;    69 

N.  W.  838),  1092,  1610,  1650. 
Hansberg   v.    People    (120    111.    1; 

8    N.    E.    857;    60    Am.    Rep. 

549),  966. 
Hanson    v.    State    ( 43    Ind.    550 ) , 

356,    1352,    1357,    1359,    1615, 

1616. 
Hanvey    v.    .State    (68    Oa.    612), 

2041,  2063. 
Hapgood     V.     Needham     (59     Me. 

442)    1807. 
Harbaiigh    v.     Munough     (74   111. 

371),  395,  474. 
Harbison  v.  Lemon   (3  Blackf.  51; 

23  Am.  Dec.  376 ) ,  2092,  2098, 

2103,  2108. 
Harbison    v.   Shirley     (139     Iowa, 

605;    117    N.   W.   963),    1811. 
Harbottle  v.  Gill    (41   J.  P.   742), 

1146. 
Hardenbrook  v.  Town  of  Ligonier 

(95  Ind.  70),  276. 
Hardesty   v.    Hine    (135   Ind.    72; 

34  N.  E.  701).  598,  599,  601, 

621,  637,  662,  663. 
Hardesty    v.    United    States     ( 164 

Fed.    420),    1602,    1662. 
Harding    v.    Commonwealth     ( 105 

Va.  858;   52  S.  E.  832),  1655, 

1743. 


Harding  v.  Commissioners    (65  S, 

W.  56;   3  Tex.  Ct.  Rep.  162), 

925. 
Harding  v.  McLennan  Co.   ( 27  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  25;    65   S.  W.  56), 

921. 
Harding   v.    State    (65    Neb.    238; 

91    N.    W.    194),    1179,    1579. 
Hardison    v.    State    (95    Ga.    337; 

22  S.  E.   681),   1517. 
Hardten   v.   State    (32   Kan.    637; 

5  Pac.  212),  1768,   17-69. 
Hardwick   v.    State    (55    Te»x.    Cr. 

App.    140;    114    S.    W.    832), 

7,  22,  32,   1491. 
Hardy  v.  Merrill    (56  N.  H.  227; 

22  Am.  Rep.  441),  1736. 
Hardy  v.  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

298;  87  S.  W.  1038),  921,  923, 

1344. 
Hare   v.   Osborne    (34  L.   T.   294), 

374,  1145,  1318. 
Hare  v.  State   (4  Ind.  241),  1501. 
Hargett  v.    Bell    (134   N.    C.   394; 

46  S.  E.  749),  975. 
Hargrave  v.  Commonwealth  ( [Va.  | 

22  S.  E.  314),   1465. 
Harkey  v.  .State    (89  Ga.  478;    15 

S.  E.  552),   1240,  1629. 
Hartgraves    v.    State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]   39  S.  W.  661),  1210. 
Hargrove     v.     State      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   76  S.  W.  926*),  1209. 
Harlan    v.    Brown     ( 4    Ind.    App. 

319;     30    N.    E.    928),    2092, 

2116,  2123,  2131. 
Harlan    v.    Richmond    ( 108    Iowa, 

161;     78    N.    W.    809),    1237, 

1254. 
Harlan    v.    State    (136    Ala.    150; 

33    So.    '858),    174,    575,    587, 

648,  652. 
Harland  v.  Adams   (76  Miss.  308; 

24  So.  262),  553. 
Harley  v.  State   (127  Ga.  308;   56 

S.   E.   452),   1228,   1229. 
Harman  v.  Clarkson  (22  Can.  PJ>. 

C.  [Can.]  291),  )i263. 
Harman  v.  Harman    ( 16  111.  85 ) , 

2154,  2L64,   2167. 


cliv 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Harman  v.  Powell    ([1892]   65  L. 

T.  255;   56  J.  V.   150),   1821. 
Harmon,  In  re  (43  Fed.  372),  308, 

998,    1434,    1435. 
Harmon  v.  -Chicago    ([HI.]    26  X. 

E.    697),    479. 
Harmon    v.    Johnston    ( 1    MacAr- 

thur,   139),  2097. 
Harmon  v.  State   (92  Ga.  455;   17 

S.  E.  666),  1120,  112<3. 
Harmony  Lodge,  I.  0.  0.  F.'s  Ap- 
peal   (127    Pa.    209;     18    Atl. 

10),    213«,   2148. 
Harney  v.  State   (8  Lea,  13),  247, 

1221. 
Harp    V.    Commonwealth     (  [Ky.] 

61  S.  W.  467;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1792),  957,   1743. 
Harper,  In  re  ( 30  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

ti63;    64    X.    Y.    Supp.    524), 

545,  720. 
Harper's    Will,    In    re     (4    Bibb, 

244),   2136,   2139,   2149. 
Harper  v.  Archer   (4  Smed.  &  M. 

[Miss.]   108),  1906. 
Harper     v.     Golden     ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    39    S.    W.    623),    762, 

763,  767. 
Harper   v.    State    ([Ark.]    127    S. 

W.    738),    1237. 
Harper    v.    State    (85    Miss.    338; 

37  So.  956),   1207. 
Harper  v.  State   (7   Ohio  St.  73), 

1741. 
Harper  v.  State    ( [Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

98  S.  VV.  839).  1603. 
Harper   v.   State    ([Ark.]     121    S. 

W.    738),     1161,     1205,     1226, 

1280,  1282. 
Harrell  v.  Speed    (113  Tenn.  224; 

81   S.  W.  840),  331. 
Harrigan,  In  re   (Myr.  Prob.  135), 

2138. 
Harring   v.    State    ([.\hi.]    48    So. 

576),  1739. 
Harrington  v.  State  (36  Ala.  236), 

1188,     1219,     1223,    1578. 
Harrington     v.     State     (36     Ark. 

236),  1221. 


Harrington  v.  State  ( 77  Ark.  480 ; 

91   S.   W.   747),   1568. 
Harrington  v.  State   (9  Wend.  [X. 

Y.]   525),  394. 
Harris  v.  Commonwealth  (23  Pick. 

280),   1760. 
Harris  v.  Jenns    (9  C.  B.   [X.  S,] 

152;    30    L.    J.    M    C    183;    9 

W.  R.  36;  3  L.  T.  [X.  S.]  408; 

22   J.   P.   807),   27,   961,   965, 

1708. 
Harris     v.     Livingston     (28     Ala. 

577),  77,  395,  431,  432,  1192. 
Harris    v.    People     (21    Colo.    95; 

39  Pac.   1084),   1125. 
Harris    v.    People     ( 1    Colo.    App. 

289;  28  Pac.  1133),  509,  1120, 

1123,    1728. 
Harris   v.    Runnels    ( 12   How.    79, 

83,  84;    13   L.  Ed.  901,  903), 

1794. 
Harris  v.  Sheffield    (128  Ga.  299; 

57   S.  E.  305;   59  S.  E.  771), 

923. 
Harris   v.    State    (61    Miss.    304), 

2246,  2247,  2252. 
Harris    v.    State    ([Miss.]    12    So. 

904),   1280,   1464,    1468,    1513. 
Harris    v.    State     (50    Ala.    127), 

1112,  1478,   1535,   1752. 
Harris  v.  State   (114  Ga.  436;   40 

S.  E.  315),  229. 
Harris  v.  State  (4  Tex.  App.  131), 

198. 
Harris  v.  State   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

588;     85    S.    W.    284,     1198), 

049,  950,  1380,  1381. 
Harris  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

86   S.  W.  763),   1697. 
Harris  v.  State   ( 49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

233;    91   S.   W.   590),    1379. 
Harris  v.  State  (50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

411;    97    S.    W.    704),    1613, 

1689,   1722,   1723. 
Harris  v.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

98    S.    W.    842),    1606,    1694, 

1695,  1705. 
Harris  v.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

100  S.  W.  'J20),  1609. 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


clv 


fRefeieiK.'t'S   are   to    pages.] 


Harris  v.  United  States  (8  App. 
D.  a  20;  36  L.  H.  A.  4ti.5), 
2042,  2044. 
Harrison  v.  Berkeley  ( 1  Strobli. 
[S.  C]  525;  47  Am.  Dec. 
578),  1838,  1893. 
Harrison  v.  Dickinson   (  [Tex.  Civ. 

App.]   113  S.  W.  770),  G53. 
Harrison  v.   Ely    (120   111.   83;    11 

N.  E.  334),  60,  1254. 
Harrison,  etc.,  v.  Holland  (3  Grat. 

[Va.]  247),  394. 
Harrison    v.    Lockhart     (25    Ind. 

112),  101,   144,   1808. 
Harrison   v.    Mayer,    etc.     ( 1    Ciill 

[Md.]    2'64),    96. 
Harrison  v.  Xicliols   (31  Vt.  709), 

1777. 

Harrison  v.  People    (195  111.  460; 

63    N.    E.    191;    reversing    91 

111.  App.  421),  o^5,  oil,  650. 

Harrison  v.  People    (222  111.   150; 

78  N.  E.  52),  594,  631. 
Harrison  v.  People   (124  111.  App. 

519),  720,  727. 
Harrison    v.    State     (91    Ala.    02; 

10   So.   30),   308. 
Harrison  v.  State    (96  Tenn.  548; 

35  S.  W.  559),  1279. 
Harryman   v.   State    (53    Tex.    Cr. 
App.  474;  110  S.  W.  926),  913, 
959,  1682,  1684. 
Hart  V.  Corlett  (4  Ohio  Dec.  181; 

1  Clev.  Law  Pvep.  92),  2012. 
Hart  V.  De  Missisgroni    (3  Quebec 

L.  R.   170),   168. 
Hart   V.   Duddleson    (20   111.   App. 

618),   1869. 
Hart   V.    State    (87   Miss.    171;    39 

So.  523),   111,  234,  953. 
Hart  V.    Thompson    (15    La.    88), 

2136,  2148. 
Harten  v.  State    (32  Kan.   G37 :    5 

Pac.  212),  226. 
Hartford    v.    Palmer     (16    Johns. 

143),  2259. 
Hartgraves    v.    State     ([Tex.    Cr. 
App.]    43    S.    W.    331),    1086, 
1698. 


Hartig   v.    Seattle    ([Wash.]    102 

Pac.  408),  558. 
Hartley,  In  re    (25  Up.  Can.   12), 

894,  914,  975. 
Hartsel  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

68  S.  W.  285),  1471. 
Harvey  v.  Olney  (42  III.  336),  811. 
Harvey   v.   Peacock    (11   M.   k  W. 

740),  1020. 
Harvey    v.    Peck     (1    Munf.    518), 

2102,  2126,  2130. 
Harvey    v.    State     (05    Ga.    568), 

1119,   1125. 
Harvey    v.    State    (80    Ind.    142), 
1176,   1224,    1248,   1565,   1621, 
1633. 
Harvey    v.    State     (8    Lea,    113), 

1578. 
Hartwell  v.  Alabama,  etc.,  Ins.  Co. 
(33    La.   Ann.    1353;    39   Am. 
Rep.  294),  2221,  128. 
Hash   V.   Ely    (45   Tex.    Civ.   App. 
259;     100    S.    W.    980),    898, 
899,  923. 
Haskell  v.   Haskell    (54   Cal.  202; 
17    Abb.    N.    C.    231),    2154, 
2164. 
Haskell     v.     New     Bedford      (108 

Mass.  208),  280. 
Haskill    v.    Commonwealth     (3    B. 

Mon.  342),  1499.  1642,  1643. 
Haskins  v.  Spillcr    (1  Dana   [Ky.] 

172),    1906. 
Haslem  v.   Schnarr    (30  Ont.  89), 

652,  715. 
Hastings,  In  re  ( [Neb.]  119  N.  W. 

27),  558. 
Hasting  v.  People   (22  X.  Y.  95), 

929. 
Hastings      Brewing     Co.,     In     re 

([Neb.]   119  N.  W.  27),  538. 
Hatclier    v.    Commonwealth     (106 
Va.  827:  55  S.  E.  677).  1652. 
Hatcher    v.   State    (80    Tenn.    [12 

Lea]  368),  135. 
Hatfield    v.    Commonwealth     ( 120 
Pa.  St.  395;   14  Atl.  151),  27, 
82.  291,   967. 


clvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Hatfield    v.    State    (9    Ind.    App. 

296;     36    N.    B.    664),    1106, 

1560.  1561,  1566. 
Hatten's  Will,  In  re   (3  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.    213),    2136,    2138,    2142, 

2147. 
Hatzen's     League,     Ex    parte     (5 

Quebec  Q.  B.   160),   619,  620, 

647. 
Hauck,   In   re    (70  Mich.  396:    38 

X.  W.  269),  244,  291,  436. 
Haug   V.    Gillett    (14    Kan.    140), 

512,  521,  1288. 
Hauk    V.    Great    Northern    R.    Co. 

(8  N.  D.  23;  77  N.  W.  97;  42 

L.    R.    A.    669),    2205,    2212, 

2214. 
Hausberg  v.   People    (120   111.  21; 

8  N.  E.  857),  43,  83. 
Hauselman    v.    Kegel     (60    Mich. 

540;  27  X.  W.  558),  1027. 
Haven    v.    State     (17    Ind.    455), 

1500. 
Haviland     v.     Chase     (116     Mich. 

214;    74  X.   W.   477;    72   Am. 

St.  Rep.  519),  1985. 
Hawaiian  Trvist  Co.  v.  High  Sher- 
iff  (16  Hawaii,  689),  1774. 
Hawesville  v.  Board   ( 99  Ky.  292 ; 

35  S.  W.  1034),  808. 
Hawk  V.  People  (44  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

560;  72  S.  W.  842),  844. 
Hawke  v.  Dunn    ([1897]    1   Q.   B. 

579;    61    J.   P.   292;    66   L.   J. 

Q.   B.   364:    76  L.  T.  355:    45 

W.  R.  359;   13  T.  L.  R.  281), 

380. 
Hawke     v.     Plymouth     Breweries, 

Limited,       ( Bodmin       A.ssizes 

[June   27,    1906],   not   report- 
ed), 1820. 
Hawkins,  Ex  parte    (61  Ark.  321; 

30   L.    R.   A.    730;    33    S.   W. 

106),  2261. 
Hawkins,  In  re    (165  N.   Y.   168; 

58    X.    E.    884;    reversing   28 

N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  383;    59   X. 

Y.  Supp.  888 :  60  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1141:  06  X.  Y.  Supp.  1132), 

580,  581,  730. 


Hawkins  v.  Bone  _(4  F.  &  F.  311), 

2098. 
Hawkins   v.   Bridgewater    (  [  1900] 

2  Q.  B.   382;    69  L.   J.   Q.   B. 

663;   64  J.  P.  631;   48  W.  R. 

587;  82  L.  T.  847;  16  T.  L.  R. 

404),  680. 
Hawkins      v.      Common      Council 

([Mich.]  79  X.  W.  570),  649, 

650. 
Hawkins  v.  Commonwealth  (76  Pa. 

St.  151),  394. 
Hawkins  v.   Litchfield    (120  Mich. 

390;  79  X.  W.  570),  759,  763. 
Hawkins    v.    State     (51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    37;     100    S.    W.    956), 

1181,   1206. 
Hawkins  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

114  S.  W.  813),  836. 
Hawkins  v.  State  ( [Tex.]  122  Pac. 

22),   1601. 
Hawks  v.  Fellows  ( 108  Iowa,  133 ; 

78  X.  W.  812),  992. 
Hawk's   Xest   v.    Fayette   Co.    (55 

W.   Va.   689;    48   S.   E.   205), 

658. 
Haworth  v.  Minns   (56  L.  T.  316; 

51  J.  P.  7),  44,  85,  87,  1708. 
Hawthorne  v.  State   (39  Tex.  Civ, 

App.  122;  87  S.  W.  839),  783, 

784. 
Hay  V.  Parker  (55  ^le.  355).  1774. 
Hay  V.   Tower  Division    (59  L.  J. 

M.  C.  79;   24  Q.  B.  Div.  561; 

62  L.  T.  290;   38  W.  R.  414; 

54  J.  P.  500),  535. 
Hayes,  Ex  parte  (98  Cal.  555;  33 

Pac.  337;    20   L.   R.   A.   701), 

432. 
Hayes  v.  Board   (6  Cal.  App.  520: 

"  92  Pac.  492),  566,  659,  665. 
Hayes   v.   Hyde   Park    ( 153   Mass. 
'  514-516;^  27  X.  E.  522;    12  L. 

R.  A.  249),  1795,  1796. 
Hayes  v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

39  S.  W.   106),  890. 
Hayes  v.   State  of  Missouri    (120 

U.    S.    68;    7    Sup.    Ct.   350), 

238. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


clvii 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Hayes  v.  Thompson   (9  B,  C.  Rep. 

249),  432,  452. 
Hayes  v.  Waite  (3G  111.  App.  397), 

1887. 
Haynes    v.    Cass    County     ( [Mo.] 

115  S.  W.  1084),  868,  925. 
Haynes   v.   State    ( [Miss.]    23    So. 

182),  1763. 
Haynes  v.  State    (118  Tenn.  709; 

105   S.  W.   251;    13   L.   R.   A. 

[N.  S.]   559),   1185. 
Haynes  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

83  S.  W.  16),  1605. 
Haynie   v.   State    (32   Miss.   400), 

827. 
Hays  V.   State    (47   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

150;  83  S.  W.  201),  1211. 
Hays  V.  State    (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

369;  91  S.  W.  585),  1694. 
Hays  V.  State    (13  Mo.  246),  513, 

1372,   1626. 
Hazell    V.    Middleton     (45    J.    P. 

548),  709. 
Hazeltine  v.  McGroorty    (6  Kulp. 

533),  815. 
Hazen  v.  Commonwealth    (23   Pa. 

St.  355),  1220,  1305,  1311. 
Head  v.  Doehlman   ( 148  Ind.  145 ; 

46  N.  E.  585),  663,  608,  609, 

662,  671,  857. 
Head    Money    Cases     (112    U.    S. 

580;  5  Sup.  Ct.  247),  100. 
Headington   v.    Smith    (113    Iowa, 

107;   84  N.  VV.  982),  770. 
Healy  v.  New  York   (3  Hun,  708), 

2171,  2186,  2198. 
Health     Department     v.     Trinity 

Church    (145   N.   Y.   32),  215. 
Hearn  v.   Brogan    (64  Miss.  334), 

488,  490,  561,  564,  928,  932. 
Hearsey    v.    Broadway     (9    Mass. 

95),  1058. 
Heart  v.  East  Tennessee  Brewing 

Co.   ([Tenn.]   113  S.  W.  364), 

1811. 
Heath  v.  Intoxicating  Liquors   (53 

Me.    172),    1059. 
Heath  V.   State    (105   Ind.    342;    4 

N.  E.  901),  511,  514,  694. 


Hebert    v.    Winn     (24    La.    Ann. 

385),   2136,  2137,  2148,  2149. 
Heblick  v.  Hancock  Co.  Ct.  ( [Ky.] 

10  S.  W.  465),  636,  648. 
Heck  V.   State    (44   Ohio   St.  536; 

9   N.   E.   305),   119,    125,    133, 

185,   247,   248,  596,    1278. 
Hederick  v.   State    (101  Ind.  504; 

1  N.  E.  47;  51  Am.  Rep.  768), 

91,  96,  105,  144,  165,  217,  311, 

456,   1303,   1314,   1316. 
Hedges  v.  Metcalfe   Co.    (116   Ky. 

524;   76  S.  W.  381;  25  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  772),  666. 
Hedges    v.    Titus     (47    Ind.    145), 

488,  494. 
Hedgreen,  In  re  (  [Neb.]  HI  N.  W. 

786),   568. 
Hedland   v.   Geyer    (234   111.   589; 

85  N.  E.  203),  1928. 
Hedman,     Ex     parte     ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  78  S.  W.  349),  245. 
HefT,   In   re    (197    U.    S.    488;    25 

Sup.  Ct.  506 ;   49  L.  Ed.  848 ) , 

1260,   1263. 
Hegard     v.     California     Ins.     Co. 

([Cal.]    11   Pac.  594),  75. 
Hegeman   v.   Western   R.    Co.    ( 13 

N.  Y.  9),  99. 
Heide,   Ex  parte    (18   Juta,   479), 

695,  698. 
Heidelberg   Garden    Co.   v.   People 

(124  111.  App.  331;   affirming 

233   111.   290;    84  N.   E.   230), 

537,  683. 
Hein  v.   Smith    (13   W.   Va.  358), 

663. 
Heinesen  v.   State    (14  Colo.  228; 

23  Pac.  995),   1308. 
Heinrich  Bros.  Brewing  Co.  v.  Kit- 
sap   Co.    (45    Wash.   454;    88 

Pac.  838),  814. 
Heintz  v.  Le  Page    (100  Me.  542; 

62  Atl.   605),  965,  969,   1779, 

1790,  1800. 
Heise  v.  Columbia   (6  Rich.   [S.  C. 

Law]  404),  244,  291,  404. 
Heisembrittle  v.  Charleston  (2  Mc- 

Mul.  233),  413. 


clviii 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Heinz  v.   Stahl    ([Kan.]    99    Pac. 

273),  1772. 
Helfrick     v.     Commonwealth      (29 

Grctt.  844  [Va.]),  202,  203. 
Helling,  In  re  (2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

76),  639. 
Helmuth  v.  Bell   (150  III.  263;  37 

N.   E.    230;    affirming   49    III. 

App.  626),  1935. 
Hemhall    v.    Ludington     (33    Wi.s. 

107),  1840. 
Heming,  In  re  ([X.  Y.]   117  X.  Y. 

Supp.  747 ),  595. 
Hemmens    v.    Bentley     (32    Mich 

89),  1915,   1955,  1962. 
Hemmer    v.    Bonson     ( 139    Iowa, 

210;     117    X.    W.    257,    260), 

983,  985. 
Hempton  v.  State    (111  Wis.   127; 

86   X.    W.    596),    2039,    2068, 

2069. 
Henberger,  License.  In  re    {S   Pa. 

Super.   Ct.  625),   705. 
Hencke  v.   McCord    (55   la.   378), 

396,  1025. 
Hencke    v.    Standiford     (66    Ark. 

535;    52    S.    A.    1),    798,    799, 

802. 
Henderson,    In   re    ( 14    ]Manitoba, 

535),  939,  940. 
Henderson        v.        Coninionwealtli 

([Ky.]  72  S.  W.  781;  24  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  1985),  2068,  2085. 
Henderson    v.    Galveston     ( [Tex.] 

114   S.  W. '108),  132. 
Henderson   v.   Hey  wood    ( 109    Ga, 

373;  34  S.  E.  590),  452. 
Henderson    v.    Mayor     (92    U.    S. 

259),   116,  316. 
Henderson  v.  Price  ( 96  X.  C.  423 ; 

2  S.  E.  155),  688. 
Henderson  v.  State   (60  Ind.  296), 

1520,  1522. 
Henderson  v.   State    (37   Tex.   Cr. 

App.  79;  38  S.  W.  017),  1237. 
Henderson    v.     State     (  [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]  39  S.  W.  116),  1730. 
Henderson   v.   State    (49   Tex.   Cr. 

App.  269:  91  S.  W,  569),  905, 

1704,  1735. 


Henderson    v.     State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]  93  S.  W.  551),  1705. 
Henderson   v.   State    (50   Tex.   Cr. 

App.    413;    98    S.    W.    1055), 

1167. 
Henderson   v.    State    (50   Tex.   Cr. 

App.    604;     101    S.    \V.    208), 

160(i. 
Henderson   v.   State    (52   Tex.   Cr. 

App.    514;     107    S.    W.    820), 

1095. 
Henderson    v.    Waggoner     (2    Lea, 

133),   1801. 
Hendersonville  v.  Price    (9(i  X.  C. 

423;  2  S.  E.  155),  526,  780. 
Hendrick    v.    State    (47    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  371;  83  S.  W.  711),  972, 

1703. 
Hendrickson  v.  Commonwealth  ( 15 

Ky.  L.   Rep.    [abstract]   542), 

1715. 
Hendrickson    v.    Hendrickson     (51 

Iowa,  68),  2126, 
Hendrey   v.    Rolleston    (22    X.    Y. 

821),   1316. 
Heney  v.   State    ([Tex.]    16   S.  W. 

342),  1680. 
Heninbvrg  v.  State    (151  Ala.  26; 

43  So.  959),  2068,  2070. 
Hening,  In  re   ([X.  Y.]   117  X.  Y. 

Supp.  747),  582. 
Henke  v.  McCord    (55  Iowa,  378; 

7  X.  W.  623),  442. 
Henkel  v.  Hoy   (4  X.  J.  L.  56;  64 

Atl.  960)',  698. 
Hennepin     Co.     v.     Robinson     ( 16 

Minn.    381),    566,    627,    645, 

807. 
Hennessey  v.  Woulfe  (49  La.  Ann. 

1376';  22  So.  394),  2136,  2147. 
Henno  v.  Fayetteville   ([Ark.]   119 

S.  W.  287),  1696 
Henry,  In  re   (124  Iowa,  358;    100 

X.  W.  43),  69,  533.  o?M,  635, 

663. 
Henry  v.  Barton  (107  C3I.  535;  40 

Pac.  798),  627,  634. 
Henry   v.   Fulton    (8  X.   J.   L.   R. 

551),  1367,  1368. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


clix 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Henry  v.  Ritenour    (31  Ind.  136), 

2092,  2093. 
Henry  v.  State  (2G  Ark.  523),  139, 

787,  791. 
Henry  v.   State    (04  Ark.  602;   43 

S.  VV.  499),  1213,  1281. 
Henry  v.  State    (71  Ark.  574;   76 

S.  W.  1071),  1715. 
Henry  v.  State    (77  Ark.  453;    92 

S.  W.  405),  1101,  1108,  1651. 
Henry  v.  State  (33  Ga.  441),  2041. 
Henry  v.  State   (113  Ind.  304;    15 

N.  E.  593),  1197,  1508,  1567. 
Henry  v.  State   ([Tex.]    116  S.  W. 

1162),  514. 
Hensley  v.  Metcalfe  €o.    (115  Ky. 

810;    74   S.  W.   1054;    25   Ky. 

L.  Rep.   204),  639,  663. 
Hensley    v.    State     (6    Ark.    252), 

1548, 
Hensley   v.   State    (1    Eng.    [Ark.] 

252),   1541. 
Hensly    v.    State     (52    Ala.     10), 

1613. 
Hensiie   v.   State    (3   Heisk.   202), 

2079. 
Hensoldt    v.    Petersburg     (03    111. 

Ill),  1702. 
Heny  v.  State   (26  Ark.  523),  ',.3. 
Hepler  v.  State    (58  Wis.  40;    10 

N.  W.  42),  1645,  1764. 
Hepworth    v.    Pickles     ([1900]     1 

Ch,    108;     69    L.    J.    Ch.    55; 

48  W.  R.  184;   81  L.  T.  818), 

1814. 
Herald  v.  State   (36  Me.  62),  929. 
Herbert,  Ex  parte  (34  X.  B.  455), 

1755. 
Hercrow    v.    State     (2    Tex.    App. 

511),   370. 
Herine      v.      Commonwealth       ( 13 

Bush,  -295),  1457,  1542,  1545. 
Hering,  In   re    ([X.  Y.]    117  X.  Y. 

Supp.   747),   103,  500. 
Hering    v.    Ervin     (48    111.    App. 

309),   1801. 
Her  lock  v.  Riser  (1  McCord,  481), 

1805. 


Herman  Goepper  &  Co.  v.  Phoenix 

Brewing   Co.    (115    Ky.    708; 

74  S.  W.  720;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

84),    1170. 
Hernandez  v.  State  ( 32  Tex.  Crim. 

Rep.    271;     22    S.    W.    972), 

2074. 
Herod  v.  State    (41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

597;    56   S.   W.  59),   1727. 
Herrick  v.  Morrill  (37  Minn.  250; 

33  X.  W.  849;  5  Am.  St.  Rep. 

841  J,   005. 
Herring    v.    Wilmington,    etc.,    R. 

Co.     (10     Ired.     L.    402;     51 

Am.    Dec.    395),    2178,    2180. 
Herron    v.    State     (51    Ark.    133; 

10  S.  W.  25),  137,  1281,  1288. 
Herron    v.    State     (17    Ind.    App. 

161;     46    N.    E.    540),     1444, 

1502. 
Herschenback    v.    State    (34    Tex. 

Cr.  Rep.  122;   29  S.  W.  470), 

1233. 
Herschey  v.  Mill  Creek  Tp.   (  [Pa.] 

8  Cent.  Rep.  252),  2187. 
Hershoff  v.  Beverly    (45   N.   J.  L. 

[16  Vroom]   288),  410,  413. 
Hertel    v.    People     (78    III.    App. 

109),  968. 
Hertzler   v.    Geigley    (196   Pa.   St. 

419;   46  Atl.  360),   123,  1380, 

1381. 
Hess  V,  Pegg   (7  Xev.  23),  394. 
Hestand  v.  Commonwealth    (  [Ky.] 

92  S.  W.   12;   28  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1315),    1005. 
Hettenbach  v.  If^hy    ( 7  Vict.  L.  R. 

104),   1368. 
Hctzer    a-.    People     ( 4    Colo.    45 ) , 

522. 
Hetzer  v.   Wheelan    (21  Ga.   401), 

401. 
Hevren    v.    Reed     (126    Cal.    219: 

58   P.   5.36),   490,   715,   716. 
Hewitt,  Appeal  of    (76  Conn.  685; 

58   Atl.   231),   597,   645. 
Hewitt's    Will,   In    re    (31    N.    Y. 

Misc.  Rep.  81;  64  X\  Y.  Supp. 

\571),   2136,   2138,   2141. 


clx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Hewitt  V.   Invercargill    (12   X.  Y. 

L.   R.    631),   644. 
Hewitt   V.   Jervis    (68    J.   P.   54), 

6D0,  1273. 
Hewitt   V.    People    (186    111.    3»6; 

57    N.   E.    1077;    affirming   87 

111.    App.    367),    11,    73,   964, 

968,    1195,    1196. 
Hexom   v.    Knights    of    Maccabees 

of    the    World     ( [Iowa  J     117 

N.  W,  19),  2240,  2242. 
Heyman,   Ex    parte    (45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  532;  78  S.  W.  349),  234, 

245,  863. 
Heyman  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (203 

U.   S.  270;    27   Sup.  Ct.    104; 

51  L.  Ed.   178   [reversing  122 

Ga.  608;  50  S.  E.  342]),  324, 

328,  330,  1429. 
Heyman   v.    State    (64    Ga.    437), 

1515. 
Hibbard  v.  Clark   (56  N.  H.  155), 

276. 
Hibbard  v.  People    (4  Mich.   125), 

254,    100-8,    1013,    1016. 
Hickcox  V.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

85    ;S.    W.     1198),    298,    307, 

1214,   1280. 
Hickey  v.  Hay    (65  J.  P.  232;    17 

T.  L.  R.  52 ) ,  380. 
Hickman   v.    Glazebrook    ( 18    Ind. 

210),  2124. 
Hicks    V.    State    ( [Ga.]    32    S.    E. 

665),   1523. 
Hicks  V.  Trustees    (151  Mich.  88; 

114    N.    W.    682;    14    Detroit 

L.  N.  812),  762,  764. 
Hierholzer  v.   State    (47    Tex.  Cr. 

Rep.    199;     83     S.    W.    836), 

2090. 
Hiers  v.  .State  ( [Fla.]  41  So.  881), 

1379. 
Higbee  v.   Guardian  Mut.   L.   Ins. 

Co.     (66     Barb.     462),     2220, 

2224,  2235. 
Higgenbotham    v.    State    ( 19    Fla. 

557),  929. 
Higgins  V.   Kavanaugh    (52  Iowa, 

368;  3  N.  W.  409),  1966. 


Higgins    V.    People     (69    111.    11), 

1552. 
Higgins  V.  Rinker   (47  Tex.  393), 

27,  555. 
Higgins  V.  State    (64  Md.  419;    1 

Atl.   876),   938,   939. 
Higgins   V.    Talty    (157   Mo.    280; 

57   S.   W.  724),   6'59. 
High   V.   State    ([Okla.]    101    Pac. 

115),  323,  325,  329,  3-85. 
Hight   V.    Fleming    (74   Ga.   592), 

800,  802. 
Hight  V.  Wilson   ( 1  Dall.  94 ;   1  L. 

Ed.  51),  2139. 
Hill    V.     Commissioners     (22    Ga. 

203),  432. 
Hill  V.  Dalton   (72  Ga.  314),  270, 

449,  1505. 
Hill    V.    Decatur     (22    Ga.    203), 

432. 
Hill   V.   Dunn    ([Iowa]    93   N.   W. 

705),  981. 
Hill   V.  Gleisner    (112   Iowa,   397; 

84  N.   W.  511),  943. 
Hill  V.  Howth    ([Tex.]    Ill   S.  W. 

649),  864. 
Hill  V.  Howth    ([Tex.   Civ.   App.] 

112   S.   W^    707),   864,   892. 
Hill  V.  Manning   (12  N.  Z.  L.   R. 

153),   1597. 
Hill    V.    People    (20    N.    Y.    363), 

2026. 
Hill   V.   Perry    (82   Ind.  28),   532. 
Hill  V.  Roach    (26  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

75;   62  S.  W.  959),  921,  925. 
Hill   v.   Sheridan    (128    Mo.    App. 

415;    107    S.   W.  426),   706. 
Hill   v.   Spear    (50   N.   H.   253;    9 

Am.    Rep.    205),    1785,    1786, 

1795,   1796,   1798,   1799,   1801. 
Hill  V.  State   (62  Ala.  168),  1223, 

1240,   1241,    1253. 
Hill  V.  State  (37  Ark.  395),  1233, 

1598. 
Hill    V.    State    (42    Xeb.    503;    60 

N.  W.  916),  2051,  2061,  2072. 
Hillard    v.    Fitzpatrick    (27    Vict. 

L.  R.  380;  23  Austr.  L.  T.  1; 

7   Austr.   L.    R.  223),   360. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxi 


I  Fieferences    are    to    pages.] 


Hillard  v.  Giese    (25  X.   Y.  App 

Div.  222;  49  N.  Y.  Sup.  28(5) 

491,  7M. 
Hillard  v.  State  ( 4S  Tex.  Cr.  App 

314;     87     S.     W.     821),     915 

1208. 
Hildreth    v.    Crawford    (6'5    Iowa 

339;  21  N.  W.  667),  185,  471 

'827. 
Hilleman,  In  re  (11  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

567),    646. 
Hillman  v.  Mayher    (38  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    377;'   85    S.    W.    818), 

761. 
Hillman  v,  Gallagher    ([Tex.]    120 

S.  W.  505),  1924,  1932,   1941. 
Hillsboro  v.  Smith  (110  N.  C.  417; 

14   S,  E.  972),  382,  596,  628, 

629,  674. 
Hilterbrand  v.  State   (49  Tex.  Cr. 

App.    342;     91    S.    W.    587), 

1212. 
Hilts  V.   Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.    (7:>o 

Mich.    437;    21    N.    VV.    87«), 

2198,  2199,  2201. 
Hilverstine  v.  Yantes  ( 88  Ky.  695 ; 

21  S.  W.  811),   289. 
Hinan  v.  Lett   (8  Wall.  148),  316. 
Hinchman  v.  Stoepel   (54  N.  J.  L. 

486;  24  Atl.  401),  616,  617. 
Hinckley  v.  German  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

(140  Mass.   38;   54   Am.   Rep. 

445;   1  N.  E.  737),  1779. 
Hine   v.   Belden    (27   Conn.   384), 

1015. 
Hines   v.   Stahl    ([Kan.]    93   Pac. 

273),   1023. 
Hines  v.  State  (26  Ga.  614),  1245. 
Hingle    v.    State     (22    Ind.    462), 

1307. 
Hingle  v.  State   (24  Ind.  28),  237, 

1304,   1307,   1308. 
Hinkle,  Ex  parte    ( 104  Mo.   App. 

104;   78  S.  A.  317),  413,  417, 

796. 
Hinkle   v.    Commonwealth    ([Ky.] 

66  S.    W.    1020;    23    Ky.    L. 
Rep.  1979),  1180,   1204,   1462. 

Hinkle   v.  Smith    (90    Iowa,    761; 

67  N.  W.  891),  1002. 


Hinson    v.    Lott     (40    Ala.    123), 

316. 
Hinson    v.    Lott     (8    Wall.     148), 

154,    156. 
Hintermeister    v.    State     ( 1    Iowa, 

101),    1489. 
Hinton      v.      Commonwealth       (7 

Dana,   216),    1096. 
Hinton    v.    State     (132    Ala.    29; 

31  So.  563),  1185,  1698,  1703. 
Hipes  V.  State  ( 18  Ind.  App.  426 ; 

48  N.  E.  12),  1507,  1535. 
Hipp   V.   State    (5    Blackf.    [Ind.] 

143),   1240,   1351,   1352,   1353. 
Hippen    v.    Ford     (129    Cal.    315; 

01  Pac.  929),  652. 
Hirn  v.  State  ( 1  Ohio  St.  15  [over- 
ruling Curtis  V.  State,  5  Ohio 

324]),  72,  508,  714,  716,  1510, 

1521. 
Hirsch  v.  State   ( 50  Tex.  €r.  App. 

1;    96    S.    W.    40),    949,    950, 

1280. 
Hirschburg     v.    People      (6     Colo. 

145),   929. 
Hitchner  v.  Ehlers   (44  Iowa,  40), 

1915. 
Kitchens  v.  People  ( 39  N.  Y.  454 ) , 

369. 
Hite    V.    Commonwealth     (96    Va. 

489;    31    S.   E.   895),   2038. 
H.  Koehler  &  Co.  v.  Clemont   ( [N. 

Y.]     Ill    N.    Y.    Supp.    151), 

723,  752. 
Hoagland  v.  Canficld  (160  F.  146), 

84,   2260. 
Hoard  v.  Peck    (56  Barb.   [X.  Y.] 

202),    1838. 
Hoard    v.    State     (15    Lea,    318), 

2055. 
Hoare  &  Co.  Limited  v.  Lewisham 

Borough    Council    ( [1902]    87 

L.   T.   281;    17  T.  L.  R.   72), 

1834. 
Hoare    v.    Metropolitan    Board   of 

Works  ([1874]   L.  R.  9  Q.  B. 

296;    38    J.    P.    535),    1834. 
Hobart  v.  Butte  Co.   (17  Cal.  23), 

233. 


clxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[ReferencciS    are    to    pages.] 


Hoboken  v.  Goodman  (68  X.  J.  L. 

217;   51   Atl.  1092),   148,  305, 

413,  416,  464,  714. 
Hockett   V.    Wilson    (12    Ore.    25; 

6  Pac.  6521.  479. 
Hochfield  v.   Sutherland    ( 15  Juta, 

101),  567. 
Hochstadler  v.  State  (73  Ala.  24), 

509,  691,   1267. 
Hockings    v.    Powell     (59     J.    P. 

358),  680. 
Hodge   V.    Commonwealth    ( 3   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  822),  1466. 
Hodge   V.    Commonwealth    (4    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  341),  1467. 
Hodge  V.  State    (116  Ga.  852;   43 

S.  E.  255),  80,   1159. 
Hodge  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

43  S.  W.  994),  1201,  1210. 
Hodges  V.  Metcalfe  Co.    (116  Ky. 

524;    75    S.   W.    381;    25    Ky. 

L.  Rep.  772),  627. 
Hodges    V.    Metcalfe    Co.     ( [Ky.] 

76  S.  W.  381;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

772,    1706;    78    S.    W.    460), 

666. 
Hodges    V.    Metcalf    Co.    Ct.    (117 

Ky.  619;   78  S.  W.   177,  400; 

25   Ky.   L.   Rep.    1553,   1706), 

619,  800. 
Hodgman  v.  People  (4  Denio,  235), 

1556,    1608. 
Hodgson  V.  New  Orleans    (21  La. 

Ann.    301),     198. 
Hodgson     V.     Temple     (5     Taunt. 

181),   1790,  1794,  1795. 
Hoefiing  v.  San  Antonio    (85  Tex. 

228;    20   S.   W.   85;    16   L.   R. 

A.   608),  4«3. 
HofiF,  In  re    (197   U.  S.  488,   505; 

25    Sup.   Ct.   500;    49    L.    Ed. 

848),   147. 
HofTer,  Ex  parte    (27  X.  B.  496), 

1723. 
Hofheintz   v.   State    (45    Tex.   €r. 

App.    117;    74    S.    W.    310), 

1130,   1451. 
Hofner    v.    State     (94    Ind.    84), 

1353,   1016. 


Hogan,   In  re    (16   R.   I.   542;    18 

AtL   273),    1065. 
Hogan   V.   Dewell    (24   Ark.   216), 

1027. 
Hogg    V.    Davidson     (3    F.    [Just. 

Cas.]  49),  1352,  1355. 
Hogg  V.  People  ( 15  111.  App.  288 ) , 

1343. 
Hogins    V.    Supreme    Council     (76 

CaL    109;     9    Am.    St.    173), 

2231,   2232. 
Hoglan  V.  Commonwealth  (3  Bush, 

147),    196,    635,   664. 
Hoitt  V.  Moulton   (1  Post.  [X.  H.] 

586),  2259. 
Holberg  v.  Macon   (55  Miss.   112), 

202,    793. 
Holcomb   V.   People    (49    111.   App. 

73 j,   11,   56,  968. 
Holden  v.  Brooks    (68  X.  H.   184; 

20  Atl.  247),  1800. 
Holden  v.  State   (41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

411;  55  S.  W.  337),  1478. 
Holland    v.    Barnes    (53    Ala.    83; 

25  Am.  Rep.  595),  2104,  2123. 
Holland  v.  Commonwealth    ( 7  Ky. 

L.   Rep.    [abstract]    223),    11, 

36. 
Holland   v.   Holland    (4   Leg.  Gaz. 

372),  2154,  2167. 
Holland    v.    Seagreve     (11     Gray, 

207),    1048. 
Holland   v.    State    ( [Fla.]    47    So. 

903),  648,   053. 
Holland  v.  State  (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

147,    157;     101    ,S.    W.    1002, 

1004),  941,   1684. 
Holland  v.  State  (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

142;    101   S.   W.   1005),   1611. 
Holland  v.  State  (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

547;    103   S.   W.   631),   957. 
Holland   V.   West   End   St.   R.  €o. 

(155    Mass.    387;     29    X.    E. 

622),  2196. 
Holleman  v.   Harward    (119  X.  C. 

150;     25    S.    E.    972),     1837, 

1838. 
Hollenbeck  v.  Drake  (37  Xeb.  680; 

56  X.  W.  296),  616,  645,  646. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


clxiii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Hollender,     Appeal     of     (11     Pa. 

Super.   Ct.  23),   664. 
Hollender   v.    Magone    (149    U.    S. 

586;    37   L.   Ed.  860;    13  Sup. 

Ct.  Rep.  932),  5. 
Hollender    v.     Magone     (38     Fed. 

912),  442. 
Holler  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

73   S.  W.  901),   1472,   1689. 
Holley    V.    State     (14    Tex.    App. 

505),  235,  289,   1176. 
Holley  V.  State    (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

324;     81     S.     W.     957),     871, 

1380,    1381,    1682,    1683. 
Holinquist,    Ex    parte     (27     Pac. 

1099),   195. 
Hollingsvvortli  v.  Atlanta    (79  Ga. 

503;   5  S.  E.   37),   1089,  1658. 
Hollis   V.    Davis    (56    X.    H.    74), 

1894. 
HoUoway    v.    State     ( 45    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.     303;     77     S.    W.      14), 

2090. 
Holloway    v.    State    (53    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    246;    110    S.    W.    745), 

911,    912,    913,    1472,    1612. 
Holloway    v.    State    (54    Tex.   Cr. 

App"^.     115;     HI     S.    W.    937, 

939),  1612,  10S9. 
Holly  &  Co.  V.  Simmons   (38  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  124;  85  S.  W.  325), 

771,   1231. 
Holly    V.     Simmons     ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    89  S.   W.   776),   771. 
Holman  v.  Jackson   (1  Cowp.  341), 

1794. 
Holman  v.  Johnson  (Cowper,  241), 

1031. 
Holman  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

89  S.  W.  977),  1207. 
Holmes,   Ex  parte    ([1906]    32   T. 

L.   R.   41),    18.30. 
Holmes  v.  Hunt    (122  Mass.  505; 

23  Am.  Rep.   381),  264,  1585. 
Holmes    v.    Morgan    (52    Ark.    99; 

12  S.  W.  201),  879. 
Holmes  v.  Oregon,  etc.,  R.  Co.    (5 

Fed.   528),    2177,   2179,   2191, 

2192,  2202,  2203. 


Holmes   v.   Robertson   Co.    ([Ky.] 

89  S.  W.  106;  28  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

283),   666. 
Holmes   v.    State    (88    Ind.    145), 

1226,  1240. 
Holmes  v.  State   (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

353;    106   S.    W.    1160),    1603. 
Holpa     v.     Aberdeen     (34     Wash. 

554;    76    Pac.    79),    745,    748. 
Holsky  v.  State    ([Tex.]   36  S.  W. 

443),   1227. 
Holt  v.  Collyer   ([1881]    16  Ch.  D. 

718;    45   J.    P.   456;    44   L.  T. 

214),   1814. 
Holt  V.   Commissioners    (31    Howr. 

Pr.  334,  note),  183,  186. 
Holt   V.   O'Brien    (15   Gray,   311), 

1782. 
Holt  V.  State   (62  Neb.  134;  86  N. 

W.  1073),  549,  833,  842,  1524, 

1526. 
Holteroir  v.  ]\Iutual,  etc.,  Ins.  Co. 

(3    Am.    L.    Rec.   272),   2229, 

2230,  2231,  2234. 
Holton   V.    Bimrod    (8    Kan.    App. 

265  ;  55  Pac.  505 ) ,  434,  954. 
Holton    V.    Haist     (8    Kan.    App. 

856;    55   Pac.   468),    1742. 
Holtun  V.  Germania  Life  Ins.   Co. 

(139   Ca!.  645;   73  Pac.  591), 

2234. 
Holy    Trinity    Church    v.    United 

State    (143   U.   S.    457,   464), 

214,  1419,  1421. 

Home   V.    Stewart    (40    Vt.    145), 

1031. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Augusta   (50  Ga. 

530),  483,  788, 
Homer    v.    Brown    (117    La.    Ann. 

425;   41   So.  711),  433. 
Homire  v.  Ilalfman  (156  Ind.  470; 

60    X.    E.    154),    1844,    1863, 

1879. 
Honesty  v.  Commonwealth  (81  Va. 

28.3),   2071. 
Honey  v.  Guilaume   ( [Ind.]  88  N. 

E.   937),    604,   607,   612. 
Hood  V.  Von  Glahm  (88  Ga.  405), 

215,  271,  273,  402,  432. 


clxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Hooker    v.   Mueller    ([Mich.]    123 

X.   W.  24),   1811. 
Hookset    V.    Amoskeag,    etc.,    Co. 

(44  X.  H.  105),  470. 
Hoop    V.    Affleck     (162    Ind.    564; 
70  N.  E.  978),  197,  206,  209, 
611,  835. 
Hooper  v.  Commomvealth   ( 1 1  Ky. 
L.  Rep.   [abstract]   369),  519, 
543. 
Hoover,  In  re    (30  Fed.   51),   102, 
110,    149,    195,   208,    239,   400. 
Hooper    v.    State    (56    Ind.    153), 

821,  1491,  1566. 
Hoover   v.   Thomas    ( 35    Tex.    Civ. 
App.  535;  80  S.  W.  859),  233, 
896,  902. 
Hoorman  v.  Climax  Cycle  Co.    (9 
App.  Div.  579,  585;   41  X.  Y. 
S.  710),  990. 
Hopcroft,  Ex  parte  ([1868]  14  \V. 

R.   168),   1834. 
Hopcraft  V.  Flabell  ([1868]   14  W. 

R.   168),  1817. 
Hope    V.    Warburton     ([1892]     2 
Q.  B.   134;    56   J.   P.   328;    61 
L.    J.    M.    C.    147;    66    L.    T. 
589;     40    W.    R.    510),    359, 
2058. 
Hopkins    v.    Knapp,    etc.,    Co.    (92 
Iowa,    212;    60    X.    W.    620). 
2254. 
Hopkins  v.  Lewis    (84  Iowa,  690; 
51    X.    W.    255;    15   L.    R.    A. 
397),  310. 
Hopson,  Appeal  of  (63  Conn.  140; 

31  Atl.  5.31),  635. 
Hopt    V.   People    (104   U.    S.    631; 
26   L.    Ed.    873),   2061,    2065, 
2067. 
Horan  v.  Travis  Co.  (27  Tex.  226), 

509,  767. 
Ilorgan's  Liquors,  In  re   (16  R.  I. 
542;    18  Atl.  279),  253,   1008, 
1049. 
Hornaday  v.  State    (43  liul.  306), 

529,   683. 
Hornberger  v.  Case    (9   Ohio  Dec. 
434;   13  VVkly.  L.  BulL  437), 
813. 


Hornberger  v.  State   (47  Xeb.  40; 

66    X.    W.    23),    1505,    1507, 

1558,   1641,    1643. 
Home  V.  Home  ( 1  Tenn.  Ch.  259 ) , 

2159,  2160. 
Horning  v.  Bailey    (50  Conn.  40), 

1040,  1055. 
Homing  v.  Wendell  (57  Ind.  171), 

223,    489,    509,    1840,    1842. 
Hornsby    v.     Raggett     ([1892]     1 

Q.  B.  20;   66  L.  T.  21;  40  W. 

R.    Ill;    55   J.   P.   508),   378. 
Horst  V.  Lewis    (71  Xeb.  365;   98 

X.  W.  1046;   103  X.  VV.  460), 

1912,  1922,  1973. 
Horton  v.  Carrington   ( 1  How.  Pr. 

[X.   S.]    124),    1601. 
Horton    v.    Central    Falls    [R.    I.] 

35  Atl.  962),  532. 
Horton  v.  Equitable,  etc.,  Soc.    (2 

Bigelow   L.   &   Ace.    Ins.   Rep. 

108),  2226. 
Horton  v.  Equitable,  etc.,  Soc.   (2 

Abb.  L.  Jr.  255),  2221,  2229, 

2233. 
Hosea    v.    State     (47    Ind.    280), 

1109,  1742. 
Hoskey    v.    State     (9    Tex.    App. 

202),  1539,  1569. 
Hoskins  v.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.] 

102  S.  W.  276;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

309),   1173,   1176. 
Hotcher     v.     Andrews      (5     Bush, 

561),   1808,  1809. 
Hotchins    v.    Hindmarsh     ([1891] 

2   Q.    B.    181;    55   J.   P.    775; 

65  L.  T.  159),  1383. 
Hotchkiss    V.    Finan     (105    Mass. 

86),  1790,   1798,  1799. 
Hotchkiss  V.  Fortson  (7  Yerg.  67), 

2109,  2128,   2130. 
Hotel    Cambridge    License,    In    re 
(20    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    Rep.    229), 
705. 
Hotham  v.  Phillips  (23  X.  B.  126), 

1790. 
Hotson   V.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 
105    S.    W.    955;    32    Ky.    L- 
Rep.  392),  188. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


clxv 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Holtendorf  v.  State  (89  Ind.  282), 

821,    827. 
Houck  V.   Ashland    (40   Ore.    117; 

66  Pac.  697),  417,  463,  473. 
Houghton  V.  Austin  (47  Cal.  646), 

231. 
Houldsworth    v.    Fairhall    (25    X. 

Z.    1),    1249. 
Houma   v.   Houraa,   etc.,   Co.    (121 

La.  21;    46  So.  42),  403,  413, 

416. 
Houman  v.  Schulster   (60  X.  J.  L. 

35;   36  Atl.  776),  675,  676. 
House,    In    re    (23    Colo.    87;    46 

Pac.   117;    33   L.   R.   A.   832), 

2022. 
House    V.    State    (41    Miss.    737), 

673,  576. 
Houser    v.    State     (18    Ind.    106), 

5,  500,  505,   1586. 
Houster    v.    Leightner     (42    Phila. 

Leg.  Ind.  289),  213.5,  2136. 
Houston   V.    Gran    (38    Neb.    687; 

57    N.    W.    403),    1862,    1959, 

1994,  1997. 
Houston   V.   Graw    (45   Neb.  813; 

64  N.  VV.  245),  1865. 
Houston  V.  Moore    (5   Wheat.    [U. 

S.]  27),  1070. 
Houston   V.    State    (26   Tex.    App. 

657;    14   S.   VV.    352),   2090. 
Houston,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  R'eason  (61 

Tex.  613),  2172,  2177. 
Houston,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Smith   (52 

Tex.    178),   2180,  2185,   2195. 
Houston,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Sympkins 

(54    Tex.    615;    38    Am.    Rep. 

632),  2180,  2183,  2184,  2107. 
Houston,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Tierney 

(72  Tex.  312;    12  S.  VV.  586), 

2098. 
Houston,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Waller 

(56  Tex.  331),  2191. 
Houtsoh  V.  Jersey  City    (29  N.  .J. 

L.  [5  Dutch]  316),  215,  1135, 

1303. 
Houtz    V.    People     ( 123    111.    App. 

445),   1183,   1702. 
Hovey  v.  Harmon    (49  Me.  269), 

2016. 


Howard,  Ex  parte  ( 25  N.  B.  191), 

1085,   1115,   1531. 
Howard  v.  Commonwealth    ([Ky.| 

33  S.  VV.  1115),  1521. 
Howard  v.  Commonwealth   ([Ky.] 

89    S.    VV.    256;     28    Ky.    L. 

Rep.   239),    1196. 
Howard  v.  Haines    (25  Ind.  541), 

232. 
Howard  v.  Harris    (8  Allen,  297), 

1165,   1166,   1783. 
Howard  v.  Moot    (64  N.  Y.  262), 

264,    1585. 
Howard  v.  Smith  (26  Sol.  J.  533), 

2169. 
Howard    v.    State     (5    Ind.    516). 

1.589,  1635,  1754. 
Howard    v.    State    (6    Ind.    447), 

978,    1102,    1481,    1550,    1760. 
Howard    v.    State    ( [Fla.]    47    So. 

963),   598. 
Howard  v.  State   (Go  S.  E.  1076), 

35. 
Howard  v.  State  (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

494;    36  S.   VV.   475),  2078. 
Howard   v.   Stenfil    ([Ky.]    102   S. 

W.  831;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  207), 

023. 
Howarth   v.   Minns    (51    J.   P.    7; 

50  L.  T.  316),  961. 
Howe   V.   Jolly    (68   Miss.   323;    8 

So.  513),  1771. 
Howe   V.   Plainfield    (37   N.    J.   L. 

145),   216,   271,   275. 
Howe  V.  State  (10  Ind.  423),  1516. 
Howe    V.     Stewart     (40    Vt.     145, 

1772,  1777. 
Howell  V.  Jackson  (6  C.  &  P.  725), 

362,   2028. 
Howell  V.  State    (71   Ga.   224;   51 

Am.    Rep.    259)     21,    52,    132, 

134. 
Howell  V.  State    (124  Ga.  698;  52 

S.  E.  649),  064,   1501. 
Howell  V.  State  (4  Ind.  App.  148; 

30  N.  E.  714),  1518. 
Howell  V.  State   (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

536;    110    S.    W.    914),    1217, 

1613. 


clxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Howes  V.  Inland  Revenue  ( 1  Exch. 

Div.    385;    41    J.    P.    423;    46 

L.  J.  M.  C.  15;   35  L.  T.  584; 

24  W.  R.  897 ) ,  1200. 
Howes  V.  Maxwell  ( 157  Mass.  333; 

32  N.  E.  152),  223,  755,  762, 

1840. 
Hoxie,  hi  re  (15  R.  1.  241;  3  Atl. 

1),   1035,   1044. 
Hoyniak   License,  In  re    (9  Kulp. 

[Pa.]  368),  500,  732. 
Hoyt   V.  State    ([Tex.    (Jr.    App.] 

89  S.  W.  1082),  952. 
Hubbard,   In  re    (6   J.   J.   Marsh, 

58),  2136. 
Hubbard's    Will,    hi   re    (6    J.   J. 

Marsh,  58),  2143,  2147,  2148. 
Hubbard    v.    Commonwealth     ( 10 

Ky.   L.  Rep.    [abstract]   683), 

875,  898,  910,   1704. 
Hubbard   v.    Lancaster    ( 127    Ala. 

157;   28  So.  796),  382. 
Hubbard  v.  Mason  City   (60  Iowa, 

400;     14    N.    W.    772),    2190, 

2191,   2193,  2194. 
Hubbard  v.   State    (11    Ind.   554), 

1497,  1501. 
Hubbell  V.  Ebrit  ( 8  Ohio  Com.  PI. 

116),  835,  839. 
Hubbell    V.    Flint    (13    Gray,   277, 

279),   1796. 
Hubbell    V.    Polk    Co.    (106    Iowa, 

618;  76  N.  \V.  854),  790. 
Huber    v.    Baugh     (43    la.    291), 

471,  714. 
Huber    v.    Commonwealth     ([Ky.] 

112    S.    \V.    583;    33    Ky.    L. 

Rep.     1031).     .".S8,     521,"  506, 
1099. 
Iluber    V.    People     ( S7     111.    App. 

120),   1230. 
Hubman    v.    State    (01    Ark.    482; 

33  .S.  W.  843).  479. 
Iluby  V.   State    (111    C.a.   842;    36 

"S.  E.  310),    1107. 
Huckless    V.    Chihlrey     (  135    I'.    S. 
622;    10   Sup.  <  t.    972;    34   L. 
Ed.    304),     149. 
Hudgins   v.   State    (14.1   Abv.   499; 
39  So.  717),  241. 


Hudson,  hi  re  (19  Ont  App.  343), 

883. 
Hudson   V.   Geary    (4   R.   I.   485), 

215,    216,    457,    1121,    1134. 
Hudson  V.  Hudson   (3  Swab.  &  T. 

314;    33    L.    J.    Mat.    [N.    S.] 

5;    9    Jur.    [N.    S.]     1302;     9 

L.  T.   [X.  S.]    579;    12  W.  R. 

216),  2164. 
Hudson  V.  Lynn,  etc.,  R.  Co,   (178 

Mass.  64;  59  N.  E.  647),  2200, 

2208. 
Hudson  V.  State  (73  Miss.  784;  19 

So.  965),  1558. 
Hudson    V.    State     (iOkla.]     101 

Pac.  275),  317,  325.  327,  329. 
Hudspeth  v.  Coope--  (114  Ind.  12), 

1849. 
Huell    V.    Ball     (20    Iowa,    282), 

107. 
Huff   V.    Aultman    (69    Iowa,    71; 

28    N.    W.    440;    58   Am.   Rep. 

213),   1886,   1971,   1972,   1998, 

2002. 
Huff  V.  Dyer    (4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R. 

595),  2261. 
Huff  V.   State    (51   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

441;    102    S.    W.    1144),    857, 

874,  909,  917,   958,   1684. 
Huff   V.  State    (51    Tex.  Cr.   App. 

550;    103    S.    W.    629),    1600, 

1604,    1696. 
Huffman  v.  Walterhouse   ( 19  Ont. 

Rep.    186),    1373,    1375,    1593. 
Huffsmith  v.  People  (8  Colo.  175), 

395. 
Huffstater    v.     Hayes     (64     Barb. 

573),   1779,   1783. 
Huffstat«r  v.   State    (5   Hun,  23), 

1638. 
Hugg  V.  People  (15  111.  App.  288), 

1215 
Hughes  V.  Hughes    (19   Ala.  307), 

2167. 
Hughes    V.    State    (35    Ala.    351), 

1652,   1740,   1747. 
Ilugill    V.    Merrifield     (12    C.    P. 
[Can.]      269),       1352,       1354, 
1762,  1907. 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


clxvii 


fReferPnoes    are    to    pages  ] 


Hugonin  v.  Adams  ( [Miss.]  33  So. 

497),  528. 
Hull  V.  Miller    (4  Neb.  503),  228. 
Hulsman  v.  State    (42   Ind.  500), 

1516. 
Hulton   V.   Waterloo,   etc.,   Co.    ( 1 

F.  &  F.  735),  2225. 
Humboldt     County     v.     Churchill 

County,  etc.  {G  Nev.  30),  106. 
Humphreys  v.  State   (34  Tex.  Cr. 

Rep.    434;    30    S.    W.    1066), 

369. 
Humphries    v.    Commonwt^ilth     { 6 

Ky.    L.    R.     [abstract]    594), 

1352. 
Humphries    v.    Johnson     (20    Ind. 

190),   1989. 
Humpler  v.   People    (92  111.   400), 

1173,    1253,    1255,    1621. 
Hundland  v.  Hardy    ( 74  Mo.  App. 

614),  434. 
Hunt  V.  New  York   ( 47  X.  Y.  App. 

■295;     62    N.    Y.    Supp.    184), 

807. 
Hunter,  In  re  ( 34  Misc.  Eep.  389 ; 

69   N.  Y.   S.   008,  atfirmed  59 

App.   Div.    626;    69   N.   Y.    S. 

1139),  5,  990,  994. 
Hunter,  In  re    (24   Ont.   522;    re- 
versing   24    Ont.     153),    575, 

646. 
Hunter  v.  Lisso  ( 35  La.  Ann.  230 ) , 

802. 
Hunter  v.  Senn    (61    S.  C.   44;    39 

S.  E.  235),  852,  898,  910. 
Hunter    v.    State     (79    Ga.    365), 

497,  550. 
Hunter  v.    State    (101    Ind.    241), 

1224,    1240,   1628. 
Hunter    v.    State     (18    Tex.    App. 

444;   51  Am.  Rep.  319),  1627, 

2090. 
Hunter  v.  State  (55  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

269;   116  S.  W.  604),  1181. 
Hunter    v.    Tolberd     (47    W.    Va. 

258;     34     S.    E.     737),    20M, 

2108,  2117. 
Huntinguon  v.  Moir   (20  Rev.  Leg. 

684),  434. 


Huntington  v.  State  (36  Ala.  236), 

1188. 
Huntington,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Decker 

(84     Pa.     419),     2192,     2194, 

2198,   2199,    2200,    2201. 
Huntsville,    hi    re    (25    Oiiio    Cir. 

Ct.  Rep.   535),  865,  867,  872. 
Hunzinger  v.  State   (39  Neb.  653; 

58  N.  W.  194),  110,  168,  170, 

407,  502. 
Hurber  v.  Baugh    (43  Iowa,  514), 

727. 
Hurdland  v.  Hardy   (74  Mo.  App. 

614),  419,  824. 
Hurl,    Ux    parte     (49    Cal.    557), 

139,    170,    187,    191,   428,   443, 

444,  791,  795. 
Hurlburt  v.  Sleeth    (27  Nov.  Sco. 

375;   25   S.  C.  C.   [Nov.  Sco.] 

620),  1076. 
Hurney    v.    State    (49    Ind.    203), 

1223. 
Huson,  In  re   (19  Ont.  App.  343), 

870. 
Hussey,   Ex   parte    (48    Ore.   621; 

85  Pac.  332 ) ,  869. 
Hussey  v.  Stiite  (69  Ga.  54),  1119, 

1120,   1122. 
Hustead     v.      Commonwealth      (5 

Leigh,  724),  1627. 
Huston    V.    Vail     (51    Ind.    299). 

2250. 
Hutcher    v.    State    (80   Tenn.    [12 

Lea]   368),  134. 
Hutchinson    v.    Brown    ( 1    Clarke 

Ch.  408 ) ,  2093,  2094,  2105. 
Hutchinson  v.   Hubbard    (21    Neb. 

33;  31  N.  VV.  245),  1864. 
Hutchinson  v.  State  (62  Ind.  556), 

1485. 
Hutchinson   v.    State    (5    Humph. 

142),  2024. 
Hutchinson    v.    State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]    90    S.    W.    178),    1207. 

Hutchinson    v.   Tindall    (2    Green. 

[N.  J.  Eq.]   357),  2093,  2094, 

2099,  2107,  2108,  2115. 
Ilut.suu   V.   (uiuniDtus  taltli    ([Ky.] 
105  S.  W.  955 ;  32  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

392),  839. 


clxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages] 


H.    W.    Metcalfe    Co.    v.    Orange 

County    {[Fla.]    47   So.  363), 

898,   901,  902,  921,  925. 
Hyman  v.  Moore   (3  Jones  L.   [N. 

C]  416),  2093,  2109. 
Hyman   v.   State    (87    Tenn.    109; 

9  S.  W.  272 ) ,  292. 
Hynum   v.    State    (74    Miss.   829; 

21  So.  971),  1654. 
Hyser  v.  Commonwealth    ( 1 16  Ky. 

410;     25    Ky.    L.    Rep.    608; 

76  S.  W.  174),  261,  262,  951, 

1571. 


I.   A.   West   &    Co.   V.   Board    (14 

Idaho,  353;  94  Pac.  445),  635, 

648. 
Ihenger    v.    State    (53    Ind.    251), 

1242,  1627,  1751. 
Ikard   v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

79  S.  W.  32),  1512. 
Illinois,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin   (71 

111.  177),  2171,  2172,  2173, 

2177,  2191,  2193. 
Illinois  R.  Co.  v.  Hutchinson    (47 

111.  408),  2180. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Hutchinson 

(47  Minn.  357;  4  N.  W.  605), 

2184. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Jewell   (46 

111.    99;    92    Am.    Dec.    240), 

2199. 
Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Proctor 

(122  Ky.  92;    89   S.  W.  714; 

28    Ky.    L.    Rep.    598),    2191, 

2217. 
Imhofl"  V.   Witmer    (31    Pa.   243), 

2109,  2114,  2119. 
Inain    v.    Russell     (8    Hun,    319), 

1847. 
Independence   v.   Noland    (21    ^lo. 

394),  448,  521. 
Indiana  County  Licenses,  In  re   (2 

Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  358),  439. 
Indiana    Co.,   In    re    (6   Pa.   Dist. 

Rep.  358),  626. 


Indianapolis   v.    Bieler    ( 138    Ind. 

30;   36  N.  E.  857),   144,   157, 

187,   198,   294,   321,  332,   427, 

796. 
Indianapolis  v.   Fairchild    ( 1   Ind. 

315),  503,  1160. 
Indianapolis,   etc.,   R.   Co.   v.   Gal- 
breath     (63    HI.    436),    2179, 

2185. 
Indianapolis  v.  Higgins    ( 141  Ind. 

1;  40  N.  E.  671),  643. 
Indianapolis    v.    Nevin    ( 151    Ind. 

139;   47  N.  E.  525;   50  N.  B. 

80),  238. 
Indianapolis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Pitzer 

(109  Ind.  186;   63  N.  E.  310; 

10    N.    E.    70;    58    Am.    Rep. 

387),  2212. 
Ingalls  V.   State    (48  Wis.   647;   4 

N.  W.  785),  2048,  2080. 
Ingersoll     v.     Skinner     ( 1     Denio, 

540),  138,  333. 
Ingram  v.  State   (39  Ala.  247;  84 

Am.  Dec.  792),  120. 
Ingram  v.  State   (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

117;    90    S.   W.    1098),    1288, 

1378. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Foley   ( 105  U.  S. 

350),  05,  1633. 
Intoxicating   Liquors,   In  re    ( 129 

Iowa,   434;    105   N.   W.   702), 

670. 
Intoxicating   Liquor    Cases,   In   re 

(25    Kan.    751;    37    Am.    Rep. 

284),  9,  10,  11,  12,  15,  18,  20, 

33,  51,  53,  55,  56,  57,  59,  79, 

86,  110,  139,  190,  557,  970. 
Intoxicating    Liquors     ( 15    R.    I. 

608;  10  Atl.  659),  255. 
Intreimer  v.  State    ([Ala.]   41   So. 

170),   1612. 
Iowa    V.    McFarland     (110    U.    S. 

471;  4  Sup.  Ct.  210;  28  L.  Ed. 

198),   1161. 
Iowa  City  v.  Mclnnery  (114  Iowa, 

586 ;'  87  N.  W.  498 ) ,  453. 
Ipswitch    V.    Fernandez     (84    Cal. 

639;  24  Pac.  298),  2253,  2254. 
Irby  V.  State  (91  Miss.  542;  44  So. 

801),  959. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxix 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Ireland,  In  re  (41  X.  Y,  Misc.  Rep. 

425;    84   N.   Y.    Supp.    1100), 

580,  584. 
Irion  V.  Lewis  (56  Ala.  190),  659. 
Irish   V.   State    ([Tex.]    25   S.   W. 

633),  837,  857. 
Irisli   V.   State    (34  Tex.   Cr.  Eep. 

130;  29  S.  W.  778),  908,  1588. 
Irwin  V.  Maloney    (6   Can.   L.  Jr. 

285),  2095.  " 
Irwin  V.  Martinsville  (9  Ohio  Dec. 

31;    10    Wkly.    L.    Bull.    76), 

1096. 
Irwin  V.  Pankyty    (20  Vict.  L.  R. 

282;  16  Austr.  L.  T.  18),  1314, 
Isaacs  V.  Stansfield  &  Co.,  Limited 

([November  1,  1907]    [not  re- 
ported]), 1829. 
Isan  V.  Griffin   (98  Ga.  623;  25  S. 

E.  611),  715. 
Isbell   V.   New    York,   etc.,   R.    Co. 

(27   Conn.   393;    71   Am.   Dec. 

78),  2212,  2214,  2215. 
Isitt   V.   Taylor    (10   N.   Z.   L.    R. 

646),  685. 
Islett   V.    Quill    (11    N.    Z.    L.    R. 

224),  685. 
Isley    V.    State     (8    Blackf.    403), 

1625. 
Isley    V.    Stubbs     (5    Mass.    280), 

1027. 
Isom  V.   State    (49   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

610;     95    S.    W.    518),    1179, 

1599. 
Ivey  V.  State   (112  Ga.  175;  37  S. 

E.  398),  426,  1702. 


J.  B.  Lyon  Co.  v.  McDonougli  (76 
App.  Div.  257;  78  N.  Y.  S. 
462),  990. 

J.  D.  Her  Brewing  Co.  v.  Campbell 
(66  Kan.  361:  71  Pac.  825), 
1022. 

J.  I.  Case,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Meyers  (78 
Neb.  685;  111  N.  W.  602;  9 
L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  970),  2095. 


J.  &  J.  Eager  Co.  v.  Burke  (74 
Conn.  534;  51  Atl.  544),  1785, 
1787,  1790,  1799. 
J.  P.  Bollin  Liquor  Co.  v.  Brandon- 
burg  ( [Iowa]  106  N.  W.  497), 
1798. 
J.  W.  Kelly  &  Co.  v.  Conner 
([Tenn.]   123  S.  W.  622),  91, 

153. 
Jack,   In   re    (11    Australia   L.   R. 

372;    2  C.  L.  Rep.  684),  695, 

701. 
Jackson  v.  Boy  J  (53  Iowa,  536; 

5  N.  W.  734),  439. 
Jackson  v.  Brookline   (5  Hun, 

530),  1876,  1893,  1897,  1927, 

1988. 
Jackson  v.  Camden  (48  N.  J.  L. 

89;  2  Atl.  668),  1643. 
Jackson  v.  Noble  (54  Iowa,  641; 

7  N.  W.  88),  1964. 
Jackson  v.  Seeber  (50  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  479;  100  N.  Y.  Supp. 

563),  85.3. 
Jackson   v.    State    (19    Ind.    312), 

0,  12,  27,  82,  1714. 
Jackson  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

24  S.  W.  902),  1743. 
Jackson    v.    State    ( 16    Tex.   App. 

373),   1575. 
Jackson  v.  State  (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

248;   91  S.  VV.  574),  948,  952. 
Jackson  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

123  S.  W.  142),  1598. 
Jacobs,  Ex  parte    (13  Idaho,  720; 

92  Pac.   1003),   164,   193,  215, 

287. 
Jacobs,  Appeal  of  (73  N.  E.  1122; 

181  N.  Y.  529),  745. 
Jacobs   v.  Hogan    (73   Conn.   740; 

49  Atl.  202),  776,  781. 
Jacobs  V.  Holgenson  ( 70  Conn.  68 ; 

38    Atl.   914),    766,   767,   779, 

781. 
Jacobs  V.  Reilly  (80  Conn.  275;  68 

Atl.  251),  753. 
Jacobs  V.  Stokes    (12  Mich.  381), 

1782,  1802,  1804. 
Jacobs'   Pharmacy   Co.   v.  Atlanta 

(89  Fed.  244),  103,  434,  826. 


elxx 


TABLE   OF    C.VSES. 


[References   aie   to   pages.] 


Jacobson  v.  Queen    ( 1   Juta,  33 ) , 

694. 
Jacoby  v.  Dallis   (115  Ga.  272;  41 

S.  E.  611),  894,  906. 
Jacoby  v.  Shoemaker  ( 26  Fla.  502 ; 

7  So.  855),  982. 
Jakes  V.  State   (43  Ind.  473),  821. 
Jalageas  v.  Winton   (119  111.  App. 

139),  1812. 
James  v.  Commonwealth   ( 102  Ky. 

108;  42  S.  W.  1107;  19  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   1045),   1280. 
James  v.  Commonwealth    ( 16  Ky, 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]  445),  518. 
James  v.  James    (58  N.  H.  266), 

2168. 
James  v.  Helm   (129  Ky.  323;   111 

S.  W.  335),  1839. 
James  v.  Nervington  J.  J.    (64  J. 

P.  489),  711. 
James  v.  State    (133  Ala.  208;   32 

So.  237),  371. 
James  v.   State    (124   Ga.   72;    52 

S.  E.  295 ) ,  287. 
James  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  189; 

17  S.  W.  143),  886,  888. 
James  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  353; 

17  S.  W.  422),  6,  20,  52,  58, 

59,  885,  886,  888,  911,  971. 
James  v.  State   (45  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

592;  78  S.  W.  951),  949,  950, 

1209. 
James  v.  State   (49  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

334;  91  S.  W.  227),  4,  10,  13, 

14. 
James'    Law   Petition,    In    re    (30 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  697),  854, 

876. 
Jamieson  v.  Blaine  (38  N.  B.  508), 

644. 
Jamieson  v.  Indiana,  etc.,  Co.  ( 128 

Ind.  555;  28  N.  E.  76),  106. 
Jamison     v.     Burton      (43     Iowa, 

282),  1237,  1461. 
Jamison  v.  People    (145   111.   357; 

34  N.  E.  486),  2056. 
Jane  v.  Alley  (64  Miss.  446;   1  So. 

497),  674. 


Janks  V.  State  (29  Tex.  App.  233; 

15    S.    W.    815),    1125,    1319, 

1375,  1377,  1539,  1569. 
Jaro  V.  Holstein  (73  S.  C.  HI;  52 

S.  E.  870),  1021,  lO'tC 
Jaroszewski   v.   Allen    (117    Iowa, 

632;     91    N.    W.    942),    1949, 

1999. 
Jarvis  v.   Conn.   Mut.   L.   Ins.   Co. 

5  Ins.  L.  Jr.  SC^,  2236. 
Jassey  v.  Speer    (10.    Ga.  828;   33 

S.  E.  718),  896. 
Jayes  v.  Harris    (99  L.  T.  56;   72 

J.  P.  364),  380. 
Jefferson  v.  People  (iCl  N.  Y.  19; 

3  X.  E.  797),  1516,  1517,  1643, 

1752. 
Jefferson  v.  Richardson    (35  J.  P. 

470),   1137. 
Jefferson  City  v.  Conture    ('.)  Mo. 

083),  270. 
Jeffersonville,    etc.,    R.    Co.     (112 

Ind.  93;   13  N.  E.  403),  467. 
Jeffrey  v.  Weaver   ([1899]  2  Q.  B. 

449;    63   J.   P.    663;    68   L.    J. 

Q.  B.  817;    81  L.  T.   193;   47 

W.  R.  638;    15  T.  L.  R.  422), 

1139. 
Jeffries  v.  State  (9  Tex.  ApiD.  598), 

2039,  2074. 
Jelinek  v.  State    (115  S.  W.  508), 

1111. 
Jelly  V.  Dils  (27  W.  Va.  267),  395. 
Jenkins  v.  Danville    (79  111.  App. 

339),  753,  775. 
Jenkins    v.    jVIapes     (53    Ohio    St. 

110;  41  N.  E.  137),  1166. 
Jenkins  v.  Price   ([1907]  24  T.  L. 

R.  70),  1827. 
Jenkins  v.  State   (93  Ga.  1;   18  S. 

E.     992),     2041,     2041,    2078, 

2079. 
Jenkins  v.  State  (4  Ga.  App.  859), 

62  S.  E.  574),  1092. 
Jenkins    v.    State    (82    Miss.   500; 

34  So.  217),  1237,  1564,  1600. 
Jenkins    v.    Thomasville     (35    Ga. 

145),  270. 
Jenkins    v.    Waldron     (11    Johns. 

114),  660. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxi 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Jenks  V.  Lima  Tp.  (17  Ind.  326), 

811. 
Jenks  V.  Turpin  (13  Q.  B.  Div. 

505,  524;  48  J.  P.  489;  49  J, 

P.  20;  53  L.  J.  M.  C.  IGl;  50 

L.  T.  808),  369,  374. 
Jenners     v.     Howard     ( 6     Blackf. 

240),  2092,  2103,  2116. 
Jennett  v.   Owens    (63   Tex.  264), 

925. 
Jenney,  In  re  ( 19  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

244;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  84),  704. 
Jennings  v.  Russell    (92  Ala.  603; 

9  So.  421),  1278. 
Jennings  v.   State    (3  Head,  520), 

1246. 
Jensen  v.  State   (60  Wis.  577;   90 

N.  W.  374),  1308,  1567. 
Jerseyville     v.     Becker     (117     111. 

App.  86),  1169. 
Jerue   v.    State    ( [Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

123  S.  W.  414),  926. 
Jervey  v.  Carolina  (66  Fed.  1013), 

179,  323. 
Jessen   v.    Wilhite    (74   Neb.    608; 

104  N.  W.   1064),   1979,   1992, 

1995,  2003. 
Jett  V.  Commonwealth    ( [Ky.]    49 

S.    W.   786;    20   Ky.    l"   Rep. 

1619),  935,   1742. 
Jewell  V.  Lynch   (117  Mich.  65;  75 

N.  W.  283),  1892. 
Jewett    V.    Waiishura     (43     Iowa, 

574),  1888,  1914. 
Jockers     v.     Borgman      (29     Kan. 

109;  44  Am.  Rep.  625),  1890, 

1993. 
Joest  V.   Williams    (42   Ind.   565; 

13  Am.  Rep.  377),  2093,  2116, 

2123. 
Joffee,    Ex    parte     (46    Mo.    App. 

360),  574. 
John,  In  re  (55  Kan.  694;  41  Pac. 

956),  221. 
John  Hancock  ]\int.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Daly    (65  Ind.  6),  2226. 
Johns   V.   Fritchey    (39  Md.   258), 

2093,  2098,  2122. 
Johns  V.  State   (78  Ind.  332),  215. 


Johns  V.  State    (159  Ind.  413;   65 

N.  E.  287),  1443. 
Johns  V.  State   (78  Miss.  662;   29 

So.  401),  1757. 
Johnson,  In  re  (57  Cal.  529),  2045, 

2135,  2138,  2151. 
Johnson,   Ex   parte    (6    Cal.    App. 
734;  93  Pac.  199),  1447,  1448. 
Johnson,    Appeal    of     (73    N.    E. 

1122;   181  N.  Y.  528),  745. 
Johnson,  In  re  ( 7  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
220;    27    N.    Y.    Supp.    649), 
2134,  2135,  2145. 
Johnson,   In    re    ( 15    N.    Y".    Misc. 
Rep.    220;     27    N.    Y.    Supp. 
649),  2136. 
Johnson,    In    re     ( 18    Misc.    Rep. 
498;    42   N.   Y.    Supp.    1074), 
729. 
Johnson,   In    re    ( 78   N.  Y.     Misc. 
Rep.    498;     42    N.    Y,     Supp. 
1074),  818. 
Johnson,  In  re   ([Neb.]  118  N.  W. 

91),  761. 
Johnson,  In   re    (165   Pa.   315;    31 

Atl.  203),  638,  648. 
Johnson,  In  re  ( 1  Dauph.  Co.  Rep. 
40;   20  Pa.  Cr.  Ct.   Rep.  464; 
7  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  248),  542. 
Johnson,    In    re    ( 13    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

Rep.  584),  638. 
Johnson,    In    re     (40    Upp.    Can. 

297),  894,  907. 
Johnson  v.   Atkins    (44   Fla.    185; 

32  So.  879),  813. 
Johnson  v.  Atlanta    (79  Ga.   507; 

4  S.  E.  673),  1594. 
Johnson  v.  Bessemere    ( 143  Mich. 
313;    106  N.   W.  852;    12   De- 
troit Leg.   N.   981),  423,   425, 
470. 
Johnson  v.  Carlson   (  [Neb.]  95  N. 

W.  788),  1844. 
Johnson  v.  Chattanooga  (97  Tenn. 
247;  36  S.  W.  1092),  454, 
1122. 
Johnson  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
58  Iowa,  348;  12  N.  W.  339), 
2207,  2214. 


clxxii 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Johnson    V.    Commonwealth     (111 

Ky.  630;  64  S.  W.  467;  23  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  856),  2262. 
Johnson     v.     Commonwealth      ( 12 

Gratt.   714),   1246. 
Johnson    v.    Drummond     ( 16    III. 

App.   [16  Bradw.]   641),  1866. 
Johnson  v.  Fayette  (148  Ala.  497; 

42  So.  621),  445. 
Johnson    v.    Gram     (72    111.    App. 

676),  1882. 
Johnson  v.  Grimminger    ( 83  Iowa, 

10;   48  N.  W.  1052),  1928. 
Johnson  \.  Harmon  (94  U.  S.  371 ; 

24  L.  Ed.  271),  2098. 
Johnson  v.  Higgins  (3  Met.  [Ky.] 

566),  106. 
Johnson    v.    Johnson     ( 100    Mich. 

326;  58  N.  W.  1115),  1918. 
•Johnson  v.  Johnson  (35  Phila.  Leg. 

Int.  70),  2153. 
Johnson    v.    Johnson     ([1900]     p. 

19),  2169. 
Johnson  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(104  Ala.  246;    16  So.  70;   53 

Am.   St.   39),   63,   2192,  2194, 

2197,  2206,  2207. 
Johnson  v.  McCann    (61   111.  App. 

110),  1892. 
Johnson  v.  Medlicott    (3  P.  Wms. 

131),  2103,  2129. 
Johnson   v.    People    (Breese    [111.] 

276),  1759,  1764. 
Johnson  v.   People    (83   111.   431), 

1219,   1237,   1371,    1374,   1459, 

1764. 
Johnson    v.    People     (44    111.    App. 

642),   1546. 
Johnson   v.   Phifer    (6  Neb.   401), 

2093,  2098,  2130. 
Johnson   v.   Pliiladelphia    (60   Pa. 

St.  491),  200,  426. 
Johnson  v.    Railroad   Co.    (23    111. 

202),  227. 
Johnson   v.   Rich    (10   N.   Y.   Leg. 

Obs.  33),  233. 
Johnson   v.    Rol>erts    ([Iowa]    101 

N.  W.  1131),  1000,  1001,  1003, 

1004. 


I  Johnson  v.  Schultz   (74  Mich.  75; 
j  41  N.  W.  865),  1906. 

Johnson  v.  State   (19  Ala.  527;  74 

Ala.  537),  370,  371. 
Johnson   v.    State    (44   Ala.    414), 

1532. 
Johnson  v.  State   (152  Ala.  61;  44 

So.  555) ,  691. 
Johnson    v.    State    (37    Ark.    98), 

515,  1349,  1371. 
Johnson   v.   State    (40   Ark.   453), 

1505. 
Johnson   v.    State    (60    Ga.    634), 

497,  1521. 
Johnson  v.  State   (83  Ga.  553;   10 

S.  E.  207),   1354;   1359,   1555. 
Johnson  v.  State    ( [Ga.]   66  S.  E. 

148),   1527. 
Johnson  V.  State  (1  Ga.  App.  195; 

58  S.  E.  265),  2025. 
Johnson  v.  Vuthrick   (7  Ind.  137), 

1989. 
Johnson   v.    State    (74   Ind.    197), 

1516,   1560. 
Johnson   v.    State    ( [Iowa]    10   N. 

W.  1131),  1318. 
Johnson  v.   State    (63  Miss.  228), 

1191,  1230,  1615. 
Johnson    v.    State     (23    Ohio    St. 

556),  10,  11. 
Johnson  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

21    S.    W.    371),    1110,    1458, 

1574. 
Jolinson    V.    State     (34    Tex.    Cr. 

App.     100;     29    S.    W.    472), 

1743. 
Johnson  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

44  S.  W.  834),  1213,  1694. 
Jolmson  V.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

55  S.  W.  968),  958. 
Johnson  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

66  S.  W.  552),  1708. 
Johnson  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

77  S.  W.  225),  1209. 
Johnson  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

89  S.  W.  834),  914. 
Johnson    v.    State     (52    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    554;     107    S.    W.    810), 

1598. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


clxxiii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Johnson    v.    State     (52    Tex.    Cr. 

Kep.  C24;  108  S.  W,  683),  914, 

1682,  1686. 
Johnson  v.  State  (53  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  339;  109  S.  W.  936), 

940. 
Johnson  v.  State   (4  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

419;   66  S.  W.  554),  59. 
Johnson    v.    Union,    etc.,    Ins.    Co. 

(127  Mass.  555),  1779. 
Johnson  v.  Williams  (48  Vt.  565), 

1068. 
Johnston's  License,  In  re    (37  Pa. 

Super.  438),  1589. 
Johnston  v.  Brown   (2  Shaw  &  D. 

437),  2109,  2114. 
Johnston  v.   State    ( 74  Ind.   197 ) , 

1240. 
Johnston    v.    State     (23    Ohio    St. 

556),  11,  47,  82,  962. 
Jokers  v.  Borgman   (39  Kan.  109; 

44  Am.  Rep.  625),  1863,  1991, 

2004. 
Jolie  V.   Cardinal    (35   Wis,   118), 

2187. 
Jolifl'  V.   State    (50  Tex.   Cr.   App. 

61;  109  S.  W.  176),  247,  1110. 
Joliff  V.  State    (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

61;   109  S.  W'.  176),  139,  288, 

1110, 1677. 
Jolly  V.  State    (8  Sm.  &  M.   145), 

1246. 
Jolly  V.  State    (53   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

484;    110  S.  W.  749),  949. 
Jones,  In  re   (78  Ala.  419),  431. 
Jones,   Ex   parte    (31    N.   B.    78), 

1098. 
Jones,  Ex  parte  (23  N.  S.  W.  93; 

6  S.  R.  [N.  S.  W.]  313),  1225, 

1228. 
Jones  V.  Alexander  (167  Ind.  395; 

79  N.  E.  368),  612,  614,  618. 
Jones  V.  Bates  (26  Neb.  693;  42 

K  W.  751),  1848,  1849,  1885, 

1910,  1912,  1936. 
Jones  V.  Bone  ([1870]  L.  R.  9 

Eq.  674;  39  L.  J.  Ch.  405;  23 

L.  T.  304;    18  W.  R.  489;   34 

J.  P.  468),  1813. 


Jones  V.  Brown    (54  Iowa,  74;  37 

Am.  Rep.  185),  660. 
Jones   V.   Chanute    ( 63   Kan.   243 ; 

65  Pac.  243),  986. 
Jones  V.  Byington  (128.  Iowa,  397; 

104  N.  W.  473),  341,  348,  991. 
Jones  V.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.]  47 

S.  W.  328),  1446. 
Jones   V.    Commonwealth    ( 75    Pa. 

403),  2040,  2067,  2070,   2072. 
Jones  V.   Commonwealth    ( 106  Va. 

833;   55   S.  E.   697),   1652. 
Jones   V.   Fletcher    (33   Me.   564), 

1038. 
Jones   V.    Fletcher    (41    Me.   255), 

1031,    1047,    1048,    1051,   1776. 
Jones  V.  Grady  (25  La.  Ann.  586), 

795. 
Jones  V.  Hard  (32  Vt.  481),  313. 
Jones   V.   Hilliard    (69    Ala.   300), 

109,  574. 
Jones'    Law    Petition,    In    re    (30 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  705),  854, 

876. 
Jones  V.  McLeod,   103   Mass.   58), 

1805. 
Jones   V.    Moore    Co.     ( 106    N.    C. 

436;    11  S.  E.  514),  558,  635, 

648. 
Jones  V.   Mould    (138    Iowa,    683; 

116  N.  W.  733),  348,  977. 
I  Jones     V.     National     Mut.     Ass'n 

([Ky.]    2   S.   W.   447;    8   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  599),  2232. 
Jones  V.  New  Orleans,  etc.,  R.  Co, 

(122    La.    354;    47    So.   679), 

2184. 
Jones    V.    Nugent    (31    Ind.    App. 

697;   67  N.  E.  195),  605. 
Jones   V.    Paducah    ( [Ky.]    115    S. 

W\  801),  1363., 
Jones  V.  People    ( 6    Colo.   452 ;    45 

Am.  Rep.  526),  2247. 
Jones  V.  People   (14  IlL  196),  101, 

109. 
Jones    V.    Robbins     (74    Mass.     [8 

Gray]   329),  270,  1748. 
Jones  V.  Root  (6  Gray,  435),  254, 

1011,   1059,   1076,  2035. 


clxxiv 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Jones  V.  Sanborn    (G8  N.  H.  602; 

40  Atl.  393),  1799,  1807. 
Jones    V.    Shervington     ([1908]    2 

K.   B.   539;    77    L.    R.    K.    B. 

771;    99    L.   T.    57;    72    J.    P. 

381;  24  T.  L.  R.  693),  354. 
Jones   V.   State    (100   Ala.  88;    14 

So.  772),  1633. 
Jones  V.  State    (136  x\la.   118;   34 

So.  236),  1443,  1604. 
Jones  V.  State  (29  Ga.  594),  2061, 

2062,   2067. 
Jones  V.   State    (100   Ga.  579;    28 

S.  E.  396),   1379. 
Jones  V.  State   ( 1  Kan.  273 ) ,  882. 
Jones   V.   State    (67    Md.   256;    10 

Atl.     216),     938,     939,     1465, 

1469,   1473. 
Jones  V.  State  (67  Miss.  11;  7  So. 

220),  1756. 
Jones    V.    State     (13    Tex.     168), 

2247,  2250,  2251. 
Jones  V.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  353; 

17  S.  VV.  422),  895,  897,  908. 
Jones  V.  State    (32  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

110;     22    6.    VV.    149),    1235, 

1236,  1628,  1646. 
Jone.-}  V.  State  (32  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

533;  25  S.  W.  124),  1125, 

1320. 
Jones  V.  State    (38  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

533;  43  S.  W.  981),  1686. 
Jones  V.  State    (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

517;   81   S.  W.  49),  759,  760, 

765,  1232,  1461. 
Jones  V.  State    ( [Tex.   Civ.   App.] 

81    S.    W.    1010),    759,    760, 

765. 
Jones  V.  State    (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

519;     107    S.    W.    849,    850), 

1465,   1473. 
Jones  V.  Surprise   (64  N.  H.  243; 

9  Atl.  384).  8,  13,  25,  27,  122, 

334,    967,    1780,     1799,     1803. 
Jones  V.  Thro   (2  Mo.  App.  1303), 

564. 
Jones    V.    U.    S.    Mut.    Ace.    Ass'n 

(92  Iowa,  652;  61  N.  W.  485), 

2239. 


Jones   V.   Walters    (62   J.  P.   374; 

78    L.    T.    167;     14    T.    L.    R. 

265),   380. 
Jones  V.  Ward    (77  N.  Car.  337), 

1027. 
Jones  V.  Yokum    ( [S.  D.]    123  N. 

W.  272),  110,  331,  1806. 
Jones   Co.   v.   Sales    (25   lud.   25), 

780. 
Joplin    V.    Jacobs    (119    Mo.    App. 

134;    96    S.    W.    219),   219. 
Jorce    V.     Parkhurst     ( 150    Mass. 

243;    22   N.   E.   899),  2258. 
Jordan,  In  re   (49  Fed.  238),  321, 

451,  523,  525. 
Jordan  v.  Bespole    (8  Minn.  441; 

90   N.   W.    1052),   415. 
Jordan  v.  District  Court  ( 74  Iowa, 

762;  38  N.  W.  430),  110. 
Jordan    v.    Evansville     ( 163    Ind. 

512;    72  N.  E.  544;    67  L.  R. 

A.   613),   91,   96,   96;  99,   144, 

148,   168,   191. 
Jordan  v.  Nicolin   (84  Minn.  367; 

87  N.  W.  915),  452,  460,  1131, 

1449,  1538. 
Jordan  v.  State  (22  Fla.  528), 

1505. 
Jordan  v.  State  ( 2  Tex.  App.  425 ) , 

167. 
Jordan  v.  State  (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

222;  38  S.  W.  780;  39  S.  W. 

110),  869,  959,  1210,  1213, 

1554. 
Jordan  v.  State   (40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

189;    49    S.   W.   371).    1764. 
Jordan    v.    Wappello    County    (69 

Iowa,    177;    28    N.    W.    548), 

1000. 
Jorgcnsen,    In   re    (75    Neb.    401; 

106  X.   W.   462),   626,   666. 
Joseph  V.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

86  S.  W.  326),  949. 
Joseph     Schlitz    Brewing    Cx).     v. 

Superior    (117    Wis.    297;    93 

N.  W.  1120),  415. 
Josephdaffer    v.    State     (32     Ind. 

402),  1586,  1649. 
Jossey  V.  Speer   (107  Ga.  828;   33 

S.  E.  718),  921,  922. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxv 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Josey  V.  State  ([Ark.]   114  S.  W. 

216),   1643. 
Jovvell  V.  State   (44  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

328;    71   S.   W.   286),   2049. 
Joyce,  In  re  ([1909]   16  App.  Ont. 

L.  R.  380),  889. 
Joyner  v.  Cush.    (567),  811. 
Joynt,  Ex  parte    (38   J.   P.   390), 

1145. 
Judd  V.  Robinson    (41   Colo.   222; 

92   Pac.   724),   1809,   1810. 
•Judefind    v.    State    (78    Md.    510; 

28  A.  405;   23  L.  R.  A.  721), 

454. 
Judge  V.  Flourney   (74  Iowa,  164; 

37  N.  VV.  130),  1940. 
Judge   V.   Jordon    (81    Iowa,   519; 

46   N.   W.    1077),    1845,    1950, 

1960. 
Judge  V.  Kribs   (71  Iowa,  183;   32 

N.  W.  324),  981,  985. 
Judge  V.  O'Conner    (74  Iowa,  166; 

37  X.  W.  131),  1940. 
Judkins,   In   re    (126   N.  Y.    App. 

Div.    524;     110    N.    Y.    Supp. 

587),  741. 
Jugenheimer,  In  re   (81  Neb.  836; 

116  N.  W.  9C6),  644. 
Julius    Kessler    &    Co,    v.    E.    F. 

Perilloux    &    Co.     (127     Fed. 

1011),  333. 
Julius        Winkelmeyer        Brewing 

Ass'n  V.   Nipp    (6   Kan.    App 

730;  50  Pac.  956),  1805. 
Julke    V.    Adam     (1    Redf.    454) 

2139,  2145. 
Jul!  V.  Tressnor    (14  N.   Y.  L.  R 

513),   1351. 
Junction  City  v.  KeefTe    (40  Kan 

275;    19   P.  735),  258. 
Junction  City   v.  Webb    (44   Kan 

71;     23    Pac.    1073),    1505. 
Jung    Brewing    Co.    v.    Common 

wealth    (123   Ky.   507;    96   S 

W.  595;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  939) 

979. 
Jung    Brewing    Co.    v.    Common 

wealth   (  [Ky.l  98  S.  W.  307 

30    Ky.    L.*^  Rep.    267),    159, 

298,  537,  540. 


I  Jung     Brewing     Co.     v.     Frank- 
fort   (100  Ky.  409;   38  S.  W. 

710),    159,   552. 
Jung   Brewing   Co.   v.   Talbot    (59 

Ohio  St.   511;    53   N.   E.  51), 

790,    1269. 
Jungenheimer  v.  State  Journal  Co. 

(81  Neb.  830;  116  N.  W.  964), 

631. 
Jury  V.  Ogden   (56  111.  App.  100), 

1905. 
Justin,  In  re    (2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

22),  602,  G39,  646. 
Justice  V.  Commonwealth   (81  Va. 

209),   182. 
Justice  V.  Lowe  (26  Ohio  St.  372) 

1812. 


Kadgihn   v.   Bloomington    (58   111. 

229),    503,    504,    503,    1159. 
Kadgin    v.    Millei     (13    111.    App. 

474),    1983. 
Kaffsmith  v.  People  (8  Colo.  175), 

488. 
Kahlbunner    v.    State     (67     Miss. 

368;  7  So.  288),  932. 
Kaliski    v.    Gray     (25    La.    Ann. 

576),   202,    792. 
Kalloch    V.     Newbert     ([Me.]     72 

Atl.  736),   337,   1023,    1062. 
Kammon  v.  People    (124  111.  481; 

16    N.    E.    661;     affirming    24 

111.  App.  388),  07,  1254,  1631. 
Kammon   v.   People    (24   111.   App. 

388;     affirmed    124    111.    4S1; 

16  N.  E.   661),  67,   1754. 
Kammann  v.  People   (26  111.  App. 

48;    affirmed   124   111.    181;    16 

N.  E.  661),   1631,   1711. 
Kamp    V.    State     (120    Ga.     157; 

47  S.  E.  548),   1446. 
Kanamura,  In  re    ( 10  B.  C.  Rep. 

354),    534. 
Kane    v.    Grady    (123    Iowa    260; 

98   N.   W.'711),   578. 
Kane    v.    Commonwealth    (89    Pa. 

522;  33  Am.  Rep.  787),  1 125, 

1319. 


clxxvi 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Kannon  v.   State    (10   Lea,   386), 

1746. 
Fansas  v.  Bradley   (26  Red.  289), 

149. 
Kansas    City    v.     Cork     (38    Mo. 

App.   666),  409. 
Kansas  City,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Davis 

(83    Ark.    217;     103     S.     W. 

603),  2191. 
Kansas    City   v.    Grash    (151    Mo. 

128),  426. 
Kansas  City  v.   Flanders    (71  Mo. 

281),  504,   1159. 
Kansas  City  v.  Muhlbeck   (68  Mo. 

638),   1111. 
Kansas    City    v.    Smith    (57    Kan. 

434;   46  Pac.   710),   1479. 
Kansas,   etc.,   R.   Co.   v.    State    (3 

Kan.   164),  271. 
Kappes  V.  State   (55  Ohio  Cir,  Ct. 

Rep.  723),   1738. 
Karan    v.    Pease     (45     111.    App. 

382),    1965. 
Karcher    v.     State     ([Kan.]     104 

Pac.  568),  1769. 
Karswich  v.  Atlanta  ( 44  Ga.  204  ] , 

215. 
Kaufman     v.     Dostal      (73     Iowa 

691),   119,   125,  990,  997. 
Kaufmann   \'.   Hillsboro    (45   Ohio 

St.  700;   17  X.  E.  557),  1192. 
Kawailani,  The   (128  Fed.  879;  63 

C.  C.  A.  347),   1697. 
Kay   V.    Oves    Darwen    ( 52    L.    J. 
"  M.  C.  90;    10  Q.  B.  Div.  213; 

47  L.  T.  411:   31  W.  R.  273; 

47   J.   P.   388),   629. 
Keady    v.    People     (32    Colo.    57; 

74  Pac.  892),  2085. 
Kean    v.    Baltimore,    etc.,    R.    Co. 
(61    Md.     154),    2174,    2178, 

2180, 
Kean    v.   Detroit,    etc.,   Mills    (66 

Mich.    277;    33    K    W.    395), 

2198,  2199. 
Kear   v.   Garrison    (13    Ohio    Cir. 

a.  447),  1983,  1991. 
Kearly  v.  Tyler    (56  J.  P.  72;   65 

L.   T.    261;    60    L.    J.    M.    C. 

159),   1383. 


Kearns  v.  Commonwealth   ( 15  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   332),  949. 
Kearny    v.    Fitzgerald     (43    Iowa 

580),   1882,   1889,   1892,   1912, 

1964,  1982. 
Keating,    In    re    (25   Pittsb.    Leg. 

J.  [N.  S.]  454),  700. 
Keating's  Appeal   ( 19  Pitts.  L.  Jr. 

[N.   S.]    283),   2139. 
Keaton  v.  State   (36  Tex.  Cr.  App, 

259;     38    S.    W.    522),    1162, 

1167,    1197. 
Kee  V.  McSweeney   ( 15  Abb.  X.  G. 

229),   1456. 
Kee  V.  State   (28  Ark.  155),  2246, 

2248. 
Keedy  v.  Howe  (72  111.  133),  1350, 

1847,   1907,    1908,   1987,   1994. 
Keefe    v.    Clarke     (10    X.    S.    W. 

L.  R.  19),  682. 
Keefer  v.  Hillsdale  (70  Mich.  413; 

38  X.  W.  277),  650,  764. 
Keefer   v.    Hillsdale    County    (109 

Mich.    645;    67    X.    W.    981), 

868,  877. 
Keeler,  Ex  parte    (45   S.   C.   537; 

23    S.    E.    865;     55    Am.    St. 

785;    31   L.   R.   A.   678),   259, 

1003. 
Keenan  v.  Commonwealth   (44  Pa. 

66;    84  Am.  Dec.   414),   2040, 

2060,  2067,  2071. 
Keesohn   v.   Elgin,   etc..    Co.    (229 

111.  533;  82  N.  E.  360;  affirm- 
ing  132   111.  App.  416),  2174. 
Keeton  v.  Commonwealth   (92  Ky. 

522;     18    S.    W.    359),    2078, 

2079. 
Kehoe  v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

89  S.  W.  270),  958. 
Kehr  v.  Columbia    ([Mo.]    116   S. 

W.  428),  920,  925. 
Kehr    v.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

26    Ky.    L.   Rep.    1234;    88*8. 

W.  633),  260. 
Kehrig  v.   Peters    (41   IMich.   475; 

2    X.    W.    801),    1350,    1838, 

1907,   1985. 
Keifer  License,  In  re    (21  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  Rep.  512),  696. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxvii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Keiser    v.    Lines    (57    Ind.    431), 

462,  598,  599. 
Keiser  v.  State  (58  Ind.  379),  510, 

511,  51(5,  518,  539,  1304. 
Keiser    v.    State    (78    Ind.    200), 

4'97. 
Keiser    v.    State     (78    Ind.    430), 

498,   500,    507,   526,   672. 
Keiser    v.    State     (82    Ind.    379), 

1176,   1754. 
Keiser    v.    State     (€4    Ind.    229), 

1637. 
Keith,  Ex  parte  (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

■283;    83  S.  W.  683),  888. 
Keith  V.   State    (91  Ala.  2;   8  So. 

353;    10   L,   R.    A.   430),   308, 

309. 
Keith  V.   State    (38  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

678;  44  S.  W.  847,849),  1320, 

1321,  1486,  1538. 
Kellar,  In  re   (17  Lane.  Law  Rev. 

96;    16  Montg.  Co.  Law.  Rep. 

24;    7    North    Co.    Rep.    129; 

23   Pa.    Co.   Ct.   Rep.    251;    9 

Pa.  Dist.  Rep.   340;    13  York 

Leg.  Rec.    155),   705. 
Kellar  v.   Leonard    ([Mo.]    116  S. 

W.  14),  560. 
Keller    v.    Lincoln     (67    111.    App. 

404),  1892,  1919. 
Kellerman  v.  Arnold  (71  111.  632), 

1847. 
Keller  v.   State     11   Md.    525;   60 

Am.  Dec.  226),  138,  139,  192, 

333,  540,  549,  787,  1194. 
Keller  v.  State  ( 23  Tex.  App.  359 ; 

4  S.  W.  886),  215,  1176,  1304, 

1622. 
Keller     v.     State      (46     Tex.     Cr. 

App.    588;    81    S.    W.    1214), 

890,  1080,  1083. 
Keller  v.  State    ( [Tex.]    87  S.  W. 

609),  245. 
Kelleway  v.  ]Macdougal    (45   J.  R. 

207'),  1297. 
Kelley     v.      Home     Ins.     Co.     (97 

Mass.  288),  1778. 
Kelley    v.     State     (3    Sm.     &    M. 

518),  2040,  2061. 


Kelley    v.    State    (31    Tex.    Crim. 

Rep.    216;     20    S.    W.    357), 

2040,  2051,  2052,  2090. 
Kelley  Drug  Co.  v.  Truett   ( [Tex.] 

75    S.   W.    536),    9. 
Kelling  v.  Palmer   (  [Neb.]   120  N. 

W.   155),  1879,  1978. 
Kellogg  V.  German  Amer.  Ins.  Co. 

(133    Mo.    App.    391;     113    S. 

W.  663),   1090,   1777,   1778. 
Kelly,  Ex  parte    (32  N.  B.  261), 

1377. 
Kelly    V.    Burke     (132    Ala.    235; 

31  .So.  512),  210,   1793. 
Kelly  V.  Commissioners   (54  How. 

Pr.  327),  72. 
Kelly    V.    Commonwealth     ([Ky.] 

83     S.  W.  99;  26  Ky.  L.  Rep, 

1038),    1211. 
Kelly    V.    Commonwealth     ( 1    Gr. 

Cas.  [Pa.]  484),  2040,  2071. 
Kelly  V.  Dwyer  (7  Lea,  180),  520. 
Kelly    V.    Earl    (26    C.    P.    [Can.] 

477),  1792,  1805. 
Kelly  V.   Faribault    (83   Minn.   9; 

85  N.  W.   720),  446. 
Kelly  V.   State    (36  Tex  Cr.   App. 

480;  3«  S.  W.  779),  895,  959. 
Kelly  V.  State    (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

220;    38    S.    VV.    779;    39    S. 

W.   Ill),  869,  873. 
Kelly   V.   Worcester,  etc.,   Ins.   Co. 

97  Mass.  285),  1779. 
Kelminski,    In  re    (164   Pa.    231; 

30  Atl.  301;  35  W.  N.  C.  309), 

632. 
Kelty  V.  State    (61  N.  J.  L.  407; 

39    Atl.    711),    1479. 
Kemp   V.   Bird    ([1877]    5    Ch.   D. 

974;    46    L.    J.   Ch.    828;    42 

J.  P.  36;  25  W.  R.  838),  1813. 
Kemp   V.   State    (120   Ga.    157;    47 

S.    E.    548),    288,    945,    1503, 

1512,   1555. 
Kemp   V.   State    (  [Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

38   S.   W.  987),   963. 
Kemper     v.     Commonwealtli      ( 85 

Ky.  219),  216. 
Kempf   V.    Kempf    (34    Mo.    211), 

2158,   2164. 


clxxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Kennedy,  Ex  parte   (23  Tex.  App. 

77),   232,   243,    884,   905. 
Kennedy   v.   Favor    (80  Mass.    [14 

Gray]  200),  1070,  1077,  10^9. 
Kennedy  v.  Garrigan  ( [S.  D.]   121 

N.   W.    183),    104,   223,    1896, 

1915. 
Kennedy  v.  Saunders  (142  Mass. 

0;  6  N.  E.  734),  1850,  1851, 

1852,  1853. 
Kennedy  v.  Sullivan  (34  111.  App. 

46;    affirmed    in    136    111.    94; 

26    N.    E.    382),    1908,    1983, 

1984. 
Kennedy  v.  Sullivan   ( 34  111.  App. 

46),   1976. 
Kennedy    v.    Warner    ( 100    N.    Y. 

Supp.    616;    51    X.    Y.    Misc. 

362),  234,  282,  853. 
Kennedy    v.    Welsh     ( 106    ilass. 

692;    83   N.   E.    11),  694. 
Kenney    v.    People    (27    How.    Pr. 

202),  2040,  2071. 
Kenney  v.  Rhinelander    (28  N.  Y. 

App.    Div.    246;     50    N.     Y. 

Supp.    1088),    63. 
Kennon    v.    Blackburn     ( 127    Ky. 

39;    104    S.    W.    968;    31    Ky. 

L.    Eep.    1256),    932,    934). 
Kenny  v.   Harwell    (42   Ga.  416), 

198. 
Kenny  v.  People   (31   X.  Y.  330), 

2040,    2070,    2071. 
Kent    v.    Willey    (11    Gray    368), 

1033,   1076,   1077,  1079. 
Kenton  v.  State   ( 36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

259;    38   S.   W.   522),    1166. 
Kentucky,  etc..  Club  ( 92  Kv.  309 ) , 

1333. 
Keokuk  v.  Dressell  ( 47  Iowa  597 ) , 

402,  412,  414,  435,  443. 
Keough  V.  Foreman   (33  La.  Ann. 

1434),   2099,   2105. 
Kerkow   v,   Bauer    (15   Neb.    155; 

18    N.    W.    27),    43,    83,    962, 

1873,  1951,  1968. 
Kern's  Appeal,  In  re  ( 38  Wkly.  N. 

C.  438),  621. 
Kern  v.  State    (7  Ohio  St.  411), 

1543. 


Kernon  v.  Blackburn  (127  Ky.  39; 

104  S.  W.  968;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1256),  652. 
Kerr  v.  Harker   (7  N.  J.  L.  349), 

1483. 
Kerr   v.   State    (63   Neb.    115;    88 

N.  W.  240),  963,   1698. 
Kerwhacker  v.   Cleveland,  etc.,  R. 

Co.    (3  Ohio  St.  172;   62  Am. 

Dec.  246),  2214. 
Kerwisch  v.  Atlanta  (44  Ga.  204), 

456. 
Kessack    v.    Smith     (7    F.     [Just. 

Cas.]  75 ) ,  360,  2028,  2029. 
Kessler,  hi  re  (163  X.  Y.  205;   57 

X.    E.    402;    reversing    60   X. 

Y.  Supp.   1141),  731. 
Kessler,  hi  re  ( 28  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

336;     59    X.    Y.    Supp.    888; 

affirmed  60  X.  Y.  Supp.  1141; 

reversed    163    X.    Y.   205;    57 

X.    E.    402),    580,    581,    730, 

736. 
Ketchum  v.   Fox    (5   X.   Y.   Supp. 

272;     52     Hun,     284),     1927, 

19-88. 
Kettering  v.  Jacksonville    ( 50  111. 

39),    91,     109,    966. 
Key   V.   Holloway    (7    Baxt.   576), 

2134. 
Key   v.    State    (37   Tex.    Cr.    App 

77;  38  S.  W.  773),  842,  1471, 

1472. 
Kicker  v.  State   (133  Ala.  193;  32 

So.  253),  370. 
Kidd,  hi  re    (5  Cal.  App.  159;  89 

Pac.   987),    172. 
Kidd    V.    Pearson    (128    U.    S.    1; 

9  S.   Ct.   8;    32   L.   Ed.   346), 

109,   119,    120,    125,    126,   148, 

100,   161,  211,  315. 
Kidd  V.  Truett  (28  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

618;   68  S.  W.  310),  921,  940. 
Kidder    v.    Knox     (48    Me.    551), 

383,    1792. 
Kidder  v.  Xorris   (18  X.  H.  532), 

1805. 
Kiefer  v.   State    (87   Md.  562;   40 

Atl.   377),   1497,   1510. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


clxxix 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Kiel  V.  Chicago    (176  111.   137;   52 

N.    E.    2!);     reversing    69    111. 

App.   685),  441. 
Kiff  V.    Old   Colony,    etc.,    R.    Co. 

(117  Mass.  591;   19  Am.  Rep. 

429),    1772. 
Kilburn   v.   State    (9   Conn.    560), 

1449,    1497. 
Kilburn  v.  Coe  (48  How.  Pr.  144), 

1933. 
Kilcoyne  v.  Hitchens  (30  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  Rep.  545),  864,  865. 
Kilgore,  In  re    (13  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

543),   664. 
Kilgore  v.  Commonwealth   (94  Pa. 

495),  809. 
Kilgore  v.  State  (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

447;  108  S.  W.  662),  1216. 
Kilip    V.    McKay    (13    X.    Y.    St. 

Rep.  5 ) ,  43,  82,  84. 
Killick   V.    Graham    ([1896]    2    Q. 

B.  196;  60  J.  P.  534;  05  L. 
J.  M.  €.  180;  75  L.  T.  29; 
44  W  R.  669;  12  T.  L.  R. 
428),    1275 

Killin  V.  Swatton  (61  J.  P.  150; 
76  L.  T.  55;  45  W.  R.  235; 
13   T.   L.  R.    121;    18   Cox   C. 

C.  477),  551. 

Killman    v.    State     (53    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    570;     112    S.     W.    92), 

1187,   1474,   1611. 
Kilman  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

102  S.  W.  404),  1465,  1473. 
Kimball   v.  Cunningham    (4  Mass. 

502;    3   Am.   Dec.  230),   2127. 
Kimball   v.   People    (20   111.   348), 

1171,    1598. 
Kimmell,    In    re     (41     Fed.    Rep. 

775),    157. 
Kincatid    v.    State     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    303;     92    S.    W.    415), 

969. 
King,  In  re  (23  W.  N.  C.  152;   16 

Atl.   487),   632. 
King,    In    re    ([Neb.]    10    N.    W. 

242),   645. 
King,   In  re    ( [Pa.]    16  Atl.   487 ; 

23  W.  N.  C.  152),  648. 


King,  Ex  parte  (52  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
383;     107    S.    W.    549),    169, 
245. 
King  V.  Batson   (12  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

62),   1724. 
King  V.  Bigelow   (9  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

322),  1285,  1723. 
King   V.    Breen    (7    Can.    Cr.   Cas. 

146),   1739. 
King    V.    Bryant     (2    Hapv.    [N. 

C]  394),  2104. 
King   V.    Cappellar    (42    Ohio    St. 

218),   120,   121,    147. 
King  V.  Chicoyne  (8  Can.  Cr.  Cas, 

507),  842,  844. 
King    V.    Commonwealth     (4    Ky. 
L.    Rep.    [abstract]    623),   24, 
26,    43,    44. 
King  V.  Conrad    (5  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

414),    1358. 
King    V.     Conrad     (35    Nov.    Sco. 

79),   1367. 
King  V.  Dedham   (15  Mass.  454), 

1014. 
King  V.  Gardner   (25  Nova  Scotia 

48),  255. 
King  V.   Gunn    (10   Can.   Cr.  Cas. 

148),    1202. 
King  V.  Haley  (96  111.  106),  1854, 

1855,   1865,   1884. 
King  V.  Ivyes    ([1687]   2  Showers 
[K.  B.]   *468),  104,  4S5,  1106. 
King    V.    .Ja-cksonville     (2     Scam. 

305),    139;   470. 
King   V.    Laird    (7   Can.    Cr.  Cas. 

318),   369,   372,   375. 
King  V.  Law  Kin   (7  Hawaii  489), 

220. 
King  V.  Lewis    (10  Can.  Cr.   Cas. 

104),  347. 
King   V.   Lightburne    (4    Can.    Cr. 

Cas.  358),  1331,  1342,  1636. 
King   V.   McEvoy    (4    Allen    110), 

310,  314,  1789. 
King     V.     McMullan      (38     Nova 

Scotia  129),  938. 
King  v.  McNutt  (11  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 
26;  38  N.  S.  339).  1085,  1662. 
King  V.   Marriot    ([1693]    4   Mod. 
*144),  104,  485,  1106. 


clxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


fUeferencos    are    to    pages.] 


King  V.  Niederstalt   (10  Can.   Cr. 

Cas.   292),    1194. 
King  V.  Nugent    (9  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

1),   1084,    1659. 
King    V.    Ohio,    etc.,    R.    Co.     (22 

Fed.   413),   2216. 
King  V.  Orland    (8   Cr.  Can.  Cas. 

208),  352. 
King    V.    Eandall     ([1695]     Salk, 

*27),   104,  485,   1106. 
King  V.  Rogers   (11  Can,  Cr.  Cas. 

257),  1118,  1360. 
King  V.  State   (81  Ala.  92;  8  So. 

159),    32. 
King   V.    State    (90    Ala.    612;    8 

.So.   856),  2063,  2069. 
King  V.  State   (77  Ga.  734),  1578. 
King  V.   State    (58   Miss.   737;    38 

Am.    Rep.    344),    21,    51,    59, 

1753. 
King   V.    State    (66   Miss.   502;    6 

;So.      188),     822,     829,      1482, 

1608,    1609,    1758. 
King  V.   Stata    (33   Tex.   Cr.  Rep. 

547;  28  S.  W.  20]  ),  893,  894. 
King  V.   State    (50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

321;   97  S.  Vr.  488),  1602. 
King   V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

100  S.  W.  024),  1464,  1472. 
King  V.  State.    (52   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

101;     109    S.    W.    182),    7e2, 

1692. 
King  V.  Stevens    (8  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

76),    1449. 
King  V.  Tomlinsoii   ( li8  East.  Dist. 

Ct.  Rep.   253),   ^ZCA. 
King  V.  Vavisclii   (8  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

78),  1080,  1342,  1346. 
King  V.  Verdon    (8  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

352),   1702. 
King    V.    Vipon     (1    Menz.    551), 

1623. 
King  V.   Walsh    (6   Can.    Cr.  Cas. 

452),    233. 
King  V.  W.   H.  Townsend    (No.   2 

39  Nov.  Sco.   189),   1059. 
Kingsley    v.    N.    E.    ]Mut.    F.    Ins. 

Co.   (8  Cush.  573),  2230. 


Kingston    v    Ft.    Wayne,    etc.    R. 

Co.    (112  Mich.  40;   70  N.  W. 

315;    40  L.  R.  A.   131),  2177, 

2191,   2193. 
Kingston  v.  Osterhondt    (33  Hun, 

[N.  Y.]   66),  498,  500. 
Kinmish  v.  Ball    (129  U.  S.  217; 

9  Sup.  Ct.  277),  315. 
Kinniundy  v.  Mahan  (72  111.  402), 

405,  420. 
Kinnebrew,  Ex  parte  ( 35  Fed.  52 ) , 

158,  159. 
Kinnebrew  v.  State    (80  Ga.  232; 

5    S.    E.    56),    59,    86,    1349, 

1353. 
Kinser    v.    State     (9     Ind.    543), 

1510,   1521. 
Kinze,  In  re    (28  Misc.  Rep.  622; 

59  N.  Y.  682),  744. 
Kinzell,  In  re  ( 28  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

022;     59    N.    Y.    Supp.    082), 

1183. 
Kiowa  County  v.  Dunn   (21  Colo. 

185),    426. 
Kipp   v.   Patterson    (2   Dutch   [N. 

J.]    298),    4C3. 
Ivirby  v.  State    (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

584;   FO  S.  W.  1007),  1216.\ 
Kirchner   v.   Myers    (35    Ohio   St. 

85),    1918. 
Kirkland  v.  Ferry  ( 45  Wash.  663 

88   Pac.    1123),   990. 
Kirkland  v.   State    (72  Ark.    171 

78  3.  W.  770),  1017,  2257. 
Kirkow   v.    Bauer    (15    Neb.   561 

20  ::.  W.  2D),  1882,  1904. 
Kirkpatricl:  v.  Commonwealth   ( 95 

Ky,  326;   Zj  S.  W.  113),  932. 
Kirkwood   v.   Autenreith    ( 1 1    Mo, 

App.  515),   ]G16. 
Kissam  v.  Kissam   (21  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.     ]  12 ;     47    N.    Y.    Supp. 

270),   2158. 
Kissel  v.  Lewis    (156  Ind.  233;   59 

N.  S.  4  78),  984,  C37,   1108. 
Kissinger   v.  Tlinkhouse    (27    Fed. 

883),  125. 
Kitchens    v.    State     (44    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  216;  70S.  W,  82),  1130. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


clxxxi 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Kitson   V.    Ann   Arbor    (26    Midi. 
325),   69,   1C8,   278,   418,   444, 
481,  908. 
Kittredge     v.     Allemenia     Society 

(3  Ohio  X.  P.  312),  1811. 
Kittrell   v.   State    (89    Miss.    666; 
42  So.   609),   268,   13.52,   1354, 
16L5,    1652. 
Ivizer    v.    Randleman     (50    X.    C. 

'    428),  4,  5,  30,  55,  355. 
Klamm,  In  re   ([Neb.]   117  X.  W. 
991),  575,  622,  623,  636,  663, 
671. 
Klare  v.  State    (43  Ind.  483),   11, 

25,  26,  83,  1586,  1592. 
Klein  v.  Livingston  Club  (177 
Pa.  224;  35  Atl.  606;  34  L. 
R,  A.  94;  55  Am.  St.  Rep. 
717),  1330,  1332,  1336,  1338. 
Klein    v.     State     (76     Ind.    333), 

1101,    1637. 
Kleppe  V.   Gard    ([Minn.]    123   X. 

W.  665),  849. 
Klepper   v.    State    (121    Ind.   491; 

23   X.  E.   287),   1656,   1665. 

Kleveshall,  In  i  -    (30  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    201;     63    X.    Y.    Supp. 

741),  580. 

Klimert   v.    Corcoran    ([Xeb.]    70 

XL  W.  910),  1890,  1887,  1955. 

Kline   v.    Baker    (99    Mass.    253), 

1280. 
Kline  v.  Kline   (50  Mich.  438;    15 

N.   W.   581),   2162. 
Kling   V,    Fries    (33    Mich.    275), 

1786,   1805. 
Klohs    V.    Klolis     (61     Pa.    245), 

212L 

Xlug  V.  State   (77  Ga.  734),  1119, 

1123,   1124,    1126,   ]3C2,   1728. 

Knapp  V.  r-anlin   (.?1  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    756;     74    X.    Y.    Supp. 

458),  820. 

Knarr,  /w  re   (127  Pa.  554;    IS  Atl. 

630),  C:-J,  648. 
Knecht  v.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (00 
Pa.  St.  118;  35  Am.  Rep. 
641;  8  Ins.  L.  Jr.  639),  2230. 
Knekamp  v.  Hidding  (31  Wis. 
503),  2100. 


Knickerbocker  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Foley 

(105   U.   S.  350),  2223,  2224. 

Knight  V.  Goss  (59  Vt.  266),  1727. 

Knight    V.    Mutual    Life    Ins.    Co. 

(14   Phila.    187;    9   W.   X.   C. 

501),   2229. 

Knight  V.   State    (88  Ga.  590;    15 

S.    E.   457),    931,    1281,    1283, 

1727. 

Kniper     v.     Louisville      (7     Bush, 

599),  444. 
Knoblauch's  License,  In  re  ( 28  Pa. 
Super.     Ct.     323),     546,    565, 
666. 
Knopf     V.     State     (84     Ind.     31), 

1444. 
Knott   V.   Miller    (12   X.  Z.   L.   K. 

397),   1313. 
Knott  V.  Peterson   (125  Iowa  404; 
101    N.    W.    173),    778,    876, 
1883,    2004. 
Knott  V.  Tidyman    (86   Wis.   164; 

56  X.  W.'  632),  2100,  2112. 
Knowles    v.    State     (80    AIa.    9), 

86,  1704. 
Knox  V.  Rainbow    (111  Cal.  539; 

44    Pac.    175),    674. 
Knox   V.   State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

77  S.  VV.  13),  1130,  1727. 
ITnox  City  v.   VVhiteaker    (Z';  Mo. 

App.    468),    832. 
Knudson    v.    Great    Council     ( [S. 

D.]   G3  X.  VV.  611),  2221. 
Kohxn    V.    State     (407    Ark.    72; 

81   S.  W.   235),   1195. 
Kob:r  V.  State    (10  Ohio  St.  44), 

1197,    1754. 
Koblenshlag  v.  State   (23  Tex.  Cr. 
App.    264;     4     S.    W.    888), 

i2;:o. 

Koch  V.  Commonwealth    (119  Ky. 

476;    84   S.    W.    533;    27    Ky. 

L.   Rep.    122),  449. 
Koch   v.  State    (48   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

346;   88  S.  W.  809),  873. 
Koch  v.  State    (32  Ohio  St.  353), 

1653. 
Koohe    v.    Owens    (23    X".    S.    W- 

102),    1147. 


clxxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   ai-e   to   pages.] 


Koegel    V.    Egner     (54    N.    J.    Eq. 
623;  35  Atl.  394),  2141,  2146, 

2149. 
Koehler    v.    Olsen     (68    Hun,    62; 

22  N.  Y.  Supp.  677),  701. 
Koenig  v.  State   ( 33  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

367;    26   S.   W.   835;    47   Am. 

St.  35),  1330,  1338. 
Koerner  v.   Oberly    (56   Ind.   284; 

26  Am.  Rep.  34),  1982,  1989. 
Koester    v.    State     (36    Kan.    27; 

12  Pac.  339),   190,  3S9. 
Kohl   V.    Schober    (35    X.    J.    Eq. 

461),    2136. 
Koliler,    Ex    'parte     (74    Cal.    38; 

15  Pac.  436),   1382. 
Kohn  V.   Melcher    1 29    Feu   433), 

109,    150,   156,    191,   208,   311, 

312,     331,     335,     1792,     1797, 

1799,   1803. 
Kojan,     Appeal     of      (73     N.     E. 

1122;    181    X.   Y.    528),    745. 
Kolling  V.  Bennett    ( 18   Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  R.  425;    10  C.  C.  D.  81), 

1850,  1852,  1974. 
Kolman  v.  State  (2  Ga.  App. 

648;  58  S.  E.  1070),  1128, 

1589,   1616,   1620,   1621,   1728. 
Koop    V.    People     (47     HI.    327), 

71,    1117,    1127,   1634. 
Koopnian   v.   State    (61   Ala.   70), 

1516. 
Korman   v.   Henry    (32   Kan.   49; 

3  Pac.  764),  1774. 
Korn    V.    Chesapeake     ( 125     Fed. 

£97;   63  L.  R.  A.  372),  2215. 
Ivorndorfor,  /;:.  re    ( [N.  Y.]   49  N. 

Y.    Supp.    559),    591. 
Komman,  In  re    (13   Pa.   Co.   Ct. 

Rep.   147;    23   Pittsb.   Leg.   J. 

[N.  S.]  476),  518,  1364. 
Koster,  Appeal  of   (73  X.  E.  1122; 

181   X.  Y.   529),  745. 
Krach  v.  Heilman    (53  Ind.  517), 

1870. 
Kramer,  Fx  parte    ( 19  Tex.  App. 

233),  886. 
Kramer    v.    Marks     (64    Pa.    St. 
151),   138,  248,   592. 


Kramer   v.   State    (106    Ind.    192; 

6  X.  E.  341),  1240,  1561. 
Kraut  V.  State  (47  Ind.  519),  510, 

531. 
Kravek  v.  State   (38  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

44;  41  S.  W.  612),  1167. 
Kray,     Appeal     of      (73     N.     E. 
'll22;     181    X.    Y.    527-530), 

745. 
Kreamer  v.  State  (106  Ind.  19-2;  6 

X.  E.  341),  1446. 
Kreiss  v.  Seligman   (8  Barb.  438), 

1790,    ISOl. 
Kreitor  v.  Xichols  (28  Mich.  496), 

223,    224,    1350,    177'..     1840, 

1907,    1908,    1984,    1985. 
Kress  v.  State   (65  Ind.  106),  659, 

660. 
Kresser  v.  Lyman   (74  Fed.  765), 

97,  183,   184,  490. 
Kretzmann  v.  Dunne   (228  111.  31; 

81   X.    E.    790;    affirming   130 

III.   App.    469),   594. 
Krick   V.   Dow    ( [Tex.   Civ.   App.] 

84    S.     W.     245),     772,     773, 

1242. 
Krieger,    In   re    (59    X.    Y.    App. 

346;    69    X.    Y.    Supp.    851), 

879,  881. 
Kriel   v.   Commonwealth    (5   Bush 

363),   2061,    2062. 
Krigler    v.    Shepler     ( [Kan.]     101 

Pac.   619),    1784. 
Krnavek    v.    State     (38    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.  44;  41  S.  W.  612),  1339, 

1342,    134G,    1567. 
Kroer    v.    People     (78    IlL    294), 

1118,   1122,   1125,   1127,    1134, 

1538,    1567,    1761,    1764. 
Kroft   V.    Keokuk    (14   Iowa   86), 

811. 
Krueger    v.     Colville     (49    Wash. 

295;    !)5    Pac.    81),    186,    259, 

714.  715,  720,  752. 
Krug,  In  re   (72  Xeb.  576;   101  N. 

W.  242),  535,  645. 
Kruger  v.  Spachek    (22  Tex.  App. 

307;   54  S.  W.  295),  1969. 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


clxxxiii 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Krulevitz  v.   Eastern  R.  Co.    ( 143 
Mass.    228;     9    N.    E.    613), 
2033. 
Krumbholz,  In  re   (60  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.    534;     113    N.    Y.    Supp. 
1060),   579, 
Krummel    v.    Kidd    ([1905]    Vict. 
L.   R.    193;    26    Austr.    L.    T. 
131;     10    Austr.    L.    R.    264), 
1257 
Kruse  v.  Williams    (80  Pac.  648), 

250,   1558. 
Krzykeva    v.    Croninger    (200    Pa. 

359;   49  Atl.  979),  808. 
Kuhlman   ([.Neb.]   98  N.  W.  419), 

1948. 
Kuhlman    v.    Wieben     ( 129    Iowa 
188;     105    N.    W.    445;    2    L. 
R.    A.     [N.    S.]     555),     1251, 
1631,   1735,  2095. 
Kuhn    V.    Bauer     (15    Neb.     150; 

18  N.  W.  27),  1884. 
Kuhn   V.    Board,    etc.    (4    W.   Va. 

499 ) ,  394. 
Kuhn    V.     Common    Council     (79 
Mich.    534;    38    N.    VV.    470), 
194. 
Kuhn  V.  State    (34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

85;  29  S.  W.  272),   1646. 
Kunkel    v.    Abell    (170    Ind.    305; 

84   N.   E.   503),   572. 
Kunkle    v.    Abel     (167    Ind.    434; 
79  N.  E.  753),  612,  614,  615, 
624. 
Kurth  V.  State    (86  Tenn.   134;    5 
S.    W.    593),    198,    201,    540, 
542,   790. 
Kurtz  V.   People    (83   Mich.  279), 

215,  1119. 
Kusta  V.  Kimberly    (  10  Oliio  Dec. 
789;    2   Wkly.   L.   Bull.   379), 
797. 
Kurz  V.   State    (79   Ind.  488),   11, 
82,    1220,     1230,     158'6,     1592, 
1«21,   1694,    1«45. 
Kwong  Wo,  In  re   (2  B.  C.  336), 

23. 
Kyle     V.     State      (18     Ind.     App. 
136;  47  N  E.  647),  832,  837, 
638. 


Labaree   v.    Klosterman    (33   Neb. 
150;    49    N.   W.    1102),    1162, 
1106. 
Laboyleaux,    Ex    parte     (65    Ind. 

545),  530. 
Lacey  v.  Palmer    (93  Va.   159;   24 

S.  E.   930),  324. 
Lackey    v.    Cunningham     (56    Pa. 

370),   2151. 
Lackman     v.     Walker      (52     Fla. 

297;   42  So.  461),  445. 
La    Croix    v.    Fairfield     Co.      (49 

Conn.    591),    488,    743. 
La    Croix    v.     Fairfield    Co.     (50 
Conn.  321;  47  Am.  Rep.  048), 
182,    183,    184,    185,   490,   715, 
718,  720,  743. 
Lacy  V.   Garrard    (2  Ham    [Ohio] 

7),  2093,  2099,  2109. 
Lacy  V.  Garrard   (2  Ohio  7)   2100. 
Lacy  V.  Mann    (59  Kan.  777;   53 

Pac.    754),    2099,    2128. 
Lacy  V.   State    (32   Tex.   227),   76, 

1637. 
Ladd  V.  Dillingham   (34  Me.  316), 

1782. 
Ladd    V.    Moore     (3    Sandf.    589), 

2127. 
Ladson    v.    State     ([Fla.]    47    So. 

517),  4,   1495. 
Ladwig  V.  State  (40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
585;     51     S.    W.     390),     958, 
1681. 
Lafayette,  In  re    (45  N.  Y.  Misc. 
141;   91  N.  Y.  Supp.  970;   or- 
der affirmed,   93   N.   Y.   Supp. 
534;     105     N.     Y.    App.    Div. 
25),  880,  881,  884,  889. 
Lafi'erty  v.  HufTman    (99  Ky.  80; 
35    S.    W.    123;    32   L.    R.   A. 
203),   932,    1286. 
Laff"ey    v.     Magarian     (22    N.     Z. 

577),  1251. 
Lafler  v.  Fisher  (121  Mich.  60;  79 

N.  W.  934),  62,  1250,  2008. 
La  Fitte  v.  Ft.  Collins    (42  Colo. 
293;   95  Pac.  927),  127. 


clxxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


La   France   v.    Krayer    (42    Iowa, 

143),  1915,  1927. 
Lagagrianmis    v.     Cruikshank      (1 

Vict.  L.  E.  97),  643. 
Lahey    v.    Crist     (130    111.    App. 

152),  1862. 
Laid  V.    State    (104   Ga.    72G;    30 

S.   E.   949),   82,  695. 
Laing  v.  State    (9  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

136;   28  S.  W.  1040),  1227. 
Lake,  In  re  (26  C.  P.  [Can.]  173), 

889. 
Lake  v.  Linton    (6  La.  Ann.  262), 

2153. 
Lake    v.    Stahl     ([Kan.]    93    Pac. 

275),    1023. 
Lake  v,   Stahl    (79   Kan.   854;    99 

Pac.  275),    1772. 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  Pv.  Co.  v.  Zoffinger 

(107   111.    199),  2191,   2194. 
Lake   Shore,  etc.  R.   Co.  v.  Miller 

(25    Mich.    274),    2179,    2180, 

2182. 
Laliberte  v.  Fortin    (2  Que.  L.  R. 

573,    reversing    3    Que.    C.    R. 

385),    1441. 
Lally,  In  re    (85  Iowa  49;   51  N. 

W.    1155;    16   L.   R.   A.   681), 

2163. 
Lambe  v.  Jobin    (12  L.  N.   [Can.] 

407),  1372. 
Lambert,  Ex  parte   (22  N.  W.  [N. 

S.  W.]  130),  371. 
Lambert  v.   Rahway    (58  N.  J.  L. 

578;    34    Atl.    5),    727,    734, 

740,  1760. 
Lambert    v.    State    (8    Mo.    492), 

509. 
Lambert    v.    State     (37    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    232;     39     S.    W.    299), 

849,    854,    869,    916. 
Lambert  v.  Stevens   (29  Neb.  283; 

45  N.  W.  263),  568. 
Lambie  v.  State   (151  Ala.  86;  44 

So.   51),   83,  967,   1349,   1556, 
1643,  1701. 
Lammert  v.  Lidwell  (62  Mo.  188), 

240. 


L'  Amoureux  v.  Crosby    (2  Paige 

422;   22  Am.  Dec.  655),  2119, 

2120. 
Lanahan  v.  Bailey   ( [S.  C]   31  S. 

E.    332;    42    L.    R.    A.    297), 

-772. 
Lanar  v.  Wiedeman   (57  Mo.  App. 

507),  408. 
Lancaster   v.    State    (2   Lea   575), 

2072,    2074 
Lancaster,  etc.  Bank  v.  Moore  (78 

Pa.   St.   407),  2123. 
Lanckton  v.  United  States  (18  App. 

D.    C.   348),   2038. 
Land  v.  State   (5  Ga.  App.  98;  62 

S.  E.  665),   1092. 
Lander  &  Bagley's  Contract,  In  re 

([1892]   3  Ch.  41),   1826. 
Landt  v.  Remley    (130  Iowa  227; 

85  N.   W.   783),   1002. 
Lane  v.  Lane    ([1890]   p.   133;   60 

J.    P.    345;    65    L.    J.    P.    63; 

74  L.  T.  558),  2168. 
Lane  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.   ( 132 

Mo.  4;    33  S.  W.  645;    1128), 

2191,  2193. 
Lane  v.  State   (37  Ark.  273),  515, 

1349,    1371. 
Lane  v.   State    (49   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

335;     92    S.    W.    839),    1212, 

1611,  1666. 
Lane  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.]  82 

S.  W.   1034),  1651. 
Lane  v.  Tippy   (52  111.  App.  5.32), 

1883,    1912. 
Lane  Co.  v.  Oregon    (7  Wall.    [U. 

S.]  71),  276. 
Lanergan     v.     People      (50     Barb. 

266;  34  How.  Pr.  390;  6  Park. 

Cr.    Rep.    209),     2039,    2040, 

2051,   2052,   2053,  2061.   2071, 

2085. 
Lang's   Est.,   In   re    (65    Cal.    19; 

2  Pac.  491),  2136. 
Lang  v.   Ingalls   Zinc   Co.    ( [Tenn 

Ch.    App.]     49     S.    W.     288), 

2094,  2122. 
Langan  v.  People  (32  Colo.  414;  76 

Pac.  1048),  1505,  1523,  1738. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


clxxxv 


[References   are   to    pages] 


Langel    v.   Bushnell    (197    111.   20; 

133    N.    E.    1086,   affirming   9() 

111.  App.  (il8),  469,  967,  978, 

1089,    1098,    1698. 
Langen   v.   Wood    River    (77   Neb, 

444;    109  N.  W.   748),   472. 
Langford,    In   re    (57    Fed.    570), 

1017,    1021. 
Langrish  v.  Archer   ( 10  Q.  B.  Div. 

44;  47  J.  P.  295;  52  L.  J.  M, 

C.  47;  31  W.  R.  183;  47  L.  T. 

548),    2025. 
Langswortliy      v.      Dubuque      ( 1 0 

Iowa  271),   393. 
Langton  v.  Hughes   ( 1  Maul.  &  S. 

593),   1796. 
Lanham  v.   Wood    (167   Ind.   398; 

79    N.    E.    376),      663,     668, 

669. 
Laning  v.  Laning  (21  N.  J.  Eq. 

248),  2156,  2166,  2168. 
Laning  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co. 

49  N.  Y.  521;  10  Am.  Rep. 

417),  2197,   2198,  2199,  2200, 

2201. 
Lanning  v.  Board    (  [N.  J.  L.]    68 

Atl.   1083),  591. 
La  Norris  v.  State    ( 13  Tex.  App. 

33;    44   Am.    Rep.    699),    549, 

1372,    1373. 
Lantz  V.  Hightstown   (46  N.  J.  L. 

102),    716,    727,    743. 
Laper,    In    re     (165    N.    Y.    618; 

59  N.  E.  1125;   53  N.  Y.  Div. 

576;  66  N.  Y.  Supp.  13),  580, 

581. 
Lapiere   v.    Briere    ( 10   Leg.   News 

387),   1781. 
Laranger    v.    Jardine     (56    Mich. 

518;  23  N.  W.  203),  1780. 
Laranne    Co.   v.    New    Albany    Co. 

92  U.   S.  307),  393. 
Largin  v.  State   (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

574;  40  S.  W.  280),  1607. 
Larimer   v.    Kelly    (13    Kan.    78), 

2253. 
Larkin  v.  Simmons  ( [Ala.]  46  So. 

451),   889. 


Larner,    In    re    (79    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1039;     12    N.    Y.    Ann.    Cas. 

362),   2019. 
La    Roche   v.    Brewer    ( 1    Ohio   C. 

D.    432),    2011,    2013. 
Larr  v.  State   (45  Ind.  364),  660. 
Larson    v.    Chistensen    ( 14    N.    D. 

476;    106  N.  W.  51),   1768. 
Lartz  v.  Gibson    (13  Bradw.   [111.] 

487),    1869,    1962. 
Larzelere     v.     Kerchgessner      ( 73 

Mich.    276;    41    N.    W.    488), 

1949,    1960,    1966,    1983,   1985, 

2005. 
Lashus  v.   State    (79  Me.   504;    11 

Atl.   180),    1729. 
Laswell    v.    State     (21    Tenn.     [2 

Humph.]    402),    31. 
Latham  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

72   S.  W.   182),    1203. 
Lathrope  v.   State    (51   Ind.   192), 

1248,   1353,    1357,   1359,    1565, 

1633. 
Lathrope  v.   State    (50   Ind.  555), 

1586,   1592. 
Latimer  v.  Birmingham,  J.  J.    (60 

J.  P.  660»i.)   623. 
Lauer  v.  District  of  Columbia   (11 

App.   D.    L.   453),    1313,    1544. 
Lauer    v.    State     (24    Ind.     131), 

356,    1352,    1356,    1359,    1360, 

1015,  1616,  1610. 
Lauk's  Appeal,  In  re  (2  Super.  Cf 

53;    39   W.   X.   C.   42).  553. 
Launder     v.     Chicago      (111      111. 

291),   472. 
Laundrum   v.    Flanigan    (60   Kan. 

436;    56   P.    753),    1895. 
Laundry    License    Case     (22    Fed. 

201),  411,  412,   786,   789. 
Lauten  v.  Rowan   (58  N.  H.  215), 

1790. 
Lauter   v.   Allenstown    (58   N.   H. 

289),  477. 
Lautznester  v.  State  ( 19  Tex.  App. 

320),    1563. 
Lavette   v.   Sage    (29   Conn.   577), 

2099,    2102,    2103. 


clxxxvi 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Law    and    Order    Society,     In     re 

185    Pa.    572;     40    MX.    92), 

G08. 
Lawrence,  In  re   (69  Ala.  608;    11 

Pae.   217),    521. 
Lawrence,  In  re    (69  Cal.  608;    11 

Pac.     217),     444,     448,     449, 

800. 
Lawrence  V.  Gray   (11  Johns.  179), 

493,  500,  687. 
Lawrence    v.     Monroe     (44     Kan. 

607;    24   Pac.    1113),   439. 
Lawrence    v.    National     Ins.     Co. 

(127  Mass.   557,  note.)    1779. 
Lawrence   v.   State    (7    Tex.    App. 

192),    1125,    1319. 
Lawrenceburg   v.    Wuest    ( 16    Ind. 

337),  397,  413,  418. 
Laws  V.   State    (144   Ala    118;    42 

So.  40),  2038. 
Lawson,   In   re    (109    N.    Y.    App. 

Div.  195;  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  33), 

745. 
Lawson  v.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

66    S.    W.    1010;     23    Ky.    L. 

Rep.  1983),  931. 
Lawson  v.  Edminson    (78  L.  J.  K. 

B.  36    [1908];    2   K.   B.   952; 

72  J.  P.  79;   25  T.  L.  Pv.  11), 

2028. 
Lawson    v.    Eggleston     (59    N.    E. 

1124;    164  N.   Y.   600;    affirm- 
ing   52    N.    Y.    Supp.     181), 

1873,  1954,  1975. 
Lawson   v.    State    (55    Ala.    118), 

1111,   1665,   1666. 
Lawson  v.  State    (151  Ala.  95;   44 

So.  50),  1554. 
Lawton   v.    Allentown    ( 58    N.    H. 

289),  384. 
Lawton   v.   Sun   Mut.   Ins.   Co.    (2 

Cash.    500),    2041. 
Layton  v.  Deck  (63  111.  App.  553), 

1908. 
Layton    v.    State     (49    Ind.    229), 

1567. 
Lazare  v.  State   (19  Ohio  St.  43), 

226. 


Lazell  V.  Pinnick    (1   Tyler   [Vt.] 

247;    4  Am.   Dec.   722),  2128, 

2131. 
Lea  V.  State   (64  Miss.  201;    1  So. 

51),  1446,  1504. 
Lea  V.  State    (78  Tenn.    [10  Lea] 

35),   247. 
Lea    V.   VVhittaker    ([1872]    L.   R. 

8  C.  P.  70;   37  J.  P.  183;   27 

L.    T.    676;    21    W.    R.    230), 

1832. 
Leach  v.  State    (99  Tenn.  584;  42 

S.  W.  195),   1583. 
Leach  v.  State  (35  Tex.  Rep.  449; 

34  S.  W.   129),   1463. 
Leach   v.    State    (  [Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

53  S.  W.  630),  1182. 
Leader   v.    Yell    (33    L.    J.   M.    C. 

p.  233),  598. 
League  v.  Erskine  ( 120  Iowa,  464; 

94    X.    VV.    938),    1736,    1861, 

1950,    1972. 
Leah    v.    Minns    (47    J.    P.    198), 

961. 
Leak    v.    Commonwealth     (  [Ky.,] 

64  S.  W.  521;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

932),    1380,    1381. 
Leake,  In  re  (26  C.  P.  [Can.]  173), 

894.  907. 
Leake  v.  Linton   (6  La.  Ann.  262), 

2166. 
Leaky,  In  re  (14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

430;   3  Pa.  Dist.  472),  696. 
Leary   v.    State     (39     Ind.     .544), 

1109,  1491. 
Leavenworth    v.    Booth     ( 15    Kan. 

628),   791. 
Leavitt  v.  Morris   (105  Minn.  170; 

117  N.  VV.  393),  2017,  2023. 
Le   Blanc,   Ex   parte    ( 1    Can.   Cr. 

Cas.  12;  33  N.  B.  90),  1571. 
Lebkovitz  v.  State    (113   Ind.  26; 

14  N.  E.  363),   1746. 
Lebolt,  In  re   (77  Fed.  587),  331. 
Leckey    v.    Cunningham     (56     Pa. 

370),   2137. 
Ledbetter  v.   State    (143   Ala.  52; 

38    So.    836),    1181. 
Lederer    v.    State     (11    Ohio    Dec. 

31),   1120. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxvii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Lederer    v.    State     (24    Wkly.    L. 

Bull.   153),   1400. 
Lee,  In   re  40  N.  J.   Kq.    193;    18 

Atl.    525),    2122,    2134,    2137, 

2149. 
Lee  V.   Lee    (3   Wash.   230),   2105, 

2107. 
Lee   V.  Roberts    (3   Oklu.    lOiJ;    41 

Pac.  595),  798. 
Lee   V.    SchuU     ([Ind.]    88   N.    E. 

521),   001,   007,   012. 
Lee  V.  State   (143  xila.  93;  39  So. 

720),   174. 
Lee  V.   Ware    (1   Hill    L.    [S.    C] 

313),   2uJ4,   201)8. 
Leech  v.  Leech    (Clark    [Pa.]    80; 

1    Phila.    244;    4    Am.    L.    Jr. 

174),  2135. 
Lee   County    v.    Hooper    ( 128    Ga. 

99;    50  N.   E.   997),   980. 
Leeds       Ck)rporation       v.       Ryder 

([1907]   A.   C.   420;    71    J.  P. 

484;   76  L.  J.  K.  B.  1032;   87 

L.  T.  261),  547,  056,  059,  678. 
Leesburg  v.  Putnam  (103  Ga.  110; 

29  S.  E.  602;  68  Am.  St.  80), 

69,  70,  75,  475. 
Leeson  v.  lioard  ( 19  Ont.  67 ) ,  648, 

052,  715. 
Leforce  v.   Commonwealth    (5   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  608),  1404. 
Leftinch  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

55    S.    W.    571),    934,    1090, 

1692,   1715. 
Leftwiche's   Case    (5    Rand.    [Va.] 

057),  929. 
Legal  Tender  Cases   (12  Wall.  [U. 

S.]  501),  100. 
Leger  v.  Rice  (Fed.  Cas.  No.  8210), 

233. 
Lcgeyt    V.    O'Brien     (^Slilw.    Eccl. 

Rep.  325),  2109,  2114.  2115. 
Legg  V.    Anderson    (110   Ga.   401; 

42  S.  E.  720),  970,  980,  1108. 
Legori  V.  State    (8  S.  &  M.  097), 

1481. 
Lehman    v.    District    of    Columbia 

(19    App.    D.    C.    217),    1130, 

1311,   1312,   1363,   1511,   1589. 


Lehman  v.  Porter    (73  Miss.  216; 

18  So.  920),   894,  897,  906. 
Lehritter  v.   State    (42  Ind.  383), 

495,  1516,  1034. 
Leibeknccht,  In  re  ( 14  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.    571;    3    Pa.    Dist.    Rep. 

474),  090. 
Leigh  V.  Westervelt  (2  Duer.  618), 

636,  658. 
Leight   V.   Milton    '2   N.   Z.   L.   R. 

214),  372. 
Leightfoot   v.   Heron    (3   Yonge   & 

Coll.  586),  2099. 
Leigh  ton  v.  Maury    (76  Va.  865), 

007,   608,   627^,   631,   632,   662, 

665. 
Leighton    v.    Sargent     (31    N.    H. 

119;   64  Am.  Dec.  323),  2254. 
Leister,   Appeal   of    (20   W.   N.   C. 

224),  675. 
Leister's    Appeal     ([Pa.]     11    Atl. 

387),  626,  628,  664. 
Leister,  In  re   (20  W.  N.  C.  224), 

638. 
Leisy  v.  Hardin    (135   U.   S.   100; 

10    Sup.    Ct.    681;    34    L.    Ed. 

128),  156,  210,  299,  305,  309, 

313,     315,     318,     1420,     1478, 

1433,   1800. 
Lemerise,   In   re    (73   Vt.   304;    50 

Atl.  1002),  1800. 
Lemington    v.    Blodgett     (37    Vt. 

210:  37  Vt.  215),  384,  385. 
Lemly  v.  State   (70  Miss.  241;    12 

So.  22 ;  20  L.  R.  A.  045 ) ,  905, 

907. 
Lemon   v.   Peyton    ( 64   Miss.    101; 

8     So.     235),    231;    232,    235, 

862,  875. 
Lemon    v.    State     (50    Ala.    130), 

1113,  1666,  1705. 
Lemon  v.  State  (4  Ind.  603),  1521, 
Lemont  v.  Washington,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(1  Mackey,  180),  2200. 
Lemore     v.     Commonwealth     ( 127 

Ky.   480;    105   S.   W.   930;    32 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  387),  949. 
Lemp  V.  Fullerton   (83  Iowa,  192; 

48  N.  W\  1034;   13  L.  R.  408), 

111,  327,  1828. 


clxxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


licney  &  Sons,  Limited,  v.  Calling- 
ham  &  Thompson    ([1907]   24 

T.  L.  R.  55),  1829. 
Lenthall  v.  Crow   ( 16  N.  S.  W.  L. 

R.  Ill),  1183. 
Lenthall  v.  Smith   ( 15  N.  S.  W.  L. 

R.. 277),  •1384.* 
Leo    Ebert    Brewing    Co.    v.    State 

(25   Ohio  Cir.   Ct.  Rep.  001), 

1109,  1170,  1177. 
Leonard  v.  Canton  (35  Miss.  189), 

412,  414. 
Leonard  v.   Saline   Co.   Court    (32 

Mo.  App.  033),  883,  885,  887. 
Leon  Mercantile   Co.   v.   Anderson 

([Tex.]   121  S.  W.  808),  715, 

720,  1769. 
Leothall  v.  Smith   ( 15  N.  S.  W.  L. 

R.   277),    1507. 
Leppert    v.    State     (7    Ind.    300), 

1589, 
Lerck   v.   State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

97  S.  W.  1049),  1693. 
Lerderer    v.    State    (24    Wkly.    L. 

Bull.     153;     affirmed,    5    Ohio 

Cir.  Ct.   Rep.   623;   3   Ohio  C. 

D.  303),  1115,  1122,  1128. 
Leroy  v.  State  (  [Ala.]  25  So.  247) , 

2038,  2000. 
Lervery  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

34  S.  W.  956),  1471. 
Leslie  v.   Clarke    (22   N.   Z.   907), 

1313. 
IL,eslie     V.      Commonwealth      ( 107 

Mass.  215),   1074. 
Lessman    v.    Territory     ( 3    Wash. 

Ter.  453),  231. 
Lester,    Ex  '  parte    (77    V^a.    603), 

627,  662,  663. 
Lester    v.   Miller    (70    Miss.    309; 

24  So.  193),  869. 
Lester  v.  Price   (83  Va.  048;  3  S. 

E.   529),    195,   608,    662,   >68, 

069,  696,  706. 
Lester    v.    State     (32    Ark.    727), 

1583. 
Lester  v.   State    ( [Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

80  S.  W.  326),  949. 


I   Lester   v.    Torrens    (2   Q.   B.   Div. 

404;    41   J.  P.  821;    25  W.  R. 

091;  40  L.  J.  M.  C.  280),  361, 

2030. 
Leveille,  Ex  parte   (Stephen's  Can- 
adian   Digest    [1877-1881]    p. 

474,  §  155),  518. 
Levering  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

33  S.  W.  976),  1712. 
Levi   V.   Rex    ([1906]    East.    Dist. 

Ct.  Rep.  272),   1182,   1720. 
Levis'  Estate  (140  Pa.  179;  21  Atl. 

242),  2148. 
Levi    V.    Louisville     (96    Ky.    394; 

30    S.   W.    973;    28   L.    R.   A. 

480),  788. 
Levi  V.  State  (4  Baxt.  289),  1382. 
Levine  v.  State   (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

647;     34    S.    W.    969),    1125, 

1013. 
Levy,  Ex  parte    (43   Ark.  42;    51 
"Am.  Rep.  550),  027,  028,  062. 
Levy  V.  State,    (133  Ala.   190;   31 

"So.  805),  953,   1600. 
Levy  V.  State  (6  Ind.  281),  216. 
Levy  V.   State    (101   Ind.   251;    68 

N.  E.  172),  789. 
Levy  V.    State    (89   Miss.  394;    42 

So.  875),   1098. 
Lewadag   v.    State    (4    Ind.    Oil), 

523. 
Lewis,  In  re   (20  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

532;     57    N.    Y.    Supp.    076), 

592,  595. 
Lewis  V.  Brennan   ([Iowa]    117  N. 

W.  279),  998,  1000,  1001. 
Lewis   V.   City  Na.   Bank    (72   III. 

543),   1843. 
Lewis    V.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

121  S.  W.  643),  718,  720,  721. 
Lewis   V.   Commonwealth    (90   Va. 

843;     20    S.    E.    777),     1111, 

1452. 
Lewis  V.  Foster   (1  N.  H.  61),  929. 
Lewis  V.  Hogan  (91  Iowa,  734;  59 

N.  W.  290),  988. 
Lewis    V.    Jones     (50    Barb.    645), 

2137.  2151. 
Lewis  V.  Lewis   (75  Iowa,  200;  39 

N.  W.  271),  2161. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxxix 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Lewis  V.  State  (21  Ark.  209),  270, 

1348. 
Lewis    V.    State    ( [Ga.]    64    S.    E. 

701),   1664. 
Lewis   V.    State    ( [Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

47  S.  W.  988;  39  S.  VV.  .570), 

1743. 
Lewis   V.   State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

49  S.  W.  603),  1687. 
Lewis  V.  United  States    ( 1  Morris 

[la.]   199),  694. 
Lewis  V.   Welch    (14  X.   H.   294), 

1780. 
Lewiston  v.   Fitch    ( 130   111.   App. 

170),  463. 
Lexington    v.    Sargent     (64    Miss. 

621;   1  So.  903),  675. 
Lexington  Brewing  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth ( 124  Ky.  476;  99  S.  W. 

618;    30    Ky.    L.    Rep.    758), 

948. 
Lexper  v.  State   ( 29  Tex.  App.  63 ; 

14  S.  W.  398),  2056. 
Leyden    v.    State     (78    Ga.     105), 

1124. 
Leyner  v.  State  (8  Ind.  490),  1741. 
Liberty  v.   Moran    ( 121   Mo.  App. 

682;     97    S.    W.    948),    1015, 

1654. 
License  Cases   (5  How.  504;    12  L. 

Ed.    256),   91,    100,    105,    107, 

139,    154,    181,    239,   302,   311, 

313,    398,   404,    418,    525,   790, 

1010. 
License    Commissioners    v.    O'Con- 

ner     (17    R.    I.    40;     19    Atl. 

1080),  744,  749. 
License  Commissioners   v.   Norfolk 

(14  Ont.  749),  262. 
License  Tax  Cases    (5  Wall.  462; 

18  L.  Ed.  497),   141,  451. 
Liddell  v.  Lofthouse   ([1896]    1  Q. 

B.  498 ;  60  J.  P.  264 ;   12  T.  L. 

R.  204),  380. 
Liebler  v.  Carrel    (155  Mich.   196; 

118  N.  W.  975;   15  Det.  L.  N. 

976),  997,  1862,  1883,  1962, 

1969. 
Liebold    V.    People     (86    111.    33), 

1303. 


Lienpe    v.    State     (28    Tex.    App. 

179;    12  S.  W.  588),   1583. 
Life  Association  v.  Foster   (11  Sc. 

Sess.    Cas.     [3d    Ser.]     351), 

2221. 
Liggett  V.   People    (26   Colo.   364; 

58  Pac.  144),  824,  1645. 
Ligonier    v.    Ackerman     (46    lud. 

552;    15   Am.   Rep.  323),   811, 

816. 
Lightfoot   V.   Heron    (3   Younge  & 

C.  Exch.  586),  2094,  2122. 
Lightner   v.    Casey    (31    Pa.   341), 

774. 
Lightner  v.  Commonwealth  (31  Pa. 

St.  341),  766. 
Liles  V.  State    (88  Ala.   139;   7  So. 

196),  1230. 
Liles  V.  State    (43  Ark.  95),  1598. 
Lillenfeld    v.    Commonwealth     (92 

Va.    118;    23   S.  E.   882),  740, 

1613. 
Lillensteine     v.     State      ( 46     Ala. 

498),   1112,    1192. 
Lilly  V.  City  of  Indianapolis   ( 149 

Ind.  648;  49  N.  E.  887),  100. 
Lincoln    v.    Smith     (27    Vt.    328), 

91,    110,    125,   253,   255,   1007, 

1008,  1040,  1043,  1072,  1088, 

1530,  1659. 
Lincoln  Center  v.  Bailey  (64  Kan. 

885;  67  Pac.  455),  1614. 
Lincoln  Center  v.  Linker  (5  Kan. 

App.  242;  47  Pac.  174),  47, 

1505,  1707,  1712. 
Lincoln  Center  v.  Linker  ( 0  Kan. 

App.  369;  51  Pac.  807),  467, 

1455,  1556. 
Lincoln  Center  v.  Linker  ( 7  Kan. 

App.  282;  53  Pac.  787),  39, 

48,  434,   1493,   1706. 
Lincoln  Parish  v.  Harper    (42  La. 

Ann.  776;  7  So.  716),  432. 
Lincolnton  v.  McCarter   ( Busb.  L. 

[N.  C]  429),  1124,  1127. 
Lindell  v.  Rokes    (60  Mo.  294;   21 

Am.  Rep.  395),  1785. 
Lindenmiller    v.    People    (3    Barb. 

[N.  Y.]  548),  215. 


exc 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


fReferonces   are   to   pages.] 


Linder  v.  Prior  ([1838]  8  C.  &  P. 

518),  1820. 
Linder    v.    State     (93    Ind.    254), 

1560. 
Lindley   v.    State    ([Ark.]    120   S. 

W.  987),  127,  336,  947. 
Lindsay  v.  Commonwealth  ( 99  Ky. 

164;  35  S.  W.  269),  1692. 
Lindsay   v.    State    (19    Ala.   560), 

1246,     1514. 
Lindsey  v.  Stone   (123  Mass.  332), 

1798,  1800. 
Lingelbach  v.  Hobson   ( [Iowa]  107 

X.  W.  168),  346,  1132. 
Linkenhelt   v.    Garrett    (118    Ind. 

599;   20  N.  E.  708),  190,  280, 

414,   430,  466. 
Lipari    v.    State     ( 19    Tex.    App. 

431),  912. 
Liquor  Dealers,  In  re   (6  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.    723;     28    Pittsb.    L.    J. 

[N.  S.]    16),   1320. 
Liquor  Dealers,  In  re   ( 19  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  Rep.  329),  1320. 
Liquor  License,  In  re    (1   B.  &  C. 

[N.  S.]  257),  560. 
Liquors,  In  re    (15   R.   I.   243;    3 

Atl.  3),  1065. 
Liquor  Locations,  In  re    (13  R.  1. 

733),   130,  247,  592. 
Liquor  Tax  Certificate  In  re    (23 

X.  Y.  Misc.   Rep.  446;    51   N. 

Y.  Supp.  281),  591,  592. 
Lissing  v.   Beach    (99   Mich.   431; 

58  N.  W.  366),  1983. 
List  V.  Padget   (96  Ind.  126),  431, 

601,  608,  854. 
Litch  V.  People    ( [Colo.  App.]   75 

Pac.   1079),   1178. 
Little,  Ex  parte   (19  W.  N.  [N.  S. 

W.]  268),  369,  372,  375. 
Little  V.  Barksdale  ( [S.  C]   63  S. 

E.  308),  381. 
Little  V.   State    (123  Ga.  503;   51 

S.  E.  501),  452,  1082. 
Little  V.  State    (42  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

551;   61   S.  W.  483),  2090. 
Little  V.  Thompson  (24  Ind.  146), 

608. 


Little    Chute   v.    Van   Camp    (136 

Wis.   520;    117    N.   W.    1012), 

459. 
Littlefield    v.    Peckham     (1    R.    I. 

500),   1748. 
Littlejohn  v.  Stells   (123  Ga.  427; 

51  S.  E.  390),  169,  216,  1761. 
Little  Rock,  etc.,  R.   Co.  v.  Park- 
hurst     (36    Ark.    371),    2178, 

2180. 
Little  Rock,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Ilaynes 

(47  Ark.  297),  2178. 
Littleton,  In  re    (113   X.  Y.  App. 

Div.    471;     99    X.    Y.    Supp. 

417),   647. 
Littleton  v.  Burgess  (13  Wyo.  261; 

82  Pac.  864),  185. 
Littleton  v.  Fritz    (65  Iowa,  488; 

22  X.  W.  641;  54  Am.  St.  19), 

256,  259,  981,  985. 
Littleton  v.  Harris  (73  Iowa,  167; 

34  X.  W.  800),  990,  992. 
Lively  v.   State    ( [Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

73    S.    W.     1048),    914,     915, 

1680,  1081. 
Livery    Stables   v.    State    (16    Mo. 

App.  131),  437. 
Livingston,  In  re    (24  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.  51;  48  X.  Y.  Supp.  989), 

491,  714,  743. 
Livingston,  In  re   (62  X.  Y.  [Misc. 

Rep.    334;     115    X.    Y.    Supp. 

269),   891. 
Livingston,  In  re  (115  X.  Y.  Supp. 

269),  853. 
Livingston  v.  Corey  (33  Xeb.  366; 

50  X.  W.  263),  576,  600,  637, 

638. 
Livingston   v.   Wolf    (136   Pa.   St. 

519;   20  Atl.  551),  408. 
Livingstone,  In  re  (6  Prac.  [Can.] 

Rep.  17),  2024. 
Livingstone,    Ex    parte     (20    Xev. 

282;  21  Pac.  322),  70. 
Llewellyn   v.    Rutherford    ([1875] 

L.  R.    10  C.  P.  456;    44  L.  J. 

C.  P.  281;  32  L.  T.  610),  1831, 

1832. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References   are   to   pages.] 


C2C1 


Lloyd  V.   Albemarle,  etc..   E.   Co 
(118    N.    C.    1010;    24    S.    E 
805),  2178,  2179. 
Lloyd  V.   Burnett    (64  J.   P.   708; 

82  L.   T.  804),    1139. 

Llyod  V.  Canon  City   ( [Colo.]    103 

Pac.  288  [P:iks'  Club]),   1325. 

Lloyd   V,    Dollison    (23    Oliio    Cir. 

Ct.  Pep.   571),   148,   151,  230, 

240,  554,  1683. 

Lloyd  V.  Kelly   (48  III.  App.  554), 

1970,    1972. 
Loan  V.   Etzel    (62  Iowa,  424;    17 

N.  W.  611),  2011. 
Loan  V.  Hiney   (53  Iowa,  89;  4  N. 

W.  865),   1927,   1931,   2013. 
Lochlieim   v.   Gill    (17   Ind.    139), 

2094,   2116. 
Locke's   Appeal,    72    Pa.    St.    491; 
13   Am.   Rep.   716),   228,   231, 
235. 
Locke    V.    Commonwealth     ([Ky.] 
63   S.   W.   795;    23  Ky.   740), 
1493. 
Locke  V.  Commonwealth   (113  Ky. 
864;    69  S.  VV.  763;    24  K.  L. 
Rep.  654),  1357,  1358,  1467. 
Locke    V.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 
74  S.  W.  654;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
76),  84,  935,  963,  1697,   1699. 
Locke  V.  Garnett   ([Ky.]  42  S,  vV. 
918;    19    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1059), 
908,  920,  922. 
Lockridge  v.   Lockridge    (3   Dana, 

28;   28  Am.  Dec.  52),  2165. 
Lock  wood    V.    Cooper     ([1903]     2 
K.    B.   428;    72    L.    J.    K.    B. 
690;   89  L.  T.  306;   52  W.  R. 
48 ;  67  J.  P.  307 ;  20  Cox  C.  C 
539),    372,    373,    374. 
Loeb,  Ex  parte  (  72  Fed.  657 ) ,  307. 
Loeb   V.    City   of   Attica    (82   Ind. 

175),   394,  432. 
Loeb    V.    Duncan     (63    Miss.    89) 

574,   674. 
Loeb  V.  State   (75  Ga.  258),   1357, 

135«,    1460,    1560. 
Lodamo    v.    State    (25    Ala     64) 
109,   210,    215. 


Loeffler    v.    District    of    Columbia 

(15  App.  D    C.  329),  1235. 
Loewer   v.   Sedalia    (77  Mo.   431) 

2171,  2190. 
Lofland,    In    re     ([Del.]     (i6    Atl. 

361),  563. 
Lofton    V.    Collins    (117   Ga.   434; 
43    S.    E.    708;    61    L.    R.    A. 
150),   475,   979,   985. 
Loftus      V.      Commonwealth      (13 

Gratt.  631),  1651. 
Loftus  V.  Hamilton   ( 105  HI.  App 

72,  75),  1879. 
Loftus   V.    Maloney    (89    Vt.   576; 

16  S.  E.  749),  2094. 
Logan,  In  re  (22  Austr.  L.  T.  109; 
6  Austr.  L.  R.  253),  626,  712. 
Logan    V.    Buck     (3    Utah,    301). 

216. 
Logan    V.    State     (24    Ala.     18i,) 

372. 
Long  V.   State    (27  Ala.   32),  426 

518,  539,  573, 
Long  V.   State    (27  Ala.   164;   42(i. 
Logan    V.    State    ([Okla.]    115    S 

W.  1192),   1454. 
Logan  City  v.  Buck  (3  Utah,  307; 

5  Pac.  564),  271,  432. 
Loid   V.    State    (104   Ga.    720-    30 

S.  E.  961),   1714. 
Lonchheim   v.   Gill    (17   Ind    139) 

2108. 
London     County     Council,     /»,    r« 
([1898]    1    Q.    B.    :m;    61    J. 
P.   808;    67   L.  J.   Q.   B.    382; 
77  L.  T.  436;   46  \V.  R.  172; 
14  T.  L.  R.  69),  1834. 
London   &   Suburban   Co.   v.    Field 
([1881]    16  Ch.  D.  645;   38  L. 
J.    Ch.    549;    44    L.    T.    444) 
1814. 
London   &   Xorthwestern   Rail   Co. 
V.    Garnett    ([1869]    L.    R.    9 
Eq.  26;    39   L.   J.   Ch.    25;    21 
L.    T.    352;    18    VV.    R.    246), 
1813. 
Londry,   Appeal   of    (79   Conn.   1; 
63  Atl.  293),  666,  740. 


CXCll 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


flleferences    ai'e    to    pages.] 


Long  V.  A.  L.  Green  &  Co.   (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  P5  S.  W.  79),  755, 

778. 
Long  V.  Commonwealth    (5  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   [abstract]    428),   1545. 
Long  V.  Ingalls  Zinc  Co.    ( [Tenn. 

'Ch.    App.]     49    S.    W.    288), 

2108. 
Long    V.    Joder    (139    lovva,    471; 

11(5    N.    W.    1063),    835,   979. 
Long   V.   Lynch    (38    Fed.   489;    4 

L.   R.  A.  831),   335,   1799. 
Long   V.   State    (103    Ala.   55;    15 

So.  565),   127'8. 
Long    V.    iState     ( 1,27     Gai.     285 ; 

■56   S.   E.   424),    1320. 
Long  V.  State  (56  Ind.  206),  1714, 

1746. 
Longfellow    v.    Quimby     (29     Me. 

196),  1014. 
Longhead  v.  B.   F.  Coombs  &   Co. 

( 64  Mo.  App.  559 ;  2  Mo.  App. 

Rep'r,   1017),  2093,  2097. 
Longley     v.     Commonwealth      ( 99 

Va.    807;     37     8.    E.    339;    2 

Va.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  660),  2039, 

2056. 
Longville    v.    State    (4    Tex.    App. 

312),  198,  199. 
Lonsdale   Co.   v.    Cumberland    ( 18 

R.    L    5;    25    Atl.    655),   603, 

608,  675. 
Looney   v.    State     (43    Ark.    389), 

1196,  1197. 
Loop    V.    Williams    (47    Vt.    407), 

1029,   1068. 
Lord,  In  re    (32  N.  Y.  Misc.  223; 

66  N.   Y.   Supp.   252),   577. 
Lord  V.  Chadbourne   (42  Me.  429; 

66  Am.  Dee.  290),  1028,  1031, 

1776. 
Lord   V.   State    (104   Ga.   726;    30 

S.  E.  949),  30. 
Lore\    V.    Kelley     ( [Xeb.]     90    N. 

W.  554),  1912. 
Loring  v.  Brackett   ( 3  Pick.  403  ) , 

610. 
Losan  v.  Etzel    (62  Iowa,  429;    17 

N.  W.  611),  1931. 


[   Lossman    v.    Fidelia    Knights    (89 

111.  App.  437),   1859. 
Lossman  v.  Knights   (77   111.  App. 

670),  1903. 
Lottery    Cases     (188    U.    S.    321; 

47    L.    Ed.   492;    23    Sup.    Ct. 

321),  298. 
Louhridge  v.  State    ( [Miss.]   3  So. 

667),    1464,    1468,    1478. 
Louisiana      v.      Anderson      ( [Mo. 

App.]   73  S.  W.  875),  1443. 
Louisiana,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  McDon- 
ald   ([Tex.    Civ.   App.]    52    S. 

W.  649),  2184. 
Louisville   v.   Cain    ( [Ky.]    119   S. 

W.  763),  758,  820. 
Louisville    v.    Gagen     ([Ky.]     116 

S.   W.   745;    118   S.   W.   947), 

634,  667. 
Louisville     v.     Hendricks      (  [Ky.] 

116    ,S.    W.    747),    600,    618, 

624. 
Louisville    v.    Kean    (18    B.    Mon. 

9),  403,  627,  632,  634. 
Louisville  v.  McKean   (57  Ky.  [18 

B.  Mon.]   9),  273. 
Louisville  v.   Worden    (11    Ky.  L. 

Rep.   [abstract]   402),  470. 
Louisville,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth   (126  Ky.  279;    103  S. 

W.  349;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  383). 

1689,   1726. 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Cummins 

(111  Ky.  3.33;   63  S.  W.  594; 

23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  681),  2177. 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson 

(1    Sneed,   637;    62   Am.   Dec. 

424),  232,  905. 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Ellis   (97 

Ky.    330;    30    S.    W.    979;    17 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  259),  2211,  2212, 

2214. 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson 

92  Ala.  204),  2203,  2210,  2214. 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson 

(108  Ala.  62;    19   So.  51;    31 

L.    R.    A.    372),    2174,    2191, 

2197,  2203,  2206,  2217,  2218. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXClll 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Louisville,   etc.,    R.  Co.    v.    Logan 
(88     Ky.    232;     3    L.    R.     A. 

80;  10  S.  W.  U55;,  2206,  2208. 
Louisville,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Lewis 

(14   Ky.   L.   Rep.   771),   2207. 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  McNally 

([Ky.]     105    S.    VV.    124;    35 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  1357 ) ,  2202. 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan 

(81    Ky.    624;    50    Am.    Rep. 

186),  2205,  2211,  2214. 
Love  V.  Porter  (93  Ala.  384;  9 

,S.  E.  585),  131,  135,  247, 

1278. 
Lovejoy  v.  Commonwealth   ( 13  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   976),  518, 

802,  1096,   1117. 
Lovelan    v.    Briggs    (32   Hun    [N. 

Y.]    477,  478),   1958. 
Loveless  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

44  S.  W.  508),  1650,  1653. 
Loveless    v.    State     (40    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  131;   49  S.  W.  98),  866, 

908,  1181,  1701. 
Loveless  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

49  S.  W.  601),  1471. 
Loveless  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

50  ,S.  W.  361),  1743. 
Loveless  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

49  S.  W.  601),  869,  909,  911, 

958,    1693,    1740,    1764, 
Loveless   v.    State    (40    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  221;   49  S.  W.  892),  80, 

958,    1684,    1688. 
Lovette   v.   Sage    (22   Conn.   577), 

2130. 
Loving  V.  State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

100   S.    W.    154),    1464,    1472. 
Lovingston  v.  Board  (99  111.  564), 

198,  788. 
Low  V.  Austin   ( 13  Wall.  29),  316, 

1425,  1431. 
Low  V.  Hutchison   ( 13  X.  Z.  L.  R. 

o4),   712. 
Low  V.  Pilotage  Commissioners   ( 1 

R.  M.  Charlt.  302 ) ,  743. 
Lowell  V.  Oliver    (8  Allen  [Mass.] 

247),   791. 
Lowell  V.  State    (126  Ga.   105;   54 

S.  E.  916),  1452. 


Lowery     v.     Briggs      ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]   73  S.  W.  1062),  903. 
Lowry    v.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

36    S.    W.    1117;    18    Ky.    L. 

Rep.  481),  232,  233. 
Lowry  v.  Grigly    (30   Conn.   450), 

1019,    1046,    1054. 
Lowery  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

34  S.  W.  956),  1464,  1474. 
Loza  V.   State    ( 1   Tex.  App.  488 ) , 

2078. 
Lucas,  Ex  parte   (2  S..R.  191;   19 

W.  N.    [N.   S.  W.i    98;   over- 
ruling  18   W.   X.    [X.   S.   W.] 

287),   682. 
Lucas     V.     Johnson      ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    64    S.    W.    823),    782, 

783,  1938. 
Lucas  V.  State  (92  Ga.  454;  17 

S.  E.  668),  1124. 
Lucio  V.  State  (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

320;  33  S.  W.  358),  1638, 

1643. 
Luck    V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

97    S.    W.    1049),    916,    1470, 

1473. 
Lucker  v.  Commonwealth   ( 4  Bush, 

440),   1594. 
Lucker    v.   Liske,    111    Mich.    683; 

70    X.    W.    421),    1867,    1953, 

1955,   1982. 
Ludwick      v.      Commonwealth     ( 6 

Harris     [Pa.]     172),    64,    65, 

2030. 
Ludwick  V.  Commonwealth  ( 18  Pa. 

St.    172),    65,    20 L8. 
Ludwig   V.    Cory    (158    Ind.   582; 

64   X.  E.    14),   606,  855,  859. 
Ludwig    V.    Sager     (84    111.    99), 

2004,  2005. 
Ludwig    V.    State    ( 18    Ind.    App. 

518;  48  X.  E.  390),  528,  668, 

669,  780. 
Ludwig  V.  State  (40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

585;    51    S.   W.   390),    1182. 
Lueken  v.  People    (3   111.  App.    [3 

Bradw.]    375),   1866. 
Luent,  In  re    (6  Greel.  412),   111, 

139,  189. 


CXCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pag-es.] 


Luff   V.    Leaper     (36    J.    P.    773), 

373. 
Luker  v.  Dennis   ([1877]   7  Cli.  D. 

227;    47    L.    J.    Ch.    174;    37 

L.   T.    827;    26    W.    R.    167), 

1815. 
Luminary,  The   (8  Wheat.  [U.  ,S.] 

407),  1073. 
Lung  V.  Michigan   ( 135  U.  S.  161 ; 

10    Sup.   Ct.    725;    34   L.    Ed. 

128),  299. 
Lunenberger    v.    State     (74    Miss. 

379;    21   So.    134),   1698. 
Lupo   V.   State    (118   Ga.    759;    45 

S.  E.  602),   1172. 
Lusher   v.   Scites    ( 4   W.  Va.   11), 

793. 
Luther    v.    State     (80    Neb.    432; 

114  N.  W.  411),  1706. 
Lutton  V.  Palmer   (69  Mich.  610; 

37  N.  W.  701),  553,  806,  1445, 

1534,  1555,  1556. 
Lutz  V.   Crawfordsville    ( 109   Ind. 

466;    10  N.   E.   411),   98,    168, 

402,   403,  405,    406,    411,    414, 

448,  450,  457,  458. 
Lydick  v.   Korner    (15   Neb.   500; 

20  N.  W.  26),  185,  662,   663, 

672,  814, 
Lyle  V.   State    (31    Tex.    Cr.   Pv©iJ. 

103),  2053,  2087,  2090. 
Lyman,  In  re   ( 163  N.  Y.  536 ;   57 

N.  E.  745;  reversing  51  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  52;  64  N.  Y.  Supp. 

756),  729,  818. 
Lyman,  In  re  (23  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

710;  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  52),  730, 

731. 
Lyman,  In  re  ( 24  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

552;    53    N.    Y.    Supp.    577), 

584. 
Lyman,  In  re  (25  Misc.  Rep.  638; 

56  N.  Y.  S.  359:   Id.  26  Misc. 

Rep.  300;   56  N.  Y.  S.  1020), 

743,   1293. 
Lyman,  In  re  (26  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

300;    56   N.   Y.   Supp.    1020), 

736,  741. 


Lj'man,    In   re    (26    N.    Y.    Supp. 

568;    57    N.    Y.    Supp.    488), 

584. 
Lyman,  in  re  (27  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

327;    57    N.    Y.    Supp.    888), 

717. 
Lyman,  In  re  ( 28  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

278;    59    N.    Y.    Supp.    828), 

752. 
Lyman,  In  re  (28  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

385;    59    N.    Y.    Supp.    971), 

741. 
Lyman,  In  re   (28  Misc.  Rep.  408; 

59  N.  Y.  Supp.  968;  48  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  275;  62  N.  Y.  Supp. 

846),  746,  751,   1310. 
Lyman,  In  re  (28  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

209;     50    N.    Y.    Supp.    898), 

1342,   1344. 
Lyman,  In  re    (29  App.  Div.  391; 

49  N.  Y.  S.  559;   52  N.  Y.  S. 

1145;      28     Misc.     Rep.     385; 

59    N.    Y.    S.    971;    28    Misc. 

Rep.   278;    59   N.   Y.  S.   828), 

744. 
Lyman,  In  re  (29  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

524;     61    N.    Y.    Supp.    946), 

721. 
Lyman,  In  re   ( 32  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

210;     67    N.    Y.    Supp.    502), 

750,  751. 
Lyman,  //(  re  ( 34  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

296;     69    N.    Y.    Supp.    781), 

729. 
Lyman,  /  .  re  (34  N.  Y.  App.  390; 

54   N.  Y.   Supp.   294),   580. 
Lyman   v.  Gramercy  Club    (39   N. 

Y.   App.   Div.   661;    57   N.   Y. 

Supp.    376),    1344. 
Lyman,  In  re   (40  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

46),  69. 
Lyman,  In  re  (44  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

507;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  805;   af- 
firming 27   N.    Y.   Misc.   Rep. 

327;    55    N.    Y.    Supp.    888), 

744. 
Lyman,  In  re  (48  N.  Y,  App.  Div. 

275;    62    N.    Y.    Supp.    846), 

594. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXCV 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Lyman,  In  re  (53  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
330;    65    N.    Y.    Supp.    073), 
746. 
Lymcan,  In  re  (59  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
217;     69    N.    Y.    Supp.    309; 
affirming  l\2  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
210;     67    I'V.    Y.    Supp.    48), 
621,  697,  '39,  745. 
Lyman,  In  re   ( 62  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
616;     70    X.    Y.    Supp.    822), 
718. 
Lyman  v.  Bradsted  (26  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Pxep.    629;     57    X.    Y.    Supp. 
869),   796. 
Lyman  v.  Brucker  ( 26  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.    594;     56    X.     Y.    Supp. 
767),    755,    768,    775. 
Lyman  v.  Cheever   (168  X.  Y.  43; 
60   X.   E.    1047;    reversing   54 
X.    Y.   App.    Div.    618;    66   X. 
Y.  Supp.  1136),  770,  817,  819. 
Lyman    v.    City    Trust,    etc.,    Co. 
(166  X.  Y."274;  59  X.  E.  903; 
affirming     62     X,     Y.     Supp. 
1141),  766,  770. 
Lyman  v.  Erie  Co.   ( 46  X.  Y.  App. 
Div.    387;     01    X.    Y.    Supp. 
884;   affirmed   161  X.  Y.  641; 
57  X.  E.  1115),  743. 
Lyman   v.   Fidelity,   etc.,   Co.    (39 
X.  Y.  App.  Div.  459 ;  57  X.  Y. 
Supp.   372),   784. 
Lyman    v.    Granmercy    Club     (28 
X.  Y.  App.  Div.  30;  50  X,  Y. 
Supp.  1004),   1742.  I 

Lyman  v.  Gramercy  Club    (39  X. 
Y.   App.   Div.   459;    57   X.   Y. 
Supp.    376),    775. 
Lyman  v.   Kane    (57   X.  Y.   App. 
Div.    549;     67    X.    Y.    Supp. 
1065),  770. 
Lyman   v.   MoGreivey    (159   X.   Y. 
561;  54  X.  E.  1093;  affirming 
25    X.    Y.    App.    Div.    68;    48 
X.  Y.  Supp.   1035),  796. 
Lyman    v.    Malcolm    Brewing    Co. 
(160  X.  Y.  96;  55  X.  E.  577; 
affirming  40  X.  Y.  App.  Div'. 
46;     57    X.    Y.    Supp.    634), 
491,  716,  721,   744,  1270. 


Lyman  v.  :\lead  (56  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  582;  67  N.  Y.  Supp. 
254),  783. 
Lyman  v.  :\lurpby  ( 33  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  349;  68  X.  Y.  Supp. 
490),  729. 
Lyman  v.  O'Reilly   ([1898]  2  Irish 

Rep.  4S),   1346. 
Lyman  v.  Oussani   ( 33  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.    409;     68    X.    Y.    Supp. 
450),    783,    1188. 
Lyman  v.  Periniutter    (166   X.  Y. 
410;    00   X.   E.   21;    affirming 
60  X.  Y.  App.  866),  777. 
Lyman    v.    Schenck     ([X.    Y.]    55 
X.  Y.    Supp.    770),    768,   777, 
778. 
Lyman   v.   Scliermerhorn    (167    X. 
Y.  113;   00  X.  E.  324;  aflirm- 
ing  53    X.   Y.   App.   Div.   32; 
65  X.  Y.  Supp.  538 ) ,  775. 
Lyman  v.  Siebert   (31  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.    285;     05    X.    Y.    Supp. 
367),  781. 
Lymans    v.    Wedniore     ([1894]     1 
Q.  B.  401;  58  J.  P.  197;  63  L. 
J.    il.    C.    44;    69   L.   T.    801; 
42  W.  R.  301),  678. 
Lyman  v.  Youitg  Men's  Cosmopoli- 
tan Club   (28  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
127;    50    X.    Y.    Supp.    979), 
718,  1344. 
Lynch  v.  Bates   (139  Ind.  206;   39 

X.  E.  <)19),  534,  599,  637. 
Lynch  v.  Crosby   (134  Mass.  313), 

1074. 
Lynch    v.    O'Donnell     (127    Mass. 

311),   1281. 
Lynch  v.   Xew   York,   etc.,   R.    Co. 
(47    Hun,    524),    2177,    2191 
2192. 
Lynch   v.   PeopU-    (10  Mich.   472) 

1129. 
Lynch  v.  State    (147  Ala.  143-   39 

So.   912),    694. 
Lynde  v.  Lynde   ( 64  X.  J.  Eq.  736, 
749;    52  A.  694;   58  L.  R.  A.' 
471),  2095. 
Lyng  V.  Michigan   (135  U.  S.  161; 
10  Sup.  Ct.  725),  157,  199. 


CXCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


fRefeiences  are  to  pages.] 


Lynn,    Ex    parte     ( 19    Tex.    App. 

293),   111,  120,  232,  235,  240, 

243,    495,   850,   851,   860,    934. 
Lynn  v.  Allen    (145   Inil.  584;   44 

N.  E.   640),  571. 
Lynn    v.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App. J 

22  S.  W.  878),  1613. 
Lyon  V.  Morris   (15  Ga.  480),  106. 
Lyon    V.    Phillips     (106    Pa.    57), 

2100. 
Lyon  V.  State    (42  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

506;   61  S.  W.  125),  940. 
Lyons  v.   Xew   York,   etc.,   R.    Co. 

(39  Hun,  385),  2198,  2199. 
Lyster  v.  Lyster   (111  Mass.  327), 

2154,  2168. 
Lytle    V.    May     (49    Iowa,    224), 

233. 
Lytle  V.  State   (31   Ohio  St.  196), 

2067. 

Mc 

McAllen  v.  Rhodes  (65  Tex.  348), 

925. 
McAllister,  In   re' {51    Fed.   282), 

1431,   1434. 
McAllister  v.  Howell  (42  Ind.  15), 

1808. 
McAllister  v.  State   (  [Ala.]  47  So. 

161),  111,  190,  192,  284,  1644. 
McArdle,   In   re    (126    Fetl.    442), 

702. 
McArthur  v.   State    (69  Ga.  444), 

247,  291. 
McAvoy,  In  re    (12  Up.  Can.  99), 

907. 
McBee  v.  McBee   (22  Ore.  329;   29 

Pac.    887;    29    Am.   St.    613), 

65,  66,  2155,  2157,  2158,  2159. 
McCabe,  In  re   (11  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

560),  696,  697,  705. 
McCabe  v.   Commonwealth    ([Pa.] 

8   Atl.  45),   1584. 
McCade  v.  State  ( [Neb.]   122  Pac. 

893),   1678. 
McCall    V.   California    (136   U.    S. 

104;    10    Sup.    Ct.    881),    157. 
McCalman   v.  State    (96   Ala.  98; 

11  So.  408),  369.   ' 


MeCam    v.    Roach    (81    111.    213), 

1973. 
McCampbell   v.    State    (116   Tenn. 

98;    93    S.    W.    100),    1759. 
McCardle,  Ex  parte    (7  Wall.   [U. 

S.]   514),  106. 
McCarl    v.    State    (23    Ind.    127), 

1499. 
McCarthy,  Ex  parte   (24  N.  S.  W. 

137),  1360. 
McCarthy   v.   McCarthy    (117  Mo. 

App.     115;     93    S.    W.    317), 

2154,  2159. 
McCarthy  v.  Wells   (51  Hun,  171; 

4  K  Y.   Supp.   672),    1951. 
McCarty  v.  Atlanta  (121  Ga.  365; 

49  S.  E.  287),   1127,   1133. 
MoCarty    v.     Commonwealth     (14 

Ky.  L,  Rep.  285),  2041,  2055. 
McCarty  v.  Gordon   ( 16  Kan.  35 ) , 

310,    1787,    1788. 
McCarty    v.    Justus     ([Tex.]     115 

.S.  W.  278),   891. 
McCarty  v.   McCarty    (4   Rich.   L. 

[S.    C]    594),   2256. 
McCarty  v.   State    (162  Ind.  218; 

70  N.  E.  131),  1873. 
McCarty    v.    State    (4    Tex.    App. 

461),  2067. 
McCarty  v.  Wells    (51   Hun,   171; 

4    "X.    Y.    Supp.    672),    1735, 

1864,   1869,   1871. 
McClain,  Ex  parte    (61   Cal.  436), 

109,  247. 
McClain  v.   Davis    (77   Ind.   419), 

2116. 
McClanahan    v.    Breeding    (  [Ind.] 

88  X.  E.  695),   125,  605,  607, 

612. 
McClanahan   v.    McClanahan    (104 

Tenn.    217;    56    S.    W.    858), 

64. 
McClandon  v.  State   ([Ark.]  51  S. 

W.  1062).  2252. 
McClay  v.   Worrell    (18   Neb.   52; 

24  N.  W.  429),  1876,  1902. 
McCkary  v.  Barcalow   ( 6  Ohio  C. 

C.  481),   2109,  2114. 
MeCleave,    Ex    parte     (35    X.    B. 

100),  1048. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXCVll 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


McCleave  v.  Moncton   (32  Can.  S. 

C.    106),    1026,   1047. 
ilcClellan  v.  State   {117  Ala,  140; 

23  So.  653),  1181,  1741. 
McClelland   v.   Louisville,   etc.,   R. 

Co.   (94  Ind.  276),  2180,  2205, 

2207. 
McClendon    v.    State     ( [Ark.]     5 1 

S.    W.    1062),    2249. 
McClure  v.  Braniff   (75  Iowa,  38; 

39   N.   W.    171),   998,    1768. 
McClure  v.  Krumbliolz  (9  Pa.  Dist. 

R.   544;    31    Pittsb.  L.  J.    [N. 

S.]     3;     14    York.    Leg.    Rec. 

31),   546, 
McClure    v.    Mansell     (4    Brewst. 

119),  2094,  2108,  2114. 
McClure  v.   State    (148    Ala.   625; 

42  So,  813),  1280,  1470,  1471, 

1493,    1609. 
McClure   v.    State    (43    Ark,    75), 

1598. 
McCoU  V.  Rally    (127   Iowa,  633; 

103    N.    W.    972),    341,    342, 

346,  583. 
McCollum  V.  State   (119  Ga,  308; 

46  S,  W.  413),  1763, 
McComas   v,   Krug    (81    Ind.  327; 

42  Am.  Rep.   135),  96,  277. 
McConihe  v,  McMann  (27  Vt.  95), 

1798, 
McConkie   v.   District   Court    (117 

Iowa,    334;    90    N,    W.    716), 

944, 
McConkie    v,    Remley    (119    Iowa, 

512;  93  N.  W.  505),  714,  722, 

738, 
McConnell,  Ex  parte  ( 23  N,  S.  W. 

9;    6  Sup.  Rep.  88),   1269, 
McConville  v.  Mayor,  etc.    (39  X, 

J.  L.  38),  436, 
McCook  V,  State    (91   Ga.  740;   17 

S.  E,  1019),  2041,  2047,  2048. 
McCool    V,    State    (23    Ind,    127), 

276, 
MeCord  v.  State   (  [Okla,]   101  Pac, 

280),  298,  325,  327,  1771, 
McCormack,  Ex  parte    (32  N,   W. 

272),  1367.  " 


McCormack  v.  State  (133  Ala. 

202;  32  So.  268),  1256,  1632. 

McCormick  v.  Jester    ([Tex.]    115 

S.    W,    278),    902,    923,    924, 

925, 
McCormick  v.   Pfeiffer    (10  N.  W. 

31),    634,    626,    627. 
McCormick  v.  State  ( 66  Neb.  337 ; 

92  X,  VV.  606),  2068,  2082, 
MeCowan     v,    Davidson     (43    Ga, 

480),   794, 
McCoy,  In  re  (104  N,  Y.  App,  Div. 

215;     93    X.    Y.    Supp,    401), 

587,    690, 
McCoy  V,   Clark    (104   Iowa,  491; 

73    X.    VV,     1050),    490,    977, 

982. 
McCoy  V,   Clark    (109   Iowa,   464; 

80   X.   W.  538),  994,  998, 
McCoy    V,    Clark    ( [Iowa]    81    N. 

W,    159),    1237,   1239,   1253. 
McCoy  V.  Zane    (65  Mo.   1),  256. 
McCracken  v.  Markeson    ( 76  Wis. 

499;    45    X.    W.    323),    2191, 

2194,  2197. 
McCracken   v.    Miller    ( 129    Iowa, 

623;    106  X,  W,  4),  979,  987, 

994,    1084. 
McCracken  v.  State   (71  Md,  150; 

17  Atl,  932),  1741. 
McCrary,  In  re  (31  Pa,  Super.  Ct. 

192),   643. 
McCraw  v.  Davis  (2  Ired,  Eq,  [N. 

C]     618),    2095,    2107,    2108, 

2152, 
McCrea    v,     Billingslea     (89    Md. 

767;  43  Atl,  42),  566. 
McCrea   v.    Washington    ( 10   Ohio 

Dec.    29;    19    Wkly.    L,    Bull, 

66),  442, 
McCreary     v.     Commonwealth     ( 8 

Ky.  L,  Rep,    [abstract]    437), 

884, 
McCreary    v,     Rhodes     (63     iNIiss. 

308)',  561,  564, 
McCreary  v.  State   (73  Ala.  480), 

156,  158,  294,  1517. 
McCrory,    In    re     (31    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.   192),  664. 


CXCVIH 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


McCroy  v.  Commonwealth   (8  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   437),  833, 

842,  1464,  1682. 
McCue    V.    Klein     (60    Tex.    168), 

1939,  2180. 
McCuen   v.   State    (19   Ark.    630), 

1500,  1504. 
McCulloch  V.  State   (11  Ind.  424), 

106. 
McCullough,  In  re    (51   Ark.   159; 

10  S.  W.  259),   6-22,  924. 
McCuUough's    Will    (35    Pitts.    L. 

Jr.  169),  2139. 
McCullough  V.  Blaekvvell   (51  Ark. 

159;   10  So.  259),  859,  860. 
McCullough   V.   Brown    (41    S.    C. 

220;    19   S.   E.   458;    23  L.  R. 

A.  410),  111,  149,  174,  307. 
McCullough      V,      Maryland       (4 

Wheat.    316;    4    L.    Ed.    479), 

331. 
McCurdy  v.  Swift  (17  C.  R.  [Can.] 

126),   1855,   1908. 
MeCusker,  In  re    (47   N.  Y,   App. 

Div.     Ill;     62    N.    Y.    Supp. 

201),  591,  731. 
'McCutcheon    v.     People     (69    111. 

601),   1237,   1238,   1353,   1357. 
McDaniel    v.    Commonwealth     ( 18 

B.  Mon.  485),  369. 
McDaniel     v.     State     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   20  S.  W.   1108),    1515. 
McDaniel  v.  State  (23  S.  W.  989), 

925. 
McDaniel     v.     State      ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    65    S.    W.    1068),    963, 

1186. 
McDermott  v.  Board,  etc.    (5  Abb. 

Pr.  [N.  Y.]  434),  404. 
McDermott       v.        Commonwealth 

{[Ky.]   96  .S.  W.  474;   29  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  750),  949,  951,   1286. 
McDiarmid      v.      McDiarmid       (3 

Bligh.  N.  R.  374),  2144,  2146. 
McDonald,    Ex    parte    (20    N.    B. 

542),  954. 
McDonald  v.  Ca.sey  (84  Mich.  505; 

47   N.   W.    1104),    1252,    1886, 

1888,   1962. 


McDonald  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

75  Wis.  121;   43  N.  W.  744), 

2175,  2178. 
McDonald  v.  Commonwealth   ( 173 

Mass.    322;    52    N.    E.    814), 

259. 
McDonald    v.    Hughes     ([1902]     1 

K.    B.    94;    66    J.    P.    86;    71 

L.  J.  K.  B.  43;  50  W.  R.  318; 

85    L.    T.    727;     18    T.   L.    R. 

79;    20   Cox   C.   C.    131),   900. 
McDonald    v.    International,    etc., 

R.  Co.    (86  Tex.   1;   22   S.  W. 

939,  reversing  20  S.  W.  847; 

21  S.  W.  774),  2182. 
McDonald  v.  State   (68  Miss.  728; 

10  So.  55),  1464,  1468. 
McDonald    v.     State     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  49  S.  W.  589),  1211. 
McDonough,  In  re    (49  Fed.  360), 

24,  25,   43,    1261. 
McDonough   v.    Cavanagh    ( 22   W. 

N.  C.   [X.  S.  W.]    151),   1316. 
McDougal   V.  Giacomini    (13   Xeb. 

431;   14  X.  W.  450),  69,  1956, 

1974,   1975. 
McDowell  V.  Preston  ( 26  Ga.  528 ) , 

2258,  2259. 
McDuffie  V.  State   (87  Ga.  687;   13 

S.   E.  596),   1492. 
McElroy    v.    State     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.     604;     95    S.    W.    539), 

1202,   1280,   1286. 
McElwee     v.     Ferguson     (43     Md. 

479),  2141. 
McEntee    v.     Spiehler     (12     Daly, 

435),  1846. 
]VIcEvoy     V.    Humphrey     (77     HI. 

388),    1864,   1993. ' 
McFee  v.  Greenfield   (62  Ind.  21), 

413. 
McGan  v.  Pratley    (24  Vict.  L.  R. 

840;    5   Austr.   L.   R.    [C.   X.  1 

80),  369. 
McGarvey,    Iti    re    (64    How.    Pr. 

135),  2120. 
McGarvey    v.    Puckett     (27     Ohio 

St.  669),  1810. 
MaGatrick     v.     Watson     (3     Ohio 

St.   566),  216. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


cxeix 


McGee   v.    Beal    (63    Miss.    455), 

601. 
McGee   v.    McCann    (69   Me.    79), 

1924,    1926,    1932,    1940. 
McGee  v.  State    (30  Ohio  St.  54), 

243. 
McGee  V.  Wolfenden  ([1907]  Vict. 

L.  R.   195),   1131. 
McGehee   v.   State    (114   Ga.   833; 

40  S.  E.  1004),  715,  1161. 
McGill    V.    License    Commissioners 

(21  Ont.  Rep.  665).  453. 
McGill   V.   McGill    (19    Fla.    341), 

67,   2155,   2156,  2157,  2162. 
McGingan   v.   Belmount    ( 89    Wis. 

637;    62   N.   W.   421),    797. 
McGinley,   hi   re    (32    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  324),  739,  742,  747,  750. 
McGinley   v.   U.    S.   Life    Ins.   Co. 

(8   Daly,   390;    7    Ins.   L.   Jr. 

791;   affirmed  77  X.  Y.  495), 

2223,  2243. 
3IcGinnis   v.   Commonwealth    (102 

Pa.  66),  2040,  2068,  2070. 
McGinnis   v.   Medway    (170   Mass. 

67;   57  N.  E.  210),  416,  813. 
McGlasson  v.   Johnson    (86   Iowa, 

477;   53  N.  W.  267),   1002. 
McGlasson    v.    Scott     (112    Iowa, 

289;    83    N.    W.    974),    1001. 
McGlinchey   v.    Barrows    (41    Me. 

74),    1018,    1047,    1048,    1051. 
McG^jnegal      v.      McGonegal      (46 

Mich.     66;     8     N.     W.    724), 

2161. 
McGonnell's    Appeal.    In    re    (209 

Pa.  St.  327;   58  Atl.  615;   re- 
versing 24  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  642 ) , 

230,  233. 
McGonnell,   In  re    (24  Pa.   Super. 

Ct.  642),  935. 
McGovern   v.    State    (49    Tex.   Cr. 

App.     35;     90     S.     W.     502), 

872,    958,    1284,     1349,     1555, 

1692. 
McGowan  v.  Brooks   (16  So.  436), 

2094,  2108. 
McGrath  v.  Patton  (24  X.  Z.  527), 

1154. 


McGraw   v.    McGraw    (171    Mass. 

146;   50  N.  E.  526),  2153. 
McGreivey,  hi  re   (161  N.  Y.  645; 

57  N.  E.  1116;  37  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  66;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  599), 

796. 
McGrew  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

101   S.   W.    1198),   1473, 
McGrimes  v.  State   (30  Ind.  140), 

777. 
McGrinley,   In  re    (32   Pa.   Super. 

Ct.  324),  736. 
McGruder  v.   State    (83   Ga.  616; 

10  S.  E.  281),  289,  930,  1176. 
McGuinness    v.    Bligh     (11    R.    1. 

94),  310,  314,  1779,  1803. 
]VIicGuire,    Ex    parte     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]    123    S.   VV.    42-5),    228, 

231. 
McGuire    v.     Callahan     (19     Ind. 

128),  2116,  2123. 
McGuire  v.  Commonwealth  ( [Ky.] 

99  S.  W.  612;   30  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

720),  952,  955,   1742. 
McGuire     v.      Commonwealth      (3 

Wall.    387;    18    L.    Ed.    226), 

451,  523,  525. 
McGuire   v.   Glass    ([Tex.]    15   S. 

W.   127),  194,  224,  777,  1884. 
McGuire  v.  State   (37  Miss.  369), 

829. 
McGuire  v.  State   (42  0.  St.  530), 

158. 
McGuire    v.    State     ([Tex.    App.] 

15    S.    W.    917),    1236,    1241, 

1627. 
MoGunn  v.  Ilanliu  (29  Mich.  476), 

1785. 
McGurk    V.    Metropolitan    L.    Ins. 

Co.     (56     Conn.    52S),    2240, 

2241. 
McHam    v.    Love     (39    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    512;     87    S.    W.    875), 

888,  915. 
McHenry   v.   Chippewa    (65   Mich. 

9;   31   N.   W.   602),  764. 
McHugh   V.   Pollaixi    (28   Vict.   L. 

R.  581;   24  Austr.  L.  T.   149; 

9  Au&tr.  L.  R.  50),  1323. 


ec 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


McHugh    V.    Schlosser     (159    Pa. 

480;   28  Atl.  291;  23  L.  R.  A. 

574),  2179,  2189. 
Mcllveney     v.     Whittingham     (25 

X.  Z.  29),  1285,  1287. 
llclnaney   v.   Hildi-eth    ([1897]    1 

Q.    B.    600;     61    J.    P.    325; 

66  L.  J.  Q.  B.  376;   76  L.  T. 

463;    13    T.   L.    R.    284),    380. 
Mclnerey  v.  Denver   (17  'Col.  302; 

29  Pac.  516),  727. 
Mclnifee    v.     Wheelock     ( 1    Gray 

[Mass.]    603),    1067. 
Mclntire    v.    MeConn     (28    Iowa, 

480),  2130,   2138.   2140,   2141. 
Mcintosh  V.  Pueblo   ( 9  Colo.  App. 

460;  48  Pac.  969),  1741. 
Mcintosh  V.  State    (140  Ala.  137; 

37   So.   223),    1105,    1611. 
Mclntyre  v.  Asheville    ( 146  N.   C. 

475;   59  S.  E.   1007),  717. 
Mclntyre  v.  Parks    (3  Met.   207), 

1794,   1795. 
Mclntyre  v.  People    (38   111.  514). 

2041,  2048,   2060,  2069,  2072. 
McKay  v.  McKay  (18  B.  Mon.  8), 

2154,   2155,  "^2160. 
McKee  v.  Ingalls  (5  111.  30),  2040. 
McKeen,  Ex  parte    (32  N.  B.  84), 

1359. 
McKeever    v.    Beacom    (101    Iowa, 

173;    70  X.  W.   112),   1811. 
McKeever   v.    Commonwealth     (98 

Va.  862;   36  S.  E.  995;  2  Va. 

Sup.   Ct.  473),  1624. 
McKenna    v.    Harding    (69    J.    P. 

354),   13.55. 
McKenzie  v.  Day    (62  L.  J.  M.  C. 

49    [1893];     1    Q.    B.    289;    5 

R.     161;     68    L.    T.    345;     41 

W.    R.    384;     17    Cox    C.    C. 

604;    57   J.   P.   216),    1114. 
McKenzie  v.  Hogg  (13  X.  Z.  L.  R. 

158),   644. 
IVIcKeown  v.  Lambe   (20  Rev.  Leg. 

232),  1509. 
McKibbins,  In  re    (11    Pa.   Super. 

Ct.    421),    696,    705,   706. 


3IcKillop    V.    Duluth    St.    R.    Co. 
(53    Minn.    532;     55    N.    W. 

739),   1736. 
McKinley   v.    State    (47    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    222;    82    S.    VV.    1042), 

1689. 
McKinley    v.    State    (52    Tex.   Cr. 

App.    182;     106    S.    W.    342), 

1597,  1606. 
McKinnell    v.   Robinson    (3   Mees. 

&  W.  434,  441),  1796. 
McKinney  v.  Xashville    (96   Tenn. 

79;   33  S.  W.  724),  454,  1124, 

1127,   1728. 
McKinney  v.   Town  of   Salem    (77 

Ind.    213),    91,    95,    129,    144, 

182,    183,   448,   488,   489,  490, 

491. 
McKinney  v.   State    (3  Wyo.  719; 

30    Pac.    293;     16    L.    R.    A. 

710),   219. 
McKrell      v.      Brentford,      J.      J. 

([1900]    2   Q.   B.    387;    64   J. 

P.   663;    69  L.   J.   Q.   B.  74«; 

48   VV.   R.   648;    83   L.   T.  31; 

16   T.   L.   R.    439),   681. 
McLain    v.    State     (43    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    213;     64    S.    W.    865), 

111,   249,   845,    1379. 
McLanahan  v.  Syracuse    (18  Hun, 

259),   798. 
McLane  v.  Granger  (74  Iowa,  152; 

37  X.  W.  123).  25i». 
McLane  v.  Leiclit    (69  Iowa,  401; 

29  X.  W.  327),  110,  125,  256. 
McLaughlin,  In  re  24  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  92),  718,  723. 
McLaughlin's   Will    (2   Redf.   Sur. 

504),  2135,  2136. 
McLaughlin    v.    Hinds     (151     111. 

403;    38  X.   E.   136;    affirming 

47  HI.  App.  598),  2253,  2255. 
McLaughlin  v.  McCloy    (26  Ir.  L. 

T.  131),  690,  1275. 
McLaughlin   v.    South   Bend    ( 126 

Ind.  471;   26  X.  E.  185),  157. 
McLaughlin     v.    State      (45     Ind. 

338),    256,    1441,    1443,    1502, 

1508. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCl 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


McLaughlin  v.  Stevens  (2  Crancli, 

[U.  S.  C.  C]   148),  271. 
McLaughlin    v.    Wisler     (28    Ind. 

App.   61;    (31   N.   E.   73),   003, 

tJl2. 
McLaury    v.    VVatelsky     (39    Tex. 

'Civ.     App.     3'J4;     87     S.     W. 

1045),  158,  281,  287,  7G1. 
McLean,  In  re  (25  Upp.  Can.  619), 

894,    914. 
McLean  v.  State  (43  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

213;  64  S.  W.  865),  839. 
McLees    v.    Niles     (93     111.    App. 

442),   1843,    1977. 
McLellan    v.   Janesville    (99    Wis. 

544;    75    N.   W.   308),   659. 
McLemore    v.     State     ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  110  S.  W.  900),  163G. 
McLenon  v.  Ricliardson   ( 15  Gray, 

74),  2035. 
McLeod   V.   Scott    (21    Or.   94;    26 

Pac.    1061),    627,   783,   813. 
McLeod  V.  State   (31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

331;    20    S.    VV.    749),    20.58, 

2090. 
McLeod  V.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

44  S.  W.   1090),  1181. 
McLeod    V.    State     (33    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    170;     76    S.    W.    216), 

720. 
McMahon    v.    Dumas     (96     Mich 

467;     56    N.    W.     13),     1975, 

1999,  2001. 
McMahon  v.  Sankey   ( 133  111.  630; 

24  N.  E.  1027),  1859,  1983. 
McManigal    v.    Seaton     (23    Neb. 

549;    37    N.    W.    271),    1957, 

1958. 
McMillan  v.   State    (18  Tex.  App. 

375),    1463,    1471,    1489. 
McMonagle,  In  re   (41  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    407;     84    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1068),  545,  582,  730. 
McMonigal    v.    State     ([Tex.    Civ. 

App.]    45    S.    W.    1038),    773, 

775. 
McManus,    Ex    parte     (32    N.    B. 

481),  1717. 


McManus  v.  State   (65  Kan.  720; 

70  Pac.   700),  25'5,  256,  257, 
1076. 
McMaster  v.  Dyer   (29  S.  E.  1016; 

44   W-   Va.   644),    1900,   1901. 
McMillan  v.   State    (18  Tex.  App. 

375),  1559. 
McMintay   v.   State    (38   Tex.   Cr. 

Rep.    521;    43    S.    W.    1010), 

69. 
McMullen    v.    Berean     (29    N.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.    443;     60    N.    Y. 

Supp.  578),  866. 
McMullen    v.    Charleston    (1    Bay 

[S.   C]   46),  442. 
McNally,  Ex  parte    (73  Cal.  632; 

15  Pac.   368),   171,   187. 
McNary  v.   Blackburn    (180  Mass. 

473;     61    N.    E.    885),    1867, 

1868,   1900,  2006. 
McNaught,  Ex  parte   (1  Okla.  Cr. 

260;    100   Pac.   271),    121. 
McXaughton  v.   Argyle    (5   N.   Y. 

Misc.    Rep.    547;     26    K    Y. 

Supp.   229),   634. 
McXeal  v.  Ryan   (56  N.  J.  L.  443; 

28    Atl.    552),    573,   616,   617, 

624. 
McXeely  v.   Morgantown    (125   N. 

C.    375;    34    S.    E.   510),   907. 
McNeely    v.    State     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    286;     92    S.    W.    419), 

1201,   1696. 
McNeely  v.  Welz   (166  N.  Y.  124; 

59    N.    E.    697;    affirming    20 

N.  Y.  App.  Div.  566;  47  N.  Y. 

Supp.    310),    703. 
McNeely  v.   Welz    (20  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  566;  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  310), 

1170,    1776. 
McNeill    V.   Collinson    (130    Mass. 

167),    1224,    1901. 
McNeill   V.   State    (92   Tenn.    720; 

23  S.  W.  52),  454. 
McNelton    v.    Herb.    ( [Mich.]    123 

N.  W.   17),   1954. 
McNulty,  Ex  parte    (73  €al.  632; 

15  Pac.  368),  445. 


ceil 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


McNulty   V.   Toopf    ([Ky.]    75   S. 

W.  258;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  430), 

168,  460,   461,   409,  983. 
McOmber,  In  re   (3  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 

431),  700. 
McPhee  v.  Sully    {163  Mass.  216; 

39   N.   E.    1007),   2198,   2201. 
ilcPherson's  Appeal   (9  Cent.  Rep. 

[Pa.]   408),  2138. 
]McPherson   v.   Simmons    (63   Ark. 

593;   40  S.  W.  78),  767,  768, 

769. 
ilcPherson    v.    State     (90    X.    E. 

610),  290,  291. 
McPike  V.  Penu   (51  Mo.  63),  885, 

886. 
McPherson    v.    State     (90    X.    E. 

610),  291. 
MoPike  V.  Penn   (51  Mo.  63),  886. 
McQuade    v.    Collins     (  [Iowa]    61 

X.  W.  213),  985,  991. 
McQaude   v.    Hatch    {Go   Vt.    482; 

27  A.  136),   1950. 
McQuery    v.    State    (40    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    571;    51     S.    W.    247), 

845,    1458. 
MacRae,  In  re   (75  Xeb.  757;    106 

X.  W.   1020),  534,  624,   1228. 
McReynoIds  v.  State  (26  Tex.  App. 

372;   9  S.  W.  617),  1113. 
McRoberts  v.   State    (45   Tex.  Cr. 

App.  288;   92  S.  W.  804),  58, 

87,  1185,  1700,  1704. 
McRobie  v.  Bowden  (24  X.  Z. 

10),  2030. 
McSorley,  In   re    (15  R.  I.  608; 

10  Atl.  659),  253,  270,  1010, 

1075,  1748. 
McSorley    v.    McSorley    (2    Bradf. 

Sur.    188),   2136,"^  2138,    2142. 
McSparran   v.    Xeely    (91    Pa.    St. 

17),  2112. 
McTigue    V.     Commonwealth     (99 

Ky.  66;  35  X.  W.  121),  1739. 
McVeigh  V.  Eccles   (18  X.  Z.  44), 

1251. 
McVey  v.  Grand  Lodge   (53  X.  J. 

L.    17;    20    Atl.    873),    2220, 

2229. 


McVey  v.  Manatt   (80  Iowa,  132; 

45    X.    W,    548),    1920,    1924, 

1930,    1959,   2012,   2013. 
McVey   v.    William    (91    111.   App. 

144),  1896. 
McVicker,  In  re    (21   N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    383;     45    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1008),  580. 
McVickar    v.    Me  Vicar    (46    X.    J. 

Eq.    490);     19    Atl.    249;     19 

Am.     St.     Rep.     422),     2165, 

2167,  2168. 
McWhorter    v.    Blumenthal     ( 136 

Ala.   568;    33   So.   552),   1806. 
McWilliams,    Ex    parte     (1    Leg. 

Xews   [Can.]    66),   1300. 
McWilliams  v.  Dawson    (56  J.  P. 

182),  378. 
McWilliams  v.   Phillips    (51   Miss. 

196),  688,  799. 
McWilliams    v.    State     ([Ga.]    34 

S.  E.  1016),  1720. 


M 

M.     Schendler     Bottling     Co.     v. 

Welch     (42    Fed.    561),    154, 

307,  313. 
Macconneliey  v.  State   ( 5  Ohio  St. 

77),   2051. 
Maccrobie  v.  Accident  Ins.  Co.   ( 13 

Sc.  L.  Rep.  391),  2238,  2239. 
Mace,  In  re    (42  Up.  Can.  p.  76), 

870,  883,  889. 
Mace  V.  Smith    (164  Ind.   152;   72 

X.  E.  1135),  562. 
Mace  V.  Reed   ( 89  Wis.  440 ;  62  X. 

W.   186),  2258. 
Macey  v.  McKenzie  (88  L.  T.  631; 

67    J.    P.    251;    20    Cox    C.    C. 

449),   1244. 
Machine   Co.   v.   Gage    (100   U.   S. 

679),  156. 
Mack  V.  Handy  (39  La.  Ann.  491), 

65,  67,  2155,  2158,  2160,  2166. 
Mack    V.    Harding    (39    La.    Ann. 

491;   2  So.   181),  65. 
Mack  V.  Lee  (13  R.  I.  293),  1787. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CClll 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Mack  V.   State    (116   Ga.   540;    42 

S.  E.  776),  1172. 
Mackall    v.    District   of    Columbia 

(16  App.  D.  C.  301),  965,  971. 
Macken    v.    State     (62    Md.    224), 

917. 
Mackenzie  v.  Day   ([1893]   1  Q.  B. 

at  p.  291),  76. 
Mackenzie  v.  Spear    ([1905]   2  K. 

B.   p.   220;    69   J.   P.   p.   270), 

1141. 
Mackenzie  v.  Whittingham   (23  N. 

Z.  857;   24  N.  Z.  620),   1285, 

1287. 
Mackey  v.  Siddell   (23  N.  Z.  L.  R. 

391),  1116. 
Mackie  v.  Erliardt   (59  Fed.  771), 

18. 
Mackinnell   v.   Robinson    (3    M.   & 

W.  434),  375. 
Mackinson     v.     Hannay      ([1906] 

Vict.  L.  R.  604),  1130. 
Macleod  v.  Gerger    (53  Iowa,  615; 

6  N.  W.  21),  1946. 
Madden  v.  State  (1  Kan.  340),  35. 
Maddox  v.  State    (118  Ga.  32;   44 

S.  E.   806),   1491,   1495,   1497. 
Maddox  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

55  S.  W.  832),  1697. 
Maddox    v.     State     (42    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    509;     60    S.    W.     960), 

1472. 
Madison  v.  Commonwealth    (17   S. 

W.  164;    13  Ky.  L.  Rep.  313), 

2060,  2072. 
Madison,   etc..    Church    v.    Baptist 

Church    (46  N.  Y.  131),   1162. 
Madison   Co.  v.   Powell    (75   Miss. 

762;  23  So.  425),  875. 
Magahay    v.    Magahay    (35    Mich. 

210),   65,   2153,  2155,  2156. 
Magee    v.    McCan     (69    Me.    79), 

1838. 
ilagee  v.  State   (50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

444;     98    S.    W.    245),     1692, 

1729. 
Magill  V.  State   (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

357;  103  S.  W.  397),  874,  890, 

1690,  1710. 


Maguire,  In-  re    (57   Cal.   604;    40 

Am.  Rep.  125),  218. 
Maguire  v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.    (115 

Mass.  239),  2177,  2202. 
Maguire     v.     Sheehan     (117     Fed. 

819;    59   L.  R.  A.  496),  2172, 

2189. 
Maguire   v.    State    (47    Md.   485), 

262,  1572,  1647. 
Maguire  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

86  S.  W.  329),  1708. 
Mahan   v.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

56  S.  W.  529;  21  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1807),  554,  852,  1470. 
Mahon  v.  Gaskell   (42  J.  P.  583), 

1277. 
Mahone  v.  Mahone    (19  Cal.  626; 

81  Am.  Dec.  91),  66,  67. 
Mahoney  v.  LePage   (21  Austr.  L. 

T.   200;    6   Austr.   L.    R.    23), 

1352,   1359. 
Mahood    v.    Tealza    (26    La.    Ann. 

108),   1801. 
Maier    v.    Mass.    Ben.    Ass'n    ( 107 

Mich.    687;    65    N.    W.    552), 

2243,  2245. 
Maier  v.  State   (21  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

296;    21    S.  W.  974),  43,  780, 

781. 
Main    v.    McCarty     (15    111.    442), 

2035. 
Mair  v.  Railway  Passenger's  Ass'n 

Co.     (37    L.    T.    356),    2238, 

2239. 
Maize  v.   State    (4  Ind.  342),  229, 

231,  240. 
Makepeace    v.    Bronnenberg     ( 146 

Ind.  243;  45  N.  E.  336),  2019, 

2020. 
Malaghan,  In  re    (184  N.  Y.  253; 

77  N.  E.  12;  affirming  108  N. 

Y.   App.   Div.    355;    95    N.   Y. 

Supp.   1142),  582. 
Malken  v.   Chicago    (217  111.  471; 

75   N.    E.   548;    affirming    110 

111.  App.    542),   69,   560,   691, 

714,  720,  1119. 
Mallet    V.     Stevenson     (26     Conn. 

428),   11,  1036,  1043. 


CCIV 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[Fteferences  are  to  pages.] 


Mallon  V.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

98  S.  W.  315;  30  Ky.  L.  Eep. 

328),  1135. 
Malmo  V.  Fairfield  Co.    (72  Conn. 

1;   43  Atl.  485),  652,  604. 
Malmo,  Appeal  of   (73  Conn.  232; 

47  Atl.  163),  665. 
jVIalone,  In  re    (41   Up.   Can.   159, 

253),  889,  894,  907. 
Malone  v.   Malone    (19   Cal.   627), 

81  Am.  Dec.  91),  2154,  2156. 
Malone    v.    State     (49    Ga.    210), 

2067. 
Malone  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

107  S.  W.  927),  1029. 
Malone  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

51    S.    W.    381),    8,    958,    963, 

964,   1611. 
Maloney    v.    Clifford     ( 6    W.    N. 

[N.  S.  W.]   124),  375. 
Maloney   v.    Dailey    (67    111.   App. 

427),    1889,    1896,    1972,   1981, 

1982. 
Maloney    v.    Traverse     (87    Iowa, 

306;  54  N.  W.  155),  985. 
Malt  Extract  Co.  v.  Chicago,  etc., 

R.   Co.    (73   Iowa,   98;    34   N. 

W.  761),  1788. 
Manasses  Club  v.  Mobile  (121  Ala. 

501;  25  So.  628),  1338. 
Manchester  Brewery  Co.  v.  Coombs 

([1901]   2   Ch.  608;    70  L.  J. 

Ch.  814;   82  L.  T.  347;    10  T. 

L.  E.  299),  1816. 
IManchester,  etc.,  Ins.  Co.  v.  Feibel- 

man    (118    Ala.    308;    23    So. 

759).   1778. 
Mandeville  v.  Bard    (111  La.  806; 

35  So.  915),  593. 
Mandeville  v.  Baudot  (40  La.  Ann. 

236;   21   So.  258),  5.  549. 
Manfian  v.  Auger    (31   Can.   S.   C. 

186),   1792. 
IMangcr  v.  Bhillips   (139  Mich.  61; 

102  N.  W.  292:    11   Det.  Leg. 

N.  748),  1981. 
Manheim   v.    State    (66   Ind.    65), 

358. 
Manis   v.    State     (3    Heisk.    315), 
1279. 


Mankato  v.  Arnold  (36  Minn.  62; 

30  N.  W.  305),  1478. 
Manker   v.   Atlanta    (78   Ga.   668; 

2  S.  E.  559),  1083. 
Mankins     v.     Leightner     ( 18     111. 

282),  2099. 
Manley's  Estate,  In  re    ( 12  N.  Y. 

Misc.  Rep.  472;  34  N.  Y.  Supp. 

258),  64. 
Manly  v.  Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(74  N.  C.  655),  2180. 
Manning   v.    Canon   City    ( [Colo.] 

101  Pac.  978),  1338. 
Manning  v.  State    (36  Tex.   670), 

1158. 
Manor  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

34  S.  W.  769),  980. 
Mansfield  v.   State    (17  Tex.  App. 

468),   1111,   1505,   1507. 
Mansfield   v.   Stonehan    ( 15   Gray, 

149),  477. 
JMansfield    v.    Watson     (2    Clarke 

[la.]    Ill),  2094,  2123. 
Manson   v.   London,   etc.,    Ry.    Co. 

(L.  R.  6  Eq.  101),  691. 
Manvelle    v.    State    (58    Ind.    63), 

1497. 
Manzer  v.  Phillips   ( 139  Mich.  61 ; 

102  N.  W.  292;    11  Det.  Leg. 
N.  748),  1973. 

Mapes    V.    People     (69    111.    523), 

1253,  1461,  1564,  1633,  2031. 
Mapes  V.  State  (69  111.  523),  1632. 
Maples  V.  State   ( 130  Ala.  121 ;  30 

So.  428),  1379. 
Marbury    v.    Madison     ( 1    Cranch 

[U.   S.]    137),   1014. 
March    v.    Commonwealth    ( 12    B. 

Mon.   [Ky.]  25),  271. 
Marcotte   v.   Lambe    (4   Quebec   S. 

C.  2),  798. 
Marcus   v.    State    (89   Ala.   23;    8 

So.  155),  1198. 
Mardorf   v.    Hemp    (  [Pa.]    6    Atl. 

754),  224,    1840. 
Marenthal  v.  Shafer  (6  L)wa,  223), 

1777. 
Margate  Pier   Co.   v.   Hannam    (S 

B.  &  Aid.  266,  270),  1421. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


cev 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


jMargoley     v.     Commonwealth     (3 

Met.  [Ky.]  405),  779. 
Marianner    v.    Vincent     (68    Ark. 

244;   58  S.  W.  25),   1738. 
Marietta   v.   Alexander    ( [Ga.]    12 

S.  E,  681),   1478. 
Marion  v.  Chandler    (6  Ala.  895), 

436,  444,  447. 
Marion  v.  State   (20  Neb.  233;  29 

N.  W.  918),  226. 
Markel    v.    State     (3    Ind.    535), 

1443. 
Market   v.    Hoffner    (5    Ohio   Dec. 

335),  1938. 
Markison    v.    State    ([Okla.]    101 

Pac.  353),  83,  1698. 
Markle  v.   Akron    (14   Ohio,  586), 

475. 
Markle    v.    State     (37    Ala.    169), 

967. 
Markle  v.  Akron    (14   Ohio,  586), 

41,   85,   110,  962,   1171. 
Markle    v.    Newton    (64    Ohio    St. 

493;   60  N.  E.  619),  794. 
Marks,  Ex  parte    (64  Cal.  29;   28 

P.    109;    49    Am.    Rep.    684), 

2261. 
Marks    v.    State     ([Ala.]     48    So. 

864),  23,  24,  25,  60,  85. 
Marks   v.    Trustees,   etc.    (37    Ind. 

163),   248. 
Markvis   v.   Thompson    (  [Tex.   Civ. 

App.]    Ill   S.  W.    1074),   357, 

1242,  1904,  1942. 
Marmer    v.    State     (47    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    424;     84     S.    W.    830), 

1218,   12:9. 
Marmont   v.   State    (48    Ind.   21), 

1306,   1337,    1340. 
Marnaugh     v.     Orlando     (41     Fla. 

433;    27   So.   34),  432. 
Marous   v.    Marous    (8G   111.   App. 

597),   2158. 
Marquardt  v.  State   (52  Ark.  209; 

12  S.  W.  562),  1566. 
Marquett    Co.    v.    Ishpeming     (49 

Mich.    244;    13    N.    W.    609), 

807,  809. 
Marquett,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Hanford 

(39  Mich.  537),  2185. 


Marre    v.    State     (36    Ark.    222), 

1623. 
Marsden    v.    Harlocker     (48    Ore. 

90;   85  Pac.  328),  867,  869. 
Marsden    v.    State     (54    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    70;     111     S.    W.    945), 

1171. 
Marsh  v.  Clark  Co.    (27  Wkly.  L. 

Bull.   56),   2256. 
Marsh   v.   Marsh    (28   L.   J.   Mat. 

[N.    S.]     13;     1    Swab.    &    T. 

312;     5     Jur.     [N.     S.]     46), 

2165,    2167. 
Marshall's   Case    ( 1    Lewin    C.    C. 

76),  2049. 
Marshall,  Ex  parte  (64  Ala.  260), 

198,  790. 
Marshall,     Ex    parte     (71     J.    P. 

501),   376. 
Marshall  &  Salt's  Contract,  Jn  re 

([1900]   2   Ch.  202;   69  L.  J, 

Ch.    542;    48    W.    R.    508;    83 

L.  T.  147),  1833. 
Marshall    v.    Central    Ontario    Ry. 

Co.    (28   Ont.  Rep.  241),  363. 
Marshall    v.    Donavan     ( 10    Bush 

[Ky.]   681),  280. 
Marshall  v.  Fox    (L.  R.   6;   Q.  B. 

370;    24  L,  T.  751;    40   L.   J. 

T.    C.    142;     19    W.    R.    1108; 

35  J.  P.  631),  369,  726. 
Marshall  v.  Creen  (26  N.  Y.  161), 

309. 
Marshall    v.    Marksville    (116    La. 

746;    41   So.  57),  416. 
Marshall  v.  Riley   (38  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    770;     78    N.    Y.    Supp. 

827),  1735. 
Marshall    v.     Snediker     (25     Tex. 

460;    78   Am.  Dec.   534),   814, 

815. 
Marshall    v.    State    (49   Ala.    21), 

1240    1241,    1374,    1460. 
Marshall   v.    State    (59   Ga.    1.54), 

2041,  2068,  2071. 
Marshall  Co.  v.  Knoll    ([Iowa]   69 

N.  W.  1146),  767,  802. 
Marston  v.  Commonwealth    ( 18  B. 

Mon.  485),  369. 


CCVl 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Martel  v.  East  St.  Louis    (94  111. 

67),  185,  815. 
Martens  v.  People    (186  111.  314; 

37    N.    E.    871;    afnrming    85 

111.   App.    66),   415,    416,    424, 

576. 
Martin  v.  Blattner  (68  Iowa,  286; 

25  N.  W.   131),  110,  259. 
Martin  v.  Dix   (52  Miss.  53),  394. 
Martin    v.    Harsh    (231    111.    384; 

83    N.    E.    164;     13    L.    R.    A. 

[N.  S.]    1000),  2095. 
Martin    v.    People    (76    111.    499), 

1764. 
Martin  v.  Pycroft    (2  De  G.  M.  & 

G.  785;   22  L.  J.  Ch.   [N.  S.] 

94;      16     Jur.      1125),      2094, 

2099,   2122. 
Martin    v.    Rooks    Co.     (32    Kan. 

146;  4  Pac.  158),  663. 
Martin    v.    State     (59    Ala.    34), 

1162,  1333,  1338. 
Martin  v.  State    (23  Neb.  371;  36 

N.    W.    554),    182,    183,    185, 

471,  490,  714,  740,  744. 
Martin  v.  State   (30  Neb.  507;   46 

N.  W.  621),  1361,  1502,  1508. 
Martin   v.    State    ([Tenn.]    79    S. 

W.   131),   1127. 
Martin    v.     State     (31     Tex.     Cr. 

Rep.  27;   19  S.  W.  434),  1508, 

1509. 
Martin  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

61   S.  VV.  486),   1692,   1729. 
Martin   v.    State    ([Tex.]    122    S. 

W.  24),  1602. 
Martinsville    v.    Frieze     (33    Ind. 

507),   396,   404,  413. 
Martz,  In  re    ( 12   Pa.   Sujjer.   Ct, 

521),  593. 
Marxhouser  v.  Commonwealth   (29 

Gratt.  853),  202,  204. 
Mascowitz  v.  State   (49  Ark.   170; 

4   S.  W.   656),   1232. 
Maskew  v.  Highlands    ([Colo.]   47 

Pac.  846),  407. 
Mason,   Ex  parte    (102   Cal.    171; 

36  Pac.  401),  550. 
Mason  v.  Atlanta    (77   Ga.   662), 

942. 


Mason    v.    Gray     (73    Mass.     [7 

Gray]   354),   1011. 
Mason     v.     Lancaster      (4     Bush, 

406),   139. 
Mason  v.  Lathrop    (7  Gray,  354), 

254,    385,     1059,     1061,    1073, 

1077,   1079,   1165,    1166,  2035. 
Mason   v.    Mason    (1    Edw.    278), 

2164,   2165,   2167. 
Mason  v.  Mason  (131  Pa.  161;   18 

Atl.   1021),  2153,  2167. 
Mason    v.    Rollins     (2    Diss.    99; 

Fed.  Cas.  No.  9252),  206. 
Masson    v.    Severance     (2    N.    H. 

501),   69. 
Mason  v.  Shay   (5  Ohio  Dec.  194), 

1848. 
Mason    v.    Shawneetown     (77    111. 

533),  469. 
Mason  v.  State    (1  Ga.  App.  534; 

58  S.  E.   139),  408,  964,  970. 
Mason  v.  State   (170  Ind.  195;  83 

N.  E.  613),  343. 
Mason  v.  State    ([Okla.]   103  Pac. 

369),  826. 
Mason  v.  State   ([Tex.]   119  S.  W. 

852),  7. 
Mason  v.  Trustees   (4  Bush   [Ky.] 

406),   167,  397,  402,  449. 
Massey,    Ex    parte     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  60;  92  S.  W.  1083),  132, 

249,  278,  335,  953,   1280. 
Massey  v.  Dunlap    (146  Ind.  350; 

44  N.  E.  145;   46  N.  E.  585), 

602,  604,  611,  614. 
Massey    v.    State    (74    Ind.    368), 

1162,    1224. 
Massie  v.  State   (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

548;     107    S.    W.    846),    1466, 

1472. 
Matey,  In  re    (9  Kulp.  215),  717. 
Matthew,  In  re   (213  Pa.  269;   63 

Atl.  837;   reversing  28  Super. 

Ct.  384),  565. 
Mathews  v.  Baxter   (L.  R.  8  Exch. 

132),   2116,   2117,   2118. 
Mathews  v.  Freker    (68  Ark.  190; 

57  S.  W.  262),  1162. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CCVll 


[References  are  to  pages.! 


Mathews  v.  People    (159  111.  39!); 

42    N.    E.    864;    reversing    53 

111.  App.  305),  761. 
Mathias  v.  Dulpin  Co.   ( 122  N.  C. 

416;  30  S.  E.  23),  635. 
Mathieu  v.  Wentworth    ([1895]   4 

Quebec   Q.   B.   343),    1681. 
Mature   v.   Devendorf    (130    Iowa, 

107;   106  N.  W.  366),  2006. 
Matkins     v.      State      ([Tex.      Cr. 

App.]    58    S.    W.    108),    968, 

1473,   1474,   1603,   1687,   1699. 
Matkins  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

62  S.  W.  911),  963,  968,  973, 

IGU,   1681,   1690. 
Mattair   v.    Card    (18    Fla.    761), 

2131. 
Matter    v.    Card     (18    Fla.    761), 

2123. 
Mattewan     Co.     v.     Bentley      (13 

Barb.  641),  2127. 
Matthew,  In  re   (213  Pa.  269;   C2 

Atl.  837),  759. 
Maupin  v.  Commonwealth    ( 1  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   281),  836. 
Mausley,    In    re    (136    Iowa,    66; 

113  N.  W.  548),  533. 
Maw  V.  Hindmansh   ([1873]  28  L. 

T.  644),  1819. 
Maw   V.   King  Tp.    (8   Ont.   248), 

2186,  2197. 
Maxton    Co.    v.    Robeson    (107    N. 

C.    335;     12    S.    E.    92),    635, 

636,  648. 
Maxwell  v.  Hannibal,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(85   Mo.   95),   2198,   2199. 
Maxwell   v.   Jonesboro    (11    Heisk. 

257),  454,  509. 
Maxwell  v.  Pittinger    (3  N.  J.  Eq. 
156),  2100,  2102,  2103,  2122, 

2129. 
Maxwell   v.   State    (27   Ala.   660), 

1192,   1248. 
Maxwell    v.    State    ([Ala.]    25    So. 

235),  1163. 
Maxwell  v.   State    (140  Ala.    131; 
37  So.  266),  1168,  1216,  1379. 


May  V.  New  Orleans    (178   U.   S. 

496;  44  L.  Ed.  1165;  20  Sup. 

Ct.     976;     affirming     51     La. 

Ann.   1064;   25  So.  959),  309, 

1433,   1434. 
May    V.    People    (8    Colo.    210;    6 

Pac.  816),  2246. 
Mayer,    Ex    parte     (39    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  36;   44  S.  W.  831),  870. 
Mayer    v.    Smith     (121    111.    442; 

13  X.  E.  216),  1912. 
Mayer    v.     State     (50     Ind.     18), 

1560. 
Mayer  v.  State    (83  Wis.  339;   53 

N.  VV.  444),   1373. 
Mayes,  Ex  parte   (39  Tex.  Cr.  R. 

36;   44  S.  W.  831),  925. 
Mayhew    v.    Eugene     ( [Ore.]     104 

Pac.    727),    441,    936,     1696, 

1723. 
Maynard  v.  Eaton  (108  Mich. 

"  201;  65  N.  W.  760),  1095. 
Mayne  v.  State  (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

93;  86  S.  W,  329),  1697, 

1698,   1702. 
Mayor   v.   Allaire    (14   Ala.    400), 

215,  271. 
Mayor  of  Anniston,  Ex  parte    (90 

Ala.  516;   7  So.  779),  447. 
Mayor,  etc.,  v.  Beasley  ( 1  Humph. 

[Tenn.]    232),   408,    428,    443, 

444,  461. 
Mayor  v.  Dickerson    (45  N.  J.  L. 

38),  783,   1188. 
Mayor  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc.,  E.  B.  & 

B.   R.   Co.    ([N.   Y.   App.]    28 

Am.  St.  Rep.  614   [s.  c.  30  N. 

E.  563]),  461. 
Mayor,    etc.,    v.    Guillo     (3    Ala. 

137),  469. 
Mayor  v.  Mason    (4  E.  D.  Smith, 

142),  504. 
Mayor  v.  Rodecke    (49   Md.   217), 

'  454. 
Mayor  v.  Rouse   (8  Ala.  515),  215, 

271. 
Mayor  v.  Shattuck  (19  Colo.  104), 
'  397,  424. 


CCVIU 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are   to  pages.] 


Mays   V.    Cincinnati    ( 1    Ohio    St. 

268),   420,   811. 
Mays    V.    Commonwealth     (3    Ky. 

L.  Kep.   [abstract]   327),  554. 
Mays  V.  Commonwealth   (3  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   [abstract]  250),  836. 
Mayson  v.  ^-itlanta    (77  Ga.  662), 

439,  454,  566,  612,  1641,  1638. 
Meacham  v.  N.  Y.  St.  Mut.  Ben. 

Ass'n    (120  N.  Y.  237;   24  N. 

E.  283),  2223,  2229,  2243. 
Mead,  Appeal  of  (161  Pa.  375; 

29  Atl.  21;  34  W.  N.  C. 

373),  628,  629,  632. 
Mead  v.  Stratton    (87  N.  Y.  493; 

41  Am.  Rep.  386),  295,  1843, 

1864,   1869,   1897,    1924,    1925, 

1926,    1929,    1930,    1949. 
Meador    v.   Adams    (33    Tex.    Civ, 

App.  167;  76  S.  W.  238),  759. 
Meadows  v.    State    (127   Ga.   283; 

56   S.  E.   404),   1186,   1198. 
Meanx     v.     Whitehall      (8     Brad. 

173),    1751. 
Meason,   Ex  parte    (5    Binn.   67), 

75. 
Meathe  v.  Meathe   (83  Mich.  150; 

47  N.  W.   109),  66,  68,  2158, 

2159. 
Medford    v.    State     (45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  180;  74  S.  W.  768),  938. 
Meehan    v.    Board     (73    N.    J.    L. 

382;    64   Atl.   689),    103,    110, 

148,   192,  214,  295,  490. 
Meenan,  In  re   (11  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

575),  664,  718,  739,  747,  1192. 
Megown     v.      Commonwealth      (2 

Met.      [Ky.]      3),     215,     216, 

1506,    1567,    1633,    1651. 
Mehan    v.    State     (7    Wis.    670), 

1645. 
Meidel    v.    Anthis    (71    111.    241), 

296,  1843,  1859,  1982,  1987. 
Meier    v.    State     (57    Ind.    386), 

1520,   1522. 
Meier  v.   State    (2  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

296;   21  S.  W.  974),  83. 
Meinoz     v.     Brassel      ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    108    S.   W.   417),    762, 

767. 


Meitzler's  Application    (2  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  Rep.  37),  598,  599. 
Melchoir    v.    McCarty     (31     Wis. 

252),  1780. 
Melton  V.  Moultrie   (114  Ga.  462; 

40  S.  E.  302),  750,  752. 
Memphis   v.    Memphis    Water    Co. 

(8  Baxt.  590),  461. 
Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Womack 

(84    Ala.     149;     4    So.    618), 

2175,  2182. 
Menach  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

(97   S.   W.  503),  2056. 
Menken  v.  Atlanta    (78  Ga.  668), 

119,    125,    232,   243,   454,   492, 

495,      715,     931,     943,      1087, 

1372,   1377. 
Menkins  v.  Lightner   (18  111.  282), 

05,   2093,   2105,   2127. 
Mensinger      v.      Steiner-Medinger 

([Neb.]  94  N.  W.  633),  1162. 
Menzies,   Ex  parte    (24   N.   S.   W. 

179),    1129. 
Merced  Co.   v.   Fleming    (111   Cal. 

40;    43  Pac.  392),  795. 
Merced    Co.    v.    Helm     (102    Cal. 

159;    36   Pac.   399),   426,   793. 
Mercer,  Ex  parte   (25  N.  B.  517), 

1683. 
Mercer    v.    State     (17    Ga.     146), 

2041,  2046,  2053. 
Mercier    v.    Brillan     (5    L.    C.    J. 

337),  1781. 
Meredith,    In    re    (2    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

Rep.  82),  563,  637,  639. 
Meredith    v.    Commonwealth    (116 

Ky.  524;   76  S.  W.  8;  25  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  455),  660. 
Meriden    v.     Silverstein     ( 30    La. 

Ann.  912),  216. 
Merkison    v.    State     ( [Okla.]     101 

Pac.  353),  38. 
Merkle  v.  State   (37  Ala.  139),  80, 

87,    962,    1713. 
Mernaugh    v.     Orlando     (41     Fla. 

433;   27  So.  34),  934. 
Mernaugh  v.   State    (41   Fla.  433; 

27  So.  34),  413. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCIX 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Meroney    v.    State     (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  337;  92  S.  W.  844),  800, 

1161. 
Merow,    In    re    (112    N.    Y.    App. 

562;   99  N.  Y.  State,  9),  887, 

899. 
Merrifield    v.    Swift     (103    Iowa, 

167;  72  N.  W.  444),  978,  981. 
Merrill  v.   Commonwealth    (6   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  663),  1463. 
[Merrill     v.     Pepperdine      (9     Ind. 

App.    416;     36    N.    E.    921), 

2187,  2191. 
Merrill     v.     Savage     ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]   109  S.  W.  408),  021. 
Merriman,   Appeal    of    ( 108   Mich. 

454;  66  N.  W.  372),  2253. 
Merrimane  v.  Miller   ([Mich.]  118 

N.  W.   11),   1862,   1912,   1915, 

1922,   1924,   1973. 
Merritt    v.     Commonwealth     ( 122 

Ky.    669;    92    S.   W.    611;    28 

Ky.  L.  Rep.   184),  949,  950. 
Merritt    v.    Sherburne    ( 1    N.    H. 

199),  1014. 
Merriweather    v.    State     (53    Tex. 

Cr-    App.     410;     108    S.    W. 

661),  1605. 
Mertz,  In  re    (12  Super.  Ct.   Rep. 

521),  639. 
Meservey   v.   Gray    (55   Me.   540), 

122,   1800. 
Meshmeier  v.  State  (11  Ind.  482), 

229. 
Mesken    v.    Highlands     (9     Colo. 

App.  255;   47  Pac.  846),  467. 
Messenger  v.   Parker    (6   R.   &  G. 

237;   6  C.  L.  T.  444),  1159. 
Messer    v.    Cross     (26    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  34;   63  S.  W.  169),  923. 
Metcalfe,    In    re     (17    Ont.    357), 

921,   1321. 
Metcalf  V.  Hart    (3  Wyo.  513;   27 

Pac.    900;    31    Am.    St.    122), 

479. 
Metcalf    V.    State     (76    Ga.    308), 

573,  576. 
Mette     V.     McGuckin      (18     Xeb. 

323;     25     N.    W.    338),     151, 

148,  311. 


Metropolitan  Board  v.  Barrie    (34 
N.   Y.   657),   91,   95,   98,    101, 

110,  120,  124,  129,  138,  168, 
179,  182,  183,  184,  185,  488, 
489,  490,  496. 

Metropolitan    Police    Commission- 
ers V.  Roberts   (73  L.  J.  K.  B. 

231   [1904];    1   K.  B.  369;   52 

W.   R.   560;    68   J.   P.   39;    20 

T.  L.  R.   105),   1131. 
Metzger   v.   People    (14   111.    101), 

1509. 
Metzler    v.    State     (18    Ind.    35), 

1353. 
Meyer  v.  Baker    (120  111.  567;    12 

N.  E.  79),  136,  138,  248,  592. 
Meyer  v.  Bohlfing    (44   Ind.   238), 

1989. 
Meyer  v.  Bridgeton    (37   N.  J.   L. 

160),   413,   473,    1477. 
Meyer    v.    Clark     (9    Jones    &    S. 

107),  2033. 
Meyer   v.   Decatur    ( 125   111.   App. 

556     [1908]),    559,    628,    634, 

635,  172,  652. 
Meyer  v.  Hobson    (116  Iowa,  349; 

90  N.  W.  85),  943. 
Meyer   v.   King    (72    Miss.    1;    16 

So.    245;    35    L.    R.    A.    474), 

2175,  2189,  2196, 
Meyer  v.   Pacific   R.   Co.    (40  Mo. 

151),  2177,  2202,  2203,  2295. 
Meyer  v.  State  (50  Ind.  8),  1623. 
Meyer  v.  State   (41  N.  J.  L.  6;  42 

N.    J.    L.     145),     1103,    1110, 

1106. 
Meyer  v.  State    ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

(105   S.   VV.   48),    1029,    1035. 

Meyer    v.    Village    of    Tentopolis 

"  (121  111.  552;   23  N.  E.  651), 

109. 
Meyer,  Josen  &  Co.  v.  City  of  Mo- 
bile   (147   Fed.  843),   427. 
Meyers,     Ex     -parte      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   44   S.  W.  831),  883. 
Meyers    v.    Kirt     (57    Iowa,    421; 

10  N.  W.  828),  2011. 
Meyers    v.    Smith     (121    111.    442; 

13    N.    E.    216;    affirming    25 

111.  App.  67),   1960,   1973. 


ecx 


TABLE   OP    CASEa. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Mezchen  v.   More    (54    Wis.   214; 

11  N.  W.  534),  605. 
Miazza  v.    State     (36    Me.    C12), 

1650. 
Michael,     Appeal     of      (63     Conn. 

583),  640. 
Michael   v.   Bacon    (49   Mo.   474), 

1801. 
Michaud,    Ex   parte     (4    Can.    Cr. 

Cas.  509),   1755. 
Michaud,   Ex   parte    (32    Can.    L. 

Jr.  779),   1755. 
Michaud,  Ex  parte  (34  N.  B.  123), 

1755. 
Michels    v.    State    (115    Wis.    43; 

90  N.  W.   1090),   1161. 
Michigan   Cent.   R.   Co.  v.   Gilbert 

(46  Mich.  176),  2198,  2199. 
Middlekauff    v.    Adams     (76    Neb. 

265;     107    N.    W.    232),    616, 

652. 
Middleton  v.  Bobbins   (54  N.  J.  L. 

566;    25   Atl.   471),    797,   868, 

879. 
Midland  Valley  R.   Co.  v.   Hamil- 
ton   (84   Ark.   81;    104   S.   W. 

540),  2191. 
Miles,   In  re    (28   Up.   Can.   333), 

914. 
Miles  V.   Rogers    (36   N.   B.   345), 

620. 
Miles  V.    State    (53   Neb.   305;    73 

N.  W.  678),  720. 
Miles   V.    State    (5    W.   Va.    524), 

1589. 
Mill    V.    Harsher     (L.    R.    9    Ech. 

317),  1170. 
Miller,   Ex   parte    (98    Ind.    451), 

561,  602. 
Miller,   In   re    (179    Pa.    651;    36 

Atl.    139;    39    L.    R.    A.    220; 

1  Wigmore  Ev.  571),   1736. 
Miller,   In   re    (8    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

223),  666. 
Miller,  Appeal   of    (13   Pa.   Super. 

Ct.   272;    13    York   Leg.    Rec. 

199),  564. 
Miller,    In   re    (179    Pa.    645;    36 

Atl.    139;    39   L.   R.   A.   220), 

2135,  2136,  2137,   2139,   2145, 

2151. 


Miller,  In  re  (171  Fed.  263),  480, 

703. 
Miller  v.  Amnion   (145  U.  S.  421; 

12    Sup.    Ct.    884;    36   L.   Ed. 

759),  414,  448. 
Miller  v.  Belthasser   (78  111.  302), 

1974. 
Miller    v.    Buncombe    Co.     (89    N. 

C.   171),   629. 
Miller  v.  Camden    (63  N.  J.  501; 

43    Atl.    1069),    1738,    1764. 
Miller    v.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.J 

76  S.  W.  515;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

848),   1215,   1548. 
Miller  v.  DeArmond   (93  Ind.  74), 

662,    671. 
Miller    v.    Drake     (113    Ga.    347; 

38  S.  E.  747),  923. 
Miller  v.  Dudley,  J.  J.   (46  W.  R. 

606),  306,  725. 
Miller   v.   Finley    (2   Mich.   N.   P. 

231),   2095,  2108,   2110. 
Miller    v.   Finley    (26    Mich.    249; 

12     Am.     Rep.     306),     2094, 

2108,  2110,  2111. 
Miller    v:    Givens     (35    Ind.    App. 

40;   78  N.  E.   1067),  669. 
Miller    v.    Givens     (41    Ind.    App. 

401;    83   N.   E.    1018),   609. 
Miller    v.    Gleason    (18    Ohio    Cir. 

€t.   Rep.   374;    10   Ohio   C.  D. 

20),   65,    1254,    1977. 
Miller  v.  Hammers  ( 93  Iowa,  746 ; 

61  N.  W.  1087),  1987. 
Miller  v.  Hobson    (17  N.  Z.  225), 

1153. 
Miller  v.  Hudson    (114   Ind.   550; 

17  N.  E.   122),   1027. 
Miller  v.  Jones   (80  Ala.  89),  244, 

291,    431,   432,    436,   437,   447, 

878,   879. 
Miller   v.    Minney    (31   Kan.   522; 

3  Pac.  427),' 794. 
Miller   v.    Mut.    Ben.   L.    Ins.    Co. 

(31    Iowa,   216;    7   Am.    Rep. 

122;    4  Am.   L.  T.   Rep.  218), 

2221,  2234,  2235,  2244. 
Miller    v.    People     (47     111.    App. 

472),  1765. 
Miller  v.  Reeder   ([Ind.]   88  N.  E. 

■516),  604,  607,  609,  612. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ecxi 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Miller  v.  State  (33  Ind.  App.  509; 

71  N.  E.  248),   1716. 
Miller    v.    State     (55    Ark.     188; 

17  S.  W.   719),   1219,   1223. 
Miller   v.   State    (5    How.    [Miss.] 

250),   1445. 
Miller    v.    State     (68    Miss.    533; 

9  So.  2h9),  1120,   1127,   1134. 
Miller  v.  State  (36  Ohio  St.  475), 

255.     975,     998,     1241,     1461, 

1543. 
Miller  v.  State    (5   Ohio  St.  275), 

1253. 
Miller  v.  State   (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

650;     34     S.     W.     959).     370, 

1576. 
Miller  v.  State   (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

35;    38   S.   VV.   772),  834. 
Miller  v.  State   (44  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

99;     69    N.    W.    522),     1320, 

1539. 
Miller    v.    State     (107    Ind.     152; 

7    N.    E.     898),     1257,     1565, 

1631,   1633. 
Miller  v.  State   (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

72;     105    S.    W.    502),    20tJ8, 

2090. 
Miller  v.  Wade   (58  Ind.  91),  196, 

531,    532,   599,    601,    602,   627, 

663. 
Milliman    v.    Xew    York^    etc.,    R. 

Co.    (66   N.   Y.   643,  affirming 

4  Hun,  409;   6  T.  &  C.  585), 

2201,  2202. 
Mills,  In  re    (28  Upp.  Can.  333), 

894. 
Mills,  Ex  parte   (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

224;   79  S.  W.  555),  863. 
Mills   V,   Ludington    ( [Mich.]    122 

N.   W.  1082),   424,   429. 
Mills  V.  Perkins    (120   Mass.  41), 

S25,   829,    831. 
Mills  V.  State    (148  Ala.  633;    42 

So.  816),  953. 
Mills  V.  State    (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

220;    82    S.    W.    1045),    1599. 
Mills   V.    Williams    (11   Ired.    [N. 

C]   558),  394. 


Minden    v.    Solverstein     (36    La. 

Ann.    912),    217,    424,     1306, 

1351,   1353,   1361. 

Minneapolis    v.    Olson    (76    Minn. 

1;    78   N.   W.  877),  471,   758. 

Minneapolis       Brewing       Co.       v. 

McGillivray    (104    Fed.   258), 

332. 
Minnehaha    Co.    v.    Champion     (5 

Dak.    397;    41    N.    W.    754), 

930. 
Minnehaha    County    v.    Champion 

(37   N.   W.   766),   174,  233. 
Minot    V.    Doherty     ( [Mass.]     89 

N.  E.   188),  2004. 
Minter  v.  State  (33  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

182;  76  S.  W.  312),  357,  771. 
Mishey's     Appeal      (107    Pa.     St. 

611),  2152. 
Miskin    v.    Hughes    ([1893]     1    Q. 

B.    Div.    275;    57    J.    P.    26b; 

67   L.  T.   680),   701,   709. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Evans   (71 

Tex.    361;     9    S.    W.    325;     1 

L.    R.    A.    476),    2174,    2176, 

2185,  2202,  2203. 
Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Patton 

([Tex.   Civ.    App.]    25    S.   W. 

39;  26  S.  W.  978),  2200. 
Mitchell,   In   re    (41    N.    Y.   App. 

Div.  271;  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  632), 

721. 
Mitchell,     Ex     parte      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    79   S.  W.   558),  863. 
Mitchell     V.     Branham     ( 104    Mo, 

App.    480;     79    S.    W.    739), 

694. 
Mitchell    V.    Commonwealth     (106 

Ky.    602;    51    S.    W.    17;    21 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  222),  964,  1697. 
Mitchell  V.  Crenshaw  ([1909]  1 

K.  B.  701;  72  L.  J.  K.  B. 

398;  88  L.  T.  463;  67  J.  P. 

179;  20  Cox  C.  C.  395), 

1244. 
Mitchell    V.   Duncan    (7    Fla.    13), 

467. 
Mitchell    V.    Gascoigne    (23   N.   S. 

W.  239;    6   S.  R.   [N.  S.  W.] 

717),  1256. 


CCJUl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Mitchell    V.    Hindman     (150     111. 

538;    37   N.   E.   916),   1974. 
Mitchell     V.     Kingmau     (5     Pick. 

431),  2093. 
Mitchell   V.   Eatts    (57    Ind.   259), 

1849,    1936. 
Mitchell  V.  Scott   (62  X.  H.  596), 

1812. 
Mitchell  V.   State    (55   Ala.    160), 

372. 
3Iitchell   V.    State    (133    Ala.    65; 

32  So.    687),    170,    172,    174, 
175,    170,   2SS,   295. 

Mitchell   V.    State    (141    Ala.    90; 

37  So.  407),  1206,  1469,  1475. 
Mitchell  V.  State    (148   Ala    678; 

41  So.  951),  1212. 
Mitchell   V.   State    (63   Ind.   276), 

1623,  1754. 
Mitchell   V.    State    (146    111.    175; 

33  N.    E.    757;    37    Am.    St- 
147),    1452. 

Mitchell   V.    State    (12   Neb.    538; 

11  N.  W.  848),  1717. 
Mitchell    V.    State     ( [Okla.]     101 

Pac,  1100),   1502. 
Mitchell  V.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

40  S.  W.  284),  1210, 
Mitchell    V.    State     (48    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    533;     89    S.     W.    645), 

■2026,   2091. 
Mitchell  V.  Williams   (27  Ind.  62), 

788. 
Mix  V.  McCoy   ( 22  Mo.  App.  488 ) , 

61,  2040. 
M.    Levy    &     Son    v.    Stegemann 

([Iowa]      104     X.     W.     372), 

1798. 
Mobile    V.    Kimball     (102    U.    S. 

691),  316. 
Mobile  V.  Phillips    (146  Ala.   158; 

40  So.  826),  1366. 
Mobile  V.  Richards   (98  Ala.  594; 

12  So.   793),   520,    553. 
Mobile    V.    Rouse     (8    Ala.    515), 

448. 
Mobile   V.    Yerille     (3    Ala.    113), 

443. 
Mobile,   etc.,   R.   Co.   v.   State    (29 

Ala.  586),   280,  294. 


Mobile,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v,  Davis   (130 

111.  146;  22  X.  E.  850;  revers- 
ing 31  111.  App.  490),  2254. 
Mobile,  etc.,  R.   Co.  v.  Watly    (69 

Miss.   145;   13  So.  825), '21 22. 
Modi    V.    Lose     (13    R.    L    293), 

310. 
Modlen  v.  Snowball   ([1831]  4  De. 

G.  F.  &  J.   143;   31  L.  J.  Ch. 

44),    1831. 
Mogensen,  Ex  parte    (5  Cal.  App. 

596;  90  ?ac.  1063),  169,  17.']2. 
Mogler    V.    State     (47    Ark.    109; 

14    S.    W.    473),    1357,    1358, 

1515,  1563. 
Mohrman  v.  State  (105  Ga.  709; 

32  S.  E.  143),  1086,  1133, 

1148,  1337,  1338,  1347. 
Moise  v.  Weymuller  (78  Neb.  266; 

110   X.  W.   554),   1779,   1789. 
Moley,  Ex  parte  ( 7  Low.  Can.  Jr. 

1),  1449. 
Molihan  v.    State    (30   Ind.    266), 

671,  1351,  1.353,  1301. 
Molinari,  Ex  parte  (6  L.  X.  [Can.] 

395),  734. 
Moloney   v.   Rogers    (3    N.   S.   W. 

L.  R.  CjI),  712. 
Molyneux  v.  Ellison  (8  Aust.  L.  R. 

[C.  X.]   "-      1113. 
Molyneux  v.  herson  ( 23  Austr. 

L.    R.    L-3;    S    Austr.    L,    R. 

120),   1314. 
Monaghan    v.    Insurance    Co.     (53 

:,Iich.    246;    18    X.    W.    797), 

945. 
Monaghan  v.   Longfellow    (82  Me. 

419;    19  Atl.  857),  1027. 
Monaghau  v.  Reid   ( 40  :Mich.  665 ) , 

1786. 
Monaghan  v.  State  (66  Miss.  513; 

<3    So.   241;    4   L.  R.   A.   800), 

1228,   1229. 
Monce  v.  State    (5  Ga.  App.  229; 

02  S.  E.  1053),  1773. 
Moncla  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

70  S.  W.  548),  1131. 
Monford    v.    State     (35    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.    237;     33    S.    W.    351), 

1557,  1650,  1740. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCXlll 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Monigal  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

45  S.  W.  1038),  760. 
Moniteau  Co.   v.   Lewis    ( 123   Mo. 
App.   073;    100   S.   W.    1107)> 
774. 
Moniteau    Co.   v.   Lewis    (123   Mo. 

673;    100  S.  W.  1107),  782. 
Monk  V.  New  Utrecht   (104  N.   V. 

552;   11  X.  E.  268),  2196. 
Monmouth  v.  Popel    (183  111.  634; 

56    K    E.    348;    affirming    81 

in.   App.   512),    193. 
Monroe    v.     Lawrence     (44     Kan. 

607;  24  P.  1113),  258. 
Monroe  v.  People    (113   III.   670), 

1645. 
Monroe    v.    State     (8    Tex.    App. 

212),  492,  929. 
Monroe  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

120  S.  W.  479),  1611. 
Monroe  v.  Thomas    (61   Me.  581), 

1779,   1782. 
Monroe   Co.   v.    Kreuger    (88   Ind. 

231),   812. 
Mouses    V.    State    (78    Ga.    110), 

1119,  1124,  1126,  1127,  1133. 
Mont  V.  State  (90  Ind.  29),  96. 
Montag    V.    People     (141    III.    75; 

30  N.  E.  337 ) ,  2038,  2056. 
Montclair    v.    State     ([X.    J.    L.] 

09  Atl.  451),  1285. 
Montford    v.    Christian    ( 13    Vict. 

L.   R.   893),   369. 
Montgomery   v.    O'Dell    (67    Hun, 

109;     22    X.    Y.    Supp.    412), 

684. 
Montgomery    v.    State     (86    Ala. 

141;   7  So.  51),  290,  292. 
Montgomery    v.    State    ( [Ala.]    49 

So.  1902),  2039,  2068. 
Montpelier  v.  Mills  (171  Ind.  175; 

85    X.   E.    0),    549,    649,   659, 

1159,  1608,  1640. 
Montross  v.  Alexander  (152  Mich. 

513;  116  X.  W.  190),  1854, 

1962,    1966,    1969,    1970. 
Montross  v.  Commonwealth  (8  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  237),  1568,  1720. 
Monty  V.  Arneson  ( 25  Iowa,  383 ) , 

1777. 


Moody   V.   Commonwealth    (6    Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   219),  543. 

Moody    V.    McKinney     (73    S.    C. 

438;    53   S.  E.  543),   1022. 
Moody  V.  Steggles   ([1879]   12  Ch. 

D.  261),  1834. 
Moog    V.    Espalla    (93    Ala.    503; 

9    So.   596),   493. 
Moog    V.    Hannon     (93    Ala.    500; 

9  So.  596),   1780. 
Moog  V.  State  ( [Ala.]  41  So.  166), 

334. 
Moon  V.  Hartsuck  (137  Iowa,  236; 

114  X\  W.  1043),  676. 
Moon     V.     State      (68     Ga.     687), 

2061. 
Mooney   v.    State    (33    Ala.   419), 

2041,  2074. 
Moore,  In  re    ([Iowa]    118  N.  W. 

879),   662,   666,   826. 
Moore   v.   Danville    (232   111.   307; 

83  N.  E.  845),  132,  251. 
Moore  v.  Eubanks    (60  S.  C.  374; 

44  S.  E.  971),  1027. 
Moore   v.    Indianapolis    ( 120    Ind. 

483;    22    N.    E.    424),   91,    96, 

{)8,    103,    124,    125,    120,    144, 

179,    182,    184,    417,    418,   446, 

488,   489,    796. 
Moore   v.  Kelley    (136  Mich.   139; 

98  X.  W.  989;  10  Detroit  Leg. 

X.   1002),   460. 
Moore    v.    Moore     (41    Mo.    App. 

176),  2162. 
Moore    v.    People    (109    111.    499), 

497,  551,  756,  824. 
Moore   v.    People    (14    How.    13), 

274. 
Moore  v.  Robinson    ([1879]   48  L. 

J.    Q.    B.    156;    40    L.    T.    99; 

28  W.  R.  312),  1819. 
Moore    v.    State     (16    Ala.    411), 

1112. 
Moore  v.   State    (126   Ga.   414;    55 

■S.   E.   327),   938,    1280,    1284, 

1286,   1288,   1558. 
Moore    v.    State     (65    Ind.    382), 

1240. 
Moore  v.  State    (58  Xeb.  608;   79 

X.  W.  163),  651,  668 


cexiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Moore    v.    State     (G4    Neb.    557; 

90    N.    W.    533),    13G1,    1374, 

1615. 
Moores    v.    State     (69    Neb.    653; 

96  N.  W.  225),  604. 

Moore  v.  State   ( 12  Ohio  St.  387 ) , 

1714. 
Moore  v.  State   (9  Yerg.  353),  71, 

1096. 
Moore    v.    State     (96    Tenii.    544; 

35    S.   W.   556),   961. 
Moore  v.  Winstead    (24  Ind.  App. 

56;  55  N.  E.  777),  1781,  1789, 

1790,    1791. 
Moran   v.    Atlanta     (  [Ga.]    30    S. 

E.  298),  432,  452,   1634. 
Moran   v.    Creager    (27    Ind.   App. 

659;    62  N.  E.   61),  561,  573, 

611,  615. 
Moran    v.    Goodman     ( 130    Mass. 

158;    39   Am.  Rep.   443),   183, 

184,    223,     1840,     1842,     1848, 

1862,    1895. 
Morel    V.    State     (89    Ind.    275), 

1567. 
Moreland  v.  Durocher    (121  Mich. 

398;   80  N.  W.  284),  1954. 
Moreland    v.    State     ([Okla.]     101 

Pac.    138),    325,    327. 
Morenus  v.  Crawford  (51  Hun  89; 

5    N.    Y.    Supp.    453),    1859, 

1934,   1945. 
Morgan,  Ex  parte   (23  L.  T.  605; 

35  J.  P.  37),  622. 
Morgan  v.  Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

97  S.  W.  411;  30  Ky.  L.  Pvep. 
139),    1555. 

Morgan      v.      Commonwealth       ( 7 

Gi-at.  592),   1493. 
Morgan    v.    Koestner     (83     Iowa, 

134;   49  N.  W.  80),  983,  9o7. 
Morgan  v.  Monmouth  PUmk  Road 

Co.    (2   Dutch.   99),   233. 
Morgan  v.   State    (81    Ala.    72;    1 

So.    472),    USD,    1221,     1379, 

1578,   1610. 
Morgan   v.   State    (117    Ind.   569; 

19  N.  E.  154),  264,  267,  1585. 


Morgan    v.    Tighe    (12    Ohio   Cir. 

Lt.    Rep.    719;    4    Ohio    C.   D. 

470),    1739. 
Morganstern      v.      Commonwealth 

(94   Va.   787;    26  S.  E.  402), 

403,     453,     467,     1119,     1122, 

1445,    1626. 
Morgan's  Steamship  Co.  v.  Louisi- 
ana   Board     (118    U.    S.    455; 

6  Sup.  Ct.  1114),  116. 
Morgan's  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Board   (118 

U.  S.  455;    6  Sup.   Ct.   1114), 

315. 
Moriarty    v.     Bartlett     (34     Hun 

272),   1838. 
Moriarty     v.     Stefl'eran     (89     111. 

528),   2127. 
Morien    v.    Gallagher    ( 199    Mass. 

486;   85  N.  E.  579),  585. 
Morrell    v.    Cook     (35    Me.    211), 

1058. 
Morrill    v.    State    (38    Wis.    428), 

443. 
Morrill  v.  'I'hurston   (46  Vt.  732), 

1739. 
Morrilton  v.  Comer   (75  Ark.  458; 

87  S.  W.   1024),  475. 
Morris,  Ex  parte    (34  Can.  L.  J. 

46),   1163. 
Morris  V.  Baltimore  (5  Gill  [Md.] 

244),  811. 
Morris    v.    Connolly     (113    Iowa, 

545;  85  N.  W.  7S9),  984. 
Morris   v.   Lowry    (113  Iowa  544; 

85   N.   W.   788),   984. 
Morris    v.    Mills    (Tex.    Civ.    App. 

82  S.  W.  334),  759. 
Morris  v.  Nixon   (7  Humph  579), 

2094,   2106,   2107,  210S,  2124. 
Morris   v.   People    (2   T.   &   C.    [N. 

Y.]    219),   1759. 
Morris    v.    Rome     (10    Ga.    532), 

263,    397,   440,   443,    457,   459. 
Morris    v.    State     (47    Ind.    503), 

1307,    1308,    1566,    1567. 
Morris  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

44    S.    W.    510),    1607,    1693, 

1695. 
Morris  v.  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

562;  89  S.  W.  832),  1365. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


ccxv 


[References  aie  to  pnges.] 


Morris  v.   Territory    (1    Okla.   Cr. 
Rep.    637;    99    Pac.    760;    101 
Fac.  Ill),  2039. 
Morison     v.      Commonwealth      (7 

Dana   218),    1542. 
Morrison    v.    MoLeod     (2    Dev.    & 

Bat.  Eq.  221),  2103. 
Morrison   v.   Morrison    ( 14    Mont. 

8;   35  Pac.   1),  2166. 

Morrison  v.   State    (84   Ala.   405; 

4  So.  402),  2042,  2059,  2009. 

Morrissey  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.    (126 

Mass.  377;  30  Am.  Rep.  686), 

2182. 

Morrow   v.    State    ( [Tex.]    120   S. 

W.  491),    1580,    1737. 
Morton    v.    State     (37     Tex.     Cr. 
App.    131;    38    S.    W.    1019), 
1682,   1720. 
Moseley  v.  State  (156  Ala.  136;  47 

So.  193),  1558. 
Mosley    v.    State     (23    Tex.    App. 

409;  4  S.  W.  907).  2034. 
Moser  v.  Stebel    (29  Oliio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  487),  805,    1810. 
Moskow  V.  Highlands    ( [Colo.]   47 

Pac.  846),  401. 
Moss    V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

44  S.   W.   833),   1213. 
Moss  V.  State    (47   Tex.  Cr.   App. 

.      459;   89  S.  W.  833),  914. 
Moss  V.  Warren  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 
123    S.    W.    1157),    172,    561, 
563. 
Mouflet  V.   Cole    ([1872]    L.   R.   8 
Ex.   32;    42    L.    J.    Ex.    8;    21 
W.  R.   175),  1819,   1832. 
Moulton,   In   re    (168    N.    Y.    645; 
(il    N.   Y.    1131;    affirming   59 
N.    Y.    App.    Div.    25;    69    X. 
Y.  Supp.   14),  580,   730. 
Moulton,  In  re    (59  App.  Div.  27; 
'69    X.    Y.    S.    14),    544,    580, 
581. 
Moulton   V.    Reid    (54    Ala.   320), 

925. 
Moundsville   v.    Fountain    (27    W. 
Va.   182),   167,  272,  395,   397, 
402. 


Mountifield  v.  Ward  ([1897]  1 
Q.  B.  326;  61  J.  P.  216;  66 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  246;  76  L.  T.  202; 
45  W.  R.  288;  18  Cox  C.  C. 
515;  13  T.  L.  R.  159),  1149. 
Mt.    Carmel    v.    Wabash    Co.    (50 

111.    69  j,    412,    435,   808. 
Mount     Pleasant     v.     Breeze     (11 

Iowa  399),  469. 
Mt.  Pleasant  v.  Vansice   (43  Mich. 
361;    5    X.    W.    378;    38    Am. 
Rep.     193),     169,     410,     414, 
474. 
Mt.   Sterling  v.   King    ([Ky.]    104 
S.    W.   322;    31    Ky.    L.    Rep. 
919),  290. 
Mowery  v.   Camden    (49   X.  J.   L.. 

106;    6    Atl.    43«),    1454. 
Moyer,  In  re  (20  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

663),    721. 
Moyer,    Appeal    of    (8    Pa.  Super. 
Ct.   Rep.    475;    43    W.    X.    C. 
100),    717. 
Moynihan,   In  re    (75    Conn.   358; 

53    Atl.    903),    197. 
Mueller  v.    People    (24  Colo.   251; 

48  Pac.  965),  460,  945. 
Mueller    &    Co.   v.    Commonwealth 
([Ky.]    116  S.  W.  336),  1342, 
1344. 
Mufibrd  v.  Clewell   (21  Ohio  State 
191),    1864,    1868,    1980,    1854, 
1856,  1857,  1982. 
Mugler  V.  Kansas   (123  U.  S.  623; 
8    Sup.    Ct.    273;    31    L.    Ed. 
205;    affirming   29    Kan.    252; 
44    Am.    Rep.    634),    91,    99, 
109,    119,    125,    139,    148,    149, 
161,   181,   211,   256,   315,   398, 
418,  450,  490. 
Muir    V.    Kcay    (L.    R.    10    Q.    B. 
599;    40   j.    P.   694;    44   L.   J. 
M.    C.    143;    23    W.    R.    700; 
41   J.  P.   423),    1296. 
Mulcahy  v.  Givens   (115  Ind.  286; 
17    X.    E.    598),    1767,    1849, 
1864,    1866. 
Mulherrin    v.    Delaware,    etc.,    R. 
■Co.   (81   Pa.  St.  366),  2180. 


ecxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages] 


Mulikin  v.   Davis    (53    Ind.   206), 

671. 
Mullen  V.  Peck   (49  Ohio  St.  447; 

31  X.  E.  1077),  2012. 
Mullen    V.    State     (96    Ind.    304), 

10,  41,  1497,   1499. 
Mullen  V.  State   ( 30  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  251),  950. 
Muller   V.    Buncombe    Co.    (89   N. 

C.    171),   628. 
Muller    V.    Mayo     (38    Ind.    227), 

662. 
Mulligan    v.    United    States     (120 

Fed.  98),  1261,  1263. 
Mullinix  v.   State    (43   Ind.  511), 

1714. 
Mullinix  v.  People    (76   111.  211), 

63,     1254,     1358,    1740,    1754, 

1763,   1764. 
Mullins  V.  Bellemore  (7  Low.  Can. 

228),  1365. 
Mullins   V.    Collins     (L.    R.    9.    Q. 

B.  292;    43   L.   J.   M.  C.   67; 

29  L.  T.  838;  27  W.  R.  297), 

1221,   1355. 
Mullins    V.    Lancaster     ( [Ky.]    63 

S.    W.    475;    23    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

436),    404,    936. 
Mullins  V.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

68  S.  W.  272),  844,  845. 
Mulreed  v.  State    (107  Ind.  62;   7 

N.  E.  884),   1240,  1241,   1242, 

1628,   2200. 
Mumford    v.    Walker    ([1901]    71 

L.    J.    K.    B.    19;     85    L.    T. 

518;   18  T.  L.  R.  80),  1825. 
Muncey    v.    Collins     ( [Iowa]     106 

N.  W.  262),  567,  572. 
Munch  V.  State  ( 3  Tex.  App.  552 ) , 

1743. 
Mundy,  In  re    (59   How.    [N.  Y.] 

Pr,  359),  443. 
Mundy    v.    State    (74    Pac.    378), 

1*739. 
Municipal     Suffrage     to     Women. 

In  re   (160  Mass.  586;   36  N. 
E.  488;  23  L.  R.  A.  113),  231. 
Municipality    v.    Morgan     ( 1    La. 
Ann.  Ill),  294. 


Municipality,    etc.    v.    Wilson     (5 

La.  Ann.  747),  270. 
Munn  V.   Illinois    (94  U.  S.   145), 

93. 
Munoz     V.     Brassel      ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    108    S.    W.   417),   337, 

771,  772,   773,  781,  784,  1903, 

1956. 
Munsel   v.    Temple     (3    Gil.    [111.] 

93),  799. 
Munson,    In   re     (95    X.    Y.    App. 

Div.  23 ;  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  509 ) , 

871,    873,    879. 
Munz  V.  People  (90  111.  App.  637), 

1865,    1876. 
Munzebock  v.  State   (10  Ohio  Dec. 

277;    19  Wkly.  L.  Bulk  389), 

1127. 
Murphy  v.  Board    (73   Ind.  483), 

•530,  561,  670. 
Murphy   v.  'Curran    (24   111.   App. 

475),   1947,   1983. 
Murphy  v.  Landrun   (76  S.  C.  21; 

56  S.  E.  850),   175,  251,  809. 
Murphy   v.    McNulty    (145    Mass. 

464;    14  N.  E.  532),  1353. 
Murphy  v.  Montclair    ( 10  Vroom, 

673),  43,  47,  84. 
Murphy   v.   Monroe    Co.    (73   Ind. 

483),   607. 
Murphy  v.  Xolan  (126  Mass.  542), 

68'8. 
Murphy    v.    People     (90    111.    59), 

65,  66,   1254,   1632,   1633. 
Murphy    v.    State    ([Ala.]    45    So. 

20*8),    1606. 
Murphy    v.    State     (1    Ind.    366), 

1179,   1190. 
Murphy   v.    State     (106    Ind.    96; 

5  X.  E.  767),  1485. 
Murphy  v.   State    (28  Miss.  637), 

1245. 
Murphy    v.    State     (77    Tenn.    [9 

Lea]    373),    134,   247,   1745. 
Murphy    v.    Union    R.    Co.     (118 

Mass.  228),  2198,  2206. 
Murphy  v.   Willow  Springs   Brew- 
ing   Co.     (81    Xeb.    223;     115 

X.  W.  763),  1838,  1896,  1897, 
1904,   1933,   1973. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


ccxvu 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Hurray  a'.  Board    (81   Minn.  359; 

84    N.    W.    103;    51    L.    R.    A. 

828),    278. 
Murray    v.    Carlin    (G7    111.    280), 

2102,    2109. 
Murray    v.     Freer     ([1894]     App. 

Cas.   576;    58    J.    P.    508;    «3 

L.    J.    M.    C.    242;     71    L.    T. 

44;    affirming   [1893]    1   Q.  B. 

035;    57    J.    P.    101,    583;    67 

L.    T.    507;    62    L.    J.    M.   C. 

33),  681,  709. 
Murray    v.    State     (46     Tex.     Cr. 

App.  128;   79  S.  W.  568),  19, 

964,  971,   1186. 
Murray  v.  State  ( 48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

128;  79  S.  W.  508),  1689. 
Murray    v.    State     (48    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    219;     87     S.    W.    349), 

2025. 
Murray   v.   State    ([Tex.]    120    S. 

W.  438),  1652. 
Murray   v.    Wilson    Distilling    Co. 

(213   U.   S.    151;    29   Sup.   Ct. 

458),    176. 
Musgrove    v.    Graham     (4    S.    R. 

[N.  S.    W.]    475;    21    W.    N. 

C.  [N.  S.  W.l  145),  1373. 
Musgrave  v.   Hall    (40   Me.   498), 

1028,    1777. 
Musick   V.    State     (51    Ark.    165; 

10  S.  W.  225),  30,  86,  968. 
Musselman    v.    Cravens     (47    Intl. 

1),   2093,    2122. 
Mutual,  etc.,  Ass'n.  v.  Colter    (81 

Ark.  205;  99  S.  W.  67),  2227. 
Mutual,   etc.,    Ins.    Co.    v.    Holter- 

hoff     (2    Cin.    Sup.    Ct.    Rep. 

379),    2220,    2244. 
Mutual   Life   Ins.   Co.   v.   Simpson 

([Tex.  Civ.   App.]    28    S.   W. 

837),  2223. 
Mutual    Ins.    Co.    v.    Stibbe     (40 

Md.   302),   2234. 
Mutual   Life  Ins.   Co.  v.   Thomson 

(94    Ky.   253;    22   S.   W.   87; 

14    Ky'.    L.    Rep.    800),    2232, 

2243. 
Mydosh  v.  Bayonne    (72  X.  J.  L. 

439;    60    AtL    1111),    697. 


Myers  v.  Circuit  Court  ([W.  Va.J 

63  S.  E.  201),  662,  665,  667. 
Myers  v.   Conway    (55   Iowa   106; 

7  N.  W.   481),    1848. 
Myers  v.   Kirt    (57   Iowa   421;    10 

N.   W.   828),    1929,   1930. 
Myers  v.  People  ( 67  111.  503 ) ,  294, 

1502,    1506. 
Myers  v.  State   (93  Ind.  251),  10, 

41,   42,   84,    1592,    1711,    1712, 

1976. 
Myers  v.  State    (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

331;   39  S.  W.  938),  1611. 
Myers   v.  State    ( [Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

39   S.  W.   Ill),  2259. 
Myers  v.  State    (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

558;  108  S.  W.  392),  1693. 
Myers    v.    State     ([Tex.]     118    S. 

W.   1032),   1064. 
Myrich   v.   Myrich    (07    Ga.   771), 

2155,  2158,  2159. 


N 


Nace  v.  State    (117   Ind.   114;    19 

N.  E.  729),   1110. 
Xacrelli,  In  re    (S   Del.   Co.   Eep. 

20),  696,  697. 
Xadeau  v.   Lewis    ( 16   Que.   L.  R. 

210),    1441. 
X'^agle,   Ex  parte    (30    X.   B.   77), 

938. 
Xagle   v.   Baylor    (3    Dr.    &   War. 

60),   2099. 
Xagle    V.    Keller     (237    111.    431; 

86    X.   E.    694;    affirming    141 

111.  App.    444),    1862. 
Xalder    &    Collyer's    Brewery    Co., 

Limited    v.    Ilarman    ([1900] 

64  J.  P.   358;    affirmed   C.   A. 

83  L.  T.  257),  1821. 
Xall  V.  Tinsley   (107  Ky.  441;  54 

S.   W.    187;    21    Ky.    L.   Rep. 

1167),   852,   869,   872. 
Xance   v.   Kemper    (35    Ind.   App. 

605;  73  X.  E.  937),  2093. 
Xankivell   v.   Donovan    ( 13   N.   Z. 

L.  R.  00),   1154. 


CCXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Napier  v.  Hodges    (31   Tex.   287), 

199. 
Napier    v.    State     (50    Ala.    168), 

371. 
Nappee  Valley   Wine   Co.   v.   Kas- 

sanave     ([Wis.]     122    X.    W. 

812),   698. 
Nash    V.    Southern    Ey.    Co.     ( 136 

Ala.    177;    33    So.    932),    63, 

2202,    2205. 
Nashville  v.  Linck    (12  Lea  499), 

216,  432. 
Nashville  Hermitage  Club  v.  Shel- 

ton     (104    Tenn.    101;    56    S. 

W.   838),   794. 
Nast   V.   Eden    (89    Wis.   610;    62 

N.  W.  409),  636. 
Nathan  v.  Louisiana    (8  How.  [U. 

S.]    73),   790. 
National    Sporting    Club    v.    Cope 

(82  L.  T.  352;  48  W.  R.  446; 

64   J.    P.    310;    19    Cox    C.    C. 

485),    1345. 
National,  etc.,  Co.   v.   Board    (138 

Iowa    11;     115    N.    W.    480), 

794. 
Naul   v.   McComb  City    (70   Miss. 

699;    12   So.   903),    1608. 
Mazum    v.    State    (88    Ind.    599), 

85. 
Neal,  Ex  parte   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

441;   83  S.  W.  831),  888. 
Neal,  etc.,  Co.,  Ex  parte   (58  S.  C. 

269;     36     S.     E.     584),     123„ 

1806. 
Neal    v.   State     ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

101  S.  W.  11.39),  874. 
Neal   V.   State    (51   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

513;    102    S.    W.    1139),    857, 

909,  917,  958,  1684. 
Neales    v.    State     (10    Mo.    498), 

1491,    1497,    1501,    1.502,    1505, 

1507. 
Needham  v.  State    (19  Tox.   332), 

15.54. 
Neely   v.   State    (60    Ark.   66;    28 

S.  W.   800;    46   Am.   St.    148; 

27  L.  R.  A.  503),  1227. 
Neideiser  v.  State    (6  Baxt.  499), 

1362,  1568,  1753. 


Neighbors        v.        Commonwealth 

([Ky.]    9    S.    W.    718),    289, 

1463,    1464,    1467,    1594,    1680, 

1686. 
Neilly,  In  re    (37  Up.   Can.   289), 

468. 
Neilon    v.    Kansas    City,    etc.,    R. 

Co.   (85  Mo,  599),  2198,  2199. 
Neilson  v.  Dunsmore    (3  F.   [Just. 

Cas.]    6),    1114. 
Neimann     v.     State      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   74  S.  W.  558),  1321. 
Nelson   v.    Commonwealth    (23    S. 

W.  350),   1609. 
Nelson   v.   Galveston,   etc.,   R.   Co. 

(78  Tex.  621;  14  S.  W.  1021), 

1900. 
Nelson    v.    State     (17    Ind.    App. 

403;   46  N.  E.  941),  163,  212, 

279,   342,   344,  490,    1319. 
Nelson  v.  .State   ( 32  Ind.  App.  88 ; 

69  N.  E.  298),  1869,  1870. 
Nelson  v.  State   (53  Neb.  796;   74 

N.  W.  279),  1662,  1703. 
Nelson  v.  State   (44  Te.x.  Cr.  App. 

595;   75  S.  W.  502),  871,  890, 

938,  1646,  1682,  1683,  1686. 
Nelson   v.    State    (111    Wis.    394; 

87  N.  W.  235),   1225. 
Nelson  v.  United   States    (30  Fed. 

112),    173,    210,    1259,    1503, 

1521. 
Nelson    v.    Woodford     ([1779]     2 

Vesey,  Jr.,  319),  1907. 
Nepp   v.    Commonwealth    (2    Duv. 

546),   635. 
Netter,  In  re    (11   Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

566),    664. 
Netso    V.   Stat«     (24    Fla.    363;    5 

So.   857),   39,   83,    1711. 
Neuman   v.    State    (76    Wis.    112; 

45   N.   W.   30),   479. 
Nevin   v.    Ladue     ( 1    N.    Y.    Code 

Rep.  43;  3  Denio  43,  437),  10, 

40,    42,    46,    47,    48,    82,    85, 

966,    1592. 
Nevling  v.  Commonwealth   (98  Pa. 

323),   2054. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ecxix 


[References  a.re  to  pages.] 


New  V.  McKechnie  (95  N.  Y.  632; 

47  Am.  Rep.  89),  1864,   1876, 

1880,  1984,  1985. 
Kewbern    v.    McCann     ( 105    Tcnn. 

159;    58   S.  W.   114;   50  L.   R. 

A.  476),  454. 
New    Decatur   v.   Laude    (93    Ala. 

84;   9  So.  382),   1621. 
Newell   V.    Hemingway    (58    L.   J. 

M.    C.   46;    60   L.   T.    544;    16 

Cox  C.  C.  604;  53  J.  P.  324), 

512,    1328,    1330,    1346,    1347. 
New     Gloucester      (28     Me.     60), 

1500,   1583. 
New  Hampton  v.  Conroy    {56   la. 

498;    9  N.  W.  417),^  397. 
New    Iberia    v.    Erath     (118    La. 

305;    42   So.  945),  332. 
New  Iberia  v.  Moss  Hotel  Co.  (112 

La.    525;     36    So.    552),    416, 

447,  812. 
Newman  v.  Jones    (17  Q.  B.  Div. 

132;   50  J.  P.   373;    55   L.   J. 

M.    C.    113;    55    L.    T.    327), 

1345,   1346,   1352,   1355,   1374. 
Newman   v.    State    (63    Ga.    533), 

1515. 
Newman   v.   State    (101    Ga.   534; 

28  S.  E.  1005),   1486,  1505. 
Newman    v.    State    ( 7    Lea    617), 

1385. 
Newman  v.   State    (76   Wis.    112; 

45  N.  W.  30),   1523. 
New    Orleans    v.    Clark     (42    La. 

Ann.  9;    7   So.   58),   186,  796, 

797. 
New    Orleans    v.    Guth     (  11     La. 

Ann.  405),  541. 
New  Orleans  v.  Jane   ( 34  La.  Ann. 

667),  508,  520,  549. 
New  Orleans  v.  Kaufman    (29  La. 

Ann.  283;   29  Am.  Rep.  283), 

791. 
New  Orleans  v.  Macheca    (112  La. 

559;   36  So.  747),  206. 
New  Orleans  v.  Smythe    (116  La. 

685;    41    So.    33),    103,    206, 

649. 


New    Orleans    Gas    Light    Co.    v. 

Louisiana  Light  Co.    (115   U. 

S.  650;   6  Sup.  Ct.  252),   100, 

116. 
New    Orleans    W.    W.    Co.    v.    St. 

Tammany  W.  W.  Co.  ( 120  U. 

S.  69;  6"  Sup.  Ct.  405;  affirm- 
ing 14  Fed.  194),  97. 
New  South,  etc.,   Co.   v.   Common- 
wealth   (123    Ky.   443;    96    S. 

W.  805 ;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  873 ) , 

948. 
New    York    v.    Mason     (4    E.    D. 

Smith,    142),   503,   506,    1484, 

1159,  1650. 
New  York  v.  Milim  (11  Pet.  102), 

100. 
New     York     Breweries     Corp.     v. 

Baker      (68    Conn.     337;     3P 

Atl.   785),   552,   954. 
New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Graham 

(   2  Duv.  506),  2244. 
New    York    Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    La 

Boiteaux    ( 4  Am.  L.  Rep.  1 ) , 

2234,    2244. 
New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parent 

(3    Quebec    L.    R.    163),    233, 

2225. 
New    York,    etc.,    L.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Simpson     ( [Tex.    Civ.    App.] 

28  S.  W.  837),  2223,  2226. 
Newbridge   Rliondda   Brewing   Co., 

Limited,  v.  Evans    ([1902]   86 

L.  T.  453;    18  T.  L.  R.  396), 

1818. 
Newburgh,    In   re     ([N.    Y.   Misc. 

Rep.]    89  N.  Y.  Supp.   1065), 

898. 
Newbury  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

44 'S.    W.    843),    958,    1616, 

1694. 
Newcomer    v.    Tucker     (89    Iowa 

486;  56  N.  W.  499),  1001. 
Neudeck   v.   Grand   Lodge    (1    Mo. 

App.   330),   2245. 
Newell    V.    Fisher    (11    Sm.    &    M. 

431;    49  Am.   Dec.  66),  2094, 

2108,  2118. 
Newlan  v.  Aurora  (14  111.  364), 

1652. 


ccxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Newman,  Ex  parte    (9   Cal.  502), 

106. 
Newman   v,   Bendysche    (10    A.   & 

E.  11;   2  P.  &  D.  340),   1540. 
Newman    v.    Covenant    Mut.    Ins. 

Ass'n     (7G    Iowa,    56;    40    N. 

W.     87;     14    Am.     St.     196), 

2233,   2239,   2241,   2244. 
Newman    v.    Des    Moines    County 

(85  Iowa,  89;  52  N.  W.  105), 

1004. 
Newman  v.   Lake    (70   Kan.    848; 

79  Pac.  675),  736. 
Newman   v.  State    (88    Ala.    115; 

11   So.   762),    1284,    1288. 
Newman  v.   State    ([Ala.]    39   So. 

648),    174. 
Newman   v.   State    (63   Ga.   533), 

1241. 
Newman   v.   State    (101    Ga.   534; 

28  N.  E.  1005),  1539,  1760. 
Newman  v.   State    (63   Ind.   533), 

1563. 
Newman   v.    State    (7    Lea,    617), 

824. 
Newman    v.    State     (55    Tex.    Cr. 

App.   376;    116    S.   W.   1156), 

1601. 
Newman  v.   State    (76    Wis.    112; 

45    N.    W.    30),   750,    1583. 
Newson  v.  State   (1  Ga.  App.  790; 

58  S.  E.  71),  951,  1561, 
Newson    v.    Tahigalien     (30    Miss. 

414),   798. 
Newsome    v.    State     ( 1    Ga.    App. 

790;   58  S.  E.  71),  951,   1234. 
Newton  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.   (80 

Hun,    491;     30    N.    Y.    Supp. 

488),   2176,  2197. 
Newton  V.   Locklin    (77   111.    103), 

2033. 
Newton    v.    McKay     ([Iowa]     102 

N.    W.    827 ) , '  199,    223,    790, 

816. 
Niagara  Ins.   Co.   v.   DeGraff    ( 12 

Mich.   124),   1777,   1778. 
Nichols,  In  re  (43  Fed.  Rep.  164), 

426. 


Nichols  V.  Commonwealth    ([Ky.] 

87  S.  W.  1072;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1176,  reversing  86  S.  W.  513; 

27    Ky.    L.    Rep,    690),    958, 

2067,   2069. 
Nichols  V.  Lehman    ([Ind.]    85  N. 

E.   786),   607. 
Nichols    V.    Nichols     (136    Mass. 

256),  2253. 
Nichols  V.  Polk  County   (78  Iowa, 

137;   42  N.  W.  627),   1075. 
Nichols    V.    State    (49    Neb.    777; 

69   N.  W.  99),   1761. 
Nichols  V.  State   (8  Ohio  St.  425), 

2073,   2074. 
Nichols  V.  State  (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

546;  40  S.  W.  268),  872. 
Nichols  V.  State   ( 39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

80;   40  S.  W.  268),  832. 
Nichols  V.  Thomas   (89  Iowa,  394; 

56   N.   W.  540),   994,    1004. 
Nichols  V.  Valentine  (36  Me.  322), 

552,   1031,   1773,  1776. 
Nicholson  v.  People    (29  111.  App. 

57),  1102,  1452,  1549. 
Xickerson   v.    Boston    (131    Mass. 

306),   97. 
Nieol  V.   Penning    ([1881]    19   Ch. 

D.   258;    45  L.   T.  738;    51   L. 

J.  Ch.  166),  1814. 
Nicolini     v.     Langermann     ( [Tex. 

Civ.   App.]    104    S.    W.   501), 

704. 
Nicrosi    v.    State    (52    Ala.    336), 

1182,   1189. 
Nieland    v.    McGrath     (29    N.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.    682;     62    N.    Y. 

Supp.   760),   737. 
Nielson   v.    Lafflin    (50   N.  Y.   St. 

Rep.    277;     21    N.    Y.    Supp. 

731),   2102,   2120,   2130. 
Nightengale,  Petitioner    (11   Peck, 

167),   448. 
Niles    v.    Fries     (35     Iowa,    41), 

1777. 
Niles  v.  Mathusa   (19  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  96;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  88), 

699,  704,  819. 


tablf:  of  cases. 


cexxi 


[  Uef'^rences  are   to  pages.] 


Ninenger  v.   State    (25   Tex.  App. 

449;     8     S.     \V.     480),     1464, 

1471. 
Nipples  V.  Valentine  (30  Me.  322), 

1772. 
Nisliimiya   v.   United   States    (131 

Fed.   650),   44. 
Nix  V.  Nottingham,  J.  J.   ([1899  J 

2   Q.  B.  294;    68   L.  J.   Q.   B. 

854;    63  J.  P.  628;    47   W.  R. 

628;    81    L.    T.   41;    15    T.   L. 

E.   463),   534,   547,   671,   681. 
Nixon    V.    State     (76    Ind.    524), 

821,  827,  1181. 

Noble    V.    Adams    ( 7    Taunt.    59 ) , 

2125. 
Noble    V    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

105    S.    W.    413;    32    Ky.    L. 

Rep.  73),  1608. 
Noble    V.    Hart     ([1897]     34    Sc 

L.  R.   151),   1823. 
Noblett   V.    Hopkinson    ([1905]    2 

K.  B.  214;    69   J.   P.  269;    74 

L.    J.    K.    B.    544;    53   W.   R. 

637;  92  L.  T.  462;  21  T.  L.  R. 

448),  1136,  1140. 
Noecker  v.  People  (91  111.  494), 

822,  1349,    1358. 

Noel  V.  Karper   (53  Pa.  97),  2121, 

2122. 
Nolan,  In  re   (16  Vict.  L.  R.  227; 

11   Austr.  L.  T.   156),  624. 
Noonan    v.    Hudson    County     (22 

Vroom,  454;    18   Atl.   117;   23 

Vroom,    398;     23    Atl.    255), 

233. 
Noonan  v.   Orton    (31    Wis.   265), 

610. 
Norcross     v.     Norcross      (53     Me. 

163),  72. 
Norden  v.  Bosman  (21  Juta,  634), 

695. 
Nordin    v.    Kjos    (13    S.    D.    497; 

83  N.  W.  573).  1898. 
Norfleet  v.  State    (4   Sneed,  340), 

2068. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth   (93  Va.  749;  24  S.  E. 

837),  324. 


Norfolk,   etc.,    R.   Co.   v.   Harman 
(83    Va.    553;    8    S.    E.   251), 

2184,  2185. 
Norfolk,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Hoover 
(79  Md.  253;  n  Atl.  994;  25 

L.  R.  A.  710),  2201. 
Norfolk     &     Western     R.     Co.     v. 

Hoover    (79  Md.  253;   29  Atl. 

994;   25  L.  R.  A.  710),  2198. 
Norgans  Liquors,  In  re    (16  R.  I. 

542;   18  Atl.  279),  1043. 
Norman  v.  Commonwealtli    ( [Ky.] 

104    S.    W.    1024;    31    Ky.    L. 

Rep.  1283),  2068. 
Norman    v.    Thompson     (90    Tex. 

250;    72    S.   W.   62;    affirming 

30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  537;    72  S. 

W.  64.1,  888,  903,  920,  925. 
Norment   v.    Charlotte    (85   N.   C. 

387),   904. 
Normoyle  v.  Latah   Co.    (5   Idaho, 

19;    46    Pac.   831),   797. 
Norris,   Ex   parte    (23    N.    S.    W. 

27;    6   S.  R.   [N.  S.  W.]   47), 

1354. 
Norris  v.  Langley  (19  N.  H.  423), 

1807. 
Norris  v.  Oakman   (138  Ala.  411; 

35  So.  450),  460. 
North  V.  Barringer   (147  Ind.  224; 

46  N.  E.  531),  534,  618,  758. 
Northern   Ind.  R.  Co.  v.   Connelly 

(10  O.  S.   159),  793. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Craft   ( 29 

U.  S.  App,  687;  69  Fed.  124; 

16  C.  C.  A.   175),  2176,  2191, 

2192,   2193,    2194,   2195. 
Northern    Pacific    R.   Co.    v.    San- 
ders  (47  Fed.  604),  1162. 
Northern   Pac.   R,   Co.   v.   Whalen 

(3    Wash.    T.    452;     17    Pac. 

890),   675,   658,   980. 
Northwestern    ^lut.    Life    Ins.   Co. 

(122    U.    S.    501;    30    L.    Ed. 

1100;    7    Sup.    Ct.   Rep.    1221; 

Appeal  of  Miskey  [107  Pa. 

St.  611]),  64,  65,  2233,  2243. 
Norton  v.  Alexander  ( 28  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  466;  67  S.  W.  787), 
921,  922,  923,  925. 


CCXXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Xorton  V.  Salisbury  (4  C.  B.  32), 

569. 
Norton    V,    State    (65    Miss.    297; 

3  So.    665),    934,    1464,    1468, 
1513,  1765. 

Xorton  V.  W.  H.  Thomas,  etc.,  Co. 

([Tex.   Civ.   App.]    91    S.   W. 

780),  1785. 
Xorton  V.  W.  H.  Thomas,  etc.,  Co. 

([Tex.   Civ.   App.]    93   S.   W. 

711),  1785. 
Xortwick  v.  Bennett   (62  S.  J.  L. 

151),  646, 
Norwood   V.   Raleigh,   etc.,   R.   Co. 

(Ill  X.  C.  236;    16  S.  E.  4), 

2178,  2183. 
Xorwood  V.  Stuart   (23  N.  Z.  473, 

1108),  1300. 
Xossman  v.  Rickert  (18  Ind.  350), 

1989. 
Xourse  v.  Pope   (13  Allen),  1807. 
Kovich  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.]  86  S.  W. 

332),  1282. 
Xowotny   v.   Blair    (32   Xeb.    175; 

49  X.  W.  357),  1937. 
Xundy,  In  re   (59  How.  Pr.  359), 

627,  634. 
Xundy,  In  re    (3  Pennewill,  282; 

51  Atl.  005),  540. 
Xurnberger  v.  Bornwell    (42  S.  C. 

158;    20  S.   E.    14),   815. 
Xussbaumer  v.  State   (54  P'la.  87; 

4  So.  712),  80,  85,  87. 
Xussear   v.   Arnold    (13    S.   &    R. 

323),  2140. 
Nye    v.    Lowiy    (S2    Ind.    316), 
605. 


Oak    Clifr    V.    State     ([Tex.    Civ. 

App.]    77    S.  W.   24;    affirmed 

67    Tex.    391;    79    S.    W.    1), 

234. 
Oak  Clitr  V.  State  ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

107   S.   W.   1121),   1553. 
Oakes  v.  Marrificld    (93   Me.  297; 

45  Atl.  31),   1791,   1807. 
O'Banion  v.  Do  Garmo   (121   Iowa, 

139;  96  X.  W.  739),  774. 


Oberer  v.  State    (28  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.   620),    1558. 
Oberfell,    In    re     (28    Pa.     Super. 

Ct.   68),   565. 
O'Brien,  In  re    (29  Mont.  530;   75 

Pac.   196),  232,  234,  919,  932. 
O'Brien  v.  Mahon  (126  Iowa,  539; 

102  X.  W.  446),  755,  759,  774, 

775,    797,    801,    802. 
O'Brien  v.  People   (36  X.  Y.  276), 

2051. 
O'Brien  v.  People   (48  Barb.  274), 

2054. 
O'Brien  v.  Putney   (55  Iowa,  292; 

7  X.  W.  615),   1924,   1927. 
O'Brien    v.    State     (91     Ala.     16; 

8  So.  560),   1161. 

O'Brien    v.    State     (109    Ga.    51; 

35  S.   E.   112),  230,    1600. 
O'Brien    v.    State    (63    Ind.    242), 

1520,   1522. 
O'Bryan    v.    Fitzpatrick    (48   Ark. 

487;     3    S.    W.    527),     1792, 

1806. 
O'Bryan    v.    State    (48    Ark.    42; 

2  S.  W.  339),   1555,   1560. 
O'Bryane  v.  Hadley  (  [Ala.]  50  So. 

87),   1811. 
O'Connell    v.    Garrett     ( 145    ]Nfass. 

311;     14    X.    E.    234),     1229. 
O'Connell  v.  Larkins    (5  X.  S.  W. 

L.  R.  8),   1293. 
O'Connell    v.    O'Leary    (145   Mass. 

311;     14    X.    E.     143),     1227, 

1932. 
O'Connell   v.    O'Malley    (18   X.   Z. 

577),   1153,   1154. 
O'Connell    v.    State     ( [Ga.    App.] 

62  S.  E.  10071,  1696. 
O'Conner,     In    re     (Temp.     Wood 

[Manitoba]    293),    683. 
O'Connor   v.  Rempt    (29  X.  J.  Eq. 

156),  2095,  2099,  2108. 
O'Connor,    In    re     (Temp.     Wood 

[Manitoba]    284).   567. 
O'Connor    v.    Board    ([Idaho]    105 

Pac.  560),  868. 
O'Connor    v.    Congen    ( 102    N.    Y. 

702;    7    X.    E.    309),    1975. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CCXXlll 


[Referfnces  are  to  pages.] 


O'Connor  v.  Gillespie   ( 17  Vict.  L. 

R,  374),  1192. 
O'Connor  v.  Kielman   ([Iowa]   121 

X.  W.  1088),  1784. 
O'Connor    v.    Price    ( 14    Vict.    L. 

R.  946;   10  Austr.  L.  T.  155), 

1347. 
O'Connor  v.  State    (45  Ind.  347), 

1291,  1292,  1501,  1517,  1742. 
Odd  Fellows'   Mut.  L.   Ins.   Co.  v. 

Rohkopp    (94    Pa.    St.    59;    9 

Ins.  I.  Jr.  787),  2236,  2245. 
O'Dea  V.  State  (57  Ind.  31),  144. 
Odell   V.   Wharton    (87   Tex.    173; 

27  S.  W.  123),  925. 
O'Donnell   v.  Commonwealth    ( 108 

Va.  882;  62  S.  E.  373),  1461, 

1616,    1706. 
O'Driscoll  V.  Viard   (2  Bay  [S.  C] 

316),   558. 
Oechslein    v.    Passaic     (2     X.    J. 

Law  J.  85),  441. 
O'Flaherty    v.    Hackett    (14    Vict. 

L.   R.   97),    1132. 
O'Flinn    v.    State     (66     Miss.    7; 

5  So.  390),  766,  767,  771. 
Ogburn  v.  Elmore    (123  Ga.   677; 

51   S.   E.   641),   920,  925. 
Ogden    V.    Saunders     (12    Wheat. 

[U.  S.]    213),  261. 
Oglesby  v.  State   (121  Ga.  602;  49 

S.  E.  706),  283,  1525. 
O'Grady  v.  People    (42  Colo.  312; 

95*^  Pac.    346),    1579,    1580. 
O'Grady   v.   State    (36    Neb.    320; 

54 'X.  W.  556),  2040,  2081. 
O'Hagan  v.  Dillon   ( 10  Jones  &  S. 

456),   2171,   2186,   2195. 
O'Halloran  v.  Jackson    ( 107  Mich. 

138;    64  X.  W.   1046),  763. 
O'Halloran    v.    Kingston     (16    111. 

App.  [16  Bradw.]  659),  1912. 
O'Hara,    In    re     (63    X.    Y.    App. 

512;     71    X.    Y.    Supp.    613), 

884,  889. 
O'Hare  v.   Chicago    (125   HI.  App. 

73),    167. 
O'Hara   v.    Cox    (42    Miss.    496), 

793. 


O'Herrin  v.   State    (14  Ind.  420), 

2040,  2080. 
Ohio  V.  Dollison    (194   U.  S.  445; 

24   Sup.   Ct.   703;    48    L.    Ed. 

1062;    affirming    68    Ohio    St. 

688;    70   X.    E.    1131),   250. 
Ohlrogg  V.  Worth  County  (  [Iowa] 

99  X.  W.  178),  1002. 
Ohlsson  V.   Kuhr    (18  Juta,  205), 

712,   1812. 
Oil    City    V.    Oil    City    Trust    Co. 

(15\    Pa.    St,    454;     31    Am. 

St.  Rep.  770),  426. 
Oke    V.    McManus     ([Iowa]     121 

X.   W.    177,  reversing   115  X. 

W.  580),  1271. 
O'Keefe    v.    Chicago,    etc.,   R.    Co. 

(32  Iowa,  467),  2172. 
O'Keefe    v.    Chicago,    etc,    R.    Co. 

(32    Iowa,    467),    2178,    2184. 
O'Keefe    v.    State     (24    Ohio    St. 

175),  1095. 
Oldham,   J.    J.    v.   Gee    (66    J.   P. 

341;    18  T.  L.  R.  34S ) ,  710. 
Oldham  v.  Ramsden    (44   L.  J.  C. 

P.    309;    22   L.   T.   825;    39  J. 

P.   583),  378. 
Oldham    v.     Sheasby     (60     L.    J. 

M.  C.  81;  55  J.  P.  214),  1152. 
Oldham  V.  State  ( 52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

516;     108    S.    W.    657),    784, 

1220,    1378,    1605,    1620. 
O'Leary    v.    Frisby    ( 17    111.    App. 

553),   1912. 
O'Leary    v.    State     (44    Ind.    91), 

1353,   1357,    1359,    1615,   1629, 

1633,   1655. 
Olivaris   v.    State    (23    Tex.    App. 

305;   4  S.  W.  903),  918. 
Oliver  v.  Connell    (29  Vict.  L.  R. 

329;    25    Austr.    L.   T.    76;    9 

Austr.  L.  R.   177),  712. 
Oliver  v.  London    (60  J.  P.  248), 

1317. 
Ollre   V.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.    App.] 

123  S.   W.   1116),   1354. 
Olmstead  v.  Crook    (89  Ala.  228; 

7   S.  E.   776),  867,   872,  918, 

930. 


ccxxiv 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Olmstead    v.    Noll    (82   Neb.    147 

117  N.  W.  102),  1981. 
Olmstead   v.   State    (90   Ala.    634 

8  So.  ',68),   1637. 
Olmstead   v.    State    (89    Ala.    16 

7  So.  775),   1456. 
Olson    V.    Hurley     (33    Minn.    39 

21  N.  W.  842),  1805. 
Olson    V.    People     (125    111.    App. 

460),   1759,   1760. 
Omit  V.  Commonwealth    (9  Harris 

[Pa.]   426),  1310. 
O'Neal  V.  Adams  ([Iowa]  122  Pac. 

976),  2263. 
O'Neal  V.  Minary   (101  S.  W.  951; 

30  Ky.  L.  Kep.  888;    125  Ky. 

571),  859,  874,  893,  900,  904, 

934,  9.35,  043. 
O'Neal   V.   Parker    (83   Ark.    133; 

103  S.  W.  165),  1028. 
O'Neil  V.  Murray   (4  Bradf.  311), 

2136. 
O'Neil,  Ex  parte   (9  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

141),    263. 
O'Neil  V.  Keokuk,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (45 

Iowa,  456),  2253. 
O'Neill    V.    Nolan    (50    N.    Y,    St. 

Rep.    641;     21     N.    Y.     Supp. 

222),  2106,  2122. 
O'Neil  V.  State    (116  Ga.  839;   43 

S.  E.  248),   1538. 
O'Neil  V.  State    (76  Neb.  44;    107 

N.   W.    119),    1022,    1084. 
O'Neil  V.  Vermont  (144  U.  S.  323; 

12    Sup.   Ct.   693;    36   L.    Ed. 

450),  298,  299,  307. 
Optumwa  V.  Schaub    (52   la.  515; 

3   N.   W.   529),   471. 
Orange     Co.     v.     Douglierty      (55 

Barb.  332),   1369. 
Orcutt   V.   Nelson    (1    Gray,   536), 

1786,    1796. 
Orcutt  V.  Renigardt    (46  N.  J.  L. 

337),   80,   561,   575,   577,   859. 
Oriatt   V.    Pond    (29    Conn.    479), 

lOOS,    1031. 
Orke    V.    McManus     ([Iowa]     115 

N.   W.    580),   ,341,   364,    1782. 
O'Reilly  -, .  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

85   S.  W.  8),   1474. 


Orme  v.  Tuscumbia  ( 150  Ala.  520; 

43  So.  589),  453,  1122. 
Ormerod    v.    Chadwick    ( 16    M,   &, 

W.    687;     2    N.    Sess.     697), 

567. 
O'Rourke  v.  People    (3  Hun,  225; 

5  Thomp.  &  C.  496),  533. 
Osborn  v.  .Sargent    (23  Me.   527), 

1739. 
Osborn  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

26  S.  W.  025),  2046. 
Osborne  v.   Hare    (40  J.   P.   759), 

374,  1145. 
Osborne    v.    State    (77    Ark.    439; 

92  S.  W.  406),  1015,  1022. 
Osburn  v.  Marietta    (118  Ga.  53; 

44  S.  E.  807),  168,  452. 
Osgood  V.  People    (39  N.  Y.  449), 

1493,  1504. 
Oshe  V.  State    (37   Ohio  St.  494), 

1093,   1091,   1456. 
Oshkosh   V.    State    (59    Wis.   425; 

18  N.  W.  324),  683,  740. 
O'Shannessey  v.   State    ( [Tex.  Cr. 

App.]    96    S.    W.    790),    1624, 

1598,   1602. 
Ostler  V.  State   (3  Ind.  App.  122; 

29  N.  E.  270),  1109. 
Oswald  V.   Moran    (8   N.   D.    Ill; 

77  N.  W.  281),   1804. 
Oswego  Lake   Tp.   v.   Kirstcn    (72 

Mich.  1 ;  40  N.  W.  26 ) ,  945. 
Ott,  In  re  (95  Fed.  274),  2263. 
Ottawa  V.  La  Salle    (11  111.  339), 

473. 
Otte   V.    State    (29    Ohio    Cir.    Ct. 

Rep.  203),  132,  853,  911,  1444, 

1553,   1589,    1602. 
Ottman    v.     Young     (12     Hawaii, 

303),  639,  644. 
Otto    V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

87    S.    W.    698),    1214,    1282, 

1289. 
Ottumwa  V.  Schaub  (52  Iowa,  515; 

3  N.  W.  529),  714,  727,   767. 
Ottumwa  V.  Zekind  (95  Iowa,  922; 

64    N.   W.   622;    29    L.   R.    A. 

734;    58    Am.   .St.    447),    483. 
Ould     V.     Richmond      (23     Gratt. 

[Va.]    464),  791 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


ecxxv 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Ouong  Woo,  In  re   (13  Fed.  229), 

189. 
Our    V.   'Commonwealth    (9    Dana, 

9),  1541. 
Our    House    Xo.    2    v.    State     (4 

Greene  [Iowa]   172).  109,256, 

989,     14S(],     1551. 
Outlaw   V.    State    (35    Tex.    481), 

2040. 
Outred  v.  Keddel    (2  N.  Y.   201), 

1279. 
Ovenden    v.    Raymond     ( 40    J.    P. 

727),  1145,  "^1318. 
Overall  v.  Berzeau  (37  Mic-li.  50G). 

76,     1085,     1111,     1115,     1158, 

1169. 
Overby    v.    State    (18    Fla.    178), 

789. 
Overman    v.    State     ( 88    Ind.    0 ) , 

1109. 
Overseen,  etc.  v.   Warner    ( 3   Hill 

[N.  Y.]   150),  498. 
Overton  v.  Hunter    (23  J.  P.  S08 ; 

1  L.  T.  360),  1136. 
Overton    v.    Schindele     (85    Iowa, 

715;    50   N.  W.   977),   991. 
Overseers     v.     W^oerner      ( 3     Hill, 

150),    72. 
Overstreet    v.   Brubaclier    (98   Mo. 

App.    75;     71    .S.    W.    1090), 

1805. 
Oviatt    v.    Pond    ( 29    Conn.    479 1 . 

109,   125,  126,  253,  255,   1776, 

1777. 
Owen     v.     Armstrong     ( 13     Juta, 

408),  969. 
Owen  V.   Geyer    (9   Juta,    [H.   C] 

162),   1347. 
Owen  V.  Langf ord   ( 55  J.  P.  484 ) , 

1218. 
0^ven  v.  McLean   (3  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

323),    45. 
Owens    V.    People     (56    111.    App. 

•569),  532,    1752. 
Owens  V.  State   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

634;    85   S.  W.   794),   950. 
Owensboro    v.    Ellter     (3    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    [abstract]    255),   815. 


Owensboro    v.    Fulds     ( [Ky.]    102 

S.   W.    1184;    31    Ky.   L.   Rep. 

627),   794. 
Owing's    Case      (1      Bland,     371), 

2093. 
Oxford    V.    Frank     (30    Tex.    1  iv. 

App.  343 ;  70  S.  W.  426 ) ,  920, 

939. 
Oxford  V.  State   (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

321;    94   S.   VV.   463),    1380. 
Oxford  V.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

97  S.   W.  484).  948. 
Oxley  V.  Allen    ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

107  S.  W.  945),  909,  923,  938, 

939,    942. 


Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Crenshaw 

(120  Fed.  144),  148,  151,  162, 

225,  240,  1383. 
Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Crenshaw 

(198    U.   S.    17;    25    Sup.    Ct. 

552;    49  L.  Ed.  925,  affirming 

120  Fed.   144),   147,  225,  328, 

331,  332,  427. 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  City  of  Terre 

Haute    (98   Fed.   330),  427. 
Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Common- 

v^ealth   ([Ky.]  107  S.  W.  728, 

729;    32    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1010, 

1013).  952.' 
Pace    v.    Raleigh    (140    X.    C.    65; 

52    S.   E.  277),   861. 
Pace  v.  State  ([Ala.]  50  So.  353), 

1581. 
Pacific  University  v.  Johnson   (47 

Ore.  448;    84   Pac.   704),   403. 
Paden  v.  Carson  (15  Okla.  399;  82 

Pac.  830),  671. 
Padgett   V.    State    (93    Ind.    396), 

507,    673. 
Padgett  V.  Sturgis   ( [Ga.]  65  S.  E. 

352),  1023. 
Paducah  v.  James    ( [Ky.]    104  S. 

W.  971;  31  Ky,  L.  Rep.  1203), 

430. 


CCXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pases.] 


Paducah  v.  Jones    (126   Ky.   829; 

104    S.    W.    971;    31    Ky.    L. 

Rep.  1203),   1358. 
Page  V.  District  of  Columbia   (20 

App.  D.  C.  4(59),  546. 
Page  V.  Krekey    (137   N.  Y.   307; 

33   N.   E.    311;    21    L.    R.    A. 

409),  2112. 
Page  V.  Krekey   (63  Hun,  629;   17 

N.  Y.  Supp.  764;   21  L.  R.  A. 

409),  2121. 
Page    V.    Luther     (51    N.    C.     [6 

Jones]   413),  1246. 
Page   V.    Page    ( [Wash  ]    96    Pac. 

82),  2156. 
Page  V.  Ratclifle   ([No.  2]    [1896] 

75  L.  T.  371),   1831. 
Page  V.  State    (11   Ala.   849),   72, 

448,   550. 
Page  V.  State    (4   South,  697;    84 

Ala.    446),    771,    1220,    1230, 

ni4,   1845. 
Page   V.   State    (28   Ohio   Cir.    Ct. 

Rep.  660),  1462. 
Palmer   v.   Doney    (2    Johns.    Cas. 

346),  499. 
Pain  V.  Boughwood   (24  Q.  B.  Div. 

353;    55  J.  P.  469),    1383. 
Paleher  v.  United  States   ( 1 1  Fed. 

47),    1030,    1259. 
Palenthorpe  v.  Home  Brewery  Co., 

Limited    ([1906]    2   K.   B.   5; 

75    L.    J.    K.    B.   555;    94    L. 

T.    871;    54    W.    R.    4-89;    22 

T,  L.  R.  505),   1824. 
Palmer,    In    re     (3    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

314),   603. 
Palmer   v.   Doney    (2   Johns.   Cas. 

346),  504,   559. 
Palmer  v.  Hartford   ( 73  Mich.  96 ; 

40  N.  VV.  850),  764. 
Palmer    v.    Sehurz     ([S.    D.]     117 

X.  W.  150),  1631,  1839,  1842, 

1849,   1869,    1896,    1903,    1939, 

1941. 
Pana  v.   State    (51   Ark.   481;    11 

S.  W.  692),  1586. 
Pancake    v.    State     (81    Ind.    93), 

1538,  1034. 


Pancoast   v.    Graham    (2   McCart. 

[N.  J.]  294),  2137,  2142. 
Paola  V.  Williford    (65  Kan.  859; 

69  Pac.  331),  1191. 
Papworth   v.   Fitzgerald    ( 106  Ga. 

378;   32  S.  E.  363),  127,  168, 

452, 
Papworth    v,    Goodnow    ( 104    Ga. 

683;  30  S.  E.  872),  639. 
Paquet    v,    Emery     (87    Me.    215; 

,  32  Atl.  881),  1051. 
Paris    V.    Graham     (33    Mo.    94), 

408,  418. 
Paris,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Robinson 

([Tex.   Civ.  App.]    114  S.  W. 

058),   2201,   2202. 
Parish  v.  State   (47  Tex,  Cr.  App. 

148;  82  S.  W,  517),  1743. 
Parish  v.  Thurston   (87  Ind.  437), 

2127. 
Park   V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

98  S.  W.  243),  1729. 
Parker  v.  Alder    ([1899]    1   Q.  B. 

Div.    23;    68    L.    J.    Q.    B.    7; 

62  J.  P.  772;   47  W.  R.  142; 

79    L.    T.    381;     15    T.    L.    R. 

3;   19  Cox  C.  C.  191),  1383. 
Parker  v.  Barker    (43  N.  H.   36), 

1058. 
Parker   v.    Commonwealtli    ([Ky.] 

12   S.   W.  276),  835. 
Parker  v.  Commonwealth   (6  Barr, 

[Penn.]    507),    231,   240. 
Parker  v.  Green    (2   B.  &   S.  299; 

26  J.  P.  247;   31   L.  J.  M.  C, 

133;     10    W.    R.    316),    367, 

726. 
Parker  v.  Griffith    ([N.  C]    06  S. 

E.   565).    434. 
Parker    v.    Parker     (52    111.    App. 

333),    1736. 
Parker  v.  Portland  (54  Mich.  308; 

20  N.  W.  55),  764. 
Parker  v.  Regina    ([1896]    2  Irish 

Rep.  404),  1152. 
Parker    v.    State     (126    Ga,    443; 

55   S.   E.   329),   938. 
Parker    v.    State    (27    Ind,    393), 

1304,   1307,   1308. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CCXXVU 


[References  are  lo  pages.] 


Parker    v.    State     (31    Ind.    App. 

1>50;   68  N.  E.  912),  822,  825, 

833,  971. 
Parker  v.  State    (99   Md.   189;   57 

Atl.     677),     111,     281,     1523, 
1524. 
Parker  v.  State   (62  N.  J.  L.  801; 

45  Atl.   1092,  affirming  61   N. 

J.  L.  308;  39  Atl.  651),  1110. 
Parker  v.  State   (4  Ohio  St.  563), 

1564,   1615. 
Parker    v.    State     (12    Tex.    App. 

401),  883. 
Parker  v.  State  (39  Tex.  €r.  App. 

262;     45    S.    W.    812),     1200, 

1680. 
Parker  v.  State  (45  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

334;   77  S.  W.  783),  1608. 
Parker  v.  State  (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

69;    85   S.   W.   1155),   1280. 
Parker  v.  State    ( [Tex.   Cr,  App.] 

75  S.  VV.  30),  1699. 
Parker  v.  .State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

84  S.  W.  822),  1225. 
Parker  v.  Wayne  Co.    (104   N.  C. 

166;      10     S.     E.     137),     793, 

797. 
Parker    v.    Winona,    etc.,    R.    Co. 

(83  Minn.  212;   86  X.  W.  2), 

2217. 
Parkinson  v.   State    (14   Md.    184; 

74  Am.  Dec.  522),  289,  1173, 

1223,   1515,   1563. 
Parks  V.  State   (15  Ind.  9211;   64 

N.  E.  862),  1443. 
Parks  V.   State    ([Ky.]    96   S.   W. 

328),  1282. 
Parmell    v.    State    (29    Ga.    681), 

1245. 
Parmenter    v.    United    States     (6 

Ind.  Ter.  530;   98  S.  W.  3"40), 

1505. 
Parrent  v.  Little    (72  X.  H.   566; 

58   Atl.    510),    718,    719,    814, 

819. 
Parrott  v.  Commonwealth    (6  Ky. 

L.   Rep.  221),  21,  52,  58,  60, 

1698,   1699. 
Parrott  v.  Wilson    (51   Ga.  255), 

1767. 


Parsley    v.    Hutehins    (47    X'.    C. 

159),   522. 
Parsons    v.    Alexander    (24    L.    J. 
Q.   B.   277;    5   E.   &   B.   263), 
374. 
Parsons  v.  George  (17  Juta,  192), 

567. 
Parsons   v.   People    (32   Colo.   22; 
76   Pac.   666),    170,    198,   200, 
286,  789. 
Part  of  Lot  294  v.  State  ( 1  Clarke 

[Iowa]  507),  1016. 
Parvin  v.  Winberg  (130  Ind.  661; 

30  X.  E.  790),  900. 
Paschal    v.    State     (84    Ga,    326; 

10  S.  E.  821),  1166,  1180. 
Pase    V.    State     ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

79  S.  W.  531),  1735. 
Pasquier  v.  Xeale  ([1902]  2  Iv.  B. 
287;  67  J.  P.  49;  72  L.  J. 
K.  B.  835;  51  W.  R.  92;  87 
L.  T.  2.30;  18  T.  L.  R.  704), 
690,  1275,  1318. 
Passenger  Cases   (7  How,  283;    12 

L.    Ed.    102),    100,   298. 
Paston    V.    State    ( [Xeb.]    119    X. 

W.  520),  1708. 
Patchell,  Ex  parte  ( 34  N.  B.  258 ) , 

549. 
Pate  V.  Jonesboro    (75   Ark.  276; 

87  S.  W.  437),  468. 
Patman  v.  Harland  (  [1881]  17  Ch. 
D.  353;   50  L.  J.  Ch.  642;   44 
L.    T.    728;    29    W.    R.    707), 
1814. 
Pattee   v.   Thompson    ([X.  H.]    41 

Atl.   265),    1743. 
Patten  v.  Centralia    (47  111.  370), 

71,  1126. 
Patten  v.  Rhymer   (3  El,  &  El.  1; 
29    L.    J.    M.    C.    189;    24    J. 
P.  342;   2  L.  T.  352;   8  W.  R. 
496),  373,  374. 
Patterson,  In  re   ( 4  How.  Pr.  $4  ) , 

2151. 
Patterson,  In  re    (43  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.    498;     89    N.    Y.    Supp. 
437),  584. 
Patterson  v.   Kentucky    (97  U.  S. 
501),  95,  es,  117,  315,  489. 


cexxvm 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Patterson    v.    Murray    (15    X.    Z. 

L.  R.  487),  1812,  1818. 
Patterson  v.  Nicol  (115  Iowa,  283; 

88  X.  W.  323),  984. 
Patterson  v.  Society,  etc.,  24  N.  J. 

L.  385),   394/ 
Patterson  v.  State    (21  Ala.  571), 

13(50. 
Patterson  v.  State    (3(3  Ala.  297), 

1293. 
Patterson     v.     State      ([Tex.    tr. 

App.]   90  S.  W.  31),  1482. 
Patton    V.    McDonald     (30    N.    P.. 

523),    1027,    1075,    1076. 
Patton    V.    People     ( 1    Colo.    77 ) , 

521. 
Patton   V.    State    (80   Ga.    714;    6 

S.  E.  273),   1650,   1651,  1740. 
Patton  V.  State   (31  Tex.'Cr.  Rep. 

20;     19     S.    W.     252 J,     1568, 

1569. 
Patton  V.  State    (42  Tex.'Cr.  496: 

61  S.  W.  309),   1233,   1234. 
Patton  V.  State    ([Tex.'Cr.  App.] 

100  S.  W.  778),  1468,  1472. 
Patton  V.  Williams    (35  Tex.  Civ. 

App.     129;     79    S.    W.    357), 

773,  781. 
Patrick  v.  State  ( 45  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

587;    78    S.    W.    947  K    1608, 

1690,  1703. 
Patrick  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

87  S.  W.  947),  1185. 
Patrick   v.   Victor   Knitting   Mills 

Co.    (37  N.  Y.  Supp.  Div.   7; 

55    N.    Y.    Supp.    340),    2254, 

2255. 
Paul  V.  Gloucester  Co.    (50  X.  J. 

L.  585;    15  Atl.  272;    1  L.  Pv. 

A.    86),    221,    228,    233,    236, 

397,  888,  892. 
Paul    V.    State     ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

106  S.  W.  448),  132,  169,  975, 

976. 
Paul    V.    Troyor     (3    Minn.    291), 

402. 
Paul    V.    Washington    (134   X.   C. 

363;  47  S.  E.  793;  65  L.  R.  A. 

902),  431,  455,  461,  472. 


Paulina's   Cargo  v.  United   States 

(7  Cranch  [U.  S.]  52).  252. 
Paulk  V.  Sycamore   (105  Ga.  501; 

31  S.  E.  200),  452,  1082. 
Paulson    V.    Languess     (16    S.    D. 

471;  83  X.  W.  655),  1911. 
Pfiunders  v.  State    (37  Ark.  399), 

1237. 
Payne  v.  Jolinston  (22  X.  Z.  176), 

1153. 
Payne  v.  State    (66   Ark.  545;    52 

S.  W.  276),  2247. 
Payne    v.    State     (74    Ind.    203), 

1226,  1500,  1561,  1630. 
Payne  v.  State    ( 5  Tex.   App.  35 ) , 

2067. 
Payne  v.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

19  S.  W.  677),  1630. 
Pajne  v.  Thomas   ( 60  L.  J.  M.  C. 

3:  53  J.  P.  824;  63  L.  T.  456; 

17  Cox,   C.  C.  212:    39  W.  R. 

240 t,   353. 
Paynor  v.  Holzgraf    (35  Tex.  Civ. 
'  App.    233;     79    S.    W.    829), 

772. 
Peache  v.  Colman    (L.  R.  1   C.  P. 

324;     35    L.    J.    M.    C.     118; 

14  W.  R.  439),  1151. 
Peacock    v.    Limburger     (95    Tex. 

258:   67  S.  W.  518),  210,  219, 

1239,  1245. 
Peacock  v.  Oaks  (85  Mich.  578; 

48  X.  W.  1082),  1848,  1960, 

1943. 
Peak  V.  Bidinger    (133  Iowa,  127; 

110  X.  W.  292).  979. 
Pearce  v.   Brooks    (L.  R.    1   Exch. 

213),  1795. 
Pearce   v.   Commonwealth    ( 5   Ky. 

L.   Rep.   407),    1545. 
Pearce    v.    State     (40    Ala.    720), 

1293,   1610. 
Pearce  v.  State   (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

150;    32    S.    W.    697),    509. 
Pearce  v.  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

352;   88  S.  W.  234),  825,  833, 

972. 
Pearman   v.  Pearraan    ( 1   Swab.  & 

T.  601 ;  29  L.  J.  Mat.  [X.  S.J 

54;   8  W.  R.  274),  2166. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CCXXIS 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Pearsall  v.  Supervisors    (71  Mich. 

438;    39    N.    W.    578),    878. 
Pearson's    Case    ( 2    Lewin,    C.    C. 

144),  2039. 
Pearson    v.    Broadbent    ( 30    J.    P. 

485),  682,  084. 
Pearson    v.    Cass    Co.     (90    Iowa, 

750;   57  N.  W.  871),  1001. 
Pearson    v.     International     Distil- 
lery  (72  Iowa,  348;  34  N.  W. 

1;    affirmed    128    U.    S.    1 ;    9 

Sup.  Ct.   6;    32   L.   Ed.   340), 

111,   119,   126,  101,  827,   1194. 
Pearse    v.    Gill     (41    J.    P.    742), 

1138. 
Pearson  v.  State   (00  Miss.  510;   0 

So.    243;     4    L.    R.    A.    835), 

1280,  1284. 
Pease  v.  Coats  ([1806]  L.  Pv.  2 

Eq.  688;  36  L.  J.  Ch.  57;  30 

J.  P.  819;  14  L.  T.  880), 

1813. 
Peavy  v.  Georgia,  etc.,  Co.  (81  Ga. 

485;   8  S.  E.  70),  2200. 
Peavy  v.   Goss    (  [Tex.   Civ.   App.] 

37    S.    W.    317),    1895,    1897, 

1903. 
Pecaria  v.  State  ( 48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

352;   90  S.  W.  42),  952. 
Peck,  In  re    (107   N.   Y.    391;    00 

N.  E.  775;   53  L.  R.  A.  888- 

reversing  57  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 

035;    68    N.    Y.    Supp.    1145), 

738,  743,  990. 
Peck,   In   re    (42   X.   Y.    St.    Rep. 

898),  2142. 
Peck   V.    Cary    (27    X.    Y.    9;    84 

Am.    Dec.    220),    2134,    2135, 

2130,   2138,   2140,   2142. 
Peck    V.    Conner    ( 82    Iowa,    725 ; 

47  X.  W.  977),  1001. 
Peck  V.  Jenness    (7  How.   [U.  S.] 

624),  1012. 
Peck  V.  Weddell  (17  Ohio  St.  271), 

925. 
Peckover  v.  Defries   ( 95  L.  T.  883 ; 

71    J.   P.    38;    21    Cox,   C.   C. 

323;    23    T.   L.   R.    20),    1220, 

1350,  1373. 


Peddie  v.  Bennett  (01  J.  P.  680), 

370. 
Pedigo    V.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

68  S.  VV.  1113;  70  S.  W.  659; 

24    Ky.    L.    Rep.    535),    1084, 

1097. 
Pedigo  V.  Commonwealth    (24  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  1029;   70  S.  W.  059), 

33,   83. 
Peer  v.  Board    (70  X.  J.  L.  496; 

57  Atl.  153),  092. 
Peer   v.   Commonwealth    (5   Gratt. 

074),  1452. 
Pegram  v.  Storty  (31  W.  Va.  220; 

6  S.  E.  485),  1850,  1852,  1934, 

1984. 
Pehrson    v.    Ephraini     ( 14    Utah, 

147;   46  Pac.  657),  716. 
Peirce  v.  Xew  Hampshire    (40  U. 

S.  504),  1433. 
Peisch   V.   Linder    (73   Iowa,   766; 

33  X.  W.   133),  991. 
Peitz  V.   State    (08   Wis.   538;    32 

X.  W.  703),  1373. 
Pekin    v.    Smelzel     (21    111.    464; 

74    Am.    Dec.    105),    83,    395, 

398,  432,  470. 
Pelgreen  v.   State    (71  Ark.  308), 

1280. 
Polham    v.    Page     (0    Ark.    535), 

2250,  2255. 
Pellecat  v.  Angell   (2  Cromp.  M.  & 

R.  311,  313),  1794. 
Pelly  v.  Wills    (141   Ind.   688;   41 

X.    E.    354),    598,    599,    600, 

622,  637,  639,  1350. 
Pelton    v.    Drummond     (21     Xeb. 

492;  32  X.  W.  593),  507,  508. 
Pemberton  v.  State    (11  Ind.  App. 

297;    38    X.    E.    1,090),    1749, 

1751. 
Pence  v.  Commonwealth  (5  Ky,  L. 

Rep.    [abstract]    608;    6    Ky. 

L.  Rep.  113),  353. 
Pendennis    Club    v.    Louisville    (7 

Ky.  L.  Rep.   [abstract]    831), 

1159,   1331,  1342,   1345. 
Pendergast  v.  Peru    (20   III.  51), 

1640. 


ccxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Heferences  are  to  pages.] 


Penn  v.   Alexander    ([1893]    1    Q. 

B.  522;    57   J.   P.    118;    68   L. 

T.    355;    41    VV.    R.    392;     17 

Cox,  C.  C.  615),  1150. 
Penn  v.  State  ([Tex.  Cr.  App.]  68 

S.  W.  170),  1706. 
Pennell   v.   State    ([Wi.s.]    123   N. 

W.   115),   19,  32,   162. 
Penner  v.  Commonwealth  (111  Ky. 

604;    64    S.    W.    435;    23    Ky. 

L.   Rep.  774),    1380,   1381. 
Penny  v.  VVairant  (26  N.  Z.  234), 

689. 
Penney  v.  Warren  ( 22  N.  Y.  602 ) , 

1297. 
Penniman  v.  Cole  (8  Met.  [Mass.] 

496),  1067. 
Pennington     v.     Baelir     ( 48    Cal. 

565 ) ,   605. 
Pennington    v.    Gillespie     (63    \V. 

Va.  541;   61  S.  E.  416),  1956, 

1962. 
Pennington   v.  Pincock    ([1908]    2 

K.    B.    244;    77    L.    J.    K.    B. 

537;   98   L.  T.  804;    72   J.   P. 

199;    6   L.   G.    R.    830;    24   T. 

L.  R.  509),  354. 
Pennington    v.    Streight    ( 54    Ind. 

376),    1014. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Books    (57 

Pa.    343;    98    Am.    Dec.    299), 

2199. 
Pennsylvania    v.    KefTer     (Addison 

[Pa.]  290),  2031. 
Pennsylvania   v.   McFall    ( 1   Addi- 
son [Pa.]  257),  2040. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Xewmeyer 

(129  Ind.  401;  28  X.  E.  860), 

2194. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    State     (142 

Ind.  498;  41   X.  E.  942).  228. 
Pennybaker    v.    State     (2    Blackf. 

484),  1369. 
People    v.    Ackerman     (80     Mich. 

588;    45    X.    W.    367),    1121, 

1319,  1377. 
People  v.   Acton    (48   Barb.   524), 

481. 
People   V.   Adair    (44   X.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    444;     89    X.     Y.    Supp. 

376),  1683. 


People  V.   Adams    (95   Mich.  541; 

55  X.   W.  461),   19,  49,    1465, 

1468,  1686,  1698. 
People  V.  Adams   (17  Wend.  475), 

1505. 
People  V.  Adolphi  Club  ( 149  X.  Y. 

5;    43  X.  E.  410;   31  L.  R.  A. 

510;    52  Am.   St.  700;    affirm- 
ing   79    Hun.   415;    29    X.   Y. 

Supp.  789),    1327. 
People   V.  Anderson    (  [Mich.]    123 

X.  W.  605),   1697,  1703. 
People    V.    Andrews     (115    X.    Y. 

427 ;  22  X.  E.  358 ;  6  L.  R.  A. 

128,    reversing    50    Hun,    591; 

3  X.  Y.  Supp.  508 ) ,  1325,  1342. 
People  V.  Aldrich   (104  Mich.  455; 

62    X.    W.    570),    1450,    1483, 

1525,  1574. 
People    V.    Andrews    ( 22    Jones    & 

S.   183),   651. 
People  V.  Andrus    (74  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.     542;     77    X.     Y.     Supp. 

780),   1609. 
People   V.   Angle    (74   X.   Y.   App. 

Div.  539 ;  77  X.  Y.  Supp.    832 ) , 

2035. 
People   v.    Arensberg    (103    X.    Y. 

388;    57  Am.   Rep.   741),   163. 
People   V.   Armstrong    (  [Mich.]    16 

Am.  St.  Rep.  584   [s.  c.  41  X. 

W.  275]),   461. 
People  V.  Aro  ( 6  Cal.  607 ;  65  Am. 

Dec.   503),    1484. 
People  V.  Bacon    (117   Mich.   187; 

75  X.  W.  438),  1104,  1731. 
People  V.  Bagley   (41   X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  97;  83*' X.  Y.  Supp.  766), 

1738. 
People    V.    Baird    (11    Hun,    289), 

1748. 
People    V.    Ball     (42    Barb.    324), 

1566.   1633. 
People    V.    Bashford     (112    X.    Y. 

Supp.    502;     affirmed    [X.    Y. 

App.  Div.];    112  X.  Y.  Supp. 

1143),    183,   235,    936. 
People    v.    Bates    (61    X.    Y.   App. 

Div.   559;    15   X.   Y.  Cr.   Rep. 

469;     71    X.    Y.    Supp.     123), 

1557. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCXXXl 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


People    V.    Batting    (49    How.    Pr. 

392),  2040,  2067. 
People  V.  Bauman   (52  Mich.  584; 

18    N.    W.    309),    13G3,    1570, 

1G42. 
People   V.    Beadle     (60    Mich.    22; 

26  N.  W.  800),  292. 
People    V.    Beach     (93    Mich.    25; 

52  N.  W.  1035),  824. 
People  V.  Beard  (33  How.  Pr.  32), 

481. 
People  V.  Belencia    (21   Cal.  544), 

2062,  2067,  2072. 
People  V.  Bell    ([N.  Y.]    86  X.  E. 

1130;     affirming     125     N.     Y. 

App.    Div.    205;     109    N.    Y. 

Supp.   90),  2261. 
People  V.   Beller    (73  Mich.   640); 

41    K    W.    827),    1120,    1123, 

1124,   1134,   1702. 
People   V.   Bellet    (99   Mich.    151), 

215. 
People  V-  Bemmerly  (98  Cal.  299; 

33  Pac.  263),  2247. 
People  V.  Bennett    (14   Hun,   63), 

1810. 
People  V.  Bennett   (107  Mich.  430; 

65  N.  W.  280),   1651. 
People  V.  Bennett    (4  N.  Y.  Misc. 

10;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  695),  674. 
People    V.    Berdenstein    (65    Mich. 

65;     31    N.    W.    623),    756. 
People    V.    Bird     (138    Mich.    31; 

100    N.    W.    103;     11    Detroit 

Leg.    N.    461;     67    L.    R.    A. 

424),  1225. 
People  V.  Blake  (65  Cal.  275; 

4  Pac.  1),  2041,  2051,  2078. 
People  V.  Blake  (52  Mich.  566; 

18  N.  W.  360),  1119,  1132, 

1353,   1674. 
People   V.    Bloom    (120   Mich.    45; 

78   N.   VV.    1015),   424. 
People   V.   Board    (24    Hun,    195), 

747. 
People  V.  Board   (91  Hun,  269;  39 

N.   Y.    Supp.    158),   564,   629, 

674,  675. 


People  V.  Board  of  Commissioners 

of  Police  and  Excise  (59  N.  Y. 

92),  743. 
People    V.   Board    ([X.  Y.]    16   N. 

Y.  Supp.  798),  627,  629,  643. 
People  V.   Board    (17   N.   Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  98;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  741), 

741. 
People  V.   Board    (32  N.   Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    123;     66    X.    Y.    Supp. 

199),  850,  852. 
People  V.  Board   (110  X.  Y.  Supp. 

745),   2033. 
People  V.  Bouchard  (82  Mich.  106; 

46    X.    W.    232;    9    L.    R.    A. 

106),  503,  548,   1280. 
People  V.  Bouduin    ( 12  X.  Y.  Cr. 

Rep.   244),   1739. 
People  V.  Bowkus  ( 109  Mich.  360), 

1119,  1125,  1128. 
People  V.  Bradley    (58  Hun,  601; 

11  X.  Y.  Supp.  594;  33  X.  Y. 

St.  Rep.  562),  1508,  1509. 
People  V.  Bradt  (46  Hun,  445; 

10  X.  Y.  Supp.  157;  7  X.  Y. 

Cr.  Rep.   444),    1499,    1673. 
People  V.  Bi-aisted    ( 13  Colo.  App. 

532;  58  Pac.  796),  1188. 
People  V.  Bray   (105  Cal.  344;   38 

Pac.   731;   27   L.   R.   A.   158), 

1261,  1264. 
People   V.   Breidenstein    ( 65   Mich. 

65;     31     X.     W.    623),     1533, 

1534. 
People  V.  Bronner  (145  Mich.  399; 

108    X.    VV.    672;     13    Detroit 

Leg.     X.     492),     1241,     1242, 

1365. 
People  V.  Brooklyn  (4  X.  Y.  419), 

793. 
People  V.  Brooklyn  Police    (59  X. 

Y.  92),  714,  743. 
People   V.   Brown    (85   Mich.    119; 

48     X.     W.     158),     185,     224, 

1759. 
People    V.    Brown     (6    Parker    Cr. 

Rep.    666),    1305. 
People  V.  iJriunbacii    (24  HI.  App. 

501),  1869,   1872. 


ccxxxu 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


People    V.    Brunswick     (13    X.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.     oM;     35     N.     Y. 

Supp.   6od ) ,   1)34. 
People  V.   Brush    (41   N.  Y.   Misc. 

Rep.  56;  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  607; 

affirmed   92   N.   Y.   App.   Div. 

611;    86    X.    Y.    Supp.    1144), 

934,  941. 
People  V.  Buffum  (27  Hun  [X.  Y.] 

216),  510 
People    V.    Burns     (77     Hun,    92; 

28  X.  Y.  S.  300),  2261. 
People   V.    Bush    (92    X.    Y.    App. 

Div.     611;     86     X.     Y.    Supp. 

1144;     41    X.    Y.    Misc.    Rep. 

56;     83     X.    Y.    Supp.     607), 

934. 
People   V.   Buss    (238   HI.  593;    77 

X.   E.   840;    affirming   111    111. 

App.  218),  391. 
People  V.  Butler    (3  Cow.   [X.  Y.] 

347),  261,  262. 
People   V.   Camp    (142   Mich.   219; 

105    X.    W.    155;    12    Det.    L. 

X.    665),    2025. 
People   V.    Cannon    (236   HI.    179; 

86  X.  E.  215),  926,  927. 
People  V.   Cannon    (139  X.  Y.  32; 

34  X.  E.  759),  264,  265,  1585. 
People  V.  Carrell    (118   Mich.   79; 

76  X.  \V.  118),  346,  469. 
People    V.    Case     (153    Mich.    98; 

116    X.    W.    558),    218,    219, 

365,  464. 
People  V.  Cassino    (30  Hun,  388), 

2061. 
People  V.  Cavanag^i    (62  How.  Pr. 

187),  2040. 
People    V.     Chandler     (41     X.    Y. 

App.  Div.  178;  58  X.  Y.  Supp. 

794),   880. 
People  V.   Charbineau    (115   X.  Y. 

433;    22    X.    E.    271),    1452, 

1741. 
People   V.   Chase    (41   N.   Y.   App. 

Div.  12;  58  X.  Y.  Supp.  292), 

1314,   1739. 
People  V.  Cliipman    (31   Colo.  90; 

71  Pac.  1108),  C96. 


People    v.    Clark,    61    X.   Y.    App. 

Div.    500;     70    X.    Y.    Supp. 

594),  1116,  1589. 
People  V.  Claverack  ( 4  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    330;     25    X.     Y.    Supp. 

322),    634,    674. 
People   v.    Clement    ( [N.   Y.]    112 

X.  Y.  Supp.  951),  818. 
People  V.  Clement  (58  N.  V.  Misc. 

Rep.    631;     111    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1033),  719. 
People   V.    Clement    ([X.   Y.]    116 

X.  Y.  Supp.   1098),  818. 
People  V.  Colleton   (59  Mich.  573; 

26  X.  \Y.  771),   197,  1739. 
People   V.   Collins    (3   Mich.   343), 

121,  231,  233. 
People  V.   Combs    (16   Hun,  577), 

1760. 
People  V.  Compagnie  Gen.   (107  U. 

S.  59;   2  Sup.  Ct.  87),   100. 
People  V.  Congdon  (137  Mich.  133; 

100    X.    W.    266;     11    Detroit 

L.  X.  236),  1098,  1544. 
People   V.   Converse    ([Mich.]    121 

X^.  W.  475),  385,  1675. 
People    V.    Cooper     (83    111.    585), 

229. 
People    V.   Copen    (20   Hun,   377), 

1285. 
People   V.   Corey    (148  X.  Y.  478; 

42  X.  E.  1066),  2084. 
People  V.  Corey    ([X.  Y.]    118  X, 

Y.  Supp.   23),    1184, 
People  V.  Cornyn   (36  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.     135;     72    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1088),    1741. 
People  V.  Cox    (70  Midi.  247;    38 

X.  W.  235),  1119,  1123,  1127, 

1128. 
People  V.  Cox  (106  X.  Y.  Div.  299; 

94  X.  Y.  Supp.  526;  affirming 

45   X.  Y.  Misc.   Rep.   311;    92 

X.  Y.   Supp.   125),  963,   1495. 
People  V.  Cox  (45  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

311;    92    N.    Y.    Supp.    125), 

9G3.  904,   1757. 
People  v.  Craig   (112  X'.  Y.  Supp. 

1142),  295. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccxxxm 


rUeferences  are  to  pages.] 


People  V.  Cramer    (12  N.  Y.  €r. 

Rep.    4ti9;     47    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1039),  1482,  1742. 
People  V.  Grilley    (20  Barb.  246), 

2,  3,  5,  23,  48,  82,  85,  966. 
People  V.  Creiger  138  111.  401;  28 

N.    E.    812),    107,    474,    424, 

436. 
People    V.    Clotty     (93    111.     180; 

affirming  3  Bradw.  [III.]  405), 

397,  405,  419. 
People  V.   Crotty    (22  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  77 ;  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  845 ) , 

259,  1526. 
People  V.  Crowley    (90  Mich.  366; 

51   N.   VV.   517),   133,    1127. 
People    V.    Cullimin     (173    N.    Y. 

604;  66  N.  E.  1114;  affirming 

67   N.   Y.  App.    Div.   446;    73 

N.  Y.   Supp.   987),  '817,   818, 

819,   820. 
People  V.  Cullinan  ( 168  N.  Y.  258; 

61  N.  E.  243;   affirmed  69  N. 

Y.  ,Supp.   1142),  817,  818. 
People  V.  Cullinan  (90  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    006;     85    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1142,  affirming  41  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    404;     84    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1018),   818. 
People  V.  Cullinan  95  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.    598;     88    N.     Y.    Supp. 

1022),  '818. 
People  V.  Cullinan  (111  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  32 ;  97  N.  Y.  Supp.  194 ) , 

817. 
People  V.   Cummerford    (58  Mich. 

328;    25    N.    W.    203),    1119. 

1122,   1134,   1303. 
People  V.  Cummins  (47  ^lich.  334; 

11    N.   W.    184),    2057,    2078, 

2086. 
People   v.    Curtis    (95    Mich.    212; 

54  N.  W.  767),  1580. 
People  V.  Curtis   ( 129  Mich.  1 ;  87 

N.  W.   1040;   8  Detroit  L.  N. 

832),   1237. 
People  V.   Cutler    (28   Hun,   465), 

369. 


People  V.  Dalton    (7  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    558;     28    N.    Y.    Supp. 

491),   627,   629,   643. 
People   V.    Davis    (45    Barb.    499; 

affirmed    36    N.    Y.    77),    509, 

532,  601,  682,  684. 
People  V.  Decarie    (80  Mich.  578; 

45  N.  W.  491),  1525. 
People  V.   Decatur  Tp.    (33   Miclu 

335),  806. 
People   V.    Deegan    (88    Cal.    602; 

26  Pac.  500),   2246,   2248. 
People  V.  Decker    (28  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  699;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  60; 

order  affirmed  63  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1113),   865,    880. 
People  V.  DeGroot  (111  Mich.  245; 

69   N.   W.   248;    3   Det.   L.   N. 

619),  497,  952,   1286,   1372. 
People  V.  Detroit   (18  Mich.  445), 

270. 
People  V.  Detroit   (82  Mich.  471), 

216,  271. 
People  V.  Dieterich  (142  Mich.  527; 

105   N.   W.    1112;    12   Det.   L. 

N.  798),   1650. 
People  V.  Dillon    (8   Utah,  92;    30 

Pac.    150),    2060,    2061. 
People  V.  Dippold   (30  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  62;  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  859), 

1581,  1589,  1624,  1649. 
People    v.   Douglass    ( 4    Cow.   26 ; 

15  Am.  Dec.  332),  2247. 
People   v.    Dowell    (141    Cal.  493; 

75  Pac.  45),  2038,  2077,  2078. 
People  v.  Draper    ( 15  N.  Y.  545 ) , 

106. 
People  V.  Drennan   (86  Mich.  445; 

49  N.  W.  215),  513,  1372. 
People    V.    Drew    (5    Mason    28), 

2134. 
People    V.    Dunne     (218    111.    346; 

76  X.   E.   570),   391. 

People    V.    Dwyer    (4    Pac.    451), 

413. 
People    V.    Eastwood     (14    X".    Y. 

562),   1631,   1735,   2000,   2067, 

2172. 


CCXXXIV 


TABLE  OP  CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


People  V.  Eckman   (63  Hun,  209; 

18    N.    Y.    Supp.    654),    755, 

756,   776,   777,    1223. 
People  V.  Edwards  (42  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    567;     87    N.    Y.    Supp. 

618),  880. 
People  V.  Everts    (112  Mich.   194; 

70  N.  W.  430),   1187. 
People    V.     Excise     Commrs.     (64 

Hun,  632;  18  N.  Y.  Sup.  621), 

651. 
People    V.    Excise    Commissioners 

(12  N.  Y.  Misc.  Eep.  296;   34 

N.  Y.  Supp.   22),   695. 
People  V.  Fellows    (122  Gal.  233; 

54   Pac.   830),  2038,  2051. 
People    V.    Ferris    (55    Cal.    588), 

2041,    2046,    2051,    2062. 
People  V.   Finley    (38  Mich.  482), 

2041. 
People   V.    Fish    (125   N.   Y.    136; 

26    K    E.    319)^    2062,    2070, 

2072. 
People  V.  Flynn    (110  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  279;  96  X.  Y.  Supp.  655; 

reversing     448    N.    Y.     Misc. 

Eep.     159;     96    N.    Y.    Supp. 

653),  185,  186,  491,  560,  741. 

819. 
People    V.    Forbes     (52    Hun,    30; 

4  N.  Y.  Supp.   757;   22  X.  Y. 

St.   Rep.   278),    749. 
People   V.    Foster    (64   Mich.   715; 

31    N.    W.    596),    19,    49,    50, 

497,    967. 
People  V.  Foster    (27  N.  Y".  Misc. 

Rop.    576;     58    N.    Y.    Supp. 

574),  909,  1683. 
People  V.  Fuller  (2  Park.  Rep.  16), 

2039,  2062. 
People  V.  Gadway   (61  Mich.  285; 

28  N.  W.  101),  244,  291,  436. 
People  V.  Gallagher  ( 4  INIich.  244 ) , 

103,   110. 
People  V.  Gamer  (47  111.  246),  904. 
People  V.  Ganey  (8  Hun,  60),  525. 
People  V.   Gantz    (41   N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  452;  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  79), 

1741. 


People    V.    Garbutt    (17   Mich.   9; 

97  Am.  Dec.  162),  2041,  2045, 

2053. 
People  V.  Garrett    (68  JVIich.  487; 

36    N.   W.   234),    1226,    1227, 

1229. 
People  V.   Gaul    (233  111.   630;   S4 

N.  E.  721),  1756,  1761. 
People  V.   Gault    (104  Mich.   575; 

62  N.  W.  724),  551,  1525. 
People  V.  Gaynor    (33  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  98;   53  N.  Y.  Supp.  86), 

1735,  2034. 
People    V.    Gebheard     ( 151     Mich. 

192;    115   N.    W.    54;    14   De- 
troit Leg.  N.  885),   1264. 
People  V.  Gilkinson   (4  Parker  Or. 

Rep.  26),  1487,  1519. 
People  V.  Gosch   (82  Mich.  22;  46 

N.  W.  101),  2056. 
People  V.   Gray    (61   Cal.    164;    44 

Am.  Rep.  549),  251,  2249. 
People  V.  Gregg  (59  Hun,  107;   13 

N.  Y^  Supp.   114),  533,   1476, 

1477. 
People  V.  Greiser    (67  Mich.  490; 

35  X.  W.  87 ) ,  509,  540,  542. 
People  V.  Griesbach    (211   111.  35; 

71    X.   E.   874;    reversing   112 

111.  App.   192),  578,  586. 
People  V.  Griffith    (146   Cal.  339; 

80  Pac.  08 ) ,  2038,  2009,  2082. 
People  V.  Haas   (79  Mich.  449;  44 

X.  W.  928),  1524,  1739,  1742. 
People   V.    Haag    (11    X.    Y.   App. 

Div.  74;  42  X.  Y.  Supp.  886), 

578. 
People    V.    Haley    (48    Mich.   495; 

12  X.  W.  671),  2067. 
People  V.  Hamilton  (101  Mich.  87; 

59  X.  W.  401),  1253,  1490. 
People  V.  Hamilton   (143  Mich.  1; 

106    X.    W.    275;     12    Detroit 

Leg.   X.    897),   852,   870,   873, 

877,  890. 
People  V.  Hamilton  (25  N,  Y.  App. 

Div.  428;  49  X^.  Y.  Supp.  605), 

580,  581. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


ecxxxv 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


People    V.    Hamilton     (27    N     Y. 
Misc.     R<^p.    308;     58    J<.     Y. 
Supp.  584),  G50,  910. 
People    V.    Hamilton     (27    N.    Y. 
Misc.    Kep.     360;     58    N.     Y. 
Supp.  959),  631,  869,  1683. 
People    V.    Hamilton     (29    N.    Y. 
Misc.     Rep.    405;     61    N.    Y. 
Supp.  979),  675. 
People  V.  Hammill   (2  Park.  Crim. 
Rep.    223),   2039,   20G0,   2061, 
2071. 
People  V.  Hannon    (59  Hun,  617; 
19  Iv.  Y.  Supp.  117;  35  X.  Y. 
St.  Rep.  117),  533. 
People  V.  Haren    (35  N.   Y.  Misc. 
Rep.-    590;     72    N.    Y.     Supp. 
205),  1624,  1627. 
People  V.  Harmon    (49  Hun,  558; 

2  N.  Y.  Supp.  421),   1453. 
People   V.    Harris    (29    Cal.    678), 

2067. 

People  V.  Harrison    (191   111.  257; 

61  N.  E.  99;  affirming  92  111. 

App.  643),  73,   192,  419,   652. 

People    V.    Hart     (1    Mich.    467), 

1741. 
People  V.  Hart  ( 24  How.  Pr.  289 ) , 

83,  85. 
People    V.     Hartmann     (10     Hun, 

602),  533,  575. 
People    V.    Hartstein     (49    N.    Y. 
Misc.    Rep.    336;     99     N.    Y, 
Supp.  272),   1228. 
People    V.    Hasbrouck     (21    N.   Y. 
Misc.     Rep.     188;     47     N.     Y, 
Supp.  109),  675,  902,  921. 
People    V.    Haug     (08    Mich.    549; 

37  N.  W.  21),  208,  254. 
People  V.  Hawley    (3   Mich.   330), 
9,    43,    47,    85,    9«,    119,    129, 
496,  966. 
People  V.  Hayne   (83  Cal.  Ill;   23 

Pac.  1),  1015. 
People  V.  Hazard  (23  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  477;  52  N.  Y.  Supp. 
670),  1760. 
People  V.  Hazen  (35  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  590;  72  N.  Y.  Supp. 
205),   1504,   1509. 


People  V.   Heffron   (53  Mich.  527; 

19  N.  W.   170),  1034,  1533. 
People    V.     Henschel     (12    N.    Y, 
Supp.     46),    85,     1613,     1712, 
1760. 
People    V.     Henwood     (123    Mich. 
317;     82     N.     W.     70),     220, 
849,  934. 
People  V.  Henze    (149  Mich.   130; 
112    N.    W.   491;    19    Det.    L. 
N.  491),   1127,   1133. 
People   V.    Hicks    (79    Mich.    457; 

44  N.  W.  931),  1578. 
People  V.  Higgins    (56  Mich.   159; 

22  N.  W.  309),  1119,  1127. 
People  V.  Hill   (7  Cal.  97),  294. 
People    V.   Hill    (123   Cal.   47;    55 
Pac.    692),    2038,   2068,   2069, 
2082. 
People     V.    Hilliard     (176    N.    Y. 

604;   G8  N.  E.   1122),  796. 
People  V.  Hilliard  (178  N.  Y.  582; 
70   N.    E.    1106;    affirming   81 
N.    Y.    App.    Div.    71;    80    N. 
Y.   Supp.  792),  818,  819. 
People  V.  Hilliard   (28  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.     140;     50    N.     Y.     Supp. 
909),  631. 
People  V.  Hilliard   (40  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  589;   83  N.  Y.  Supp.  21; 
affirmed   85   N.   Y.   App.   Div. 
507;    83    N.    Y.    Supp.    204), 
796. 
People  V.  Hilliard   (81  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.    80    N.    Y.    Supp.    792), 
732. 
People    V.    Hinchman     (75    Mich. 
587;    42    N.    W.    1006;    4    L. 
R.  A.   707),  843,  844,  1490. 
People   v.    Hislop    (77   N.   Y.   331; 
affirming   16  Hun  577),   1248, 
1760. 
People   V.    Hobson    (48   Mich.    27: 
11    N.    W.    771),    929,    1319, 
1538,    1539. 
People  V.  Hoenig    ( [N.  Y.J   86  N. 

Y.  Supp.  673),   1741. 
People  V.  Hofl'man   ( 24  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.    233;     48    N.    Y.    Supp. 
482),  1654. 


CCXXXVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


People  V.  Houghton  (41  Hun  558), 

737. 
People  V.  House  of  Good  Shepherd 

(32    N.    Y.    Misc.    Rep.    453; 

15    N.    Y.    Cr.    Rep.    145;    66 

N.  Y.  Supp.  794),  2023. 
People   V.   Hower    (151    Cal.   638; 

91     Pac.     507),     2038,     2060, 

2062,   2084. 
People  V.  Huflman  (24  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    233;     48    N.    Y.    Supp. 

482),    1504. 
People  V.  Hughes    (86  Mich.  180; 

48    N.    W.    945),    1357,    1359, 

2248,    2252. 
People  V.  Hughes    (90  Mich.   308; 

51    X.    W.    531),    1119,    1122, 

1127. 
People  V.  Hughes    (97  Mich.  543; 

56  N.   W.  942).  1123. 
People    V.    Huntington    (4    N.    Y. 

Leg.  Obs.  187),   HI,  316. 
People  V.  Husted    (52  Mich.  624; 

18  X.  W.  388),   1485,  1539. 
People    V.    Ingraham     (100    Mich. 

530;    59    N.    W.    234),    1185, 

1753. 
People  V.  Jackson    (8  Mich.   110), 

270. 
People  V.  James    (100  Mich.  522; 

59  N.  W.  236),  1123. 
People   V.  Jarvis    (19   N.   Y.  App. 

Div.    466;     46    N.    Y.    Supp. 

596),  786. 
People  V.  Jenness    ( 5  Mich.  305 ) , 

1746. 
People  V.  Johnson   (86  Mich.  175; 

48   N.   W.   870;    13   L.   R.   A. 

163),   2035. 
People    V.    Jones     (63    Cal.    168), 

2067,   2070. 
People  V.  Jones    (2  Edw.  Sel.  Cas. 

88),  2039,  2071. 
People    V.    Jones    (2    Mich.    X.    1'. 

194),   2033,    2034,   2035. 
People  V.  Jorneau  (147  Mich.  520; 

111  X.  W.  95;  13  Uet.  L. 

N.  1115),  1381. 


People  V.  Judson  (59  X^.  Y.  ^Misc. 

Rep.  538;  112  X.  Y.  Supp. 

408),   67 L 
People   V.    Kansas    (31    How.    Pr. 

334,  note),   183. 
People   V.    Keefer    (97    Mich.    15; 

56  X.  W.  105),  944,  945,  1448. 
People  V.  Kemmis  (153  Mich.  117; 

116  X.  W.  554),  233. 
People    V.    Kemmler     (119    X.    Y. 

580;  24  X.  E.  9).  2062,  2085. 
People  V.  Kennedy  (105  Mich.  75; 

62  X.  W.   1020).  345,  1537. 
People    V.    Kestner     (101    X.    Y. 

App.     Div.     265;     91     X.    Y. 

Supp.   1004),   1700,   1709. 
People  V.  King    (27   Cal.  507;   87 

Am.  Dec.  95),   2061. 
People  V.  Kinney   (124  Mich.  486; 

83  X.  W.   147),   1698. 
People    V.    Klass    (115    Cal.    567; 

47  Pac.  459),  2039.  2081. 
People  V.  Koerner  (117  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.  40;    102  X.  Y.  Supp.  93; 

affirmed    191    X.    Y.    528;    84- 

N.  E.  1117),  2038,  2039,  2068. 
People  V.    Koob    (109   Mich.   358; 

67  X.  W.  320),  1119,   1126. 
People  V.  Krank   (110  X.  Y.  488; 

18    X.    E.    242;    reversing    46 

Hun    032),    1304,    1307,    1308, 

1600,  1G50. 
People  V.   Kridler    (80  Mich  592; 

45  X.  W.  374),  1125. 
People  V.  Kriesel    (136  Mich.  80; 

98    X.    W.    850;     10    Detroit 

Leg.  X.  972),  1132,  1319. 
People  V.   Krushaw    (31  How.  Pr. 

344    [note]),    186. 
People   V.    Lacy    (124   Mich.    180; 

82  X.  W.  826),  346. 
People    V.    Lanamerts    (18    X*.    Y. 

Misc.    343;     40    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1107;    affirmed   14  X.   Y.  App. 

Div.    628;     43    X.     Y.    Supp. 

1161),  580,  590. 
People    v.    Lane     (100    Cal.    379; 

34   Pac.   856),   2084. 
People  V.  Langton    (67  Cal.  427), 

2063. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccxxxvn 


..References  are  to  pages.] 


People  V.  Laning    (73   Mich.   284; 

41  N.  W.  424),  765,  774,  779. 
People  V.  Lavin   (4  N.  Y.  Cr.  Rep. 

547),   1634. 
People  V.  Law  &  Order  Club   (203 

111.    127;    67    N.    E.    855;    62 

L.  R.  A.  884),  1325,  1338. 
People  V.  Lawrence   (30  Barb.   [X. 

Y.]    190),  294. 
People  V.  Lawtoii    (30  Mich.  386), 

383. 
People    V.    Leary     (105    Cal.    480; 

39  Pac.  24),  2247. 
People  V.  Lee  Chuck  (78  Cal.  317; 

20   Pac.    719),   2251. 
People    V.    Leonard!     ( 143    X.    Y. 

300;    38  N.  E.  372),  2072. 
People   V.   Lester    (80   Mich.   043; 

45  X.  W.  492),  511,  1372. 
People    V.    Lewis     (30    Cal.    531), 

2041,   2045,   2062. 
People  V.   Leying    (74   Mich.  579; 

42  X.  W.   139),   1192. 
People    V.    Longwell     ( 120    Mich. 

311;    79   X.  W.  484),   1358. 
People    V.    Longwell     ( 130    Mich. 

302;   99  X.  W.   1;    10  Detroit 

L.  X".  1049),  820. 
People  V.  Luders   (125  Mich.  440; 

85  X.  W.  1981;   8   Detroit  L. 

N.  81),   1190,   1193. 
People  V.  Ludnell  (130  Mich.  303; 

99  X.  E.   12;    11   Detroit  Leg. 

X.  1),  1127,  1132,   1303. 
People    V.   Luhrs    (7   X.   Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    503;     28    X.    Y.    Supp. 

498),    1325. 
People  V.  Lupton   (52  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    330;     103    X.    Y.    Supp. 

172),    1540. 
People  V.  Lyman   ( 156  X.  Y'.  407 ; 

50   X^.   E.   1112;    affirming  27 

X.  Y".   App.   Div.   527;    50   X^. 

Y.  Supp.  497),  098,  099,  705. 
People  V.  Lyman  (108  X.  Y.  069; 

01    X.   E.    1133;    affirming   53 

X.   Y^-  App.   Div.    470;    65   X. 

Y.  Supp.  1002),  752,  818,  820. 


People  V.  Lyman    (25  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  217;  55  X.  Y.  Supp.  70), 

818,   820. 
Pe<jple  V.  Lyman    (27   X.  Y.  App. 

Div.    527;     50    X.    Y.    Supp. 

527),    819. 
People  V.  Lyman    (33  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    243;     68    X.    Y.    Supp. 

331),   532,   818,   819. 
People  V.  Lyman    (48  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.  484;  62  X.  Y.  Supp.  902; 

affirmed  103  X.  Y.  602;   57  X. 

E.  1120),  615,  790. 
People  V.  Lyman    (53  X.  Y'^.  App. 

Div.    470;     65    X.    Y^    ,Supp. 

1002),  744. 
People  V.  Layman   (59  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.  172;  09  X.  Y.  Supp.  Ill; 

affirming  Go  X.  Y.  Supp.  462), 

818,  819. 
People  V.  Lyman    (67  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.    446;     73    X.    Y.    Supp. 

987),  819. 
People  V.  Lyman   (.09   X.  Y".  App. 

Div.    406;     74    X.     Y.    .Supp. 

1104),  818. 
People  V.  Lyng   (74  Mich.  579;   42 

X.    W.    139),    151,    153,    199, 

200,   299. 
People  V.  McBride    (234   III.    146; 

84  X\  E.  805),  230,  233,  234, 

204,    275,   282,    284,    335,    714 

752,  898,  1505,  1506,  1507. 
People  V.  McDonald    ( [X.  Y.]    108 

X.  Y.  Supp.  749),  1453,  1480, 

1495,    1498,    1540,   1552,   1500. 
People    V.     McGlyn     (131     X.     Y. 

002;    30  X.  E.   804;   affirming 

02  Hun  237;    10  X.  Y.  Supp. 

730),    748. 
People    V.    McGowan     (44    X.    Y. 

App.  Div.  30;   60  X.  Y^  Supp. 

407),  735,  738. 
People  V.  McKee    (59  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    368;     112    X.    Y.    Supp. 

338 ) ,  279,  682. 
People  V.  MacLean    (59  Hun  626; 

13  X.  Y.  Supp.  077),  1735. 


CCXXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


People  V.  Manzer   (18  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.     292;     41     N.    Y.    Supp. 

1075),  697,  699. 
People  V.  Markell   (20  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    149;     45    N.    Y.    Super. 

904),    2033. 
People  V.  Marsh    (125  Mich.  410; 

84    N.    W.    472;    7    Det.    Leg. 

N.    555;    51    L.    R.    A.    461), 

2261. 
People   V.   Martin    (60    Cal.    153), 

426. 
People  V.  Martin    ( 15  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  6;   36  N.  Y.  Supp.  437; 

affirmed    149    N.    Y.    621;    44 

N.    E.    1127),    1735. 
People  V.   Marx    ( 128   N.   Y.   App. 

Div.    828;     112    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1011),  170,   1700. 
People  V.  Maxwell    (83  Hun,  157; 

31  N.  Y.  Supp.  564),  1643. 
People  V.  Mayor    (33  Barb.   102), 

98. 
People  V.  Meakim    (56   Hun   631; 

10  N.  Y.  S.   163),  743. 
People  V.  Meakin   (133  N.  Y.  214; 

30    N.    E.    828;    affirming    15 

N.   Y.  Supp.   917),  734. 
People    V.    Medberiy     (17    N.    Y. 

Misc.  Rep.  8;   39  N.  Y.  Supp. 

207),    796. 
People  V.  Methever   (132  Cal.  326; 

64     Pac.     481),     2039,     2051, 

2062,   2068. 
People  V.  Metzger   (95  Mich.   121; 

54  N.  W.  639),  472,  514,  721, 

722,   1180,   1359. 
People    V.    Miller     (79    N.    Y.    St. 

1122),   351. 
People  V.  Mills   (3  N.  Y.  Cr.  Rep. 

184),  2067. 
People   V.    Mills    (98   N.   Y.    176), 

2058. 
People  V.  Mills   (91   Hun   142;    35 

N.  Y.  Supp.  273),  627,  629. 
People  V.  Minnock   (52  Mich.  628; 

18  N.  W.  390),   1554,   1555. 
People  V.   Minter    (59  Mich    557; 

26  N.  W.  701),   1304. 


People  V.   Monroe    (26  Colo.   232; 

57  P.  696),  2261. 

People    V.     Montague     (71     Mich. 

447;    39   X.  W.  585),  2252. 
People    V.    Monteith    (73    Cal.    7; 

14   Pac.   373),    1735. 
People    V.    Montgomery     ( [N.    Y.] 

25  X.  Y.  Supp.  873),  636. 
People   V.    Moore    (62    Mich.   496; 

29   X.   W.   80),   2261. 
People  V.  Moore    (155   Mich.  107; 

118    X.    W.    742;    15    Det.   L. 

X.   920),    1659,    1665,    1732. 
People  V.  Moore    (59  X.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    533;     112    X.    Y.    Supp. 

475),    526. 
People   V.   Morris    (13   Wend.    [X. 

Y.]    325),    394. 
People  V.  Mosso    (30  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.     164;     63     X.     Y.    Supp. 

588),  882,  900,  927,  940. 
People    V.    Mount     (1S6    111.   560; 

58  X.  E.  360;  affirming  87 
111.  App.  194).  415,  416,  419, 
445,  446,  558,  798. 

People  V.  Mullins    (5   X.  Y.   App. 

Div.    172;     39    X.    Y.    Supp. 

361),   1604,  1620,  1728. 
People  V.  Mulkins   (25  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    599;     54    X.    Y.    Supp. 

599),   945. 
People  V.   Murphy    (93  Mich.  41; 

52  X.  W.  1042),  1686. 
People    V.    Murphy    ( 5    Park.    Cr. 

Co.  [X.  Y.]   130),  1304,  1310. 
People  V.  Murray   (149  X.  Y.  367; 

44    X.    E.    146;    32    L.    R.    A. 

344),    743. 
People  V.   Murray    (2  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.    607;     37    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1096).  629. 
People  V.  Murray   (14  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.     177;     35    X.    Y.    Supp. 

463),  675. 
People  V.  Murray   (38  X.  Y.  Supp. 

177),  628,  629,  643. 
People   V.    Murry    (2   X.   Y.   App. 

607;    37    X."  Y.   Supp.    1096), 

628. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccxxxix 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


People     .  Myers    (95  X.  Y.   223), 

138. 
People  V.  Myers    (115  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    864;     101    N.    Y.    Supp. 

291),    1693. 
People  V.  Myers    (185  N.  Y.  558; 

77  N.   E.   1193;    affirming  109 

N.   Y.    App.    Div.    143;    95   N. 

Y.    Supp.    993),     1490,     1498, 

1499. 
People  V.  Newmann  (85  Mich.  98; 

48    N.    W.    290),    771,    1231, 

1234,    1845. 
People  V.  Newman   (99  Mich.  148; 

57   N.  W,   1073),  543. 
People    V.    Nicol     (34    Cal.    212), 

2041,  2047,  2060,  2063. 
People    V.    Xorman     ( [Mich.]     122 

N.  W.  369;    13  Det.  L.  News. 

704),  1123. 
People  V.   Norton    (7    Barb.   477), 

635,  685. 
People  V.  Nylin    (236   III.   19;    86 

N.  E.   156;    affirming   139  111. 

App.  500),  508,  554,   1638. 
People  V.  O'Connell    (62  How.  Pr. 

436),  2040,  2051. 
People  V.   Odell    (1   Dak.    197;    46 

N.  W.  601),  2041,  2067,  2074. 
People  V.  O'Donnell  (46  Hun  358), 

1453. 
People   V.   Olmsted    (74   Hun  323; 

26    N.    Y.    Supp.    818),    1476, 

1483,   1487. 
People  V.  O'Neill    (107  Mich.  556; 

65  N.  W.  540),  1744. 
People    V.    O'Reilly     ([N.    Y.l    88 

N.  E.   1128;   affirming   129   N. 

Y.    App.    Div.     522;     114    N. 

Y.  Supp.  258),   12,  38,  45. 
People  V.  O'Reily   ( 129  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    522;     114    N.    Y.    Supp. 

'258;    affirmed    [N.   Y.]    88   N. 

E.  1128),  83. 
People  V.   Osmer    (24   How.   Prac. 

451),   1305. 
People  V.  Owens    (148  N.  Y.  648; 

43    N.    E.     71;     affirming    91 

Hun    344;     36    N.    Y.    Supp. 

755),   1309,   1634,   1669. 


People   V.   Packerhan    (115   N.   Y. 

200;    21    N.    E.    1035),    1736. 
People   V.   Page    (3    Parker    Grim. 

600),    1457. 
People   V.   Paquin    (74    Mich.    34; 

41  N.    W.    852),    1445,    1447, 
1532,  1534,   1641,   1648. 

People   V.   Parks    (49    Mich.    333; 

13  N.  W.  618),  1359. 
People  V.  Pekarz    (185  N.  Y.  470; 

78  N.  E.  294),   2038,  2068. 
People  V.  Pettit    (  [N.  Y.]    113   N. 

Y.   Supp.   243),  729. 
People  V.  Phelan     93  Cal.  HI;  28 

Pac.  855),  2077. 
People  V.  Pierson   (64  N.  Y.  App. 

Div,    624;     72    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1123;  affirming  35  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    406;     71    N.    Y.    Supp. 

993),  896,  902. 
People  V.  Pierson   (35  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    406;     71    N.    Y.    Supp. 

993;    order   affirmed   64  N.   Y. 

App.  Div.  624 ;  72  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1123),   894,   903. 
People    V.    Pine     (2    Barb.    566), 

2040. 
People  V.  Polhamus  (8  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.     133;     40    N.    Y.    Supp. 

491),    1482,    1487,    1504,    1558. 
People   V.   Porter    (2   Park.   C'rim. 

Rep.  14),  2039. 
People  V.  Possing  (137  Mich.  303; 

100    N.    W.    396;     11    Detroit 

Leg.  N.  249),  1132,  1363. 
People    V.    Potter    ( 1    Parker    Cr. 

Rep.   47),   2261. 
People    V.    Pratt    (22    Hun    300), 

2035. 
People    V.    Pscherhoder     ( 64    Hun 

483;     19    N.    Y.    Supp.    483), 

2240,  2248. 
People    V.    Power     (24    111.    187), 

393. 
People  V.  Quant   (12  How.  Pr.  83; 

2  Parker  Cr.   Rep.  410),   111. 
People   V.    Quinn    (74    Mich.   632; 

42  N.  W.  604),  1489,  1534. 
People    V.    Rains    (20    Colo.    489; 

39  Pac.  341),  478,  521. 


ccxl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


People    V.    Rail     (135    Mich.    510 

98    N.    W.    3;    10    Det.    L.    N 

858),    1524. 
People  V.  Ramirez    (56  Colo.  533 

38   Am.   Rep.   73)    1584. 
People  V.   Rand    (114  N.   Y.   App 

Div.    826;     100    N.    Y.    Supp 

174),    1131. 
People  V.  Randolph   (75  Hun  224 

27   N.  Y.   Supp.   41),   633. 
People  V.  Remus    (135  Mich.  629 

98    X.    W.    397;     100    N.    W 

403;    11  Det.  L.  X.  237),  842 

845,  1083,  1085,  1731. 
People  V.  Rice  (103  Mich.  350 

61  X.  W.  540),  1372,  1375. 
People  V.  Richmond  (59  Mich 

570;  26  X.  W.  770),  1135 

1511. 
People    V.     Ringstead     (90    Mich 

371;    51    X.    W.    519),    1119 

1123,   1127,   1483. 
People  V.  Robbins    (79  Mich   130 

37  X.  W.  924),  1124,  1524. 
People  V.  Robinson  ( 1  Park.  Crim. 

Rep.   649),  2039,   2045. 
People  V.  Robinson   (2  Park  Crim. 

Rep.   235),   2039,   2047,   2056, 

2070,   2071. 
People    \.    Robinson     ( 135    Mich. 

511;    98    X.      V.    12;    10    Det. 

L.  X.  857),   1084. 
People    V.    Roby    (52    Mich.    577; 

18  X.  W.  ^363;  50  Am.  Rep. 

270),  215,  1123,  1132,  1353. 
People  V.  Rogers  (18  X.  Y.  9; 

72  Am.  Dec.  487),  2040,  2043, 

2046,  2059,   2060. 
People    V.    Rouse     (72    Mich.    59; 

40   X.   W.   57),    1762. 
People   V.    Rush    (113    Mich.    539; 

71   X.   W.   863),   460,    1187. 
People   V.    Ryan    (86   X.    Y.   App. 

Div.    524;    83    X.    Y.    Supp. 

657),   1129. 
People  V.  Sackett    (15  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.    290;     44    X.    Y.    Supp. 

593;   reversing  17  X.  Y".  Misc. 

Rep.    405;     40    X.    Y^    Supp. 

413),  669,  676,  812,  817,  884. 


People  v.  Sackett   (17  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    406;     40    X.    Y.    Supp. 

413),    531,   535. 
People    V.    Safford    (5    Denio    [X. 

Y.]    112),    822,    835. 
People  V.  St.  Saviour's  Sanitarium 

(34  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  363;    56 

X.  Y.  Supp.  431),  278,  2017. 
People   V.    Salomon    (51    111.    37), 

233. 
People  V.  Sansome    (98   Cal.  235; 

33   Pac.  202),  2247,  2252. 
People    V.    Saratoga    Co.    (7    Abb. 

Prac.    34),   650. 
People  V.  Saunders  (25  Mich.  119) 

1219. 
People  V.   Schatz    (50  X^.  Y.  App. 

544;    64  X.  Y.  Supp.   127;    15 

X.  Y.  Cr.  Rep.  38),   1742. 
People  V.   Schewe    (29   Hun    122), 

12,  85,  86,  1753. 
People    V.    Schimmel     (141    Mich. 

310;    104  X.  W.  670;    12  Det. 

L.  X.  406),  1537. 
People  V.  Schmidt  19  X.  Y\  Misc. 

Rep.    458;     44    X.    Y.    Supp. 

607),   1558. 
People    V.    Sehmitz    (7    Cal.    App. 

330;     94    Pac.    407),    490. 
People  V.   Schottey   (116  Mich.   1; 

74    X.    W.    209),    1119,    1122, 

1128,  1739. 
People  V.  Scott  (90  Mich.  376; 

51  X.  W.  520),  1534,  1555, 

1556. 
People  V.  Scranton   (61  Mich.  244; 

28  X.  W.  81),  1119,  1752. 
People  V.  Seeley    (183  X.  Y.  544; 

76  X.  E.   1102;   affirming  105 

X.  Y.  App.   Div.    149;    93   X. 

Y.    Supp.    982),     1453,     1535, 

1624,   1627. 
People  V.  Seeley    ( 105  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.     149;     93    X.    Y.     Supp. 

982),  1444,  1463,  1491,  1508, 

1698. 
People  V.  Sehorn  (116  Cal.  503; 

48  Pac.  495),  1735. 


TABLE' OF    CASES. 


ccxli 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


People  V.  Shaver  (37  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  21;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  701), 
1452,  148G,   1506,  1760. 

People  V.  Sheeler    (36   Mich.  161; 

98  N.  W.  986;  10  Detroit  L. 
News,  1004),  194,  840,  841, 
1293,  1510,  1747. 

People  V.   Sinell    (12  X.  Y.   Supp. 

40;     34    N.    Y.    Ct.    R.    898), 

1325. 
People  V.  Smith    (145  Mich.   530; 

108   N.   W.    1072;    13   Det.  L. 

N.  651),  344,  345,  346. 
People  V.  Smith   (69  N.  Y.   175), 

508. 
People    V.    Smith     (28    Hun    626; 

1    N.    Y.   Cr.    Rep.    72),    783, 

1188,    1218. 
People    V.    Soloman     (5'7    X.     Y. 

Misc.    Rep.    288;     106    X.    Y. 

Supp.   1110),  2032. 
People   V.    Soule    ( 74    ^Nlich.    250 ; 

41  N.  W.  90S;  2  L.  R.  A.  454), 

1338,    1374. 
People  V.  Squires   (95  X.  Y.  Supp. 

995),   1490,   1499. 
People  V.  State    (  [Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

99  ,S.  W.  1102),  1473,  1699. 
People   V.    Stock    (26   N.  Y.   App. 

Div.     504;     50    N.     Y.     Supp. 

483;    affirmed   157  X.  Y.  091; 

51   X.   E.    1092),   1760. 
People  V.  Sullivan   (83  Mich.  355; 

47   X.   W.   220),    1524. 
People    V.    Supervisors,    etc.     ( 16 

X.  Y.  432),   1014. 
People  V.   Sweetser    (1    Dak.   308; 

46  N.  W.  452),  9,  1491,  1504, 

1552,    1555,    1559,    1765. 
People   V.    Sykes    (96    Mich.    452; 

56  X.  W.  12),  700. 
People  V.  Symonds   (4  X.  Y.  Mi.<c. 

Rep.  6 ;   23  X^.  Y.  Supp.  689 ) , 

634,   674. 
People  V.  Talbot    (120  Mich.  486; 

79    X\    W.    688),    1119,    1132, 

1133,  1538,  1541. 
People  V.  Taylor    (110  Mich.  491; 

68    X.    \V.    303),    1119,    1134, 

1525. 


People  V.  Telford    (56  Mich.  541; 

23    X.    W.    213),    1524,    1556, 

1574. 
People    V.    Thielman     (115    Mich. 

66;   72  X.  W.  1102;   39  L.  R. 

A.    218),    1319. 
People    V.    Thompson     ( 147    Mich. 

444;      111      X.      W.     96;       13 

Detroit    Leg.    X.    1122),    428, 

7'87,  788,  841,   1663. 
People  V.  Thornton    (186  111.  162; 

57   X\   E.   841),  403,   413. 
People   V.   Throop    (12   Wend.    [X. 

Y.]     183),    408. 
People  V.  Tighe    (5  Hun  25),  722, 

734. 
People   V.    Tiridale    (57    Cal.    104), 

929. 
People  V.  Tolman  (148  Mich.  305; 

111    X.    W.    772;    14    Detroit 

L.  News.  107),  1123,  127. 
People   V.   Town   Clerk    (26   N.   Y. 

Misc.     Rep.     22';     50    N.    Y. 

Supp.    64).    I..U. 
People  V.  Townsey    (5   Denio   70), 

1556. 
People    V.   Toynbee    (2    Parker    C. 

C.    329;    2    Park.    C.    C.    490; 

1    Kern    [N.    Y.j     378),    122, 

125,    255. 
People  V.  Travers  ( 88  Cal.  233 ;  26 

Pac.  88),  2051,  2052,  2055. 
People  V.   Turner    (4   X.  Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    247;     23    N.    Y.    Supp. 

913;     judgment     affirmed     71 

Hun    614;     24    X.    Y.    Supp. 

1148),   633,   674. 
People  V.  Tuthill    (79  X.  Y.  App. 

Div.  24 ;  79  X.  Y.  Supp.  905 ) , 

1739,   1742. 
People  V.   Tweed    (63   X.  Y.   202), 

394. 
People  V.  United  Surety  Co.   (120 

X.  Y.  App.  Div.  655;    105  X. 

Y.  Supp.  72),  784. 
People  V.    Utley    (129    Mich.   628; 

89   N.    W.   349;    8   Detroit    L. 

N.  1077),  756. 


cexlii 


TABLE   OF  tASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


People   V.   Van   Alstyne    ( [Mich.] 

122  N.  W.   193;    16  Det.  Leg. 

N.  392),  52,  53,   1290. 
People   V.    Vincent    (95    Cal.   425; 

30  Pac.  581),  2062. 
People  V.  Voorhis  (131  Mich.  398; 

91  N.  W.  624;   9  Detroit  Leg. 

N.    377),    332. 
People   V.    Wade    (101    Mich.    89; 

59  N.  W.   438),   928,    1450. 
People  V.  Wilbaum    (1   Dak.  301; 

46  N.  W.  452),  1765. 
People    V.    Waldvogel     (49    Mich. 

337;    13    N.    W.    620),    1127, 

1137. 
People  V.  Walker   (38  Mich.  156), 

2067,  2078. 
People  V.  Walker   (60  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    130;    112    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1021),   5G3. 
People   V.    Wallace    (70   111.   680), 

227. 
People  V.  Walling   (53  Mich.  264; 

18    N.    W.     807),     299,    333, 

486. 
People  V.  Walsh    (95  N.  Y.  Supp. 

996),    1499. 
People  V.  Walters    (4  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  1;   23  N.  Y.  Supp.  091), 

674. 
People  V.  Warden   (17  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  1;   38  N.  Y.  Supp.  837; 

affirmed    6    X.    Y.    App.    Div. 

520;     39    X.    Y.     Sup.    582), 

488. 
People  V.  Warder    (6   X.  Y.   App. 

Div.    520;     39    X.    Y.    Supp. 

582),   165,  495. 
People  V.   Warfield    (20   111.   103), 

904. 
People  V.  Warsaw   (4  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    547;     24    X'.    Y.    Supp. 

739),  633. 
People     V.     Webster      (2      Doug. 

[Mich.]  92),  25,  80,  1534. 
People  V.  Webster   (139  X.  Y.  73; 

34    X.    E.    730;    affirming    68 

Hun  11;  22  X.  Y.  Supp.  634), 

2258,   2259. 


People  V.   Welch    (71   Mich.   548; 

39    X.    W.    747;    1    L.    R.    A. 

385),   1235,   1236,   1240,   1242, 

1628. 
People  V.   Wells    (11   X.   Y.  Misc. 

Rep.     239;     32    X.     Y.    Rep, 

973),   695. 
People  V.  Werner   (174  X.  Y.  132; 

66    X.    E.    667;    reversing    66 

X.     Y.     Supp.     1139),     1237, 

1582,  1630. 
People   V.   Wheeler    (96    Mich.    1; 

55  X.  W.  371),  1538,  1539. 
People  V.   Wheelock    (3   Park   [X. 

Y.]    9),  43,  84,   966,   1592. 
People    V.     Whipple     (107     Mich. 

587;  66  X.  W.  490),  1123. 
People  V.  White    (127  Mich.  428; 

86  X.  W.  992;   8  Detroit  Leg. 

X.  397),  346. 
People     V.     Whitney     ( 105     Mich. 

622;     63    X.    W.    765),    911, 

913,   1684,   1686. 
People    V.    Wiant     (48    111.    263). 

904. 
People  V.   Wilcox    (152   Mich.   39; 

115    X.    W.    973),    1192. 
People  V.  Wiley  (2  Park.  Rep.  19), 

2039. 
People  V.  Williams   (43  Cal.  344), 

2041,  2045,  2067,   2068,  2072, 

2085. 
People    V.    Williams     (162    X.    Y.- 

240;   56  X.  E.  625;   reversing 

47    X.    Y.    App.    Div.    88;    62 

X.  Y.   Supp.    130),   807. 
People    V.    Williams     (29    X.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.    463;     61     X.    Y. 

Supp.   983),   807. 
People  V.  Wilson    (55   Mich.  506; 

21  X.  W.  905),  2041. 
People  V.  Windholz   (68  App.  Div. 

552;   74  X.  Y.  S.  241),  990. 
People    V.    Wing     (147    Cal.    379; 

81   Pae.   1103),   1108. 
People  V.   Winter    (59   Mich.   557; 

26  X.  W.  701),  1124. 
People  V.  Woodman  (15  Daly  136; 

3  X.  Y.  Supp.  926),  651,  716, 

721. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cexliii 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


People  V.  Wotodman  (4  N.  Y.  Supp. 

532;   22  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  435), 
733,  751. 
People  V.  Woodman    (5  N.  Y.   St. 

Rep.   318),   638. 
People    V.    Wright     (3    Hun    506; 

■5  T.  &  C.  518),  737,  743,  752. 
People  V.  Wuant   (2  Park.  [N.  Y.] 

410),    110. 
People  V.  VVynehamer   (2  Park.  C. 

C.  377;'  2  Park  C.  C.  421;   3 

Kern   [N.  Y.]    378),   255. 
People    V.   Young    (102   Cal.   411; 

36    Pac.    770),    2041. 
People  V.  Young   (237  111.  196;  86 

N.   E.   589),    1284. 
People  V.  Zeiger    (6  Parker  Crim. 

Cas.     [N.    Y.]     355),    12,    15, 

85. 
People's   Ins.   Co.   v.    Spencer    (53 

Pac.  353;   91   Am.   Dec.  217), 

1778. 
Peplow  V.  Richardson    (L.  R.  4  C. 

P.     168;     33    J.    P.    407;     17 

W.  R.  410),   1149. 
Perdue  v.  Ellis  (18  Ga.  586),  109, 

395,  413,  431. 
Perdue  v.  Gill    (35  Ind.  App.  99; 

73  N.  E.  844),  570. 
Perkins,    Ex    parte    (34    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.    429;     31     S.    W.     175), 

'852,    861,    911,    1723. 
Perkins  v.  Brais   (20  Quebec  S.  C. 

536),   1223,   1225,   1230,   1231. 
Perkins    v.    Henderson    ( 08    Miss. 

631;  9  So.  897),  577. 
Perkins    v.    Henderson     ( 68    Miss. 

327;    8    So.    507).    400,    627, 

634. 
Perkins   v.   Loux    (14   Idaho   607; 

95  Pac.  694),  577,  029,  636. 
Perkins   v.   State    (92   Ala.   66;    9 

So.  536),  1171,  1615. 
Perry   v.    Bailey    (12    Kan.    539), 

2253,  2255. 
Perry  v.  Edwards  ( 44  N.  Y.  223 ) . 

1235,    1461. 
Perry  v.  Rasmusen  (22  X.  Z.  581), 

1154. 


Perry  v.  Richardson  (75  Mass  [9 

Gray]   216),  1027. 
Perry  v.  Salt  Lake  City   (7  Utah 

143;     25    Pac.    739,    998;     11 

L.  R.  A.  446),  628,  634. 
Perry  v.  State  (87  Ala.  30;  6  So. 

425),  225. 
Perry  v.  Washburn  ( 20  Cal.  350 ) , 

276. 
Persinger,    hi    re    ( [Neb.]    90    N. 

W.  242),  663. 
Persinger    v.    Miller     ( [Neb.]     90 

N.  W.  242),  665. 
Persons,   Ex  parte    ( 1    Hill   655 ) , 

650. 
Pervear  v.  Commonwealtli  ( 5  Wall 

475;   18  L.  Ed.  608),  147,  790. 
Peter    Schoenhofen    Brewing    Co., 

In  re    (8  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  141; 

42   W.   N.    C.   402),   538. 
P.    Schoenhofen    Brewing    Co.    v. 

Whipple     ([Neb.]    89    N.    W. 

751),   1785,   1792. 
Peters,  In  re  (10  Knlp,  93).  2261. 
Peters  v.  District  Court  ( 114  Iowa 

207;  86  N.  W.  300),  1185. 
Peters    v.     Eaton    Circuit    Judge 

153    Mich.    467;     117    N.    W. 

68;   15  Det.  L.  N.  462),  1498, 

1526. 
Peters  v.  Goulden  (27  Mich.  171), 

1804,    1805. 
Peterson   v.   Brocky    ([Iowa]    119 

N.  W.  967),  1912,  1972,  1991. 
Peterson  v.  Knoble   (35  Wis.  80), 

1855. 
Peterson    v.    State    (7    Ind.    603), 

1521. 
Peterson    v.    State    (83    Md.    194; 

34  Atl.   834),   1628. 
Peterson  v.    State    (63   Neb.   251; 

88  N.  W.  549),  80,   84,   1084. 
Peterson   v.   State    (64   Neb.   875; 

90  N.  W.  964),  1084,  1086. 
Peterson   v.  State    (69   Neb.   875; 

90  N.  W.  964),  1531. 
Peterson  v.  State  ('80  N.  W,  549), 

S3. 
Peterson  v.  State  (  [Tex.  €r.  App.J 
70  S.  W.  977),  1694. 


ccxliv 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  pages.] 


Peterswold  v.  Bartley  (4  S.  E.  [X 

S.  W.]   290;   21  W.  X.  C.   [X. 

H.  W]    81),  484,   1195. 
Petherick    v.    Sargent     (26    J.    P. 

135;    6  L.   J.  48),   1136. 
Petit    V.   People    ([Colo.]    52   Pac. 

676),    1446. 
Petitfils    V.     Jeanerette     ( 52     La. 

Ann.   1005;   27  So.   358),  413, 

445,   796. 
Pett    V.    Smith     (3    Campb.    33), 

2092,   2106. 
Petteway    v.    State     (36    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  97;   35  S.  W.  646),  968, 

1699. 
Pettilione  v.  State    (19  Ala.  586), 

1544. 
Pettis    County    v.    Debokl     ([Mo.] 

117  S.  W.  88),  1955. 
Pewtress    v.    Smith     (13    Vict.    L. 

R.   390),   1132,   1133. 
Peyton    v.    Hot    Springs    Co.     ( 53 

Ark.  236;   13  S.  W.  764),  185, 

'812. 
Peyton   v.    State    ([Ark.]     102    S. 

W.  1110),   1733. 
Pfefferle    (39    Kan.    128;    17    Pac. 

828),   1768. 
Pfirrmann,    Ex    parte     ( 134    Cal. 

143;  66  Pac.  205),  789. 
Phelan  v.  Gardner    (43   Cal.  306), 

2094,  2098,   2108,  2121,  2122. 
Phelps,   In  re    (82    Xeb.    45;    116 

X.  W.  681),  618,  800. 
Philadlephia  Licenses,  In  re  (4  Pa. 

Dist.  Rep.   201),   639. 
Philadelphia      v.      Comnionwealtli 

(98  Pa.  St.  48),  791. 
Philadelphia,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Drink- 
house     (17    Phil.    23),    2135, 

2139. 
Phillips,  In  re    (82  Xeb.  45;    116 

X.    W.    950),    111,    168,    536, 

600,  799. 
Phillips,  Ex  parte   (26  X.  B.  398), 

1681. 
Phillips   V.    Denver    ([Colo.   Sup.] 

41   Am.   St.   Rep.   230;    34   P. 

902),  461. 


Phillip    V.    Desmaeais     (28    L.    C. 

J.  291),  1781. 
Phillips    V.     Fadden     (125     Mass. 

198),  2035. 
Phillips  V.  Goe    (85  Ark.  304;    108 

S.   W.  207),  610,  879. 
Phillips  V.  Harris   (3  J.  J.  Marsh. 

[Ky.]    122),    1027. 
Phillips    V.   Jefferson   Co.   5    Kan. 

412),    811. 
Phillips  V.  Mobile   (208  U.  S.  472; 

28    Sup.   Ct.   370;    52   L.   Ed. 

— ;    affirming    146    Ala.    138; 

40  So.  826),  331. 
Phillips   V.   Moore    (11    Mo.    600), 

2099. 
Phillips    V.    State     (51    Ala.    20), 

370. 
Phillips   V,   State    (156    Ala.    140; 

47  So.  245),  1381,  1601,  2249. 
Phillips  V.  State   (95  Ga.  478;   20 

S.  E.  270)    1365,   1367. 
Phillips    V.    State    (23    Tex.    App. 

304;   4   S.  W.  893),  918. 
Phillips  V.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

40   S.  W.   270),   1379. 
Phillips  V.  State  ( 50  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

481;    98   S.   W.   868),  2090. 
Phillip  V.  Tecumseh   (5  Xeb.  305), 

395,  400,  532. 
Phoenix  Brewing  Co.  v.  Rumbarger 

181  Pa.  St.  251;  37  Atl.  340), 

1384. 
Pickard   v.    Teatro     (34    111.    App. 

398),    1876. 
Pickens    v.    State    (20    Ind.    116), 

510. 
Pickering  v.   Railroad   Co.    (L.  R. 

3   €.   P.  250),    1782. 
Picket  V.  State   (22  Ohio  St.  405), 

1482,  1488. 
Pickett    V.    Sutter     (5    Cal.    412), 

2041,   2094,   2098. 
Pickett  V.  Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(117    X.    C.    616;     23    S.    E. 

264;  30  L.  R.  A.  257),  2178. 
Pickens  v.  State  (20  Ind.  116 », 

694. 
Pickey,  In  re  (  [1907]  14  App.  Ont. 

L.  R.  587),  889. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccxlv 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Piddlesden,   Ex  parte    (18    J.    P. 

391),   547. 
Pidgeon  v.  Legge   (21   J.  P.  743), 

362,    2028. 
Piedmont   Club   v.    Commonwealth 

(87   Va.   541;    12   S.   E.   963), 

1330. 
Pierce  v.  Boston   (3  Mete.  [Mass.] 

520),  270. 
Pierce  v.  Hillsborough    (57   X.  H. 

324),    1767. 
Pierce    v.    New    Hampshire     ( [Li- 
cense Cases]  5  How.  504),  315, 

1426,  1428. 
Pierce    v.    Pierce     ( 17    Ind.    App. 

107;  46  X.  E.  480),  510),  694. 
Pierce  v.   Pierce    (38   Mich,   412), 

2134,   2135,  2136,  2147,   2148, 

2152. 
Pierce    v.    State     (109    Ind.    535; 

10   N.  E.   302),   1618. 
Pierce  v.   State    (13   N.   H.  536), 

138,  314,   1189. 
Piers  V.  State  (53  Ga,  365),  1631. 
Pierson,    In    re    (32    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    293,     66    N.    Y.    Supp. 

546),  730. 
Pierson   v.    State    (39   Ark.    219), 

523,  525. 
Pierson  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

107  S.  W.  546),  1465,  1473. 
Pietz  V.   State    (68   Wis.   53S;    32 

N.  W.  763),  523,  540,  1194. 
Pigford  V.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

74  S.  W.  323),  1311,  137-1. 
Pigman    v.    State    (14    Ohio   556, 

45  Am.  Dec.  558),  2040,  2J'Jl, 

2067. 
Pike  V.   State    (40   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

613;    51    S.  W.    395),   8,    948, 

962,  903,  964,  1603,  1610. 
Pike  V.  State  (40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

668;  51  S.  W.  395),  1715. 
Pike  County  Dispensary  v.  Brun- 

dige  (130  Ala.  193;  SO  So. 

451),  981. 
Pikeville    v.    Huffman    (65    S.    W. 

794;    23   Ky.   L.  Rep.    1692), 
50,  968. 


Pinchard  v.    State    (13   Tex.   App 

373),  929. 
Pindar   v.    Barlow    (32   Vt.   828), 

1807. 
Pine    V.    Barnes     (20    Q.    B.    Div. 

221;    52   J.    P.    199;    57   L.   J. 

M.   C.   28;    58   L.   T.  520;    36 

W.  R.  473),  1313,  1316,  1317. 
Pioneer    Trust    Co.    v.    Stioh     (71 

Ohio  St.  459;   73  X.  E.  520). 

805. 
Piper  V.  State    (53  Te.x.   Cr.  App. 

485;     110    S.    W.    898),    958, 

1491. 
Piqua  V.  Zimmerlin    (35   Ohio  St. 

507),   166,  216,  268,  294,  433. 

437,  1728. 
Pirtle   V.   State    (9   Humph.   663), 

2040,  2063,  2067. 
Pisar   V.  State    (56   Xob.   455;    76 

N.  W.  869),  567,  610. 
Pitner  v.  State   (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

268;   39  S.  \V.  662),  869,  957, 

1611,  1730. 
Pitt    V.    Smith     (3    Campb.    33), 

2098,  2103,  2130. 
Pittinger    v.    Pittinger     (2    Green 

Ch.  156),  2099. 
Pitts    V.    State    (124    Ga.    70;    52 

S.  E.   147),   1650. 
Pittsburgh    v.    Anderson     (7    Pa. 

Dist.   Rep.   714),  801. 
Pittsburg  Brewing  Co.,  In  re    ( 12 

Pa.  Super.  Ct.  129;  29  Pittsb. 

Leg.    J.    [N.   S.]    349;    12   Pa, 

Super.    Ct.     176;     30     Pittsb. 

Leg.    J.    [X.    S.]     179),    537, 

540. 
Pittsburg  Brewing  Co.,  In  re   (16 

Pa.  Super.  Ct.  215),  421,  646. 
Pittsburg  Brewing  Co.,  In  re   ( 16 

Super.  Ct.  Ap.  215),  347.  797. 
Pittsburg  Brewing  Co.,  In  re    (29 

Pittsburg     Leg.     J.     [X.     S.] 

350),    1192. 
Pittsburgh   Nat.   Bank   v.    Palmer 

22  Pa.   Leg.  J.    [0.   S.]    189), 
2106,   2112. 


ccxlvi 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Pittsburg,   etc.,  Coal   Co.  v.  Bates 

(156    U.    S.   577;    39    L.    Ed. 

538),  331. 
Pittsburgh,   etc.,   R.    Co.   v.    Cald- 

Avell   (74  Pa.  421),  2191. 
Pittsbugh,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Hinds 

53     Pa.     512;     91     Am.    Dec. 

224),  2216. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,   R.   Co.   v.   Pillow 

(76  Pa.  510),  2216. 
Pittsburg,  etc.,   Ry.  Co.  v.   Porter 

(32     Ohio     St.     328),     2255, 

2256. 
Pittsburgh,   etc.,   Ry.   Co.   v.   Van- 
dyne    (57    Ind.    576;    26    Am. 

Rep.  68),  2201,  2202. 
Pittston,  In  re  (7  Kulp  527),  795, 

796. 
Pize  V.  Fraser  (17  Ont.  Rep.  635), 

602. 
Place,  In  re    (27   App.   Div.   561; 

50    N.    Y.    S.    640),    545,    560, 

581,   582,   589,    593,   094,   743. 
Place,  In  re    (27  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

561;     50    N.    Y.     Supp.    640; 

34   N.   Y.   App.   Div.   389;    54 

N.    Y.    Supp.    294),    581. 
Plainfiekl    v.    Batchelder    (44    Vt. 

9),  1744. 
Plainfield   v.    Plainfield    (67    Wis. 

526;   30  N.  W.  672),  809. 
Plainfield    v.    Watson     (57    N.    J. 

L.   525;    31   Atl.    1040),    1643. 
Plank  V.   Hertha    (132   Iowa  213; 

109   N.   W.    732),    1004. 
Plank    V.    Mcllvenney     (21    N.    Z. 

508),  1347. 
Plass    V.    Clark     (71    N.    Y.    App. 

Div.    488;     76    X.    Y.    Supp. 

2),   346,    739,    745. 
Platteville  v.  Bell    (43   Wis.  488), 

452,  457,  459. 
Platteville  v.  McKernan    (54  Wis. 

487;   11  N.  W.  798).  473. 
Platts   V.   White    (25   J.    P.   485), 

1271. 
Plattsburg  v.  Riley    (42  Mo.  App. 

18),  409. 
Pleuler    v.    State    (11    Neb.    547), 

484,  490. 


Pletts    V.    Beattie     ([1896]     1    Q. 

B.    519;     60    J.     P.     185;     65 

L.  J.  M.  C.  86;  74  L.  T.  148), 

690,  1272. 
Pletts   V.   Campbell    ([1895]    2   Q. 

B.    229;     59    J.    P.    502;     64 

L.    J.    M.    C.    225;    73    L.    T. 

344;     43    W.    R.    634;     15    R. 

493),  690,   1271. 
Pleuler    v.    State    (11    Neb.    547; 

10  N.  W.  481),  139,  182,  195, 

407,   492,   714,   715,   788,   789, 

793. 
Plinsley  v.  Plinsley   (35  N.  J.  Eq. 

L8),  2168. 
Plisson  v.  Skinner    (4  Terr.  L.  R. 

391),  1365,  1371,  1779. 
Plucknett  v.  Tippey  ( 45  Neb.  343 ; 

63  N.  W.  845),  757. 
Plumb  V.   Christie    (103  Ga.  686; 

30    S.    E.    759;    42    L.    R.    A. 

181),   111,  172,  175,  176,  259, 

659. 
Plumbly     V.     Common  vvealtli     (43 

Mass.    [2   Met.]    413),    262. 
Plumley     v.     Massachusetts     ( 155 

U.  S.  461;    15  Sup.  Ct.   154), 

321,    1434,    1438. 
Plummer     v.     Commonwealth     ( 1 

Bush  26),  740. 
Phinimers  v.  Erskine   (58  Me.  59), 

1783. 
Plunkett   V.    State    (69    Ind.    68), 

11.  83,  1097,  1292,  1442,  1491, 

1500,   1586,   1592,   1657. 
Pocket  V.  State  ( 5  Tex.  App.  552 ) , 

2067. 
Poe    V.    State     ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

44  S.  W.  493),  1623. 
Pofl'enbarger    v.    Smith     ( 27    Neb. 

788;   43  N.  W.  1150),  1972. 
Poinders  v.  State    (37   Ark.   399), 

1223. 
Point    Pleasant    v.    Greenlee     (63 

W.  Va.   207;    60   S.   E.   601), 

760,  779. 
Poirer    v.    C^arroll     ( 35    La.    Ann. 

699),  2199. 
Poitras    v.    Quebec    (9    Rev.    Leg. 

531),   1129. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


ccxlvii 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Police  Jury  v.  Descant    ( 105  La. 

512;   29  So.  976),  899,  919. 
Police  Jury  v.  Manslield    (49   La. 

Ann.    796;    21    So.   598),   939. 
Police  Jury  v.  Mansura    ( 107  La. 

201;    31    So.    650),    934,   935, 

941,    942. 
Police   Jury    v.   Marrero    (38   La. 

896),   520. 
Police   Jury   v.   Ponchatoula    (118 

La.   138;    12  So.  725),  872. 
Polk    V.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.    App.] 

97  S.  W.  467),  948,  1600. 
Polk  Co.  V.  Johnson  (21  Fla.  578), 

563,  599. 
Polk   County    v.    Hierb    (37    Iowa 

361;    222,   226,    260. 
Pollard,  In  re    (127   Pa.   507;    17 

AtL    1087;    24    Wkly.    N.    C. 

181),  291,  621,   630,  675. 
Pollard,    Ex    parte    (51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    488;     103   S.    W.    878), 

863,  938. 
Pollard  V.  Allen   (96  Me.  455;  52 

Atl.    924),    822,     10S4,     1792. 

1793. 
Pollard    V.   Phoenix    Ins.    Co.     :  63 

Miss.  244;   56  Am.  Rep.  S05), 

1779. 
Pollard  V.  State   (4  Ohio  Doc.  30; 

1  Cleve.  Law  Rec.  35),   1:-:2S. 
Pollock,  Ex  parte  ( 24  N.  S.  Wales 

144;  7  S.  R.  648),  621. 
Pomeroy  v.   Rocky  Mountain  Ins. 

Co.  ( 9  Colo.  295 ;  59  Am.  Rep. 

144),  2241. 
Ponchatoula   v.    Tangipahoa    ( 120 

La.  292;  46  So.  16),  924. 
Pond  V.  State   (47  Miss.  30),  1643. 
Pontius  V.  Bowman   (66  Iowa  88; 

23  N.  W.  277),  359,  982. 
Pontius  V.  Winebrenner    (65  Iowa 

591;     22    N.    W.    646),    259, 

981. 
Pool,  In  re    (14  Vict.  L.  R.  519), 

533. 
Pope  V.   People    (26  111.  App.  44), 

1451. 
Pope    V.    State     (36    Miss.     121), 

2246,  2252. 


Pope  V.  Swan   (2  Swan  611),  688. 
Popel  V.  Monmouth    (81   111.  App. 

512),   190,  429,  1378. 
Porritt  V.  Porritt   (16  Mich.  140), 

2153,  2154. 
Porter    v.    Butterfield     (116    Iowa 
725;     89     N.    W.     199),     623, 
1748. 
Porter  v.  State    (135  Ala.  51;    33 

So.  694),  2060,  2065,  2068. 
Porter  v.  State    (140  Ala.  87;   37 
So.    81),    2038,     2051,    2056, 
2082. 
Porter  v.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 
(86  S.  W.   1014),  1700,  1704. 
Portingell,  Ex  parte    (  [1892]    1  Q. 
B.   15;    65   L.   T.   603;    40   W. 
R.     102;     56    J.    P.    276;     61 
L.  J.  M.  C.  1),  679. 
Portland   v.  Rolfe    (37   Me.   400), 

1744. 

Portland  v.  Schmidt   (13  Ore.  17; 

6    Pac.    221),    216,    410,    413, 

417,    424,   427,    432,   437,    443. 

Portsmouth    v.    Smith     (L.   R.    13 

Q.  B.  Div.  p.  198),  74. 
Portsmouth  Brewing  Co.  v.  Smith 
(155    Mass.    100;     28    N.    E. 
1130),   1787,   1788. 
Portwood    V.    Baskett     (64    Miss. 
213;     1    So.    105),    198,    231, 
790,  801. 
Post  V.  Sparta  Tp.  (63  Mich.  323; 
29  N.  W.  721),  763,  764,  765. 
Poston   V.    State    ([Neb.]    119    N. 

W.  520),  1660,  1697,  1702. 
Pottenger  v.   State    (54  Kan.  312; 

38   Pac.  278),  993. 
Potter   V.  Bowling    (5   W.  X.    [N. 

S.  W.]    143),  533. 
Potter    V.    Homer     (59    Mich.    8; 

26  N.  W.  208),   764. 
Potts   V.    state    (Liex.    k.t.   App.] 

89  S.  W.   836),  1608,   1697. 
Potts   V.   State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

96  S.  W.  1084),  1213,  1225. 
Pounder,  In  re  ( 19  App,  Ont.  684 ) , 

921. 
Pounaers  v.  State   (37  Ark.  399), 
1239,   1628,   1645. 


ccxlviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Powell,  In  re    ([Neb.]    119  N.  W. 

9),    575. 
Powell    V.    Bradlee     (9    Gill    &    J. 

[Md.]   220),  1027. 
Powell    V.   Commonwealth    ([Ky.] 

66  S.  W.  818;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

2167),   832,    834. 
Powell    V.    State     (27    Ala.    151), 

1245. 
Powell    V.    State     (63    Ala.    177), 

1293,    1635. 
Powell  V.  State   (69  Ala.  10),  124, 

156,    158,  183,  488,  490,   1491, 

1493,    1517. 
Powell    V.    State     (62    Ind.    531), 

358. 
Powell  V.  State   (50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

592;    99    S.  W.    1002),  958. 
Power   V.  King    ( [N.   D.]    120   N. 

W.  543),  2094,  2095,  2121. 
Power    V.    Litchfield     (141    Mich. 

350;    104  N.  W.  664;    12  De- 
troit Leg.  N.  484),  759,  764. 
Power  V.  Power   (11  Jur.  [N.  S.] 

800;    4    Swab.   &   T.    173;    34 

L.   J.   Mat.    [N.   S.]    137;    13 

W.  R.   1113),  2165. 
Powers,   In    re    (334   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    598;     70    N.    Y.    Supp. 

590),  884. 
Powers  V.  Commonwealth    (90  Ky. 

167;     13    S.    W.    450),    1175, 

1456. 
Powers  V.  Decatur   (54  Ala.  214), 

798,  799. 
Powers   V.    Klett    ([Iowa]    82    N. 

W.  752),   1270. 
Powers  V.   Powers    (20  Neb.   529; 

31  N.  W.   1),  68,  2166,  2167. 
Powers    V.     Winters     (106     Iowa, 

751;  77  N.  W.  509),  982. 
Powesheik  County  v.  Ross  ( 9  Iowa, 

511),   385. 
Pradat  v.  Ramsay    (47  Miss.  29), 

29),   882. 
Prader    v.    National,    etc.,    Assoc. 

(95  Iowa,  149;  63  N.  W.  601), 

2189,    2238,   2239. 


Prater   v.    Commonwealth    (3   Ky. 

L.       Rep.       [abstract]      695), 

1483. 
Prater   v.   Commonwealth    (4   Ky. 

L.  Rep,  344),  480. 
Prather    v.    People     (85    lU.    36), 

505,   506. 
Prather    v.    State    (12    Tex.    App. 

401),  86,  850,  910,  1569,  1704. 
Prather    v.    State    (14    Tex.    App. 

453),    492,    929. 
Prather    v.    People     (85    111.    36), 

762,   1639. 
Pratt,    Ex    parte     (17    N.    S.    W. 

L.  R,   295),   933. 
Pratt,   Ex  parte    (13    W.   N.    [N. 

S.   W.]    9),    682. 
Pratt    V.    Brown     (80    Tex.    608; 

16  S.  W.  443),  2033. 
Pratt    V.    State     (56     Ind.     179), 

2247,  2250. 
Prentice  v.  Achorn   (2  Paige,  30), 

2093,  2099. 
Presbyterian    Church    v.    City    of 

New   York    (5    Cow.    [N,   Y.] 

540),   404. 
Pressley  v.  State   (114  Tenn.  534; 

86*  S.    W.    378;    69    L.    R.    A. 

291),   1232,   1762. 
Pressler   v.    State    (13    Tex.    App. 

95),    1629,    1235. 
Preston   v.    Boston    (12   Pick.    7), 

811, 
Preston    v.    Culbertson     (58    Cal. 

198),   894. 
Preston    v.    Drew     (33    Me.    558; 

54   Am.   Dec.    639),    110,    123, 

126,  1031,  1032,  1776. 
Preston    v.    Reeve    (65    N.   H.   6), 

2126. 
Prestwood    v.    Borland     ( 92    Ala. 

599;     9    So.    223),    897,    900, 

906. 
Prestwood  v.  State   (88  Ala.  235; 

7   So.  259),   938. 
Price    V.    Jones     ([1892]    2    Q.    B. 

428;    56  J.   P.    471;    57   J.   P. 

148;    61   L,  J.  M,   C.  203;    67 

L.    T.    543;    41    W.    R.    57), 

678. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


ccxlvix 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Price    V.   Lincoln    (130    111.    App. 

254),  043. 
Price  V.  Philadelphia,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

84    Md.     506;     3(j    Atl.     203; 

36  L.  R.  A.  213),  2204. 
Price    V.    St.    Louis,    etc.,    R.    Co. 
(75  Ark.  479;  88  S.  W.  575), 

2215. 
Price    V.    State     ([Miss.]     38    So. 

41),    1207. 
Prichett    v.    Snider    ([Ky.]    01    S. 

W.  277;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1718), 

883. 
Pride  v.  State    (52  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

449;    107    S.    \V.    819),    1003. 
Princeton    v.    Vierling     ( 40    Ind. 

340),  814. 
Princeville  v.  Hitchcock    (101    111. 

App.  588),  1623. 
Prine  v.  Prine  (30  Fla.  070;  18  So. 

781;    34   L.   R.   A.   80),   2109, 

2114. 
Prinzel  v.  State   (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

274;    33   S.  W.  350),  25,  550, 

551,  552. 
Pritiz,  Ex  parte    (9   la.  30),  228. 
Privet    V.     Sexton     (10    C.  L.    J. 

192),  648. 
Prohibition  Amendment   Cases,  In 

re    (24   Kan.    700),    110,    124, 

125,    183,    184,   211,  488,  489, 

490,  491,  495,  710,  1194,  1521. 
Promoters    Ins.    Co.    v.   Barrie    (5 

Murray    [S.    C]     135),    2243. 
Prospect  Brewing  Co.,  In  re    ( 127 

Pa.    523;     17    Atl.    1090;     24 

W.  N.  C.  177),  600,  621,  630, 

649,  651. 
Providence    Bank    v.    Billings     (4 

Pet.   [U.   S.]    514),   790. 
Providence    v.    Bligh     ( 10    R.    I. 

208),   757. 
Providence    v.     Shackelford     (106 

Ky.    378;    50    S.    W.    542;    20 

Ky.   L.   Rep.    1921),   817. 
Provo   City   v.   Shurtliff    (4   Utah, 

15;  5  Pac.  302),  410,  432,  437, 

4,39,  827,  1640. 
Prowitt  v.  Denver    ( 1 1  Colo.  A]ip. 

70;    52    Pac.   286),    835,    838. 


Prussia  v    Guenther    (6  Abb.  [N. 

S.]   230   ["sun  smile"]),   14 
Puckett  V.   Snider    (110  Ky.   261; 

22   Ky.    1718;    61   S.   W.  277; 

22    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1718),    853, 

869,    873,   895,   890,   903,  920, 

921. 
Puckett    V.    State     (33    Fla.    385; 

14   So.   834)    049. 
Puckett   V.   State    (71    Miss.    192; 

14    So.   452),   907. 
Pugh  V.  State   (2  Tex.  App.  539), 

2074. 
Pugh  V.   State    (55  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

402;   117  S.  W.  817),  2027. 
Pughsley    v.    State     (4    Ga.    App. 

494;  01  S.  E.  886),  403,  1558. 
Pulbrook    V.    Ashley     ([1887]     56 

L.    J.    Q.    B.    376;    35    W.    R. 

779),   1817,   1834. 
Pulling  V.  People    (8  Barb.  N.  Y. 

384),   1303. 
Pullman  Southern  Car  Co.  v.  No* 

Ian    (22   Fed.  276),  479. 
Pullman,    etc.,    Co.    v.    State    (64- 

Tex.  274),  793. 
Pulse   v.   State    (5   Humph.    108), 

1246. 
Pumpelly    v.    Green   Bay   Co.    (13 

Wall.  100),  117. 
Pumphrey    v.    Anderson     ([Iowa] 

119    S.    VV.    617),    348,    1001, 

1002,  1043. 
Punnett,  Ex  parte   ([1880]  16  Ch. 

D.  220;  50  L.  J.  Ch.  212; 

44  L.  T.  220;  29  W.  R.  129), 

1831. 
Purdy.  In  re   (40  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 

133;    57    N.    Y.    Supp.    629), 

544,  582,  731,  748. 
Purdy    v.    Sinton    (56    Cal.    133), 

208,  573.  570. 
Purefoy    v.    People    (65    111.    App. 

167),  1129. 
Purkis    v.    Huxtable    ( 1    E.    &    E. 

780;    28   L.    J.   M.    C.   221;    5 

Jm-.     790;     23     J.    P.     197), 

367. 


eel 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References    p.re    to    pages.] 


rursifull  V.  Commonwealth  (  [Ky.] 

47  S.  W.  772;   20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

863),   403,    1764. 
Putnam  v.  Broadway,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(55  N.  Y.   108;    14   Am.  Rep 

190),  2201,  2206,  2216,  2217. 
Putney   v.   O'Brien    ^53    lowu,   S9, 

117;  4  N.  W.  891),  3931. 
Purvis  V.  Segar    (132  Mich.   167; 

93    N.    W.    26!;    9    Det.    Leg. 

N.   556),  2014. 


Q 


Quachita  Co.  v.  Rolland    (60  Ark. 

516;  31  S.  W.  144),  531. 
Quails  V.  Sayler  ( 18  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

400;   45  S.  W.  839),  772. 
Qualter  v.  State    (120  Ind.  92;   22 

N.  E.   100),   1742. 
Queen  v.  Abel   ( 29  Vict.  L.  R.  84 ; 

26  Austr.  L.  T.  58;   10  Austr. 

L.  R.  158),  1269. 
Queen    v.    Armstrong     (13    Juta, 

408),  833. 
Queen  v.  Atwell   (9  East.  Dist.  Ct. 

Rep.   174),  1208. 
Queen  v.  Bridges    (17  Juta,  385), 

1264. 
Queen  v.  Brooks  (6  Sup.  Ct.  319), 

1720. 
Queen   v.    Brooks    (6    Juta,   319), 

1128. 
Queen  v.  Cahill    (35  N.  B.  240;   6 

Can.  Cr.  Cas.  204),  949,  950, 

1218. 
Queen  v.  Calhoun    (20  X.  S.  395; 

9  C.  L.  T.  62),  1159. 
Queen  v.  Cunerty  ( 2  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

325;    26  Ont.   Rep.   51),    1191. 
Queen    v.    Davidson     (6    Can.    Cr. 

Cas.  117;   3  Terr.  L.  R.  425), 

11,32. 
Queen  v.  Derringer   (9  East.  Dist. 

Ct.  Rep.  168),  1357. 
Queen  v.  Deydier    (13  Juta,  388), 

1227. 
Queen    v.    Dias    ( 1    Can.    Cr.    Cas. 

534),  1257,  1853. 


Queen    v.    Fourie     (17    Juta,    24), 

1189. 
Queen  v.  Goldman    (9  Juta,  313), 

1208,  1215,  1229. 
Queen   v.   Harkins    ( 7    Juta,    69 ) , 

1248,   1634. 
Queen  v.  Harrell   ( 1  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

510),   1332,   1346,   1724. 
Queen  v.   Hazel    (2   Can.   Cr.   Cas. 

516),  1272. 
Queen  v.  Hughes   (2  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

5),   1346. 
Queen  v.   Hurlburt    (27  Nov.   Sco. 

62;  26  Nov.  Sco.  123),  1076. 
Queen   v.   King    (25   Nova   Scotia, 

488),  263. 
Queen  v.  Kirston    (16  Juta,  510), 

1264. 
Queen  v.  Lammert   (31  N.  S.  387; 

5  Can.  Cr.  Cas.  151),  1105. 
Queen  v.  Langf ord    ( 55  J.  P.  484 ) , 

1220,    1331,   1344,   1346. 
Queen  v.  Lloyd    (1  Cox  C.  C.  51), 

1724. 
Queen  v.  Lyons  (5  R.  &  G.  [N.  S.] 

201),  !»19. 
Queen  v.  McDonald  (26  N.  S.  402), 

343. 
Queen  v.  McGlashun  (9  East.  Dist. 

Ct.  Rep.  9),  1502. 
Queen  v.  McKenzie   (23  Nova  Sco- 
tia, 6),  263. 
Queen  v.  McLean   (3  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

323),   13. 
Queen  v.  McLeod  (6  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

94),  1572. 
Queen  v.   McNutt    (33   N.   S.   14), 

1105. 
Queen  v.  McPherson   (24  Nov.  Sco. 

378),  594. 
Queen  v.  Major   (9  East.  Dist.  Ct. 

Rep.   186),   1352. 
Queen  v.  Maybe   (9  East.  Dist.  Ct. 

Rep.  186),  1354. 
Queen  v.  Murrens  (7  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

4.59),  1571. 
Queen     v.     Nokitshini      (13     Juta, 

413),  1377. 
Queen  v.  Nurse    (2  Can.   Cr.   Cas. 

57),  1579,  1719. 


TABLE   OF    CASE6. 


ccH 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Queen    v.    Otto     (13    Juta,    251), 

2028. 
Queen  v.  Parrott    (13  Juta,  452), 

1264. 
Queen    v.     Pilkingtou     ( 10     Juta, 

132),   1316. 
Queen  v.  Pols  (2  H.  C.  R.  p.  580), 

1189. 
Queen    v.    Power     (28    Nov.    Sco. 

3/3),  344. 
Queen  v.  Rankin    (17  Juta,  526), 

1265. 
Queen  v.  Reynolds   ( 1 1  East.  Dist. 

Ct.  Rep.  17),  2028. 
Queen  v.  Robertson  (9  Juta,  29!)), 

1228,  1229,  2029. 
Queen  v.  Ronnan  (23  Nova  Scotia, 

421),  263. 
Queen    v.    Roos     (17    Juta,    547), 

1265. 
Queen  v.  Saterio  (1  Terr.  L.  R.  301 

[$100  per  annum]),  480,  795. 
Queen  v.  Sauer  (3  B.  C.  Rep.  308; 

1  Can.  Cr.  Cas.  317),  1312. 
Queen  v.   Sutton    (10   Juta,   273), 

1310. 
Queen    v.    Tliesen     (6    Juta,    68), 

1366. 
Queen   v.   Truman    (15  Juta,   79), 

1154. 
Queen  v.  Van  Zyle  (16  Juta,  278), 

689. 
Queen  v.  Walsh    ( 1   Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

109),  1175,  1177,  1178. 
Queen    v.    Walsh     (29    Nov.    Sco. 

336).   1332. 
Queen  v.  Walsh  (29  Nov.  Sco.  521; 

reversing   19   Nov.   Sco.   336), 

1346. 
Queen  v.  Ware   (12  Juta,  4),  518. 
Quigley    v.    Monsees     (56    N.    Y. 

Misc.    Rep.    110;     106    N.    Y. 

Supp.  167),  581.  588. 
Quill  V.  Isitt  (10  N.  Z.  L.  R.  636), 

685. 
Quinhin  v.  Welsh   (23  N.  Y.  Supp. 

963;  69  Hun,  584),  1904,  1905, 

1907. 
Quinn,  In  re    (11    Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

554),  594,  664,  665. 


Quinn  v.   O'Keefe    (9  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  68;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  116; 

appeal    dismissed,    151    N.    Y. 

633;    45   N.   E.   34;    75   N.   Y. 

St.  753),  63,  1735. 
Quinn  v.   State    (123   Ind.  59;    23 

N.  E.  977),  1497,  1500. 
Quinn  v.   State    (82  Miss.   75;    33 

So.  839),  282. 
Quinnipac   Brewing    Co.    v.    Hack- 

borth    (74  Conn,  392;  50  Atl. 

1023),  480,  1772. 
Quintard   v.    Corcoran    (50    Conn. 

34),  456,  757,  766,  1125,  1134. 
Quintard    v.    Knoedler    (53    Conn. 

485;   2  Atl.  752),  778. 
Quinton,  In  re    (169   Pa.    115;    32 

Atl.   101),  664. 
Quirk,  In.  re   (17  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

327),  598,  637,  696. 
Quist   V.    American    Bonding,   etc., 

Co.   (74  Neb.  692;    105  N.  W. 

255),  782. 
Quolter  v.  State   (120  Ind.  92;  22 

N.  E.   100),  1320. 


Rabe  v.  State    (39  Ark.  204),   II, 

36,  968. 
Racer   v.    State    ( [Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

73  S.  W.  968),  871. 
Racer   v.    State    ( [Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

73    S.    W.    807),    964,    1703, 

1704. 
Radford    v.    Thornell     (81     Iowa, 

709;  45  N.  W.  890),  982,  988. 
Radley   v.   Leider    (99   Mich.  431; 

58    N.    W.    366),    1862,    1889, 

1962,  1983. 
Rae     v.     Yates     Castle     Brewery 

([1903]   67  J.  P.  427),   1822. 
Rafferty    v.    Buchman     (46    Iowa, 

195),  1888,  1897. 
Rafferty   v.   People    (66   111.    118), 

2041. 
Rafter  v.  State  (62  Mo.  App.  101), 

1458. 


celii 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Eagan  v.  State    (67  Miss.  332;    7 

So.  280),  1480,  1571. 
Eagle  V.  Mattox  (159  Ind.  594;  05 

N.  E.  743),  012,  855. 
Eagland   v.    State    ( [Fla.]    46    So. 

724),  1701. 
Eahrer,  In  re   (140  U.  S.  545;   11 

S.  Ct.  865;  35  L.  Ed.  372;  re- 
versing 43  Fed.  556),  320,  328, 

427,  695. 
Eail  V.  Potts  ( 8  Iluinph.  225 ) ,  660. 
Eailroad   Co.  v.  Berry    ( [Ky.]    40 

Am.   St.   Eep.    161;    10   S.   W. 

1026),  461. 
Eailroad  Co.  v.   Husen    (95  U.   S. 

465),  116,  316. 
Eailway  Co.  v.  Illinois   (118  N.  S. 

557;  7  Sup.  Ct.  4),  316. 
Eailway  Co.  v.  Alabama  ( 128  U.  S. 

96;   9  Sup.  Ct.  28),  315. 
Eailway  Co.  v.  Valleley    (32  Ohio 

St.    345),    2202,    2208,    2212, 

2215. 
Eailway   Co.   v.  Wyant    (114   Ind. 

525;    17  N.  E.  118),  1951. 
Eailway   Sleepers    Co.,   In   re    (29 

Ch.  Div.  204),  569. 
Eains  v.   Sampson    ( 50   Tex.   495 ; 

32  Am.  Eep.  609),  660. 
Eaisler    v.     State     (55    Ala.     64), 

1553. 
Ealeigh   v.   Cane    (47   N.   C.   293), 

683. 
Ealeigh  v.  Douglierty    (3  Humph. 

[Tenn.]   11),  270. 
Ealeigh  v.  Kane    (47  N.   C.   288), 

635. 
Ealey  v.   State    ([Tex.   Civ.  App.] 

105  S.  W.  342),  768. 
Ealston   V.    Turpin    (25    Fed.    7), 

2094,   2105,   2100,   2121.   2122, 

2152. 
Eamagnano  v.  Cook   (85  Ala.  226; 

3  So.  845),  291,  035. 
Eamagnano     v.     Crook     (88     Ala. 

450;  7  So.  247),  648,  668. 
Eamey  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

61  S.  W.  126),  1148,  1728. 
Eamsoy    v.    State     (11    Ark.    35), 

1093. 


Ean  V.  People  (63  N.  Y.  279),  41. 
Eana  v.  State  (51  Ark.  481);  11 

S.  W.  692),  513,  1371,  1372, 

1590,  1619,  1644. 
Eanch   v.   Commonwealth    (78   Pa. 

St.  490),  262,  932,  935,  1572. 
Eancour,  In  re   (66  N.  H.  172;  20 

Atl.  930),  976. 
Eandall,    Ex    parte    ( 50    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  519;  98  S.  W.  870),  865, 

939. 
Eandall    v.    State     (14    Ohio    St. 

435),  1228,  1229,  1233. 
Eandall  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

22  S.  VV.  411),  1028,  1629. 
Eandall  v.  State   (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

261;  90  S.  W.  1012),  952. 
Eandall  v.  Tillis    (43  Fhi.  43;   2!) 

So.  540),  233,   1467. 
Eandenbusch,  In  re   (120  Pa.  328; 

14  Atl.  148),  626,  635. 
Eandolph   v.   Eandolph    (40   N.   J. 

Eq.  74),  1906. 
Eank  v.  People   (80  111.  App.  40), 

73. 
Eankin    v.    Hunt     ([1894]     10    E. 

249),  1815. 
Eankine   v.   Greer    (38    Kan.   343; 

16  Pac.  680),  1027. 
Eanney  v.  Mutual  Ben.  L.  Ins.  Co. 

[U.  S.  D.  C.  Mass.  1873] ;  May 

on  Ins.  [3d  Ed.]  p.  302),  2234. 
Eapken,    In    re     (14    Vict.    L.    E. 

317),    1209. 
Eapp    V.    Eapp     (149    Mich.    218; 

112  N.  W.  709;    14  Det.  L.  N. 

415),  2158. 
Easquin,   In   re    (37    N.   Y.   Misc. 

Eep.    693;     76    N.    Y.    Supp. 

404),  583,  729. 
Eater  v.  State  (49  Ind.  507),  1579, 

1580,   1590. 
Eather    v.    State     (25    Tex.    App. 

623;  9  S.  W.  69),  2070,  2090. 
Eathburn  v.   State    (88  Te.x.  281; 

31     S.    W.     189     [Texas    Civ. 

App.]  32  S.  W.  45),  794,  934. 
Eathburn    v.     State     ([Tex.     Civ. 

App.]  32  S.  W.  45),  933. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References    are    to    pages.] 


celiii 


riathmiller    v.    People     (44    Mich. 

280;   6  N.  W.  667),  1319. 
Eatliff  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

49  S.  W.  583),  1603,  1608. 
Rattenbury     v.     Northville      (122 

Mich.' 158;    80   N.    \V.    1012), 

433. 
Raubenheimer      v.      Parsons      ( 12 

Juta,  326),  852. 
Eaubold  v.  Commonwealth  ( 12  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  987),  1117. 
Eaubold  v.  Commonwealtli   (  [Kv.] 

54  S.  W.  17;   21  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1125),  111,  400, 
Raubold    v.    Commonwealth     (111 

Ky.  433;  03  S.  W.  781;  23  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  735),  1493. 
Rauch  V.   Commonwealtli    (78   Pa. 

St.  490),  934.  1679. 
Raw  V.  People   (63  N.  Y.  277),  12, 

47,  48,  82,  85,  277,  1592. 
Rawlins   v.    Desborough    (2   M.   & 

Rob.  328),  2220. 
Rawlins    v.    State     (2    Md.    201), 

1246. 
Rawlins  v.  Vidvard  (34  Hun,  205), 

1988. 
Rawls  V.  State    (48  Tc.x.  Cr.  App. 

622;  89  S.  VV.  1071),  909,  914, 

1733. 
Eawson   v.    State    ( 1    Conn.   292 ) , 

1541. 
Rawson  v.   State    (19  Conn.  292), 

1445,  1484. 
Ray  V.   State    (50  Ala.   172),  369, 

370,  371. 
Ray   V.    State    (47    Tex.   Cr.   App. 
.     407;  83  S.  W.  1121),  211,  230, 

233,  234,  246,  249. 
Ray   V.    State    (46   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

176;     79    S.    W.    535),    1166, 

1167,  1197,  1662,   1689. 
Rayman    Brewing    Co.    v.    Brister 

(179   U.   S.  445;    21    Sup.    Ct. 

201;  45  L.  Ed.  269;  affirming 

92  Fed.  28),  200,  311. 
Raymond   v.   Clement    ( 1 18   X.   Y. 

App.    Div.    528;     102    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1070),  880. 


Read  v.  Bishop  of  Lincoln  ([1892J 

App.  Cas.  at  p.  656),  27. 
Read  v.  Board   ( [N.  J.  L.]  71  Atl 

120),  573. 
Read  V.  Taft   (3  R.  L  175),   1801. 
Reading   v.    Reading    (96    Cal.    4; 

30  Pac.  803),  2159,  2160. 
Reagan    v.    State     (28    Tex.    App. 

227;  12  S.  W.  601),  209,  2074, 

2076. 
Real  V.  People    (42  N.  Y.  270;   af- 
firming 55  Barb.  551;   8  Abb. 

Prac.      [N.     S.]     314),     2000, 

2082. 
Reams    v.    State     (23    Ind.     Ill), 

1499. 
Reason   v.   Commonwealth    (5   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  428),  1486, 

1670. 
Reatli  V.  State   (16  Ind.  App.  146; 

44    N.    E.    808),    1860,    1900, 

1907. 
Rebman,  In  re  (41  Fed.  Rep.  867), 

156. 
Rector  v.  State   (6  Ark.  187).  270. 
Rector  v.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

90  S.  W.  41),  1379,  1579. 
Redd   V.   State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

77  S.  W.  214),  1623,  1624. 
Redding   v.    Commonwealth    (3   B. 

Men.  339),  1499. 
Redding  v.  State    (91  Ga.  231;    18 

S.  E.  289),  162,  931. 
Redgate  v.  Haynes    ( 1   Q.  B.  Div. 

89;    41    J.    P.    86;    33    L.    T. 

779;   45  L.  J.  M.  C.  65),  376. 
Redmond    v.    State    (36    Ark.    58; 

38  Am.  Rep.  24),  1237. 
Redpath  v.  Nottingham  (5  Blackf. 

207),   758,  780. 
Reed's    Will,    />^  re    (2    Con.    Sur. 

403:     20    X.    Y.    Supp.    649), 

2137,  2147. 
Reed,    Apeai    of    (114    Pa.   452;    6 

All.  910),  621,  622. 
Reed    v.    Adams     (2    Allen,    413), 

1046,  1079. 
Reed  v.  Ball   (42  Miss.  472),  183. 


ecliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Eeed  v.  Collins   (5  Cal.  App.  494; 

90    Pac.    973),    91,    103,    627, 

628,  630. 
Eeed  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.]  44 

S.  W.  1093),  1379,  1380,  1381. 
Keed  v.   State    (53   Tex.   Cr.  App. 

4;   108  S.  W.  368),  1186,  1615, 

1716,  1732,  1733. 
Reed    v.    State    ( [Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

109  S.  W.  182),  1729. 
Reed    v.    Territory     (1    Okla.    Cr. 

App.  481;  98  Pac.  583),  1492, 

1641,   1648,   1703,   1984. 
Reed  v.  Terwilliger  (42  Hmi,  310), 

1927,   1988. 
Reed    v.    Terwilliger     (116    N.    Y. 

530;    22    N.    E.    1091),    1954, 

1987,  1988. 
Reese    v.    Atlanta     (63    Ga.    344), 

497,  503,  504,   1160. 
Reese  v.  Newman    (120   Ga.    198; 

47  S.  E.  560),  452,  1084,  1209. 
Reeve  v.  Long  ( 1  Salk.  227 ) ,  1906 
Regadanz  v.  Haines  (168  Ind.  140; 

79  N.  E.  352),  206,  209,  286, 

612,  614,  618. 
Regadanz  v.  State  (171  Ind.  387; 

86  K  E.  449),  1444,  1510, 

1512. 
Regan,  In  re  (213  Pa.  279;  02  Atl. 

841;    reversing  28   Super.   Ct. 

386),  565,  759. 
Regan    v.    Wooten    ([Tex.]    16    S. 

W.  546),  1851. 
Regdance  v.  Haines  (168  Ind.  140; 

79  N.  E.  752),  606. 
Regina  v.  Aberdare  (14  Q.  B.  854), 

569. 
Regina    v.    Adams     (5    Manitoba, 

153),  1316.  1697. 
Regina  v.  Alehurst   (3  Vict.  L.  R. 

R.   [Aufitr.]    Ill),  682. 
Regina  v.  Alexander  (17  Ont.  App. 

458).   1.555. 
Regina  v.  Allmey    (35  J.  P.  534), 

547. 
Regina  v.  Altrincham  (11  T.  L.  R. 

3),  680. 


Regina  v.  Andover  (55  L.  J.  M.  C. 

143;    16  Q.  B.  Div.  711;  55  L. 

T.  23;  34  W.  R.  456;  50  J.  P. 

549),  670. 
Regina  v.  Anglesey   (59  J.  P.  743; 

65  L.  J.  M.  C.  12;   15  R.  614), 

615,  620,  679. 
Regina  v.  Anglesey  J.  J.    ([1892] 

1  Q.  B.  852),  654. 
Regina  v.  Armagh    (1897]   2  Irish 

Rep.  57),   1159. 
Regina  v.  Armstrong  (65  L.  J.  M. 

C.  35),  616,  620. 
Regina  v.  Ashton  ( 1  E.  L.  &  B.  L. 

286;    16   J.   P.    790;    22   L.   J. 

M.  C.  61;    17   Jur.  501),  374. 
Regina  v.  Aulton   (30  L.  J.  M.  C. 

129;   25  J.   P.  09;    3   E.  &  E. 

568:    3    L.   J.    099;    9    W.   R. 

278;  16  Cox  C.  C.  259),  352. 
Regina  v.  Austin  (17  Ont.  Rep. 

743),  1331,  1332,  1342,  1344. 
Regina  v.  Barrett  ( 1  L.  &  C.  263 ; 

32  L.  J.  M.  C.  36;  7  L.  T. 

435:    11  W.  R.  124),  724. 
Regina  v.  Barton   (14  J.  P.  738), 

657. 
Regina    v.    Beard     (13    Ont.    608), 

1603. 
Regina   v.   Belmont    (35   Up.   Can. 

298),  455.  468,  469. 
Regina    v.   Bennett    (1   Ont.   445), 

87,   1531,    1658,   1681,   1762. 
Regina   v.   Bigelow    (36  Nov.   Sco. 

554),    1723. 
Regina   v.    Birley    (55   J.    P.   88), 

570. 
Regina  v.   Bishop    (5   Q.   B.   259), 

1251. 
Regina  v.  Blackburn  J.  J.    ( 42   J. 

P.  775;  43  J.  P.   111).  570. 
Regina  v.  Blakely   (6  P.  C.  [Can.] 

Rep.  244),  2027. 
Regina    v.    Blair    (24   N.    B.    74), 

1651. 
Regina    v.    Bodmin     ([1892]    2    Q. 

B.  21;   56  J.  P.  504;   61  L.  J. 

M.  C.   151;    66  L.  T.  562;   40 

W.   R.   606;    8  T.  L.  R.  553), 

657. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cclv 


[Ileferences    ;ire    to    pages.] 


Regina  v.  Booth  (3  Ont.  App.  144; 

9  C.  P.  452),  539,  711. 
Regina  v.  Boteler   (4  B.  &  S.  959; 

33  L.  J.  M.  C.  101;   28  J.  P. 

453),  632. 
Regina  v.  Bowman  (07  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

463    [1898];    1   Q.   B.   663;    78 

L.  T.   230;    62   J.   P.   374;    14 

T.  L.  R.  303),  654,  689. 
Regina   v.    Brady    (12    Ont.    358), 

1762. 
Regina  v.  Breen  ( 36  Up.  Can.  84 ) , 

1372. 
Regina  v.  Bristol  J.  J.   (5  R.  276; 

57   J.   P.   486;    68   L.   T.   335; 

41  W.  R.  379),  656. 
Regina  v.   Bristol  J.  J.    (67  J.  P. 

375),  620. 
Regina  v.  Brown   (1  Q.  B.  119;  64 

L.  J.  M.   C.    1;    72   L.   T.   22; 

43   W.  R.  222:    50  J.  P.  485; 

15    Rep.    59),    378. 
Regina    v.    Brown    (10    Ont.    41), 

1724. 
Regina    v.    Brown    (10    Ont.    41), 

1755. 
Regina  v.  Cameron   (12  Ont.  524), 

1681. 
Regina  v.   Campbell    (2  Pac.   Rep. 

[Can.]   55),   1370. 
Regina  v.  Cavanagh    ( 27  Com.  PI. 

[Can.]  537),  1479,  1481,  1540. 
Regina  v.  Charles    (24  Ont.  432), 

1332,  1346,  1347. 
Regina  v.  Chertsey  J.  J.   (3  Q.  B. 

D.  374;    42   J.   P.  598;    47   L. 

J.  M.  C.  104;   20  W.  R.  682), 

655. 
Regina  v.  Clark  (15  Ont.  49), 

1724. 
Regina  v.  Cockshott  ([1898]  1  Q. 

B.  582 ;  62  J.  P.  326 ;  67  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  467;  78  L.  T.  168;  14  T. 

L.  R.  264),  744. 
Regina  v.  Commissioners  (57  L.  J. 

M.  C.  92;  21  Q.  B.  Div.  569; 

59  L.  T.  378;   36  W.  R.  692; 

52  J.  P.  390),  1299. 
Regina   v.   Conway    (46   Up.   Can. 

85),  539. 


Regina   v.   Collier    ( 12   Prac.   Rep. 

[Can.]  316),  1483,  1484. 
Regina  v.   Collins    (14   Ont.   613), 

1739,   1762. 
Regina  v.  Cothan   ([1898]   1  Q.  B. 

802 ;  62  J.  P.  435 ;  14  T.  L.  R. 

367;    67    L.  J.  Q.   B.  632;    78 

L.    T.    468;    46    W.    R.    512), 

654,  711. 
Regina    v.    Coulter     (4    Manitoba, 

309),  1445,  1478. 
Regina  v.  Crewkerne  J.  J.  ([1888] 

21  Q.  B.  D.  85;  52  J.  P.  372; 

57  L.  J.  M.  C.   127;   58  L.  T. 

450;   30  W.  R.  629),  658. 
Regina  v.  Crothers    (11  Manitoba, 

567),  747. 
Regina  v.  Cruse  (8  Car.  &  P.  541), 

2073. 
Regina  v.  Curzon    (L.  R.  8  Q.  B. 

400;    42   L.   J.  M.  C.   155;    37 

J.    P.    774;    29    L.   T.    32;    21 

W.  R.  886),  710. 
Regina  v.  Darwen  J.  J.    (39  L.  T. 

[N.  S.]    444),  570. 
Regina   v.   Davis    (30  N.   B.  248), 

1448. 
Regina  v.  Davis  (14  Cox  C.  C.  563; 

28    Mack.     Eng.    Rtep.    657), 

2054,  2067,  2073. 
Regina  v.  Deane  ( 2  Q.  B.  96 ) ,  668. 
Regina  v.  Denbigh  J.  J.  (59  J.  P. 

708»),  679. 
Regina  v.  Denham  (35  Up.  Can. 

Rep.  503),  840,  1192. 
Regina  v.  Denton  (16  Q.  B.  832; 

18  Q.  B.  761;  83  E.  C.  L. 

701),  929. 
Regina  v.  Deputies  (15  Q.  B.  671), 

679. 
Regina  v.  DeRutzen   ( 1  Q.  B.  Div. 

55;    40    J.    P.    150;    33    L.    T. 

726;   24  W.  R.   343;    45  L.  J. 

M.  C.  57),  547,  654. 
Regina  v.  Dickson    (11  Cox  C.  C. 

341),  2039. 
Regina    v.    Dixon     (11    Cox    C.    C. 

341),  2055. 
Regina  v.  Dobbins    (48  J.  P.  182), 

350. 


cclvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Eegina    v.    Doody    (6    Cox    C.    C. 

463),  2039,  2077. 
Eegina    v.    Doyle    (12    Out.    347), 

1048,   1060. 
Eegina   v.   Dublin    (8    L.    R.   Irish 

Rep.  274),   1152. 
Regina  v.  Duquette   (9  U.  C.  C.  P. 

[Can.]    28),   1263,   1322. 
Regina  v.  Durnion   (14  Ont.  172), 

1739. 
Regina  v.  Eales   (44  J.  P.  553;  42 

L.  T.  735),  680. 
Regina    v.    Edgar     ( 15    Ont.    Rep. 

142),  1442,  1724,  1762. 
Regina  v.   Elborne    ( 19   Ont.  App. 

439;    reversing  21    Ont.    504), 

840. 
Regina  v.  Eli   (10  Ont.  727).  1755. 
Regina   v.   Elliott    (12    Ont.   524), 

1681,  1762. 
Regina   v.   Essex   J.   J.    (46   J.   P. 

761),  679. 
Regina    v.    Excise    Commissioners 

(2  T.  R.  381),  76. 
Regina   v.   Farquliar   L.   R.    (9   Q. 

B.   258;    39   J.   P.    166),   020, 

656,  079,  680. 
Regina  v.  Faulkner    ( 20  Up.  Can. 

Rep.  529),   1192. 
Regina  v.  Fee  (13  Ont.  590),  1579. 
Regina   v.    Flynn    (20   Ont.    638), 

1643. 
Regina   v.    Frances    (4   Cox   C.    C. 

57),  2074. 
Regina  v.  French    (34  IT.  C.  403), 

1322. 
Regina    v.    Gamble     (8    Up.    Can. 

263),  420. 
Regina  v.   Gamlen    (1   Fost.   &   F. 

90),  2039. 
Regina  v.  Gibson    (11   Vict.  L.  R. 

94),  1251. 
Regina  v.  Gilroys  (4  Sc.  Sess.  Cas. 

3d    series.'  056),    513,     1272, 

1,352.   1355. 
Regina  v.  Gloucestershire  J.  J.  (54 

'  J.  P.  519).  055. 
Regina    v.   Grannis    (5    Manitoba, 

153),  1132. 


Regina   v.   Green    (12   P.   R.  373), 

1263. 
Regina  v.  Groom    ([1901 J  2  K.  B. 

157;    65   J.   P.   452;    70   L.   J. 

K.  B.  636;   49  W.  R.  484;   84 

L.  T.  534;    17  T.  L.  R.  433), 

620. 
Regina  v.  Guittard   (30  Ont.  283), 

262. 
Regina  v.  Haggard   (30  Ujjp.  Can. 

Rep.  152),  lolG,   1540. 
Regina     v.     Halliday      (21      App. 

[Ont.]  42),  1270. 
Regina   v.   Halpin    (12   Ont.   330), 

919,   1579. 
Regina    v.    Hampshire     (44    J.    P. 

72),   1270. 
Regina    v.    Harrell     ( 12    ilanitoba, 

198,  522),  824. 
Regina   v.   Harris    (2   B.   C.    177), 

1152. 
Regina  v.   Harris    (13   Easl.  270), 

657. 
Regina    v.    Heath     (13    Ont.    Rep. 

471),   1218. 
Regina     v.     Hefferman      ( 13     Ont. 

016),   1048. 
Regina   v.    Henderson    { 4   Terr.   L. 

R.  146;  2  Can.  Cr.  Cas.  364), 

il32. 
Regina    v.    Herrell    ( 12    Manitoba, 

198,  522),   1643,  1044. 
Regina  v.  Higgins    (18   Ont.   148), 

i.38. 
Regina  v.  Hobbs    ([1898]    2  Q.  B. 

047:  62  J.  P.  474,  551;  67  L. 

J.  Q.   B.   928;    79   L.   T.    160; 

14  T.  L.  R.  573;  47  W.  R.  79), 

379. 
Regina    v.    Hodge     (23    Ont.    Rep. 

450).   1047." 
Regina  v.  Hodgins    (24  Ont.  433), 

1220,  1332,  1346. 
Regina  v.  Holland  J.  .J.    (46  J.  P. 

312).  724. 
Regina  v.  Holland    (1  T.  R.  692), 

657. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cclvii 


[RefereRces   are   to   pages.] 


Eegina  v.  Howard  ([1902]  2  K.  B. 

363;    66   J.   P.   579;    71    L.  J. 

K.  B.  754;    80  L.  T.  839;    51 

W.  R.  21;    18  T.  L.  R.  690), 

033. 
Regina   v.   Howard    (45   Up.    Can. 

340),  1372. 
Regina  v.  Howard,  Congleton  J.  J. 

(23    Q.    B.    D.   502;    53    J.    P. 

454;    60  L.   T.  960;   37  W.  R. 

617),  656,  657,  681. 
Regina  v.  Hughes  (2  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

5),  1332. 
Regina   v.   Hughes    (29   Ont.   Rep. 

179),  1340. 
Regina    v.    Hull    J.    J.    (47    J.   P. 

820),  709. 
Regina  v.  Humphrey  ([1897]  2  Q. 

B.  242;  61  J.  P.  548;  66  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  601;   77  L.  T.  2;  46  W. 

R.  9;   affirmed,  H.  L.    [1890] 

A.  C.  143;  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  392; 
63  J.  P.  260;  47  W.  R.  580; 
80  L.  T.  538;  15  T.  L.  R. 
266),  380. 

Regina    v.    Irland    (31    Ont.    Rep. 

267),  1047. 
Regina  v.  James    (12   J.  P.  262), 

567. 
Regina  v.  Jenkins    (55  J.  P.  824; 

61  L.  J.  M.   C.   57;    65   L.  T. 

857;   40  W.  R.  318),  542. 
Regina  v.  Justices  (2  Pug.  [N.  B.] 

535),  262. 
Regina  v.  Justices   (46  J.  P.  312), 

368,  535. 
Regina    v.    Keepers    of    the    Peace 

(25  Q.  B.  Div.  257;   39  L.  J. 

M.  C.   146;    63  L,  T.  243;    39 

W.  R.  11),  669. 
Regina  v.  Kennedy  (17  Ont.  159), 

1724, 
Regina  v.  Kennedy  (10  Ont.  390), 

1724. 
Regina  v.  Kensington  J.  J.   (12  Q. 

B.  654;    12  J.  P.  743).  547. 
Regina   v.    Kent   J,   J.    (41    J.   P. 

263),  679. 


Regina   v.   King    (57   L.   J.   M.   C. 

20;   20  Q.  B.  Div.  430;   58  L. 

T.  607;   30  W.  R.  600;   52  J. 

P.   164),   1158. 
Regina  v.  King   (20  Q.  B.  D.  43; 

'53  J.  P.    164;   57   L.  J.  M.  C. 

20;    58   L.   T.   607;    36   W.   R. 

600),  657,  658. 
Regina  v.  Kingston  J.  J.   (66  J.  P. 

547;  86  L.  T.  589;  18  T.  L.  R. 

477),  656,  679. 
Regina  v.  Kirkdale  J.  J.   ( 1  Q.  B. 

Div.  49 ;   40  J.  P.  39 ;   45  L.  J. 

M.   C.   36;    33   L.   T.   603;    24 

W.  R.  205),  620. 
Regina  v.   Kirkdale    (50  L.   J.  M. 

C.  24;    18  Q.  B.  Div.  248;    15 

J.  P.  214),   1127. 
Regina    v.    Klemp    { 10    Ont.    Rep. 

143),  1449,   1738,  1755. 
Regina  v.  Knopp   (2  E.  &  B.  447; 

22  L.  J.  M.  C.  139;    17  J.  P. 

599),  1142. 
Regina  v.  Lancashire  J.  J.    (L.  R. 

6  Q.  B.  97;  35  J.  P.  170;  40 

]..  J.  M.  C.  17;  23  L.  T.  461; 

19  W.   R.  204),  633. 
Regina  v.  Lancashire  J.  .J.   (54  J. 

P.  580;  64  L.  T.  562),  655. 
Regina  v.  Langridge   (24  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  73;  2  C.  L.  R.  1657),  547. 
Regina  v.  Lawrence  (11  Q.  B.  Div. 

638;    47   J.   P.   596;    52   L.   J. 

M.  C.    114;    49  L.  T.  244;    32 

W.  R.  20),  681,  708. 
Regina    v.    Leigh     ( 4    Fost.    &    F. 

915),  2055. 
Regina    v.    Lennox    (26    Up.    Can. 

141),  468. 
Regina  v.   Liverpool  J.   J.    (11   Q. 

B.  Div.  644),  678,  704. 
Regina  v.  Local  Government  Board 

(10  Q.   B.  Div.  231),  658. 
Regina  v.  London  J.  J.    (55  J.  P. 

56),  669. 
Regina    v.   Lyon    (62   J,   P.   357), 

570. 
Regina  v.  McAuley   (14  Ont.  643), 

1263,  1370. 


cclviii 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Eegina   v.   McCoy    (23    Ont.    Rep. 

442),  826,   840. 
Regina  v,  JMcGarry    (24  Ont.  Rep. 

52),  1053. 
Regina    v.    McGauley     (12    P.    R. 

259),    1263. 
Regina  v.  ^IcGregor   (20  Ont.  Rep. 

115),  1370. 
Regina  v.  McKenzie   (0  Ont.  165), 

1263. 
Regina    v.    Mabey     (37    Up.    Can. 

248),  1723. 
Regina  v.  IManchester  J.  J.  ( [1899] 

1  Q.  B.  571;  63  J.  P.  360;  68 

L.    J.    Q.   B.   358;    47    W.    R. 

410;  80  L.  T.  531),  547,  676. 
Regina    v.    Manchester    J.    J.    (20 

Q.  B.  D.  430;  52  J.  P.  164;  57 

L.  J.  M.  C.  20;  58  L.  T.  607; 

36  W.  R.  600),  655. 
Regina  v.  ^Market  Bosworth  J.  J. 

(51   J.   P.   438;    57   L.   T.  56; 

35  W.  R.  734;  56  L.  J.  M.  C. 

96),  681. 
Regina  v.  Marsh    (25  N.  B.  371), 

1716,  1717,  1718. 
Regina    v.    iMarthye    Tydvil    J.    J. 

(14  Q.  B.  Div.  584;   49  J.  P. 

213;   54  L.  J.  M.  C.  78),  656, 

679,  680. 
Regina   v.    Martin    (21    Ont.   App. 

145),  469. 
Regina   v.   ^Mellon    (4   Terr.   L.   R. 

301),  1262,  1263. 
Regina  v.  Middlesex    (3  B.  &  Ad. 

938),  670. 
Regina    v.    Miskin,    Higher    J.    J. 

([1893]     1    Q.    B.    275;    5    R. 

121;    67  ]..  T.  680;   41   W.  R. 

252;  57  J.  P  263),  604,  623. 
Regina   v.   Monkhouse    (4    Cox   C. 

C.  55),  2039,  2073. 
Regina  v.  Monteith   (15  Ont.  290), 

803,  938. 
Regina  v.  Monmouth    (L.  R.  5  Q. 

B.  251;  34  J.  P.  566;  39  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  77;  21  L.  T.  748),  654. 
Regina    v.    Moore    (3    Car.    &    K. 

319;  10  Jur.  750),  2039,  2077. 


Regina    v.   Mount    (30    Ont.    Rop. 

303;    3    Can.    Cr.    Cas.    209), 

1249. 
Regina   v.   Munshall    (1    N.   &   M. 

277),  683,  685. 
Regina  v.  Newcastle,  J.  J.    (51  J. 

P.  244),  658,  678,  681,  710. 
Regina  v.  Nicholson    ([1899]   2  Q. 

B.  455;  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  1034; 
64  J.  P.  388;  48  W.  R.  52; 
81  L.  T.  257;  15  L.  T.  R. 
509),  654,  677. 

Regina  v.  Nicolson   ( 10  Vict.  L.  R. 

255),   536. 
Regina    v.    Northumberland    J.    J. 

(43  J.  P.  271),  711. 
Regina  v.  Nurse    ( 2  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

57),   1322. 
Regina  v.  O'Meare   ( 14  Viet.  L.  R. 

516),  347. 
Regina    v.    Palmer    (46    Up.    Can. 

262),    691. 
Regina    v.    Parlee     (23    Com.    PI. 

[Can.]  359),  1479,  1481,  1540. 
Regina   v.   Patten    (20    Ont.   App. 

516),  1047. 
Regina   v.    Patton    (35   Upp.   Can. 

442),  686. 
Regina  v.  Pearson    (9  Juta,  261), 

1316. 
Regina  v.  Peckridge    (61  L.  J.  M. 

C.  132;  66  L.  T.  371;  56  J. 
P.  87),  561. 

Regina   v.   Pelly    (66  L.   J.   Q.   B. 

519   [1897]   2  Q.  B.  33;    76  L. 

T.  467;    45  W.  R.  504;    61  J. 

P.    373;    18    Cox   C.    C.   556), 

2028,  2030. 
Regina    v.    Penkridge     (57    J.    P. 

87;  66  L.  T.  371;  61  L.  J.  M. 

C.  132),  573. 
Regina  v.  Pilgrim    (L.  R.  6  Q.  B. 

96;   35  J.  P.  169;  40  L.  J.  M. 

C.  3;   23  L.  T.  410;    19  W.  R. 

99),  .599,  622. 
Regina  v.  Powell    ([1891]   1  Q.  B. 

718;    2    Q.    B.    693;    55    J.    P. 

422;  56  J.  P.  52;  65  L.  T.  210; 

60  L.  J.  Q.  B,  594;  39  VV.  R. 

630),  709. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cclix 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Rcgina  v.  Powell  (62  L.  J.  M.  C. 
174  [1803];  2  Q.  B.  158;  5 
R.  486;  70  L.  T.  138;  57  J.  P. 
24),  569. 
Regina  v.  Powell  ([1891]  2  Q.  B. 
693;  55  J.  P.  422;  60  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  594;  65  L.  T.  210;  39 
W.  R.  630;  56  J.  P.  52),  658, 
710. 
Regina  v.  Prince  (L.  R.  2  C.  C.  R. 

154),  1251. 
Regina   v.   Radwell    (5   Ont.   186), 

1132,   1322. 
Regina  v.  Raffles   (1  Q.  B.  D.  207 ; 
40  J.   P.   68;    45   L.   J.   M.   C. 
61;    34   L.   T.    180;    24   W.    R. 
536),  1276. 
Regina  v.  Ramsay   (11  Ont.  210), 

1739. 
Regina    v.    Raynor    ( 15    C.    L.    T. 
Que.  N.  403),  1225,  1230,  1231. 
Regina  v.  Redditch   (50  J.  P.  246), 

679,  680. 
Regina  v.  Rice  (L.  R.  1;  C.  C.  R. 
21;   25  L.  J.  M.  C.  93;    13  L. 
T.    382;    14   VV.    R.    56),   368, 
374,  535,  724. 
Regina    v.    Richardson     (20    Ont. 

Rep.  514),  1198. 
Regina   v.   Riley    (53   J.   P.    452), 

570. 
Regina  v.  Risteen    (22  N.  B.  51), 

954. 
Regina  v.  Robson    (57  J.  P.   133), 

657. 
Regina  v.  Roddy    (41   U.   C.   291), 

1322. 
Regina  v.   Rodds  J.  J.    ([1905]    2 
K.   B.    40;    69    J.    P.    210;    74 
L.    J.    K.    B.    599;    53    W.    R. 
559;    93   L.   T.   319;    21    T.   L. 
R.  391),  655. 
Regina  v.  Roper    (63  L.  J.  M.  C. 
68;   10  R.  598;   70  L.  T.  409; 
58  J.  P.  512),  531. 
Regina   v.    Rymer    (2    Q.    B.    Div. 
136;   46   L.  ,T.   M.   C.    108;    41 
J.    P.    199;    25    W.    R.    415), 
362,  1159. 


Regina   v.    Rynier    (2    Q.    B.    Div. 
136;    46   L.  J.  M.  C.    108;    41 
J.    P.    199;    25    VV.    R.    415) 
2028. 
Regina  v.  Rymer   (2  Q.  B.  Div.  p. 

140),  1159. 
Regina  v.  Sainsbury  (4  T.  R.  451), 

657. 
Regin?  v.  Salford   (18  Q.  B.  687), 

547. 
Regina    v.    Saner    (3    B.    C.    Rep. 

308),   1313. 
Regina  v.  Scott    ([1889]  22  Q.  B. 
D.  481;  53  J.  P.  119;  58  L.  J. 
M.  C.  78;    37   W.   R.   301;    60 
L.  T.  231),  657. 
Regina  v.  Scott   (34  Up.  Can.  Rep. 

20),  1193. 
Regina  v.  Sharp   (42  Sol.  J.  572), 

569. 
Regina  v.  Shavelear  (11  Ont.  727), 

863,  938. 
Regina  v.  Sheffield  J.  J.   (63  J.  P. 

595),  1276. 
Regina  v.  Sherman  ([1898]  1  Q. 
B.  578;  62  J.  P.  296;  67  L. 
J.  Q.  B.  460;  46  W.  R.  367; 
78  L.  T.  320;  14  L.  T.  R. 
269),  534,  623,  676. 
Regina  v.  Shropshire    (8  A.  &  E. 

173),  569. 
Regina  v.   Slattery    (20  Ont.  Rep. 

148),   1340. 
Regina  v.   Slattery    (26  Ont.  Rep. 

148),   1332. 
Regina    v.    Sloan     (18    Ont.    App, 

482),  1047. 
Regina   v.    Smith    (31   J.   P.   259; 

15  L.  T.  178),  1276. 
Regina   v.   Smith    (42  J.   P.  295), 

700,  709. 
Regina  v.  Southport  J.  J.    (L.  R. 
8    Q.    B.    146;    37    J.   P.    214; 
28  L.  T.   129;    21   W.  R.  382; 
42  L.  J.  M.  C.  46),  657. 
Regina     v.     Southwick     (21     Ont. 

Rep.  670),  1311. 
Regina  v.  Spiero    (4  Austr.  L.  R. 
[C.  N.]  42),  1314. 


cclx 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Eegina  v.   Sproule    (14  Ont.   375), 

1579,   1739,   1755. 
Kegina  v.  Stafford  (22  C.  P.  177), 

715. 
Regina   v.    Staffordshire    J.   J.   R. 

(14  Q.  B.  D.  13;  49  J.  P.  30; 

54  L.  J.  M.   C.   17;    15   L.  T. 

[N.  S.]    534;    33  W.  R.  205), 

655. 
Regina    v.   Stannard    ( 1    L.    &    C. 

349;  33  L..  J.  Mc.  61;  9  L.  T. 

428;    12  W.  R.  208;   28  J.  P. 

20),  724. 
Regina     v.     Stechlan     (20     C.     P. 

[Can.]  182),  799. 
Regina  v.  Stranahan   (20  Can.  Cr. 

Cas.  182),  1188,  1192. 
Regina  v.   Surry    (52   J.   P.  423), 

670,   1298. 
Regina  v.  Sykes  ( 1  Q.  B.  D.  52 ;  40 

J.  P.  39;   45  L.  J.  M.  C.  39; 

78  L.  T.  566;   24  W.  R.   141), 

655. 
Regina  v.  Sylvester    (31   L.  J.  ..i. 

€.  93;   26  J.   P.    151;    2   B.  & 

C.   322;    5   L.   T.   794;    8   Jur. 

[N.  S.]   484),  633. 
Regina  v.  Sylvester  (50  J.  P.  246), 

649. 
Regina  v.   Templeton    (3   Viet.   L. 

R.  24),  711. 
Regina  v.  Thomas  ([1892]   1  Q.  B. 

426;    56    J.   P.    151;    61    L.    J. 

M.  C.   141;    66  L.  T.  289;    40 

W.    R.    478).    649,    655,    657, 

681,  709,  710. 
Regina  v.  Thornton  (62  J.  P.  196), 

676. 
Regina  v.  Tott    (25  J.  P.  327;   30 

L.  J.  M.  C.  177;  4  L.  T.  306; 

9  W.  R.  663),  350,  692,  1146. 
Regina  v.   Upper   Osgoldcross    (52 

J.  P.  823;  62  L.  T.  112),  709, 

710. 
Regina   v.   Vine    (L.   R.    10   Q.   B. 

195;    39   J.  P.   213;    44   L.   J. 

IVI.   C.    60;    31    L.   T.   842;    23 

W     R.    649),    529,    532,    682, 

684,   1572. 


Regina   v.   Walker    (13   Ont.  83), 

1048,  1066. 
Regina   v.   Walsall    (24  L.   T.   [0. 

S.]    Ill;    18  J.  P.  757;    3  W. 

R.  69;   3  C.  L.  R.   100),  633. 
Regina    v.    Walsh     (2    Ont.    206), 

1681,  1762. 
Regina    v.    Walsh     (29    Ont.    Rep. 

36),  1311. 
Regina    v.    Walton    (34    C.    L.    J. 

746),  13,   14,  44. 
Regina  v.  Welby    (54  J.  P.   183), 

709, 
Regina   v.   West  Riding  J.  J.    (L. 

R.  5   Q.   B.  33;    34  J.  P.  44; 

L.   J.   M.   C.    17;    10   B.  &   S. 

840),  619. 
Regina  v.  West  Riding  J.  J.    (11 

Q.  B,  Div.  917;  48  J.  P.  149; 

92  L.  J.  M.  C.  99),  671. 
Regina  v.   West  Riding  J.   J.    (21 

Q.  B.  Div.  258;  52  J.  P.  455; 

57  L.  J.  M.  C.  103;  36  W.  R. 

258),  684,  708,  709. 
Regina  v.  West   Riding  J.  J.    (59 

J.  P.  278),  709. 
Regina     v.     West     Riding     J.     J. 

([1898]   1  Q.  B.  503;  62  J.  P. 

197;    67  L.   J.  Q.   B.  279;    78 

L.  T.  47;  46  W.  R.  334;  14  T. 

L,  R.  89;  M.  &  W.  Dig.  74), 

G58,  711. 
Regina  v.  Westlake   (21  Ont.  Rep. 

619).  1212. 
Regina  v.   Wharton    ([1895]    1   Q. 

B.  227;  64  L.  J.  M.  C.  74;  72 

L.    T.    29;     15    Rep.    102;    18 

Cox  C.  C.  70),  378. 
Regina    v.    White     (21    Can.    Pr. 

354),  1322,  1509. 
Regina    v.    Wigg     (2    Ld.    Raym. 

1163),  1455. 
Regina    v.    Wilkinson     (10    L.    T. 

370;   28  J.  P.  597),  633. 
Regina  v.  Williams    (42  Up.  Can. 

402),  1370,  1372. 
Regina  v.  Williams    (8  Man.  Rep. 

342:  12  Can.  L.  T.  282),  1132, 

1316,    1322. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


celxi 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Eegina    v.    Woodhouse,    Ex   parte 

Ryder    ([llXXi]    2   K.   B.  501; 

70  J.  P.  485;   75  L.  J.  K.  B. 

745;   95  L.   T.  367;   22   T.  L. 

R.  603),  656. 
Regina  v.  Worcester  J.  J.   ([1899] 

1  Q.  B.  59;  62  J.  P.  836;   68 

L.  J.  Q.  B.  109;  47  W.  R.  134; 

79  L.  T.  393;    15  T.  L.  R.  45; 

19  Cox  C.  C.  198),  558,  667. 
Regina   v.    Word    (C.   &   P.   366), 

1723. 
Regina  v.  Yeomans  (24  J.  P.  149), 

2169. 
Regina    v.    Yeoveley    (8    A.    &   E. 

806),  1723. 
Regina  v.  Yorkshire  J.  J.   ([1898] 

1  Q.  B.  503 ;  62  J.  P.  197 ;  67 

L.  J.  Q.  B.  279;  78  L.  T.  47; 

46  W.  R.  334;    62  J.  P.   197; 

M  &.   W.   Dig.    74),  707. 
Regina   v.   Young    ( 1    Burr.   556 ) , 

657. 
Regina    v.    Young     ( 5    Ont.    Rep. 

184a),  1478. 
Regina  v.  Young  (7  Ont.  88),  1263, 

1643. 
Regina    v.    Young     (8    Ont.    476), 

262,   1270. 
Regit  V.  Bell    (77  111.  593),   H87. 
Reich  V.  State    (53  Ga.   73),  270. 
Reich  V.  State  (63  Ga.  (il6),  1240, 

1241,   1515,    1563. 
Reichard  v.   Manhattan   Life   Ins. 

Co.    (31  Mo.  518),  2228. 
Reid  V.  Colorado    (187  U.  S.   146; 

23  Sup.  Ct.  29),  1438. 
Reiger  v.  Commissioners,  etc.   (70 

N.  C.  319),  904. 
Reigner,    In    re    (11    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

Rep.  401),  622. 
Reilly's  Estate,  In  re  (0  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.  252),  701. 
Reinhard   v.   Mayor,  etc.    (2   Daly 

[N.   Y.]    243),   470. 
Reinhart   v.    State    (29   Ga.   522), 

1246. 
Reinicker  v.  Smith   (2  Harr.  &  J. 

421),  2093. 


Rein.skopf  v.  Rogge  ( 37  Ind.  207 ) , 

2092,  2110,  2116. 
Reisenberg     v.    State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]    84    S.    W.    585),    965, 

971. 
Reithmiller    v.    People     (44    Mich. 

280;   6  N.  W.  667),   140,   185, 

456,  488,  494,  790,  1121,  1304. 
Rencour,  In  re    ( [N.   H.]   52   Atl. 

930),   995. 
Renfro  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

91  S.  W.  576),  1198. 
Renfrew  v.   U.   S.    (3    Okla.    170; 

41    P.   88),    1262. 
Reniger  V.  Fogossa  (1  Plowd.  19), 

2039. 
Rennie's  Case  (1  Lewin,  C.  C.  76), 

2054. 
Rennie's  Case   (4  Coke,  76),  2039. 
Reno  V.  State   ([Tex.]    117   S.   VV. 

129),  926. 
Reno  V.   State    ( [Tex.]    120  iS.   W. 

429),    1601. 
Renshaw    v.   Lane    (49    Ore.   526; 

89  Pac.  147),  934. 
Rerchenbach  v.  Ruddach    ( 127   Pa. 

564;    16   Atl.   432;    24   Wkly. 

N.  C.  476),  2151. 
Republic  of  Hawaii  v.  Warbel   ( 1 1 

Hawaii,  221),  953. 
Respublica    v.    Weidle     (2    U.    S. 

2   Dall.    88;    1    L.    Ed.    301), 

2040. 
Retsbottom,   In   re    (42   Up.    Can. 

358),   907. 
Reu's  Appeal,  In  re   ( [Pa.]  38  W. 

N.   C.   438),  621. 
Reubottom,   In  re    (42   Upp.   Can. 

358),   894. 
Reusch   V.   Lincoln    (78  Neb.  828; 

112   N.   W.   377),  525,   849. 
Renter  v.  State   (43  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

572;    67    S.    W.    505),    1320, 

1321. 
Rex  V.  Altenkirch   ( 18  Juta,  33S ) , 

1264. 
Rex  V.  Athay   (2  Burr.  653),  689. 
Rex  V.  Atwood  (4  B.  &  Ad,  481), 

294. 


cclxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References    are   to    pages.] 


Rex    V,    Balme     (2    Cowp.    650), 

2169. 
Kex    V.    Barlow     (18    Juta,    478), 

1215. 
Rex    V.    Bath     ([1904]     2    K.    B. 

570;    &8  J.    P.   438;    73   L.   J. 

K.  B.  845;   91  L.  T.   383;   20 

T.  L.  R.  526 ) ,  642. 
Rex  V.  Bell  ( 8  East.  Dist.  Ct.  Rep. 

3),  1195. 
Rex  V.  Bigelow  (36  Nov.  Sco.  559), 

1571,  1786,  1787,  1789. 
Rex   V.    Boomer    ([1908]    15    Ont. 

App.  321),   1377. 
Rex    V.    Brien     (38    X.    B.    381), 

1724. 
Rex    V.    Bristol,    J.   J.    (67    J.    P. 

375;    89  L.   T.  474;    19   T.  L. 

R.  596),  620,  678. 
Rex    V.    Byron     (37    X.    B.    383), 

1724. 
Rex  V.  Carroll   (7  €ar.  &  P.  145), 

2067. 
Rex    V.    Cohen     (21    Juta,    676), 

695. 
Rex    V.    Davis     (38    X.    B.    335), 

1755. 
Rex  V.  Davia   (Sayer,   163),  2169. 
Rex  V.  J.  Deaville    ([1903]    1    K. 

B.  468;    72  L.  J.   K.  B.  272; 

67  J.   P.  82;    51    W.  R.   004; 

88  L.  T.  32;  19  1.  L.  R.  223), 

379. 
Rex  V.  Dickenson    ( 1   Sand.  Wms. 

ed.  135,  note),  1455. 
Rex  V.  Dixon   (3  Maule  &  S.  11), 

1353. 
Rex  V.  Downs   ( 3  T.  R.  560 ) ,  682, 

684. 
Rex  V.    Fenkner    (2    Keb.   506   pi. 

79),  104. 
Rex    V.    Francis     ( 18    Juta,    57 ) , 

1264. 
Rex    V.    Gillingham     (2     Hawaii, 

750),  1643. 
Rex  V.  Gontshe   (6  East.  Dist.  Co. 

Rep.  280),  1169. 
Rex   V.    Groom    (70   L.    J.    K.    B. 
636;    [1901]   2  K.  B.  157;   84 
L.  T.  534;   49  W.  R.  484;   65 
J.  P.  452),  670,  677. 


Rex   V.   Hammerschlag    (21    Juta, 

399),   348. 
Rex  V.  Heath    (Russand  R.    184), 

1080. 
Rex    V.    Hoffman    (22    Juta,    32), 

518. 
Rex   V.   Howard,   J.   J.    ([1902]    2 

K.  B.  363;    66  J.   P.   579;    71 

L.   J.    K.   B.    754;    51    W.   R. 

21;  86  L.  T.  839;    18  T.  L.  R. 

690),   679. 
Rex   V.    Huggins    (2    Lord    Reym. 

1574),  1351. 
Rex  V.   Johnston    (75  L.  J.  K.  B. 

229;    [1906]    1   K.  B.  228;   94- 

L.    T.    377;    54    W.    R.    347; 

,30    J.    P.    118;    22    T.    L.    R. 

226),  499. 
Rex    V.    Joplin     (19    Juta,    502), 

1264. 
Rex  V.  Kay   (38  X.  B.  325),  1716, 

1763.  " 
Rex  V.  Kingston,  J.  J.    (86  L.  T. 

589;   66  J.  P.  547),  648,  679. 
Rex   V.   Laird    ([1903]    6   Ont.   L. 

R.   180),   371. 
Rex   V.   Logan    (6   CoUinson,   86), 

1154. 
Rex  V.  Mac  Williams  ( 7  East.  Dist. 

Ct.   Rep.    15),    1228. 
Rex   V.   Manchester,   J.   J.    (08   L, 

J.    Q.    B.    358     [1899];     1    Q. 

B.   571;    8   L.  T.  531;    47   W. 

R.  410;  63  J.  P.  360),  534. 
Rex    V.    Marsh     (36    X.    B.    186), 

1571. 
Rex  V.  Mathebus    (20  Juta,  403), 

1176,   1178. 
Rex  V.  Meakin   (7  Car.  &  P.  297), 

2039.  2071. 
Rex  V.  Medley    (6  Car.  &  P.  292), 

1353. 
Rex    V.    Meehan    ([1905]    2    Irish 

Rep.   577).   2018. 
Rex  V.  Meikleham  ([1906]   11  Ont. 

App.   L.  R.  366;    10  Can.  Cr. 

Cas.   382).    1300. 
Rex   V.    Xornian    (19   Juta,   200), 

2029.   2032. 
Rex  V.  Xortli    (6  D.  &  Ry.  143), 
1540. 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 


cclxiii 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Kex   V.   O'Brien    (38   N.  B.   381), 

1571. 
Rex    V.    Parsons    (20    Juta,    140), 

1357. 
Rex  V.  Reese   (21  Juta,  197),  1192, 

1193. 
Rex   V.    Robinson    (2    Burr.    799), 

2169. 
Rex  V.   Rogiers    ( 1    B.  &   C.   272; 

2  D.  &  Ry.  431),  374. 
Rex    V.    Stern     (20     Juta,     564), 

1264. 
Rex   V.  Sunderland    ([1901]    2   K. 

B.  357;    70  L.  J.  K.   B.  946; 

65   J.   P.   598;    85   L.   T.    183; 

17  T.  L.  R.  551),  676. 
Rex  V.  The  Company,  etc.  ( 8  Tenn. 

R.  356),  294. 
Rex  V.  Thomas   (7  Car.  &  P.  817), 

2039,  2059,  2061,  2067. 
Rex  V.  Turner    (5  M.  &   S.   506), 

1642. 
Rex    V.    Tyrone    Justice     ([1901] 

2   Irish   Rep.   497),  570. 
Rex   V.    Walker     (21    Juta,    195), 

1208. 
Rex    V.    Wall     (7    Hawaii,    760), 

549. 
Rex  V.  Ward   (21  N.  Z.  506),  363, 

1257. 
Rex  V.   Weddell    (22    Juta,   261), 

1358. 
Rex    V.    West    Riding,    J.    J.     (21 

Q.  B.  Div.  258;  52  J.  P.  455; 

57    L.   J.   M.    C.    103;    36    W. 

R.  258),   733. 
Rex  V.  Wexford,  J.  J.    ([1904]    2 

Irish  Rep.  251),  718. 
Rex    V.    Willett    (19    Juta,    168), 

1264. 
Rex  V.   Willowby    (1    East.   P.   C. 

288),  2028. 
Rex   V.   Woodhouse    ([1906]    2    K. 

B.  501;    75   L.  J.   K.   B.   745; 

reversed  [  1907]  A\)p.  Cas.  420 ; 

71  J.  P.  484;  76  L.  J.  K.  B. 

1032;  97  L.  T.  261).  547,  676, 

677. 
Rex    V.    Wynne     (21    Juta,    679), 

1357. 


Reyfelt   v.    State    (73    Miss.    415; 

IS  So.  925),  5,  967. 
Reyman    Brewing    Co.    v.    Bristor 

92  Fed.  28),  543,  1270. 
Reyman    Brewing    Co.    v.    Brister 

179  U.  S.  445;  45  L.  Ed.  269; 

21   Sup.  Ct.   201),  537. 
Reynolds,  Ex  parte    (87  Ala.  138; 

6  So.  335),  431,  432. 
Reynolds    v.    Commonwealth    ( 106 

Ky.    37;    49    S.    W.    969;    20 

Ky.  L.  Rep.   1681),  1470. 
Reynolds  v.  Deary  (26  Conn.  179), 

1780. 
Reynolds    v.    Dechaums    (24    Tex. 

174;   76  Am.  Dec.  101),  2094, 

2098. 
Reyjiolds  v.  Geary  (26  Conn.  179), 

98,    109,    123,    149,    150,    153, 

313,  1800. 
Reynolds    v.    Reynolds    (44    Minn. 

132;    46  N.  W.  236),  2154. 
Reynolds    v.    State     (73    Ala.    3), 

1175. 
Reynolds   v.    State    (52    Fla.   409; 

42  So.  373),  1380,  1381,  1602. 
Reynolds    v.    State    (32    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  36;  22  S.  W.   18),  1627, 

1646. 
Reynolds     v.     Waller      ( 1     Wash. 

[Va.]    164),  2094,  2098,  2130. 
Reynoldsville  Distilling  Co.,  In  re 

(34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  209),  664. 
Reznor  Hotel  Co.,   In   re    (34    Pa. 

Super.     Ct.    525),     536,    546, 

619,    626,   629,   630,  632,   640, 

647. 
Rhinehart  v.  Long   (95  Mo.  396), 

426. 
Rhoads   v.    Commonwealth    ( [Pa.] 

6    Atl.    245;    reversing    i    Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  639),  821,   1757. 
Rhode   Island,   etc.,    Co.   v.    Board 

([R.   1.]    46    Atl.    1063),    616, 

618. 
Rhode   Island    Society   v.   Budlong 

(21    R.   I.   577;    25  Atl.   657), 

67.3,  677. 


cclxiv 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Hhode  Island  Society  v.  Cranston 

(21  R.  I.   577;   44  Atl.  223), 

677. 
Ehode   Island,   etc.,   Co.   v.   Dwyer 

(19    R.   I.    643;    36    Atl.    2), 

603,  604. 
Ehode  Island,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Evaston 

(21  R.  I.  577;   44  Atl.  223), 

670. 
Rhodes  v.  Bowden  ( 26  X.  Z.  1097 ) , 

1265. 
Rhodes   v.   Iowa    (170   U.  S.   412: 

18    S.    Ct.    664;    reversing   90 

Iowa,  496;   58  N.  W.  887;   24 

L.  R.  A.  245),  323,  324,  327, 

1433. 
Rhyner    v.    Menasche     ( 107    Wis. 

201;    S3    N.    W.    303),    2174, 

2186. 
Rice,   In  re    (95  X.  Y.   App.  Div. 

28;     88    X.    Y.    Supp.    512), 

854,   867,   869,   870,   873,   890. 
Rice  V.  Commonwealth    ( [Ky.]   61 

S.    W.    473;    22   Ky.    L.'  Rep. 

1793),  945. 
Eice    V.    Foster     (4    Harr.    [Del.] 

479),  231,  240. 
Rice    V.    Peet     (16    Johns.    503), 

2094. 
Rice  V.  People   (38  111.  435),  1505. 
Rice    V.    Schlopp    (78    Iowa,    753; 

41  X.  W.  603),  991. 
Eice  V.   State    (3   Kan.   135),   216, 

271. 
Eice  V.   State    (52  Tex.   Cr.   App. 

359;    107    S.    W.    833),    1606, 

1701. 
Eichard   v.   Carrie    ( 145   Ind.  49 ; 

43  X.  E.  949),  1585. 
Eichards  v.  Banks    (58  L.  T.  634; 

52  J.  P.  23),  31. 
Eichards   v.    Bayonne     (61    X.    J. 

L.    496;    39"   Atl.    708),    460, 

1 129. 
Eichards   v.    Columbia    (55   X.   H. 

96),  383. 
Eichards  v.   Kirkpatrick    (53   Cal. 

433),  1027. 


Eichards    v.    Mobile    (208    U.    S. 

480;    28   Sup.  Ct,   372;    52  L. 

Ed.  — ),  331. 
Eichards  v.  Moore  (62  Vt.  217; 

19  Atl.  390),  1959. 
Eichards  v.  Richards  ( 19  111.  App. 

465),  65,  2155,  2156,  2157, 

2161. 
Eichards  v.  Eevitt  ([1877]  7  Ch. 

D.  224;  44  L.  J.  Ch.  472;  26 
W.  E.  166;  37  L.  T.  632), 
1813. 

Eichards  v.  Stogsdell  (21  Ind.  74), 

798. 
Eichards  v.  Swansea,  etc.,  Co.    ( 9 

Ch.   Div.    425),    691. 
Eichards  v.  \Voodward   (113  Mass. 

285),  316,  1799. 
Eichardson  v.  Commonwealth    (11 

Ky.  L.   Rep.   [abstract]   367), 

512,  1601. 
Eichardson  v.  Commonwealth    ( 76 

Va.    1007),    1190. 
Eichardson  v.  Foster  (73  Miss.  12; 

18  So.  573;  55  Am.  St.  481), 

2253,  2254. 
Eichardson  v.   State    (3   Ga.  App. 

313;    59    S.    E.   916),    1128. 
Eichardson    v.    Wilmington,    etc., 

E.  Co.   (8  Eich.  L.  120),  2180. 
Eichland    Co.   v.    Eichland   Center 

(59  Wis.  591;   18  X.  W.  497), 

201. 
Eichler,  Ex  parte   (1  L.  X.  [Can.] 

59),  733. 
Eichler  v.  Judah    (1  L.  X.   [Can.] 

591)   734. 
Richmond    v.    Dudley     (129    Ind. 

112;   :iS  X.  E.  312;    13  L.  R. 

A.   587),   454. 
Richmond    v.    Shickler    { 57    Iowa, 

486;     10    X.    W.     882),    811, 

1914,  1916,  1924,  1989. 
Eiehter  v.  State  (156  Ala.  127; 

47  So.  163),  852,  872,  878, 

893,  894,  908,   918,  93.3. 
Eiehter  v.   State    (63   Miss.   304), 

1227. 
Rickert    v.    People     (79    111.    85), 

1341. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


cclxv 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Riddell  v.  Neilson    (5   F.    [J.   C] 

57),  353. 
Riden  v.   Grimm    (97   Tenn.   220; 

36   S.   W.   1097;    35  L.   R.  A. 

587),   1850,   1851,   1853,   189G, 

1897,   1939. 
Rider  v.  State   (26  Tex.  App.  334; 

9  S.  W.  688),  2247. 
Ridley  v.  Greiner   (117  Iowa,  679; 

91  N.  W.  1033),  984. 
Ridley  v.  Lamb  ( 10  Up.  Can.  354), 

2186. 
Ridling   v.    State     (56    Ga.    601), 

1630. 
Riggs  V.  State   ([Neb.]    121  N.  W. 

588),   1075,   1082,  1085,   1659, 

1756,  1762. 
Riggs  V.   State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

96  S.  W.  25),   1472,   1696. 
Riggs  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

97  S.   W.   482),   915,    1472. 
Riley  v.   Bancroft    (51   Neb.   864; 

71  N.  W.  745),  551. 
Riley  v.  Rowe    (112  Ky.  817;   66 

S.    W.   999;    23    Ky.   L.   Rep. 

2168),  630,  646,  (353. 
Riley    v.    State     (43    Miss.    397), 

1171,   1178,   1358,   1505,   1598. 
Riley  v.  Trenton   (51  N.  J.  L.  [22 

Vroom]     498;     18    Atl.     116), 

397,  420. 
Rindskoff    v.    Curran     (34    Iowa, 

325),  1790. 
Rineman    v.    State    (24    Ind.    80), 

1240,   1241,   1628. 
Ring  V.  Nichols    (91   Me.  478;    40 

Atl.  329),  1028,  1037. 
Ring   V.   Ring    (112    Ga.    854;    38 

,S.    E.    330),    63,    64,    67,    68, 

2154. 
Rintleman  v.  Hahn   (20  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    244;     49    S.    W.    174), 

1922. 
Rippey  v.  State  (44  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

72;  73  S.  W.  15),  110,  120. 
Rippy   V.   State    (68   S.    W.    687), 

194. 
Ristine  v.  Clements   (31  Ind.  App. 

338;  66  N.  E.  924),  799. 


Riteliie,    In    re    (18    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    341;     40    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1106),  580. 
Ritchie  v.  Zalesky   (98  Iowa,  589; 

67  N.  W.  399),  341,  344,  995. 
Ritter,  Appeal  of   (59  Pa.  St.  9), 

2094,  2105,  2106,  2144. 
Ritz  V.  Lightson    ( [Cal.]    103  Pac. 

303),    424,    429. 
Rizer  v.   Topper    (133  Iowa,  628; 

110    N.    W.    1038),    977,   980, 

086. 
Roach  V.   Kelly    (194   Pa.  St.  24; 

44  Atl.   1090),   1875. 
Roach  V.  Springer    (75  S.  W.  933 

[Tex.]),    1889,    1951. 
Roach  V.  State    (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

500;    84    S.    W.    586),    1211, 

1611. 
Robb    V.     Commonwealth     ([Ky.] 

101    S.    W.    918;    31    Ky.    L. 

Rep.  246 ) ,  2038,  2068. 
Robbins   v.   People    (95    111.    175), 

271. 
Robbins  v.  Shelby  County  Taxing 

District   (120  U.  S.  489,  493; 

7  Sup.  Ct.  592),  156,  157,  316, 

330. 
Roberson  v.  Lambertville  (38  N.  J. 

L.  69),  1189,  1454,  1478,1502, 

1508,   1521. 
Roberson  v.  State   (100  Ala.   123; 

14  So.  869),  962,   1169,   1475. 
Roberson  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

91  S.  W.  578),  1210. 
Robert's   Estate,   In   re    (197    Pa. 

621;    47    Atl.    987),    2019. 
Roberts  v.  Clinmire    (46  Up.  Can. 

264),  462,  1249. 
Roberts  v.  Hopper    (55  Neb.  599; 

76  N.  W.  21),  2008. 
Roberts  v.  Humphreys   (L.  R.  8  Q. 

B.  483;    42  L.  J.   M.   C.    147; 

38   J.   P.   135;    29  L.   T.  387; 

21  W.  R.  885),  1150. 
Roberts  v.  O'Connor  (33  Me.  496), 

1374. 
Roberts  v.  People   (19  Mich.  401), 

2051,  2052,   2067,  2070,  2074, 

2075. 


eclxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Hoberts    v.    State    (26    Fla.    360 

7  So.  861),  505,  506,  1533. 
Roberts    v.    State    (114    Ga.    541 

40  S.  E.  750),  230,  251. 
Roberts  v.  State   (4  Ga.  App.  207 

60  S.  E.  1082),  4,   10,  14,   17, 

51,  53,  55,  295,   342. 
Roberts    v.    State     (14   Mo.    138), 

2035. 
Roberts  v.  State  ( 52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

355;     107    S.    W.    59),     1128, 

1349,  1555,  1616,  1691. 
Roberts   v.   lay  lor    (19   Neb.    184; 

27  N.  VV.'87),  1940,  1994. 
Robert     Porter     Brewing     Co.     v. 

Southern  Express  Co.    ( [Va.] 

63  S.  E.  6),  956. 
Robertson   v.    Moore    ( 15    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    [abstract]    240),   926. 
Robertson     v.     People     (20     Colo. 

279),   264,    1585. 
Robertson   v.   State    (5   Tex.  App. 

155),  930,  933. 
Robertson  v.  State    ( 12  Tex.  App. 

541),  495,  716,  928,  933. 
Robinius   v.   State    (63   Ind.  235), 

1240,    1242,   1627,   1751. 
Robinson,  Ex  parte  (12  Xeb.  263), 

791. 
Robinson    v.    Americus     (121    Ga. 

180;   48  S.  E.  924),  452. 
Robinson      v.      Baker      (5      Cush. 

[Mass.]   137),  1070. 
Robinson  v.  Bank,  etc.,  18  Ga.  65), 

294. 
Robinson  v.  Barrows  (48  Me.  186), 

1031,  1776. 
Robinson  v.  Bidwell  (23  Cal.  379), 

233. 
Robinson    v.    Charleston    (2    Rich. 

317),   811. 
Robinson     v.     Commonwealth      ( 7 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    [abstract]    453), 

543. 
Robinsfjn      v.      Commonwealth     (6 

Dana,  287),   1746. 
Robinson   v.  Ilaug    (71    ^lich.    38; 

46  N.  E.  941),  £12. 
Robinson  v.  Mayor,  etc.  ( 1  Humph. 

156;   34  Am,   Dec.  627),  461. 


Robinson  v.  Miner   (68  Mich.  549; 

37  X.  W.  21),  189,  1016. 
Robinson  v.   Piocae    (5   Cal.   460), 

2171,  2172,  2187. 
Robinson  v.  Randall   (82  111.  521), 

1751,  1974. 
Robinson  v.  Riffey   (111  Ind.  112; 

12  N.   E.    141),   467. 
Robinson  v.  Rockland,  etc.,  St.  E. 

Co.   (87  Me.  387;  32  Atl.  994; 
29  L.  R.  A.  531),  2207. 
Roberson  v.   State    (99   Ala.   1S9; 

13  So.  532),  1197. 
Robinson  v.  State    (38  Ark.  548), 

1567. 
Robinson  v.  State    (38  Ark.  641), 

1.365,  1366. 
Robinson   v.   State    (59   Ark.   341; 

27  S.  W.  233),  1167. 
Robinson  v.   State    (130  Ga.   361; 

60  S.  E.  1005),  2068. 
Robinson  v.   State    (84  Ind.   452), 

225,  226. 
Robinson  v.  State    (113   Ind.  510; 

16   X.  E.    184),   2040,  2080. 
Robinson  v.   State    (24   Tex.   App. 

4;    5    S.    W.    509),    369,    389, 

1575. 
Robinson  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

75    S.    W.    526),    954,     1558, 

1705. 
Robinson    v.    State     (53    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    565;     110    S.    W.    90S), 

178,  1717,  1722,  1723. 
Robinson  v.  State  (53  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  567;  110  S.  W.  905), 

1202,  1558,  1654. 
Robinson    v.    Waddington    (13    Q. 

B.  753),  569. 
Robinson    v.     Weingale     (36    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  65;   83  S.  W.  182), 

925. 
Robson    V.    Doyle    (191    111.    506; 

61  X.  E.   435),   426. 
Robison   v.    Haug    (71    Mich.    38; 

38  X.  W.  668),   110,    195. 
Roblin   V.   Roblin    (28    Grant.    Ch. 

[U.  C]  439),  2109,  2114. 
Robv    V.   .State     ( [Tex.   Cr.    App.] 
'37  S.   W.   651),   957. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cclxvii 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Roche,  In  re  (7  N.  Z.  L.  R.  206 ) , 

536. 
RoclKster  v.  Harrington  ( 10  Wend. 

[N.  Y.]   547),  394. 
Rochester    v.    Upman     ( 19    Minn. 

108),  418,  549. 
Rock  Island  v.  Vanlandsehoot   (78 

111.  485),  2171,  2187. 
Rock    Co.    V.    Edgerton    (90    Wis. 

28«;    63    N.    W.    291),    808. 
Rodden   v.  License   Commissioners 
(IR.   I.]    21    Atl.    1020),  747. 
Roden  v.   State    (136  Ala.   89;    34 

So.  351),  2032. 
Rodericks   v.   Jones    (3    W.   N.    C. 

[N.   S.   W.]    116),    1313. 
Rogers   v.   Hahn    (03    Miss.    5^8), 

601. 
Rodgers   v.    People    ( 15    How.    Pr. 

557;    3    Park.   Cr.   Rep.   632), 

2084,  2068. 
Rodman    v.    Rodman     (20    Grant 

Ch.   [U.  C]   428),  2167. 
Rodman    v.    Zilley     (1    N.    J.    Eq. 

320),  2099. 
Roesch  V.  Henry   (  [Ore.]   103  Pac. 

439),   861,  891,   892,  902. 
Roethke  v.   Phillips  Best  Brewing 

Co.   (33  Mich.  340),   1786. 
Rogers,  In  re  (4  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

389;    84    X.    Y.    Supp.    1024), 

854. 
Rogers,  In  re   ( 75  Vt.  329 ;  55  Atl. 

601),  2033. 
Rogers    v.    Johns     (42    Tex.    340), 

925. 
Rogers  v.  Jones   ( 1  Wend.   [X.  Y.] 

261),  271. 
Rogers  v.  Maddocks   ([1892]  3  Ch. 

346),   1826. 
Rogers  v.   People    (3   Park.   Crim. 

Rep.    633),   2039,    20G0,    2084. 
Rogers    v.    State     (33     Ind.    543), 

2036. 
Rogers  v.  State   (58  N.  J.  L.  220; 

33  Atl.  283),  1556. 
Rogers  v.  State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

101  S.  W.  803),  1473. 
Rogle   V.   Mattox    (159    Ind.   584; 

05   N.   E,   743),  606. 


Rolilff  V.  Bise   ( [Neb.]   120  N.  W. 

904),   1805. 
Rohr    V.    Gray    (80    Md.    274;    30 

Atl.    632),    789. 
Rohrbacker  v.   Jackson    (51   Miss. 

735),     138,    208,    208,    240. 
Roland    v.    State    ([Ala.]    41    So. 

963),  1455, 
Rollestone  v.  T.  Cassireo  &  Co.   ( :5 

Ga.  App.   161;   59  S.  E.  442), 

2176,  2217. 
Rollins    V.    Rich     (27     Me.    561), 

1058. 
Roman    v.    State    (41    Wis.    312), 

2247. 
Rome  V.   Duke    (19  Ga.   93),   627, 

634. 
Rome  V.  Knox   (14  How.  Pr.  268), 

499,  504. 
Rome    V.    Lumpkin    (5    Ca.    447), 

495,   496. 
Rome  V.  .McWilliam  (52  Ga.  251), 

791. 
Rommel  v.  Schombacker    (120  Pa. 

579;   11  Atl.  779),  2187. 
Rood  V.  McCargar    (49  Cal.   117), 

294. 
Roouey  v.  Augusta   (117  Ga.  709; 

45  S.   E.   72),   110,  127,   1083, 

1129. 
Roose  V.  Perkins    (9   Neb.   304;    2 

N.  W.  715;  31  Am.  Rep.  409), 

1882,  1885,  1897,  1910,  1912, 

1936,  1990. 
Root  V.  Alexander  (63  Hun,  557; 

28  Abl).  N.  C.  390;  8  N.  Y. 

Supp.  632;  142  N.  Y.  063; 

37  N.  E.  570),   1743. 
Roper    V.    McKay     (29    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    470;     69    S.    W.    459), 

940. 
Roper   V.   Scurlock    (29    Tex.   Civ. 

App.    464;    69    S.    W.    456), 

875,  878,  890,  891. 
Roquemore  v.  State  (19  Atl.  528), 

371. 
Rose,  Ex  parte  (2  S.  R.  [N.  .S.  W.] 

268;     19    W.    N.    [N,    S.    W.] 

202),  670. 


cclxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Rose   V.   Commonwealth    ( 106   Va. 

850;   56  S.  E.  151),  21,  1763. 
Rose   V.   Commonwealth    ( 106   Va. 

S50;     56    «.    E.     151),     1491, 

1505. 
Rose   V.    Frogley    (57   J.    P.    376; 

62   L.  J.   M.   C.    181;    5   Rep. 

530;  69  L.  T.  346;  9  T.  L.  R. 

466;   17  Cox  C.  C.  685),  700. 
Rose   V.   Lampley    ( 146   Ala.   445 ; 

41  So.  521),  381. 
Rose   V.    Mitchell    (6    Colo.    102), 

1801. 
■Rose  V.  Rose    (9  Ark.  507),  2154. 
Rose  V.  State    ( 1   Ga.   App.    596 ; 

58  S.  E.  20),  954. 
Rose  V.  State    (107   Ga.   697;    33 

S.  E.  439),  1320. 
Rose   V.   State    (4   Ga.  App.   588; 

62  S.   E.    117),   91,   333,   382, 

953,    1170,    1378. 
Rose  V.   State    (171    Ind.  662;    87 

N.  E.  103),   125,  255,  291. 
Roseerants      v.      Shoemaker      (60 

Mich.  4;  26  N.  W.  794),  1886, 

1981,  1991. 
Roseman  v.  Carolina  Cent.  R.  Co. 

(112  N.  C.  709;  16  S.  E. 

766;  19  L.  R.  A.  327),  2203, 

2204,   2209,  2212,   2217. 
Rosenbarger    v.    State     ( 154    Ind. 

425)  ;  56  N.  E.  914),   1444. 
Rosenbaura  v.  State   (4  Ind.  599), 

1305,  1441. 
Rosenbaum  v.  State  (24  Ind.  App. 

510;    57    N.    E.    1050),    1353. 
Rosenbaum   v.   Dunston    (16   Neb. 

Ill;    19  N.   W.   610),  2014. 
Rosenfield   Bros.   Co.   v.   Common- 
wealth ([Ky.]  29  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1179;    96  S.  W.   134),    199. 
Rosenham    v.    Commonwealth     ( 7 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    [abstract]    602), 

826. 
Rosenham    v.    Commonwealth     ( 7 

Ky.  L.   Rep.   590),    190. 
Rossenhamm  v.  Commonwealth   (9 
Ky,  L.  519),  822. 


Rosenham        v.        Commonwealth 

( [Ky.]  2  S.  W.  230;  3  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  519),  503. 
Rosenstein  v.   State    (9   Ind.  App. 

290;     36    N.    E.    652),    2025, 

2026. 
Rosenthal  v.   Hobson    ([Iowa]    77 

N.  W.  488),  1002,   1127. 
Rosewater  v.  Pinzenham   (38  Neb. 

835;    57   N.   W.  563),  568. 
Ross,  In  re    (14   Can.  Prae.   171), 

460,  1225,  1258. 
Ross's  Case   (2  Pick.  [Mass.]  165), 

261. 
Ross  V.  Crow  (9  Baxt.  420),  1789. 
Ross    V.    People     (17    Hun,    591), 

1226,   1227. 
Ross  V.  State   (62  Ala.  224),  2041, 

2049,   2054. 
Ross    V.     Stat!e     (116     Ind.     495; 

ir    N.    E.    451),    1240,    1241, 

1242,   1628. 
Ross    V.    State    (9    Ind.   App.    35; 

36  N.  E.   167),  1242. 
Ross  V.   State    (52   Tex.   Cr.  App, 

295;    109  S.  W.  152),  1691. 
Ross  V.   State    (52   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

604;  108  S.  W.  375),  14. 
Ross  V.   State    (53   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

162;    109    S.    W.    153),    1607, 

1696. 
Rossell  V.  Garon  ( 50  X.  J.  L.  358 ; 

13  Atl.  26),  432,  433. 
Roth  V.  Eppy   (80  111.  283),  1848, 

1868,    1942,   1951,   1964,  1990, 

2006. 
Rothwell,  In  re  (44  Mo.  App.  215), 

907,  1687,  1688. 
Rottman   v.   State    (64   Neb.   875; 

88  N.  W.  857),  1531. 
Rouse  V.  Catskill  &  N.  Y.  Steam- 
boat Co.    (133  N.  Y.  679;   31 

N.  E.  623;   affirming  61  Hun, 

022;     15    N.    Y.    Supp.    971), 

1927. 
Rouse    V.    ^lelsheimer     ( 82    Mich. 

172;    4G    N.    W.    372),    1801, 

1883,  1984. 
Rout  V.   Feemster    (7  J.  J.  Marsh 

[Ky.]    131),  1767. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


cclxix 


TReferences   are   to    pages.] 


Uowe    V.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

70  S.  W.  407 ;  24  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

974),    840,    845,     1198,     1589, 

1649. 
Howe  V.  Edmunds   (3  Allen,  334), 

383. 
Howe  V.     State      (30     Tenn.     [11 

Humph.]    491),  2247. 
Eowels    V.    State     (39    Neb.    659; 

58  N.  W.  197),  110,  168,  502. 
Rowland   v.    Collingwood    ([1909J 

16  Ont.  L.  R.   272),  889. 
Rowland  v.  Greencastle    ( 157  Ind. 

591;  62  N.  E.  474),  132,  183, 

184,   186,   188,  423,  597. 
Rowland   v.   State    ( 12   Tex.  App. 

418),  488,  490. 
Rowley,    In    re    (34    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    662;     70    N.    Y.    Supp. 

208),  891. 
Eowls   V.    American,    etc.,   L.    Ins. 

Co.    (27    N.   Y.   282;    84   Am. 

Dec.  280),  2220. 
Roy  V.  Paroisse  de  St.  Paschal   (9 

L.  N.   [Can.]    275),  028. 
Roy  V.  State   (91  Ind.  417),  1486, 

1566. 
Royal    V.    State     (78    Ala.    410), 

968. 
Royal  V.  State  (9  Tex.  449),  1575. 
Royall    V.    Virginia     (116    U.     S. 

572),  426. 
Roy\vadosfskie     v.      International, 

etc.,  R.  Co.   ( 1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

487;    20    S.    W.    872),    2188, 

2205. 
Rubinstein  v.  Kahn  (5  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    408;     25    N.    Y.    Supp. 

760),  695,  2188. 
Ruble  V.   State    (51   Ark.   170;    10 

S.  W.  262),   1720. 
Rucker  v.  State   ( [Tex.]   24  S.  W. 

902),  9,  17,  1233. 
Rucker  v.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

101  S.  W.  902),  1465,  1473. 
Ruddick    v.    Liverpool     (42    J.    P. 

406),  679. 
Rude  V.  Faker  (143  111.  App.  456), 

1878,  1991. 


Rude   V.   Nass    (79    Wis.   321;    48 

N.  W.  555;   24  Am.  St.  717), 

66. 
Ruemmeli    v.    Cravens     ( 13    Okla. 

342;     74    Pac.    908;     76    Pac. 

188),  515,  543,  1789. 
Ruffner  v.  Lather    (19  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  349),  2021. 
Ruge  V.  State  (62  Ind.  388),  1121, 

1122,   1304,   1318,  1566. 
Ruhland  v.  Waterman   ( [R.  I.]  71 

Atl.   1),  235,  892. 
Ruland,    In    re    (21    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.    504;     47    N.    Y.    Supp. 

561),  582,  583,  584. 
Runde  v.  Commonwealth   ( 108  Va. 

873;     61     S.    E.    792),     1505, 

1584,    1730,    1731. 
Runyan   v.    State    (52    Ind.    320), 

510,  514,  531,  694. 
Rupp,  In  re  (122  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

891;    106    N.   Y.    Supp.    1163; 

affirming  55  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

313;    106    N.   Y.   Supp.    483), 

583. 
Rupp,  In  re   (54  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

1;     105    N.    Y.    Supp.    407), 

582,  589,  590,  736. 
Rupp,  hi  re   (55  N.  Y,  Misc.  Rep. 

313;     106    N.    Y.    Supp.    483; 

affirmed   122  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

891;    100   N.   Y.   Supp.    1143), 

731. 
Rush  v.  Commonwealth   ([Ky.]  47 

S.    W.   586;    20   Ky.    L.   Rep. 

775),  935,  1108,  1678. 
Rushton   V.   Bromley  J.  J.    (52   J. 

P.   760),   563. 
Rushworth,    Ex   parte    (23    L.    T. 

120;  34  J.  P.  676),  620. 
Russell,    In    re    (11    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

Rep.  505),  639. 
Russell,  Ex  parte   (20  N.  B.  536). 

954. 
Russell  V.  Blaekheath  J.  J.   (61  J. 

P.  696),  681. 
Russell  V.  Sloan   (33  Vt.  656),  79. 
Russell  V.  State  (77  Ala.  89),  567, 

682. 


cclxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Russell   V.   State    (53   Miss.  367), 

2247. 
Hussell    V.    State    (33    Vt.    656), 

969. 
Eussell    V.    Tippin     ( 12    Ohio    Cir. 

Ct.  521),  1848. 
Russellville,  Ex  parte  (95  Ala.  19; 

11  So.  18),  431. 
Ruston  V.  Fountaine    (118  La.  53; 

42  So.  644),  110,  441. 
Ruth,  hi  re    (32  Iowa.  250),   189. 
Rutherford,  In  re    (2  Ta.  Co.   Ct. 

Rep.  78),  637. 
Rutherford  v.  Ruff   (4  Desaus.  Eq. 

[S.   C]    365),   2094,   2106. 
Rutherford  v.   State    (48  Tex.  Cr. 

App.    431;     88     S.    W.    810), 

9G4,  972,  1496,  1690. 
Rutherford  v.  State  (49  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  21;  90  S.  W.  172),  1466, 

1693. 
Rutland  v.  Cleaves  { 1  Swan,  198 ) , 

2149,  2150. 
Riitledge  v.   Elendorf    ([Tex.]    116 

S.  \y.  158),  2250. 
Rutter  V.  Daniel   ([1882]  46  L.  T. 

684;    30    VV.    R.    801),    1821, 

1831. 
Rutter    V.    Sullivan    (25    W.    Va. 

427),  233. 
Ryall  V.  State   (78  Ala.  410),  11, 

24,  36,  1711. 
Ryan,  Ex  parte  (1  W.  N.  C.  122), 

1158,    1368,   1370, 
Ryan,  In  re   (85  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

621;    83    N.    Y.    Supp.     123; 

affirming     80     X.     Y.     Supp. 

1114),  584,  730,  1192. 
Ryan,   In   re    ([Xeb.]    112   X.   W. 

599),  559. 
Ryan  v.  Harrow    ( 27  Iowa,  494 ) , 

2251. 
Ryan  v.  Ryan   (9  Mo.  539),  2153, 

2161.  ' 
Ryanv.  State  (32  Tex.  280).  1625. 
Ryan   v.  United   States    (26   App. 

D.   C.   74),   2038,   2078,   2079. 
Ryland    v.    Crawford     (17    X.    Y. 

79),   1818. 


Ryland  v.   Foley    (16  N.  Z.  L.  R. 

670),   1310. 
Ryon,  In  re   (39  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

698;    80    X.    Y.    Supp.    1114; 

affirmed   85   X.   Y.   App.   621; 

83  X.  Y.  Supp.   123),  545. 


Sachs  v.   Garner    (111   Iowa,  424; 

82  X.  W.    1007),   1779,   1788, 

1800. 
Sackett  v.  Rudder  ( 152  Mass.  397; 

25  X.  E.  736;  9  L.  R.  A.  391), 
1850,  1851,  1939,  1943,  1955, 
1956. 

Saco  V.  Wentworth    (37  Me.   165), 

270,  1010,  1748. 
Sacramento  v.  Diliman    ( 102   Cal. 

107;   36  Pae.  385),  802. 
Sadler  v.  Sheahan   (92  Mich.  630; 

52  X.  W.  1030),  1739. 
Sadler  v.  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

507;   89  S.  W.  974),  1321. 
Saffroi    v.    Cobun     (32    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  79;  73  S.  W.  828),  774. 
Safler  v.  Fisher   (121  Mich.  P.  62; 

79  N.  W.  934 ) ,  2003. 
Sage   V.    State    (127    Ind.    15;    26 

X.  E.  607 ) ,  225. 
Sah   Quah,   In   re    (31    Fed.   327), 

1260. 
St.  Albans   [Bishop]   v.  Batterxby 

([1878]    3    Q.    B.   D.   359;    42 

J.  P.  581;  47  L.  J.  Q.  B.  571; 

26  W.  R.  679;  38  L.  T.  685), 
1821. 

St.  Amour  v.  St.  Francis  de  Sales 

(7  Q.  B.  [Que.]  479),  648. 
St,   Ames  v.   St.   Francis  de  Sales 

( 1  Quebec  S.  C.  463 ) ,  628. 
St.  Anthony  v.  Brandon  { 10  Idaho, 

205;   77   Pac.  322),  289. 
St.  Aubin   v.   Laf ranee    (8   Quebec 

L.  R.  [Can.]    190).  434. 
St.    Charles    v.    Elener     (155    Mo. 

671;   56  S.  W.  291),  483. 
St.     Goddard     v.    Burnham     (124 

Mass.  578),  1228, 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


celxxi 


I  References   are   to   pages.] 


St.  James  v.  Hingtgen    (47  Minn. 

521;  50  N.  W.  700),  758. 
St.  Joseph  V.  Ernst   (95  Mo.  360; 

8  S.  W.  558),  483. 
St.  Joseph  Tp.  V.  Rogers  ( 16  Wall. 

[U.  S.]   644),  904. 
St.  Louis  V.  Allen    (13  Mo.  414), 

394. 
St.   Louis  V.   Bentz    (11   Mo.   62), 

216,  271. 
St.    Louis    V.    Cafferata     (24    Mo. 

94),  215,  271. 
St.  Louis  V.  Gerardi   (90  Mo.  640; 

3  S.  W.  408),  509,  691,  1267, 

1268. 
St.   Louis   V.   Green    (7   Mo.   App. 

468),  791. 
St.    Louis   V.    Knox    (6   Mo.    App. 

247),  426.  * 

St.  Louis  V.  Shields   ( 62  Mo.  247 ) , 

228. 
St.  Loui.s  V.  Siegrist  ( 46  Mo.  593 ) , 

72. 
St.   Louis  V.   Smith    (2   Mo.   113), 

412,  418,  441. 
St.  Louis  V,  Spiegel   (75  Mo.  145), 

789. 
St.  Louis  V.  Wehring  (46  111.  393), 

788. 
St.  Louis  V.  Weitzel  (130  Mo.  600; 

31  S.  W.  1045),  648. 
St.    Louis   V.    Western    U.    T.    Co. 

(148  U.  S.  92;  37  L.  Ed.  380; 

13  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  485),  789. 
St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Carr   (47 

111.    App.    353),    2204,    2213, 

2218. 
St.   Louis   S.  W.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Gana 

(69  Ark.  252;  62  S.  W.  738), 

1022. 
St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.   Co.   v.   Wilker- 

son  (46  Ark.  513),  2174,  2178. 
St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright 

([Tex.    Civ.   App.]    84   S.    W. 

270),  1735. 
St.   Mary's   Ben.    Soc.   v.    Burford 

(70  Pa.  St.  321),  2232. 
St.   Paul  V.   Troyer    (3  Minn.   291 

[Gil.  200]),  167,395,397,400. 


St.  Paul  V,  Upham   (12  Minn.  49), 

404. 
St.   Paul   Fire  &  Marine  Ins.   Co. 

V.    Kelly     (43    Kan.    741;    23 

Pac.  1040),  2253,  2256, 
Sale  of  Intoxicating  Liquors,  In  re 

( [Iowa]  79  N.  W.  260),  623. 
Salford,  Ex  parte   (16  J.  P.  649), 

547. 
Salina  v.  Seitz  (16  Kan.  163),  402, 

822,  835. 
Salina  v.  Tropper   (27  Kan.  545), 

2171,  2172,  2197. 
Salisbury,  In  re    (19  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    340;     44    K    Y.    Supp. 

291),  581. 
Salter,  In  re  ([1902]  4  Ont.  L.  R. 

— ),  870,  883.  894. 
Salter  v.  Columbus   (121  Ga.  829; 

49  S.  E.  734),  1179. 
Saltfleet,   In   re    ([1909]    10   App. 

Ont.  L.  R.  293),  889. 
Sampson,   In   re    ( 19   Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

Rep.  1;  5  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  717), 

2017,  2020. 
Sampson   v.    State    (107   Ala.    76; 

18  So.  207),  38,  1756. 
Samuel    v.    Agnew    (80    111.    553), 

1027. 
Samuel  v.  Westheimer   (131  Iowa, 

043;     109    N.    W.    189),    298, 

1280. 
Sanasack  v.  Aden    (168  Ind.  559; 

78  N.  E.  675;   79  N.  E.  457; 

80  N.  E.   151),  601,  013,  662, 

663. 
Sanderfur-.Julian  Co.  v.  State   (72 

Ark.   11;   77  S.  W.  596),  954. 
Sanderlin     v.     State     (2     Humph. 

315),   1459. 
Sanders  v.  Elberton   (50  Ga.  178), 

691,   1267. 
Sanders  v.  State  (74  Ga.  82),  215, 

1303,   1594. 
Sanders    v.    State    (94    Ind.    147), 

2040. 
Sanders   v.    State    (2   Iowa,   230), 

1017. 
Sanders  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  Rep.] 

20  S.  W.  360),  1463. 


ccixxu 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.  1 


Sanders    v.    Town    Commissioners 

(30  Ga.  679),  396. 
Sanders  v.  Town  Council    (50  Ga. 

178),  68. 
Sanderson,  In  re    (34  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    375;     69    N.    Y.    Supp. 

928),  582. 
Sanderson  v.   Goodrich    (46   Barb. 

616),  694,  1783. 
Sanderson  v.  Sanderson   (52  N.  J. 

Eq.  243;  30  Atl.  326),  2149. 
Sandford  v.  Court    (7  Vroom,  72; 

13  Am.  Rep.  422),  232. 
Sandoval  v.  Meyers  (8  N.  M.  636; 

45  Pac.  1128),  801,  809. 
Sandys  v.  Williams   (46  Ore.  327; 

80  Pac.  642),  250,  467,   1558. 
San  Francisco  v.  Canavan  (42  Cal. 

541),  393. 
San    Francisco    v.    Liverpool,   etc., 

Co.  (74  Cal.  113;  15  Pac.  380; 

7  Am.  St.  425),  479. 
Sanitary  Dist.  of  Chicago  v.  Cul- 

lerton   (147  111.  385;  35  N.  E. 

723),  2253. 
San  Jose  v.  San  Jose,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(53  Cal.  475),  483. 
San  Luis  Obispo  Co.  v.  Greenberg 

(120  Cal.  300;   52  Pac.  797), 

446. 
Santo  v.  State    (2  Iowa,    165;    63 

Am.  Dec.   487),  98,   109,   231, 

253,  204,  265,  294,  1008,  1047, 

1050. 
Sapp   v.   State    (116   Ga.    182;    42 

S.  E.  410),  62. 
Sappington  v.  Carter  (67  111.  482), 

1637. 
Sarbecker  v.  State    (65  Wis.   171; 

26   W.  N.  541;    56  Am.   Rep. 

624),  1280,  1281. 
Sargeant,    In    re    ( 13    Nat.    Bank 

Reg.  144),  610. 
Sargeant  v.  Little    (72  N.  H.  555; 

58  Atl.  44),  797,  813. 
Sarle  v.  Pulaski  Co.  (76  Ark.  336; 

98  S.  W.  9.53),  628,  714. 
Sarlo,  In  re    (76  Ark.  336;   88  S. 

W.  953),  689. 


Sarris  v    Commonwealth    (83  Ky. 

327),  842. 
Sarris  v.   Commonwealth    (83   Ky. 

327;  7  Ky.  L    Rep.  473),  190. 
Sarris  v.  Commonwealth  ( 7  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  299),   110. 
Sarlls  V.  United  States  ( 152  U.  S. 

570;   38   L.  Ed.  556;    14   Sup. 

Ct.  Rep.  720),  24,  25,  39,  43, 

1263. 
Sasser  v.  Martin   (  [Ga.]   29  S.  E. 

278),   139,  249,  250. 
Sate  V.  Frost    (103  Tenn.  685;   54 

S.  W.  986),  136. 
Sate  V.  Keen   (34  Me.  500),  383. 
Satterfield    v.     State     ([Tex.     Or. 

App.]   44  S.  W.  291),  1699. 
Saunders    v.    Alvido     ( [Tex.    Civ. 

App.]  113  S.  W.  992),  1903. 
Saunders     v.     Saunders     (Ch.     D. 

[March  7,   1907]    [not  report- 
ed]),  1832. 
Saunders  v.  State    (2  Iowa,  230), 

1046. 
Saunders    v.    Thorney     (60    J.    P. 

404;    78   L.   T.   027;    14  T.  L. 

R.  346),  1135,  1138. 
Saner,   In   re    (23   Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

Rep.  463 ) ,  647. 
Sauer  v.  Walker  (2  B.  C.  93),  263. 
Sauvage  v.  Trouillet  (3  Mon.  S.  C. 

276),  1839,  1981. 
Savage  v.  Commonwealth    (84  Va. 

582;    5    S.    E.    565),   87,    125, 

1469,   1483,   1491,   1699,   1713, 

1714. 
Savage  v.  Commonwealth    (84  Va. 

619;    5   S.   E.  565),  228,  233, 

2.35,  248,  1465   1478,  1484, 

1555,  1556. 
Savage  v.  Mallory  (4  Allen,  492), 

1800. 
Savage  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

88  S.  W.  351),  1309,  1323, 

1021,  1681. 
Savage   v.    Umphries    ( [Tex.    Civ. 

App.]    118    S.    W.    893),   903, 

924,  920. 
Savage  v.  Wolf  ( 69  Ala.  569 ) ,  920, 

939. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cclxxiii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Savalot  V.  Populus    (31   La.   Ann. 

854;     1    Bishop    ilar.    Div.    & 

Sep.   §§614,  624),  2114. 
Savannah  v.  Ilussey    (21  Ga.  80), 

270. 
Savannah  v.  Weed  (84  Ga.  683;  11 

S.  E.  235),  793. 
Savier     v.     Chipman     ( 15     Wend. 

260),  72. 
Savill  Bros.,  Limited,  v.  Langman 

([1898]  79  L.  T.  44;   14  T.  L. 

504),  1817. 
Sawtelle   v.   Jones    (23    N.   S.    W. 

165),  1270. 
Sawyer    v.    Blakely    (2    Ga.    App. 

159;  58  S.  E.  399),  1659. 
Sawyer  v.  Mould    ([Iowa]    112  X. 

"W.  813),   1003. 
Sawyer  v.  Oliver    ([Iowa]    122  X. 

W.  950),  1001,  1003. 
Sawyer    v.    Sanderson     (113    Mo. 

App.  233;  88  S.  W.  151),  511, 

694. 
^awj-er   v.   Sauer    (10   Kan.   406), 

2198,  2201. 
Sawyer  v.  State  ( 52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

597;    108  S.  W.  394),  1471. 
Sawyer    v.    Termohland     ( [Iowa] 

'l22  N.  W.  924),  982,  984, 

1000. 
Say  v.  Berwick  (1  Ves.  &  B.  195), 

2099,  2102,  2103. 
Sayers  v.  Collyer  ([1884]  28  Ch. 

D.  103;  54  L.  J.  Ch.  1;  55 

L.  T.  723;  33  W.  R.  91;  49 

J.  P.  244),  1814. 
Sayles   Ann.    Civ.   St.    (1897    Art. 

5060g),   1231. 
Saylor  v.  Duel    (236   111.  429;    80 

N.  E.  119),  249,  925. 
Scales  v.   State    (47   Ark.   476;    1 

S.  W.  769;  58  Am.  Rep.  768), 

1441,   1694. 
Scalzo  V.  Sackett   (30  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    543;     63    N.    Y.    Supp. 

820),  814. 
Scanlan  v.   Childs    (33  Wis.  663), 

1194. 
Scanlon  v.  Denver    (38   Colo.  401; 

88  Pac.   156),  415. 


Scarritt  v.  Jackson   (89  Mo.  App. 

585),  585. 
Scatchard   v.    Johnson    (52    J     P. 

389;  57  L.  J.  M.  C.  41),  361, 

1247,    1248,   1249,    1252,   1295, 

1313. 
Schab  V.  People   (4  Hun,  520),  46. 
Schade  v.  Russell  ([Mo.  App.]  110 

S.  W.  667),  645,  647,  648,  649. 
Schafer   v.    State    (49    Ind.    460), 

1844. 
Schafer   v.    Smith    (63   Ind.   226), 

1989. 
Schafer  v.  Mumma   (17  Md.  331), 

216. 
Schaffner    v.    State     (8    Ohio    St. 

642),  844,  1162. 
Schaller   v.    State    (14   Mo.    502), 

2040. 
Schaps  V.  Leliner    (54  Minn.  208; 

55  N.  W.  911),  2106. 
Schaub   V.   Schaub    (117   La.   727; 

42  So.  249),  2158. 
Scheffler    v.    Minneapolis,    etc.,    R. 

Co.   (32  Minn.  518;   12  N.  W. 

711),  2182. 
Schenck    v.    Saunders     ( 13    Gray, 

37),  1162. 
Schencker  v.  State   (9  Neb.  241;   1 

N.  W.  857),  2040. 
Schendler    Bottling    Co.   v.    Welch 

(42  Fed.  561),  327. 
Schiek  v.   Sanders    ([Neb.]    74  N. 

W.  39),  1882,  1992. 
Schiller  v.   State    ( [S.   C]   38   So. 

706),  291,  1322,  1558. 
Schilling  v.  State   (116  Ind.  200), 

18    N.    E.    682),    1292,    1488, 

1635. 
Schilling,   Ex   parte    (38   Tex.   Cr. 

App.  287;  42  S.  W.  553),  907, 

912. 
Schlachter  v.  Stokes    (63  N.  J.  L. 

138;   43  Atl.  571),  410. 
Schlandocker  v.  Marshall    (72  Pa. 

200),  628,  629,  648. 
Schlencker  v.   State    (9   Neb.   241; 

1  N.  W.  857),  2043,  2053. 
Schlesinger   v.   Stratton    (9    R.   T. 

578),  310,  1787. 


oclxxiv 


TABL.E  OP   CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Schlict  V.  State  (31  Ind.  246),  500, 

1306. 
Schlicht   V    State    (56    Ind.    173), 

12,  32,  80,  1488,  1490,  1554. 
Schlosser   v.   Mould    (  [Iowa]    121 

N.  W.  520),  341,  343,  1002. 
Schlosser   v.    State    (55    Ind.    82), 

83,  15!)2,  1871,  1976. 
Schmeltz  v.  State   (8  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  82),  132. 
Schmidt's   License,  In  re    (37   Pa. 

Sup.  Ct.  420),  563. 
Schmidt  v.  Cobb    (119  U.  S.  286; 

7  Sup.  Ct.  1373),  258. 
Schmidt  v.  Indianapolis   ( 168  Ind. 

631;    80  N.   E.   632),  91,    144, 

199,  425.  426,  427,  796. 
Schmidt  v.  Mitchell   (84  III.  195), 

1874. 
Schmidt   v.    State    (14   Mo.    137), 

1348,  1349,  1643. 
Schmidt  v.  State  ( 53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

465;   110  S.  W.  897),  1211. 
Schmitker,  Ex  parte  (6  Neb.  108), 

522. 
Schneider,  Ex  parte   (11  Ore.  288; 

8  Pac.  289),  73,  75,  410,  412, 
414,  418,  439. 

Schneider         v.         Commonwealtli 

([Ky.]  Ill  S.  W.  303;  33  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  770),  545. 
Schneider  v.  Hosier  (21  Ohio  State, 

98),    296,    1843,    1859,    1864, 

1897. 
Schober    v.    Rosefield     ( 75    Iowa, 

455;    39    N.    W.    706),    1803, 

1804. 
Schollenberger      v.      Pennsylvania 

(171   U.  S.   1;    43  L.   Ed.  49; 

18    Sup.    Ct.    1),    309,    1427, 

1433. 
Scliomaker,  In  re   ( 15  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    048;     38    K.    Y.    Supp. 

167),  636. 
Schomp  V.  Schenck  (40  N.  J.  Law, 

195-200;    29    Am.    Rep.    219), 

2095. 
School    District  v.    Thompson    (51 

Neb.  857;  71  N.  W.  728).  816. 


School  District  v.  Twin  Falls  (13 

Idaho,  -i71;  90  Pac.  735),  808. 
Schoonmaker    v.    Kelly    (42    Hun, 

299),  2127. 
Schopp,    In   re    (119    N.    Y.    App. 

Div.    192;    104    N.    Y.    Supp. 

307),  735,  736,  738. 
Schramm    v.     O'Connor     ( 98     111. 

539),  2099,  2103,  2105. 
Schreiber,    In    re    (22    N.    Y.    St. 

Rep.  892),  2143. 
Schroeder  v.  Charleston   (2  Const. 

Rep.  720),  442. 
Schroder  v.  Crawford  (94  HI.  357; 

34  Am.  Rep.  236),  1872,  1924, 

1943,  2001. 
Schuck  V.  State   (50  Ohio  St.  493; 

34  N.  E.  603),  1125. 
Schuenke  v.  Pine  River    (84  Wis. 

609;   54  N.  W.  1007),  2198. 
Schulenberg  v.  State   (79  Neb.  65; 

112  N.  W.  304),  1703. 
Schuler  v.  Bordeaux  (64  Miss.  u9; 

8  So.  201),  138,  232,  235. 
Schulherr  v.  State   (68  Miss.  227; 

8  So.  328),  780,  1248. 
Scliulte  V.  Schleeper  (210  111.  357; 

71  N.  E.  323),  1843,  1856. 
Schultheis    v.    Wilson    (13    N.    Y. 

L.   R.  295),   1211. 
Schultz  V.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (6  Fed. 

672;  14  Ins.  L.  Jr.  171),  2229, 

2230,  2231. 
Schultz  V.  State  (32  Ohio  St.  276), 

987,  998,  1000,  1374. 
Schumm  v.  Gardener   (25  111.  App. 

033),  520,  1189. 
Schuneman  v.  Sherman  (118  Iowa, 

230;  91  N.  W.  1004),  944 
Schurzer  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

25  S.  W.  23),  1028. 
Schusler,  Appeal  of  (81  Conn.  276; 

70  Atl.  1029),  594. 
Schusler's  Estate,  In  re    (198  Pa. 

81;   47  Atl.  906),  2135,  2141, 

2147,  2148,  2149. 
Schuyler,  In  re    (63  N.  Y.  App. 

biv.  200;  71  N.  Y.  Supp.  437), 

742,  1297,  1312. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cclxxv 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Schuyler,   In   re    (32   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.  221;  66  N.  Y.  Supp.  251), 

742,   746. 
Schuylkill  Co.,  In  re    (24   Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  Rep.  571),  762. 
Schwab  V.  People  4  Hun,  520),  24, 

1480,  1489. 
Schwabacher    v.    People     ( 165    111. 

618;   46  N.  E.  809),  2077. 
Schwann  v.  Osborn   (59  Ind.  245), 

1936. 
Schwarm  v.  State    (82   Ind.  470), 

525. 
Schwarting,    Ex    parte     ( 76    Neb. 

773;     108    N.    W.    125),    277, 

2023. 
Schwartz    v.    State     (32    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.  387;   24  S.  VY.  28),  352. 
Schwarz    v.   Dover    (72    N.    J.    L. 

311;    62   Atl.    1135;    affirming 

70  N.  J.  L.  502;  57  Atl.  394), 

197. 
Schwedes    v.    State     (1    Okla.    Cr. 

245;    99   Pac.   804),   317,  323, 

327,  328,  330. 
Schwedes    v.    State     ([Okla.]     104 

Pac.  765),  325. 
Schweirman     v.      Highland     Park 

([Ky.]    113   S.   W.   507),    183, 

388,  479,  627. 
Schweitzer    v.     Liberty     (82     Mo. 

309),  439. 
Schwenyer  v.   Oberkoelter    (25  111. 

App.  183),   1112. 
Schwerman  v.  Commonwealth    (99 

Ky.  296;   38  S.  W.   146),  401. 
Schwulst   V.    State    (52    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  426;   108  S.  W.  698),  87, 

225,  1378,  1615. 
Schwuchow    V.    Chicago     (68    111. 

444),    69,    91,    103,    111,    138, 

143,    167,    182,    185,    189,   316, 

395,   398,    420,    437,   456,   471, 

472,  496. 
Scotland    Life    Ass'n    v.    McBlane 

9  Irish  Eq.  176),  2243. 
Scott   V.    Chope    (33    Neb.    41;    49 

N.  W.  940),  1873,  1876,  1911, 

1952. 


Scott  V.  Donald  (165  U.  S.  58;  17 

Sup.  Ct.  265;  41  L.  Ed.  632), 

174,  179,  323. 
Scott  V.  Gilmore    (3  Taunt.  226), 
Scott   V.  Naacke    ([Iowa]    122   N. 

W.  824),  576,  579,  585. 
Scott   V.    Paquitt    ( 17    Low.    Can. 

Rep.  283),  2109,  2114. 
Scott  V.  Scott   (29  L.  J.  Mat.   [N. 

S.]  64),  2164. 
Scott   V.    State    (150   Ala.   59;    43 

So.     181),    1455,    1482,    1518, 

1613. 
Scott  V.  State  (25  Tex.  Supp.  168), 

1591,  1638,  1754. 
Scott  V.  State   (12  Tex.  App.  31), 

2039,  2073,  2090. 
Scott   V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

44  S.  W.  495),  1694. 
Scott  V.   State    (46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

176;  82  S.  W.  656),  1364. 
Scott  V.  State    (47   Tex.  Cr.  App. 

176;    82    S.    W.    656),    1737, 

1761. 
Scott  V.  State    (52  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

164;    105  S.  W.  796),  1174. 
Scottish,  etc.,  Soc.  v.  Buist   (4  Ct. 

Sess.  Cas.   [4th  series]    1078), 

2221. 
Scovern  v.  State  (6  Ohio  St.  288), 

1743. 
Scoville  V.  Calhoun    (76  Ga.  263), 

927. 
Seaboard,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chapman 

(4    Ga.    App.    706;    62    S.    E. 

488),  2188. 
Seaborn  v.  Commonwealth    ([Ky.] 

80  S.  W.  223 ;   25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

2203),  2068. 
Seagar  v.  White  (48  J.  P.  436; 

51  L.  T.  261),  1275,  1370. 
Seagin  v.  Ehmke  (120  Iowa,  464; 

94  N.  W.  938),  1844,  1846. 
Sealy  v.  Tandry  ([1902]  1  K.  B. 

296;  66  J.  P.  19;  71  L.  J.  K. 

B.  41;  50  W.  R.  347;  85  L. 
T.  459;  18  T.  L.  R.  38;  20  Cox 

C.  C.  57),  363,  2028. 


cclxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Searcy   v.   Lawreneeburg    (20   Ky. 

L.  Kep.  1920;   50  S.  W.  534), 

798. 
Searcy  v.  State  (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

444;    102    S.    W.    1127),    917, 

942. 
Searcy  v.   Turner    ([Ark.]    114    S. 

W.  472),  441. 
Searle  v.  McArdle   (15  N.  Z.  L.  R. 

613),   689. 
Sears  v.  State    (35  Tex.  Cr.   Rep. 

442;     34    S.    W.     124),    1188, 

1628. 
Seaton  v.  Higgins   ( 50  Iowa,  305 ) , 

1027. 
Seattle   v.   Clark    (28   Wash.   717; 

69    Pac.   407),    401,   419,    446, 

689. 
Seattle  v.  Foster    (47  Wash.   172; 

91  Pac.  642),  188,  220,  295. 
Shaver  v.  Phelps    (11   Pick.   304), 

2094. 
Sebastian   v.   State    (44   Tex.   Civ. 

App.   508;    72  S.   W.  849),  9, 

972,  1210,  1686,  1690. 
Secor  V.   Taylor    (41    Hun,    421), 

1953. 
Seddon  v.  State    (100   Iowa,   378; 

69  N.  W.  671),  999. 
SedgAvick    v.    State    (47    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    627;     85    S.    W.    813), 

298,  307,  1214,  1280. 
Sefried  v.  Commonwealth  (101  Pa. 

St.  200),  1456. 
Segars,    Ex    parte     (32    Tex.    Cr- 

Rep.  553;  25  S.  W.  26),  852. 
Segars  v.  State   (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

45;  31  S.  W.  370),  888,  1447, 

1550. 
Segars  v.  State   (40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

577;  51  S.  W.  211),  958,  1443, 

1456. 
Segur    V.     State      (6     Ind.     451), 

1501. 
Seibert    v.    State     (40    Ala.     60), 

1367. 
Seick    V.    State    (94    Md.    71;    50 

Atl.   436),    1572. 
Seim   V.    State    (55    Md.    506;    39 

Am.  Rep.  419),  1330. 


Seitz,  In  re   (32  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

108;    65    N.    Y.    Supp.    462), 

818. 
Selah    V.    Selah    (23    N.    J.    185), 

2103. 
Sellers  v.  Arie    ( [Iowa]  38  N.  W. 

814),  1803,  1805. 
Sellers    v.    Foster    (27    Xeb.    118; 

42  X.  W.  907),  1872,  1980. 
Selm   V.    State    (55    Ind.    566;    39 

Am.  Rep.  419),  1339. 
Selma  v.  Brewer   (9  Cal.  App.  70; 

98    Pac,    61),    439,    441,    462, 

831, 
Sells  V.  State    (76  Ala.  92),  1581. 
Semones    v.    Xeedles     ( 137    Iowa, 

177;    114  X.  W.  904),  659. 
Semple  v.  Flynn    ( [X.  J.  Eq.]    10 

Atl.    177  h    694,    701,    17S3. 
Senate  of  the   Happy  Home  Club 

V.   Board    (99   Mich.   117;    57 

N.  W.  1110;  23  L.  R.  A.  142), 

2022. 
Sendcroft,   In  re    (168  Pa.  45;    31 

Atl.  948),  665. 
Senior    v.    Pierce    (31    Fed.    Rep. 

625),  1013. 
Senior  v.  Ratterman   (44  Ohio  St. 

661;    11   X.   E.   321;    affirming 

17   Wkly.  L.  Bull.   115),   121, 

147,    198,  202,   542,   790,   792. 
Sentance  v.  Poole    (3   C.  &  P.   1), 

2108,  2110. 
Seollings   v.    Lee    (123    Ala.    464; 

26  So.  211),  1780. 
Seranely,  In  re    (40  X.  Y.   Supp. 

1106;     18    X.    Y.    Misc.    Rep. 

341),  580. 
Sessions  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

98  S.  W.  243),  1624. 
Seube,    Ex   parte    (115    Cal.    C29; 

47  Pac.  596),  416 
Seven,  In  re    (2  Pa.  Co.   Ct.  Rep. 

75),  622. 
Severance  v.   Kelly    (86   Ky.  522; 

6S.  W.  386),  800. 
Severance    v.    Murphy     ( 67    S.    C. 

409;  46  S.  E.  635),  381. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[U>3ferences   are   to   pages.] 


eclxxvii 


Sewell  V.  Taylor   (7  C.  B.  IN.  S.] 

160;  23  J.  P.  792;  29  L.  J.  M. 

C.    50;     1    L.    T.    37),    1301, 

2025,  1027. 
Sexson    v.    Kelley    (3    Neb.    104), 

758. 
SexUm  V.   Board    ([N.   J.   L.]    6!) 

Atl.  470),  138,  589,  590. 
Sexton  V.  Goodwine   (33  Ind.  App. 

329;    68  N.  E.  929;   70  N.  E. 

999),  601,  610,  611,  612,  613. 
Sexton  V.  Lelievere    (4  Cold.   11), 

2255. 
Seymer  v.  Lake    (66  Wis.  651;   29 

N.  W.  554),  2177,  2190,  2191, 

2192,  2193. 
Sej'mour,   In   re    (47   N.   Y.    App. 

Div.  320;  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  25), 

751. 
Seymour    v.    De    Lancey     (3    Cow. 

445),  2093, 
Sliackelford    v.    State     ([Tex.    Cr. 

App.]   22  S.  W.  26),  1515. 
Shackleton  v.  Sebree  (86  111.  616), 

2094,   2098.  2103. 
Shader     v.     Railway     Passenger's 

Assur.  Co.   (60  N.  Y.  441;  23 

Am.   Rep.    65;    5    Ins.   L.   Jr. 

749;    affirming    3    Hun,    424; 

5  T.   &   C.   543),    2232,    2238, 
2244. 

Shafer  v.  Miamma   (17  Md.  336), 

271. 
Shafer  v.  Patterson    (4  Ohio  Dec. 

157;    1   Cleve.  Law.  Rep.  84), 

1991. 
Shaffer    v.    Stern     (160    Ind.    375; 

60  N.  E.  1004),  666. 
Shaffer    v.    State    (106    Ind.    319; 

6  N.  E.  818),  1500,  1562. 
Shaffer    v.    Stern    (160    Ind.    375; 

66  N.  E.  1004),  601,  605,  606, 

611,  613,  614,  856. 
Shatter    v.   State    (114    Ind.    194; 

16  N.  E.  521),  1719. 
Shain  v.  Maxwell    (115  Cal.  208; 

46   Pac.   1069),    1780,    1783. 
Shanley    v.    Wells     (71    111.    78), 

2034. 


Shannahan    v.    Commonwealth    (8 

Busli,  464;    8  Am.  Rep.  405), 

2041,   2046,  2057,   2061,   2085. 
Shannon   v.    State    (39   Neb.   658; 

58  N.  W.  196),  108,  110,  502. 
Sharpe  v.  Arnold   (108  Iowa,  203; 

78  N.  W.  819),  981,  992. 
Sharon  Borough  v.  Mercer  Co.  (20 

Pa.  Ct.  Rep.  507),  400. 
Sharp  V.  Hughes    (57  J.  P.  104), 

367,  535. 
Sharp    V.    State     (17     Ga.    290), 

1643. 
Sharpe    v.    Wakefield     (22    Q.    B. 

Div.  242),  678. 
Sharpless   v.    Mayer,   etc.,   21    Pa. 

St.   147),   105. 
Sharpley  v.  Brown    (43  Hun,   [N. 

Y.]   374),   1968. 
Shaw   V.   Carpenter    (54   Vt.    155; 

41   Am.  Rep.  837),  9,   10,  17. 
Shaw    V.    Morley    (L.    R.   3    Exch. 

137;   32  J.  P.   391),  379. 
Shaw    V.    Pickett     (26    Vt.    486), 

276. 
Shaw   V.  State    (3  Ga.   App.   607; 

60  S.  E.  326),   1181,   1589. 
Shaw  V.  State  ( 56  Ind.  88  ) ,  39,  82, 

510,  516,  517,  539,  1364,  1496. 
Shaw  V.  Thackrah   (17  Jur.  1045), 

2111. 
Shaw  V.  Thackray   (1  Sm.  &  Giff. 

537),  2099. 
Shea  V.  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.    (83  N. 

Y.   App.    Div.   305;    82   N.   Y. 

Supp.  39),  776. 
Shea    V.    Muncie     (148    Ind.    14; 

46  N.   E.    138),   98,   138,    168, 

169,    172,    183,   409,   423,   424, 

488,     496,     597,     1213,     1558, 

1649. 
Shear  v.  Bolinger    (74  Iowa,  757; 

37  N.  W.  164),  125. 
Shear  v.  Brinkman  (72  Iowa,  698; 

34  N.  W.  483),  982. 
Shear   v.    Green    (73    Iowa,    688; 

36    N.    W.    642),    986,    990, 

992,   1589. 
Shearer,  hi  re   (26  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

34),  666. 


celxxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Shearer  v.  State    (7   Blackf.  99), 

1642. 
Sheasby  v.  Oldham  (55  J.  P.  214; 

60  L.  J.  M.  C.  812),  1149. 
Shedlinsky  v.   Budweiser   Brewing 

Co.   (17  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  470; 

45  N.  Y.  Supp.   174),   1811. 
Sheelian  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

([Ky.]  101  S.  W.  380;  31  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  113),  935. 
Shelbyville    v.    Cleveland,   etc.,   R. 

Co.    (146    Ind.    66;    44    N.    E. 

929), 409. 
Sheldon  v.  Clark    (1  Johns.  513), 

1642. 
Shelling     v.     Commonwealth     ( 1 1 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    [abstract]    675), 

1459,  1508. 
Shelton    v.    Mayor,    etc.,    30    Ala. 

540),  294. 
Shelton   v.   State    ([Ind.]    89    Ind. 

860),  554. 
Shepard  v.   New  Orleans    (51   La. 

Ann.  847;  25  So.  542),  586. 
Shepheard   v.   Walker    ([1876]    34 

L.  T.  230),   1819. 
Shepler   v.    State    (114    Ind.    194; 

16    N.    E.    521),    1305,    1323, 

1567,   1740. 
Sheppard  v.  Bowling   (127  Ala.  1; 

28  So.  791),  382. 
Sheppelman    v.    People     ( 134    III. 

App.  556),  64. 
Sherlock  v.  Stuart  (96  Mich.  123; 

55    X.    W.    845;    21    L.   R.    A. 

580),    94,    99,    397,   400,    424, 

440,  634,   1840. 
Sherry,    In    re    (25    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.  361 ;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  4:1 ) , 

589. 
Sherry,  In  re  (12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

129),   563. 
Sherwood,    In    re     (21     Fed.    Cas. 

1285),   71. 
Sherar    v.    State     (30    Tex.    App. 

349;    17  S.  W.  621).  2090. 
Sheritt,  Ex  parte    (L.   R.  5  Q.   B. 

174),   1572. 


Sherras   v.   De   Rutzen    ([1895]    1 

Q.  B.  918;    59   J.   P.   440;    64 

L.    J.    M.    C.    218;    72    L.    T. 

839;   43  W.  R.  526),   1221. 
Sheilds    v.    State     (95    Ind.    299), 

1291,  1751. 
Shields  v.  State  (38  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

252;  42  S.  W.  398),  872,  894, 

1686. 
Shiflet  V.  Grimsley    ( 104  Va.  424 ; 

51  S.  E.  838),  797. 
Shihagen   v.    State    (9    Tex.    430), 

369,  371. 
Shilling,    Ex   parte    (38    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  287;  42  S.  W.  553),  865. 
Shilling    V.    State     (5    Ind.    443), 

1545,   1552. 
Shilling  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

51    S.    W.    240),   958,    1466. 
Shiretzki  v.  Julius  Kessler  &  Co. 

([Ala.]     37    So.    423),     1787, 

17S8. 
Shonkwiler  v.  Stewart    ( 104  Iowa, 

67;   73  N.  W.  479),  552. 
Shorb   v.    Webber    (188    111.    126; 

58  X.  E.  949,  afhrming  89  111. 

App.   474),   2007. 
Short  v.  People  (96  111.  App.  638), 

1228. 
Short  V.  State    (49  Tex.  Cr.   App. 

244;   91   S.  W.  1087),   1380. 
Shover    v.    State    (5    Eng.    [Ark.] 

529),  214. 
Showalter  v.  State   (84  Ind.  562), 

1618. 
Showyer      v.      Chamberlain      (113 

Iowa,    742;     84    N.    W.    661), 

1805. 
Shreveport  v.  Draiss  &  Co.  Ill  La. 

511;    35    So.    727),    432,    463, 

470. 
Shreveport  v.  Roos  (35  La.  Ann. 

1010),  469. 
Shuch  V.  State  (50  Ohio,  493; 

34  N.  E.  063),  1319. 
Shuck  V.  Shuck  (7  Bush,  306), 

2155,  2156,  2160. 
Shuler  v.  State  (125  Ca.  778; 

54  S.  E.  689),  1322,  1479, 

1501,  1505. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cclxxix 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Shultz  V.  Cambridge    (38  Ohio  St. 

659),  213,  345. 
Shultz  V.   Wall    (134   Pa.  262;    19 

Atl.    742;     8    L.    R.    A.    97), 

2187. 
Shurman  v.  Ft.  Wayne    (127  Ind. 

109;    26   N.   E.   560;    11   L.  R. 

A.  378),  479. 
Shuster  v.  State  (62  X.  J.  L.  521; 

41  Atl.  701),  1285,  1286,  1372, 

1376. 
Shutt  V.   Shutt    (71   Md.   193;    17 

Atl.   1024),   2153,   2165,   2166. 
Shuttleworth    v.    State     (35    Ala. 

415),    1246. 
Sibila  V.  Bahney    ( 34   Ohio  State, 

399),    223,    224,     1840,     1841, 

1882. 
Sieeluff    v.    State     (52    Ark.    56; 

11  S.  W.  964),  1227. 
Sickinger  v.  State    (45   Kan.  414; 

25  Pac.  868),  991,  1003. 
Siebold    v.    People     (86    111.    33), 

215. 
Siegel    V.    People     (106    111.    89), 

1173,   1176,    1220,    1224,   1225, 

1230,  1844,  1846. 
Siegle  V.   Rush    (173   111.   559;    50 

N.   E.    1008,   affirming   72   111. 

App.  485),    1954. 
Sifred  v.  Commonwealth    ( 104  Pa. 

179),  1304,  1307,  1308. 
Sights  V.  Yarnells  (12  Gratt.  292), 

714. 
Sigmore  v.  Commonwealth   ([Ky.] 

102  S.  W.  277;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

310),  1173. 
Sikes,  Ex   parte    \  102  Ala.  173; 

15  So.  522;  24  L.  R.  A.  774), 

431,  432,  444,  447,  480. 
Sill   V.   McKnight    (7   Watts  &  S. 

244),   2121. 
Sills  V.  State    (76  Ala.  92  >     1517, 

1713. 
Siloam   Springs  v.   Thompson    '41 

Ark.  456),  906,  1160. 
Silver  v.  State    (105   Ga.   838;    32 

S.  E.  22),  1379,  1380,  1381. 
Silver    v.    Sparta    (107    Ga.    275; 

33  S.  E.  31),  173,  188,  479. 


Silvers  v.  Traverse   (82  Iowa,  52; 

47   N.   W.   888;    11    L.   R.   A. 

804),   1001. 
Silvey  v.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

98  S.  W.  1058),  1472. 
Silverman    v.    Rumbarger    (4    Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  439),  1805. 
Simmons,  Ex  parte   ( 76  Neb.  639 ; 

107   X.   W.   863),   2017,   2018, 

2020. 
Simmons  v.  Blackheath   ( 17  Q.  B. 

Div.    765;    50    J.    P.    742;    55 

L.    J.    M.    C.    166;    35    W.    R. 

167),  701,  709. 
Simms,    Ex   parte    (41    Fla.    316; 

25  So.  280),  401. 
Simons    v.    State    (25    Ind.    331), 

1223. 
Simons  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

67  S.  W.  502),  1646. 
Simonton    v.    Colbourne     (3    Terr. 

L.   R.   372),   750. 
Simpkins  v.  Marlatt  (9  Ind.  543), 

1019. 
Simpson  v.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.] 

97  S.  W.  404;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

132),   535,   610,   615. 
Simpson  v.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.] 

104  S.  W.  269;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

821;  104  S.  W.  270;  31  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  851),  747. 
Simpson  v.  Seuriss   (2  Ohio  C.  D. 

246),  797,  804. 
Simpson    v.    State     (93    Ga.    196; 

18  S.  E.  526),   1250. 
Simpson   v.   State    (17   Ind.   444), 

1491. 
Sims  V.  Pottawottamie  County  (91 

Iowa,    442;     59    X.    W.  "68), 

1004. 
Sims    v.    State    (135    Ala.    61;    33 

So.    162),    1451,    1511. 
Sims  v.  State   (10  Tex.  App.  131), 

1746. 
Sims    V.    State    ([lex.    Cr.    App.] 

87  S.  W.  689),  1282. 
Sinclair   v.    State    (69    X.    C.    47), 

152,  331. 
Sinclair  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

70  S.  \N.  218),  1235. 


cclxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Sinclair    v.    State     (45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    487;     77    S.    W.    621), 

914,  916,  1284,   1690. 
Singer    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Wright     (33 

Fed.  Eep.   121),   793. 
Singleton  v.  Ellison    ([1895]    1  Q. 

B.  607;    64   L.  J.   M.   C.    123; 

59  J.   P.    119;    72   L.   T.   236; 

43   W.  R.   426;    18   Cox,   79), 

368,  724. 
Sinking    Fund    Cases     (99    U.    S. 

700),   114. 
Sinnot    v.    Davenport     (22    How. 

227;  16  L.  Ed.  243),  479. 
Sires  v.   State    (73   Wis.   251;    41 

N.  W.  81),   1523. 
Sis    V.   Boarman    ( 1 1    App.   D.    C. 

116),   1771. 
Sisson  V.   Conger    ( 1   T.  &  C.    [N. 

Y.]    564),    2258. 
Sisson,  Potter  &   Co.   v.   Hill    (18 

R.    I.    212;    26    Atl.    196;    21 

L.  R.  A.  266),  2127. 
Sizemore  v.  Commonwealth   ( [Ky.] 

102    S.    W.    277;    31    Ky.    L. 

Rep.   310),    1176. 
Sizer  v.  Syracuse,  etc.,  R.  Co.    ( 7 

Lans.  67),  2199. 
Sjoblom  V.  Mark   (103  Minn.  193; 

114  N.  W.  746),  1809. 
Skelton  v.  State   ([Ind.J   89  N.  E. 

860),   1193. 
Skidmore         v.         Commonwealth 

([Ky.]     57     S.     W.     468;     22 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  409),  1186,  1380, 

1381. 
Skinner  v.  State    (97  Ga.  690;   25 

S.  E.  364),  1166,  1167. 
Skinner   v.   State    (120   Ind.    127; 

22  N.  E.  115),  1109,  1549. 
Skipwith     V.     State      ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  68  S.  W.  278).  1682. 
Skyles  v.   State    ([Neb.]    123  Pac. 

447),  1187. 
Slack,    Ex    parte    (8    Vict.    L.    R. 

144),   626,   711,   712. 
Slack,  Ex  parte  (7  Vict.  L.  R.  28), 

539. 


Slack   V.   Jacob    (8   \\.  Va.    612), 

106. 
Slater  v.  Fire  &  Police  Board   (43 

Colo.  225;   96  Pac.  554),  560, 

569,   577. 
Slattery,  Ex  parte    (3   Ark.   484), 

270. 
Slaughter    v.    Commonwealth    (13 

Gratt.  [Va.]  776),  428,  793. 
Slaughter     v.     People      (2     Doug. 

[Mich.]  334),  270. 
Slaughter     v.     State     ([Tex,     Cr. 

App.]    21    S.   W.   247),    1629, 

1630. 
Slaughter   House   Case    ( 16    Wall. 

36),  100. 
Slavens  v.   Wood    (54  J.  P.   742), 

1220. 
Slavin,  In  re    (36  Up.  Can.   159), 

424. 
Sleenburgh,  In  re   (24  X.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  1;   53  N.  Y.  Supp.  197), 

796. 
Slentz  V.  State   (27  Ind.  App.  700; 

61  N.  E.  956),  346,  1486,  1536. 
Sleeth  V.  Hurlbert  ( 25  S.  C.  [Ont.] 

620),    1050. 
Sleith    V.    Hurlbert     (25     S.      C. 

[Ont.]    620),   1059. 
Sliger  V.  State    (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

341;   88  S.  W.  243),  1207. 
Slinger's  Will,  In  re   (72  Wis.  22; 

37  N.  W.  236),  2145,  2151. 
Slinger    v.    Henneman     (38    Wis. 

504),    228. 
Sloan   V.  Johnson    (86   Iowa   750; 

53  N.  \N.  268),   1002. 
Sloan   V.   State    (8   Blackf.    [Ind.] 

35  L.),   393,   466,  521,  523. 
Slocum  V.  Mayberry  ( 2  Wheat.  [U. 

S.]    1),   1012. 
Sloman  v.  William   D.   Moebs   Co. 

(139    Mich.    334;    102   X.    W. 

854;     11    Det.    Leg.    K    857), 

299,    307,    333,    334. 
Slymer    v.    State     (62    Md.    240), 

235,    1469. 
Smart  v.  Hochelaga   (4  Leg.  News 

[Can.]  255),  648. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


eclxxxi 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Smart  v.  State   (49  Tex.  Cr,  App, 
373;     92    S.    W.    810),    1202, 
1380,   1381,   1613,   1758. 
Smeltzer,  iJx  parte  { 17  \V.  N.  [N. 

S.  W.]   190),  568. 
Smiser  v.  State  ( 17  Ind.  App,  519; 
47    N.    E.    229),    1855,    1869, 
1882,  1941. 
Smith,    In    Appeal    of    (65    Conn. 

135;    51    Atl.    529),    532. 
Smith,    Ex   parte    (38    Cal.    702), 

164,   218. 
iSmith  In   re    (104    Iowa    199;    73 

N.  W.  605)    805. 
Smith,  In  re   (126  Iowa,  128;    101 

N.  W.  875),  669,  670,  826. 
Smith,  In  re    (53   N.   Y.   St.   Rep. 

658),  2141. 
Smith,  1)1  re  (44  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
384;    89    N.   Y.    Supp.    1006), 
880,  889. 
Smith,  In  re    (48  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
423;    63    N.    Y.    Supp.    255), 
730,   1312. 
Smith,  In  re    (2   Pa.   Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

74),  639. 
Smith,  Ex  parte  (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

356;    88   S.   VV.   245),   939. 
Smith,  Ex  parte    ( 1  Hemstead   [9 

U.  S.  C.  C]  201),  270. 
Smith    V.    Adrian     (Man.    [Mich.] 

495),  502,  1366,  1509,  1644. 
Smith  V.  Alabama   (124  U.  8.  465; 

8  Sup.  Ct.  564),  315. 
Smith  V.  Anderson   (82  Mich.  492; 

45  X.  W.  729),   1952. 
Smith   V.    Benton    (20    Ont.    344), 

919,   1779,   1807. 
Smith  V.  Board   (46  X.  J.  L.  312), 

586. 
Smith   V.   Butler    ([1900]    1   Q.   B. 
694;    69   L.   J.   Q.  B.  521;    48 
W.    R.    583;    82    L.    T.    281; 
16  T.  L.  R.  208),  1833. 
Smith   V.   Commonwealth    ( 1   Duv. 
[Ky.]    224),  2048,  2060,  2061, 
2067,   2073,   2081. 
Smith    V.     Commonwealth     (6     B. 
Mon.    21),    1094,    1102,    1107, 
1110. 


Smith  V.  Commonwealth  ( 4  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  261),   1639. 
Smith    V.    Commonwealth    ([Ky.] 

48  S.  W.   1081),  1370. 
Smith   V.    Grable    (14   Iowa   429), 

1779,   1780,   1785. 
Smith  V.  Heneman   ( [Ala.]  24  So 

364),  1169. 
Smith   V.   Hickman    (68   III.   314), 

1802. 
Smith  V.  Huntington   (3  X.  H.  76; 

14   Am.    Dec.    33),    1027. 
Smith  V.  Janesville  (26  Wis.  291), 

240. 
Smitli    V.    Jeffries    (9    Price    257), 

1642. 
Smith    V.    Joyce     (12    Barb.    21), 

1643,    1805. 
Smith  V.  Kibbee   (9  Ohio  St.  563), 

1385. 
Smitli      V.      Knights      of      Father 
Mathew    (36    Mo.   App.    184), 
2231,   2232. 
Smith  V.  Knoxville   (3  Head  245), 
165,    183,    184,    263,    454,   459, 
461. 
Smith       V.       Land       Corporation 
([1884]    28    Ch.   D.    7;    49   J. 
P.   182;   51   L.  T.   718),   1832. 
Smith  V.  Lapar   (67  S.  C.  491;  46 

S.  E.  332),  1033. 
Smith    V.    McCarthy     (56    Pa.    St. 

359),  233. 
Smith   V.   McCormick    (2   Vict.   L. 

R.   93),    1299. 
Smith  V.  City  of  Madison   (7  Ind. 

86),  396. 
Smith  V.  Xewburn   (70  X.  C.  14), 

396. 
Smith    V.   Xew   York,   etc.,   R.   Co. 

(38  Hun  33),  2188. 
Smith  V.  Norfolk,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (114 
X.   C.   728;    19   S.  E.  863;    25 
L.    R.    A.    287),    2173,    2174, 
2178,   2182. 
Smith    V.    Patton    (103    Ky.    444; 
45  S.  W.  459 ;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
165),  853,  865,  872,"  931,  942. 
Smith    V.    People    (32    Colo.    251; 
75  Pac.  914),  288,  291. 


celxxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


IRefereiices    are    to    pages.] 


Smith  V.  People   (141  111.  447;  31 

N.    E.   425;    affirming'    .*?8    111. 

App.    630),     62,     1809,     1972, 

1976,   1998,   1999,  2005. 
Smith    V.    People     ( 1    Parker    Cr. 

Rep.   583),   111,   139. 
Smith    V.    People     (9    Hun,    446), 

508. 
Smith  V.  Portsmouth  J.  J.  ([1906] 

2  K.  B.  229;    75  L.  J.  K.  B. 

851;    95    L.    T.    5;    54    W.   R. 

598 ;     22  T.  L.  R.  650 ;     revers- 
ing 70  J.  P.  157),  642. 
Smith  V.  Reynolds  (8  Hun  [N.  Y.] 

128),   1350,   1907. 
Smith    V.    Rheimstrom     (65     Fed. 

989;    13  C.  C.  A.  201),  18. 
Smith    V.    San    Antonio     (7    Tex. 

646),  270. 
Smith  V.   Shann    ([1898]    2   Q.   B. 

347;    62   J.  P.   354;    67   L.   J. 

Q.    B.    819;    79    L.    T.    77;    14 

T.  L.  R.  443),  623. 
Smith  V.  Skow    (97  Iowa,  640;   66 

N.  W.  893),  2263. 
Smith  V.  Smith    (11   Ky.  L.   Rep. 

859),   2161. 
Smith    V.    Smith     (67    Vt.    443), 

2145. 
Smith  V.  State   (23  Ala.  39),  309, 

371. 
Smith    V.   State    (55    Ala.    1),    64, 

1632,  1754. 
Smith    V.    State     (132     Ala.     38; 

31    So.    552),    1232,    1234. 
Smith    V.    State     ([Ala.]     46    So. 

753),   1516. 
Smith  V.   State    (54  Ark.   248;    15 

S.   W.  882),  309. 
Smith    V.    State     ([Ark.]     16     S. 

W.    2),    1280,    1288. 
Smith    V.    State    (19    Conn.    493), 

1255,   1493,    1632. 
Smith   V.  State    (90   Ca.    133;    15 

S.  E.  682),  201. 
Smith  V.   State    (105  Cia.  724;    32 

S.  E.  127),  1083,   1722. 
Smith  V.  State    (109    (5n.  227;    34 

S.  E.   325),  333,   551. 


Smith  V.  State    (112  Ga.  291;   37 

S.  E.  441),  1475. 
Smith  V.  State   (3   Ga.  App.  326; 

59  S.  E.  934),   1602,  1662. 
Smith    V.    State     (23    Ind.     132), 

1497,    1499. 
Smith  V.  State   (24  Ind.  App.  688; 

57  N.  E.  572),  1749,  1751. 
Smith  V.  State  (4  Neb.  277),  2040, 

2062. 
Smith  V.   State    (32  Neb.   105;    48 

N.  W.  823),  1445,  1446,  1449. 
Smith  V.   State    (1    Humph.   396), 

2024. 
Smith  V.  State  (18  Tex.  App.  454), 

1304,    1320,    1570. 
Smith    V.    State     (24    Tex.    547), 

1246. 
Smith    V.    State     (19    Tex.    App. 

444),    886,    888. 
Smith  V.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

49  S.  W.  373),   1466,  1478. 
Smith  V.  State   (42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

414;  57  S.  W.  815),  225,  1212. 
Smith   V.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

66    S.    W.    780),    1235,    1237, 

1627. 
Smith  V.  State    (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

509;   90  S.  W.  37),  1122. 
Smith  V.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

91  S.  W.  592),  1179. 
Smith   V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

100  S.  W.  953),  1473,  1611. 
Smith   V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

103  C.  VV.  953 ) ,  1465. 
Smith  V.  State    (52  Tex.  Cr.  App 

357;  107  S.  W.  353),  1128. 
Smith  V.  State   (52  Tex.  Cr.  App 

507;   107  S.  W.  819),  1695. 
Smith    V.    State     ([Tex.]     116    S 

W.  593),  1111. 
Smith  V.  State   ( [Tex.]    120  S.  W 

801),  10. 
Smith  V.  State    (120  N.  W.  881) 

33,    1697,    1702,    1708. 
Smith  V.  Toronto   (16  C.  P.  [Ont.] 

200 ) ,  472. 
Smith    V.    Vaux     (26    J.    P.    134; 

6  L.  T.  46),  1141. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


celxxxiii 


I  References    are    to    pages.] 


Smith   V.   Warrior    (99   Ala.   481; 

12  So.  418),  432. 
Smith    V.    Wilcox     (47    ^"t.    5i57), 

1843. 
Smith    V.    Young    (13    Okla.    134; 

74    Pac.    104),    508,    021. 
Smitham    v.    State    ( 53    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    173;     108    S.    W.    118), 

917,   1685. 
Smithers    v.    Commonwealth     ( 12 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  030),  1484,   1485. 
Smithville  v.  Lee  County  ( 125  Ga. 

559;  54  S.  E.  539),  382. 
Smithy,  Ex  parte    (33   Pac.  338), 

432. 
Smothers   v.   Jackson    ( [^liss.]    45 

So.  982),    1002. 
Smurr    v.    State     (88    Ind.    504), 

2040. 
Snead  v.  State   (40  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

262 ;  40  S.  W.  597 ) ,  829,  832, 

■835,    845,    896,    958. 
Snearly  v.  State  ( 40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

507;  52  S.  W.  547;   53  S.  W. 

696),  933. 
Snider  v.  Koehler   (17   Kan.  432), 

310,   1787,  1788. 
Snider   v.    State    (81    Ga.    753;    7 

S.   E.   631;    12  Am.  St.   350), 

9,   11,   12,   18,  81,   1349,   1357, 

1358. 
Snider    v.    State     (78    Miss.    366; 

29  So.  78),   1729,  1730,   1732. 
Snider    v.    Thompson     (134    Iowa 

725;   112  N.  W.  239),  2033. 
Snow  V.  Hill    (14  Q.  B.  Div.  588; 

54  L.  J.  M.  C.  95;    52  L.  T. 

859;   33  W.  R.  475;    49  J.  P. 

440),   380. 
Snow   V.   State    (50    Ark.    557;    9 

S.  W.  306),   69,   73. 
Snyder,  In  re    (2  Pa.   Dist.   785), 

638,   664. 
Snyder's  Lease,  In  re  ( 2  Pa.  Dist. 

Rep.  785),  1808,  1809. 
Snyder  v.  Launt  ( 1  App.  Div.  142 ; 

37    N.    Y.    Supp.    408),    1850, 

1852. 
Snyder  V.  State  (5  Ind.  194),  1501. 


Snyder    v.    State    (40    Kan.    543; 

20  Pac.  Rep.  123),  222,   1768. 
Society,  etc.,  v.   Wheeler    (2   Gall. 

[U.  S.]   105),  261. 
Soehl   V.   State    (39   Xeb.   695;    58 

N.    W.    196),    110,    168,    502. 
Sohn  V.  State   (18  Ind.  389),  1304, 

1714. 
Solomon    v.    Dreschler     (4    Minn. 

278),   1780,   1783. 
Somers   v.   Newman    (31    App.   D. 

C.  193),  2263. 
Somers  v.  Vlasney    (04  Xeb.  383; 

89    X.    W.    1036),    565,    586, 

609. 
Somerset  v.   Hart   (12   Q.   B.   Div. 

360;    48   J.   P.   327;    53   L.   J. 

M.  C.  77),  375,  376. 
Somerset    v.    Wade    ([1894]    I    Q. 

B.   574;    58   J.   P.  231;    63   L. 

J.   M.   C.    120;    70   L.  T.   452; 

42  W.  R.  399),  359,  306,  725, 

2027,   2028. 
Sommer   v.    Gate    (22   Iowa   585), 

1771. 
Sonora   v.   Curtin    (137   Cal.   583; 

70  Pac.  674),  478. 
iSopher    v.    State    (157    Ind.    360; 

61  X.  E.  785),  497. 
I   Sopher    v.    State    (169    Ind.    177; 

81    X.    E.    912;    14    L.    R.    A. 
I  [X.   S.]    172),    104,    105,    106, 

144,   486,    1106,    1549,    1676. 
Sortwell  V.  Hughes    ( 1   Curt.  244 ; 

Fed.    Cas.    No.    13177),    1161, 

1164,  1795. 
Sothman  v.  State  (66  Xeb.  302; 

92  X.  W.  303),  83,  253,  254, 

1341,   1342,   1343,   1749. 
South  v.   Commonwealth    ( 79  Ky. 

493;  3  Ky.  L.  Rep.  276),  1220, 

1487,    15i6. 
South   v.    State    (86   Ala.    017;    6 

So.  52),  225. 
Southcombe  v.  Merrian  ( 1  C.  &  M. 

286:   41   E.   C.  L.   159),  2229, 

2232. 
South    Betlilehem    v.    Hemingway 

(16    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    Rep.    103), 

807. 


cclxxxiv 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Soutk   Carolina    v.    United    States 

(199   U    S.   437;    26   Sup.   Ct. 

110;    affirming   39    Ct.    of    CI. 

257),   175. 
South     Shore     Country     Club     v. 

People   (228  111.  74;   81  N.  E. 

805;  12  L.  R.  A.  [X.  S.]  519), 

1325,  1338. 
Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  State  (107 

Ga.  670;  33  S.  E.  637),  956. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  State  ( 1 

Ga.  App.  700;  58  S.  E.  67), 

1234,  1350,  1359,  1623,  1630, 

1714. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  State 

(114  Ga.  226;  39  S.  E.  899), 

1281,    1283. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Heyman   (119 

Ga.  616;   45  S.  E.  491),  324. 
Southwestern  R.  Co.  v.  Hankerson 

(72  Ga.   182),  2197. 
Southwestern  R.  Co.  v.  Hankerson 

(61  Ga.  114),  2180,  2184. 
Southworth  v.  State    (52  Tex.  Cr. 

App.    532;     109    S.    W.    133), 

1690. 
Spake  V.  People  (89  111.  617),  688, 

689,   799,   827. 
Spann  v.   Lowndes   Co.    (141   Ala. 

314;    34  So.  369),  796. 
Sparks  v.  State    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

45    S.    W.    493),    249,     1689, 

1707. 
Sparks  v.  State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

99  S.  W.  546),   1167. 
Sparrow,  In  re    (138  Pa.  116;   20 

Atl.    711;    27    W.   N.   C.    47), 

400,  632,  648,  649,  651. 
Sparta  v.  Boorom  (129  Mich.  555; 

89  N.  W.  435;   90  S.  W.  681; 

S  Det.   L.  N.    1100),   70,  453, 

1554,    1742. 
Spauldingv.  Nathan  (21  Ind.  App. 

122;    51  X.  E.  742),  520. 
Spaulding    v.     Nathan     (21     Ind. 

App.  122;  51  N.  E.  472),  520, 

538. 
Spears    v.    State     (18    Tex.    App. 

467),  1759. 


Specht  V.  Commonwealth  (8  Penn. 

St.   312),   215,   216. 
Speckert    v.    Louisville     (78     Ky. 

287),  929. 
Speigle  V.  Meredith    (22  Fed.  Cas. 

910),    1166. 
Spencer    v.    State    (15    Lea    539), 

2058. 
Spencer       v.       ^Yashington       Co. 

([Miss.]  45  So.  863),  879. 
Speogle,    Ex    parte    (34    Tex.    Cr. 

Rep.  465;  31  S.  W.  171),  887. 
Sperrig,  In  re    (7   Pa.   Super.  Ct. 

Rep.    131;    42    W.   N.   C.    37), 

628. 
Spicer  v.  Martin   ([1888]   14  App. 

•Cas.   12),   1821. 
Spickler,  In  re    (43   Fed.    653;    10 

L.  R.  A.  446),  321,  325,328. 
Spiegler  v.  'City   of   Chicago    (216 

111.   114;    74  X'.  E.  718),  428. 
Spira  V.  State    (146  Ala.   177;   41 

So.  465),  415. 
Spohn  V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.   ( 87 

Mo.  74),  2216. 
Spokane    v.    Baiighman    ([Wash.] 

103   Pac.   14),    1325,   1338. 
Spoonheim   v.    Spoonheim    (14    N. 

D.     380;     104     N.     W.     845), 

2095,    2108. 
Spratt,  Ex  parte  (2  S.  C.  X.  S.  W. 

254),    1048. 
Sprayberry    v.    Atlanta     (87    Ga. 

120;    13  S.  E.  197),   182,  471, 

472,   488,   490,    714,    740. 
Springfield  v.  Starke  (93  Mo.  App. 

70),  408. 
Springfield  v.  State    ([Tex.]   13  S. 

W.  752 ) ,  09,  372. 
Springfield  v.  State   (125  Ga.  281; 

54  S.  E.  172),  1380,  1381. 
Spring  Valley  v.  Henning    (42  111. 

App.    159),   1285. 
Squires    v.     State     (3    Ind.    App. 

114;   28  X.  E.  708),  1746. 
Staats   V.    Freeman    (6  N.   J.   Eq. 

490),    2098,    2131. 
Staats    V.   Washington    (44   N.   J. 

L.    605;     43    Am    Rep.    402), 

433,  457,  458. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


cclxxxv 


IReferences   are    to    pages.] 


Staats  V.  Washington    (45   N.   J. 

L.   418),    447,    453,    457.    458, 

460. 
Staats  V.  Washington  (36  La.  Ann. 

912),  457. 
Stacy   V.    Portland    Pub.    Co.     (US 

Me.  279),   1735. 
Stackberry    v.    Spencer    (55    L.    J. 

M.    €.    141;    51    J.    P.    181), 

1275. 
Stahel  V.  Commonwealth   (7  Bush, 

387),  369. 
Stahl    V.    Lee     ([Kan.]     80    Pac. 

983),   256,  258,  931,  2257. 
Stahuka  v.  Krieth    (66  Neb.  829; 

92  N.  W.   1042),  1979. 
Staley  v.  Columbus  ( 36  Mich.  38 ) , 

798. 
Stallings   v.   Lee    (123    Ala.    464; 

26  So.  211),  1779. 
Stallings  v.   State    (33   Ala.  425), 

1632. 
Stallworth  v.  State   ( 16  Tex.  App. 

345),  231,   1489,  1560. 
Stambaugh,  In  re    (31   Pa.  Super. 

Ct.   243),   542. 
Stamper  v.  Commonwealth   ([Ky.] 

103  S.  W.  286;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

707),     936,     949,     957,     1170, 

1200. 
Stancliffe  v.  Clarke   ([1852]  7  Ex. 

439),  1818. 
Standard,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Attorney- 
General    (46   N.   J.   Eq.    270), 

791. 
Standard    Life,    etc.,    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Jones    (94   Ala.    434:    10    So. 

530),     61,     62,     2032,     2189, 

2232,  2238,  2239. 
Standard,   etc.,   Ins.   Co.    v.   Laud- 
erdale   (94   Tenn.   635;    30   S. 

W.  732),  2221,  2230. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Angevine   (60 

Kan.  167;   55  Pac.  879),   123. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Commonwealth 

(119  Ky.  75;  82  S.  W.   1020; 

26  Ky.  L.  Rep.  985),  479. 
Stanford  v.  State    (16  Tex.  App. 

331),  1111. 


Stanley  v.  Monnet   (34  Kan.  708; 

9  Pac.  755),  627,  628,  648. 
Stanley    v.    State     (26    Ala.    26), 

64,    1631,    1632. 
Stanley  v.  State   (89  Miss.  63;   42 

So.    284),    1662. 
Stanley  v.  State  (43  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

270;    64    S.    W.    1051),    1167, 

1168. 
Stansfield  v.  Kunz   (62  Kan.  797; 

64  Pac.  614),  1785,  1792. 
Stanstead     v.     Beach     ([1899]     8 

Quebec  Q.  B.  276;   overruling 

8  Quebec  C.  S.  178),  631. 
Stanton  v.  James   (19  K  Z.  392), 

1153. 
Stanton  v.  Simpson   (48  Vt.  628), 

223,    224,    1840. 
Stapf  V.  State   (33  Ind.  App.  255; 

71  N.  E.  165),  1488,  1502. 
Staples   V.    State    (114    Ind.    194; 

16  N.  E.  521),   1524. 
Starace  v.  Rossi    (69  Vt.  303;   37 

Atl.   1109),   1789. 
Starbeck    v.    State    (53    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    192;     109    S.    W.    162), 

1471,  1694. 
Starke  v.  State  (49  Fla.  41;  37 

So.  850),  2038,  2068,  2082. 
Starkey  v.  Palm  (80  Neb.  393; 

114  N.  W.  287),  588. 
Starling  v.  State  (34  Tex.  App. 

295;  30  S.  W.  445),  1230, 

1231. 
Starnes  v.  State  ( 52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

403;  107  S.  W.  550),  1464, 

1471,  1691,  1696. 
Starnes  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

107  S.  W.  555),  1680,  1694. 
Starr  v.  State   (149  Ind.  592;   49 

N.  E.  591),  1740. 
Starrett     v.     Douglas     (2     Yeates 

[Pa.]   48),  2135,  2149. 
State  Bank  v.  McCoy   (69  Pa.  St. 

204;   8   Am.  Rep.  246),  2106, 

2108,   2110,   2112,   2116. 
State  Board  v.  Aberdeen  (56  Miss. 

518),   807. 


cclxxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.! 


State  Brewery  Co.  v.  Primer    (59 

111.    App.    581;    affirmed    163 

111.  652;  45  N.  E.  144),  1808. 
Ktavolo,  Appeal  of   (81  Conn.  454; 

71  Atl.  549),  667,  682. 
State    V.    (87    N.    Car. 

560),  448. 
State   V.    Abbey     (29    Vt.    60;    67 

Am.  Dec.  754),   1510. 
State  V.  Abbott    (31   N.   H.  434), 

1460,   1489,   1525. 
State    V.    Abrahams     (4    la.    541; 

6  la.   116),  390. 
State    V.    Aehert     (95    Iowa    210; 

63  N.  W.  557),  577. 
State    V.    Adams     (16    Ark.    497), 

1541. 
State   V.    Adams    ( [Del.]    65    Atl. 

510),  2038,  2068,  2069. 
State   V,    Adams    (20    Iowa    486), 

508. 
State  V.  Adams   (81  Iowa  593;   47 

N.  W.  770),  1548. 
State  V.  Adams   (44  Kan.  135;   24 

Pac.  71),  1698,  1702. 
State   V.   Adams    (6    N.   H.   532), 

1517,   1518. 
State  V.   Adams    (51   N.   H,   568), 

12,  15,  19,  25,  262. 
State   V.    Adams    (49    S.    C.    518; 

27  S.  E.  523),  1086,  1104. 
State  V.  Adamson    (14  Ind.  296), 

211,  289,  439. 
State  V.   Adler    (68   Miss.   487;    9 

So.   645),    426,   793,   802. 
State  V.  Agnew    (10  N.  J.  L.  Jr 

165),  2060,  2063,  2067,  2068 
State  V.  Ah  Chew   (16  Nev.  55) 

110. 
State  V.   Ah  Jum    (9   Mont.   167 

23  Pac.  76),  225. 
State   V.   Ah   Sam    (14    Ore.    347 

13   Pac.   303),    1655. 
State    V.    Ahern    (54    Minn.    195 

55  N.  W.  959),   1643. 
State  V.  Aiken    (42  S.  C.  222;   20 

S.  E.  221;   26  L.  R.  A.  345), 
111,   149,   150,   168,   1017. 
.State   Y.   Ainsworth    (11   Vt.   91), 

1716. 


State    V.    Alcorn    (137    Mo.     121; 

38  S.  W.  548),  2039,  2076. 
State  V.  Alderton   (50  W.  Va.  101; 

40   S.   E.   350),    1256. 
State  V.  Alexander    (73   Mo.  App. 

605),  831. 
State  V.  Allen   (12  Ind.  App.  528; 

40    N.    E.    705),    1502,    1560, 

1561. 
State    V.    Allen     (32    Iowa    491), 

1502. 
State  V.   Allen    (71   Iowa  216;    32 

N.  W.  267),  1017. 
State  V.   Allen    (63   Kan.   598;    66 

Pac.   628),    1478. 
State    V.    Alliance    (65   Xeb.    524; 

91  X.  W.  387).  662,  664.  669. 
State  V.  Allmond   (2  Houst.  [Del. J 

612),   91,    101,    110,    126,    152, 

211,   307,   313,   316. 
State  V.  Ambs    (20  Mo.  24),  215, 

216,    456,     1121,     1134,     1304, 

1308. 
State    V.    American    Express    Co. 

118  Iowa  447;   92  N.  W.  66), 

253,  256,  307,  324,  326. 
iState    V.    Amery    (12    R.    I.    64), 

121,  294,  307,  316. 
State    V.     Amor     (77    Mo.     568), 

1220,  1224. 
State    V.    Anderson    (81    Mo.    78), 

833. 
State  V.  Anderson  (3  Rich.  [S.  C.l 

172),  1649. 
State    V.    Andre     ([S.    D.]    84    N. 

W.    783),   2251. 
State   V.   Andrews    (26  Mo.    171), 

185,  495,    1457,  1637. 
State   V.   Andrews    (27    Mo.   267), 

1716. 
State    V.    Andrews     (28    Mo.    14), 

183. 
State   V.   Andrews    (11    Xeb.   523; 

10  X.  W.  410),  397,  401,  419. 
State    V.    Andrews     (82    Tex.    73; 

18   S.   W.  554),  345. 
»State   V.    Anthony    (25    Mo.    App. 

507 ) ,  845. 
State    V.    Anthony    (52    Mo.    App. 

507),   838. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cclxxxvii 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State   V.   Appergcr    (80   Mo.   173), 

1600. 
State  V.   Arbogast    (24   Mo.   363), 

1499. 
State  V.  Arie    (95  Iowa   (375;    34 

N.   W.   268),    1089,    1658. 
State  V.  Arien    (71   Iowa   216;   32 

N.  W.  267),  1739. 
State  V.  Aden    (71   Iowa  216;    33 

X.  W.  267),  1016. 
State    V.    Aries     ( [Minn.]     73    N. 

W.  403),  957. 
State    V.    Arnold     ( 98    Iowa    253 ; 

•67    N.    W.    252),    1610,    1650, 

1673,    1674. 
State    V.    Arnold    (80    S.    (".    383; 

61  S.  E.  891),  268,  955,  959, 

1465,   1528. 
State   V.    Ascher    (54    Conn.    299; 

7  Atl.  822),  1283,  1800. 
State   V.    Aslicraft    (11    Ind.   App. 

406;   39  N.  E.   199),   1519. 
State    V.     Ashley     (45     La.    Ann. 

1036 ) ,  2062. 
State    V.    Atkins     (40    Mo.    App. 

344),    1556. 
State  V.  Atkinson    (139  Ind.  426; 

39    N.    E.    51),     1121,     1122, 

1304,    1318. 
State  V.  Atkinson   (33   S.  C.   100; 

11  S.   E.  93),   844,   1452. 
State  V.   Atlantic  City    (48   N.   J. 

L.   118;   3  Atl.  65),  669,  677. 
State    V.    Auberry     (7    Mo.    304), 

1442,    1488. 
State  V.   Aulman    ( 76    Iowa   624 ; 

41    N.    W.    379),    825,    1752, 

1754. 
State   V.    Austin    ( 74    Minn.    463 ; 

77  N.  W.  301),  1609. 
State   V.   Austin    (114  N.   C.  855; 

19    S.    E.    919;    25    L.    R.    A. 

283),  462,  463. 
State    V.    Austin    Club     (89    Tex. 

20;  33  S.  W.  113;  30  L.  R.  A. 

500),  1330,  1331,  133£,  1338, 

1339. 
State  V.  Aydelott  (7  Blackf.  157), 

1443. 


State   V.    Baber    (74   Mo.  292;    41 

Am.  Rep.  314),  2247. 
State  V.  Bach    (36  Minn.  234;   30 

X.    W.    764),    500,    505,    1499, 

1643,    1739. 
State  V.  Bach  Liquor  Co.   (67  Ark. 

163;    55  S.  W.  854),   1211. 
State  V.   Back    (i»9  Mo.   App.   34; 

72  S.  W.  466),  1505,  1615. 
State    V.    Backer    (3    S.    Dak.    29; 

51  X.   W.   1088),   110. 
State   V.   Bacon    (41    Vt.   526;    98 

Am.  Dec.   616),    1747. 
State    V.     Bacon    Club     (44     Mo. 

App.  86),  1342. 
State    V.    Baden     (37    Minn.    212; 

34    X.    W.    24),     1188,    1218, 

1221,   1308,   1578. 
State   V.    Badworth    ([Minn.]    116 

X.  W.  486),  1499. 
State   V.   Baer    (37   W.   Va.   1;    16 

S.  E.  368),   1237. 
State     V.     Bahnenkamp     (88     Mo. 

App.    172),  555. 
State  V.  Bailer   (91  Minn.  186;  97 

X.  W.  670),  807. 
State    V.    Bailey     (43    Ark.    150), 

1504,    1505. 
State  V.  Bailey    (74  Kan.  873;   87 

Pac.   189),    1654. 
State  V.  Bailey  (  73  Mo.  App.  576 ) , 

833,  834.' 
State  V.  Bailey    (57   Xeb.  204;   77 

X.   W.   654),    1261,    1264. 
State   V.    Bailey    (100    X.   C.   528; 

6   S.   E.   372),   2247. 
State   V.    Bailey   63   W.    Va.   668; 

60  S.  E.  785),  1773,  1774. 
State  V.  Baker    (74   Iowa  760;   38 

X.  W.  380),  1763. 
State    V.     Baker     (71    Mo.    475), 

1367. 
State  V.  Baker   (36  Mo.  App.  38), 

885. 
State  V.  Baker   (36  Mo.  App.  63), 

885. 
State  V.  Baker   (32  Mo.  App.  98), 

183,   188,  495,  650. 


cclxxxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are   to  pages.] 


State    V.   Baker    ([Ore.]    92    Pae. 

1076;     13    L.    K.    A.    [N.    «.J 

1040),  219,  358,  401,  1724. 
State  V.   Baldwin    (109   Mo.   App. 

573;  83  S.  W.  261)),  870. 
State    V.    Baldwin    (50    Mo.    App. 

423),   1499. 
State    V.    Baldy     (17     Iowa     39), 

2247. 
State   V.    Ball    CZl    Neb.   601;    43 

N.   W.   398),   1553,    1445. 
State  V.   Ballard    (6   N.    C.    186), 

1476. 
State    V.    Ball     ( [N.    D.]     123    N. 

W.  826),   1169,  1708. 
State    V.    Ballingall    (42    la.    87), 

389. 
State  V.  Bane   ( 1  Kan.  App.  537 ; 

42  Pac.  376),   1674. 
State  V.   Barber   [(S.  D.]    101   N. 

W.   1078),  233,  249,  283,  881. 
State    V.    Barge     (82    Minn.    256; 

84  N.  W.  911),  342,  465. 
State    V.    Barker     (3    R.    1.    280), 

1513,   1533. 
State   V.   Barker    (4    Sneed.    554), 

1306. 
State  V.   Barnett    (111    Mo.    App. 

552;  86  S.  W.  460),  349,  723, 

750,    1160,    1354,    1372,    1373, 

1457,   1639,    1640,   1641,   1650. 
State   V.   Barnett    (111    Mo.   App. 

688;  86  S.  W.  572),  1374. 
State  V.  Barr    (39   Conn.  40),  70, 

1124. 
State    V.    Barr     (78    Vt.    97;     62 

Atl.    43),    281,    1491,    1652. 
State  V.  Barrels  of  Liquor   ( 47  N. 

H.    369),     1015,     1016,     1029, 

1071. 
State  V.  Barrett    (138  N.  C.  130; 

50  S.  E.  506),  129,  265,  1084. 
State  V.  Barringer  (110  N.  C.  525; 

14  S.  E.  781),   131,  210,  247, 

249. 
State  V.  Barron  (37  Vt.  57),  10, 

48,  82,  1594,  1604,  1712,  1713, 

1753. 


State   V.    Bartlett    (47   Me.    388), 

1038,    1039,    1051,   1057,   1063, 

1068,  1098. 
State  V.  Bartley    (92  Me.  422;   43 

Atl.   19),   1532,  1572. 
State  V.   Barton    (138   N.   C.  575; 

50  S.  E.  214),  1512. 
State    V.    Baskett     (52    Mo.    App. 

389),   1458,   1499. 
State   V.    Baskins    (82   Iowa    761; 

48  N.  W.  800),  1670. 
State   V.    Bass    (104   Me.   288;    71 

Atl.  894),  336. 
State  V.  Basserman  ( 54  Conn.  88 ; 

6   Atl.    185),   1348,    1349. 
State   V.    Bassett    (133    Mo.    App. 

366;    112   S.   W.  764),  892. 
State  V.  Batchellor   (66  N.  H.  145; 

20  Atl.  931),  989. 
State    V.    Bates     (96    Minn.    110; 

104  N.  W.  709),  197. 
State  V.  Bates  (62  Vt.  184;  19  Atl. 

Pxep.  229  ) ,  389. 
State  V.  Baughnian  ( 20  Iowa  497 ) , 

452,     523,     525,     1447,     1531, 

1589. 
vState  V.  Baughmer    (5  S.  D,  461; 

59  N.  W.  736),   1508. 
State  V.  Banm   (33  La.  Ann.  981), 

171,  263. 
State  V.  Bauserman  (54  Conn.  88; 

6    Atl.    185),    1559. 
State  V.  Bayne    (100  Wis.  35;    75 

X.   VV.   403),   694,   697. 
State    V.    Bayonne    (44    N.    J.    L. 

114),    566. 
State    V.   Bays    (31    Neb.    514;    48 

N.   W.   270;    31   Neb.  516;    48 

N.   W.   271),   672. 
State  V.   Beach    (147  Ind.   74;    43 

N.    E.    949),    166,    264,    268, 

1443. 
State  V.  Beam   (51  Mo.  App.  360), 

928,  934. 
State   V.   Bean    ( [N.    H.]    71    AtK 

216),    1460. 
State    V.    Bearden    (94    Mo.    App. 

134;    67    S.    W.    973),    1322, 

1323. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


cclxxxix 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State  V.  Beardsley   (43  Kan.  641; 

23  Pac.  1070),  1605. 
State  V.  Beartheol   (6  Blackf.  474; 

39  Am.  Dec.  442),   104. 
State  V.  Beasley   (21  W.  Va.  777), 

1712. 
State    V.    Beattie     (16    Mo.    App. 

131),  409. 
State   V.   Beaumier    (87   Me.   214; 

32  Atl.  881),  1647,   1656. 
State   V.    Becker    (20    Iowa    438), 

1447,    1479,    1505,    1531,   1550, 

1589. 
State  V.   Becker    (3   S.   D.   29;    51 

N.  W.  1018),  294,  1455,  1744. 
State  V.   Beech    (147    Ind.   74;    46 

N.  E.   145),   1585,   1586. 
State  V.  Behrnians    (Riley   [S.  C] 

82),    1246. 
State  V.  Bell  (29  Iowa  316),  2041, 

2077. 
State    V.    Bell     (2    Jones    [N.    C] 

337),  1190. 
State  V.  Bellow  ( 42  La.  Ann.  586 ; 

7    South    782),    2247. 
State  V.  Beloit    (74  Wis.  267;   42 

N.  W.    110),   749,    1615. 
State   V.   Benadom    (79    Iowa    90; 

44  N.  W.  218),  842,  844. 
State  V.  Beneke  (9  Iowa  203),  231, 

1511,   1525. 
State  V.  Benghmeu  ( 20  Iowa  497 ) , 

110. 
State   V.   Bengschs    (170    Mo.    81; 

70  S.  VV.  710),  199,  224,  250, 

282,  286,  294,  332,  789,   1574. 
State   V.   Benjamin    (49  Vt.   101), 

1462. 
State  V.  Bennett    (3   Harr.   [Del.] 

565),    6,    24,    25,    33,    55,    57, 

81. 
State  V.  Bennett  (128  Iowa  713; 

105  N.  W.  324),  2084. 
State  V.  Bennett  (95  Me.  197;  49 

Atl.  867),  1050,  1059,  1481, 

1531. 
State  V.  Bennett  (101  Mo.  App. 

224;  73  S.  W.  737),  676,  756, 

762. 


State   V.    Bennett    (19    Neb.    191; 

26  N.  W.  714),  201. 
State   V.   Benz    (41    Minn.   30;    42 

N.  W.  547),  1189. 
State    V.   Bergman    (0    Ore.    341), 

271. 
State  V.  Berkeley   (41  W.  Va.  455; 

23  S.  E.  608),  845. 
State    V.    Berlin    (21    S.    C.    292; 

53  Am.  Rep.  677),   132,  149, 

150. 
State  V.  Bernstein  (129  Iowa  520; 

105  S.  W.  1015),  1623. 
State  V.  Berry   (12  Iowa  58),  467. 
State  V.   Berry    (50  La.   1309;    24 

So.  329),"  1583. 
State  V.  Bertheol    (6  Blackf.  474; 

39  Am.  Dec.  442),  485,  1106, 

1109. 
State  V.  Berton    (27  Xeb.  476;   43 

N.   W.   249),    673. 
State  V.  Bertrand    (72  Miss.  516; 

17  So.  235),   1468. 
State    V.    Besheer    (69    Mo.    App. 

72),  43,  964. 
State    V.    Best     (106    N.    C.    747; 

12   S.   E.   907),   1225. 
State  V.  Best   (108  N.  C.  747;    12 

S.  E.  907),   1231,   1234,   1845. 
State  V.  Beswick    (13  R.   I.  211), 

46,  83,  267. 
State    V.    Bevans     (51    Mo.    App. 

368),  928,  930. 
State    V.    Beverly     (45    N.    J.    L. 

288),    439. 
State   V.   Biddle    (54  X.   H.   379), 

10,    11,    19,    44,    48,    51,    82, 

1753. 
State    V.    Bielby    (21    Wis.    204), 

1505,    1506,   1553. 
State    V.    Bierman     (1    Strob.    [S. 

C]    256),   1246,   1365. 
State    V.    Binder     (38    Mo.    450), 

904. 
State    V.    Bindle    (28    Iowa    512), 

8. 
State  V.  Binnard    (21  Wash.  349; 

58  Pac.  210),  1128,  1133. 


ccxc 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State    V.    Binswanger     (122    Mo. 

App.    78;     988    S.    W.     103), 

400. 
State  V.  Bird   (108  Mo.  App.  163; 

83  S.  W.  284),  870. 
State   V.   Bissell    (67    la.   616;    25 

N.  W.   831),  822,  830,  835. 
State  V.  Bixman    (162  Mo.   1;    62 

S.    W.    828),    139,    225,    331, 

789,    1382,    1383,    1384. 
State  V.  Black  ([Ark.]   Ill  S.  W. 

993),  1098. 
State    V.    Black    (9    Ind.    [N.   C] 

378),  370. 
State  V.  Blackman  ( 134  N.  C.  683  ; 

47  S.  E.  16),  1084,  1454. 
State  V.  Blackwell    (65  Me.  556), 

307,    316,    325. 
State  V.  Blair    (72   Iowa   591;    34 

N.   W.   432),   827,    828,    1026, 

1073,  1044,  1065,  1756. 
State  V.  Blaisdell  (33  N.  H.  388), 

23,  1492,  1519,  1527. 
State  V.  Bland  (121  Ind.  514),  294. 
State  V.  Blands  (101  Mo.  App. 

618;  74  S.  W.  3),  1300,  1491, 

1637. 
State  V.  Blankeney   (96  Md.  711; 

54   Atl.    614),    1453. 
State  V.  Blodgett      (50  Ore.   329; 

92  Pac.  820),   2068. 
State   V.   Blount    (48    Ark.   34;    2 

S.  W.  190),  1716. 
State   V.    Bluefield   Drug   Co.    (43 

W.   Va.    144;    27    S.   E.   350), 

839. 
State  V.  Board    (70  ,S.  C.  509;   50 

S.  E.  203),  175. 
State  V.  Board    (78  S.  C.  461;   59 

S.  E.   145),  902. 
State  V.  Board,  etc.  (45  Ind.  501), 

627,   675,  662,   1015. 
State    V.    Board     ( [Xeb.]     108    X. 

W.    122),   618,    662,    665. 
State  V.  Board  of  Corrections   (16 

Utah  478;  52  P.   1090),  2261. 
State  V.  Board    ([Wyo.l    105  Pac. 

295),  103,  105,  158. 


State  V.  Bock    (167   Ind.  559;    79 

N.    E.    493),    192,    293,    543, 

831. 
State  V.  Bodeckar   (11  Wash.  417; 

39  Pac.  645),   1508. 
State  V.  Bogan   (2  La.  Ann.  838), 

1446,    1459. 
State  V.  Boggess   (36  W.  Va.  713; 

15    S.    E.    423),    1461,    1483, 

1562. 
State  V.  Bohen  ( [DeL]  74  Atl.  1), 

1161. 
State  V.  Boice  (Cleves  [S.  C]  77), 

1515. 
State  V.  Bollenbach    ([Minn.]    108 

N.  W.  3),  958),  '687. 
State   V.    Boncher    (59   Wis.    477; 

18  X.  W.  35),  1492,  1561. 
State    V.   Bonnell     (119    Ind.   494; 

22  X.  E.  301),   179,   183,  450, 

490,  639,   649. 
State   V.      Bonner    (2   Head    135), 

1221. 
State  V.  Bonney    (30  X.  H.  206), 

1615, 
State   V.  Bonsfield    (24   Xeb.   517; 

39  N.  W.  427),  196,  662,  671. 
State  V.  Boston  Club  (45  La.  Ann. 

585;    12  So.  895;   20  L.  R.  A. 

185),   139,   1333. 
•State  V.  Bott    (31   La.  Ann.   663; 

34   Am.  Rep.   224),    124,    127, 

163,    104,    167,    168,   183,    184, 

215,   216,   217,   263,   299,  431. 
State  V.  Bougher   (3  Blackf.  307), 

1443. 
State  V.  Bowden   ([Kan.]  101  Pac. 

654),  1742,  1744. 
State  V.  Bowen  ( 1  Houst.  Cr.  Rep. 

([Del.]    91),   2085. 
State    V.    Bowen     (17    S.    C.    58). 

2034. 
State   V.    Bowen    (4    Cranch    C.   C. 

404),   2073. 
State    V.    Bowerman    ( [Mo.   App.] 

124  S.  W.  41),  1179. 
State  V.  Bowerman    (40  ^Mo.  App. 

576),  886,  893. 
State  v.  Bowers  ( 65  Mo.  App.  639 ; 

2  Mo.  App.   Rep.   1181),  839. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


ecxci 


[Referonccs    are    to    pages.] 


State  V.  Bowman    (79  Iowa  500; 

44  N.  W.  813),  1001. 
State   V.   Bowman    ([Iowa]    82   N. 

W.  493),   1003. 
State  V.   Brackett    (41   :\Iinn.   33; 

42  N.  W.  548),  549,   1189. 
State    V.    Bradford     (2    Mo.    App. 

Repr.  425;  79  Mo.  App.  346), 

1525. 
State    V.   Bradford    (79   Mo.   App. 

346;    2   Mo.   App.   Rep.   425), 

1641,  1650. 
State  V.  Bradford  (13  S.  D.  201; 

83  N.  W.  47;  80  N.  W.  143), 

1457. 
State  V.  Bradish   ( 95  Wis.  205 ;  70 

K  W.  172),  734. 
State  V.  Bradley   (96  Me.   121;   51 

Atl.    810),    1047,    1048,    1002, 

1602. 
State  V.  Bradley   (132  X.  €.  1060; 

44  S.  E.  122),  757,  1575. 
State  V.  Bradley    (10  N.   D.   157; 

86   N.   W.   354),   985. 
State  V.  Bradley  (15  S.  D.  148;  87 

N.   W.   590),    1241,   1440. 
State  V.  Bradshaw   (2  Swan  627), 

1240,   1457. 
State   V.    Brady    (41    Conn.    588), 

473,   1315,   1643. 
State  V.  Brady   (6  R.  I.  76),  1445. 
State    V.    Brady    (14    R.    I.    508), 

505,   551. 
State   V.   Brady    (10   R.   T.   51;    12 

Atl.  238),  1445,  1545,  1552. 
State  V.   Brandon    (28   Ark.   410), 

688. 
State  V.  Brattleboro   (68  Vt.  520; 

35  Atl.  472).  382,  809. 
State  V.  Braun  (96  Minn.  521;  105 

N.  W.  975),  391,  1559. 
State    V.    Brawn     ( 130    Mo.    App. 

214;    109  S.  W.  99),  890. 
State    V.    Breaux     (  [La.]     47    So. 

876),  291,   844,    1526. 
State    V.    Brennen's    Liquors     ( 25 

Conn.  278),  120,  175.  192,  2.55, 

270,  319,  1008,  1010,  1036, 

1043,  1047,  1058,  1059,  1068, 

174S. 


State  V.  Brennan   (2  S.  D,  384;  50 

X.    W.    625),    148,    149,    240, 

1455. 
State  V.  Briiinan    ([Iowa]    117   N. 

W.    279),    999. 
State   V.    Brennan    (0    Kan.    App. 

765;   50   Pac.  986),   1556. 
State  V.  Briggs   (81  Iowa  585;   A7 

X.   W.    865),    1176. 
State   V.   Brindle    (28   Iowa   512), 

965,  960,   907. 
State  V.  Brittain    (89  X.  C.  574), 

214,   270,  273,  396,  437. 
State    V.    Broeder     (90    Mo.    App. 

109),   1384,  1720,  1723. 
State  V.   Brooks    (33   Kan.   708;    7 

Pac.  591),  1491,  1739,  1743. 
State  V.  Brooks   (74  Kan.  175;   85 

Pac.  1013),  287,  1077. 
State  V.  Brooks   ( 94  Mo.  App.  57 ; 

07   S.  W.  933),  500. 
State    V.    Brosius     (39    Mo.    534), 

1189,  1037. 
State   V.   Broussard    (41    La.   Ann. 

81;   5  So.  647),  2246,  2248. 
State    V.    Brown    ([Ark.]     102    S. 

W.    394),    1168. 
State    V.    Brown     (51    Conn.    — ), 

24,    1494,    1495,    1496. 
State    V.    Brown     (19    Fla.    503), 

208. 
State    V.    Brown     (4    Iowa    349), 

1016. 
State   V.   Brown    (58   Iowa,   298), 

1746. 
State  V.  Brown   (75  Iowa  708;   39 

X.    W.    829),    1723. 
State   V.   Brown    ([Iowa]    109   X. 

W.      1011),     526,     527,     688, 

1512,  1095,  1741. 
State  V.  Brown  (41  La.  Ann.  771; 

0  So.  638),  502,  1160,  1505, 

1506. 
State  V.  Brown    (31   Me.  522),  53, 

822,    1503,    1510,    1527,    1554, 

1756. 
State  V.   Brown    (107   Minn.   175; 

119  X.  W.  657),  1098. 
State    V,    Brown     (83    Mo.    480),. 

1567. 


CCXCll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State  V.  Brown   (181  Mo.  192;   79 

S.  W.   nil),  2038,  2056. 
State    V.    Brown     (18     Mo.     App. 

620),  831. 
State  V.  Brown   (93  Mo.  App.  543; 

67  S.  W.  711),  1372,  1373. 
State    V.    Brown     ( 130    Mo.    App. 

214;  109  S.  W.  99),  1686. 
State  V.   Brown    (00   N.  H.   205), 

829. 
State   V.   Brown    (14    N.    D.    529; 

104  S.  W.  1112),  1103,  1481. 
State  V.  Brown   ([Okla.]    103  Pac. 

762),  2261. 
State  V.  Brown  (30  Vt.  560),  1445; 

1446. 
State  V.  Brown  (49  Vt.  437),  1723. 
State  V.  Bruce    (48  Iowa  530;   30 

Am.  Rep.  403),  2247. 
State  V.  Bruce    (20  W,  Va.  123), 

1483,  1484,  1485. 
State    V.    Bruder     (35    Mo.    App. 

475),   1233,   1237. 
State  V.  Brunswick    (2  N.  J.  Law 

J.  240),  467. 
State  V.  Bryant   (97  Minn.  8;   105 

X.  W.   974),    1105,    1108, 
State    V.    Bryant     (14    Mo.    340), 

513,  1372. 
State   V.    Bryon    (74   X.    C.    351), 

1583,  1633. 
State  V.  Buck  (78  Me.  193;  3  Atl. 

573),   1484,   1552. 
State  V.  Buck    (120  Mo.   479;    25 

S.  W.  573),  264,   1585. 
State  V.  Buckley    (40  Conn.  246), 

1094. 
State  V.   Buckley    (5   Har.    [Del.] 

508),   1107,   1109. 
State   V.   Buckner    (52    Ind.   278), 

1518. 
State    V.    Buckner     (20    Mo.    App. 

420),    1489. 
State  V.  Budwig    (21   Minn.  202), 

271. 
State  V.  Buechler    (10  S.  D.   156; 

72  X.  W.  114),  139,  201,  808, 

816. 
State    V.    Buford     (10    Mo.    703), 

1510,  1521. 


State  V.  Bugbee   (22  Vt.  32),  513, 

1111,    1372. 
State  V.  Bullard    (16  X.  H.   139), 

2247. 
State   V.    Bullock    (13    Ala.   413). 

2041,   2045,   2052,  2071,  2072, 

2074. 
State  V.  Bundy   (24  S.  C.  439;   58 

Am.  Rep.  *262),  2040,  2046. 
State   V.   Burchard    (4   S.  D.  548; 

57  X.  W.  491),  1502. 
State   V.      Burchfield    (149    X.    C. 

537;    63   S.  E.  89),   1620. 
State  V.  Burchinal  (4  Harr.  [Del.] 

572),  1100,  1109,  1354. 
State    V.    Burgess     (4    Ind.    606), 

1502. 
State   V.    Burgoyne    (7    Lea    173), 

182. 
State  V.  Burk   (66  Me.  127),  1051, 

154. 
State   V.    Burkett    (51    Kan.   175; 

32  Pac.  !25),  1476. 
State  V.  Burkhalter   (118  La.  657; 

43   So.   208),   1479,   1505. 
State   V.    Burks    (33    Kan.    70S;    7 

Pac.  591),   1505. 
State   V.    Burnett     (77    Mo.    570), 

1303,    1305. 
State    V.    Burns     (44    Conn.    149). 

1445. 
State   V.   Burns    (20   X.   H.    550), 

1519. 
State  V.   Burr    (10   Me.  438),   77. 
State  V.  Burrow    ( 37   Conn.  425 ) , 

1015,  1074. 
StaiC    V.    Bursaw    (74   Kan.    473; 

87   Pac.    183),    1558. 
State  V.   Burton    (138  X.  C.  575; 

50    S.    E.    214),    1469,    1650, 

1651. 
State  V    Busby   ( 44  X.  J.  L.  627 ) , 

55f. 
State  V.   Bush    ([Mo.]    118   S.   VV. 

670),  917,   1714. 
State    V.    Buskirk    (18    Ind.    App. 

629;     48    X.    E.    872),     1509, 

1520. 
State    V.    Buskirk    (20    Ind.    App. 

496;   48  X.  E.  871),   1740. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCXClll 


[References    are    to    pages  ] 


State  V.  Bussamiis   (108  Iowa  11; 

78  N.  \V.  700),  341,  972. 
State   V.   Butcher    (40   Ark.   302), 

1459. 
«tate    V.    Butler     ([Me.]     /3    Atl. 

560),  1744. 
State    V.    Butcher    (1    S.    D.    401; 

47  X.  W.  40U),  1454. 

State  V.  Cady  (47  Conn.  44),  1125, 

1304,  1320. 
State   V.   Cain    (78   S.   C.  348;    58 

N.  E.  937),  424. 
State    V.    Cain     (8    W.    Va.    720), 

1516,  1567. 
State   V.    Cain     (9    W.    Va.    559), 

1237,  1460,   1537,   1G45. 
State  V.  Cairns   (64  Kan.  782;   08 

Pac.  621),  949. 
State  V.  Caldwell    ( [Miss.]    17  So. 

372),   1505. 
State  V.  Calloway   (11  Idaho  719; 

84    Pac.    27),    91,    103,    104, 

184,    192,    289,    408,   415,    455, 

1129,   1303. 
State   V.    Calvin    (127    Iowa    632; 

103  N.  W.  968),  963. 
State    V.    Camden     (40    N.    J.    L. 

156),   170. 
State   V.    Camp    (64   Vt.    295;    24 

Atl.  1114),  1299. 
State  V.  Campbell   (76  Iowa,  122; 

40  N.  W.  100),  386,  955,  956. 
State  V.  Campbell    (214  Mo.  302; 

113    S.    W.    1081;    119    S.   W. 

494),  891,  1403,  1400,  1088. 
State  V.  Campbell   (12  R.  I.  147), 

1530. 
State  V.  Camper   (91  Md.  072;   47 

Atl.  1027),  1558. 
State  V.  Capdeville   (104  La.  501; 

29   So.   515),   426. 
Stae  V.  Capitol  Brewing  &  Ice  Co. 

([Ala.]    50   So.   312),  544. 
State  V.  Cappy  (50  Ind.  291),  133, 

247. 
State   V.    Cardozo    (5    S.    C.    297), 

100. 
State  V.  Carins   (64  Kan.  782;   68 

Pac.  621),   1218. 


State    V.    Carl    (43    Ark.   353;    51 

Am.  Rep.  565),   1280,   1281. 
State  V.  Carlyle    (33  Kan.  716;   7 

Pac.    623),    1763. 
State  V.  Carmody    (50  Ore.   1;    91 
Pac.     440,     i081),     83,     1682, 
1684. 
State   V.   Carnahan    (63   Mo.   App. 

Rep.   766),   83.3,    1650. 
State  V.  Carney  (20  Iowa  82),  110, 

183,  316,  523,  525. 
State  V.  Carpenter    (20  Ind.  219), 

1490,  1491,   1516. 
State   V.   Carron    (73   N.   H.  434; 
02  Atl.   1044),  490,  73.3,   1359, 
1742,  1707. 
State  V.  Carson    (2  Ohio  Dec.  81), 

1461. 
State   V.   Carter    (98  Mo.    176;    11 

S.    W.    624),    2041. 
State  V.  Carter    (28  S.  C.  1;   4  S. 

E.  790),  928. 
State  V.  Carter    (7   Humph.   158), 

1508. 
State   V.    Carver    (12    R.    I.   285), 

1503. 
State  V.  Carver  Co.  (60  Minn.  510; 

62  N.   W.   1135),  635. 
State  V.  Casey  (45  Me.  435),  1542. 
State    V.    Casey     (54    Me.    435), 

1550. 
State     V.      Cass     Co.      (12     Neb. 
54;    10  N.  W.  571),  637,  648, 
600. 
State  V.   Cass  Co.  Ct.    ([Mo.]    119 

S.   VV.    1010),  283. 
State  V.   Cass   County   Ct.    ( [Mo.] 
119    S.    W.    1010,    1014),    648, 
93  7 
State   V.  Cassety    (1   Rich.   L.    [S. 

C]   90),  iTll,  1504. 
State  V.  Cassidy  (22  Minn.  312;  21 

Am.   Rep.   765),    192,   277. 
State    V.    Cassity     (49    Mo.    App. 

300,  302 ) ,   1502. 
State  V.  Castello  (62  Iowa  404;  17 

X.  W.  005),  22.58. 
State  V.  Caswell   (2  Humph.  399), 

1377. 
State  V.  Cate  (58  N.  H.  241),  110. 


CCXCIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State   V.   Gather    (121    Iowa    lOG; 

96  N.  W.  722),   1736. 
State    V.    Cathey    HI    Ark.    308), 

1571. 
State    V.    Cattle     (15     Mo.     473), 

1486. 
State    V.    Caulfield    (23    La.    Ann. 

148    ([1887]),   2247. 
State   V.   Caiithorn    (40   Mo.   App. 

94),  563,  564. 
State  V.  Certain  Liquors    ( [R.  I.] 

45  Atl.  552),  1074. 
State    V.    Chamberlain     (74    Iowa 

266;  37  N.  W.  326),  220,  355, 

840,  841. 
Stat«  V.  Chambers  (93  N.  C.  600), 

1463,  1468,  1476. 
State   V.   Chambers    (2    Ohio   Dec. 

647),   1290. 
State  V.  Chambless   ( 45  Ark.  349 ) , 

1498. 
State  V.  Chamblyss  (1  Cleves  220; 

34  Am.  Dec.  593 ) ,  72,  508. 
State   V.    Chandler    (15   Vt.   425), 

1111. 
State  V.  Chapman  ( 94  Iowa  67 ;  62 

N.  W.  659),   1449. 
State  V.  Chapman  ( 1  S.  D.  414;  47 

N.  W.  411;    10  L.  R.  A.  432), 

309,  336,   1101. 
State    V.    Chapman     (25    W.    Va. 

408),  1557. 
State  V.   Charles    (16   Minn   478), 

271. 
State  V.   Charleston    (12   Rich.   L. 

702),   97. 
State   V.   Charleston,  etc.   Co.    (80 

S.  C.  116;  61  S.  E.  209),  980. 
State  V.  Charlton   (  1 1  \V.  Va.  332 ; 

27  Am.  Rep.  003),  1488. 
State  V.   Chartrand    (86   Me.   547; 

30  Atl.  10),  1057. 
State   V.   Chastain    (19    Ore.    176; 

26  Pac.  963),   513,  514,   1238, 
1372,   1373. 

State  V.   Chastain    (49  S.   C.   171; 

27  S.  E.  2),  1086. 

State  V.  Chester    (18   S.  C.  464), 
124. 


State  V.  Chester   (39  S    C.  307;   17 

S.  E.  752),  1,  185. 
State   V.   Cheyenne    (7   Wyo.   417; 

52    Pac.    975),    400,   424,    448, 

627. 
State  V.   Chico    ([S.  C]   64  S.   B. 

306),  1480. 
State  V.  Chiles    (64  Kan.  453;   67 

Pac.  884).   1549. 
State    V.    Chilton     (26    Mo.    170), 

1457. 
State  V.  Chipp  (121  Mo.  App.  556; 

97  S.  W.  236),  825,  1634. 
State  V.  ChiswoU   (36  W.  Va.  659; 

15   S.  E.   412),   1505. 
State    V.    Cliristian     ( [Mo.    App.] 

114  S.  W.  549),  1077. 
State   V.    Church    (199   Mo.    605), 

2038. 
State  V.  Church    (6   S.  D.  89;    60 

X.  V\  143).  i2,  ?3. 
State   V.    Churchill    (25   Me.   306) 

1447,  1534. 
State  V.  Cicault   (1  Daily  [X.  Y.] 

23),    1727. 
State  V.   Circuit  Court    (50  N.   J. 

L.    585;     15    Atl.    272),    18G, 

235,   237,   238,   289,   807,   868, 

893. 
State  V.  City  Council  of  Aiken  ( 42 

S.   C.    222;    20  S.   E.   221;    26 

L.   R.  A.  345),    174,   476. 
State  V.   Clark    (3   Ind.   451),  23, 

1492. 
State  V.  Clark   ([La.]  50  So.  811), 

1700. 
State   V.    Clarke    (54   Mo.    17;    14 

Am.  Rep.  471),  294,  437,  449, 

488,   490. 
State  V.  Clark   (18  Mo.  App.  531), 

1752. 
State  V.   Clarke    (8   Post.   176;    61 

Am.  Dec.  611),   165,   168,  169. 
State   V.    Clark    (28    N.    H.    176), 

432,  439,  457. 
State   V.    Clark    (15    R.   I.   383:    5 

Atl.  635).   121.   147.  294,  491, 

1194. 
State  V.  Clark   (23  Vt.  293),  1519. 
State  V.  Clark  (44  Vt.  636),  1445. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXCV 


[References   ate   to   pages.] 


State  V.  Cleary   (97  Iowa  413;   66 

N.  W.  724),   1670. 
State    V.    Clemniensen     ( 92    Minn. 

191;  99  N.  W.  640),  1540. 
State   V.   Clevenger    (25   Mo.  App. 

653),  838. 
State  V.  Clevenger    (156  Mo.   190; 

56  S.  W.  1078),  2038,  2056. 
State  V.  Clinkenbeard    ([Mo.]   115 

S.  W.    1059),   1556. 
State    V.    Clotter     (33    Ind.    409) 

1233. 
State  V.  Cloud   (6  Ala.  628),  72. 
State  V.   Cloughly    (73   Iowa   626; 

35   N.    W.    652),    11,   43,   828, 

843,  1587,  1589,  1643,  1701, 

1712. 
State  V.  Clow  (131  Mo.  App.  548; 

110  S.  W.  632),  1211,  1376. 
State  V.  Cloyd  (34  Neb.  600;  52 

X.  W.  579),  1088. 
State  V.  Cobaugh  (78  [Nle.  401;  6 

Atl.  4),  1070. 
State  V.  Cochran  ( [Ore.]  104  Pac. 

419),  121,  400,  936. 
State  V.  Coday  (69  Mo.  App.  70), 

832. 
State  V.  Coffeyville   (78  Kan.  599; 

97  Pac.  372),  418. 
State   V.    Cofield    (22    S.   C.   301), 

493,  498. 
State    V.    Cofran     (48    Mc.    364), 

1487,  1651. 
State  V.  Cohen    (65  Kan.  849;    70 

Pac.  600),  1203. 
State    V.    Cohen     (35    Md.    236), 

508. 
State  V.  Colby    (92  Iowa  463;    61 

N.    W.    187),    1280. 
State    V.    Colby     (55    N.    H.    72), 

1615,  1616. 
State    V.    Coleman     (3    Ala.     14), 

1575. 
State    V.    Coleman    (27    La.    Ann. 

691),  2041,  2051,  205G. 
State  V.  Coleman  (34  Neb.  440;  51 

N.  W.  1025),  610,  616,  617. 
State   V.    Collina    Ul    Iowa    141), 

1516,   1517. 


State  V.  Collins  (8  Kan.  App.  398; 

57  Pac.  38),  1609,  1652. 
State    V.    Collins    (48     Me.     217), 

1542,   1550. 
State  V.  Collins    (68  N.  II.  46;   36 

Atl.  550),  989,  991,  993,  994, 

1907. 
State  V.  Collins    ([Minn.]    120  N. 

W.   1081),   1739. 
State  V.  Collins   (28  R.  I.  439;   67 
Atl.     796),     171,    824,     1171, 

1374,    1376,   1589,   1655,    1660, 

1662,   1663. 
State   V.    Collins    (74    Vt.   43;    52 

Atl.   69),   976,  987,   989. 
State    V.    Colnen    (48    Iowa    567), 

1233. 
State    V.    Columbia    (6    S.    C.    8), 

793. 
State  V.   Cobi.uhia    (17  S.  C,  80), 

394,   395,   398,   400,   558,   645. 
State  V.  Colvin  (127  Iowa  632;  103 

N.  W.  968),  1697,  1698. 
State    V.    Colwell    (3    R.    I.    284), 

1451. 
State  V.  Combs  (32  Me.  529),  1722. 
State  V.  Combs    (19  Ore.  295;   24 

Pac.  235),   1759. 
State  V.  Comolli    (101  Me.  47;   63 

Atl.  326),   1048,   1050. 
State     V.     Common     Council      (41 

Minn.    211;    42   N.   W.    1058), 

746. 
State   V.   Common   Pleas,  etc.    (36 

N.  J.   L.   72),   240. 
State    V.    Commonwealth     (28    Vt. 

508),    1287. 
State   V.   Comstock    (27   Vt.   553), 

1444,  1748. 
State  V.  Conega    (121  La.  522;   46 

So.    614),    1483. 
State  V.  Conley   (22  R.  I.  397;  48 

Atl.   200),   642. 
State  V.  Conlin   (27  Vt.  318),  110, 

1744,   1748. 
State   V.   Connell    (38   N.   H.   81), 

1637. 
Stale    V.    C;mn(:iy    fC3    :^,1l\    212), 

1081,    1082,   1087. 


CCXCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


?tate.  V.  Connolly  ( 9(5  Me.  405 ;  52 

Ail.  908),  1009,   1062. 
State  V.  Connor  (30  Ohio  St.  -105), 

1447. 
State   V.   Conway    (38    Mont.    42; 

98  Pac.  654),  1444,  1724. 
State    V.    Constantine     (43    Wash. 

102;  86  Pac.  384),  1236,  1357. 
State  V.  Constantino   (76  Vt.  192; 

56  Atl.  1101),  1520. 
State  V.  Cook  (30  Kan.  82;   1  Pac. 

32),    1073. 
State    V.    Cooke     (24    Minn.    247; 

31   Am.   Rep.   344),   228,  232, 

235,    236,   240,    495,    716,    928, 

933. 
State  V.  Cool   ( [W.   Va.]   66  S.  E. 

740),  1700. 
State   V.    Cooler    (30    S.    C.    105), 

226. 
State  V.  Coonan   ( 82  Iowa  400 ;  48 

X.  W.  921),  309,  310,  327. 
State  V.  Cooper    (114  Ind.   12;    10 

X.   E.  518),    1849. 
State    V.    Cooper     (16    3Io.    551), 

1637. 
State  V.  Cooper  (35  Mo.  App.  532), 

1245. 
State  V.  Cooper    (101   N.  C.   684; 

8  S.  E.  134).  908.  920. 
State  V.  Cooper   (26  W.  Va.  338), 

1197,  1622. 
State   V.   Cooper   County    (66   Mo. 

App.  96),  600,  60L 
State   V.    Cooster    (10    Iowa    453), 

369. 
State    V.    Copland    (3    R.    I.    33), 

233,  294. 
State   V.    Copp    (34    Kan.    522;    9 

Pac.  233),  827. 
State  V.   Corcoran    (70  Minn.    12; 

72  N.  W.  732),  1523. 
State  V.  Coren  (35  Md.  236),  520. 
State  V.    Corn    (76   Kan.   416;    91 

Pac.   1067),   1679. 
State  V.  Corn76  Kan.  416;  91  Pac. 

1067),   1679. 
State   V   Cornwell    (12   Neb.    470; 

11  N.  W.  729),  799. 


State  V.  Corrick  (82  Iowa  451;  48 

N.  W.  808),  324,  327. 
State  V,  Corrivau   (93  Minn.   176; 

100   N.   W.  638),   2038,   2069. 
State  V.  Corron   ( 73  X.  H.  434 ;  62 

Atl.  1044),  103,  718,  750,  768, 

778. 
State  V.  Cosgrove  (16  R.  I.  411; 

16  Atl.  900),  1749,  1751. 
State  V.  Costa  (78  Vt.  198;  62 

Atl.  38),  969,  970,  971,  1086, 

1660,   1662.   1663,    1697,   1998, 

1706,  1710. 
State  V.  Cottle  (15  Me.  473),  1446, 

1537. 
State  V.  Cottrill    (31  W.  Va.  162; 

6  S.  E.  428),   1483. 
State  V.  Couch    (54  S.  C.  256;   32 

S.  E.  408),   1506. 
State  V.  Coulter    (40  Kan.  87;    19 

Pac.    368),    .53,     1610,     1626, 

1701. 
State  V.  County  Court,  etc.  (50  Mo. 

317),   228*,   248. 
State  V.  Courtney    (73  Iowa   019; 

35  X.  W.  685),  286,  756,  825, 

830,  831. 
State  V.  Coval   (  [W.  Va.]  66  S.  E. 

740),  1483. 
State  V.  Cowan  (29  Mo.  330),  270, 

271,  394. 
State  V.  Cox  (82  Me.  417;   19  Atl. 

857),  1479,  1551. 
State  V.  Cox    (29  Mo.  475),   1441, 

1442,  1557. 
State  V.  Cox  (23  W.  Va.  797),  837, 

839. 
State  V.   Crabtree    (27   Mo.   232), 

1305,  1308,  1310,  1567. 
State   V.    Cragg    ([Mo.    App.]    Ill 

S.  W.  856),  1566. 
State  V.  Craig  (1.32  Ind.  54;  31  X. 

E.  352 ) .  643. 
State   V.   Crawford    (9   Kan.   App. 

886;  61  Pac.  316),  1698. 
State  V.  Crawford    (28  Kan.   726; 

42  Am.  Rep.  182).  256.  977. 
State  V.  Crawley  (75  Miss.  919;  23 

So.    625),   968. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccxcvu 


r References  are   to   pages.] 


State  V.  Creden  (78  Iowa  556;  43 
N.  W.  673;   7   L.  R.  A.  295), 

111,  1021,  1070. 
State  V.  Crimmins    (31   Kan.  576; 

2  Pac.  574),  1740,  1746. 
State  V.  Cron  (23  Minn.  140),  505, 

550,   1160. 
State    V.    Cronin     (39    Tex.    171), 

1458. 
State  V.  Crooker  (95  Mo.  389;  8  S. 

W.  422),  li43. 
State  V.  Cross  (27  Mo.  332),  2041. 
State   V,   Cross    (42   W.   Va.   253; 

24  S.  E.  996),  2056,  2063. 
State   V.  Crotean    (23   Vt.   14;    54 

Am.  Dec.  90),  1609. 
State  V.   Crow    (53   Kan.   662;    37 

Pac.   170),   1643. 
State    V.    Crowell     (25    Me.    171), 

1643. 
State    V.    Crowell    (30    Me.    115), 

1492,   1527. 
State   V.   Crowley    (37    Mo.    369), 

1537. 
State  V.  Cucuel   (24  N.  J.  L.  249), 

2250. 
State  V.  Cucuel    (31  N.  J.  Law  [2 

Vroom]  249),  2247. 
State  V.  Cummins    ( 76  Iowa  333 ; 

40    N.    W.     124),     828,    840, 

1646. 
State  V.  Cummings   (17  Neb.  311; 

22  N.  W.  545),  541,  551. 
State    V.    Cunningham    (25    Conn. 

195),    264,    265,     314,      1089, 

1592,  1659. 
State   V.    Curley    (33    Iowa   359), 

1510,  1649. 
State  V.  Currie    (8  N.  D.  545:   80 

N.  W.  475),  43,  964,   1703. 
State  V.  Currier   ([N,  H.]   19  All. 

1000),  258. 
State  V.  Curtiss   (69  Conn.  86;  90 

S.  W.  1014),  1349,  1555. 
State  V.  Curtis   (8  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

506;  28  S.  W.  134),  768,  781. 
State  V.  Curtis  (130  Wis.  357;  110 

N.  W.  189),  742. 
State  V.  Curtright    ([Mo.]    114  S. 

W.  1146),  1505. 


State    V.    Cutting    (3    Ore.    260), 

1171,    1172,    1598,    1643. 
State   V.   Dahlquist    ([N.   D.]    115 

N.  W.  81),  1606,  1691,  1701. 
State  V.  D'Alemberte  ( 30  Fla.  545 ; 

11  So.  905),  429,  441,  573,  585. 
State  V.  Dalton    (101   N.  C.   680; 

8  S.  E.  154),  822. 
State    V.    Danforth    (62    Vt.    188; 

19   Atl.   229),    1175,    1299. 
State  V.  Dannenberg    ( [N.   C]   60 

S.  E.  301),  162,  433,  440,  796. 
State  V.   Darling    (77   Vt.   67;    58 

Atl.  974),  957,  1558. 
State  V.  Darlington  ( 153  Ind.  1 ;  53 

N.  E.  925),  1443. 
State  V.  Davis   (130  Ala.   148;    30 

So.  344),  292,  294,  295. 
State   V.   Davis    (9    Houst.    [Del.] 

407),  2041,  2045,  2052,  2072. 
State  V,   Davis    (44   Kan.   60;    24 

Pac.  73),  986. 
State  V.  Davis  (119  La.  247;  44  So. 

4),  652. 
State  V.  Davis  (23  Me.  403),  1115. 
State  V.  Davis    (108  Mo.  666;    18 

S.   W,   894;    32  Am.   St.  Rep. 

640;    117   Mo.   614;    23   S.   W. 

759),  268. 
State  V.  Davis  ( 126  Mo.  App.  235 ; 

102   S.   W.    1103),   1525. 
State    V.    Davis     (129    Mo.    App. 

129;   108  S.  W.  127),  838. 
State  v.  Davis  (76  Mo.  App.  586), 

831,  838,   1649. 
State  V.  Davis    (69  N.  H.  350;  41 

Atl.  267),  993,  996,  1003. 
State  V.  Davis   (109  N.  C.  780;   14 

S.  E.  55),   1476. 
State  v.   Davis    ([S.   C]   66   S.  E. 

875),  333. 
State   V.   Davis    (52   W.   Va.   224; 

43  S.  E.  99),  2068,  2082. 
State  V.  Davis  (62  W.  Va.  500;  60 

N.   E.   584).    1598. 
State  v.   Day    (37  Me.  244),  265, 

1114,   1113,   1666,   1667. 
State    v.    Dean.    (44    Iowa    648), 

1448,    1549. 


CCXCVlll 


TABLE   OP    CASES 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


State    V.    Bearing    (65    Mo.    533), 

2041,   2072. 
State   V.    Deberry    (5    Iowa    371), 

2024. 
State  V.  De  Gress    (53  Tex.  387), 

925. 
State  V.   DeKruif    (72   Iowa   488; 

34  N.  W.  007),  777. 
State    V.    Delancey     (76    N.    J.    L. 

462;   69  Atl.  958),  1504. 
State    V.    Delano     (54    Me.    501), 

452,  523,   525. 
State   V.   Dellaire    (4   X.   D.   312; 

60  N.  W.  988),  1505,  1507. 
State  V.  Delemater    (20  S.  D.  23; 

104   N.   W.   537),   1372,    1376, 

1379, 
State  V.   Demareste    (41   La.  Ann. 

413;  6  So.  654),  2248. 
State  V.  Dengolensky  (82  Mo.  44), 

32,   33,   81,   1496. 
State  V.  Dennie  (51  La.  Ann.  608; 

25    So.   394),    129<j. 
State  V.  Denoon    (31  W.  Va.  122; 

5   S.   E.   315),    1358. 
State   V.    Denton     (128    Mo.    App. 

304;     107    S.    W.    446),    667, 

677. 
State  V.  De  Paoli    (24  Wash.   71; 

63  Pac.  1102),  1462. 
State  V.  Depeder    (65  Miss.  26;   3 

So.    80),   777. 
State   V.    Devers    (38    Ark.    517), 

513,   1372,   1517. 
State    V.    Devine     ([Me.]    13    Atl. 

128),    1046. 
State  V.  Deschamp    (53  Ark.  490; 

14  S.  W.  653),  151,  157,  158. 
State  V.  Dick    (47  Minn.  475;    50 

N.  W.  362),  43,   1712. 
State    V.    Dieffenbach      (47     Iowa 

638),  1102. 
State  V.  Di  Guglielmo    ([Del.]   55 

Atl.  350).  2038. 
State  V.  Dillahunt  (3  Harr.  [Del.] 

551).  2041,  2051,  20.54. 
State  V.  Dillard   (59  W.  Va.   197; 

53    S,    E.    117),    2038,    2062, 

2068. 


I   State     V.    Dittfurth     ( [Te.x.    Civ. 

App.]  79  S.  W.  52),  357,  771, 
I  772. 

I   State  V.  Dixon   ( 104  Iowa  741 ;   74 
I  N.   W.   692),    1451,    1482. 

State   V.   Dobbins    (116   Mo.    App. 

29;    92   S.   W.    136),   887. 
State  V.  Dobbins    (149  N.  C.  465; 

62  S.  E.  645),  1089. 
State    V.    Dodge    (78    Me.    439;    6 

Atl.  875),   1542,  1548. 
State  V.  Doe    (79  Ind.  9),  788. 
State  V.   Doherty    (2  Idaho   1105; 

29  Pac.   855),   170,   187. 
State  V.  Dolan   (13  Idaho  693;   92 

Pac.  995),   164,  193,  215,  287. 
State  V.  Dolan    (122  Ind.   141;   23 

N.  E.  761),  1248,   1253,  1256, 

1564. 
State  V.  Dolan   (17  Wash.  499;  50 

Pac.  472),   1736. 
State    V.    Doniinissee    ( [Iowa]    99 

N.    W.   561),   977. 
State  V.  Donahue    (120  Iowa   154; 

94.x.  W.  503),   1269.   1512. 
State  V.  Donaldson   ( 12  S.  D.  259 ; 

81  X.  W.  299),  1449,  1538. 
State   V.    Donehey    (8    Iowa   396), 

110. 
State  V.   Donnenberg    ([X.   C]    66 

S.  E.  301),  795. 
State    V.    Donner    (21    Wis.    274), 

1501. 
State  V.  Donovan    (41   Iowa  587), 

1098. 
State  V.  Donovan    (61    Iowa   369; 

16    X.    W.    206),    2041,    2048, 

2076. 
State  V.  Donovan    (10  X.  D.  203; 

86  X.  W.  709),  977,  984,  986, 

1004,  1253,  1257. 
State  v.  Dorr  (82  Me.  212;  19  Atl. 

171),  121,  491,  1491,  1542, 

1548,   1572. 
State    v.   Doss    (70   Ark.   312;    67 

S.  W.  867),  124,   183,  180. 
State  V.  Dougherty  (2  Idaho  1105; 

29  Pac.  855),   168. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccxeix 


[Eeffrences  are  to  pages.] 


State  V,  Dougherty    ( 1   Ohio  Dec. 

37;     1    West.    Law    J.    271), 

2247. 
State  V.  Douglass    (73  Iowa  279; 

34   N.    W.    856),   830. 
State  V,  Dow    (74  Iowa    141;    37 

N.  W.  114),  1747. 
State  V.  Douglass    (75   Iowa  432; 

39  N.  W.  680),  986,  987,  999, 

1003,  1004. 
State   V.    Dougher    (49    Mo.   409), 

1559. 
State    V.    Douglass     (28    W.    Va. 

297)    2069,  2071. 
State  V.  Dow    (21  Vt.  484),   1353, 

1354. 
State  V.  Dowclell   (98  Me.  460;   57 

Atl.   846),   253. 
State  V.  Dowdy  ( 145  N.  C.  432;  58 

S.  E.   1002),  264,   1508,   1732. 
State   V.   Downer    (21    Wis.    274), 

503,  504,   1159,   1554. 
State  V.  Downs  (7  Ind.  237),  1501. 
State  V.   Downs    (116  N.  C.   1064; 

21  S.   E.    689),    1185. 

State  V.  Doyle  (11  R.  I.  574),  1502, 

1508.  ^ 
State  V.  Doyle  (15  R.  I.  527;  19 

Atl.  900),  212,  1505,  1507, 

1545. 
State   V.   Drake    (69    X.    C.    589), 

1566. 
State  V.  Drake    (83   Wis.  257;   53 

K   W.  496),   896. 
State    V.    Drischel     (26    Ind.    154, 

180),   1307,    1308. 
State  V.  Drug  Co.  ( 43  W.  Va.  144 ; 

27  S.  E.  350),  844. 
State  V.  Duane    (100  Mc.  447;   62 

Atl.  80),  1035. 
State  V.  Dudley  ( 33  Ind.  App.  640 ; 

71  N.  E.  975),  511,  514,  530, 

531. 
State  V.  Duesting   (33  :Minn.   102; 

22  N.   W.   442;    53   Am.   Rep. 
12),  1171,  1177,   1178. 

State  V.   Dugan    (52  Kan.   23;    34 
Pac.  409),   1674. 


State  V.  Dugan    (110  Mo.  138;   19 

d.    W.    195),    2.33,    875,    885, 

1466,  1468,   1687,   1688. 
State  V.  Duggan   (15  R.  I.  403;   G 

Atl.  787),  831,  1521,  1525. 
State  V.  Dunlap    (81  Me.  389;    17 

Atl.  313),  1489. 
State  V.   Dunning    (14  S.  D.  316; 

85  N.  W.  589),  501,  824,  834. 
State   V.   Dunphy    (79  Me.    104;    8 

Atl.  344),  1077,  1078. 
State  V.  Dupries   (18  Ore.  372;  23 

Pac.   255),   1223,   1224. 
State  V.  Durein   (46  Kan.  695;  27 

Pile.   148),   1002. 
State  V.  Durein    (70  Kan.   13;    78 

Pac.     152).    HI,     662,     1211, 

1583,   1652. 
State  V.  Durein    (70  Kan.   13;    80 

Pac.    987,    ailinning    78    I'ac. 

152;    70    Kan.    1),    111,    247, 

632,  662,  987,  1211,  1583,  1652. 
State   V.    Durein    (70   Kan.    1;    78 

Pac.   132;    affirmed   208  U.  S. 

613;    28   Sup.  Ct.  567;    52  L. 

Ed.),    997. 
State    V.    Durkera     (23    Mo.    App. 

387),  1353,  1358,  1361. 
State  V.   Durnam    (73   Minn.    150; 

75  N.  W.   1127),  259. 
State   V.   Dwyer    (21    Minn.   512), 

395,  397,  472,  723,  727. 
State   V.   Easton    Social   Club    (73 

Md.    97;    20   Atl.    783;    10    L. 

R.  A.  64),  1325,  1337,  1339. 
State  V.  Eaves   (106  N.  C.  752;   11 

S.   E.  370;    8   L.   R.   A.  259), 

131,    593,    1278. 
State  V.  Ebby  ( 170  Mo.  497;  71  S. 

W.  52),  199. 
State  V.  Edmunds  (  [Ore.]  104  Pac. 

430),  1443. 
State   V.   Edwards    (109   La.   236; 

33  So.   209),  259. 
State   V.   Edwards    (60   Mo.  490), 

1365. 
State   V.   Elder    (65   Ind.   282;    32 

Am.  Rep.  32),  1716,  1722. 
State  V.  Eldred  (8  Kan.  App.  625; 

56  Pac.   153),   1742. 


cce 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


State    V.    Elliott     (34    Tex.    148), 

1484. 
State  V.  Elwood   (37  Neb.  473;  55 

N.  W.   1074),  G72. 
State  V.  Ely    ( [S.   D.]    118  N.  W. 

687),  1486,  1697. 
State  V.  Emmons  ([Ore.]   104  Pac. 

282),    1444,    1466. 
State  V.  Engleman   (66  Kan.  340; 

71  Pac.  859),   1679. 
State    V.    Ensley    (10    Iowa    149), 

1747. 
State  V.  Erickson    (13  N.  D.  139; 

103   S.  W.  389),   1455. 
State  V.  Essex  Club   (53  N.  J.  L. 

99;   20  Atl.  769),   1325,  1338. 
State   V.    Essman    (112   Mo.   App. 

132;  85  S.  W.  955),  1482. 
State    V.    Estlinbaum    ([Kan.]    27 

Pac.  996),   1749. 
State  V.  Etzel    (2  Kan.  App.  673; 

43  Pac.  798),   1454. 
State  V.  Evans   (83  Mo.  319),  683. 
State  V.   Faber    (28  Neb.  803;   44 

N.  W.  1137),  1759,  1764. 
State    V.    Fagan     ([Del.]    74    Atl. 

692),  1354. 
State  V.  Fagan  (22  La.  Ann.  545), 

106. 
State  V.  Fagan   (64  N.  H.  431;   4 

Atl.   727),   1719,    1724. 
State   V.    Fahey    (5    Penn.    [Del.] 

585;  65  Atl.  260),  1241,  1242. 
State  V.  Faino  (2  llardesty  153;   1 

Marb.     [Del.]     492;     41     Atl. 

134),   2038,  2060,  2068,  2069. 
State   V.   Fail-child     ( [S.    D.]    117 

S.  W.  506),  1538. 
State   V.    Fairfield    (37   Me.   517), 

383,  1226,  1227,  1234. 
State  V.  Fairgrieve    (29  Mo.  App. 

641),  1451. 
State  V.   Falk    (51    Kan.   298;    32 

Pac.  1122),  1349. 
State  V.   Falkenlieimer    ( [La.]    49 

So.  214),  278,  388.  521. 
State   V.    Fanning    (38    Mo.    409), 

1457,   1499,   1501,   1505,    1556, 

1557. 


State  V.  Fant    (2  La.  Ann.  837), 

1446,    1459,    1554. 
State  V.  Fargo  Bottling  \Yorks  Co. 

([N.  D.]   124  N.  W.  387),  13, 

1708. 
State  V.   Farley    (87   Iowa   22;   53 

N.  W.  1089),  1581,  1670. 
State  V.  Farmer    (104  N.  C.  887; 

10  S.  E.  563),  1746,  1458. 
State   V.   Farming    (38   Mo.   410), 

1502 
State  V.  Farnum  (73  S.  C.  165;  53 

S.  E.  83),  381. 
State  V.  Farr    (34  W.  Va.  84;    11 

S.  E.  737),  1253. 
State  V.  Farrell   (22  W.  Va.  759), 

1651 
State    V.    Farrington     ( 141    N.    C. 

844;  53  S.  E.  954),  1761. 
State  V.   Faucett   (4  Dev.  &  B.  L. 

107),   1502. 
State  V.   Fawcett    (20  N.  C.  239), 

1508. 
State    V.    Fay    (44    N.    J.    L.    [15 

Vroom]'474),   397,    435,   436. 

436. 
State    V.    Feagan     (70    Mo.    App. 

406).   834. 
State  V.  Fearson  (2  Md.  310),  215, 

1303,  1308. 
State   V.    Feeney    (13   R.   I.    623), 

1623. 
State  V.   Fell    (42  Md.  7   L.),   95, 

129. 
State   V.    Felter    (51    Iowa    495;    1 

N.  ^Y.   755),   1583. 
State  V.  Fenton    (29  Neb.  348;   45 

N.    W.    464),    807. 
State   V.    Ferguson    (8   Kan.   App. 

810;   57  Pac.  555),  1653. 
State  V.   Ferguson    (72  Mo.   297), 

750,  824.   1385. 
State  V.  Ferguson    (33  N.  H.  424), 

397,  438. 
State  V.  Ferrell    (22  W.  Va.  759), 

1198. 
State  V.  Ferrell    (30  W.  Va.  363; 

5  S.  E.  155),  1505. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCCl 


[References  are  to  pag'es.] 


State  V,  Fertig   (70  Iowa  272;  30 

N.  W.  633),  1065,  1591,  1670, 

1763. 
State  V.  Fertig   (98  Iowa  139;   67 

N.  W.  87),  1309,  1371. 
State  V.  Fezzette  (103  Me.  467;  69 

Atl.  1073),  1038. 
State   V.    Field    (89    Iowa   34;    50 

N.  W.  276),  1754. 
State  V.  Field    ([Mo.]    119   S.  W. 

499),  1210,  1238,  1444. 
State   V.    Fierline    (19    Mo.    380), 

1608. 
State  V.  Finan  (10  Iowa  19),  1372, 

1374,   1554,  1560,  1623. 
State    V.    Findley     (77    Mo.    338), 

1484. 
State  V.  Finn   (38  Mo.  App.  504), 

1590. 
State  V.  Finney   (178  Mo.  385;   77 

S.  W.  992),  835. 
State  V.  Fisher   (35  Vt.  584),  383, 

384. 
State    V.    Fisher     (33    Wis.    155), 

498,  756. 
State    V.    Fiske     (63    Conn.    388), 

2075. 
State  v..  Fitzpatrick   (10  R.  I.  54; 

11  Atl.  767),  111,  119,  120, 
161,  253,  256,  270,  298,  486, 
1043,   1748. 

State  V.  Flanagan   (38  W.  Va.  53; 

17  L.  E.  792;  22  L.  R.  A.  430; 

45  Am.  St.  832),  1281. 
State   V.    Flanders    (  [La.]    49    So. 

169).  183. 
State  V.  Fleming  (112  Ala.  179;  20 

So.  846),  802. 
State  V.  Fleming  (86  Iowa  294;  53 

]Sr.  W.  234),  1632,   1670. 
State  V.  Fleming   (32  Kan.  588;   5 

Pac.   19),  842. 
State  V.  Fleming   (107  N.  C.  905; 

12  S.  E.  131),  1476. 

State   V.    Fletcher    (74   Kan.    620; 

87  Pac.  729),   1224. 
State  V.    Fletcher    (1    R.   I.    193), 

929. 
State  V.   Fletcher    (J3   R.  I.  522), 

1485. 


State   V.   Flusche    (79    Iowa    765; 

44  N.  W.  698),  827. 
State    V.    Fragiercomo     (70    Miss. 

799;   14  So.  21),  802. 
State  V.  Frahm   (109  Iowa  101;  80 

N.  W.  209),  994. 
State  V.  Frame   (39  Ohio  St.  399), 

110,  120,   147,  479. 
State  V.  Francis  (95  Mo.  44;  8  S. 

W.  1),  448. 
State  V.   Franklin    (40  Kan.   410; 

19  Pac.  801),  167. 
State  V.    Franklin   Co.    (49    Wash 

268),  94  Pac.  1086),  422,  432, 

662. 
State   V.    Frapport    (31    La.    Ann. 

340),  1299. 
State  V.  Eraser    (1  N.  D.  425 ;   48 

N.  W.  343),  321,  325,  328,  978, 

1093,   1095,   1103. 
State  V.  Fredericks   (16  Mo.  382), 

509,   691,    1267. 
State    V.    Frederickson     (101    Mc. 

37;    63    Atl.    535),    4,    13,    49, 

159,  162,  1094. 
State    V.    Freight    Tax    (15    Wall. 

232),   316. 
State  V.  Freeman   (6  Blackf.  248), 

1488. 
State  V.  Freeman    (27  Iowa  333), 

1546. 
State  V.  Freeman   (38  N.  H.  426), 

408,   457. 
State  V.  Freeman    (86  N.  C.  683), 

2035. 
State   V.    Freeman    (27    Vt.    520), 

1177,  1521,  1748. 
State  V.  French    (17  Mont.  54;    14 

Pac.   1078;    30  L.  R.  A.  415), 

788. 
State  V.  Froehlich    (118  Wis.  129; 

94  N.  W.  50;  61  L.  R.  A.  345), 

2023. 
State  V.  Fromer    ( 14  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.    289;    6   Ohio   Dec.    374), 

1402,  1502. 
State  V.  Frudie  ([N"eb.]  92  N.  W. 

320),  1729. 
State  V.  Foley  (45  N.  H.  466), 

1678. 


CCCll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pagrcs.] 


State  V.  Forcier   (65  N.  H.  42;   17 

Atl.  577),   188. 
State   V.    Ford    (76   Kan.   424;    91 

Pac.  1066),  1691,  1701. 
State  V.  Ford   (47  Mo.  App.  601), 

1505,    1507,    1521. 
State  V.  Ford  ( 6  S.  D.  228 ;  92  N. 

W.  18),  2077. 
State  V.   Foreman    (121   ]\lo.  App. 

502;  97  S.  W.  209),  861,  941, 

1687,   1688. 
State  V.   Forkner    (94   Iowa    1;    62 

N.  W.  683),  232. 
State  V.  Forman  ( 66  N.  J.  L.  397 ; 

52  Atl.  956),  1490. 
State  V.  Fort   (75  Mo.  App.  214), 

557,  559. 
State  V.  Fort  ( 107  Mo.  App.  328 ; 

81  S.  W.  476),  557,  559,  566, 

587,  645. 
State   V.    Foster    (22    R.    I.    163), 

426. 
State  V.   Foster    (3   Fost.    [N.  H.] 

348;  5  Am.  Dec.  191),  1643. 
State  V.  Fountain    ( [Del.]  69  Atl. 

926),  111,  226,  229,  234,  240, 

244,  246,  284. 
State  V.  Four  Jugs  ( 58  Vt.  240 ;  2 

Atl.  586),  17. 
State  V.  Fowler    (74  Kan.  896;   87 

Pac.   731),    1224. 
State  V.  Fox  (1  Harr.  [N.  J.]  152), 

1492. 
State  V.  Fulker    (43  Kan.  237;   22 

Pac.    1020;    7    L.   R.   A.    183), 

309,  328. 
State  V.  Fulkerson    (73  Ark.   163; 

83  S.  W.  934;  86  S.  W.  817), 

919,   1048. 
State  V.  Folks    (207  Mo.   26;    105 

S.  W.  733),  293. 
State  V.   Fuller    (33   N.   11.   259), 

316,  328,  1527. 
State  V.   Fullman    ([Del.]    74  Atl. 

1),  1220,  1664. 
State  V.  Funk  (27  Wmn.  318;  7  X. 

W.   359),   451,   503,   523,   525, 
1160. 
State    V.    Furncy     (178    Mo.    385; 

77  S.  W.  992),  833. 


State  V.  GafTeny  ( 66  Iowa  262 ;  23 

N.  W.  659),  1746. 
State  V.  Gallagher    ( 126  Mo.  App, 

729;     106    S.    W.    Ill),    1374, 

1574. 
State  V.  Gajjen   (17  Ind.  App.  524; 

45  N.   E.  678;   47  N.  E.  25), 

1716,  1720,  1721. 
State  V.  Garlock  (14  Iowa  444), 

467. 
State  V.  Garm  (50  K.  J.  L.  358)  ; 

13  Atl.  26),  436. 
State    V.    Garrand    (5    Ore.    216), 

2067. 
State  V.  Garrigan    (36  Kan.  327; 

13  Pac.  545),  1443. 
State   V.   Garvey    (11   Minn.    154), 

2041,  2067,  2073. 
State  V.  Gary   (124  Mo.  App.  175; 

101  S.  W.  614),  1233,  1630. 
State   V.   Gazette    (11   R.   I.   592), 

39. 
State  V.   Gear    (29  Minn.  221;    13 

N.  W.  140),  2082. 
State  V.  Gegner   (88  Iowa  748;  56 

N.  W.   182),  994. 
State  V.  Geise   (39  Mo.  App.  189), 

1643. 
State  V.  G<?ning  (1  McCord  [S.  C.] 

573),  1643. 
State   V.   George    (93   N.   C.   567), 

1476. 
State  V.  Gerhardt    (145  Ind.  439, 

44    N.    E.    469;    33    L.    R.   A, 

313),   94,    101,    143,    144,    164, 

166,   209,   239,   264,   268,   281, 

456,    488,    489,   496,    594,    602, 

010,   611,    612,   622,   630,   858, 

859,  800,  1315,  1728,  1840. 
State  V.  Gerhardt  ( 3  Jones  [N.  C.] 

178),  518,  539,  688,  1364. 
State  V.  German  Rifle  Club  (80  S. 

C.   126;   61  S.  E.  208),  980. 
State  V.  Gibbs  ( [Minn.]  123  N.  W. 

810),   1187,   1579,   1697,   1703, 
State  V.  Gibbs  ( [Vt.]  74  Atl.  229), 

163,  481. 
State   V.   Gibson    ([Ga.]    28   S.   E. 

487),   1311,   1321. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCClll 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State    V.    Gibson    (114    Mo.    App. 

G52;  90  S.  W.  400),  1G07. 
State  V.  Gibson  (01  Mo.  App.  768; 

1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  050),  827. 
State  V.  Giersch   (98  N.  C.  720;  4 

S.  E.  193),  905. 
State   V.   Gifford    (111    Iowa    648; 

82    N.    W,    1034),    980,    983, 

1003,  1004. 
State   V.   Gilbert    (21    S.  W.   209; 

111  S.  W.  538),  1458,  1762. 
State  V.  Gill   (89  Minn.  502;  95  N. 

W.  449),  19,  38,  431,  1185. 
State  V.  Gillilen    (51  W.  Va.  278; 

41  S.  E.  131;  57  L.  R.  A.  426), 

1158. 
State  V.  Gillispie  (03  W.  Va.  152; 

59  S.  W.  957),  963,  1612,  1700. 
State  V.  Gilman   (33  VV.  Va.   146; 

10  S.  E.  283 ;  G  L.  R.  A.  847 ) , 

126,  127,  1349. 
State  V.  Gilmore   (9  W.  Va.  041), 

1237  1483. 
State  V.  Gilmore    (80  Vt.  514;   68 

Atl.  658),   1237,  1350. 
State  V.  Giroux   (75  Kan.  695;  90 

Pac.   249),    1098,    1447,    1670, 

1676. 
State  V.  Glasgow  (Dud.  L.  [S.  C] 

40),  1111. 
State  V.   Gloucester    (50  N.   J.  L. 

585),  232. 
State    V.    Gluck     (41    Minn.    553; 

43  N.  W.  483),  1539. 
State   V.   Goff    (62   Kan.    104;    61 

Pac.   683;    reversing    10    Kan. 

App.  286;   61   Pac.  680),  997, 

1644. 
State  V.  Goff  (66  Mo.  App.  491;  70 

Mo.  App.  295),  826,  831,  832. 
State    V.    Golding     (28    Ind.    App. 

233;   62  N.  E.  502),  520,  539, 

760,  765,  780. 
State  V.  Gomes    (9  Kan.  App.  03; 

57  Pac.  262),   1053. 
State  V.  Good   (56  W.  Va.  215;  49 

S.    E.    121),    963,    1699,    1700. 
State   V.    Gordon    (10    Mo.    383), 

271. 


State    V.    Gorham    (65   Me.   270), 

262,   1572,   1639,   1732. 
State  V.  Gorman   (171  Ind.  58;  85 

N.  E.  763),  557,  559,  601,  647, 

662. 
State  V.   Gorman    (58  N.   H.   77), 

1610,   1061. 
State  V.  Goss   (59  Vt.  206;  9  Atl. 

829;    59   Am.  Rep.  706),   386, 

956,  1281,  1283. 
State   V.    Gowgill    (75    Ind.    599), 

1516. 
State  V.  Goyette    (11   R.   I.  592), 

45,  83,  85,   1592. 
State  V.  Graeter    (6  Blackf.   105), 

1477. 
State  V.  Graham   (73  Iowa  553;  35 

N.  W.  628),  1723. 
State    V.    Grames     (68    Me.    618), 

1037,  1088,  1112,  1114. 
State  V.  Grant  (97  M.  113;  49  Am. 

Rep.   218),   2258,  2259. 
State  V.  Grant   (20  S.  D.  164;  .105 

N.  W.  97),  1129,  1133,  1727. 
State  V.  Gravelin    (16   R.   I.  407; 

10  Atl.  914),  10,  12,  110,  162, 

987,   1753. 
State    V.    Graves     ( 135    Mo.    App. 

171;   115  S.  W.  1054),  957. 
State  V.   Gray    (61    Conn.   39;    22 

Atl.    675),    21,    25,    52,    150, 

195,  822,  829,  834. 
State  V.  Green    (09   Kan.  805;    77 

Pac.  95),  1103,  1198. 
State  V.   Green    (01   S.   C.   12;    39 

S.  E.  185), 1602. 
State  V.  Greenliagen   (36  Mo.  App. 

24), 1499. 
State  V.  Greenleaf    (31   Me.   517), 

1171,  1581,  1754. 
State  V.  Green  way   (92  Iowa  472; 

61  N.  W.  239),  578,  585,  977, 

1278. 
State    V.    Grear    (29    Mich.    221), 

2075. 
State  V.  Grear   (28  INIinn.  426;   10 

N.  W.  472;  41  Am.  Rep.  296), 

1583,  2008. 
State  V.  Greer  (22  W.  Va.  800), 

2249,  2252. 


ceciv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State  V.  Gregorj^    (47  Conn.  276), 

1126. 
State  V.  Gregory    (110  Iowa  624; 

82  N.  W.  335),  832,  835,  969, 

970,  1608. 
State  V.  Gregory  ( 74  Kan.  467 ;  87 

Pac.  370),  835. 
State    V.    Gregory    (27    Mo.    231), 

1556. 
State  V.  Grime    (85  Iowa  415;   52 

N.  W.  351),  993. 
State  V.   Grosman    (214  Mo.   233; 

113  S.  W.  1074),  263. 
State  V.  Groves    (121   N.   C.   632; 

28  S.  E.  403),  1281. 
State    V.    Grunald    ([La.]    49    So. 

162),  183. 
State  V.  Gruner   (25  R.  I.  129;  54 

Atl.   1058),    1084. 
State  V.  Guettler   (34  Kan.  582;  9 

Pac.  200),  1747. 
State  V.  Guinfcess    (16  R.   I.   401; 

16  Atl.  910),  6,   10,   110,   162, 

1083,   1530. 
State    V.    Guisenhouse     (20    Iowa 

227),  1589. 
State  V.  Gulley    (41   Ore.  318;    70 

Pac.   385),  359,   1237,   1239. 
State  V.   Cumber    (37   Wis.   298), 

1544. 
State  V.  Glimmer    (22   Wis.   441), 

1505. 
State  V.  Gurlagh   (76  Iowa  141;  40 

N.  W.   141),   1715. 
State  V.   Gurlock    (14   Iowa  444), 

402. 
State    V.    Gurney     (33    :Me.    527), 

1044,  1079. 
State    V.    Gurney     (37    :\re.    149), 

1527. 
State  T.  Gurney    (37  Me.   156;    58 

Am.  Dec.  156),  91. 
State  V.  Gut  (13  Minn.  341),  2002, 

2071. 
State  V.  Gutekunst   (24  Kan.  252), 

1257. 
State  V.  Guthrie   (90  Mo.  448;   38 

Atl.  368),  1059. 
State  V.  Earles   (84  Ark.  479;   lOG 

S.  W.  941),  954. 


State  V.   Eastbrook    (6  Ala.  653), 

448,  449. 
State   V.   Eaton    (97   Me.   289;    54 

Atl.  723),  1185. 
State  V.  Eby    (170  Mo.  71   S.  W. 

52),  2261. 
State  V.  Eckert  (74  Minn.  463;  77 

N.  W.  294),  1133. 
State  V.   Edlavitch    (77   Md.   144; 

26  Atl.  406),  1459. 
State  V.  Edmunds  (  [Ore.]  104  Pac. 

430),  909,  911,  913. 
State    V.    Edwards     ( 47    La.    Ann. 

688;   17  So.  246),  1278 
State   V.    Edwards    (00   Mo.   420), 

1626,  1643. 
State   V.   Edwards    (71   Mo.    324), 

2041. 
State  V.  Edwards   (134  N.  C.  636; 

46  S.  E.  766),  1158,  1178. 
State  V.  Edwards    (109  Lea,  236; 

37   So.  209),  262. 
State    V.    Effinger     (44     Mo.     81), 

1496,  1567. 
State   V.    Eighteen    Casks    of    Beer 

([Okla.]    104  Pac.  1093),  329, 

330. 
State  V.  Ekanger   ( 8  N.  D.  559 ;  80 

N.  W.  482),  1090. 
State  V.  Elad    (8  Kan.  App.  625; 

56  Pac.   153),  1003. 
State  V.  Elder    (54  Me.  381),  524. 
State  V.  Elliott    (45  Kan.  525;   26 

Pac.    55),    829,     1613,     1647, 

1650,   1G53. 
State    V.    Ellison     (14    Ind.    380), 

1019. 
State  V.  Ely    ( [S.  D.]    118  N.  W. 

687),  9.57,  1163. 
State   V.   Emerick    (35  Ark.   324), 

1514. 
State    V.    Emerick    (35    Ind.    324), 

1563. 
State  V.  Emery    (98  N.  C.  768;   3 

S.  E.  810)",  908,  920,  928,  1589, 

1644,   1646. 
State  V.  Emmons   ([Ore.]   104  Pac. 

883).   1184. 
State  V.  Engborg  (63  Kan.  853;  66 

P.  1007),  825. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CCCV 


[References  are  to  pares.] 


State  V.   English    (78  N.  H.  328; 

68  Atl.  129),  760,  1180. 
State  V.  Erb    (74  Mo.   199),  2054. 
State  V.  Erickson    (14  N.  D.  139; 

103   N.   W.   389),   1547. 
iState    V.    Erskine    (66    Me,    358), 

1050. 
State  V.  Esterbrook    (6  Ala.  653), 

521. 
iState     V.     Estabrook      ( 29     Kan. 

739),  777,  784. 
State  V.  Eskridge    (1   Swan.  413), 

1306,  1566. 
State   V.    Essman    (112    Mo.   App. 

132;  85  S.  W.  955),  1489. 
State  V.  Estop    (66   Kan.  416;    71 

Pac.  857),  979. 
State  V.  Evans  (83  Mo.  319),  1638. 
State  V.  Evans  (5  Jones  L.  [N.  C] 

250),    1645. 
State    V.    Evans     (3    Hill    [S.    C] 

190),  1246. 
State  V.   Haab    (105   La.   230;    29 

So.  725),  2039,  2045,  2058. 
State  V.  Haden  ( 15  Mo.  447  ) ,  1522. 
State   V.    Hadloek    (43    Me.    282), 

1542. 
State   V,  Hafsoos    (1    S.   D.    382; 

47    N.    W.    400),    1158,    1489, 

1490. 
State  V.  Haines    ([Mo.   App.]    107 

S.   W.  36),   1685. 
State  V.  Haines    (35   N.  H.   207), 

1369. 
State  V.  Haines    (35  Ore.  379;   58 

Pac.  39),  354,  410,  1158,  1739. 
State  V.  Hale    (72  Mo.  App.   78), 

834,  1524,  1637. 
State  V.   Hale    (91   Iowa   367;    59 

N.  W.  281),  1084,   1754. 
State  V.  Haley  (52  Vt.  476),  1655. 
State  V.  Hall    (78  Me.  37;   2  Atl. 

546),    1058. 
State  V.  Hall   (79  Me.  501;  11  Atl. 

181),  1551,  1719. 
State  V.  Hall    (81  Me.  34;   16  Atl. 

329),  1062. 
State  V.  Hall    (39  Me.   107),   822, 

1163. 


State  V.  Hall    (130  Mo.  App.  170; 

108  S.  W.  1077),  959,  1466. 
State   V.    Hall    (2    Bailey    [S.   €.] 

151),  557,  590,  1509. 
State   V.   Hall    (26    W.   Va.   236), 

1455. 
State  V.  Halter   (149  Ind.  292;  47 

N.  E.  665),  1740. 
State  V.   HaltzschuUerr    (72  Iowa 

541;   34  N.  VV.  323),  841. 
State  V.  Ham    (64  N.  J.  L.  49;   44 

Atl.  846),  1714. 
State  V.  Hambright   (33  Mo.  394), 

531. 
State  V.  Hamby   ([N.  C]  35  S.  E. 

614),  382. 
State  V.  Hamil  ( 127  Mo.  App.  661 ; 

106  S.  W.   1103),  829. 
State  V.  Hamilton    (75  Ind.  238), 

1223,  1560. 
State  V.  Hamilton   (78  Vt.  467;  63 

Atl.  7),  159. 
State  V.   Hammaek    (93  Mo.   App. 

521),  839,  1371. 
State   V.   Hammel    (134   Wis.    61; 

114  N.  W.  97),  735. 
State  V.  Hampton   (77  N.  C.  526), 

247,  692,   1278. 
State  V.  Hanaphy    (117   Iowa   15; 

90  N.  W.  60i),  335. 
State    V.    Hand     (1    Marv.    [Del.] 

545;  41  Atl.  192),  2038,  2051. 
State  V.  Handler   (178  Mo.  38;  76 

S.  W.  984),  233,  1512,  1178. 
State  V.  Hanlan   (24  Neb.  608;  39 

N.    W.    780),    600,    616,-    617, 

637. 
State   V.   Hanley    (25   Minn.  429), 

1466,  1469. 
State  V.  Hannan     (53    Ind.    335), 

1491,  1561. 
State    V.    Hannons     (59    W.    Va. 

475;  53  S.  E.  630),  1225. 
State  V.  Hansen   (25  Ore.  391;  35 

Pac.  976;   36  Pac.  296),  2070, 

2071. 
State   V.   Hanson    (16   N.   D.   347; 

113  N.  W.  371),  103,  220. 
State    V.    Harley     (54    Me.    562), 

264. 


CCCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


fReferenoes  are  to  pages.] 


State  V.  Harden   (62  W.  Va.  313; 

58  S.  E.  715;   60  N.  E.  394), 

170,  197,  559. 
State    V.    Hardy     (7    Neb.    377), 

140,   187,  479,   651,   788. 
State    V.    Harlow     (21    Mo.    446), 

2040. 
State   V.   Harp    (31    Kan.    496;    3 

Pac.  432),  1484. 
State  V.  Harp    (210  Mo.  254;    109 

S.  VV.  578),  111,234. 
State  V.  Harper  (42  La.  Ann.  312; 

7  So.  446),  140,  167,  397.  402, 

432. 
State    V.    Harper     (58    Mo.    530), 

448,  449,  522. 
State  V.  Harper    (99  Tex.   19;    86 

S.  W.  920 ;  reversing  85  S.  W. 

294),  760,  761. 
State  V.  Harper   (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

87  S.  W.  878).  757,  764,  765. 
State  V.  Harrigan   (9  Houst.  369; 

31    Atl.    1052),     2041,     2051, 

2054,  2247. 
State    V.    Harrington     (69    N.    H. 

496;   45  Atl.  404),  996,   1086, 

1098,   1701. 
State    V.    Harrington     ( 12    Eich., 

2G3),    1246. 
State    V.    Harris    (27    Iowa    429), 

1670,   1677. 
State    V.   Harris    (36    Iowa    136), 

1013,   1044. 
State   V.    Harris    (38    Iowa    242), 

1028,  1777. 
State  V.  Harris   (64  Iowa  287;  20 

N.  W.  439),  831,   1092. 
State  V.  Harris  ( 100  Iowa  188;  69 

N.  W.  413),  2077. 
State  V.  Harris   (122  Iowa  78;   97 

N.    W.    1003),    840. 
State  V.  Harris   (50  Minn.  128;  52 

N.  W.  387 ) ,  440. 
State  V.  Harris  (47  IMo.  App.  558), 

1502,    1504,    1524. 
State    V.    Harris    (2    Snord.    224), 

1508. 
State   V.   Harris    ( [S.   D.]    115   K 

W.  533),  898. 


State  V.  Harrison    (162  Ind.  542; 

70  N.   E.  877),  343,  643. 
State    V.    Hart     (29    Iowa    268), 

2041,  2078,  2080. 
State  V.  Hart  (84  Iowa  215;  50  N. 

W.  981),  1097,  1658. 
State   V.   Hartfield    (24   Wis.   61), 

1238. 
State  V.  Hartwick  (49  Conn.  101), 

1659. 
State    V.    Harvey     (11     Tex.    Civ. 

App.    691;     33     S.    W.    885), 

933. 
State    V.    Hass     (22     Iowa     193), 

1546. 
State   V.    Hassett    ( [Vt.]    23    Atl. 

584),  1600. 
State  V.  Haugh   (123  N.  W.  251), 

358. 
State   V.  Hauley    (25   Minn.  429), 

934. 
State  V.  Hawkins   (91  N.  C.  626), 

370. 
State    V.    Hawley     ([Me.]    9    Atl. 

620),    1045. 
State  V.  Haworth    (122  Ind.   462; 

23  N.   E.  946),   106. 

State  V.  Haworth    (70  Iowa,   157; 

30  N.  W.  389),   1452. 
State  V.  Hayes    (67   Iowa,  27;   24 

N.  W.  574),   1356,   1359. 
State    V.    Hayes     (38    Mo.    367), 

1383,    1537. 
State  V.  Haymond  (20  W.  Va.  18; 

43  Am.  Rep.  787),  18,  24,  51, 

55,  86,  971. 
State    V.    Haynes     (35    Vt.    570), 

1719,  1765.  1766. 
State  V.  Haynie    (118  N.  C.   1270; 

24  S.  E.  536),  382. 

State  V.  Hays  (36  Mo.  80),  1623. 
State  V.  Hays  (49  Mo.  607),  106. 
State   V.   Hazell    (100   N.   C.   471; 

6   S.  E.  404),  523,  525,   1268, 

1497,   1499. 
State    V.    Hazleton     (78    Vt.    567; 

63  Atl.  305),   158,   1491. 
State  V.  Head   (3  R.  I.  135),  1081, 

1082,  1091. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCCVll 


[Ueforences  are  to  pages.] 


State   V.   Heard    (107    La.   60;    31 
So.    384),    1323,     1486,     1623, 
1720,   1723. 
State  V.   Heaton    (81   N.   C.   542), 

1476. 
State    V.    Heck     (23    Minn.    549), 

1253,   1255,   1461,   1492. 
State    V.    Heckler    (81    Mo.    417), 

1761. 
State  V.  Heege   (37  Mo.  App.  338), 

564,  585,  674,  676. 
State  V.  Heibel   (116  Mo.  App.  43; 

90  S.  W.  758),  1443.  1505. 
State  V.  Heibel   (54  Ohio  St.  321; 

43  N.  E.  328),  1119,  1128. 
State  V.  Heinemann   (80  Wis.  253; 

49    N.    VV.    818;    27    Am.    St. 

34),   188. 
State    V.    Heinze     (45    Mo.    App. 

403),  43,   650. 
State  V.   Heitsch    (29   Minn.    134; 

12  N.  W.  353),  1457. 
State    V.    Heldt     (41     Tex.    220), 

1505,  1554,  1555. 
State  V.   Hellnian    (56   Conn.   190; 

14  Atl.  806),  1315. 
State  V.  Helms    (136  Ind.   122;   35 

N.  E.  893),  1740. 
State  V.  Henderson   (52  S.  C.  470 

30  S.  E.  477),  1091,  1705. 
State    V.    Hendrix     (98    Mo.    374 

11  S.  W.  728),  832,  836. 
State    V.    Hensley     (94    Mo.    App 

151;   67  S.  W.  964),  832,  834 
State  V.  Herd    (1  Mo.  App.  Eep'r 

343),  1556. 
State    V.   Jenkins    (32    Kan.    477 

425),    12,    24,    561,    576,    648 
State    V.    Herod     (29    Iowa    123) 

411,  483. 
State  V.  Herring   (145  N.  C.  418 

58   S.  E.    1007),   165,  951. 
State  V.  Hcrtzog    (55  W.  Va.  74 

46  S.  E.   792),  2068. 
iState    V.    Hesner     (55    Iowa,    594 

8  N.  W.  329),  1713. 
State    V.    Hibner    (115    Iowa,    48 

87   N.   W.  741),   995. 
State  V.  Hickerson  (3  Heisk.  375), 

1505. 


State    V,   Hickerson    ( [Mo.    App.] 

109   S.  W.   108),  934,  939. 
State  V.   Hickman    (54  Kan.   225; 

38   Pac.    256),    1712. 
State    V.    Hickok     (90    Wis.    161; 

62  N.  W.  934 ) ,  1483. 
State    V.    Hicko.x    (64    Kan.    650; 

68  Pac.  35),  335. 
State   V.   Hicks    (101    N.   C.    747; 

7  S.  E.  707),  362,  1760,  1762. 
State    V.    Higgins     (71    Mo.    App. 

180),  576. 
State    V.    Higgins     (84    Mo.    App. 

531),  618,  624,  646,  648. 
State   V.   Higgins    (13   R.    I.   330; 

43    Am.    Rep.    26),    264,    265, 

1643. 
State    V.    Higgins     (53    Vt.    193), 

1504,  1508,  1555. 
State   V.    Hill    (46    La.    Ann.    27; 

14  So.  294),  2068,  2082. 
State  V.   Hill    (52   N.   J.   L.    326; 

19    Atl.    789),   53J,   538,   622. 
State  V.  Hilliard    (10  X.  D.  436; 

87  N.  W.  980),  1267. 
State  V.  Hines   (13  R.  I.  10),  1501, 

1504,   1519. 
State  V.  Hipp   (38  Ohio  St.   199), 

120,  147,  479,  483. 
State    V.    Hirscli     (125    Ind.    207; 

24   N.    E.    1062;    9    L.    R.    A. 

170),  1304,  1320. 
State  V.  Hitchcock  ( 124  Mo.  App. 

101;  101  S.  W.  117),  857, 

874,  916,  1466,  1471,  1685. 
State  V.  Hitchcock   (68  N.  H.  244; 

•w  Atl.  296),  r:;3,  1664. 
State    V.    Hix     (3    Dev.     [N.    C] 

116),  370. 
State     V.    Hoard     (123     Ind.    34; 

23    N.    E.    972),    1109,    1541, 

1545. 
State  V.  Hoagland   (77  Iowa,  135; 

41   X.   W.   595),  827,   831. 
State    V.    Hodgson     (66    Vt.    134; 

28   Atl.    1089),   148,    149.   153, 

193,    259,    260.    261,    1169. 
State    V.    Hogan     (67    Conn.    581; 

35    Atl.   508),    1728. 


cccvm 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State    V.    Hogan     (117    La.    863; 

42  So.  352),  1583,  2038,  2068. 

State   V.  Hogan    (30   X.   H.   2G8), 

1268,  1296. 
State  V.  Hogrewer   (152  Ind.  652), 

215. 
State  V.   Holder    (133   N.  C.   709; 

45   S.   E.   862),   1516,   1517. 
State   V.   Holleyman    ( [S.    C]    31 

S.  E.  362),  174,  327,  381. 
State    V.    Holleyman    ([S.   €.]    33 
S.  E.  366;   45  L.  R.  A.  567), 
323. 
State  V.  Hollin  (12  La.  Ann.  677), 

1741. 
State  V.  Hollingsworth  ( 100  N.  €. 
535;    6   S.  E.  417),   931,  933, 
1739. 
State  V.  Holmes    (38  N.  H.  225), 

182,   492. 
State  V.  Holt    (65  Minn.  423;    72 

N.  Y.  700),  957. 
State    V.    Holt    Co.    Ct.     (39    Mo. 

521),    627. 
State  V.  Hooker    ([Okla.]   98  Pac. 

964),   110,   122,  291,   1037. 
State   V.    Hopkins    (94    Iowa,   86; 

62  X.  VV.  656),  1453. 
State    V.    Hopkins    (5    R.    I.    53), 

1442. 
State   V.   Hopkirk    (84    Mo.   278), 

1584. 
State    V.    Horacek    (41    Kan.    87; 
21  Pac.  204;  3  L.  R.  A.  687), 
1339,   1342. 
State    V.    Horan     (25    Tex.    Supp. 

371),  1516. 
State  V.  Hornbeak    (15  Mo.  478), 

1519. 
State    V.    Horner     (9    Kan.    119), 

2041. 
State  V.  Horton    (21    Ore.    83;    27 

Pac.   165),  722,   734. 
State  V.  Hough  (  [Wis.]  123  N.  W. 

251),  3.58. 
State    V.    Houts     (36    Mo.    265), 
7,    8,    11.    13,    84,    1285,    1469, 
1495,  1505. 
State  V.  Hovey    (118  Ind.  350;   21 
N.  E.  244),  1014. 


State    V.    Howard     (91    Me.    396; 

40  Atl.   65),  1661,  1732. 
State  V.  Howard  Co.  Ct.    (90  Mo. 

593;   2  S.  W.  788),  583. 
State  V.  Howarth    (70  Iowa,   157; 

30  N.  W.  389),  1546. 
State  V.  Howe    (95   Wis.  530;    70 

X.   W.    670),    796. 
State    V.    Howloy     (65    Me.    100), 

1063,  1078. 
State   V.   Hoxsie    (15   R.   L    1;    22 

Atl.    1059;    2    Am.    St.    838), 

1101,  1102,  1372,  1375,  1580, 

1643,  1644,  1659,  1672. 
State  V.  Hubbard  (60  Iowa,  466; 

15  X.  W.  287),  1247. 

State    V.    Hudson    (78    Mo.    302), 

139,   198,  427,   787,   788. 
State    V.    Hudson     (11    Mo.    App. 

590),  432. 
State    V.    Hudson     ( 13    Mo.    App. 

61),   635,   648. 
State  V.  Huff    (76   Iowa,   200;    40 

X.    W.    720),    828,    835,    996, 

1647,   1752,   1763. 
State  V.  Huffman    (51   Kan.  541; 

33  Pac.  377),  1454. 

State  V.  Huffschmidt  (47  Mo.  73), 

215,    1305. 
State  V.  Hughes  ( 3  Kan.  App.  95 ; 

45  Pac.  84),  1097,  1609,  1658. 
State    V.    Hughes    (24    Mo.    147), 

497,  500,  509,  691,  1267. 
State    V.    Hughes     (35    Mo.    App. 

515),  1385. 
State    V.    Hughes    (16    R.    I.    403; 

16  Atl.   911),  961,  978,   1104, 
1697,    1702,    1708,    1709. 

State  V.  Hughes   (22  W.  Va.  753), 

1280,   1281. 
State  V.   Humber    (72   Iowa,   767; 

34  X.  W.  829),  777. 

State   V.    Hundley    (46   Mo.   414), 

2041,  2045,  2051,  2053. 
State    V.    Hunt     (29     Kan.     762), 

511,  1371,  1459. 
State  V.  Hunter    (8   Blackf.   212), 

1443. 
State    V.    Hunter     (77    Kan.    850; 

92    Pac.   603),    983,   996,   997. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCIX 


[References  are  to  pages.! 


State  V.  Hunter    (106   N.  C.   796; 

11    iS.    E.    306;     8    L.    R.    A. 

529),  2034. 
State    V,    Huntley     (29    Mo.    App. 

278),  504,  505,   1160. 
State    V.    Hurley     ( 1     Houst.    Cr. 

Cas.    [Del.]'  28),    2041,   2051, 

2060,  2061. 
State    V.    Hurley     (54    Me.    562), 

265,   1585. 
State  V.   Hutchins    (74   Iowa,  20; 

36  N.  W.  775),   1175. 
State    V.    Hutchinson     ( 72    Iowa, 

561;  34  N.  W.  421),  50,  968. 
State  V.  Hutchinson    (56  Ohio  St. 

82;   46  N.  E.  71),  1384. 
State    V.    Hutton     (39    Mo.    App. 

410),    885,    932,    1465,    1468, 

1687,  1688. 
State   V.    Hutzell     (53    Intl.    160), 

1444. 
State  V.   Huxford    (47   Iowa,    16), 

1736. 
State    V.    Hyde     (27    Minn.     153; 

6  N.  W.  555),  1245,  1562. 
State    V.    Hynes     (66    Me.     114), 

1113,  1667. 
State  V,  Ilgner  &  Co.  ( [Kan.]   105 

Pac.  14),  1003. 
State  V.  Illsley   (81   Iowa,  49;   46 

X.  W.  977),  1065,  1096,  1656, 

1070. 
State   V.   Ingalls    (59    N.   H.    88), 

1486. 
State  V.   IngersoU    (17   Wis.  031), 

929. 
State    V.   Ingram    (118    Mo.    App. 

323;  94  S.  W.  790),  1108. 
State  V.  Innes  (53  :\Ie.  530),  1722. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (40 

Iowa,   95),    1016. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (64 

Iowa,    300;    20    K    W.    445), 

1013,  1037. 
State  V,  Intoxicating  Liquors   (76 

la.  243;   41  S.  W.  6;   2  L.  R. 

A.   418),   7,   10,   902. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors   ( 92 

Iowa,    762;     60    X.    W.    030), 

1065. 


State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors   (109 

Iowa,    145;    80    X.    W.    230), 

1064,   1070,    1072. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (50 

Me.    506),    1021,    1009. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (61 

Me.    520),    1071. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (63 

Me.  121),  1045,  1070. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (68 

Me.   187),   1021,   1029. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (09 

Me.  524),  1071. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (80 

Me.    57;     12    Atl.    794),    208, 

1010,   1113,   1115. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (80 

Me.    91;     13    A.    403),    1016, 

1018. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (82 

Me.   558;    19    Atl.    913),    154, 

307,  313,  310. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    ( 85 

Me.  304;   27   Atl.   178K   1005. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (96 

Me.   415;    52    Atl.    911),    324. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (98 

Me.   404;    57    Atl.    798),   250, 

1022. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors  (101 

Me.     101,    430;     53    Atl.    000, 

812),  307,  324,  325,  326,  10:12. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors   ( 102 

Me.    206;    66    Atl.    393),    307, 

324,  325,  326. 
State      V.      Intoxicating      Liquors 

([Me.]     71    Atl.    759),    1383, 

1389,   1390. 
State      V.      Intoxicating      Liquors 

([Vt.]     73    Atl.    580),     1034, 

1068,  1071,  1662,  1748. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (38 

Yt.    387).     1035,    1040,    1042. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    ( 44 

Vt.    208),    1033,    1040,     1182, 

1729. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors    (58 

Vt.  594;  4  Atl.  902),  91,  111, 

1072,  1073,  1075,  1077. 


cccx 


TABLE  OP  CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State    V.    Irvine    (3    Heisk.    155), 

1446,  1568. 
State  V.  Isabel   (40  La.  Ann.  340), 

183,    185,    22a,    488,    494. 
State    V.     Jabbour     (72    Vt.    22; 

47     Atl.     107),     1016,     1068, 

1071. 
State    V.    Jackson     (68    Ind.    58), 

660. 
State   V.   Jackson.    (105    La.    436; 

29   So.  870),  941. 
State    V.    Jackson     (72    Mo.    App. 

59),    1756. 
State    V.    Ja-cobs     (133    Mo.    App. 

182;   113  S.  W.  244),  1662. 
State    V.    Jaeger     (63    Mo.    403), 

540. 
State   V.   Jamison    (23    Mo.    330), 

504,    1159. 
State  V.  Janesville    (90  Wis.   157; 

62    N.   W.    933),    797,    898. 
State    V.    Jangravv     (61    Vt.    39; 

17   Atl.   733),    1723. 
State    V.    Jaques     (68    Mo.    200), 

1505,   1524,  1555. 
State    V.    Jarvis     (67    Minn.     10; 

69  N.  W.  474).   1512. 
State  V.   Jeffcoat    (54    S.   C.    196; 

32  S.  E.  298),  1506. 
State  V.  Jefferson  County  ( 20  Fla. 

425),  12,  24,  561,  576,  648. 
State  V.  Jenkins   (32  Kan.  477;  4 

Pac.  809),  10,  41,  43,84,  1707, 

1710. 
State  V.  Jenkins  (64  X.  H.  375: 

10  Atl.  699),  1495,  1496. 
State  V.  Jenkins  (116  X.  C.  972; 

20  S.  E.  1021),  2252. 
State  V.  Jennings  (27  Ark.  419), 

393. 
State  V.  Jennings  (79  S.  C.  246; 

60  S.  E.  699 ) ,  909. 
State  V.  Jepson  (76  Kan.  644; 

92  Pac.  600,  603),  983,  991, 

996,   997. 
State  V.  Jersey  City    (54  N.  J.  L. 

437;    24  Atl.   571),  567. 
State    V.     Jocks     (54    Ind.    412), 
1499,   1501. 


State    V.    John     (8    Ired.    L.    330; 

49  Am.  Dec.  396),  2039. 
State  V.  Jolinny   ( 29  Nev.  203 ;   87 

Pac.    83),    2038,    2068,    2069, 

2085. 
State  V.  Johns   ([Iowa]  118  N.  W. 

295),  980,   996,   1333,   1662. 
State  V.  Johnson    (40  Conn.  136), 

2061,  2062,  2066,  2067. 
State  V.  Johnson   (41   Conn.  584), 

2041,  2060,  2063,  2067. 
State   V.   Johnson    (61    Iowa,   504; 

16  X.  W.  534),  1101. 
State  V.   Johnson    (92   Iowa,   768; 

61  X.  W.  195),  1658. 
State   V.   Johnson    (93   Iowa,   708; 

61  X.  W.  195),  1097. 
State  V.  Johnson    (74  Minn.  381; 

77  X'.  W.  293),  1156. 
State  V.  Jolmson    (86  Minn.   121; 

90    X.     W.     161),    234,    251, 

1205,  1409. 
State  V.  Johnson  (17  Mo.  App. 

150),  831. 
State  V.  Johnson  (37  Xeb.  302; 

55  X.  W.  874),  735. 
State  V.  Johnson  (33  X.  H.  441), 

552,  1170. 
State  Y.  Johnson  (3  R.  I.  94), 

1110,  1513,  1533. 
State  V.  Johnson  ( [S.  D.]  121 

X.  W.  785),  357,  358. 
State  V.  Johnson  (62  W.  Va.  154; 

57  S.  E.  371;  11  L.  R.  A. 

[X.  S.]  872),  1218,  1558. 
State  V.  Johnston  (139  X.  C.  640; 

52  S.  E.  273),  1285. 
State  V.  Jones  (3  Ind.  App.  121; 

28  X.  E.  717),  32,  80,  1496, 

1501. 
State  V.  Jones  (88  Minn.  27;  92 

X.  W.  408),  551,  1175. 
State  V.  Jones   (73  Mo.  App. 

525).  1201. 
State  V.  Jones  (7  Xev.  408),  2247, 

2251. 
State  V.  Jones  (39  Vt.  370),  1175. 
State  V.  Jordan  (72  Iowa.  377; 

34  X.  W.  285),  111,  119,  148, 

153,  254,  258,  1101. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXl 


[References    are    to    pag-es.] 


State    V.    Jordan     (87    Mo.    App. 

466),  1370. 
State    V.    Jordan     (87    Mo.    App. 

420),   825. 
State   V.   Joyner    (81    X.  C.   534), 

110,    247,    1521. 
State  V.  Judge  (39  La.  Ann.  132), 

215. 
State    V.    Justices     (15    Ga.    408), 

627. 
State  V.  Kalb  (14  Ind.  403),  1240, 

1460,  1628. 
State    V.    Kale    (124    X.    C.    81G; 
32    S.    E.    892),    2039,    20(i2, 
•2078. 
State  V.  Kaler   (56  Me.  88),  1081, 

1083. 
State  V.  Kampman    (81   Mo.  App. 

205),  834. 

State   V.   Kane    (15   R.   I.   395;    6 

Atl.   783),   121,   147,  491,  492, 

1194. 

State   V.    Kantler    (33    Minn.    69; 

21  X.  W.  856),  405,  420,  503. 

State    V.    Kantz    (13    R.   I.    528), 

253,  385,  1333,  1676,  1677. 
State   V.  Kass    (25   Xeb.    607;    41 

X.  W.  558),  600. 
State  V.   Kaufman    (45   Mo.   App. 

656),   885,   887,   930. 
State   V.   Kauffman    (68    Ohio    St. 

635;  67  X.  E.  1062),  39. 

State  V.  Kavanaugh    (4  Pennewill 

[Del.]  31;  53  Atl.  335),  2038, 

2051,  2078. 

State   V.   Keaough    (68    Wis.    135; 

31  X.  W.  723),  186,  445,  796. 

State  V.  Keen    (34  Me.  500),  476, 

1510. 
State   V.    Keenan    (5    R.    I.    497), 

125. 
State    V.    Keenan     (7    Kan.    App. 
813;  55  Pac.  102),  1001,  1654. 
State  V.  Keith    (37  Ark.  96).  515, 

1349,  1371. 
State    V.    Kelley     (76    Me.    333), 

1070. 
State  V.  Kelley    (47  Vt.  294),  61, 
63. 


State    V.   Kellogg    ([Tex.]    113    S. 
W.  660),   858,   860,  867,  883, 
892. 
'State     V.     Kelly     (29     Mo.     470), 

1554. 
State    V.    Kelly     (12    R.    I.    535), 

2031. 
State  V.  Kelly   (47  Vt.  294),  1249. 
State  V.  Kempman    (75  Mo.  App 

188),   890. 
State   V.  Kennard    (74   X.  H.   76; 
65  Atl.   376),   14,   1496,   160l', 
1662. 
State    V.    Kennedy     (1    Ala.    31), 

369,  617,  1575. 
State  V.   Kennedy    (16   R.   I.   409; 

17    Atl.    51),    121,    147. 
State    V.    Kennedy    (36   Vt.   563) 

1484. 
State  V.  Kenney   (62  W.  Va.  2S4; 

57   S.   E.   823),  307,   1218. 
State   V.   Kerr    (3   X.   D.   523;    58 

X.  W.  27),   1446. 
State    V.    Kesells     (120    Mo.    App. 
233;   96  S.  W.  494),  403,  415 
460. 
State    V.    Kezer     (74    Vt.    50-    52 

Atl.  116),  20,  24,  963. 
State    V.    Kibling     (63    Vt.    630; 
22    Atl.   613),    295,    298,   327, 
1712,  1757. 
State  V.  Kidd  (74  Ind.  554),  1304 

1320. 
State  V.  Kidvvell    (62  W.  Va.  466; 
59    S.    E.    494;     13    L.    R.    A. 
[X.    S.]     1024),    2038,    2051, 
2052,  2068. 
State  V.   Kiefer    (90   Md.    165;    44 

Atl.    1043),   1441. 
State   V.   Kiger    (63   W.   Va.   450; 
01    S.    E.    362),    1172,    1204, 
1604. 
State   V.   Kight     (103  Minn.  371; 

119  X.  W.  56),  260. 
State  V.  Kiley   (36  Ind.  App.  513; 

76  X.  E.  184),  1498,  1573. 
State   V.    Kindred    (148   Mo.   270; 

49   S.   W.   845),   2038. 
State    V.    King     (37    Iowa,    462), 
167,   169,  402. 


CCCXll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References    are   to    pages.] 


State  V.  Kingsburg   ( 105  Mo.  App. 

22;   78  S.  W.  641),  586. 
State  V.   Kingsley    (108  Mo.    135; 

18  S.  W.   994),   264,   1585. 
State  V.  Kingston    (5   R.  I.   297), 

1677. 
State  V.  Kinkead   (57   Conn.   173; 

17     Atl.     855),     1238,     1239, 

1751. 
iState  V.   Kinney    (21    S.   D.    390; 

113  N.  W.  77),  1128. 
(State  V.  Kirk   (112  Mo.  App.  447; 

•86    S.    W.     1099),    723,    747, 

748. 
State  V.  Kirkham   ( 23  N.  C.  384 ) , 

1190,  1757. 
State  V.  Kite   (81  Mo.  97),  686. 
State  V.  Kittelle    (110  N.  C.  560; 

15  S.  E.  103;  28  Am.  St.  Rep. 

698;  15  L.  R.  A.  694),  1357. 
State    V.    Klein    (22    Minn.    328), 

192,  277. 
State   V.    Kline    (107    Minn.    184; 

119    N.    W.    656),    341,    342, 

343. 
State  V.  Klein  (  78  Mo.  627 ) ,  1450, 

1452. 
State  V.  Kline  (50  Ore.  426;  93 

Pae.  237),  232,  1339,  1342, 

1680,  1682. 
State  V.  Kleinfield    (72  Kan.  674: 

83  Pac.  831),  287. 
State  V.  Knoby  (6  Kan.  App.  334; 

51  Pac.  53),  1526,  1551. 
State    V.    Knotts     (24    Ind.    App. 

477;  56  N.  E.  941),  767,  771, 

1861,  1878. 
State  V.   Knotts    (131    N.  -C.   705; 

42  S.  E.  444),  1278. 
State    V.    Knott     (5    R.    I.    293). 

1655. 
State  V.  Knowles    ( 57    Iowa,   669 ; 

11    N.   W.   620),  822,   828. 
State    V.     Knowles     (8     Me.     71), 

1014. 
State  V.  Knowlton    (70   Me.   200). 

1038,   1040. 
State    V.    Kraemer     (49    La.    Ann. 

766;   22  So.  254),  2038,  2045, 

2051. 


.State    V.    Kreichbaum     (81    Iowa, 

633;  47  N.  W.  872),  513,  1372, 

1606,  1647,  1738. 
State  V.  Kreig  (13  Iowa,  426), 

1550. 
State  V.  Krinski  (78  Vt.  162; 

62  Atl.  37),  969,  1086,  1660, 

1663,  1706. 
State   V.   Kruse    ( [N.   D.]    124   N. 

VV.  385),  1546. 
State   V.   Kobe    (26    Minn.    148;    I 

X.  W.  1054),  1741. 
State  V.  Koch   (61  Mo.  117),  1567. 
State   V.    Koehler    (6    Iowa,   398), 

1742. 
State  V.  Koler   (56  Me.  88),  1087. 
State   V.   Koso    (25   Neb.   607;    41 

N.  W.  558),  637. 
State  V.  Kuhn  (24  La.  Ann.  474), 

1500,  1505. 
State   V.   Kuhuke    (26   Kan.  405), 

688. 
State  V.  Kurtz   (2  Mo.  App.  Rep'r, 

913),   1491. 
State    V.   Laborde    (119    La.    410; 

44   So.    156),   528,   529,    1638. 
State  V.  Labore   (  [Kan.]    103  Pac. 

106),   1444,    1550. 
State  V.  Ladd   (15  Mo.  430),  1501, 

1505,   1627. 
State    V.    Ladenberger     (44    Kan. 

261;  24  Pac.  347),  1454. 
State    V.    Laferty    (5   Har.    [Del.] 

491),  2034. 
State    V.    Lafier    (38    Iowa,    422), 

20,  21,  52,  53,  55,  79,  1753. 
State    V.    Lager    Beer    (68    N.    H. 

377:  39  Atl.  255),  1023,  1043. 
State  V.  Lamberton  ( 37  Minn.  362 ; 

34  N.   W.   336),  669,  674. 
State  V.  Lamos  (26  Me.  258),  737. 
State  V.  Lang  (63  Me.  215),  1063, 

1447,   1512. 
State  V.  Langdon    (29  Minn.  393; 

13   N.   W.   187),   402.   467. 
State  V.  Langdon    (31   Minn.  316; 

17  N.  VV.  859),  395,  448,  449. 
State  V.  Langdon    (74   N.   H.  50; 

64  Atl.   1099),   1456. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCCXlll 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State  V.  Lane   (33  Mc  536),  1510, 

1554. 
State   V.    Langan    (149    Ala.    647; 

43   So.   187),  648. 
State   V.   Langley    (79   Me.    52;    7 

Atl.  902),  1044, 
State  V.  Langstou   ( 88  X.  C.  682 ) , 

398. 
State   V.  Lanier    (88   X.   C.    658), 

1476. 
State  V.  Lantz    (90  :Mo.  App.  15), 

1650. 
State  V.  Larimore    (19   Mo.   391), 

821,  842. 
State    V.    Larned     (47    Me.    426), 

1016,   1023,   1024. 
State  V.  La  Rose    (71  X.  H.  435; 

52   Atl.  943),    1086,    1766. 
State   V.   Larson    (83    Minn.    124; 

86    X.    W.    3;     54    L.    R.    A. 

487),  766. 
State    V.    Lashus     (79    Me.    504; 

11  Atl.  ISO),  1528,  1572,  1717, 

1724. 
State  V.  Lavake   (26  Minn.  526;   6 

X.  W.  339;  37  Am.  Rep.  415), 

1483,   1484,   1499. 
State   V.   Lawler    ( 85    Iowa,    564 ; 

52  X.  W.  490),  987. 
State  V.  Lawrence   (97  X.  C.  492; 

2  E.  367 ) ,  1226,  1233. 
State   V.   Lawson    (45    Kan.    339; 

25   Pac.   864),    1609. 
State  V.   Lawson    (83   Minn.    124; 

86  X.  W.  3;  54  L.  R.  A.  487), 

784. 
State    V,    Leaeh     (17     Ind.    App. 

174;  46  X.  E.  549),  769,  1352. 
State  V.  Leap   ( 1  Crancli    C.  C.  1 ; 

Fed.   Cas.    Xo.    16964),    1757. 
State    V.   Learned    (47    Me.    426), 

1044,  1045,  1444,  1530. 
State    V.    Leavenworth     ( 36    Kan. 

314;    13   Pac.   591),    169,   434, 

443,  475. 
State  V.  Leavitt    (63   X.   H.   381), 

1456. 
State   V.   Le   Clair    (86    Me.    522; 

30  Atl.  7).  254,  1014,  1078. 
State  V.  Lee  (29  Minn.  445),  271. 


State    V.    Leiclit     (17    Iowa,    28), 

369. 
State    V,    Leis     (11     Iowa,    416), 

1764. 
State   V.   Lemp    (16   Mo.    389),   7, 

11,  44,  84,  966. 
State    V.    Leonard    (  [Mo.J    116    S. 

W.    14),    498,    499,    502,    647, 

683. 
State    V.    Leonard     (72    Vt.    102; 

47  Atl.  395),  1368,  1370. 
State    V.    Leppert     (7    Ind.    355), 

1554. 
State     V.     Lewis     (63    Kan.     268; 

65  Pac.  258),  1104. 
State  V.  Lewis    (116  La.   762;   41 

So.    63),    683,    1643,    1644. 
State    V.    Lewis     (86    Minn.    174; 

90  X.   W.  318),   11,  33,   1357, 

1602. 
State    V.    Lewis     (86    Minn.    374; 

90  X.  W.  918),  12. 
State    V.    Lewis    (101    U.    S.    30), 

238. 
State    V.    Lichta     (130    Mo.    App. 

284;     109    S.    W.    825),    490, 

723,   747,   1109. 
State    V.    Lillard     (78    :Mo.    136), 

21,    52,    58,    970. 
State    V.    Lincoln     (6     Xeb.     12), 

799,  808,   815. 
State    V.    Lincoln     (50    Vt.    644), 

1722. 
State  V.   Lincoln    (73  Vt.  221;    51 

Atl.   9),   995. 
State    V.    Linden    (87    Iowa,    702; 

54   X.   W.   1075),    1706,   1710. 
State  V.  Linder   (76  Ohio  St.  463; 

81  X.  E.  753),  679,   1614. 
State  V,  Lindgrove    ( 1   Kan.  App. 

51;    41    Pac.    688),    148,    149, 

150,  190,  1703. 
State  V.  Lindquist   (77  Minn.  540; 

80  X.  W.   701),  400. 
State   V.    Lindqnist    ( [Minn.]    124 

X.  W.  215),   1703. 
State   V.   Lindven    (87    Iowa,   702; 

54  X.  W.  1075),  1185. 
State  V.  Liquors  &  Vessels  (80  Me. 

57;    12   Atl.  794),   1731. 


CCCXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State  V.  Liquor  ( 38  Vt.  387 ) ,  8. 
State    V.    Lisles     (58     Mu.     35!)), 

1458,  1568,  1763. 
State  V.  Livingston  ( 64  Iowa,  560 ; 

21   N.  W.  34),   2246. 
State  V.  Lockstand    (4   Ind.   572), 

1501. 
State  V.  Lock-year   (95  X.  C.  633; 

59  Am.  Rep.  287),  1339,  1342. 
State    V.    Loftis     (49    S.    C.    443; 

27  S.  E.  451),  381. 

State  V.  Long  (7  Jones  L.  [X.  C] 

24),   1201. 
State  V.  Long    (48   Ohio   St.  509; 

28  X.    E.     1038),     133,    596, 
1278. 

State  V.  Longley  (79  Me.  52;  7 

AtL  902),  1047. 
State  V.  Looker  (54  Kan.  227; 

38  Pac.  288),  1554. 
State  V.  Lord  (8  Kan.  App.  257; 

55  Pac.  503),  993,  1101,  1108, 

1678. 
State    V.   Lotti    (72    Vt.    115;    47 

Atl.    392),    1175,    1176,    1178, 

1183. 
State  V.  Louis    (63   Kan.   268;    65 

Pac.    258),    1102. 
State  V.  Louis  ([La.]  49  So.  167), 

183. 
State  V.  Lovell   (47  Vt.  493),  110, 

972,   1194. 
State  V.  Lowe   (93  Mo.  547)  ;  2  S. 

W.  840),  2041,  2045. 
State    V.    Lovvenliaught     ( 1 1    Lea, 

13),   542. 
State  V.   Lowry    (74   X.    C.    121), 

25,  30,  82,  1753. 
State  V.  Lucas  (94  Mo.  App.  117; 

67  S.  W.  971),  1180,  1322, 

1323,   1374. 
State    V.    Luddington      ( 33      Wis. 

107),  103,  223,  49S. 
State  V.  Ludwig    (21   INIinn.   202). 

215,  216,  400.  460. 
State   V.  Lund    (49    Kan.    200;    30 

Pac.   518),    1448. 
State   V.   Lundergan    ( 74    Vt.    48 ; 

52  Atl.  70),  995. 


State  V.  Lunsford  (150  X.  C.  862; 

64  N.  E.  745),   1516. 
State    V.    Lydick     (11    Xeb.    366; 

9  X.  W'.  560),  694. 
State    V.    Lynch    (72    X.    H.    185; 

55  Atl.  553),  986. 
State  V.  Lyons    (3  La.  Ann.  154), 

1246. 
State  V.  McAdams    (106  La.  720; 

37  So.  187),  1378. 
State   V.    McAdoo    (80   Mo.    216), 

1524,  1525. 
State  V.  McAnally    ( 105  Mo.  App. 

333;   79  S.  W.  990),  826,  832, 

1289,  1486,  1507. 
State  V.  McBrayer   (98  X.  C.  619; 

2  S.  E.  755'),  1224. 
State   V.   McBride    (64   Mo.    364), 

1524. 
State  V.  McBride  ( 4  McCord,  332 ) , 

493,   1760. 
State  V.  McBryer    (98  X.  C.  619; 

2  S.  E.  755).  822,  1235. 
State    V.    McCabe     (94    Mo.    App. 

122;     67    S.    W.    973),     1205, 

1211. 
State  V.  McCafferty   (63  Me.  223), 

1703. 
State  V.  ]\IcCammon    ( [Mo.  App.] 

86  S.  W.  510),  408,  415,  432, 

648. 
State  V.   McCance    (110  Mo.  398; 

19  X.  W.  648),   1627,  1629. 
State    V.   McCann    (59    Me.   383), 

1062,  1063,  1078. 
State    V.    McCann    (61    Me.    116), 

1017,   1024,    1081,   1658,    1663, 

1756. 
State   V.    McCann    (67    Me.    372), 

1016,  1024,  1034. 
State    V.    McCants     (1     Speer    L. 

389),  2040,   2046,  20-59,   2060. 
State    V.    McClain     (49    Mo.    App. 

398),  1228. 
State  V.  McCieary    (17  Iowa,  44), 

452,  523,  525. 
State     V.     McConnell      (90     Iowa, 

107;     57    X.    W.    707),    1358, 

1364,  1015,  1632. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cccxv 


[Heferences   are   to   pages.] 


State   V.   McCord    (207   Mo,    519; 

106  S.  W.  27),  851,  853,  874. 
State   V.   McCord    (124   Mo.   App. 

63;   100  S.  W.  1120),  874. 
State  V.  McCorniick   ( [Wash.]   105 

Pac.     1037),     15,     1234,     1236, 

1445. 
State  V,  McCoy   (86  Minn.  140;  90 

N,  W.  305),  1108. 
State  V.  McDaniel   (115  N.  C.  807; 

20    S.    E.    622),    2070,    2071, 

2072. 
State  V.  McDaniel  ( 1  Houst.  Crim. 

[Del.]  506),  1369. 
State   V.    McDavid    (84   Mo.   App. 

47),  674. 
State  V.  McDonald   (4  Harr.  555), 

660. 
State  V.  McDonough    (S4  :SIq.  4SS; 

24  Atl.  944),  152S. 
State  V.  McElrath  (40  Ore.  294;  89 

Pac.  803),  234,  867. 
State  V.  McEntee    (68  Iowa,  381; 

27  N.  W.  265),  355,  841. 
State  V.  McEnturff   (87  Iowa,  691; 

55  N.  W.  2),  1546. 
State  V.  McEvoy  ( 69  Iowa,  63 ;  28 

N.  W.  437)',  1065. 
State  V.  McGahan  (48  W.  Va.  438; 

37  S.  E.  573),  1110. 
State  V.   McGill    (65   Vt.   604;    27 

Atl.  429),  1582. 
State  V.  McGinnis    (30  Minn.  52; 

14   N.    W.    258),    1223,    1446, 

1491. 
State  V.   McGinnis    (38  Mo.  App. 

15),  1627,  1629. 
State  V.  McGinnis   (14  Mont.  462; 

36  Pac.  1046),  1447. 
State  V.  McGlynn   (34  N.  H.  422), 

1085,  1510,  1527,  1660. 
State  V.  McGonigal   (5  Harr.  [Del.] 

510).   2041,   2051,  2052.   2054. 
State  V.  McGoiigh    (14   R.   I.  63), 

1462,  1541. 
State  V.   McGowan    (  [:Me.]    5   Atl. 

561),  1065. 
State  V.  McGrath    (73  Mo.    181), 

1359. 


State  V    McGregor   (88  Minn.  74; 

92  N.  W.  509 ) ,  465. 
State  V.  McGrier  ( 9  N.  D.  566 ;  84 

N.  W.  363),  977. 
State  V.  McGuiness    (38  Mo.  App. 

15),   1357. 
State   V.   McGuire    (74  Neb.   769 j 

105  N.  W,  471),  666. 
State  V.  McGuire    (64  N.  H.  529; 

15  Atl.  213),  1084,  1372,  1375. 
State  V.  Mcllvenna   (21  S.  D.  489; 

113  N.  W.  878),  1532. 
State  V.  Mcintosh  ( 98  Me.  397 ;  57 

Atl.  83),  1104. 
State  V.  Mclntyre  (139  N.  C.  599; 

52  S.  E.  63),  1082,  1059, 
State  V.  McKenna    (16  Pv.  I.  398; 

17    Atl.    51),    7,    8,    10,    1492, 

1495,  1697,  1702,  1708,  1709. 
State  V.  McLafferty  (47  Kan.  140; 

27  Pac.  843),  49,  50. 
State    V.    McLaughlin     (47    Kan. 

143;  27  Pac.  840),  1452,  1616. 
State  V.  McMahon   (53  Conn.  407; 

5    Atl.    596);     55    Am,    Rep. 

140),  215,  1227,  1228,  1303, 
State  V,  Mc:Master  (13  N.  D.  58; 

99  X,  W.  58),  256,  998,  1066, 

1076,  1330,  1791. 
State  V,  McMickle   (34  Tex,  676), 

1484, 
State  V,  McMillan   (21  S.  D,  209; 

111  N,  W,  540),  1458,  1762, 
State  V.  McMinn   (83  N.  C.  668), 

197,  1196. 
State    V.    McNair     (46    N,    C,    [1 

Jones]   180),  1245. 
State  V.  McNally    (34  Me.  210;  56 

Am,    Dec.    650),    1038,    1047, 

1051. 
State  V.  McXamara   (69  Me.  133), 

49,  968. 
State   V.    McXary    (88   Mo.    143), 

498,  503,  1100, 
State   V.    McNeary    (14   Mo,    App. 

410),  1643,  1644. 
State    V,    McNett    (5    Pen,    [Del.] 

334;    61    Atl.   689),   527,   539, 
541. 


cccxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.l 


State  V.  McXeeloy    (1  Winst.   [N. 

C.  L.]  234),  694. 
State  V.  McNeeley  (60  X.  C.  232), 

510. 
State  V.  McNinch  (87  N.  C.  567), 

2034. 
State  V.  McNinn   (118  N.  C.  1259; 

24  S.  E.  523),  833. 
State    V.    Mackiii     (51    Mo.    App. 

299),  869,   1687,    1688. 
State   V.   Maddox    (74   Ind.    105), 

1509. 
State   V.   Madeira    ( 125   Mo.   App. 

508;    102   S.  W.   1046),    1128, 

1350,   1641,   1651. 
State  V.  Madigan    ( 57  ]Minn.  425 ; 

59  N.  W.  490),  2249. 
State    V.    Maber     (35    Me.    225), 

1722. 
State    V.    Malm     (25    Kan.    182), 

2086. 
State  V.  Mahneler  County   ( [Ore.] 

103  Pac.  446),  864. 
State  V.  Mahoney  (23  Minn.  181), 

1362. 
State  V.  Major  (81  Mo.  App.  289), 

1485,  1487,  1504. 
State  V.  Malheur  County   (46  Ore. 

519;    101   Pac.  907),  926,  936. 
•State  V.  Malia   ( [Me.]  5  Atl.  562). 

1045. 
State  V.  Mailing    (11  Iowa,  239), 

1653. 
State  V.  Maloney    (78  Iowa,  598; 

43  X.  W.  606),  1000. 

State  V.  Maloney    (79   Iowa,  413; 

44  X.  W.  693),  1763. 

State    V.    Maloney     (6    Ohio    Dec. 

209;  4  Ohio  X.  P.  197),  17'68. 
State   V.   Mancke    (18   S.    C.    81), 

449,  496. 
State   V.   Mann    ([Ind.]    86   X.   E. 

976),  1853. 
State   V.    Manning    (87    Mo.   App. 

78),   1526. 
State  V.   Manning    (107  :Mo.  App. 

51;   81   S.  W.  223),  833,  838. 
State  V.  Manning    (14  Tex.  402), 

226. 


State  V.  Mansker    (36  Tex.  364), 

69,  1575. 
State    V.    Marchbanks     (61    S.    C 

17;  39  S.  iL.  187),  1676,  1677 

1698. 
State  V.  Marciniak  (97  Minn.  355 

105  X.  VV.  965),  460. 
State   V.    Marion    ( 14   Mont.   458 

36    Pac.    1044),    1447. 
State  V.  Marks    (65   X.  J.  L.  84 

46  Atl.  757),  971,  1700. 
State  V.  Markuson   (5  X.  D.   147 

64  X.  W.  934),  1001,  1003. 
State  V.  Markuson    (7  X.  D.  155 

73  X.  W.  82),  1002,   1053. 
State    V.    Marley    (78    Conn.    330 

62   Atl.  85),  476. 
State    V.    Marsh     (37    Ark.    356) 

157. 
State   V.    Marshall    ( 2    Kan.   App 

792;    44    Pac.   49),    1609. 
State  V.  Marston    (64  X.  H.  603 

15  Atl.  222),  987. 
State  V,  Martel    (103   Me.  63;    68 

Atl.   454),    1732. 
State  V.  Martin    ([X.  J.]   3  Crim 

L.  Mag.  44),  2040,  2051,  2063 
State    V.    Martin     (20    Ark.    629) 

2008. 
State    V.    Martin    (34    Ark.    346) 

5,    16,    17,    25,   81,   962,    1457 

1532. 
State  V.  Martin    (55  Fla.  538;    46 

So.  424),  652,  920. 
State    V.    Martin     (20    Ind.    App 

699),   1119. 
State    V.    Martin     (108    Mo.    117 

18   S.    W.    1005,   affirming   44 

Mo.  App.  45),   1502,   1504. 
State  V.   Martin    (64   X.   H.    603 

15  Atl.  222),  988. 
State   V.   Martin    (3   Heisk.   487) 

1385. 
State  V.  Maryland  Club   (105  Md 

585;  66  Atl.  667),  1310,  1332 

1566. 
State  V.  Mason  (108  Ind.  48;  8  X 

E.  716),  929. 
State  V.  Massey    (72   Vt.  210;    47 

Atl.  834),  988,  989,  999. 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 


cccxvn 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


State   V.    Mateer    (105    Iowa,    66; 

74  N.  VV.  1)12),   1768. 
State  V.  Matherson  (77  Iowa,  485; 

42  N.   W.   377),  992,    1716. 
State    V.    Mathews    (51    N.   J.    L. 

253;    17   Atl.    154),   616,   617. 
State    V.    Mathis     (18    Ind.    App. 

608;   48  N,  E.  645),  214,  346, 

1536. 
State    V.    Mathis     (20    Ind.    App. 

699;     48    K    E.    1109),    214, 

1536. 
State  V.  Mattle  (48  La.  Ann.  728; 

19  So.   748),   139. 
State  V.  Maurer   (7  Clarke   ([la.  | 

406),  369. 
State  V.  Maxwell   (36  Conn.   157), 

1074. 
State  V.  Maxwell    (42  Iowa,  208), 

2041. 
State    V.    May     (20    Iowa,    305), 

1774. 
State    V.    May    (52    Kan.    53;    34 

Pae.  407),  10,  1753. 
State  V.  May    (32  S.  C.  39;    11  S. 

E.  440),   832. 
iState  V.  Mayor,  etc.   (37  Mo.  270), 

904. 
State   V.   Mays    (59    W.   Va.    331; 

53  S.  E.  416),   1560. 
State    V.    Meader     (62    Vt.    458; 

20  Atl.  730),  929. 
State  V.  Mead's  Liquors   (46  Conn. 

22),   1656. 
State    V.    Meagher    (49    Mo.    App. 

571),   1309,   1634. 
State  V.   Meagher    (114   Mo.   App. 

266;    89   S.   W.   595),    1129. 
State  V.  Meagher    ( 124   Mo.  App. 

333;    101    S.    W.    634),    1319. 
State  V.  Meek    (26  Wash.  405;   67 

Pac.    76),    1383. 
State    V.    Meekin     (51    Mo.    App. 

299),   910. 
State   V.    Mellor    (13    R.    I.    666), 

1729. 
State    V.    Melton     (38    Mo.    368), 

1495,  1537. 
State   V.    Melton    (130    Mo.    App. 

262;   109  S.  W.  858),  1682. 


State  V.  Melton    (120  X.  C.  591; 

26  S.   E.  933),   1476. 
State   V.   Mercer    (32   Iowa,   405), 

1341. 
State    V.    Mercer     (58    Iowa,    182; 

12   N.   W.   269),   825,    1523. 
State    V.    Merget    (129    Mo.    App. 

46;    107  S.  W.  1015),  1482. 
State    V.    Meteer     (94    Iowa,    42; 

62   N.   W.   684),  577,  585. 
State    V.    Meyers     (80    Mo.    601), 

585. 
State  V.  Midgett    (85  X.  C.  538), 

130,   137,  247. 
State    V.    Midkiir    (125    Mo.    App. 

397;    102    S.    VV.   590),    1350. 
State  V.  Mieyer  ( 94  Mo.  App.  201 ; 

67  S.  VV.  933),  1383. 
State   V.   Miller    (20    Conn.    523), 

1510,  1608. 
State   V.   Miller    (53   Iowa,   84;    4 

N.  VV.  838),  1581,  1589,  1698. 
State    V.    Miller     (86    Iowa,    638; 

53  N.  VV.  330),  309,  310. 
State   V.   Miller    (114   Iowa,   396; 

87  N.  VV.  287),  484. 
State   V.  Miller    (63   Kan.   62;    64 

Pac.  1033),  1722. 
State  V.  Miller   ( 48  Me.  576 ) ,  253, 

1017,   1024,    1059,   1068,   1074, 

1530. 
State    V.    Miller     (104    Mo.    App. 

297;   78  S.  VV.  643),  555. 
State    V.    Miller     (129    Mo.    App. 

390;     108    S.    VV.    603),    649, 

650. 
State    V.    Mitchell    ([Mo.]    115   ,S. 

VV.  1098),  924. 
State    V.    Miller     (48    Vt.     576), 

1044. 
State   V.  Miller    ( [VV.   Va.]    66   S. 

E.  522),   159,  233. 
State  V.  Miller    (26  VV.  Va.   106), 

1221,  1578. 
State  V.  Milwaukee  (129  Wis.  562; 

109   N.   W.   421),   410,  472. 
State    V.    Millikan    (24    Mo.   App. 

462),   834. 
State  V.  Milliken   (8  Blackf.  260), 

486. 


-eccxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State  V.  Minnehan    (83  Me.  310; 

22  All.  177),  1049,  1050. 
State  V.  Minnesota  Club   ( [Minn.] 

119  N.  \V.  494),   13,  1325. 
State    V.    Mitchell     (4    Kan.    App. 

743;  46  Pac.  541),  1636,  1652. 
State   V.   Mitchell    (28    Mo.    562), 

821. 
State   V.  Mitchell    (134   Mo.   App. 

540;     114    S.    W.    1113),    38, 

S3. 
State  V.   Mitchell    (127   Mo.   App. 

455;  105  S.  W.  655),  617,  621. 
State   V.   Mitchell    ([Mo.J    119    S. 

W.  498),  675. 
State    V.   Mitchell    (3    S.   D.   223; 

52  X.  W.  1052),  995. 
State  V.  Moceli    (49  Kan.  142;   30 

Pac.  189),  1454,  1504. 
State  V.   Mohr    (53   Iowa,   261;    5 

N.  W.  183),  1529. 
State    V.    Molheur    €o.     (46    Ore. 

519;   81  Pac.  368),  927. 
State   V.    Momberg    ( [N.    D.]    103 

N.  W.  566),   1661,   1731. 
State    V.    Mondy     (24    Ind.    268), 

1491,   1498,   1499. 
State    V,    Moniteau    Co.    Ct.     (45 

Mo.  App.  387),  537,  538,  560, 

568,  586,  602. 
State  V.   Moody    (95   N.   C.   656), 

509,  691,  1267. 
State    V,    Moody     (70    S.    C.    56; 

49  S.  E.  8),  300,  307,  324. 
State   V.   Moore    (5    Blackf.    118), 

21,    23,    25,    26,    28,    30,    82, 

967. 
State  V.  Moore    (6  Ind.  436),  275. 
State   V.   Moore    (129    Iowa,    514; 

100  N.  W.  268),   1650. 
State   V.  Moore    (107   Mo.    78;    16 

S.    W.    937),    233,    826,    930, 

D36,  1524. 
State    V.    Moore     (84    Mo.     App. 

11),  677,  684,  685. 
State   V.   Moore    (14   N.   II.   451), 

314,  493,   687.    1637. 
State  V.  iloorc!    ( 1    Jones    [N.  €.] 

276),  528,  576,  684,  685. 


State    V.    Moore    (49    S.    C.    438; 

27  S.  E.  454),  1104,  1105. 
State    V.    Mooty    (3    Hill    [S.    C.J 

187),  81,   1556. 
State  V.  Moran    ([Idaho]   90   Pac. 

1044),  285. 
State    V.    Moran     (40    Me.     129), 

1451,  1530. 
State  V.  :\[orchead  (22  R.  I.  272; 

47  Atl.  545),  963,  1101,  1104, 

1677,   1697. 
State    V.   Morgan    (40   Conn.    44), 

1094. 
State    V.    Morgan    ([Mo.]     115    S. 

\V.    491),     1291,    1294,    1478, 

1489. 
State    V.    Morgan     (96    Mo.    App. 

343;  70  S.  W.  267),  824,  1640. 
State    V.    Morgan    (40    S.    C.    345; 

18  S.  E.  937),  2040,  2046. 
State  V.  Moriarty   (50  Conn.  415), 

1650. 
State  V.  Moriarty    (74  Ind.   103), 

2024,  2026. 
State  V.  Morin    (102  Me.   290;    66 

Atl.    650),    1730. 
State    V.   Morphy    (33    Iowa,    270; 

11  Am.  Rep.  122),  2246,  2248, 

2252. 
State   V.    Morris    (77    N.    C.   512), 

182. 
State  V.  Morris  County    (36  N.  J. 

L.    72;     13     Am.     Rep.    422), 

235. 
State   V.   Morrison    (3    Dev.   299), 

1642,    1643,    1644. 
State  V.  Mortland    (71  Iowa,  543; 

32  N.  W.  485),  777. 
State    V.    Morton     (42    Mo.    App. 

64),  1372. 
State    V.    Mosier     (25    Conn.    40), 

1380,    1381. 
State  V.  .Alott    (61  Md.  297),  291, 

436. 
State    V.    :Moulton    (52    Kan.    69; 

34  P.  412),   1185. 
State    V.    :\Ioury     (37    Kan.    309; 

15   Pac.   282),  2041,   2067. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXIX 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


State  V.  Mudie    ( [S.  D.]    115   N. 

W.    107),    1196,     1325,    1343, 

1447, 1558. 
State   V.  Mueller    (38  Minn.  497; 

38  N.  W.  691),  1362,   1620. 
State   V.   Mugler    (29    Kan.    252), 

110. 
State  V.  Mulhern   (130  Iowa,  46; 

106   N.   W.   267),   1239,   1241. 
State  V.  Mullen  (14  La.  Ann.  577), 

2059,  2060. 
State  V.  Mullenhoff  (74  Iowa,  271; 

37  N.  W.  329),  183,  450,  488, 

495,    827,    1093,    1094,    1160. 
State  V.  Mullikin  (8  Blaekf.  260), 

104,   1106,  1107,   1109. 
State  V.  Mullinix   (6  Blaekf.  554), 

1491. 
State   V.    Mullins    (67    Ark.    422; 

55    S.    W.    211),    1509,    1511. 
State  V.  Muncey   (28  W.  Va.  494), 

11,   53,   55,   1713. 
State  V.  Munch  (15  Mo.  App.  207), 

1729. 
State  V.  Munch  (57  Mo.  App.  207), 

1732. 
State    V.    Munger     (15    Vt.    290), 

23,   24,   25,    34,   35,   80,    1487, 

1496,    1505,    1519,    1537,    1648, 

1650. 
State  V.  Munson  (25  Ohio  St.  3 Si). 

1173,  1231,   1234,   1845. 
State    V.    Muntz     (3    Kan.    383), 

1479,   1501,   1554. 
State    V.     Munzemeier     ( 24    Iowa, 

87),    1089,    1658. 
State  V.  Murch  ( [Me.]  7  Atl.  115), 

1528. 
State  V.  Murphy    (118  Mo.   7;    25 

S.  W.  95),  2041. 
State    V.    Murphy    (51    X.    J.    L. 

250;    17  Atl.   157),  507. 
State   V.   Murphy    (15    R.    I.    543; 

10     Atl.     585),      1082,     1444, 

1531. 
State  V.  Murphy   (71   Vt.   127;   41 

Atl.   1037),   2257. 
State  V.  Murphy    (23  X.   W.  390; 

48  Pac.  628),  25. 


State  V.  Muse    (4  D.  &  B.  L.  [N. 

C]    319),    132,   138,    1507. 
State  V.   Myers    (146   ind.  36;    44 

X.   E.   801),   1573. 
State    V.    Xagley     (8    Kan.    App. 

812;  57  Pac.  554),  1484,  1652. 
State  V.  Xash  (97  Ala.  514),  156. 
State   V.   Xash    (97   X.   C.   514;    2 

S.   E.   645),  25,   156. 
State  V.  Xathan    (60  W.  Va.  673; 

55   S.  E.   742),  1254. 
State    V.    Xations     (75    Mo.    53), 

1446. 
State    V.    Xeagle     (65    Mc.    468), 

1717,  1719,  1724. 
State    V.    Xeal     (27    X.    H.    131), 

1365,   1366. 
State    V.    Xed    (105    La.    696;    30 

So.    126;    54    L.    R.    A.    933), 

2250. 
State  V.  Xeese   (38   S.  C.   201;    16 

S.  E.  893),  970. 
State    V.    Xeeson     ( [Iowa]    64    X. 

VV.  409),   1097,  1658. 
State  V.  Xeild    (4  Kan.  App.  026; 

45  Pac.  623),   1086. 
State    V.    Xeiss    (108    X.   C.    787; 

13    S.    E.    225;    12    L.    R.   A. 

412),  1338,  1339,  1342. 
State  V.  Xelson  (10  Idaho,  522; 

79  Pac.  79 ;  67  L.  R.  A.  808 ) , 

218,  465,  466. 
State   V.   Xelson    (14    X.   L.    297; 

103  X.  W.  609),  1207. 
State   V.   Xelson    (13    X.   D.    122; 

99    X.    W.    1077),    976,    977, 

978,  992. 
State  V.  Xerbovig    (33  Minn.  480; 

24    X.    W.    321),    1446,    1519, 

1492. 
State  V.  Xethken  ( 60  W.  Va.  673 ; 

55  S.  E.  742),  1248,  1250, 

1631,  1645. 
State  V.   Xew    (165   Ind.   571;    76 

X.  E.  400),  1443. 
State  V.  Xew    (36   Ind.  App.  521; 

76  X.  E.   181),   1443. 
State    V.    Xew    Orleans     (113    La. 

371;    36   So.    999),    190,    490, 

627,  632,   649. 


•cccxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State   V.  New   Orleans,  etc.,   Club 

(116    La.    46;     40    So.    526), 

798. 
State    V.    New    Orleans     (117    La. 

715;   42  So.  245),  576,  578. 
State  V.  Newcomb  (107  N.  C.  900; 

12  S.  E.  53),  508. 
State  V.  Newcomb   (36  S.  E.  147; 

126  N.  C.   1104),   1476. 
State  V.  Newton   (5  N.  J.  L.  534), 

163. 
State  V.  Nibblet   ([Nev.]    102  Pac. 

229),  1576. 
State   V.    Nickels    (65    S.   C.    169; 

43   S.  E.  521),   1084. 
State  V.  Nickerson    (30  Kan.  545; 

2  Pac.  654),  1542,  1548. 
State  V.  Nield   (4  Kan.  App.  626; 

45  Pac.  623),  1546,  1608,  1756. 
State  V.  Niers    (87  Iowa,  723;   54 

N.   W.   1076),    1546. 
State   V.   Nippert    (74    Kan.    371; 

86  Pac.  478),  1732. 
State    V.    Nixford     (46    Mo.    App. 

494),   838. 
State    V.    Nolan     (37    Minn.    16), 

395,  400. 
State    V.    Nolan     (15    Pv.    L    529; 

10     Atl.     481),     1445,     1446, 

1738. 
State    V.    Noland     (29    Ind.    212), 

1485. 
State  V.  Norman    (13  N.  C.  222), 

1476. 
State  V.  Norris    (59   N.   H.   536), 

1752. 
State   V.    Norris    (65    S.    C.    287; 

43  S.  E.  791),  1104. 
State   V.   Northfield    ( [S.   D.]    101 

N.  W.    1063),   648,   650. 
State   V.   Norton    (41    Iowa,    4.30), 

1670. 
State   V.   Norton    (67    Iowa,    641; 

25  N.  W.  842),  2087. 
State    V.    Nowlan    (64    Me.    531), 

1756. 
State   V.   Noyes    (30    N.    H.    279), 

167,  228",  233,  240. 
State  V.  Nulty  (57  Vt.  543),  1643. 


State   V.   Nunnelly    (43   Ark.    68), 

1653. 
State  V.  Nutt   (28  Vt.  598),  1534. 
State  V.  Nutter    (44  W.  Va.  385; 

30  S.  E.  67),  768,  778,  779. 
State  V.  Nye    (32  Kan.  201,  204; 

4  Pac.    134,   136),  1641,   1645. 
State   V.    O'Brien    (35   Mont.   441; 

90  Pac.  514),   916,  958,   14G3, 

1467,    1469,   1614,    1620,   1679, 

1681,    1682,   1685,   1696,   1738. 
State  V.  O'Connell    (26  Ind.  266), 

70. 
State  V.   O'Connell   (31   Kan.  383; 

2  Pac.  579),  1740. 
State  V.  O'Connell    (  [Me.]    14  Atl. 

291),   1717,   1724. 
State    V.    O'Connell     (82    Me.    30; 

19  Atl.  86),  1113,  1115,  1639, 

1665,  1729,   1731,   1732. 
State    V.    O'Connell     (99    Me.    61; 

58  Atl.   59),  967,   1490,   1697- 
State   V.    O'Conner    (49   Me.   594). 

1114. 
State   V.   O'Connor    ( 3    Kan.   App. 

594;   43  Pac.  859),  498,  1372, 

1670,   1678,   1689. 
State    V.    O'Connor    (13    La.    Ann. 

486),   929. 
State  V.  O'Conner   (58  Minn.  193; 

59  N.  W.  999),  750. 

State   V.   O'Connor    ( 65   Mo.  App. 

324),  498,  1372,  1643,  1644. 
State  V.  O'Connor    (11  Nev.  416), 

2075. 
State  V.  0!Connor  (5  N.  Dak,  629), 

426. 
State  V.  Odam   (2  Lea,  220),  1570. 
State    V.    Oder     (92     Iowa,    767; 

61    N.   W.    190),    1674. 
State  V.  O'Donnell   (41   S.  C.  553; 

19  S.  E.  748),  150,  174. 
State  V.  O'Donnell  (10  H.  I.  472), 

1510. 
State  V.   Oeder    (80   Iowa,   72;    45 

N.   W.  543),  827. 
State     V.     O'Orady     (65     Vt.     66; 

25  Atl.  905),' 1084. 
State    V.    O'Keefe     (41    Vt.    691), 

1484. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXXl 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


State  V.  Oliphant    (128  Mo.  App. 

252;     107    S.    W.    32),    1685. 
State  V.   Oliver    (26   W.   Va.  422; 

53  Am.  Rep.  79  1 ,  7,  24,  25,  43, 

47,  48,  49,  968. 
State    V.    Olson     (38    Minn.    150; 

36    N.   W.    446),    1538,    1539, 

1648. 
State  V.  O'Malley   (132  Iowa,  696; 

109   N.   W.   491),    1678. 
State  V.  O'Neal    ([N.   D.]    124   X. 

W.  68),   1546. 
State    V.    O'Neil     (51    Kan.    651; 

33  Pac.  287;  24  L.  R.  A.  555), 

2041,  2054,  2061,  2067. 
State   V.    O'Neil    (58    Vt.    140;    2 

Atl.  586;   56   Am.   Rep.  557), 

254,    1008,    1010,    1283,    1727. 
State    V.    O'Neill     (24    Wis.    149), 

233. 
State  V.  One  Bottle  of  Brandy   (43 

Vt.  297),   1016. 
State   V.    O'Reilly    (126   Mo.    597; 

29  S.  W.  597),  2040. 
State  V.  Orth    (38  Minn.    150;    36 

N.  W.   103),  541. 
State    V.    Orton     (41    Ark.    305), 

1571. 
State  V.  Osborn  (155  Ind.  385; 

68  N.  E.  491),  2116. 
State  V.  Oshkosh  ([Wis.]  70  N. 

W.  300),  718,  734. 
State  V.  Otten  (10  Kan.  App.  351; 

59  Pac.  380;  60  Pac.  1132), 

1678. 
State  V.  Owen  (15  Mo.  506),  73, 

1499,  1519. 
State  V.  Packer  (80  N.  C.  439 

[port  wine]),  8,  13,  30,  82, 

1491. 
State  V.  Packett   ([Mo.]  119  S.  W. 

25),  579,  648. 
State    V.    Paddock    (24    Vt.    312), 

1637,   1764. 
State  V.   Page    (66   Me.   418),   11, 

29,   85,  967,   973. 
State  V.  Page    ([Mo.  App.]    80  S. 

W.  912),  646. 
State  V.  Paige   (50  Vt.  445),  1672. 


State   V.    Paige    (78    Vt.    286;    62 

Atl.     1017),    282,    295,    1491, 

1512,  1529,  1531. 
State  V.  Papp  (45  Md.  432),  1649. 
State  V.  Parker  ( 15  La.  Ann. 

231),  1189. 
State  V.  Parker  (139  N.  C.  586; 

51  S.  E.  1028),  964,  965. 
State  V.  Parker  ( 26  Vt.  357 ) ,  233, 

240. 
State  V.  Parkersburg  Brewing  Co. 

(53  W'.  Va.  591;  45  S.  E, 

924),  1461. 
State  V.  Parkin'- ^n  (5  Nev.  15), 

228. 
State  V.  Parks  (29  Vt.  70),  383. 
State   V.   Parnell    (16    Ark.   506), 

1504. 
State  V.  Parr   (34  W.  Va.  81;    11 

S.  E.  737),  1255. 
State  V.  Parsons  (40  N.  J.  L.  123), 

243. 
State  V.  Parson   (102  Mo.  436;  27 

S.  W.  1102;  46  Am.  St.  457), 

311. 
State  V.  Parsons  (124  Mo.  436; 

27  S.  W.  1162;  42  Am.  St. 

457),  309. 
State  V,  Partlow    (91   N.   C.   550; 

49   Am.   Rep.   652),    136,    137. 
State  V.  Pasnau    (118  Iowa,  501; 

92    N.    W.    682),    2038,    2060, 

2077,  2082. 
State  V.   Patterson    (116  Ind.  45; 

10  N.  E.  289;    18  N.  E.  270), 

1485. 
State  V.  Patterson   ( [N.  J.  L.]  25 

Atl.  1098),  676. 
State  V.  Patterson   (98  N.  C.  666 

4  S.  E.  540),  541,  1739. 
State  V.  Patterson  ( 134  N.  C.  612 

47  S.  E.  808),  268,  951. 
State  V.  Patterson   ( 13  N.  D.  70 

99  N.  W.  67),  982,  1040,  1060 
State    V.    Patrick     (65    Mo.    App 

653),  1740,  1741. 
State    V.     Patrick     (2    Mo.    App. 

Rep'r.  1149).  929. 
Stat«  V.  Paul    (87  Mo.  App.  47), 

831. 


CCCXXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


State  V.  Paul    (5  R.  I.    185),  98, 

125,  126,  129,  179,  258,  259. 
State    V.    Paulk    (18    S.    C.    514), 

2040,  2U53. 
State  V.  Paull   (14  N.  D.  557;  105 

N.  W.  717),  1103. 
State   V.   Pawtucket    ([K.    I.]    46 

Atl.  1047),  589. 
State  V.  Peak    (9  Kan.  App.  436; 

5"  Pac.  1034),  1500,  1701. 
State  V.  Pearls    (35   VV.  Va.  320; 

13  S.  E.  1006),  1400. 
State  V.  Pearse   (31  Neb.  562;   48 

N.  W.  391),  603. 
State    V.    Pearsell     (43    la.    630), 

389,  390. 
State   V.   Peek    (66   Kan.   701;    72 

Pac.  237),  1103. 
State  V.   Pecker    (47   N.   H.  364), 

1068. 
State  V.  Peckham    (3   R.   I.   289), 

111,    139,    155,   233,  234,   314, 

316. 
State  V.  Peel,  etc.,  Co.   (36  W.  Va. 

802;   15  S.  E.  1000;   76  L.  R. 

A.  385),  479. 
State  V.  Pefl'erle   (33  Kan.  718;   7 

Pac.  Rep.  597),  221. 
State  V.  Pell    ([Iowa]    119  N.  W. 

154),  2039,  2062,  2068. 
State   V.   Pendergast    (20   W.   Va. 

672),   1505. 
State   V.    People    (1    Penn.    [Del.] 

525),  1230,  1239. 
State  V.  People  ( 139  111.  App.  500; 

affirmed   [111.]   86  N.  E.  236), 

1184. 
State  V.  Percy    (72  N.  J.  L.  375; 

61  Atl.  148:  affirmed,  73  N.  J. 

L.  554;  64  Atl.  113),  21. 
State  V.  Perkins    (63  N.  H.  368), 

1530. 
State  V.  Perkins    (141  N.  C.  797; 

53  S.  E.  735),  1558. 
State  V.  Peterson    (38  Minn.  143; 

36    N.    W.    443),    1478,    1538, 

1539,   1567,   1640,   1648. 
State  V.  Peterson   (98  Minn.  210; 

108  N.  W.  6),  1611. 


State  V.  Peterson  (129  N.  C.  556; 

40  S.  E.  9),  2039,  2078. 
State   V.    Peterson    (41    Vt.    504), 

1702. 
State  V.  Pfeifer    (26  Minn.   175), 

443. 
State  V.  Pferferle  (36  Kan.  90;  12 

Pac.    406),    1656,    1702,    1706, 

1713,   1740. 
State   V.  Ptleajor    (81    Iowa,   759; 

46  N.  W.   1063),  307,  327. 
State   V.   Phillips    (73   Minn.    77), 

259. 
State  V.  Pianfetti   (79  Vt,  236;  65 

Atl.    84),    1653,    1717,    1719, 

1723. 
State  V.  Piazza    (66  Miss.  426;    0 

So.  316),  802. 
State    V.    Piche    (98   Mo.   348;    56 

Atl.  1052),  19,  972,  973,  1708. 
State  V.  Pickett   (47  S.  C.  101;  25 

S.  E.  46),  1528,  1739. 
State  V.  Pierce    (65  Iowa,  85;    21 

N.  W.  195),  62,  1101,  1250. 
State  V.  Pierce  (26  Kan.  777),  777, 

824. 
State  V.  Pierce  ( [Me.]  15  Atl.  68), 

1547,  1549. 
State    V.    Pierce     (111    Mo.    App. 

216;     85    S.    W.    663),    1354, 

1596. 
State  V.  Pierce   (55  Vt.  82),  1028, 
State  V.  Pierce  County   (50  Wash. 

650;  97  Pac.  778),  472. 
State  V.  Piezzo    (66  Miss.  420;    6 

So.  316),  793. 
State   V.   Pigg    (78   Kan.   618;    97 

Pac.  859),  34,  80,   1696,  1729, 

1732. 
State   V.   Pike    (49   N.   H.   399;    6 

Am.  Rep.  533),  1631,   1735. 
State  V.   Pillsbury    (47   Me.   449), 

1455. 
State  V.  Pinckney    (111  Iowa,  34; 

82  N.  W.  450),  1482. 
State  V.  Piner   (141  N.  C.  760;   .53 

S.  E.  305),  945,  1707. 
State  V.  Piper    (70  N.  H.  282:   47 

Atl.  703),  997,  999. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cccxxin 


[Rel'erpncea   are   to    pages] 


State  V.  Pischel   (16  Neb.  490;  20 

N.  W.  848),  1445,  1446,   1449, 

1501,   1503,   1508,   1557. 
State  V.   Pittman    (10  Kan.  593), 

497,  550,  1522. 
State    V.    Pittman     (76    Mo.    56), 

1445,   1446. 
State  V.  Pitts  ( [Ala.]  49  So.  441), 

251. 
State  V.  Pitts  (58  Mo.  556),  2041. 
State    V.    Pitzer     (23    Kan.    250), 

1522. 
State   V.    Plainfield    (44    N.   J.    L. 

118),  443,  484,   1502. 
State  V.  Planiondon  ( 75  Kan.  26!) ; 

89  Pac.  23),  1002,  1004. 
State   V.    Plunket    (64    Me.    534), 

1046,  1057. 
State  V.  Plunket   (3  Har.   [N.  J.] 

5),  271. 
State    V.    Pollard     (72    Mo.    App. 

230),  833. 
State  V.  Pollard  (6  R.  I.  290),  270. 
State  V.  Police  Jury  (116  La.  767; 

41  So.  85),  559. 
State  V.  Police  Jury  ( 120  La.  163; 

45  So.  47),  651,  652. 
State  V.  Polk  (69  AtL  1006),  1456, 

1517. 
State  V.  Pond    (93  Mo.  606;   6  S. 

W.   469),    110,   228,    232,    233, 

235. 
State  V.  Pope  ( 79  S.  C.  87 ;  60  S. 

E.  234),  387,  955,  1011,  1023. 
State  V.  Popp  (45  Md.  432),  1323. 
State  V.  Porter  (76  Kan.  411;  91 

Pac.  1073;  13  L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.] 

462),  1001. 
State  V.  Porterfield   (47  S.  C.  75; 

25   S.   E.   39),    111,    139,    149, 

281,  383. 
State  V.    Poteet    (80   K   C.    612), 

1163. 
State  V.  Potter   (30  la.  587),  389. 
State    V.    Potter     ( 125    Mo.    App. 

465;    102    S.    W.    668),    1349, 

1505. 
State  V.  Potts    (100  N.  C.  457;   6 

S.  E.  657),  2051,  2058. 


State  V.  PouU  (14  N.  D.  557;  105 

N.  W.  717),  1481,  1676. 
State   V.   Powell    (141   N.   C.   790; 

53  S.  E.  515),  1185. 
State  V.  Powers   (38  Ohio  St.  54), 

243. 
State  V.  Prater   (59  S.  C.  271;  37 

S.  E.  933),   1108,   1486,   1552, 

1671,  1716. 
State    V.    Prather    (41    Mo.    App. 

451),   1465,  1468. 
State  V.   Pratt    (52  N.  J.  L.  306; 

19  Atl.  607),  1290. 
State  V.   Pratt    (34  Vt.   323),   64, 

o5,  67,  1253,  1588,  1633,  1754, 

2031. 
State  V.  Prescott    (67  N.  H.  203; 

30  Atl.  342),   1179,   1460. 
State    V.    Prescott    (27    Vt.    194), 

110. 
State    V.     Pressman     ( 103     Iowa, 

449),  72  N.  W.  660),  683,  901. 
State  V.  Probst   (87  N.  Car.  560), 

449,  522. 
State     V.     Prettynian      (3     Harr. 

[Del.]  570),  69,  509,  690,  694, 

1267. 
State  V.  Price    (75  Iowa,  243;   39 

N.  W.  291),  1541,  1546,  1763. 
State  V.  Price    (92  Iowa,   181;    60 

N.  W.  514),  994. 
State  V.   Priester    (43  Minn.  373; 

45  N.  W.  712),  221,  283,  474, 

1606. 
State  V.  Priester    (Cheves   [S.  C] 

103),  1451. 
State  V.  Pritchard   (16  S.  D.  166; 

91   S.  W.   583),   12,    15,   1257, 

1630. 
State  V.  Prouty    (102   Iowa,    105; 

84  N.  W.  670),  999. 
State    V.    Putnam     (38    Me.    296), 

383,  476. 
State    V.    Quinlan     (40   Minn.   55; 

41  N.  W.  299),  5,  24,  26,  43. 
State  V.  Quinn    (170  Mo.   176;    70 

S.  W.  1117),  553. 
State  V.  Quinn  (25  Mo.  App.  102), 

1598. 


CCCXXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State  V.  Quinn  (40  Mo,  App.  627), 

1361. 
State  V.  Quinn  ( 49  Mo.  App.  602 ) , 

1502. 
State  V.  Quinn    (94  Mo.  App.  59; 

C7  S.  W.  974),  1192. 
State  V.   Eaiford    (7    Post    [Ala.] 

101),   1492. 
State   V.    Rairort    (64    N.   J.    412; 

45  Atl.  78<3),  1678. 
State    V,    Ramsey     (82    Mo.    133), 

2041. 
State   V.    Rand    (51    N.    H.    361), 

1221,   1578. 
State    V.    Randall     (73    Mo.    App. 

463,   465),  824,   831. 
State    V.    Randolph     ([Mo.    App.] 

123  S.  W.  61),   1484. 
State    V.    Ranelle     ([Mo.]     119    S. 

W.  55),  372. 
State   V.    Ransclier     (69    Tenn.    [1 

Lea]   96),   110,   132,  134,   135, 

247,  248,   424. 
State  V.  Rathsack    (82  Neb.   336; 

117  N.  W.  949),  672. 
State    V.    Ratner     (44    Kan.    429; 

24  Pac.     953),     1442,     1554, 
1555, 

State    V.    Ranch    (47    Ohio,    478; 

25  N.  E.  59),  813. 

State    V.    Ray    (119    La.    417;    44 

So.    417),    528,    529. 
State  V.  Raymond  (24  Conn.  204), 

1610,  1659. 
State  V.  Rechards   (21  Minn.  47), 

1109. 
State    V.    Redden    (5    Har.    [Del.] 

505),   1196. 
State  V.  Reed    (168   Ind.   588;    81 

N.  E.  571),   1446,   1722. 
State  V.  Reed  ( 35  Me.  489 ;  58  Am. 

Dec.   727),   1500. 
State    V.     Reed     (35    Pac.     706), 

2246. 
State  V,  Reick    (43   Kan.   279;   23 

Pac.  577),  1651. 
State  V.  Reid   (134  Mo.  App.  582; 

114  S.  W.  1116),  891. 
State  V.  Reid    (11,^  X.  C,  741;   20 

S.  E,  468),  382. 


State    V.    Reiley     (75    Mo.    521), 

1353,   1359,   1361. 
State   V.   Reilly    (108    Iowa,    735; 

78   N.   \V.   680),  955,   956. 
State  V.   Reily    (66  N.  J.  L.  399; 

52  Atl.  1005),  23,  39,  1493. 
State   V.  Reingardt    (46   N.   J.   L. 

337),  610. 
State  V.  Renneker    ( 75  Kan.  685 ; 

90  Pac.  245),  1185. 
State   V.   Reno    (41    Kan.    674;    21 

Pac.    803),    989,    1650,    1613, 

1655,  1674. 
State    V.    Repetto     (66    Mo.    App. 

251),   1638. 
State    V.    Reymann     (48    W.    Va. 

307;   37  S.  E.  591),  991,  999. 
State   V.   Reylets    (74    Iowa,    499; 

38    N.    W.    377),    1101,    1670, 

1740. 
State   V.    Reynolds    ( 5    Kan.   App. 

515;    47   Pac.  573),  963,  964, 

969,   1609. 
State  V.  Reynolds   (14  Mont.  383), 

218. 
State  V.   Reynolds    (18  Neb.   431; 

25  N.  W.  610),  603,  616,  617. 
State   V.   Reynolds    (47   Vt.    297), 

1491. 
State    V.    Rhodes    (90    Iowa,    496; 

58   N.   W.    887;    24   L.   R.   A. 

245),   323. 
State    V.    Rhodes     (2    Ind.    321), 

1549. 
State  V.  Richardson   (48  Ore.  309; 

85   Pac.   225),    148,   234,   291, 

868,  913,  927. 
State   V,    Richter    (23    Minn.    81), 

1223,    1245. 
State    V.    Ridgway    (73    Ohio    St. 

31;  76  N.  E.  95),  1502. 
State   V.   Riddock    (80   S.   C.    118; 

61  S.  E.  210),  980,  987. 
State  V.   Riffe    (10   W.   Va.   794), 

1519. 
State    V.    Rigley     (7    Idaho,    292; 

62  Pac.  679),   2039,  2069. 
State   V.   Riley    (86    Me.    144;    29 

Atl.    920),    1087. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cccxxv 


FReferences  are  to  pages.] 


State  V.  Riley    (100  Mo.  493;    13 

S.  W.  1063),  2041,  2054,  2055, 

205G,  2079. 
State  V.  Riley    (3  Hill  L.    [S.  C.J 

65),   1459. 
State  V.  Rinke    ([Mo.]    121   S.  W. 

159),  882,  892,  902,  924. 
State  V.   Ripley    (104   N.   C.    752; 

10    S.    E.    259),    2057,    2059, 

2086. 
State  V.  Ritzman   (8  Ohio  S.  &  P. 

685),   1481,   1697. 
State    V.    Roach     (74    Me.    360), 

1037. 
State    V.    Roach     (74    Me.     562), 

1479. 
State  V.  Roach    (75  Me.  123),  49, 

968. 
State    V.    Roan     (122    Iowa,    136; 

97  X.  W.  997),  2038,  2060. 
State    V.    Robbins     (54    N.    J.    L. 

566;    25   Atl.   471),   797,   878, 

879. 
State  V.   Robbins    ([Me.]    14  Atl. 

584),   1717,   1724. 
State  V.  Robbins  (51  Mo.  82),  228, 

248. 
State    V.    Roberts     (33    Mo.    App. 

524),  1609. 
State  V.  Roberts  (74  N.  H.  476;  69 

Atl.  722),   163,   186,  496,  976. 
State  V.  Roberts   (55  N.  H.  483), 

1615,  1616. 
State  V.  Roberts    (74  X.  li.  476; 

69  Atl.  722),  279. 
State  V.  Robinson    (111   Ala.  482; 

20  So.  30),  61,  64,  2032. 
State  V.   Robinson    (33   Me.   564), 

1038,    1043,    1044,    1048,    1051, 

1062,  1063,  1074,  1530. 
State  V.  Robinson    (39   Me.    150), 

1572. 
State   V.   Robinson    (49   Me.  285), 

306,  307,  313,  316,  1016,  1049, 

1051,  1056,  1074,  1589. 
State  V.  Robinson   (101  Minn.  277; 

112  N.  W.  269),  171. 
State  V.  Robinson    ( 129  Mo.  App. 

147;    108   S.  W.   619),   940. 


State  V.  Robinson   (17  X.  H.  263), 

nm. 

State  V.  Robinson  (116  X.  C.  1046; 

21  S.  E.  701),  382. 
State  V.   Robinson    (61    S.  C.   106; 

39  S.  E.  247),  968,  1677,  1698. 
State    V.    Robinson     (20    W.    Va. 

713;   43  Am.  Rep.  799),  2039, 

2044,   2045,   2051,   2061,   2063, 

2067,   2070,   2071,   2072. 
State  V.  Rock  (9  Tex.  369),  198. 
State  V.  Rockwell   (82  Iowa,  429; 

48  X.  W.  721),  1738. 
State    V.    Roehm     (61     Mo.    82), 

1567. 
State    V.    Rogers     (39    Mo.    431), 

1491,   1505,  1501,   1537. 
State    V.    Rohrer     (34    Kan.    427; 

8  Pac.  718),  1479. 
State  V.  Rolle    (30  La.  Ann.  991), 

202,  428,  792. 
State  V.  Roller   (77  Mo.  120),  825, 

831,  833. 
State    V.    Rollins     (77    Me.    380), 

1542,    1550. 
State  V.  Rollins    (113  X.  C.   722; 

18  S.  E.  394),  2258. 
State    V.    Ronan     (37    Fed.    117), 

208. 
State   V.    Roney    fl33    Iowa,   416; 

110  X.  W.  604),  344. 

State  V.  Rosenberg  (212  Mo.  648; 

111  S.  W.  509),  1280. 

State   V.   Rosenblatt    ( 9  Mo.   App. 

587),  279,  558. 
State  V.  Ross    (58    S.    C.   444;    36 

S.  E.  659),  554,  1754. 
State  V.  Rosum    (8  X.  D.  548;    80 

X.  VV.  477),  1090,  1454,  1455, 

1742. 
State  V.  Rouch    (47  Ohio  St.  475; 

25   X.   E.  59),   198,   233,   281, 

433. 
State  V.  Rowell  (75  S.  C.  494; 

56  S.  E.  23),  2038,  2068,  2070, 

2082. 
State  V.  Roy  (119  La.  417;  44 

So.  159),  1638. 
State  V.  Ruark  (34  Mo.  App.  325), 

650,  883,  885,  893. 


CCCXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State  V.  Ruby  ( 68  Me.  543 ) ,  1549. 
State   V.   Rudolph    {3   Hill   L.    [S. 

C]  257),  1503. 
State  V.   Rudy    (9   Pan.    App.   60; 

57  Pac.  263),  1613,  1652. 
State  V.  Rundlett   (33  N.  11.  70), 

1650,  1740. 
State    V.    Runyan     (26    Mo.    167, 

169),  1457. 
State  V.  Rupperty   (70  Iowa,  160; 

30  N,  W.  391),  1546. 
State  V.   Rush    (13  R.   1.    198),  8, 

12,  45,  85,  962.  9t;6. 
State  V.   Rushing    (140   Ala.    187; 

36  So.  1007),  475. 
State  V.  Russell    (1  Hou.st.   [Del.] 

122),  2035. 
State    V.   Russell    ([Del.]    69    Atl. 

839),   1172,   1205,   1372,   1376. 
State   V.    Russell    (69    Minn.   499; 

72  N.  \V.  837),  1510,  1512. 
State    V.    Russell     (99    Mo.    App. 

373;  73  S.  W.  297),  834,  1375, 

1649. 
State    V.    Rust    (35    X.    II.    438), 

1500. 
State    V,    Ryan     (50    Conn.    411), 

1126. 
State  V.  Ryan    (68  Conn.  512;   37 

Atl.  377),   1722. 
State  V.  Ryan  ( [La.]  48  So.  537 ) , 

63. 
State    V.    Ryan    (81    Me.    107;    16 

Atl.  406),  1461,  1549. 
State  V.  Ryan  (30  Mo,  App.  159), 

1457,  1497,  1499. 
State  V.  Ryan  (70  Wis.  076;  36 

N.  VV.  823),  65. 
State  V.  St.  Louis  Club  ( 125  Mo. 

308;  28  S.  W.  604;  20  L.  R. 

A.  573),  537,  1329,  1332,  1338. 
State  V.  Salikowski  ([Del.]  69  At!. 

839),  1241,  1448. 
State  V.  Salts    (77   Iowa,   193;   39 

N.  W.  107),  829,  1094,  1102. 
State  V.  Salveraon    (87  Minn.  40; 

91  N.  W.  1),  2247. 
State    V.    Sanborn     (38    Me.    32), 

1018. 


State  V.  Sanford    (67   Conn.  286; 

34  Atl.  1045),  1766. 
State  V.   Sanford    (15   S.   D.    153; 

87  N.  W.  592),  1241. 
State  V.  Sanger   ( [Ark.]  88  S.  W. 

903),  910,  1686. 
State  V.  Sannerud   (38  Minn.  229; 

36    N.    VV.    447),    1538,    1539, 

1640,  1641,  1648. 
i   State    V.    Sargent    (  [Vt.]    69   Atl. 

825),  884,  890. 
State  V.   Sartin    (55  Iowa,  340;   7 

N.  W.  604),  1591. 
State  V.  Sartori    (55  Iowa,  340;   7 

N.  W.  604),  1658. 
State  V.  Sasse  (6  S.  D.  212;  60  N. 

W.    853;     55    Am.    St.    834), 

1237. 
State  V.  Sattley   (131  Mo.  464;  33 

S.  W.  41)^  264,  1585. 
State   V.   Saunders    (66   N.   IL   39; 

25  Atl.  588;   18  L.  R.  A.  646), 

981. 
State  V.  Savage   (89  Ala.  1;   7  So. 

70;  7  L.  R.  A.  427),  01,  2031, 

2032,  2262. 
State  V.   Savage    (48   N.   H.   484), 

1513,  1516. 
State  V.   Sawyer    (67  Vt.  239;   31 

Atl.  285),   1766. 
State   V.    Saxaner    (48    Mo.    454), 

1739. 
State  V.  Scale    (36  Ind.  App.   73; 

74  II.  E.   1111),  1907. 
State  V.  Scampini    (77  Vt.  92;   59 

Atl.  201),  230,  282,  957,  1159, 

1183,    1184,    1192,    1193,   1512. 
State   V.   Scarlett    (38    Ark.   563), 

1521. 
State  V.   Scatena    (84  Minn.   281; 

87  N.  W.  764),  467. 
State    V.    Schaefer     (44    Kan.    90; 

24    P.    92),    43,    49,    50,    968, 

1185,  1708,  1709. 
State     V.      Scharrer      (2      Coldw. 

[Tenn.]  323),  215. 
State  V.  Schell  (  [S.  D.]  117  X.  W. 

505).  1538. 
State  V.  Schilling   (14  Iowa,  455), 

1484,   1548,    1550,    1551,    1741. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXXVIJ 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State   V,   Schingen    (20   Wis.   75), 

2079,  2080,  2081. 
State  V.  Schleuter    (110  Mo.  App. 

7;   83  S.  W.   1012),   1448. 
State  V.  Schmail    (25  Minn.  368), 

522,  1503,  1508,   1509. 
State  V.   Schmidt    (34    Kan.   399; 

8  Pac.  867),  1516,  1640. 
State    V.    Schmidt     (57    N.    J.    L. 

625;  31  Atl.  280),  1556. 
State  V.  Schmidtz   (65  Iowa,  556; 

22  N.  W.  673),  675,  743,  749, 

879. 
State    V.    Schmitz    (36    Mo.    App. 

550),  851. 
State  V.   Schmulbacli   Brewing  Co. 

56  W.  Va.  333;  49  S.  E.  249), 

543. 
State  V,   Schneider    (47   Mo.  App. 

669),  668,  674. 
State    V.    Schoenthaler     (63    Kan. 

148;   65  Pac.  235),   1093. 
State   V.    Scliraps    (97    Minn.    62; 

106  N.  W.  106),  279. 
State  V.  Schreiber    (98   Jnd.  332), 

1554. 
State  V.  Schreiner   ( 86  Minn.  253 ; 

90  N.  W.  401),  756. 
State  V.  Schroeder   (51  Iowa,  197; 

1  N,  VV.  431),  168,  407,  424. 
State  V.  Schroeder   (43  INlinn.  231; 

45  N.  W.    149;    45   jNIinn.  44; 

47  N.  W.  308),  540,  541,  1194. 
State  V.  Schroeder    (3  Hill  L.   [S. 

C]     61),     1223,     1246,     1459, 

1502. 
State    V,    Schroff     (123    Wis.    98; 

100    N.    W.    1030),    716,    732, 

748. 
State  V.  Schuler    (109  Iowa,   111; 

80  N.  W.  213),  1449. 
State   V.    Schultz    (79    Iowa,    478; 

44  N.  W.  713),  993. 
State  V.  Schwartz    (25  Tex.  764), 

1515. 
State    V.    Schweickardt     (109    Mo. 

496;  19  S.  W.  47).  190.  980. 
State  V.  Sehweifer   (27  Kan.  499), 

1446,  1502,  1500.  1641. 


State  V.  Scott   (96  Mo,  App.  620; 

70  S.  W.  736),  539,  577. 
State  V.  Scroggins  (107  N.  C.  959; 

12  S.  E.  59;  10  L.  K.  A.  542), 

1229,  1365,  1367. 
State   V.   Scott    (116   N.   C.    1012; 

21  S.  E.  194),  1753. 
State  V.  Searcy   (20  Mo.  489),  111, 

138. 
State  V.  Searcy   (111  Mo.  236;   20 

S.  W.  186),  1465,  1642,  1687, 

1688. 
State    V.    Searcy     (39    Mo.    App. 

393),    893,    1465,    1468,    1688, 

1750. 
State  V.  Searcy  (  46  Mo.  App.  421 ), 

832,  907,  908,  1687,  1688. 
State  V.   Scarlett    (38   Ark.   563), 

1525. 
State  V.  Seattle   ([Wash.]  71  Pac. 

712),  807,  808. 
State  V.  Seebold   (192  Mo.  720;  91 

S.  W.  491),  282,  718,  720. 
State  V.  Seelig  (16  N.  D.  177;  112 

N.  W.   140),   1706. 
State  V.  Seibert  (98  Mo.  App.  212; 

71  S.  W.  95),  567,  576,  646. 
State  V,  Sejours   (113  La.  676;  37 

So.  599),  2258. 
State   V.    Semmes    ( [Ala.]    50    So. 

120),  1749. 
State   V.    Settles    (34    Mont.   448;; 

87  Pac.  445),  208,  578. 
State  V.  Severson    (88  Iowa,  714; 

54  N.  H.  347),  981,  993. 
State  V.  Sevier   (117  Ind.  338;   20 

N.  E.  245 ) ,  2026. 
State   V.    Sewell    (3   Jones  L.    [N. 

C]    245),  2051,  2082. 
State   V.   Shackle    (29   Kan.   341), 

1490,   1554,   1583. 
State   V.    Shafer    (20    Kan.    226), 

1717. 
State  V.  Shafer  (82  Mo.  App.  58), 

1458. 
State  V.  Shanahan  (54  N.  H.  497), 

389. 
Slate  V.  Sliaiik    (74  Inva.  C-i:);   T.S 

N.   W.    523),   827,   831,    1088, 

1094,  1102,  1591,  1660,  1754. 


CCCXXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


tReferences   are   to    pages.] 


State  V.  Shanks  (98  Mo.  App.  138; 

71  S.  W.  1065),  826,  832. 
State    V.    Sharpe    (119    Mo.    App. 

386;   95  S.  VV.  298),  836,  969. 
State  V,  Sharrer    (2  Cddw.  323), 

23,  27,  304,  965. 
State    V.    Shaw     (23    Iowa,    316), 

1760. 
State  V.  Shaw   (8  Kan.  App.  679; 

57  Pac.  137),  1187,  1188. 
State  V.  Shaw   (32  Me.  570),  497, 

503,  756,   1638,  1639. 
State   V.    Shaw    (35    N.    H.    217), 

1482,  1511,  1513. 
State  V.  Shaw  (58  X.  H.  72),  830, 

1616. 
State    V.    Shaw    (13    X.    C.    198), 

1499. 
State  V.  Shawbeck    (7  Iowa,  322), 

1742. 
State  V.  Shearer    (8  Blackf.  362), 

1479,  1489. 
State  V.   Sheasley    (71   Kan.   857; 

78   Pac.   997),    211,   247,    632, 

662. 
State  V.  Shelton  (38  Ind.  App.  80; 

77  S.  E.  1052),  1318. 
State  V.   Shelton    (16  Wash.  590; 

48  Pac.  258),  841,  1210,  1613, 

1643. 
State  V.  Shenkle   (36  Kan.  43;    12 

Pac.  309),  1219. 
State  V.  Sheppard    (64  Kan.  451; 

67  Pac.  870),  269,  1084. 
State  V.  Sheriff  (38  La.  Ann.  975), 

520. 
State  V.   Sherman    (50   Mo.   265), 

448,  522. 
State  V.    Sherman    ([Mo.]    119    S. 

W.  476),  1575. 
State  V.  Slierman  (  [Mo.  App.]  119 

S.  W.  479),  1638. 
State  V.  Shields    (8  Blackf.   151), 

1444. 
State  V.  Shields   (110  La.  547;  34 

So.  673),  1161,  1164,  1280. 
State  V.  Shinn    (63  Kan.  638;    66 

Pac.  650),  1254,  1458,  1520. 
State  V.  Shine   (149  X.  C.  400;  62 

S.  E.  1080),  1573. 


State  V.  Shoemaker    (4  Ind.  100), 

1563. 
State  V.  Shorten    (93  Mo.   123;    5 

S.  W.  691),  1353,  1359. 
State  V.  Shunate   ( [W.  Va.]  29  S. 

E.   1001),  1332. 
State  V.  Shuster   ( 63  X.  J.  L.  355 ; 

46  Atl.  1101),  1286. 
State  V.   Sies    (30  La.   Ann.  918), 

520. 
State  V.  Sills    (56  Mo,  App.  408), 

1499. 
State    V.    Simmons    (3    Mo.    414), 

228. 
State  V.  Simmons   (66  X.  C.  622), 

1365,    1625. 
State   V.   Simons    (17    X.   H.   83), 

1621. 
State    V.    Sims     (16    S.    C.    4SG), 

2033. 
State  V.  Sinks   (42  Ohio  St.  345), 

200. 
State    V,    Sinnott    (15    Xeb.    472; 

19    X.    W.    613),    215,    1303, 

1304,  1741. 
State  V.   Sioux  Falls  Brewing  Co. 

(5  S.  D.  39;   58  X.  W.  1;   26 

L.    Pv.    A.    138),    11,    43,    83, 

1712. 
State  V.  Sioux   Falls,  etc.,  Co.    ( 2 

S.    D.    363;    50    X.    W.    629), 

985. 
State  V.  Sitterle  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

26  S.  W.   764),   758. 
State    V.    Skeggs    (154    Ala.    249; 

46    So.    268),     110,    234,    251, 

285. 
State  V.  Skillicorn,  (104  Iowa,  97; 

73    X.    W.    503),    969,     1101, 

1102,    1104,    1612,    1633,    1704. 
State  V.  Skillicorn   (109  Iowa,  97; 

73  X.  W.  503),  1711. 
State    V,    Skinner    (34   Kan.    256; 

8    Pac.    420),    1349. 
State  V.  Slack    (52  X.  J.  L.    113; 

18  Atl.  687),  807. 
State  V.   Slate    (24  Mo.   530),   73. 
State   V.   Slaughter    (17   Mo.  App. 

142),   1223,   1224. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXXIX 


rHeferences   are   to   pages.] 


State  V.  Slentz  ( 27  Ind.  App.  558 ; 

Gl  N.  E.  956),  214,  342,  346, 

1485,    1535,    1566. 
State   V.    Sloss    (25    Alo.    291;    69 

Am.  Dec.  467 ) ,  260. 
State     V.     Small      (80     Me.     452; 

14  Atl.  942),  1650,   1655. 
State    V.    Small     (31    Mo.     197), 

1483,   1649. 
State    V.    Small     (64    N.    H.    491; 

14   Atl.   727),    1572. 
State  V.   Smiley    (101   X.   C.   709; 

7   S.  E.   904),   382,   928,   933. 
State  V.  Small    ( [S.  C]    60  S.  E. 

676),   951,   1180,   1206. 
State   V.   Smause    (50    Iowa,   43), 

1444. 
State    V.    Smith    (49    Conn.    376), 

2085. 
State   V.    Smith    (26    Fla.    427;    7 

So.  848),  928,  931. 
State  V.  Smith    (122  Ind.   178;   23 

N.  E.  714),   1257,  1461,  1565, 

1566,   1631,   1633. 
State    V.    Smith     (74    Iowa,    580; 

38  N.  VV.  492),  840,  1646. 
State   V.   Smith    (132    Iowa,    645; 

109   N.   W.    115),   2247. 
State    V.   Smith    (135    Iowa,   523; 

113   N.   W.    336),    1528. 
State  V.  Smith   (54  Me.  33),  1021. 
State    V.    Smith     (61     Me.    386), 

1448. 
State  V.  Smith  (38  Mo.  App.  618), 

850,  851,  857,  885,  887,   1713. 
State  V.   Smith    (117    N.   C.   809; 

23  N.  E.  449),  1198. 
State  V.   Smith    (126  N.  G.  1057; 

35   S.   E.   615),   382,   1476. 
State   V.    Smith     (3    Heisk.    465), 

2024. 
iState    V.    Smith     (35    Tex.    132), 

1442,   1554. 
State  V.  Smith   (22  Vt.  74),  1609. 
State  V.  Smith    (55  Vt.  57),  1747. 
State   V.    Smith    (81    Vt.   291;    69 

Atl.   762),    1217. 
State  V.  Smith    (61   W.  Va.   329; 

56  S.  E.  528),   1605. 


State   V.    Sneed    (88    Mo.    138;    3 

West.   Rep.  797),   2041,  2067, 

2085. 
State    V.    Snow     (3    Penn.    [Del.] 

259;  51  Atl.  607),  2039,  2077, 

2078. 
State  V.  Snow  (117  N.  C.  778;  23 

S.  E.  323),  136,  1476. 
State  V.  Snow  (3  R.  I.  64),  253, 

254,  255,  294,  1008,  1010, 

1050,  1067. 
State   V.  Snyder    (108  Iowa,  205; 

78  S.  W.  807),  1163. 
State   V.    Snyder     (34    Kan.    425; 

8    Pac.    Rep.    425),    222,    226, 

1163. 
State   V.  Soale    (36  Ind.  App.  73; 

74  N.  E.  1111),  1910. 
State    V.    Sodini     (84    Minn.    444; 

87   N.   VV.    1130),    1130,    1133, 

1363. 
State    V.    Solio     (4    Penn.     [Del.] 

138;   54  Atl.  684),  1557. 
State  V.  Solkowski   ([Del.]  69  Atl. 

839),  1557. 
State  V.    Solomon    (33   Ind.   450), 

136, 
State  V.  Somerville    (21   Mo.  20), 

1063. 
State  V.  Somerville   ( 1  Ohio  N.  P. 

422),  132,   1768. 
State    V.    Sommers    (3    Vt.    156), 

1523. 
State    V.    Sopher    (157    Ind,    360; 

61  N.  E.  785),   196,  671,  672. 
State   V.   Sopher    (70    Iowa,   494), 

2044,  2047,  2067,  2077. 
State  V.    Sorrell    (98    N.    C.    738; 

4  S.  E.  630),  1643. 
State   V.   South    Omaha    (33    Xeb. 

856;    51  N.  W.  291),  568. 
State  V.   Sowers    (111   N.   C.  685; 

16    S.    E.    315),    1093,    1095, 

2027. 
State     V.    Spain     (29     Mo.     415)5 

1505,  1507. 
State    V.    Sparegrove     ( 134    Iowa, 

599;     112    N.    W.    83),    2038, 

2060,  2069,   2082. 


cccxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.  1 


State  V.   Sparrow    (3   Murph.    [N. 

C]  487),  2246,  2252. 
State  V.   Spaulding    (61    Vt.   505; 

17    Atl.   844),   49,    968,    1096, 

1103,   1490,   1491,   1493,    1598, 

1635,   1677,   1724. 
State   V.   Spaulding    (60   Vt.   228; 

14   Atl.    769),    1729,    1732. 
State  V.  Spence  (87  Mo.  App.  577), 

1641. 
State    V.   Spiers    (103    Iowa,    711; 

73  N,  W.  343),  1043,  1084. 
State    V.    Spirituous    Liquors    (39 

Me.  262),  1048. 
State    V.    Spirituous    Liquors     (68 

N.  H.  47;   40  Atl.  398),  1011. 
State  V.   Spirituous   Liquors    ( [N. 

H.]    73  Atl.    169),   1061. 
State  V.  Spokane  (2  Wash.  St.  40; 

25  Pac.  903),  492,  807. 
State    V.    Squires     (26    la.    340), 

228. 
State    V.    Stacks    ([Miss.]    26    So. 

962),  1443. 
State    V.    Stallord     (67    Me,    125), 

978. 
State  V.   Stakke    ( [S.  D.]    117   S. 

W.  129;   118  S.  W.  703),  906, 

937. 
State    V.    Staley     (3     Lea,    565), 

1505. 
State  V.   Stamey    (71   N.   C.   202), 

1502,    1524,   1569. 
State  V.  Standish    (37  Kan.  643), 

1175. 
State  V.  Stanley    (84  Me.  555;   24 

Atl.  983),   1096,   1461. 
State  V.  Stanton   (37  Conn.   421), 

1383. 
State    V.    Stanton's    Liquors     (38 

Conn.    233),    1075. 
State    V.    Staples     (37    Me.    228), 

1018,   1048. 
State    V.    Staples     (45    Me.    320), 

1455. 
State    V.    Stapp     (29    Iowa,    551), 

8,  29,  39. 
State  V.  Stark    (63  Kan.   529;    66 

Pac.  243;  54  L.  R.  A.  910), 

986. 


State  V.  Stark  ( 1  Strob.  L.  [S.  C.J 

479),  2040,  2052. 
State  V.  Starr  (67  Me.  242),  38, 

1753. 
State  V.  State  Board  (78  S.  C. 

461;  59  S.  E.  145),  898. 
State  V.  Steedman  (8  Rich.  L. 

312),  1502. 
State  V.  Steele  (84  Mo.  App.  316). 

831. 
State  V.  Steifel  (74  Md.  546;  22 

Atl.  1),  1194. 
State  V.  Stephens  (70  Mo.  App. 

554),  1608,  1643,  1652,  1653, 

1718. 
State  V.  Stephens  (36  N.  H.  59), 

2026. 
State  V.  Stephens  ( [N.  D.]  123 

N.  W.  888),  1486,  1742,  1743, 

1762. 
State  V.  Stephens  ( 1  Mo.  App.  Kep. 

500),  1499. 
State  V.  Sterling  (8  Mo.  697), 

182. 
State  V.  Sterns  (28  Kan.  154), 

512,  1365,  1480,  1491,  1625. 
State  V.  Stevens  (119  Iowa,  675; 

94  N.  W.  241),  1084,  1102, 

1104. 
State    V.    Stevens     (47    Me.    357), 

1062,   1063,   1648. 
State  V.  Stevens    (114  N.  C.  873; 

19  S.  E.  861),  382,  414. 
State  V.   Stevens    (8   Ohio  Dec.   6; 

5  Ohio  N.  P.  354),  233. 
State   V.    Steward    (31    Me.    515), 

25,  28,  1357,  1554,  1753. 
State   V.    Stibbens    (188   Mo.   387; 

87  S.  W.  460),  2080. 
State   V.   Stiefel    (74   Md.  546;    22 

Atl.  1),  549,  550. 
State  V.  Stifl'   (104  Mo.  App.  685; 

78  S.  W.  075),  628,  630,  648. 
State  V.  Stilsing  (52  X.  J.  L.  517: 

20  Atl.   65),   159,  307,  313. 
State  V.  Stilsing    (23  Vroom,  517; 

20  Atl.  65),  159. 
State    V.    Stinson     (17    Me.    154), 
1447,   1534,   1739. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXXXl 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


State  V.  Stock    (95  Mo.  App.  55; 

68  S.  W.  579),  1457,  1458. 
State  V.  Stockman    (9   Kau.   App. 

888;     58     Pac.     1000),     1357, 

1661,  1689. 
State  V.  Stockman   (82  S.  €.  388; 

64  S.  E.  595),  63. 
State  V.   Stoffels    (89   Minn.   205; 

94  K.  W.  675),  110,  225,  1008, 

1059,   1662,   1670. 
State  V.  Stommel   (84  la.  751;   52 

N.  W.  557),  452. 
State  V.  Stone   (54  Vt.  550),  1544. 
State  V.  Storm    (74  Kan.  859;   86 

Pac.  145),  1643. 
State   V.    Story    (87    Minn.   5;    91 

K  W.  26),   1205. 
State  V.  Stout    (96  Ind.  407),   10. 
State  V,  Stovall    (103   N.   C.   416; 

8  S.  E.  900),  132,  133. 
State  V.   Stover    (111   La.   92;    35 

So.  405),  1650. 
State   V.    Strauss    (49    Md.    288), 

263,  459,  1135. 
State  V.  Strathmann    (4  Mo.  App. 

[abstract]    583),   498. 
State  V.  Strickford  (70  N.  H.  297; 

47  Atl.  262),  981. 
State  V.  Strobh.  L.   (  [S.  C]   470), 

2051. 
State    V.    Strodemeir     (41     Wash. 

159;  83  Pac.  22),  2251. 
State    V.    Stroeschein     (99    Minn. 

248;   109  N.  W.  235),  1225. 
State     V.     Stubblefield      (40     Fed. 

454),  59. 
State  V.   Stucker    (33   Iowa,  395), 

1372,   1375. 
State  V.  Stucker    (58  la.   490;    12 

N.  W.  483),  110,  158. 
State  V.  Stuckey    (2  Bkickf.  289), 

1502,  1504,  1508. 
State   V.    Stultz    (20    Iowa,    488), 

452,  523,  1730. 
State  V.   Suitor    (78   Vt.   391;    03 

Atl.    182),    1084,    1085,    1091, 

1530,   1531,   1662. 
State  V.  Sullivan   (83  Me.  417;  22 

Atl.  381),  1375. 


State  V.  Summers    (142  Mo.  586; 

4  S.  W.  797),  826,  1384,  1385. 
State   V.   Summers    (50   So.    120), 

279. 
State  V.  Summey   (60  X.  C.  496), 

972. 
State  V.  Sumter  Co.    (22  Fla.   1), 

525),  567,  568,  576,  585,  636, 

694. 
State  V.  Sundquist  ([Wis.]  118  N, 

W.  836),  903,  926. 
State  V.   Sundry  Persons    (2   Ohio 

Dec.  435),  975,  995,  998. 
State  V.  Superior  Court  (49  Wasli. 

268;   94  Pac.   1086),   168. 
State  V.  Superior  Court   ( [Wash.] 

87  Pac.  818),  747. 

State    V.    Sutton     (25    Mo.    303), 

1513. 
State   V.   Sutton    (100  N.   C.  474; 

6  S.  E.  687),  492,  1497,  1499. 
State  V.  Sutton    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

40  S.  W.  501),  1341. 
State  V.  Swallum    (111  Iowa,  37; 

32  X.  W.  439),  561,  1184. 
State   V.    Swan    (14   N.   W.   492), 

491. 
State  V.  Swanson    (85  Minn.    112; 

88  X.  W.  410),  957. 

State  V.  Swearingen  ( 128  Mo.  App. 

005;    107   S.   W.   1),  890,  896, 

1685. 
State  V.  Sweizowski  (73  Kan.  733; 

85  Pac.  800),  1598. 
State  V.  Swift  (35  W.  Va.  542;   14 

S.  E.  135),  551. 
State   V.    Swisher    (17    Tex.   441), 

232,  240. 
State  V.  Sykes  (104  X.  C.  694;   10 

S.  E.  191),  1285. 
State  V.  Taber   (34  Ind.  App.  393; 

72  X.  E.   1039),  1108. 
State   V.   Tague    (76   Vt.    118;    56 

Atk  535),  1169,  1173,  1178. 
State  V.  Tall    (56  Wis.  577;   14  X. 

W.  596),   1455,   1519. 
State  V.  Tamler    (19  Ore.  528;   25 

Pac.  71),  1510. 
State  V.  Tanner   (50  Kan.  365;  31 

Pac.  1096),  1554,  1555. 


CCCXXXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State  V.  Tarver  (11  Lea,  758),  247, 

542,  1279. 
State  V.   Tatlow    (34   Kan.    10;    8 

Pac.  267),  2346,  2248. 
State  V.  Tatro   (50  Vt.  483),  2039, 

2071. 
State  V.  Taylor  (70  Mo.  52),  1524. 
State  V.  Taylor  (72  Mo.  52),  1512. 
State  V.  Taylor   (134  Mo.   109;  35 

S.  W.  92),  2246. 
State   V.   Taylor    (89   N.   C.   577), 

1180,  1198,  1615. 
State  V.  Teague   ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

Ill  S.  W.  234),  757,  758. 
State   V.   Teahan    (50    Conn.    92), 

1165,   1167,    1221,   1446,   1491, 

1501,  1578,  1729. 
State  V.  Teasdale   (145  N.  C.  422; 

58  S.  E.  744),  1507. 
State  V.  Tegder   ( 6  Kan.  App.  762 ; 

50  Pac.  985),  1104,  1454. 
State   V.   Teissedre    (30  Kan.   210, 

476;   2  Pac.   108),  38,  39,  84, 

111,  1516. 
State  V.  Terheide    (166   Ind.  689; 

78  N.  E.  195),  767,  771,  778, 
782. 

State  V.  Terry  ( 104  Mo.  App.  400; 

79  S.  W.  477),  1361. 

State  V.  Terry    (72  N.  J.  L.  375; 

61   Atl.    148;    affirmed,   73   N. 

J.   L.   554;    64   Atl.    113),   52, 

832. 
State  V.  Terry    (73  N.  J.  L.  554; 

64  Atl.  113;  affirming  72  N.  J. 

P.    375;     01    Atl.     148),    971, 

1643,  1644. 
State  V.  Terry    (4  Dev.  &  B.    [N. 

C]   185),  370.  1576. 
State  V.   Terry    (9    Ired.    [N.    C] 

378),  370! 
State   V.    Terry    (35     Tex.     366), 

1523. 
State  V.  Thibodeaux   (69  Miss.  92; 

10  So.  58),  801. 
State     V.     Thoemke      (11     N.     D. 

386;     92    N.    W.    480),    1083, 
1176,  1203. 
State  V.   Thomas    (47    Conn.    546; 

36  Am.  Pvep.  98),  264,  265. 


State  V.  Thomas    ( 1  Houst.  Crim 

Rep.   [Del.]   511),  2041,  2051 

2052. 
State   V.    Thomas    (74    Kan.    360 

86  Pac.  499),  259,  288,  998. 
State  V.  Thomas   (118  N.  C.  1221 

24  S.  E.  535;  442,  454. 
State   V.   Thomas    (7    Rich   L.    [S 

C]    481),    1457,    1459. 
State  V.  Thomasson    (19  Ind.  99) 

1306,  1307. 
State  V.  Thompson  (44  Iowa  399) 

1033,   1678,   1044,   1049,   1074, 

1483. 
State  V.  Thompson   (74  Iowa  119 

37  N.  W.  104),  827,  828,  841 

1237,   1646. 
State  V.  Thompson  ( 130  Iowa  227 

106   N.   W.   515),    1002. 
State  V.  Thompson    (2  Kan.  432) 

1510,  1521. 
State  V.  Thompson   (42  Mich.  594 

4  N.  W.  536),  1912,  1918. 
'State  V.  Thompson   (12  Nev.  140), 

2040,   2045,  2050. 
State     V.     Thompson     ( 1     Wright 

[Ohio]    617),  2040,  2048. 
State    V.    Thompson     (20    W.    Va. 

674),   25,   29,   41,   822. 
State    V.   Thornburn    (75   Vt.    18; 

52  Atl.  1039),  968. 
State  V.  Thornton    (Busb.   L.    [N. 

C]    252),   1107,  1109,   1495. 
State   V.   Thurman    (65   Kan.   90; 

68  Pac.   1081),   1550. 
State    V.    Tibbetts     (35    Me.    81), 

1752. 
State   V.    Tierney    (74   Iowa,   237; 

37  N.  W.   176),   1670. 
State  V.  Till   ( 1  Houst.  Crim.  Rep. 

[Del.]    233),  2041,  2045. 
State    V.    Tincher     (21    Ind.    App. 

142;     51    X.    E.     943),    2025, 

2027. 
State    V.    Tindall     (40    Mo.    App. 

271),  1341. 
State   V.   Tisdale    (54    Minn.    105; 

55  y.  W.  903),  1753. 
State    V.    Tissing     (74    Mo.    72), 

1650. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXXXIU, 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Btate  V.  Titrich    (34  W.  Vt.  137; 

11  S.  E.   1002),  838. 
State   V.    Toler    (145    N.    C.    440; 

58    S.    E.    1005),    2G4,    1508, 

1732. 
State  V.  Tomah    (80  Wis.  198;   49 

K   W.   753),   737. 
State    V.     Tomlinson     (77    N.    C. 

528),    1476. 
State  V.  Tomlinson    (7  X.  D.  294; 

74  N.  W.  995),  2250. 
State   V.  Tonks    (15   R.   I.   385;    5 

Atl.  636),   121,  147,  491,  495, 

716. 
State  V.  Toohy    (2  Eice,  Dig.    [S. 

C]    105),   2040. 
State  V.  Topeka    (30  Kan.  653;    2 

Pac.  387;  31  Kan.  452;  2  Pac. 

597),    169,   475. 
State    V.    Topeka     (31    Kan.    586; 

3    Pac.   320;    31    Kan.   452;    2 

Pac.   593),   434,   442. 
State    V.    Totman     (82    Mo.    App. 

56),    1159. 
State  V.  Towler    ( 19  Ore.  528 ;   25 

Pac.    71;    9    L.    R.    A.    853), 

1521. 
State  V.  Tovvnley   (3  Har.   [N.  J.] 

311),  6,   1521. 
State   V.   Tracey    (12   R.   I.   216), 

1445. 
State   V.    Trageser    (73    Md.    250; 

20  Atl.  905;   25  Am.  St.  587; 

9  L.  R.  A.  780),  189. 
State  V.  Trenton  (51  N.  J.  L.  498; 

18  Atl.   116),  169. 
State  V.  Truit  (5  Pennewill  [Del.] 

466;  62  Atl.  790),  2038,  2049, 

2069,  2076,  2081. 
State    V.    Tucker     (45    Ark.    55), 

502,    1160. 
State    V.    Tucker     (46    Ind.    355), 

227,   248. 
State    V.    Tucker     (32    Mo.    App. 

620),  883,  885,  886,  887. 
State  V.   Tucker    (127   N.   C.   539; 

37  S.  E.  203),  1624. 
State   V.    Tufts    (56   N.    H.    137), 

1016,    1034. 


State  V.  Tulip    (9  Kan.  App.  454; 

60  Pac.  659),  1520. 

State   V.    Tuller    (34    Conn.    280), 

1484. 
State   V.    Tullock    (108    Mo.    App. 

32;   82   S.  W.  645),  575,   674, 

675. 
State  V.  Turner  (63  Kan.  714; 

66  Pac.  1008),  1105. 
State  V.  Turner  (210  Mo.  77;  107 

S.  W.  1064),  283,  648. 
State  V.  Turner  ( 125  Mo.  App. 

21;  102  S.  W.  599),  1637. 
State  V.  Turner  (1  Wright  [Ohio] 

30),  2040. 
State  V.  Turner  (18  S.  C.  103), 

541. 
State  V.  25  Packages  of  Liquor 

(38  Vt.  387),  1057,  1060, 

1062,  1063,  1712. 
State    V.    Uferty     (70    Iowa    160; 

30  N.  W.  391),  1452. 
State  V.  Uhrig  (14  Mo.  App.  413), 

975,   980. 
State    V.    Union   Social    Club    (82 

S.  C.  142;  63  S.  E.  545),  990. 
State    V.    U.    S.    Express   Co.    (70 

Iowa    271;     30    N.    W.    568), 

1021,   1283. 
State   V.   U:   S.,  etc.,   Ex.   Co.    (60 

N.   H.   219),   791. 
State    V.    Upton     (20    Mo.    397), 

2252. 
State    V.    Valkmar    (20    La.   Ann. 

585),  793. 
State    V.    Valure     (95    Iowa    401; 

64  N.  W.  280),   1185. 
State  V.  Vandenburg    (  [Miss.]   28 

So.    825),    939,    957. 
State  V.  Van  Vliet  (92  Iowa,  476; 

61  N.  W.  241),  931,  977. 
State    V.   Verden    (24   Iowa    126), 

1676. 
State  V.  Vic.  De  Bar  (18  Mo.  395), 

437. 
State    V.    Vierling    (33    Ind.    99), 

662,  663. 
State  V.  Viers    (8.2  loAva,  397;    48 

N.  W.  732),  1083,  1087,  1093, 

1094,    1102. 


CCCXXXIV 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to  pages.] 


State  V.  Virgo   (14  X.  D.  29;    103 

N.  VV.  610),  963,  973. 
State   V.    Volkman    (20    La.    Ann. 

585),   199. 
State    V.    Volmer     (6    Kan.    371), 

S,  38,   41,   1588,   1097. 
State    V.    Von    Haltzschuber     (72 

Iowa,    541;    34    N.    W.    323), 

830. 
State    V.    VV  acker     (71    Wis.    672; 

38  N.  VV.   189),  1102,   1304. 
State   V.    Wade    (34    N.    H.   495), 

1511,  1521. 

State  V.  Wade  (63  Vt.  80;  22  Atl. 
12),    1084,    1588. 

State  V.  Wadsworth  (30  Conn.  55) , 
10,  11,  34,  35,  48,  80,  81, 
82,     1180,     1365,    1377,     1509, 

1512,  1625,  1750. 

State  V.  Wagener   (77  Minn.  483; 

77  Am.  St.  Rep.  081),  426. 
State  V.  Waggoner   (52  Ind.  481), 

2024,   2026. 
State  V.   Walil    ([Mo.]    119  S.   W. 

453),   1178,   1304. 
State   V.   Waite    (72   Vt.    108;    47 

Atl.   397),  50. 
State  V.  Waldron    (16   R.   I.   191; 

14  Atl.  847),  264,  265. 
State  V.  Walker  (103  N.  C.  413;  9 

S.  E.  582),   1228. 
State   V,    Walker    (3    Har.    [Del.] 

547),  1502. 
State  V.  Walker   (16  Me.  241),  69, 

091.  509,   1267. 
State    V.    Walker    ([Mo.]     119    S. 

W.    1198;    affirming    129    Mo. 

App.    371;    108    S.    W.    615), 

1642. 
State  V.  Walker  ( [Mo.]   120  S.  W. 

1198;   affirming  129  Mo.  App. 

371;     108    S.    W.    615),    110, 

121,    174. 
State    V.    Walker    (129    Mo.    App. 

371;    108  S.  W.  615),  784. 
State  V.   Walker    (7   N.   J.  L.   Jr. 

86),  2067. 
State  V.  Walker    (56   N.  H.   76), 

778. 


State  V.  Walker    (Taylor   [N.  C] 

299),    1455. 
State  V.  Wall   (34  Me.  165),  1753. 
State  V.  Wallace    (94  N.  C.  827), 

1456. 
State  V.  Waller    (3   Murph.  229), 

2024. 
State    V.    Walriiff    (26    Fed.    178), 

111,  112, 
State   V.   Walters    (57    Kan.   702; 

47     Pac.     839),     1479,      1480, 

1481. 
State   V.   VV^alterstradt    (74   Minn, 

292;   77  N.  VV.  48),  1627. 
State  V.  Waltz    (74  Iowa,  610;  38 

N.    W.    494),    1550. 
State  V.  Wambold    (72  Iowa,  468; 

34  N.  W.  213),  1483,  1650. 
State  V.  Wambold   (74  Iowa,  605; 

38    X.    VV.   429),    1087,    1594, 

1658. 
State  V.  Warcholik  (80  Conn.  351; 

68  Atl.  379),   1345,  1J47. 
State  V.  Ward    (75  Iowa,  637;   36 

X.  VV.   765),  830,   1253,   1631. 
State  V.   Washburn    (91   Mo.  571; 

4  S.  VV.  274),  2247. 
State    V.    VV'ashington     (44    X.    J. 

L.    318;    43    Am.    Rep.    402), 

263,    459. 
State  V.  VV'atson    (5  Blackf.   155), 

1516,  1519. 
State    V.    Watson     (6    Kan.    App. 

897;    50  Pac.  959),   1104. 
State  V.  Watts    (HI  Mo.   553;    20 

S.  VV.   237),  233. 
State    V.    Watts     (101    Mo.    App, 

666;    74  S.   VV.   376),    19,  43, 

44,   722,    1494. 
State  V.  Watts  (39  Mo.  App.  409), 

893,  1465,  1468,  1752. 
State  V.  Wayricli    (45  Iowa,  516), 

1101. 
State  V.  Weathers   (98  X.  C.  685; 

4  S.  E.  512),  382. 
State    V.    Weaver     (83    Ind.    452), 

1508,    1570. 
State  V.  Weaver   (35  Ore.  415;   58 

Pac.   109),  2038,   2063. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCC2XXV 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


State  V.  Webb  (49  Mo.  App.  407), 

859,   867,   882,  883. 
State   V.   Webber    (76    Iowa,   686; 

39    N.    W.    286),    986,    1094, 

1102. 
State  V.  Webber   (11  Mo.  204;   20 

S.  W.   33),   1357. 
State  V.  Weber    (20  Neb.  467;   30 

N.  W.  531),  576,  616. 
State  V.  Webster  (5  Halst.  [N.  J.] 

293),   1520,   1522. 
State   V.    Wecker    (71   Wis.    577), 

215. 
State  V.  Weckerling   (38  La.  Ann. 

36),  540,  796. 
State    V.    Weeks    (67    Me.    60;    8 

Atl.   754),  383,   476. 
State   V.    Weeks    (93    Mo.    409;    6 

S.  W.  266),  650. 
State  V.  Weeks  (  38  Mo.  App.  566 ) , 

850,   851,   857,   885,   886,   914, 

930. 
State  V.  Weeks    (7   Humph.  522), 

1246,  1505,  1507. 
State  V.  Weir   (33  la.  134;   11  Am. 

Rep.   115),  231,  240. 
State   V.    Welch    (36   Conn.    215), 

275,  449,  456,  457. 
State    V.    Welch     (88    Ind.    308), 

2026. 
State    V.    Welch     (79    Me.    99;    9 

Atl.  348),   1035,   1046. 
State    V.    Welch     (21    Minn.    22), 

2067. 
State  V.  Wells   (28  Mo.  565),  821. 
State    V.    Welsh     (109    Iowa,     19; 

79  N.  W.  369),  2261. 
State  V.  Welsh  ([Me.]  7  Atl.  475), 

1552. 
State    V.    Wentworth     (35    N.    H. 

442),  1503,  1555. 
State  V.  Wentworth    (65  Me.  234; 

2  Atl.  688),  1353,  1354,   1361, 

1616,  1752. 
State  V.  Wenzel  ( 72  N.  H.  396 ;  56 

Atl.  918),  919,   1084. 
State  V.  Werner   ([Kan.]   101  Pac. 

1004),  1739. 
State    V.    West    (69    Mo.    401;    33 

Am.  Rep.  506),  2247. 


State  V.   West    (157   Mo.   309;   57 

S.  W.  1071),  2080. 
State  V.  Wester   (67  Kan.  810;  74 

Pac.  239),   1547. 
State  V.  Western  U.  T.  Co.  ( 73  Me. 

518),  791. 
State   V.  Weyland    (126   Mo.  App. 

723;    105  S.  W.  660),  1455. 
State    V.    Whalen     (85    Me.    469; 

27  Atl.  348),   1048. 
State  V.  Whalen   (54  Iowa,  753;   6 

N.  W.  552),  1491. 
State  V.  Wheat    (48  W.  Va.  259; 

37  S.  E.  544),  953. 
State  V.  Wheeler    (25  Conn.  290), 

109,   120,    126,    192,   211,   253, 

255,  294,  314. 
State  V.   Wheeler    (27   Minn.   76), 

400. 
State    V.    Wheeler     (87    Mo.    App. 

580),    1210. 
State  V.  Wheeler    (62  Vt.  439;   20 

Atl.   601),    1081,    1722. 
State  V.  Wheelock    (95  Iowa,  577; 

64   N.   W.   620;    30   L.   R.   A. 

429),  331. 
State   V.    Wheldon    (6    Kan.    App. 

650;  49  Pac.  786),  995. 
State   V.    Whipple    (57    Vt.    637), 

1650. 
State   V.   Whisemant    ( [N.  C]    63 

S.  E.  91),   1187,  1756. 
State  V.  Whiskey   (54  N.  H.  164), 

1043,    1049. 
State   V.   Whisner    (35   Kan.   271; 

10     Pac.     852),     1491,     1506, 

1581,   1746. 
State  V.   Whissenhunt    (98    N.    C. 

682;  4  S.  E.  533),  1757,  1758. 
State    V.    White     (23    Ark.    275), 

505,  506. 
State    V.    White     (14    Kan.    538), 

2041. 
State   V.   White    (31   Kan.   342;    2 

Pac.  598),  1600. 
State  V.  White   (63  Kan.  882;   65 

Pac.  234),   1623. 
State  V.  White    (115  La.  779;   40 

So.  44),  522,  549,  802. 


CCCXXXVl 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State    r.    White     (7    Baxt.    15S), 

247,  1298. 
State   V.    White    (70   Vt.   225;    39 

Atl.   1U85),   1084,   1651,   1654, 

1658,   1660,  1661,   1705. 
State  V.   White    (72   Vt.    108;    47 

Atl.   397),    968. 
State   V.    White    (10    Wash.    611; 

39    Pac.    160;    41    Pac.    442), 

2259. 
State  V.  Whitener    (23  Ind.  124), 

777. 
State   V.   Whitney    (15   Vt.    298), 

1557. 
State    V.   Whitted    (3    Ala.    102), 

1446, 
State  V.  Whitter  (18  W.  Va.  306), 

1223,  1645. 
State   V.    Whorton    (26    Tex.   Civ, 

App,    262;     63    S.    W.    915), 

760. 
State    V.    Wickey    (54    Ind,    438), 

1450, 
State   V.    Wickey    (57    Ind.    596), 

1450. 
State  V.  Wickmire   (16  Ind.  App. 

348;   45  N.  E.   195),   1537. 
State   V.    Wiggin    (72    Me.    425), 

1729,  1732. 
State  V.  Wiggin    (20  X.  H.  449), 

1180,   1349. 
State  V.   Wilburn    ([Ala.]    39   So. 

816),  382. 
State   V.   Wilcox    (42    Conn.   304), 

232,   240. 
State  V.   Wilcox    (66   Ind.  557;    9 

Cent.    L.   Jr.    408),    498,    500, 

501,  526. 
State    V.    Wilcox    (78    Kan.    597; 

97  Pac.  372),  418. 
State  V.  Wilkinson    (36  Mo.  App. 

373),   1498,   1499. 
State  V.  Williams    (143  Ala.  501; 

39  So.  276),  241,  522,  648. 
State  V.  Williams    ([Ala.]    39   So. 

816),    241. 
State  V.  Williams    (90  Iowa,  513; 

58  N.  W.  904),  994. 
State   V.   Williams    (38   Mo.   App. 

37),  930. 


State   V.   Williams    fCO   Mo.   App. 

284,  286),  832. 
State  V.  Williams   (68  N.  H.  449; 

42    Atl.   898),    1739. 
State    V.    Williams    (30    N.    J,    L. 

102),   309,    1106,    1110. 
State  V.  Williams    (14  N.  D.  411; 

104    X.    W.    546),    969,    1704, 
711. 
State  V.   Williams    (6   Pv.  I.  207}, 

1112,   1115. 
State  V.  Williams    (1   Xott.  &  M. 

26),  1767. 
State  V.   Williams    (3  Hill   L.   [S. 

C]  91),   1362,  1714, 
State  V,  Williams    (11  S.  C,  288), 

271. 
State  V.  Williams    (79  S.  C.   101; 

60  S,  E.  229),  1476. 
State  V.  Williams    (  [X.  C]    61  S. 

E,   61),   111,   127,   128,  139, 
State  V.   Williams    (11   S.   D.   64; 

75  X.  W.  815),  1505,  1533. 
State  V.  Williams    (20  S.  D.  492; 

107,  X.  W.  830),  833,  1624. 
State   V.    Williams    (10   Tex.    Civ. 

App.    346;     30    S.    W.    477), 

123. 
State  V.  Williamson  (19  Mo.  384), 

1488,    1552. 
State  V.  Williamson  (21  Mo.  496), 

32,  80,  1496. 
State  V.  Williamson   (8  Utah  219; 

30   Pac.    753),   2112. 
State    V.    Willard     (39    Mo.    App. 

251),  756. 
State  V.  W^ills   (106  Mo.  App.  196; 

80    S.   W.    311),    1709. 
State  V.  Wilson   (71  Kan.  263;   80 

Pac.   565),   842. 
State  V.   Wilson    (124  La.   82;   49 

So.   986),   2039,  2086. 
State  V.  Wilson   (80  Mo.  303),  58, 

60,  970. 
State    V.    Wilson     (90    Mo.    App. 

154),  676. 
State    V.    Wilson     (39    Mo.    App. 

114),    1643. 
State  V.  Wilson    (104  X.   C.   868; 

10   S.  E.   315),   2039,  2045. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


eccxxxvii 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


State   V.    Wilson    (5    R.    I.    291), 

1591,   1594. 
State  V.   Wilson    (15    R.    I.    180; 

1    Atl.    415),    265,    1677. 
State    V.    Winebrenner    (67    Iowa, 

230;   25   N.  W.    146),   1447. 
State    V.    Winfield    (65    Mo.    App. 

662),   1740,   1741. 
State  V.  Wingfield   (115  Mo.  428; 

22    S.    W.    363;    37    Am.    St. 

406),  1283. 
'State    V.    Winstrand     (37     Iowa, 

110),   1760. 
State   V.   Winters    (44   Kan.   723; 

25  Pac.  235;  10  L.  R.  A.  616), 

309,    313,    324,    327. 
State   V.   Wise    (70   Minn.   99;    72 

N.  W.  843),  210. 
State  V.  Wise   (66  N.  C.  120),  929. 
State  V.  Wiseman   (97  Me.  90;  53 

Atl.  875),   1543. 
State   V.    Wishon    (15    Md.    503), 

1519. 
State  V.  Wisnevvski  (13  N.  D.  649; 

102  N.  W.  883),  1762. 
State    V.    Wister    (62    Mo.    593), 

271. 
State  V.  Witt  (39  Ark.  216),  9,  16, 

18,   81,   961,   962,    1490,   1491. 
State  V.  Witter    (107  N.  C.  792), 

394. 
State   V.   Wittmar    (12   Mo.    407), 

7,  1698,  1753. 
State  V.  Witts  ( 106  Mo.  App.  196; 

80   S.   W.   311),   1700. 
State  V.  Witty  (74  Mo.  App.  550), 

824,  831. 
etate   V.    Wold    (96    Me.    401;    52 

Atl.    909),    972,    1092,     1647, 

171S. 
State  V.  Wolf   (46  Mo.  584),  1626. 
State    V.    Wolfer     (53    Minn.    135; 

19   L.   R.   A.   783;    54   N.   W. 

1005),  2261. 
State  V.  Wood    (155  Mo.   425;    56 

S.  W.  474;  48  L.  R.  A.  596), 

980,   1384. 
State   V.    Wood    (14    R.    I.    151), 
1446. 


State  V.  Woodbury  (35  X.  H.  230), 

383. 
State  V.  Woods  (68  Me.  409),  261, 

1051. 
State  V.  Woodward   (34  Me.  293), 

508,    1643. 
State  V.  Woodward  (191  Mo.  617; 

90  S.  W.  90),  2038. 
State  V.  Woodward    (25  Vt.  616), 

1447,  1532,  1535,  1554. 
State  V.  Woll   (86  N.  C.  708),  215, 

1304,   1305,   1306. 
State  V.  Wooley    (59  Vt.  357;    10 

Atl.   84),    1442,    1747. 
State   V.   Woolsey    (92    Ind.   131), 

1488,   1553. 
State  V.  Wooten    (  [Mo.  App.]   122 

S.  W.  1101),  576,  648. 
State  V,  Worden   ( 27  R.  I.  484 ;  63 

Atl.  486),   1460,   1543, 
State  V.   Workman    (75  Mo.   App. 

454),    825. 
State   V.    Wray    (72    N.    C.    253), 

821,  828. 
State  V.  Wright   (98  Iowa,  792;  68 

N.  W.  440),  1678,  1689. 
State    V.    Wright     (20    Mo.    App. 

412),  58,  825,  832, 
State  V.   Wright    (68   N.  H.   351; 

44  Atl.  519),   44,   1086,    1661, 

1678,   1701,   1702,   1708. 
State  V.  WMght    (14  Ore.  365;    12 

Pac.   708),   790. 
State   V.    Wright    (5    R.    I.    287), 

1758. 
State  V.  Wyman    (80  Me.   117;    13 

Atl.   47),    1572. 
State  V.  Wyman  (42  Minn.  182;  43 

N.  W.  1116),  1499. 
State   V.    Wm,    J.    Lemp    Brewing 

Co.    ([Kan.]    102    Pac.    504), 

335. 
State    V.    W.    J.    Langran    &    Co. 

([Tex.   Civ.    App.]    87    S.   W, 

713),  346. 
State  V.  Yager    (72  Iowa,  421;   34- 

N.  W.  188),  829. 
State    V.    Yates     (132    Iowa,    475; 

109  N.  W.   1005),  2038,  2060, 

2083. 


CCCXXXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are    to   pages.] 


8tate  V.  Yewell  (63  Md.  120),  930. 
State    V.    Yockey     (49    Mo.    App. 

443),   1623. 
State  V,  York    (74  N.  H.   125;   65 

Atl.    685),    5,    7,    10,    12,    15, 

43,  79,  964,   1086,   1495,  1662. 
State    V.    Young    (17    Kan.    414), 

500. 
State  V.  Young  (36  Mo.  App.  517), 

1754. 
State  V.  Young  (70  Mo.  App.  52), 

1268),   1479. 
State    V.    Young     (73     Mo.    App. 

602),    1478. 
State  V.  Young  (2  Cold.  51),  1550. 
State    V.    Zeitler     (63    Ind.    441), 

1253,  1497,  1498,  1500. 
State    V.    Zermmehler     (110    Iowa 

1;    81    N.   W.   154),   518. 
State  V.  Zimmerman  (2  Ind.  565), 

1552. 
State    V.    Zimmerman     ( 78    Iowa, 

614;     43    N.     W.     458),     314, 

1719. 
State    V.    Zimmerman     (S3    Iowa, 

117;  49  N.  W.  71),  176'.,  1.66. 
Stebbins    v.    Hart     ( 4    Dem.    Sur. 

501),   2136. 
Stebbins   v.    State    (22   Tex.    App. 

32;  2  S.  W.  617),  370. 
Steckard  v.  Reade   ( [Tex.]    121  S. 

W.    1114),    249. 
Stedham    v.     Stedham      (32     Ala. 

525),  2135. 
Stedler,  In  re  (52  N.  C.  Misc.  Rep. 

322;    102    N.    C.    Supp.    147), 

739. 
Steel    V.   Smith    (1    Barn.    &    Aid. 

94),  1509. 
Steel  V.  State   (26  Ind.  92),  1554. 
Steele  v.  State  ( 19  Tex.  App.  425 ) , 

120,   232,    240,   243,   850,    851, 

860,  900. 
Steele  v.  State   (52  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

426;  108  S.  W.  698),  111. 
Steele  v.  Thompson  (42  Mich.  594; 

4    N.    W.    536),    1845,    1882, 

1994. 


Steffy   V.   Monroe  City    (135   Ind. 

466;    35   N.   E.    121;    41    Am. 

St.  436),  409,  468. 
Stehle  V.  Commonwealth   ( [Pa.]   7 

Atl.  109),  774 
Stein   V.    Adams    (  [Miss.]    23    So. 

269),    1697. 
Stein  V.  State   (50  Ind.  21),  1516, 

1567. 
S^;einberger  v.  State    (35  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  492;  34  S.  R.  617),  1185, 

1539,   1540,   1640. 
Steinkraus    v.    Hurlbert    (20   Neb. 

519;  30  N.  W.  940),  617. 
Steinkuhler  v.  State  (77  Neb.  331; 

109  N.  W.  395),  1084. 
Steinmetz    v.    Versailles    (40    Ind. 

249),   412. 
Stellard   v.   Marks    (3   Q.   B.   Div. 

412;    47    L.   J.    M.   C.   91;    S3 

L.    T.    566;    26    W.    R.    694), 

1275. 
Stelle   V.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

92    S.    W.   530),   52,   58,    972, 

1185,   1651. 
Stephen,  Ex  parte   (114  Cal.  278; 

46    Pac.    86),    403,    407,    453, 

474. 
Stephens   v.    Henderson    ( 120   Ga. 

218;   47  S.  E.  498),   159,  168, 

555,  1385. 
Stephens  v.   People    (89   111.   337), 

886. 
Stephens  v.  State    (14  Ohio  386), 

1451. 
Stephens  v.  State   ( 7  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

970;  73  S.  W.  1056),  845. 
Stephens  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

73  S.  W.  1056),  1474. 
Stephens    v.    State     (47    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    604;    85    S.    W.    797), 

210,  234,   1224. 
Stephens  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

87    S.   W.    157),   915. 
Stephens    v.    State     (50    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  251;   96  S.  W.  7),  1681. 
Stephens  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

97  S.  VV.  483),   1472. 
Stephens    v.    Watson     ([1702]     1 

Salk.  *45),  104,  1106. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCCXXXIX 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Stephenson    v.    Rogers    (63    J.    P. 

230;    80   L.   T.    195;    15   T.  L. 

R.   748),   690,    1273. 
Stephenson  v.  State  (28  Ind.  272), 

1242,  1627. 
Sterling    v.    Callahan     (94    Mich. 

536;  54  N.  W.  495),  1878. 
Stern's    License,    In    re     (27    Pa. 

Super.  €t.   538),   696. 
Stevens    v.    Cheney    (33    Hun    [N. 

Y.]  1),  1860,  1901. 
Stevens    v.     Commonwealth     ( 124 

Ky.  32;  98  S.  W.  284;  30  Ky. 

L.    Rep.    200),    2033,    2034. 
Stevens   v.   Emson    ( 1    Exch.   Div. 

100;    40  J.   P.   484;    45  L.   J. 

M.  C.  63;  33  L.  T.  821),  526, 

683. 
Stevens  v.  Green    (23  Q.  B.  Div. 

142;    53   J.   P.   423;    58   L.   J. 

M.  C.    167;   61   L.  T.  240;    37 

W.  R.  605),  709,  733. 
Stevens  v.  Marston   [[1890]   55  J. 

P.  404;    64  L.  T.   274;    39  W. 

R.   129),  1816. 
Stevens   v.    San    Francisco   R.    Co. 

(100  Cal.  554;   35  lac.   168), 

2199. 
Stevens   v.    Shornbrook,    J.  J.    ( 23 

Q.   B.  Div.   142;    58  L.   J.   M. 

C.  167;   61  L.  T.  240;   37  W. 

R.    605;    52   J.    P.    423),    071, 

708. 
Stevens  v.  State   (61  Ohio  597;  50 

N.  E.  478),  233,  334. 
Stevens    v.    State    (93    Fed.    793), 

324. 
Stevens  v.  Stevens    (8  R.  I.  557), 

2153. 
Stevens  v.   Watson    (1    SaJk.  45), 

485. 
Stevens  v.   Wood    (54  J.  P.   742), 

1331,  1344,   1345,   1346. 
Stevenson    v.    Deal     (2    Pars.    Eq. 

Cas.  212),   800,  801. 
Stevenson  v.   Hunter    (2    Ohio  N. 

P.    300;    5    Ohio    S.    &   C.    P. 

Dee.  27),  521,  815. 
Stevenson  v.  State   (65  Ind.  409), 

1176,    1177. 


Stevenson  v.  West  Seattle,  etc.,  Co. 

(22    Wash.    84;    60    Pac.   51), 

2201,   2202. 
Stewart  v.  Calhoun  Circuit  Judge 

(156    Mich.    642;    121    N.    W. 

279),  826,  1457,  1575. 
Stewart  v.   Calhoun  Co.    ([Mich.] 

124  N.  W.  39),  826. 
Stewart  v.  Cooley   (23  Minn.  347; 

23  Am.  Rep.  690),  660. 
Stewart  v.  State  (25  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  438),   1502,  1508. 
Stewart  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

153;     19    S.    W.    908),    2249, 

2252. 
Stewart  v.  State  (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

391;  33  S.  W.  1081),  1464, 

1471),  1474. 
Stewart  v.  State  (34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

33;    28    S.   W.  806),   372. 
Stewart  v.  State  (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

135;    38    S.    W.    1143),    1692, 

1698,   1099. 
Stewart  v.  State  ( 38  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

627;   44  S.  W.  505),   1735. 
Stewart  v.  Waterloo  Turn  Verein 

(71   Iowa,  226;    60  Am.  Rep. 

786),    1342. 
Steyer    v.    McCauley     ( 102    Iowa 

105;   71  N.  W.   194),  999. 
Stick   V.  State    (23   Ohio   Cir.   Ct. 

Rep.     392),     859,     898,     899, 

1652. 
Stickrod     v.     Commonwealth     (86 

Ky.  285;   5  S.  W.  580;   9  Ky. 

L.   Rep.   563),    119,    125,   221, 

289,  945,  1158. 
Stiles    V.   State    (  l  i'ex.   Cr.   App.] 

43  S.  W.  993 ) ,  1200. 
Still  V.  McNight   (7  W.  &  S.  245), 

2018. 
Stinson  v.  Gardner   (97  Tex.  287; 

78   S.   W.   492),  922. 
Stirling  v.  Hinckley   (4  Atl,  [Pa.] 

358;   2  Cent.  Rep.  824),  2103, 

2119,   2120. 
Stockley    v.    Stockley     (1    Ves.    & 

B.  23),  2115. 
Stockton    V.    Baltimore     (32    Fed. 

Rep.   9),   156. 


cecxl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Stockwell  V.  State    (85  Ind.  522), 

1290. 
fc>tockwell  V.  Brent    (97  Ind.  474), 

598,   599,   600,   601,   621,   623, 

663. 
Stockwell    V.    State    (27    Ohio    St. 

563),  1608, 
Stoddait    V.    Hawke     (50    W.    R. 

93;   18  T.  L.  R.  22),  377. 
Stokes  V.  Sehlachter   (66  N.  J.  L. 

247;  49  Atl.  556),  413. 
Stokes  V.  Wall    (112  Ga.  349;    37 

S.  E.  383),  677. 
Stolte  V.  State   (115  Ind.  128;    17 

X.  E.  258),  1624. 
Stommel  v.  Timbal   (84  Iowa  336; 

51  N.  W.   159),  523,  525. 
Stone  V.  Dana   (46  Mass.  [5  Met.] 

98),  1062. 
Stone    V.    Mississippi    (101    U.    S. 

814),  93,  95,  98,  126,  129,  180, 

182,  450  490. 
Stone  V.  State  (30  Ind.  115),  1509. 
Stone  V.  State  ([Miss.]  7  So.  500), 

1456,  1608. 
Stone  V.  State   (3  Tex.  App.  675), 

369. 
Stone   V.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.   App.] 

39  S.  W.  367),  1237,  1627. 
Stone    V.    Mississippi     (101    U.    S. 

814),  489. 
Stone     V.     State      (23     Tenn.      l^ 

Humph.]   27   [1851]),  2247. 
Stoner  v.  State   (5  Ga.  App.   716; 

63   S.  E.  602),  4,   1491,   1697, 

1702,    1708. 
Storey,  In  re    (20  111.  App.   183), 

2U7. 
Stormes  v.  Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

47   S.  W.  262),  824. 
Stormes    v.     Commonwealth     (105 

Ky.    619;    49    S.    W.    451;    20 

Ky.   L.   Rep.    1434;    reversing 

47  S.  W.  262),  549,  826,  931. 
Stormes  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

107   S.   W.   550),   1471. 
Story  V.  Finkelstein  ( 46  Neb.  577 ; 

65   N.   W.    195;    30  L.   R.   A. 

644),  1781. 


Stountebugh   v.   Hennick    (129    U. 

S.  141;  9  Sup.  Ct.  256),  157. 
Stout    V.    State     (43    Ark.    413), 

1320. 
Stout  V.  State  (93  Ind.  150),  1291, 

1446,  1635,  n^2. 
Stout  V.  State    (96  Ind.  407),  41, 

84,  1592. 
Stout    V.    Territory     ( [Okla.]     103 

Pac.    75),    1459. 
Stovall  V.  State   ( 37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

337;  39  S.  W.  934),  845,  1526. 
Stoval  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

97  S.  W.  92),  948,  1376,  1611, 

1612. 
Strahn  v.  Hamilton   (38  Ind.  57), 

694,  695,  1783. 
Strand  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (67 

Mich.    380;    34    N.    W.    712), 

2174,  2177,  2203,  2217. 
Strange   v.  Prince    (17  Ind.   524), 

749. 
Strattman  v.  Moore  ( 134  111.  App. 

275),    1956. 
Straub  v.   Gordon    (27  Ark.  625), 

198,   200,    788,   791,    793. 
Straus,  Appeal  of  (73  N.  E.  1122; 

181  N.  Y.  530),  745. 
Straus  V.  Galesburg  (203  HI.  234; 

67    N.    E.    836;    affirming    89 

111.   App.   504),   73,    108.    415, 

424,  1193. 
Straus    V.    Pontiac    (40    111.   301), 

405,  432,  439. 
Streeter   v.   Peojjle    (69    111.   595), 

111,  138,  256. 
Streever   v.   Birch    (62   Hun   298; 

17  N.  Y.  Supp.   195),  1858. 
Streit   V.    Sanborn    (47    Vt.    702), 

1807. 
Strickland  v.  Knight  (45  Fla.  712; 

36    So.    363),    645,    658,    659, 

974. 
Strickland     v.     State     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    47    S.    W.    720;    rever- 
sing   on    rehearing    [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]    47    S,    W.    470),    914, 

1182, 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cccxli 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Strickland    v.    Whittaker     (68    J. 

P.    235;     52    W.    R.    538;    90 

L.  T.  445;    20  T.  L.  K.  224), 

690,  1274. 
Stringfield    v.    Louisville    Ry.    Co. 

([Ky.]     105   S.    W.    1190;    32 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  578),  2206. 
Stringer  v.  Huddersfield,  J.J.    (40 

J.  P.  22;    45  L.  J.  M.  C.  39; 

33  L.  T.  568),  563,  1277. 
■Stringer    v.    State    (32    Fla.    239; 

13  So.  450),  928. 
Strommert     v.     Johnson     ( [Iowa] 

123  Pac.  337),  996. 
Strong  V.  State    (1   Blackf.   [Ind.] 

193),    261. 
Stroup    V.    State     (70    Ind.    495), 

749. 
Stroutsburg     v.     Shick      (24     Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  442),  809. 
Struble  v.   Nodwift    (11   Ind.   64), 

1838,    1989. 
Strydon  v.  Yandale  ( 20  Juta  385 ) , 

615. 
Stuart,  In  re   (61  Cal.  374),  410, 

417. 
Stuart  V.  Cullen    (16  X.  Z.  L.  R. 

336),  548. 
Stuart   V.   Machias   Port    (48    Me. 

477),  2171,   2186,  2191,  2197. 
Stuart    V.    State     (1    Baxt.    178), 

2051,  2057,  2058. 
Stuckman  v.  State   (21  Ind.  160), 

1498. 
Studabaker     v.     White      (31     Ind. 

211),    1808. 
Stukeley    v.    Butler     (Hob.    172), 

1036. 
Stultz    V.    State     (96    Ind.    456), 

1618,  1714. 
Sturgis  V.  State  ( [Okla.]   102  Pac. 

57),  1450. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Mayer,  etc.    (7  Cow. 

[N.   Y.]    604),    404. 
Sublett,  Ex  parte    (23   Tex.   App. 

309;   4  S.  W.  894),  866,  871, 

872,  883. 
Suggs   V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

101  S.  W.  999),  1733. 


Suit  V.  Woodhall   (113  Mass.  391, 

395),   1795,   1798. 
Sullivan,   In   re    (30    N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.     682;     64    N.    Y.    Supp. 

303),  867,  881,   882,  884. 
Sullivan,     Ex    parte      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   75  S.  VV.  790),  915. 
Sullivan,   In   re    (21    D.    C.    139), 

414. 
Sullivan    v.    Borden     (163    Mass. 

470;   40  N.  E.  859),  722,  734. 
Sullivan    v.     Commonwealth     ( 13 

Ky.   L.  Rep.    [abstract]    397), 

1107. 
Sullivan   v.    District   of   Columbia 

20  App.  D.  C.  29),  1122,  1124, 

1129. 
Sullivan   v.    Kohlenberg    (31    Ind. 

App.    215;     67     N.    E.    541), 

1808,    1809. 
Sullivan    v.   McCammon    (51    Ind. 

264),  811. 
Sullivan  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.  ( 148 

Mass.    119;    18   N.   E.   678;    1 

L.  R.  A.  513),  2206. 
Sullivan  v.  Oneida    (61    111.   242), 

225,     396,     442,     1008,     1025, 

1585. 
Sullivan   v.    Park    (33    Me.    438), 

1777. 
Sullivan   v.    Radezwirtt    (82   Neb. 

657;    118    N.   W.   571),    1922, 

1957. 
Sullivan   v.   Seattle,   etc.,   Co.    (44 

Wash.  53;  86  Pac.  786),  2209, 

2215,  2218. 
Sullivan    v.    State     (48    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    201;     87    S.    \N.    150), 

1697. 
Summa,  In   re    (3   Pa.   Dist.   Rep. 

651),  701. 
Summa,  In  re  ( 12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

667),  695. 
Summer    v.     Crawford     (91     Tex. 

132;  41  S.  W.  994).  925. 
Summerson,   In  re    ([1900]    1    Cli. 

112,   note),   1814. 
Summit  v.  Hahr  (66  N".  J.  L.  333; 

52  Atl.  956),   1485, 


ceexlii 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  a.re  to  pages.] 


Sumner  v.  State  (4  Ind.  App.  403; 

30    N.    E.    1105),    1219,    1223, 

1224,   1226,   1227. 
Sun,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Bennett    (26  Pa. 

Super.   Ct.  243),  571. 
Sun  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sear- 

les  (73  Miss.  62;  18  So.  544), 

1779. 
Sunoury,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Cooper 

(33  Pa.  St.  278),  106. 
Supernant     v.     People      (100     111. 

App.    121),    1232,   1560,   1562, 

1564. 
Supervisors,  etc.  v.  Davis   (63  111. 

405),  294. 
Supreme  Council  v.  Curd  (111  111. 

284),    2231. 
Surber  v.  State  (99  Ind.  71),  2040, 

2071. 
Surrat   v.    State    (45    Miss.   601), 

1524. 
Susquehanna  Co.,  In  re  (3  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.   Rep.   616),   532. 
Sutherland  v.  McKinney   (146  Ind. 

611;     45    N.    E.     1048),    610, 

612,    857,    860. 
Sutherland    v.    Standard    L.,    etc., 

Ins.    Co.    (87    Iowa,    505;    54 

N.     W.     453),     2239),     2243, 

2244. 
Sutton  v.  Grand  Lodge  A.  0.  U.  W. 

(84  Mo.  App.  208),  65. 
Sutton   V.   Head    (86    Ky.    156;    5 

S.   W.   410;    9    Am.   St.   274), 

ISOS,    1809. 
Sutton  V.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

40    S.    W.    996,    .501),     1342, 

1344,  1695. 
Sutton  V.  Washington  (4  Ga.  App. 

30;   60  S.  E.  811),  1722. 
Swalm    V.    State     (49    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  241;  91   S.  W.  575),  85, 

87,  1609. 
Swan,  In   re    (150  U.   S.   637;    14 

Sup.  Ct.  225 ;  37  L.  Ed.  1202 ) , 

1046. 
Swann,   Ex  parte    (96   Mo.   44;    9 

S.  W.  10).  228.  232,  233,  237, 

238,  928,  930.  932,  934,   1763. 
Swan  V.  State  (11  Ala.  594),  1290. 


Swan  V.   State    (4   Humph.    136), 

2040,  2067. 
Swan   V.    Talbott    (152    Cal.    142; 

94  Pac.   238),  2095,   2107. 
Swan  V.  Wilderson   (10  Okla.  547; 

62    Pac.   422),   616,   617,   671, 

672,  735. 
Swan  River,  In  re    (16   Manitoba, 

312),  906. 
Swarth  v.   People    (109   111.   621), 

795. 
Swarthout    v.    State     ([Mo.]     119 

S.  W.  1014),  283. 
Swartz   v.   Dover    ([N.   J.   L.]    62 

Atl.  1135;  affirming  7  IS.  J.  L. 

502;   57  Atl.  394),  168. 
Sweatt  v.  State    (153  Ala.  70;  45 

So.   588),    1612,    1652. 
Sweeney,  In  re   (11  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

569),  664. 
Sweeney    v.    State     (49    Tex.    Cr. 
App.  226;   91  S.  W.  575),  1357. 
Sweeney  v.  Traverse  (82  Iowa  720; 

47  N.  W.  889),  1001. 
Sweeney   v.   Webb    (97   Tex.  250), 

234,  803. 
Sweeney    v.    Webb    (33    Tex.    Civ. 

App.     324;     76     S.     W.     766; 

[Tex.]    77    S.    W.    135),    188, 

230,  249,  282,  295,  871. 
Sweeney    v.    Webb     (45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.     170;     76    S.    W.    766), 

245. 
Sweet  V.  Wabash   (41  Ind.  7),  244, 

291,  432,  436,  443.  444,  795. 
Sweetman.  Ex  jjarte    (5  Cal.  App. 

577;   90  Pac.   1069),   171. 
Swick  V.  Home  L.  Ins.  Co.   (2  Dill 

160),  2223,  2229. 
Swift    V.   Klein    (163   111.   269;    45 

X.  E.  219),  279,  416,  421. 
Swift    V.     People     (63     III.     App. 

453),  424.  652. 
Swift  V.  People    (162  111.  534;   44 

X.  E.   528;    33  L.  R.  A.  470; 

reversing    60    111.    App.    395), 

208. 
Swift    V.    State    (108    Tcnn.    610; 

69  S.  W.  326),  957. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cccxliii 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Swift    V.    State    (108    Tenn.    610; 

69   S.   W.   320),    1286. 
Swift   V.    Sutphiu    (39    Fed.    Rep. 

631),  156. 
Swigart  v.    State    (99    Ind.    Ill), 

1241,   1242,   1627,   1628. 
Swihart  v.  Hansen    (76  Neb.  727; 

107  N.  W.  862),  588,  624. 
Swinfen   Eady,   J.    ([1907]    2    Ch. 

229;   72  L.  J.  Ch.  507),  1827. 
Swinford  v.  Lowiy  (37  Minn.  345; 

34  N.  W.  22),   1877,   1878. 
Swords   V.    Daigle    (107    La.    510; 

32   So.   94),  446,   794. 
Swygart  v.  Willard   (166  Ind.  25; 

76  N.   E.  755),  2137,  2138. 
Sydleman   v.   Beckwith    (43    Conn. 

9),  1736. 
Sylvester  v.  Casey  (110  Iowa,  256; 

81  N.  W.  455),  2174,  2186. 
Symons  v.  Wedmore   ([1S94]   1  Q. 

B.    Div.   401;    58    J.    P.    197; 

63  L.  J.  M.  €.   44;    69   L.  T. 

801;  42  W.  R.  301),  081,  704. 


Taber    v.    Lander     (94    Ky.    237; 

21  S.  W.   1056),  931. 
Taber  v.  New  Bedford   (177  Mass. 

197;  58  N.  E.  640),  559. 
Tacke,  In  re  (17  N.  St.  Rep.  805), 

2141. 
Tackaberry    v.    State     ([Tex.    Cr. 

App.]  71  S.  W.  376),  1237. 
Tadcaster   Tower    Brewery    Co.    v. 

Wilson  ([1897]  1  Ch.  705;  61 

J.  P.  360;    66  L.  J.  Ch.  402; 

70  L.  T.  459;    45  W.  R.  428; 

13  T.  L.  R.  295),   1831. 
Taffe  V.  State   (23  Ark.  .34),  2257. 
Taggart    v.    Graham     (  [Tex.    Civ. 

App.  93  S.  W.  246),  762. 
Taggart  v.  Hillman   (42  Tex.  Civ. 

App.   71;    93   S.   W.   245,   762. 
Taggart  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

85    S.    W.     1155),    298,    307, 

1214,   1280. 


Taggart  v.  State  ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

97  S.  W.  95),  1167,  1611. 
Tai    Kec    v.    Minister    of    Interior 

(12  Hawaii   164),  G31. 
Taite   v.   Gosling    ([1879]    11    Ch. 

D.  273;   48  L.  J.  Ch.  397;   40 

L.    T.    251;    27    W.    R.    394), 

1821. 
Talbott  v.  Dent   (9  B.  Mon.  [Ky.] 

526,  539),   904. 
Tallassee     v.     Tooms     ([Ala.]     47 

So.  308),  382. 
Tally  v.  Grider  (00  Ala.  119),  850, 

854. 
Tangilpahoa  v.  Campbell   (106  La. 

464;   31   So.  49),  932,  933. 
Tanner   v.   Alliance    (29    Fed.    196 

(111,    120,    125,    152,  475. 
Tanner    v.    Bugg     (74    Mo.    App. 

196),    561,    576,    587. 
Tanner  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  Co.    (60 

Ala.  621),  2214. 
Tanner    v.    Trustee,    etc.     (5    Hill 

[N.    Y.]    121),   228. 
Tardiflf    v.    State     (23    Tex.    169), 

1371,  1372. 
Tarkington  v.  Bennett   ( [Tex.  Civ. 

App.]  51  S.  W.  274),   1953. 
Tarkio  v.   Cook    ([Mo.   Supp.]    25 

S.  W.  202),  461. 
Tarr's  Estate,  In  re  ( 10  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  554),  2020. 
Tasker's    Estate,    In    re    (205    Pa. 

455;   55  Atl.  24),  2135,  2138, 

2141,  2147,  2148. 
Tasher  v.  Stanley   (143  Mass  148; 

26   N.   E.   417),    1790. 
Tassell  v.  Ovenden    (2   Q.  B.  Div. 

383;    41    J.   P.   710;    40    L.   J. 

M.  C.  228;    36  L.  T.   696;    25 

W.  R.  692),  1142,  1145. 
Tate  V.  Donovan    (143  Mass.  590; 

10  N.  E.  492)    1850,   1851. 
Tate  V.    State    (91   Miss.  382;    44 

So.  830),  1182. 
Tattersal  v.  Nevels   (77  Neb.  843; 

110  N.  W.  708),  570. 
Tatum   V.    Commonwealth    ( [Kv.J 

59   S.  W.  32;   22  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

927),    958,    1205,    1498. 


cccxliv 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Tatum   V.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

65  S.  W.  449;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1533),   1469,   1470. 
Tatum    V.    State     (63    Ala.    147), 

64,  65,  1254,  1632,  1633,  2231. 
Tatum  V.  State   (74  Ga.  176;  3  S. 

E.   907),   928,   932,   934. 
Tatum   V.    Trenton    (85    Ca.    468; 

21  S.  E.  705),  812. 
Taul  V.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.]  61 

S.   W.  394),   1695. 
Taylor    v.    Becker     (6    Ohio    Dec. 

151;    6    Wkly.    L.    Bull.    25), 

1808. 
Taylor  v.  Board    (31   Pa.  St.  73), 

811. 
Taylor  v.   Carroll    (145   Mass   95; 

13  N.  E.  348),   1850,   1905. 
Taylor  v.  Chester    (L.  R.  4.  Q.  B. 

309,  311),  1795. 
Taylor  v.  Carryl   (20  How.  [U.  S.] 

597),    1012. 
Taylor   v.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

40  S.  W.  383),   1407,   1694. 
Taylor   v.    Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

59  S.  W.  482;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1003),  900. 
Taylor   v.    Felsing    (164    111.   331; 

45   N.   E.   161),    1974. 
Taylor    v.    Humphries     (28    J.    P. 

793;  34  L.  J.  M.  C.  1),  1149. 
Taylor  v.  Humphries   (30  L.  J.  M. 

C.  242;   10  C.  B.   (N.  S.)  429; 

9   W.   R.   705;    4   L.   T.   514), 

1149. 
Taylor  v.  Isitt  (7  N.  Z.  L.  R.  678) , 

685. 
Taylor   v.    Kelly    (31    Atl.    59;    68 

Am.  Dec.  150),  2136. 
Taylor  v.  Monnot    (4  Duer.   116), 

544. 
Taylor  v.   Oran    ( 1   H.  &   C.   370; 

27    J.   P.   8;    31    L.    J.   M.    C. 

252;    7    L.   T.    58;    10   W.    R. 

800),   1297. 
Taylor    v.    Patrick    (1    Bibb,    168 

2094,  2117. 
Taylor  v.  Pinchett   (52  Iowa  467; 

3    N.    W.    514),     1283,     1290, 

1353,  1788. 


Taylor   v.   Place    (4   R.   I.   324), 

1014. 
Taylor  v.  Purcell   (60  Ark  606;  31 

S.  W.  567),   2098. 
Taylor  v.  State    (121  Ala.  24;   25 

So.  689),   1180. 
Taylor  v.  State    (121  Ala.  39;   25 

So.  701),  1163,  1180. 
Taylor  v.  State    (69  Ark.  468;   60 

S.  W.  33),  1379. 
Taylor  v.  State   (5  Ga.  App.  237; 

62    S.    E.    1048),    1602,    1662, 

1722. 
Taylor  v.  State   (126  Ga.  557;   55 

S.  E.  474),  1501,  1554. 
Taylor    v.    State     (49    Ind.    555), 

1643. 
Taylor  v.  State    (107  Ind.  483;   8 

N.  E.  450),   1241. 
Taylor  v.  State   (113  Ind.  471;   IG 

N.   E.   183),    1712. 
Taylor  v.  State    (7  Humph.  510), 

1515. 
Taylor  v.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

49  S.  W.  589),  1705,  1707. 
Taylor  v.  State    ([Tex.]  49  S.  W. 

845),  9. 
Taylor  v.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

50  S.  W.  343),  1613,   1699. 
Taylor  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

51  S.  W.   1106),  2261. 
Taylor  v.  State   (44  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

437;  72  S.  W.  181),  963,  1698, 

1703. 
Taylor  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

75  S.  W.  536),   1210,   1211. 
Taylor  v.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

77   S.  W.  221),   1209,   1378. 
Taylor  v.  State   (54  Tex.  App.  90; 

111  S.  W.  932),  1694. 
Taylor  v.  State    (  [Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

112  S.  W.  942),  1596. 
Taylor  v.  Strong    (3  Wend.  384), 

2033. 
Taylor  v.  Taylor    (10  Minn.   107), 

904. 
Taylor  v.  United  States  ( 6  Ind.  T. 

350;    98   S.   W.    123),   953. 
Tavlor   v.    Vincent    (12    I^a   282; 

47  Am.  Rep.  338),  76,  542. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cccxlv 


IReferences  are  to  pages.] 


Taylor    v.    Wright    (126    Pa.    St. 

617;    170,  G77),  1912,  1913. 
Teegarden  v.  State    (39  Ind.  App. 

15;   79  N.  E.  211),  342,  1536. 
Teague   v.    State    (39   Miss.    516), 

1740. 
Teague  v.  State   (51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

526,    529;     102    S.    W.     1141, 

1144),  1680,  1696. 
Teal  V.  Commonwealth    (  [Ky.J   57 

S.    W.    464;    22    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

350),    1285. 
Teasdale  v.   State    ( [Miss.]    3   So. 

245),    1358. 
Tefft  V.  Commonwealth    ( 8  Leigh. 

721),   1496,   1741. 
Tegler  v.  Shipman   (33  Iowa  194), 

1788,   1790. 
Tejszeaski    v,    Dallas     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]   45  S.  W.  569),   1553. 
Temme  v.  Sclmiidt    (210  Pa.  507; 

60  A.  158),  1999,  2000. 
Temmick  v.  Owings    (70  Md.  246; 

16  Atl.  719),  246,  941. 
Temple   v.  Temple    ( 1   Hen.  &   M. 

476),  2139. 
Temple  ton.  In  re  ( [Pa.]  4  Lancast. 

Law.  Rev.  242),  694. 
Tenant  v.  Knlilemeier  ([Iowa]  120 

K  W.   689),   1744. 
Tennant  v.  Belyea   (24  N.  B.  238), 

1075. 
Tennant  v.  Cumberland   ( 1  El.  and 

El.  401;  23  J.  P.  57),  1136. 
Tennessee  Club  v.  Dwyer    ( 1 1  Lea 

452:  47  Am.  Rep.  298),  1330, 

1338. 
Tenney   v.    Leroy    (16   Wis.    566), 

184. 
Tenth  Ward  Election,  In  re  (5  Pa. 

Dist.  Rep.  287),   1320. 
Teoli  V.  Nardoli    (23  R.  I.  87;   49 

Atl.  489),  690. 
Terre  Haute  '^        •  -..  r<„    y    Hart- 
man    (19    Ind.    App.    596;    49 

N.  E.  864),   1791,   1806. 
Terre  Haute  Brewing  Co.  v.  New- 
land    (33    Ind.    App.    544;    70 

N.  E.   190),   1792,   1912,   1919, 

1975. 


Terre  Haute  Brewing  Co.  v.  State 

169   Ind.   242;    82   N.   E.   81), 

1192,  1549. 
Terrell  v.  State   (165  Ind.  443;   75 

N.  E.  884),  1485. 
Territory  v.  Burgess   (8  Mont.  57; 

19  Pac.  558;   1  L.  R.  A.  2247. 
Territory  v.  Clark    (79  Pac.  708), 

2257. 
Territory  v.  Coleman   (1  Ore.  191; 

75   Am.  Dec.    554)     1264. 
Territory  v.  Connell  (2  Ariz.  339; 

16    Pac.   209),    174,   201,   523, 

792. 
Territory    v.    Crunka    ( 15    Hawaii 

607  \   r58. 
Territory  v.  Dana   ( [Ark.]  6  Law- 
son  Crim.  D-^*  "-es  630) ,  2072. 
Ter-'        -    V.    Da--     (2    Ariz.    59; 

10   Pac.   359),   2051,  2052. 
Territory  v.  Farnsworth    (5  Mont. 

303;   5  Pac.  869),  788. 
Territory    v.     Ferris     ( 15    Hawaii 

139)    2247. 
Territory   v.    Franklin    (2    N.    M. 

307),  2040,  2058,  2070. 
Territory  v.  Grinnell  (2  Ariz.  339; 

16  Pac.   209),   138. 
Territory  v.  Guyott    (9  Mont.  46; 

22  Pac.   134),   1264. 
Territory  v.  Hall  (17  Hawaii  536), 

1231,  1241. 
Territory  v.   Hart    (7   Mont.   489; 

14  Pac.  768),  2246. 
Territory   v.    McPherson    (6    Dak. 

27;   50  N.  W.  351),  648,  649, 

796. 
Territory  v.  Manton   (8  Mont.  95; 

19  Pac.  387),  2040,  2046. 
Territory    v.    Miguel     (18    Hawaii 

402),   124,  174,  645. 
Territory  v.  O'Connor  (5  Dak.  397; 

37  N.  W.  765;   41  N.  W.  746; 

36   L.   R.   A.    355),    174,   233, 

235,  242,  452,  529,  931. 
Territory  v.  Pacific  Club    (16  Ha- 
waii 517),   1338. 
Territory   v.    Pratt    (6    Dak.   483; 

43  N.  W.  711),  1466,  1698, 

1713. 


cccxlvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Territory  v.  Robertson    (19   Okla. 

149;    92   Pac.    144),  414,   ^17, 

035,   974. 
Territory  v.  Webster  (5  Dak.  .351; 

40  N.  W.  535),  402. 
Territory  v.  Wong  Feart    (17  na- 

waii   353),    1293,    1612,    1">33. 
Territt    v.    Barlett     (21    Vt.    184. 

188,  189),  1797,  1798. 
Terry  v.  Haldiman   ( 15  Upp.  Can. 

380),  687. 
Terry  v.  State    (44  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

411;   71  S.  W.  968),  1699. 
Terry  v.  State    (46  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

75;  79  S.  W.  317).  1695,  1708. 
Tetzner  v.  Naughton   (12  111.  App. 

148),  19 J 5. 
Texas    Banking    Co.   v.   State    (42 

Tex.  636),  428,  791. 
Texas,  etc..  R.  Co.  v.  Robertson  ( 82 

Tex.    657;     17    S.    W.    1041), 

1906. 
Thackrah  v.  Haas  (119  U.  S.  499; 

7    Sup.    Ct.    311;    30    L.    Ed. 

486,,  2104,  2109.  2136. 
Thalheimer   v.   Board    ( [Ariz.]    94 

Pac.  1129),  230,  233,  242. 
Thayer   v.   Felt    (4   Pick.    [Mass.] 

354),  1067. 
Thayer    v.    Boyle     (30    Me.    475), 

2259. 
Thayer  v.  Partridge   (47  Vt.  423), 

'l802,   1803. 
Thayer   v.   Turner    (8   Met.    552), 

2127. 
Thcis  V.  State    (54  Ohio   St.  245; 

43  N.  E.  207),  1279. 
Theisen,   Ex  parte    (30    Fla.   529; 

11   So.  901;   32  Am.   St.  30), 

429,  441. 
Thei.sen  v.   Johns    (72  ]Mich|    285; 

40  N.  W.  727),   1952. 
Theo.  Hamm  Brewing  Co.  v.   Foss 
([S.  D.]  91  N.  W.  584),  291, 

1786,   1789. 
Theuer  v.  People  211   111.  296;   71 

N.   E.   997,   affirming    113    111. 

628),  578    580,  589,  610,  083. 


Thibodeaux    v.    State     (69    Miss. 

683;     13    So.    352),    794,    800, 

802. 
Thill   V.   Pohlman    (76   Iowa   638; 

41  N.  W.  385),   1987. 
Thirty   Hhds.    Sugar   v.    Boyle    (9 

Cranch    191),  252. 
Thixton    v.    Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co. 

([Ky.]   96  S.  W.  548;   29  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  910),  2215. 
Thoma,  In  re    (117  Iowa  275;   90 

N.  W.  581),  533,  535. 
Thomas,  In  re    (53  Kan.  659;    37 

Pac.   171),  403. 
Thomas,  In  re  ( 169  Pa.  Ill ;  3  Atl. 

100),  627,  639. 
Thomas,  In  re  (26  Ont.  Rep.  448), 

658. 
Thomas  v.  Abbott  (105  Mich  687; 

63  N.  W.  984),  877,  878,  879, 

887,   892,   907,   911. 
Thomas    v.    Arie    (122    Iowa    538; 

98  N.   W.  380),   1268. 
Thomas  v.  Ashland    (12   Ohio   St. 

127),  2035. 
Thomas   v.    Burke    ([Ark]    121    S. 

W.   1061),  947. 
Thomas  v.  Commonwealth   (90  Va. 

92;   17  S.  E.  788),  35,  80,  908, 

929,  1465,  1493. 
Thomas  v.  Dansby  (74  Mich.  398; 

41  X.  W.  1088),  1864,  1865, 

1889,  1966,  1967,  1978,  1980. 
Thomas  v.  Ivey  (12  Austr.  L.  T. 

190),  351. 
Thomas  v.  Hayward  ([1869]  L. 

R.  4  Ex.  311;  38  L.  J.  Ex. 

175),  1819. 
Thomas  v.  Ilinklcy    (19  Xeb.  324; 

27    X.    W.    231),     758,    762, 

1924. 
Thomas   v.    Marks    (19   Xeb.    324; 

27  X.   W.  321),  683. 
Thomas   v.   Mount    (9    Ohio    219), 

294. 
Thomas    v.   Xorris    (62   Ga.   538), 

814. 
Thomas  v.  Powell    (57  J.  p.  329), 

356,  1146. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cccxlvii 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Thomas  v,  Sanders  ([Fla.]  47  So. 

79G),  263. 
Thomas  v.   State    (97   Ala.   3;    12 

So.  409),  72. 
Thomas   v.   State    (117    Ala.    134; 

23   So.  636),   1199. 
Thomas   v.    State    ( [  Fla.]    23    So. 

101),   2038. 
Thomas  v.   State    (47   Fla.  99;    36 

So.  161),  2068. 
Thomas   v.   State    (37  Miss.  353), 

1190,  1643. 
Thomas  v.  Slitters    ([1900]    1   Ch. 

10;   69  L.  J.  Ch.  27;   63  J.  P. 

724;   48  W.  R.   133;   81   L.  T. 

469;    16  T.  L.  R.  7),  .380. 
Thomas   v.   Westfield    ([X.   J.   L.] 

57  Atl.   125),  812. 
Thomason  v.   State    ("0   Ahi.  20), 

842,  843. 
Thomasson  v.  State  (80  Ark.  304; 

97   S.  W.  297),    1050,   1652. 
Thomason   v.   State    (92   Ga.    405; 

17  S.  E.  858),  1126. 
Thomasson  v.  State   (15  Ind.  449), 

91,    138,    139,    144,    163,    189, 

198,   201,   211,   215,   289,   290, 

450,  788,  790,  791,  821,  1303, 

1304,  1307,  1628. 
Thompkins   v.   State    (2   Ga.   App. 

639;   58   S.  E.   1111),   1700. 
Thompkins  v.  State  (65  S.  E.  842), 

1700. 
Tliompkins   County   v.  Taylor    (21 

N.  Y.  173),  24. 
Thompson,  Ex  parte  (  Ki  N.  S.  W. 

L.  R.  42),  933. 
Thompson  v.  Bassett  (5  Ind.  535), 

773. 
Thompson    v.    Bellemore    ( 7    Low. 

Can.   Jr.  74),  098. 
Thompson  v.  Commonwealth    ( 103 

Ky.  035;  45  S.  W.  1039).  936, 

941,   1742. 
Thompson  v.   Commonwealth    ( 123 

Ky.    302;    94    S.    W.    654;    29 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  705),  199. 
Thompson        v.        Commonwealth 

([Ky.]  107  S.  W.  223;  32  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  714),  1128, 


Thompson  v.  Commonwealth  (8 
Gratt.    637),    2246,    2248. 

Thompson  v.  Durnford  ( 12  Low. 
Can.  Jr.  285),  1759. 

Thompson  v.  Egan    (70  Neb.   169; 

97  N.  W.   247),  571,  585. 
Thompson    v.    Harvey     (23    J.    P. 

150;   4  H.  &  N.  254;  28  L.  J. 

M.    C.    163),    529,    547,    683, 

685. 
Thompson  v.  Hiatt  (145  Ind.  530; 

44  N.  E.  486),  603. 
Thompson  v.   Koch    (98  Ky.   400; 

33  S.  W.  96;    17  Ily.  L.  Rep. 
941),    635,    662. 

Thompson  v.  Lessee  of  Carroll  (22 

How.  422),  396. 
Thom])son  v.  McKenzie    (77   L.  J. 

K.  B.  605  [1908];    IK.  B.  905; 

98  L.   T.   896;    72   J.   P.    150; 
24  T.  L.  R.  330),  2028. 

Thompson  v.  Mt.  Vernon  ( 1 1  Ohio 

St.  688),  395,  441. 
Thompson  v.  Peck   (115  Ind.  512; 

18   N.   E.    16),   2127. 
Thompson  v.   Rose    (16  Conn.  71; 

41  Am.  Dec.  121),  2125. 
Thompson  v.  State   (37  Ala.  151), 

510. 
Thompson  v.  State  (37  Ark.  408), 

1510,   1524. 
Thompson  v.  State    (109  Ga.  272; 

34  S.  E.  579),   1200,  1701. 
Thompson  v.  State   (45  Ind.  495), 

356,    1352,    1357,    1359,    1615, 

1616. 
Thompson    v.    State      (5     Humph. 

138^     1349    1374,   1377. 
Thompson    v.    State      (  [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]     97    S.    W.    310),     13, 

1602,    1693,    1701,   1704,    1705, 

1731. 
Thomson    v.    Grand    Gulf    R.    Co, 

(3  How.   [Miss.]  240),  294. 
Thomson  v.  Greig   (34  J.  P.  214), 

1137,   1141. 
Thomson  v.  Norris    (63  Ga.  538), 

812. 
Thomson  v.  Weems   (L.  R.  9    App. 

Cas.  671),  221,  223,  22S. 


cccxlviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Thon  V.  Commomvealth   (31  Gratt. 

[Va.]    887),    215,    448,    1304, 

1307. 
Thorn    v.    Atlanta    (77    Ga.    661), 

506,  682. 
Thornewall  v.  Johnson   ([1881]  50 

L.  J.  Ch.  641;    44  L.  T.  768; 

29  W.  R.  707),  1814. 
Thornley  v.  Reilly    (17  Ont.  App. 

204,  affirming  26  C.  L.  J.  20), 

1853. 
Thornton  v.  Clegg   (24  Q.  B.  Div. 

132;    53   J.   P.   342;    58   L.  J. 

M.    C.    6;    61    L.    T.    562;    38 

W.  E.  160),  709,  710. 
Thornton  v.  Territory  ( 3  Wash.  T. 

482;    17   Pac.   896),    174,  231. 
Thorp    V.    Brookfield     (36    Conn. 

320),  2186,  2191,  2193. 
Thorpe  v.   Rutland    (27   Vt.   149), 

94,  95,  99. 
Threemits  v.  Threemits  (4  Desaus. 

560),  2163. 
Throckmorton    v.    Commonwealth 

([Ky.]    18   Ky.   L.    Rep.    130; 

35    S.    W.    635),    1464,    1468, 

1521,   1524. 
Throckmorton     v.     Commonwealth 

([Ky.]  49  S.  W.  474;  20  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  1508),  1446,  1678, 
Thulmeyer,  Ex  parte    ([Tex.]    119 

S.  W.  1146),  925. 
Thurlow  V.  Massachusetts  (5  How. 

504;     12    L.    Ed.    256),     147, 

195. 
Thurman    v.    Adams     ( [Miss.]    33 

So.  944),  1370. 
Thurman    v.    State     (45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    569;     78    S.    W.    937), 

1483,  1486. 
Thurmond  v.  State  (46  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  102;  79  S.  W.  316),  873, 

916. 
Thurston  v.  Adams   (41  Me.  419), 

122,    1060,   1074. 
Thurston    v.    Blanchard    (22   Pick. 

18;  33  Am.  Dec.  700),  2125. 
Thweatt  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 
95    S.    W.    517),    1320,    1510, 
1570. 


Tibbatts  v.  Boultar   ([1895]  73  L. 

T.  534),  1833. 
Tibbettsv.  Burster  (76  Iowa,  176; 

40  N.  W.  707),  982,  991. 
Tidwell    V.    State     (70    Ala.    33), 

2041,  2060,  2085. 
Tiernan  v.  Harrison  ( 109  111.  593), 

202. 
Tiernan    v.    Rinker     (102     U.    S. 

123),  199,  299. 
Tierney,  In  re  (11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

406),  645,  718. 
Tiffany  v.  Driggs   (13  Johns.  253), 

1649. 
Tifft's  Will,  In  re  (55  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  81;  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  671), 

2136. 
Tigler  v.  Shipman  (33  Iowa  194), 

1283. 
Tigner  v.  State    (119  Ga.   114;   45 

S.  E.  1001),  1510,  1523. 
Tilford    V.    State    (109    Ind.   3.59; 

10  N.  E.   107),  8.32,  837,  883, 

1305,  1306. 
Tilleny  v.  State  (10  Lea,  35),  131, 

135,  247,  1279. 
Tillery    v.    State     (10    Lea,    35), 

1453. 
Tilton   V.  Tilton    (16  Ky.   L.   Rep. 

538),  2161. 
Tilton  V.   Tilton    (29   S.  W.  290), 

2154. 
Tilton    V.    Swift     (40    Iowa    78), 

225. 
Timm  v.  Harrison    (109  111.  593), 

792. 
Timm   v.    Caledonia    Station    ( 142 

Mich.    323;    112    N.    W.    942; 

14  Det.  L.  X.   442),   167. 
Tindall  v.  Monmouth    ( [N.  J.  L.] 

68  Atl.  799),  741. 
Tinkcom,   In  re    (50   N.   Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    250;     100    N.    Y.    Supp. 

467),  675. 
Tinker  v.  State    (96  Ala.   115:    11 

So.    383),    35,    38,    309,    325, 

965,   960,   967,    1017,   1643. 
Tinkle   v.   Sweenev    (97   Tex.   190; 

77   S.   W.  609),   772. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cccxlix 


f References  are  to  pages.] 


Tinkle    v.    Sweeney     ([Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    78    S.    W.    248),    357, 

771,  772,  1241. 
Tinsley  v.   State    (  [Ga.]    35   S.   E. 

303),  945,  946. 
Tinson  v.  Moulton   (3  Cush.  209), 

1784. 
Tippett  V.  Heyman   ( 19  W.  N.  [X. 

S.  W.]    6),  375. 
Tippett  V.  State  ( 53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

180;    109    S.    W.    101),    1177, 

1681. 
Tipton    V.    Thompson     (50    S.    W. 

641;   21   Tex.   Civ.  App.    143), 

1887,  1953,  1970. 
Tipton    V.    Yakey    (72    Mo.    380), 

470. 
Tivorney  v.  O'Brien  (29  Vict.  L.  R. 

729;   25  Austr.  L.  T.  255;    10 

Austr.  L.  R.  101),  1792,  1805, 

1800. 
Tobert   v.    Clough    (72    Iowa    220; 

33  N.  W.  639),   1803. 
Tobin  V.  District  of  Columbia   (22 

App.  D.  C.  482),  1130. 
Todd,  Ex  parte  (3  Q.  B.  Div.  407; 

42  J.  P.  662;    47   L.  J.  M.  C. 

89),   708. 
Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nordyke   (27 

Ind.  95),  237. 
Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pence  ( 68  111. 

524),  1509. 
Toledo,   etc.   R.    Co.   v.    Riley    (47 

111.  514),  2180,  2185. 
Tolman  v.  Johnson   (43  Iowa  127), 

1798,  1804. 
Toman  v.  Westfield    (70  N.   J.  L. 

610;    57   Atl.    125).    812,   813. 
Tombeaugh  v.   State    (50  Tex.  Cr. 

App.    286;    98    S.    W.    1054), 

1167. 
Tome  v.   Stump    (89  Md.   264;    42 

Atl.  902),  2017,  2020. 
Tomlinson    v.    Bainake    (163    Ind. 

112;  70  N.  E.  155),  1510. 
Tompkins  v.  Oswego   (40  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.   4),   2176,  2197. 
Tompkins    v.    State    (2    Ga.    App. 

639;  58  S.  E.  1111),  80,  1161, 

1598. 


Tompkins   v.    State    (49    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    154;    90    S.    W.    1019), 

934. 

Tompkins  Co.  v.  Taylor   (21  N.  Y. 

173;  19  How.  Pr.  259),  43,  46, 

906. 
Tomlinson  Carriage  Co.  v.  Kinsella 

31  Conn.  208),  1783. 
Tonatio,    In    re    (49    N.    Y.    App. 

Div.  84;  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  560), 

729. 
Tonella  v.  State  (4  Tex.  App.  325), 

139. 
Tony   V.    State    (144    Ala.   87;    40 

So.  388),  1229,  1233. 
Tooke  V.  State  (4  Ga.  App.  495; 

61  S.  E.  917),  1301,  1453, 

1689,  1690,  1695. 
Toole  V.  State   (88  Ala.  158;  7  So. 

42),    885,    887,    1593,    1684. 
Tooth  V.  Laws   (2  N.  S.  W.  L.  R. 

154),  1784. 
Tooth   V.    Parker    (17   W.   N.    [N. 

Z.]   17),  1819. 
Topeka  v.  Chesney    (66  Kan.  480; 

71   Pac.  843),   1679. 
Topeka    v.    Myers    (34    Kan.    500; 

8  P.  726),  258. 
Topeka  v.  Raynor    (60  Kan.   800; 

58  Pac.  557;    61   Kan.   10;   55 

Pac.     509),    258,     433,     1542, 

1742. 
Topeka  v.  Stevenson  (79  Kan.  394; 

99  Pac.  598),  1732. 
Topeka  v.  Webb    (44  Kan.  71;   23 

P.  1073),  258. 
Topeka  v.  Zufall   (40  Kan.  47;   19 

Pac.  359),  9,  51,  258,  1753. 
Topper    V.    State    (118    Ind.    110; 

20  N.  E.  699),  771,  1219, 

1220.  1223.  1220.  1230,  162l' 

1845. 
Tousey  v.  De  Huy  ([Ky.]  62  S. 

W.  1118;     23ky.L.Rep.458), 

858,  868.  869. 
Tousey  v.  Stites   ( [Kv.]   60  S.  W. 

277;    23    Ky.    L.'Rep.    1738). 

939. 
Towles.   Ex  parte    (48   Tex.   413), 

925. 


eccl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Townley  v.  State  ( 18  N.  J.  L.  311 ) , 

1525. 
Townsend,   Matter   of    (129   N.   Y. 

App.    Div.    909;     114    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1149),  595. 
Townsend  v.  State  (2  Blackf.  151), 

(588,   1751. 
Tozer   v.    Saturlee    (3   Grant   Cas- 

[Pa.]    162),  2119. 
Tracy,  In  re    (11   N.  Y.   St.   Rep. 

103),  2137,   2148. 
Tracy,   In  re    (1    Paige    580),    66, 

2018. 
Tracy  v.  Ginzberg  (189  Mass.  260; 

75  N.  E.  637),  480,  682,  694, 

702,  819. 
Tracy  v.  Ginzberg  (205  U.  S.  170; 

51    L.    Ed.    755;    27    Sup.    Ct. 

461,  affirming  189  Mass.  260; 

75  N.  E.  637),  480,  702. 
Tracy    v.    Perry    (5    N.    H.    504), 

1365,  1625. 
Tracy   v.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

85  S.  W.  1056),  1225. 
Tracy  v.  Talmage    (14  N.  Y.   162; 

67  Am.  Dec.  132),  1795,  1797, 

1801. 
Trageser  v.  Gray   (73  Md.  250;  20 

Atl.   905;    25   Am.  St.   589;    9 

L.   R.   A.   780),   96,    149,    150, 

152,  313. 
Trail    v.    State    ([Tex.    Cr.    App.] 

107  S.  W.  545),  1598. 
Trainor  v.  Multnoma  (2  Ore.  214), 

808,  812,  813. 
Trammel]     v.     Bradley     (37     Ark. 

374),  136,  247. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Parkersburg 
(107   U.    S.    691;    2    Sup.    Ct. 

732),  315. 
Tranter   v.    Lancashire    J.    J.    (51 

J.  P.  454),  655. 
Travelers'  etc.,  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harvey 
(82   Va.   949;    5   S.   E.   553), 

2189,  2238,  2239.  2245. 
Travis  v.  State   (37  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

486;  36  S.  W.  .589),  509, 
Traynor  v.  Jones    ( [  1894]    1  Q.  B. 
p.  86),  701,  709,  711. 


Treadway     v.     State     ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    62    S.    W.    574),    1204, 

1380. 
Treahey  v.  Holliday   (43  Kan.  29; 

22    Pac.    1004),    1159. 
Treas.     v.     Maxwell      (157     Mass. 

333;   32  N.  E.   152),  1840. 
Tredway   v.   Riley    (32   Neb.   495; 

49    X.    W.    268;    29    Am.    St, 

447),   8,   111,   119,   1788. 
Treefty    v.    Board     (73    N.    J.    L. 

278;    62  Atl.   1004),  698. 
Treese    v.    State     (14    Tex.    App. 

31),   929. 
Tremblay  v.   Pointe-au-Pic    (13   L. 

N.   [Can.]   386),  649. 
Trembly,  Ex  parte    (7  Mon.  S.  C. 

17),  1839. 
Treue   v.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

44    S.    W.    829),    1186,    1615, 

1692,   1694. 
Trice   v.   Robinson    ( 16   Ont.    Rep. 

433),    1843. 
Trigg  v.  State    (49  Tex.  645),  64. 
Trigally     v.     Memphis      (6     Cold. 

[Tenn.]   382),  470. 
Triggs  V.  Mclntyre    (215  111.  369; 

74   N.   E.   400;    affirming    115 

111.  App.   257),   1999,  2000. 
Trinkle    v.    State     (52    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    42;     105    S.    W.    201), 

1094. 
Trinkle  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

123  S.  W.   1114),  921,  926. 
Tripp    v.    Bristol    Co.     (2    Allen, 

556),  2252. 
Tripp  v.  Flanigan   (10  R.  I.  128), 

770,   783,   1188. 
Tripp  v.  Ilenncssy   (10  R.  I.  129), 

1190. 
Tripp   V.   Norton    (10   R.   I.    125), 

758. 
Tromans    v.    Hodkinson     ([1903] 

1  K.  B.  30;  72  L.  J.  K.  B.  21; 

67J.  P.  30;     51W.  R.286;     87 

L.   T.    549;    19   T.   L.   R.    19), 

379. 
Trometer  v.   District  of  Columbia 

(24    App.    D.    C.   242),    1507, 

1617. 


TABIJ^   OF    CASES. 


cccli 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Tron  V.  Lewis   (31  Ind.  App.  178; 
66    N.    E.    490),    975,     1108, 
1268. 
Tross  V.  Board    (59   X.   J.  L.  97; 

35  Atl.  646),  682. 
Trost   V.   State    (64   Miss.    188;    1 

So.  49),  1556,  1744. 
Trott    V.    Irish     (1    Allen,    481), 

1775,  1805. 
Trotter,  In  re    (24  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

26),  628,  638. 
Trout  V.   State    (107   Ind.   578;    8 

N.  E.  618),  1485. 
Troy   V.    Cape    Fear,  etc.,   R.   Co. 
(99  N.  C.   298;    6   S.   E.  77), 
2183. 
Truesdell    v.    State    (42    Tex.    Cr. 
App.    544;     61     S.    W.    935), 
911,  1680. 
Trumbull    v.    Erickson     (97    Fed. 
891;    38   C.  C.  A.  536),  2191. 
Trustees   v.   Board    (62   Miss.   68; 

39  S.  E.   793),  889. 
Trustees,  etc.,  v.  Board   (56  N.  J. 
L.    411;     29    Atl.     150),    616, 
617. 
Trustees   v.  Keating    (4   Den.    [N. 

Y.]  341),  395. 
Trustees   v.  Lewis   Co.    ([Ky.]    46 
S.  W.  1;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  369), 
807,  809. 
Tuchman  v.  Welch   (42  Fed.  548), 

154,  307,  313,  327. 
Tuck  V.   Waldron    (31   Ark.   462), 

432,  436. 
Tucker  v.  Adams   (63  X.  H.  361) 

1771,  1772. 
Tucker  v.  Moultrie   (122  Ga.  160; 

50  S.  E.  61),  127,  169,  1690. 
Tucker  v.   United  States    (151   U. 
S.    164;    14   Sup.   Ct.   299;    38 
L.  Ed.  112),  2068,  2085. 
Tugman    v.    City   of    Chicago    (78 

III.  405),  408. 
Tuichner,  Ex  parte  (69  Iowa,  393- 

28  N.  W.   655),   1760. 
Tulloss  V.  Sedan   (31  Kan.  165;   1 

Pac.  285),  428. 
Tummings  v.   State    (32   Tex.   Cr. 
App.  117;  22  S.  W.  409),  932. 


Tupelo  V.   Beard    (56  Miss.   532), 

813. 
Turnbull    v.    Appleton    (45    J.    P, 

469),  1301. 
Turner  v.  Cheesman   ( 15  N,  J.  Eq. 

243),  2135,  2137. 
Turner  v.  Clay  (3  Bibb,  52),  2126. 
Turner   v.    Forsyth    (78    Ga.    683; 

3  S.  E.  649),  473,  932. 
Turner  v.  Johnson   (51  J.  P.  22), 

1643. 
Turner    v.    Rehm    (43    Ind.    208), 

662. 
Turner    v.    Saxon     ([Wash.    Ter.] 

20  Pac.   Rep.  685),  231. 
Turner  v.  State   (121  Ga.  154;   48 

S.  E.  906),   1752,   1754. 
Turner   v.   Wilson    (49   Ind.   581), 

276. 
Turpin    v.    State     (8f    Ind.    148), 

1485. 
Tuttle  V.  Cincinnati,  etc.,  Ry.  Co. 
([Ky.]  80  S.  W.  802;  26  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  152),  2207,  2217. 
Tuttle  V.  Commonwealth   (2  Gray, 

505),  262,   1764. 
Tuttle   V.    Holland    (43   Vt.   542), 

1798. 
Tuttle    V.    Poechert    ([Iowa]    121 

N.  W.  1057),  577,  578. 
Tuttle  V.   Russell    (2  Day,  201;    2 

Am.  Dec.  89),  2258. 
Twining  v.  St.  Louis  Co.   (47  Mo. 

App.   647),  662. 
Tyler  v.   State    (69  Miss.  395;    11 

So.  25),   1624. 
Tynemouth    v.    Attorney    General 
([1899 J     App.    Cas^    293;     68 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  752;  63  J.  P.  404; 
15  T.  L.  R.  340),  671,  681. 
Tyra    v.    Commonwealth     (2    Met. 

[Ky.]   1),  2041,  2049,  2053. 
Tyrrell  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

38  S.  W.   1011),  1613. 
Tyson    v.    Bowden     (8    Fed.    61) 

1027. 
Tyson     v.     Postlethwait     (13     III 
728),  467. 


ccclii 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[J^eferences  are  to  pages.] 


u 


Uldrich  v.  Gilmore   (35  Neb.  288; 

53  N.  W.  135),  761,  773,  1981. 
Ulmer    v.    State     (61    Ala.    .208), 

1476. 
Ulmer  v.  State  (14  Ind.  52),  1485. 
Uloth  V,  State   (48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

295;     87     S.    W.    822),     972, 

1185,  1731. 
Ulrich  V.  Commonwealth   ( 6  Bush, 

400),  1237. 
Ulterminova  v.  Zekind    (95   Iowa, 

622;     64    N.    W.    646;    29    L. 

E.   A.   734;    58  Am.  St.  447), 

786. 
Umholtz,  Iti  re   (9  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

450;    43  W.   N.  €.  495),  480, 

695,  696,   701,  705,   800. 
Underhill's  Will,  In  re  (Prob.  Rep. 

[N.     Y.]     196),     2136,     2138, 

2142. 
Underwood  v.  Fairfield  County  ( 67 

Conn.  411;   35  Atl.  274),  653, 

9J9. 
Undtrvvood  v.  MeDulTee    ( 15  Mich. 

361),    1015. 
Union   v.    State    ( [Ga.]    66    S.    E. 

24),    1602,    1579. 
Union  Mut.   Life   Ins.   Co.  v.  Reif 

(36    Ohio    St.    596;     38    Am. 

Rep.   613,   and  note,   pp.   615, 

616;   38   Am.  Rep.  — ),  2222, 

2223. 
Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Diehl   (33 

Kan.  422;   6  Pac.  566),  2197. 
Uniontown  v.  State  (  [Ala.]  39  So. 

814),  241,  382. 
United     Brethren,     etc.,     Soc.     v, 

O'Hara   (120  Pa.  256;   13  Atl. 

932),   2223,   2226,   2245. 
United    Breweries    Co.    v.    Colby 

(170  Fed.   100).    153,  165. 
United  States  v.  Abigan   (1   Phil- 
ippine, 83),  20.38,  2082. 
United   States   v.    Allen    (38    Fed. 

736),  76. 
United  States  v.  Ames  Mercantile 

Co.  (2  Alaska,  74),  538,  1114. 


United  States  v.  Angell    (11   Fed. 

34),   81,   498,   500,   527,   1638. 

United    States    v.     Anthony      ( 14 

Blatchf.  92),  21. 
United  States  v.  Ash    (  [D.  C]   75 

Fed.  651),  34,  80. 
United  States  v.  Bede    ( Fed.  Cas. 

No.   14558),   1107,   1109. 
United   States   v.   Belt    (128    Fed. 

168),  1262. 
United  States  v.  Berner  ( 5  Crancli 
C.    C.    347;      Fed.     Cas.     No. 
14569),  1106,  1110. 
United    States   v.    Binns    (194    U. 

S.  486,  495),  1419. 
United  States  v.  Bonham   (31  Fed. 

808),    1111,    1616,    1617. 
United   States   v.   Boss    (160    Fed. 

132),  1259. 
United  States  v.  Bowen  (4  Cranch 

C.  C.  604),  2039. 
United  States  v.  Britton    (107  U. 
S.  670;  2  Sup.  Ct.  512),  1510. 
United   States   v.   Buckles    (6  Ind. 
T.     319;     97     S.    VV.     1022), 
1259. 
United  States  v.  Burch   ( 1  Cranch 
C.     C.     36;      Fed.     Cas.     No. 
14682).    1649. 
United  States  v.  Burdick    ( 1  Dak. 
142;     46    N.    W.    571),    1261, 
1262. 
United  States  v.  Calhoun   ( 39  Fed. 

Rep.  604),  821. 
United    States   v.    Carr    (2    Mont. 

234),  1260. 
United    States    v.    Celestine     ( [U. 

S.]  30  Sup.  Ct.  93),  1260. 
U.   S.   V.   Clapox    ([D.   C]    35    F. 

575),  1262. 
United  States  v.  Clare  (2  Fed.  55), 

77,    1192. 
United  States  v.  Clarke   (2  Cranch. 

C.  C.   158),  2054. 
United    States     v.    Claypool     (14- 

Fed.   127),  2039,  2048. 
United    States   v.    Cline    (26    Fed. 
Rep.   515),    1267,    1283,    1727. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cccliii 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


United  States  v.  Colin  ( 2  Ind.  Ty. 

474;    52    S.    W.    38),    18,    38, 

174,  963. 
United    States     v.    Columbus     (5 

Cranch   C.   C.   304;    Fed.   Cas. 

No.   14841),    1106,    1109. 
United    States    v.    Commissioners 

17  D.  C.  409),  627,  628. 
United   States   v.   Cook    (17   Wall. 

168),  1509. 
United  States  v.  The  Cora  ( 1  Dak. 

1;  46  N.  W.  503),  1030. 
United   States  v.    Cornell    (2   Ma- 
son, 91;   Fed.  Cas.  No.  14868), 

2039,  2042,  2048,  2069. 
United    States    v.    Cota    (17    Fed. 

734),  60. 
United      States     v.     Coulter      (1 

Cranch   C.   C.   203;    Fed.  Cas. 

No.   14875),   1107,   1110. 
United  States  v.  Cutting   (3  Wall. 

441;    18   L.   Ed.    241),    480. 
United  States  v.  Dalasay   (5  Phil- 
ippine, 41),  2082. 
United   States   v.  Davis    (37    Fed. 

468),  518,  539. 
United  States  v.  Devlin  (Fed.  Cas. 

No.   14955),  1643. 
United    States     v.     De    Witt     (9 

Wall.  41),  91. 
United  States  v.   Distilled   Spirits 

(5   Sawy.   421),    1775. 
United    States   v.    Dodge    (Deady, 

186;    Fed.    Cas.    No.    14974), 

1183. 
United  States  v.  Douglass   ( 19  D. 

C.  99),  626,  632,  648. 
United    States    v.    Downing    ( Fed. 

Cas.  No.   14991),   1262. 
United  States  v.  Drew    (5  Mason, 

28;     Fed.     Cas.    No.     14993), 

2050,  2052. 
United    States   v.   Ducournau    (54 

Fed.  138),  39,  83. 
United    States    v.    Earl     (17    Fed. 

75),  1259,   1262. 
United  States  v.  84   Boxes   Sugar 
(7  Pet.  [U.  S.]    453),  252. 


United  States  v.  Elder  (4  Cranch 
€.  C.  507;  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
15039),  109,  1107. 

United  States  v.  Ellis  (51  Fed. 
808),   24,    26,    42,    1263. 

United  States  v.  50  Cases  of  Dis- 
tilled Spirits  (S3  Fed.  1000), 
1030. 

United  States  v.  Fiscus  (42  Fed. 
395),  154,  307,  313,  327. 

United.  States  v.  Fitzgerald  (2 
Phillipiae,    419),    2082. 

U.  S.  V.  Flynn  (1  Dill,  451;  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  15124),  1262. 

United  States  v.  Forbes  (Crabbe, 
558;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  15129), 
2039,  2048,  2051. 

United  States  v.  Fortin  (1  Phil- 
ippine, 299),  351. 

United  States  v.  43  Gallons  of 
Whisky  (3  Wall.  407;  18  L. 
Ed.    182),    1258. 

United  States  v.  Forty-Three  Gal- 
lons of  Whisky  (93  U.  S. 
188;  23  L.  Ed.  846),  210, 
1259. 

United  States  v.  Forty-Three  Gal- 
lons of  Whisky  (108  U.  S. 
491;  2  Sup.  Ct.  906;  27  L. 
Ed.  803),  524,   1260. 

United  States  v.  Four  Bottles  of 
Sour  Mash  Whisky  (90  Fed 
720),  1260. 

United  States  v.  Fox  (Fed.  Cas. 
No.   15155),   1425,  1430,   1434. 

United  States  v.  Gilbert  (2  Sum. 
19;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  15204), 
2247. 

United  States  v.  Git  (3  Philip- 
pine, 414),   2082. 

United  States  v.  Glab  ( 1  McCrary, 
166),  539. 

United  States  v.  Gordon  ( 1  Cranch 
C.  C.  58 ;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  15233) , 
1491,   1505. 

United  States  v.  Guillermo  (3 
Philippine,  329),  2082. 

United  States  v.  Harris  (1  Abb. 
[U.  S.]    110),   1767. 


cccliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


United  States  v.  Hey  ward  (2  Gall, 

485),  1642. 
United  States  v.  Higliliill   (4  Phil- 
ippine, 384),  2082. 
United     States     v.     Holliday      (3 

Wall.    407;    18    L.    Ed.    182), 

210,   1261,   12G2. 
United    States    v.    Hull     (14    Fed. 

324),   1446. 
United    States    v.    Hurshman    (53 

Fed.  543),   1261,   1262. 
United      States      v.      Jackson     ( 1 

Hughes,   531),    1113. 
Uaiied   States   v.  Johnson    ( 12   U. 

S.  App.  D.   C.  92),  560,  592. 
United  States  v.  Johnson  ( 12  App. 

D.    C.    545),    545,    600,    618, 

624,  627,  657. 
United    States    v.    Kaldenbacli     ( 1 

Cranch  C.  C.   132),   396,   413. 
United  States  v.  Kopp    (110  Fed. 

160),   1263. 
United  States  v.  Lackey   ( 120  Fed. 

577),  1288. 
United  States  v.  Le  Bris    (121  U. 

S.    278;    7    Sup.    Ct.    894;    30 

L.  Ed.  946),  1260. 
United      States     v.     Lindsay      ( 1 

Cranch   C.   C.   245;    Fed.  Cas. 

No.   15602),  1107,   1110. 
United     States     v.     Luyties     ( 124 

Fed.  977),  23. 
United  States  v.  McGlue   ( 1   Curt. 

1;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  15679),  2039, 

2051,  2052,  2054. 
United   States  v.  Mares    ( [N.  M.] 

88  Pac.  1128),   1263. 
United  States  v.  Meagher  ( 37  Fed. 

875),  2061,  2062. 
United  States  v.  Mickle   ( 1  Cranch 

C.     C.     268;     Fed.    Cas.    No. 

15763),  1112. 
United   States   v.   Morin    (4    Biss. 

93),  1306,  1323. 
United  States  v.  Nelson    (29  Fed. 

Rep.  202),  109,  1043. 
United    States    v.    1,960    Bags    of 

Coffee  (8  Cranch  [U.  S.]  398), 

253. 


United  States  v.  Odita   (4  Philip- 
pine, 309),  2082. 
U.  S.  V.  Osborn  ([D.  C]  2  F.  58), 

1262. 
United      States     v.      Overton      (2 

Cranch   C.    C.    42;    Fed.    Cas. 

No.  15979),  552,  700. 
United  States  v.  Paxton  ( 1  Cranch 

C.     C.     44;      Fed.     Cas.     No. 

16013),   1372. 
LTnited  States  v.  Powers    ( 1   Alas- 
ka, 180),  1268,  1741. 
United  States  v.  Prout   (Fed.  Cas. 

No.  16093),  1107,  1110. 
United  States  v.  Recano    ( 4  Phil- 
ippine, 91),  2082. 
United  States  v.  Renfrow  (3  Okla. 

161;    41    Pac.    88),    1261. 
United    States    v.    Rennecke     (28 

Fed.  847),   76. 
United   States  v.  Ronan    (33   Fed. 

117),  132,  400. 
United      States      v.      Roudenbush 

(Baldw.   514),   2039. 
United  States  v.  Seveloff  (2  Savvy. 

311;    Fed.    Cas.    No.    10252), 

1260. 
United    States    v.    Shaw    (Mux.    2 

Sawy.  264),  210,  1259. 
United  States  v.  Sheiver   (23  Fed. 

134),   1267,    1283,    1727. 
United  States  v.  Shuck   ( 1  Cranch 

56;     Fed.     Cas.     No.     16285), 

1372. 
United    States    v.    6    Packages    of 

Goods    (6  Wheat.  U.  S.  520), 

252. 
LTnited   States   v.    Six    Fermenting 

Tubs    (1    Abb.    [U.   S.]    268), 

929. 
United   States  v.   Smith    (45   Fed. 

115),  76. 
United  States  v.  Squagh  ( 1  Cranch 

C.    C.    174;      Fed.     Cas.     No. 

16370),    1190. 
United  States  v.  Stafford   (20  Fed. 

720),  38,  60,  968. 
United     States    v.    Stephens      (12 

Fed.  52),  173,  968,  1260. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccclv 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


United  States  v.  Stephens  ( 37  Fed. 

665),  76. 
United  States  v.  Stofloe    (76   Pac. 

611),  1263. 
United   States   v.   Stubblefield    (40 

P'ed.  454),  15,  21,  52,  58,  969. 
United  States  v.  Sutton    ([U.  S.] 

30  Sup.  Ct.   116),   1260. 
United    States    v.    350    Chests    of 

Tea   (12  Wheat.    [U.  S.]  486; 

United    States    v.    422    Casks 

of  Wine,  1  Pet.  [U.  S.]  547), 

252. 
United  States  v.  Tom   (1  Ore.  20), 

1260. 
United    States    v.    29    Gallons    of 

Whisky    (45  Fed.   847),   1030, 

1260. 
United    States    v.    Twenty    Boxes 

of  Corn  Liquor  ( 123  Fed.  135; 

affirmed   133   Fed.   910;   67  C. 

C.  A.  214),  337. 
United  States  v.  Voss    ( 1   Cranch 

C.    C.     101;     Fed.     Cas.     No. 

16628),   1349. 
United  States  v.  Winslow  ( 3  Sawy. 

337;    Fed.    Cas.    No.    16742'), 

1262. 
United    States    v.    Wirt    (3    Sa\vj\ 

161;    Fed.    Cas.    No.    16745), 

1260. 
United   States   v.   Wittig    (2  Low. 

Dec.   460),    1338. 
United    States    v.    Woodward     (2 

Hayw.   &   H.    119;    Fed.   Cas. 

No.    16760a),    2051,    2052. 
United  States  v.  Yape   ( 10  Philip- 
pine,  204),   2082, 
United  States  Distilling  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago   (112    111.    19;    1    N.    E. 

166),  169,  184,  199,  444. 
United  States  Exp.  Co.  v.  Keefer 

59  Ind.  263),  1727. 
University  Club  v.  Louisville    (11 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  902),   1333. 
Untriner   v.   State    ([Ala.]    41   So. 

170),   1612,   1654. 
Upstone  V.  People    (109  111.   169), 

2041,   2045,   2053,  2055,  2062, 

2067. 


Urhahns   v.   State    (72   Ind.  602), 

1498. 
Uterminova   v.    Zekind    (95   Iowa, 

622;   04  N.  W.  646;   29  L.  R. 

A.    734;     58    Am.    St.    447), 

789. 
Utsler  V.  Territory   (10  Okla.  463; 

62  Pac.  287),  372,  1123,  1481, 

1650. 


Vaccarezza,    Ex    parte     (52    Tex. 

Cr.  App.  311;  106  S.  W.  392), 

714,  715,  716,  752. 
Vail,  In  re    (38  N.  Y.  Misc.   Rep. 

392;    77    N.    Y.    Supp.    903), 

584,  590. 
Vallance   v.   King    (3   Barb.   548), 

931,  933,  1009. 
Vanaman  v.  Adams    ( 74  N.  J.  L. 

125;    05   Atl.   204),    714,   727, 

743. 
Van     Alstine     v.     Kaniecki      ( 109 

Mich.    318;    67    N.    W.    502), 

1878,   1978. 
Van  Buren  v.  Wells  (53  Ark.  308), 

216. 
Van    Buskirk    v.    Daugherty     (44 

Iowa,  42),  2253. 
Vance   v.   W.    A.   Vandercook    Co. 

(170  U.   S.  438;    18   Sup.   Ct. 

674;    42    L.    Ed.    1100),    147, 

158,  328,  1289,   1428. 
Vandalia    v.    Carracher     (116    111. 

App.  62),  1129. 
Vanderbilt     v.     Adams      (7     Cow. 

[N.  Y.]  349),   129. 
Vanderlip  v.  Derby   (19  Neb.  165; 

26  N.  W.  707),  601,  616. 
Vandewood  v.   State    (50  Ind.  26, 

295),  1442,  1488. 
Van  Hook  v.  Schea   (70  Ala.  361; 

45  Am.  Rep.  85),  167. 
Van  Hook  v.  Selma  (70  Ala.  361), 

443. 
Vanliew  v.  Johnson  (4  Hun,  415), 

2127. 
Van  Loan  v.  Willis  ( 13  Daly,  281), 

2258,  2259. 


ccclvi 


TABLE   OF    CASKS. 


[iiefeiences  are  to  pages.] 


Vann  v.  State    (140  Ala.   122;   37 

So.  158),  1602. 
Vann  v.  State  (83  Ga.  44;  10  S.  E. 

591),  2041,  2059. 
Vannony    v.   Patton    (5    B.    Mon. 

248),  1780. 
Van  Nortwich  v.   Bennett    (62   N. 

J.  L.   151;   40  Atl.  689),  576, 

628. 
Vannoy   v.    State    (64    Ind.    447), 

498,  500,  501,  506,  526. 
Van  Noy  v.  State    (14   Tex.  App. 

09),  1760. 
Van    Valkenburgh    v.    Amer.    Pop. 

Ins.  Co.   (70  N.  Y.  605),  2223, 

2243,  2244. 
Van    Vliet,   In    re    (43    Fed.    Rep. 

761),  321. 
Van  Wert  v.  Brown    (47   Oliio  St. 

477 ;  25  N.  E.  59  [reversing  4 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  407]),  233. 
Van  Wyck  v.  Brasher    (81   N.   Y. 

262),  2105,  2121. 
Van  Zant  v.  People   (2  Parker  Cr. 

Rep.  [N.  Y.]   168).  1310. 
Varble   v.   Commonwealth    (3    Ky. 

L.  Rep.  [abstract]  694),  1290. 
Vardeman  v.  State    (108  Ga.  774; 

33  S.  E.  643),  19,  33. 
Vaughan  v.  State   (5  Chuke  [la.] 

369),  1529,  1531. 
Vaughn  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

93  S.  W.  741),  1651. 
Vavasour   v.    Ormrod    (6   B.   &   C. 

530),  1509. 
Veasey,  /?i  re  ( [Del.]  63  Atl.  801), 

588. 
Veeder.  In  re  (31  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

569;    65    N.    Y.    Supp.    517), 

582.  584,  592. 
Venus,    The     (8    Cranch    [U.    S.] 

253),  252. 
Veen  V.  Creaton    (130  Pa.  St.  48; 

20  A.  865).  1899.  1901. 
Vernon    v.    State    ([Ala.]    50    So. 

57),  515. 
Ver  Straeten   v.  T^ewis    ( 77   Iowa, 

130;   41  N.  W.  594),  1002. 
Veruki  v.  State   (127  Ga.  289;  56 

S.  E.  408),  1130. 


Ververka  v.  Fullmers   ([Neb.]   118 

N.  W.  1097),  671. 
Victoria   v.   Union  Club    (3   B.   C. 

363),  1332. 
Vidalia  v.   Falkenheine    ( [La.]   49 

So.  217),  418. 
Viefhaus  v.   Bohenstehn    (71   Ark. 

419;  75  S.  W.  585),  127. 
Viefhaus   v.   State    (71   Ark.   419; 

75  S.  W.  585),  1475. 
Viles,    Ex   parte     (139    Fed.    68), 

1259. 
Vincent  v.  State  (42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

413;     55    S.    W.    819),    1226, 

1227,  1247,  1562,  1615. 
Vine  V.  Leeds  (J.  J.  L.  R.  10  Q.  B. 

195;  39  J.  P.  213;  44  L.  J. 

M.  C.  60;  31  L.  T.  842;  23 

W.  R.  849),  2168. 
Vines  v.  State  (67  Ala.  73),  156. 
Vinson  v.  Augusta    (38  Ga.  342), 

270. 
Vinson    v.    Monticello     (118    Ind. 

103;     19  N.  E.  734),  144,  410, 

415,  439. 
Vinton    v.    Middlesex    R.    Co.    (11 

Allen  304;  87  Am.  Dec.  714), 

2202. 
Violet's  Will    (1  Bibb,  617),  2138, 

2140. 
Virginia  v.  Smith   ( 1  Cranch  C.  C. 

46),  1649. 
Virginia  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Boswell 

(82    Va.    932;    4    S.    E.    689), 

2180,  2184. 
Virginia    Pocahontas    Coal    Co.   V. 

McDowell  Co.  Ct.   (58  W.  Va. 

86;  51  S.  E.  1),  667. 
Viser  v.  State   (10  Tex.  App.  86), 

1743. 
Vizacchero  v.  Rhode  Island  Co.  (26 

R.  I.  392;  59  Atl.  105;   69  L. 

R.  A.  188),  2174. 
Vliet,  In  re  (43  Fed.  761),  328. 
Voetsch     v.     Phelps      (112     Mass. 

407),  1067,  1008. 
Vogel  v.  State   (31  Ind.  64).  1516. 
Voght  V.  State   (124  Ind.  358;   24 

N.  E.  680),  264,  1585. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


ceelvii 


[Refeiences  are  to  pages.] 


Voglesong  v.  State    (9   Ind.    113), 

215. 
Voight  V.  Board   (59  N.  J.  L.  358; 

36  Atl.  686;  37  L.  R.  A.  292), 

183,  270,  718,  738,  739. 
Volans   V.   Owen    (74    N.   Y.   526; 

30  Am.  Rep.  337),  1864,  1947. 
Volans   V.   Owen    (9   Hun,  55    [N. 

Y.]),  1901. 
Volmer   v.    State     (34    Ark.   487), 

1540,  1544. 
Von  der  Leith  v.  State    (60  N.  J. 

L.  46;   37   Atl.  436;    60  N.  J. 

L.  590;  40  Atl.  590),  403,  453. 
Vose    V.    Hundy     (2    Mass.    322), 

1039. 
Voss   V.   Haggerty    (11    Ohio   Dec. 

408;   26  Wkly,  L.  Bull.  268), 

541,  542. 
Voss  V.  Terrell   ( 12  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

439;  34  S.  W.  170),  888. 


W 

Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Monegan  (94  Til. 

App.  82),  2177. 
Wachholz   v.    Wachholz    (75    Wis. 

377;  44  N.  W.  506),  2167. 
Waddle  v.   State    ([Miss.]    24   So. 

311),   1182,   1604,   1615. 
Wade   V.    Colvert    (2    Mill    Const. 

26;   12  Am.  Dec.  652  [1833]), 

2094,  2095,  2098. 
Wade  V.  State  (22  Tex.  App.  629; 

3  S.  W.  786),  797,  1613. 
Wade   V.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.   App.] 

43  S.  W.  995),  1201. 
Wade  V.  State    (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

608;  109  S.  W.  191,  192),  940, 

1471,  1472. 
Wade  V.  State    (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

184;     109    S.    W.     191),    873, 

1471. 
Waddell  v.  Wadd*^ll   (2  Swab.  &  T. 

584),  2167. 
Wadsworth    v.    Dunnam     (08    Ala. 

610;  13  So.  597),  14,  21,  52, 

63,  970,  1753,  2032. 


Wadsworth  v.  Dunnam  (117  Ala. 

661;  23  So.  699),  962,  1703, 

1807. 
Wadsworth  v.  Sherman    ( 14  Barb. 

169),  2119. 
Wagner  v.  Breed  (  [Neb.]  46  N.  W. 

286),  1786,  1788. 
Wagner  v.  Garrett   (118  Ind.  114; 

20  N.  E.  706),   190,  280,  414, 

430,  464,  466,  474,  530,  536. 
Wagner  v.  Hallack    (3  Colo.  184), 

1727. 
Wagner  v.  Holmes   (88  Iowa,  728; 

55  N.  W.  473),  1002. 
Wagner  v.  Scherer   (89  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.    202;     85    N.    Y.    Supp. 

894),   1807. 
Wagner  v.  State  (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

306;    109    S.    W.    169),    1579, 

1654,    1693. 
Wah  Yum  &  Co.,  In  re   (11  B.  C. 

154),  539. 
Wahl   V.   Walton    (30  Minn.  506; 

16  N.  W.  397),  2033. 
Waits,  Ex  parte   ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

64  S.  W.  254),  873. 
Wakefield  v.   State    ([Tex.]   28   S. 

W.  470),   1235,   1236,   1627. 
Wakeman,    Appeal    of    ( 70    Conn. 

733;    50  Atl.   733),   698,   747, 

748. 
Wakeman  v.   Chambers    (69  Iowa, 

169;    28    N.    W.    498),    1221, 

1578. 
Wakeman    v.    Price     ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]    89    S.   W.    1093),   772, 

782,  784. 
Walbert   v.    State    (17    Ind.    App. 

350;  46  N.  E.  827),  358,  1566. 
Waldo  V.  Bell    (13  La.  Ann.  329), 

467. 
Waldron  v.  Angieman  (71  N.  J.  L. 

166;    58  Atl.  568),  2095. 
Waldron  v.  I^uisville,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(lllKy.  30;    63S.W.  580;   54 
,L.  R.  A.  919),  2211,  2214. 
Waldstien  v.  State   (29  Tex.  App. 

82;   14  S.  W.  394),  1228. 
Wales   V.    Belcher    (3   Pick.   508), 

233. 


ccclviii 


TABL£   OF    CASES. 


[neferences    are    to    pages.] 


Walker  v.  Cincinnati  (21  Ohio  [N. 

S.]   14),  228. 
Walker  v.   Commonwealth    ( [Ky.] 

75  S.  W.  242;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

401),  554. 
Walker    v.    Daily    (101    111.    App. 

575),  55,  971,  1843. 
Walker    v.    Holtsclaw     (57    S.    C. 

459;   35  S.  B.  754),  755,  759. 
Walker's   License,   In   re    (24    Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  90),  562. 
Walker  v.  Lovell    (28  X.  H.   138), 

1782. 
Walker  v.  Mobley    (  [Tex.]    103   S. 

W.  490),  894,  898. 
Walker     v.    Mobley     ( [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]  105  S,  W.  61),  898,  900. 
Walker  v.  McNelly   (121  Ga.  114; 

48  S.  E.  718)'  413,  984. 
Walker  v.  Oswald  (68  Md.  146;  11 

Atl.  711),  906. 
Walker    v.    Prescott     (44    N.    H. 

511),  24,  26,  47,  48,  966. 
Walker  v.  Shook    (49  Iowa,  264), 

1032,  1777. 
Walker     v.     Springfield      (94     111. 

364),  791. 
Walker  v.  State   (122  Ca.  747;  50 

S.  E.  994),  1207. 
Walker    v.    State     (32    Teim.     [2 

Swan]  287),  373. 
Walker    v.    State    (85    Ala.    7;    4 

So.  686;   7  Am.  St.  Pep.  17), 

2042,  2006,  2074. 
Walker  v.  State  (38  Ark.  656),  85. 
Walker    v.    State     (25    Tex.    App. 

448;  8  S.  W.  644),  1236,  1028. 
Walker  v.  State    (  [Tox.  Cr.  App.] 

64  S.  W.  1052 ! ,  834,  837,  842, 

844. 
Walker  v.  State   (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

72  S.  W.  401),  1584,  1652. 
Walker  v.  State  (49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

345;     94    S.    W.    230),     1611, 

1729,  1733. 
Walker  v.  State  (50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

495:   98  S.  W.  843).   1185. 
Walker  v.  State   (  [Tev.  Cr.  App.] 

98  S.  W.  205),  964,  969. 


Walker  v.  State  (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

293;     106    S.    W.    376),    948, 

1202,  1685,  1597. 
Walker  v.  Walker    (67  J.  P.  452; 

90    L.    T.    88;    20    Cox    C.   C. 

594),  690,  1273. 
Wall,  Ex  parte  (48  Cal.  279),  231, 

236,  240. 
Wall  V.   State    (78  Ala.  417),   24, 

53,  59,  86,  1711. 
Wall  V.  State  (78  Ala.  718),  25. 
Wall  V.  State   (10  Ind.  App.  530; 

38    N.    E.    190),    1849,    1869, 

1870,  1935,  1951. 
Wallace  v.  Cubanola  (70  Ark.  395; 

68  S.  W.  485),  446,  471,  474, 

934. 
Wallace  v.  Reno    (27  Nev.  71;   73 

Pac.  528),  714,  741. 
Wallace   v.   Salisbury    ( 147   X.   C. 

58;   60  S.  E.  713),  925. 
Wallace    v.    State    (54    Ark.    542; 

16  S.  W.  571),  1227. 
Waller    v.    State    (38    Ark.    65G), 

1360,   1560,   1639,  1641. 
Walling   V.   Michigan    (102    U.    S. 

123),  156. 
Walling   V.   Michigan    (116   U.   S. 

440;     6    Sup.    Ct.    454),    116, 

154,  150,  199,  299,  315. 
Wallis   V.    Hodson    (2    Atk.    115), 

1906. 
Wallis  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

78  S.  W.  231),  1311. 
Walser  v.  Kerrigan   (56  Ind.  301), 

1937. 
Walsh,  In  re  (208  Pa.  582;  57  Atl. 

983 :   reversing  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

87),  566. 
Walsli  V.   Bedfoll    (16  Aust.  L.  T. 

35 ) .  365. 
Walsh  V.  Porterfield   (87  Pa.  376), 

2187. 
Walsh  V.   State    (126   Ind.   71;   25 

X.   E.   883;    9   L.  R.  A.    664), 

190. 
Walter  v.  Columbia  City   (61  lud. 

24),  144,  413. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


ccelix 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Walter  v.  Commonwealth    (88  Pa. 

137;    32  Am.  Rep.  429),  217, 

365,  1511. 
Walter   v.    State    (38    Ark.    650), 

1365. 
Walter  v.  State    (105  Ind.  389;   3 

N.  E.  735),  1495,  1497,  1499. 
Walters  v.  State  (5  Clarke  [Iowa] 

507),  1452,  1764. 
Walton,    Ex    parte    (45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  74;   74  S.  W.  314),  871. 
Walton  V.   Canon  City    (13   Colo. 

App.  77;   59  Pac.  840),  1188. 
Walton    V.    State    (62    Ala.    197), 

1248,  1252. 
Walton  V.  Walton    (34  Kan.  195; 

8   Pac.    110),   65,   2155,   2158, 

2161. 
Wanack   v.  People    (187   111.    116; 

58  N.  E.  242 ;  affirming  87  111. 

App.  371),  2008,  2009. 
Wanganni,  In  re   ( 10  N.  Z.  L.  P. 

583),  685. 
Ward,  Ex  parte  ( 2  Sol.  Cas.  N.  S. 

W.  872),  1374. 
Ward  V.  Chicago,  etc.,  P.  Co.   (85 

Wis.    601;     55    N.    W.    771), 

2176. 
Ward  V.  County  Court  (51  W.  Va. 

102;   41  S.  E.   154),  169,  401, 

403. 
Ward  V.  Greenville   (8  Baxt.  228; 

35  Am.  Rep.  700),  453,  461. 
Ward  V.  Maryland   (12  Wheat.  [U. 

S.]  419;"  20  L.  Ed.  449),  789, 

790. 
Ward    V.    Mayor,    etc.     (8    Baxt. 

228),  454,  459,  461. 
Ward  V.  Monaghan   ([1895]  59  J. 

P.  392),  1823. 
Ward  V.  State  (45  Ark.  351),  771, 

1220,  1224,  1230. 
Ward  V.   State    (51    Fla.    133;    40 

So.  177),  1603. 
Ward  V.  State  (48  Ind.  289),  1240, 

1460,  1462. 
Ward  V.  State  (48  Ind.  293) ,  1460, 

1496. 
Ward  V.   State    (2   Cold.   605;    91 

Am.  Dec.  270),  684. 


Ward  V.  State  (19  Tex.  App.  664), 

2039,  2054,  2090. 
Ward  V.  State   ([Tex.]    116  S.  W. 

1154),  1330. 
Ward  V.  Thompson  (48  Iowa,  588), 

1889,  1904,  1966. 
Warden    v.    McConnell     (23    Neb. 

152;    36    N.    W.    278),    1912, 

1922,   1923. 
Warden  v.   Louisville    ( 1 1   Ky.  L. 

Rep.  179;   11  S.  W.  774),  448, 

521. 
Warden  v.  State   ( [Tex.  Cr.  Rep.] 

34  S.  W.  125),  1463. 
Warden  v.  Tye    (2  C.  P.  Div.  74; 

41  J.  P.  120;   46  L.  J.  M.  C. 

Ill;  35  L.  T.  852),  361,  2028, 

2030. 
Ware    v.    State    ( [Ga.]    65    S.    E. 

333),  44,  965. 
Ware  v.   State    (71  Miss.  204;    13 

So.  936),  1608. 
Waring  v.  The  Mayor    (75   U.   S. 

110),  1426. 
Warner  v.  Brooks  (14  Gray,  107), 

1665. 
Warner   v.   Hoagland    (22   Vroom, 

62;   16  Atl.  166),  233. 
Warner    v.    Lawrence     (62    Mich. 

251;   28  N.  W.  844),  764. 
Warner  v.  New  York,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

44  N.  Y.  465),  2201. 
Warner  v.  State  (56  N.  J.  L.  686; 

29  Atl.  505),  2060,  2069,  2071. 
Warnock    v.    Campbell    (25   N.   J. 

Eq.  485),  2094,  2095,  2102, 

2106,  2107,  2130. 
Warren    v.    Chapman    ( 105    Mass. 

87),  1800,  1807. 
Warren    v.    Englehart     ( 13    Neb. 

283;    13  N.  W.  401),  1896. 
Warren  v.  Moore  ( [1897]  14  T.  L. 

K.  138),  1831. 
Warrensburg  v.  McHugh  ( 122  Mo. 

649;  27  S.  W.  523),  416,  442, 

447,  470. 
Warrick  v.  Rounds    (17  Neb.  411; 

22  N.  \\.  'iSo),    1SS2,  19C3, 

1993. 


ccclx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Warwick  v.  State   (48  Ark.  27;  2 

S.  W.  253),  1124,  1728. 
Wartelsky   v.   State    (33   Tex.   Cr. 

App.    629;     44    S.    W.     510), 

1694. 
Wasenhut  v.  State    ( 18  Tex.  App. 

491),  929. 
Wash  V.  Lewis  (5  Oliio  Is.  P.  391), 

790. 
Washburn,  In  re   (32  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.    303;     66    N.    Y.    Supp. 

732),  729,  750. 
Washington  Co.,  In  re   (8  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  Rep.  169),  622. 
Washington    v.    Eames     (6    Allen, 

417),  477. 
Washington  v.  Gallagher    (7   Ohio 

N.  P.  511;   5  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P. 

Dee.  562),  214. 
Washington     v.     Giddens      ( [Ky.] 

a  03  S.  W.  321;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

647),  936. 
Washington   v.   Lasky    (5    Cranch 

C.     C.     381;     Fed.     Cas.     No. 

17230),  463. 
Washington    v.    State     ( [Tex.    Cr. 

App.]  85  S.  W.  801),  1380. 
Washington   v.    Young    (19    L.    J. 

Exch.  348;  5  Exch.  403),  353. 
Wasliington    Liquor    Co.    v.    Shaw 

38  Wash.  398;   80  Pac.  536), 

1801. 
Wason  V.  Underhill  (2  X.  H.  505), 

513,  1372. 
Wasserboehr    v.    Boulier     (84    Me. 

165;   24  Atl.  808;   30  Am.  St. 

344),  310,  1787. 
Wasserboehr  v.  Morgan  ( 168  Mass. 

291;  47  N.  E.  126),  1797, 

1798,  1799. 
Wasson  v.   First  Nat.   Bank    (107 

Tnd.    206,   219;    8    N.    E.    97), 

80,   82.   355. 
Wason  V.  Sovevanco  (2  N.  IT.  501), 

509.   (59 1.    1267. 
Waters   v.   Allen    (2    Bradf.    354), 

2144. 
Waters  v.  Ctinipbell    (5  Sawy.   17; 

Fed.  Cas.  No.  17265),  1263. 


Waters  v.  Fitzgerald   (25  Vict.  L. 

R.  86;  21  Austr.  L.  T.   17;   5 

Austr.  L.  R.  149),  363. 
Waters  v.  Leech  (3  Ark.  llu),  408. 
Waters  v.  McDowell  (126  Ga.  807; 

56  S.  E.  95),  382,  476. 
Wathan,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Commonwealth 

([Ky.]    116  S.  W.  239),  1342, 

1344,  1755. 
Watkins  v.  Grieser  (11  Okla.  302; 

66   Pac.   332),   480,   534,   535, 

571,  602,  609,  617,  621,  623. 
Watkins  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

62  S.  W.  911),  891. 
Watson,  In  re   (34  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

906),  2148. 
Watson  V.  Doyle   (130  III.  415;  22 

N.  E.  613),  2098. 
Watson  V.  State  (55  Ala.  158),  45, 

83,  966. 
Watson   V.    State    (140   Ala.    134; 

37  So.  225),  291. 
Watson    V.    State     (13    Tex.    App. 

160),  370. 
Watson  V.  State  (42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

13;    57   S.  W.   101),  824,  832, 

1470,   1474. 
Watson  V.  State  (52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

551;  107  S.  W.  544),  1473. 
Watt  V.  Glenister    (40  J.  P.    181; 

32  L.  T.  856),  1151. 
Watts  V.   Commonwealth    (78   Ky. 

329),  183,  435. 
Waugh  V.  Graham    (47  Neb.   153; 

.    66  N.  W.  301),  563. 
Wayne    Co.   v.   Detroit    (17   Mich. 

390),  270. 
Wa\Tiell   V.   Reed    (5   T.   R.   599), 

' 1790,  1794. 
Wear  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.]  29 

S.  W.  1082),  1321. 
Weathered     v.     State     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  60  S.  W.  876),  950,  957, 

1179. 
Weaver,  In  re   (20  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

95 ) ,  664,  665. 
Weaver    v.    Mt.    Vernon     (6    Ohio 

Dec.  436),  1322. 
Weaver  v.  State    (89  Ga.  639;    15 

S.  E.  840),  793. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccclxi 


[References   are   to    pages.] 


Weaver  v.  State   (74  Ohio  St.  53; 

77  N.  E.  273),  1000,  1765. 
Weckerly    v.    Geyer    (U    S.    &    R. 

35),  660. 
Webb  V.  Baird   (11  Lea,  607),  77, 

542,   1192. 
Webb  V.  Catehlove   (50  J.  P.  795), 

368,  535,   724. 
Webb  V.  Commonwealth   (7  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   [abstract]   453),  543. 
Webb  V.  Laird  (11  Lea,  667),  1102. 
Webb  V.  Nickerson    (11   Ore.  382; 

4  Pac.  1126),  1030,  1263. 
Webb   V.    State    ([Kan.   App.]    53 

Pac.  276),  1652. 
Webb  V.  State    (51  N.  J.  L.   189; 

17  Atl.  113),  2033. 
Webb  V.  State  (11  Lea,  662),  541, 

542,  1450. 
Webb  V.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.]  58 

S.  W.  82),  958,  1650. 
Webb  V.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.]  86 

S.  W.  331),  1214,  1726. 
Webb    City    v.    Parker     (103    Mo. 
App.  295;  77  S.  W.  119),  1633. 
Webber    v.    Birkenhead    (61    J.    P. 

664),  020,  679. 
Webber  v.   Curtis    (104   III.   309) 

571. 
Webber    v.     Donnelly     (33     Mich. 
469),   1786,   1788,   1790,   1798, 
1801. 
Webber  v.  Lane   (99  Mo.  App.  69; 

71  S.  W.  1099),  045,  647. 
Webber  v.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 
109  S.  W.  182),  139,  247,  288, 
1110. 
Webber    v.    Virginia     (103    U.    S. 

344),  156,  315. 
Webber  v.  Williams  (36  Me.  512) 

518. 
Webbs  V.  State  (4  Cold.  199),  779 

2008. 
Weed  V.  Page   (7  Wis.  512),  2127. 
Weed  V.  State   (55  Ala   13),   1241, 

1514,  1563. 
Weeks     v.     Milwaukee      (10     Wis 

242),  394. 
Weeks  v.  Xew  Orleans,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
(32  La.  Ann.  615),  2174,  2185. 


Weidman    v.     People     (7     Bradw. 

[III.]  38),  1129. 

Weightman    v.    Weightman     (462 

[1906]   70  J.  P.  120;  94  L.  T. 

621;    22   T.  L.   R.  362),  2169. 

Weikman     v.     City     Council      (2 

Speers  [S.  C]   371),   1758. 
Weil    V.    Calhoun    (25    P'ed.    865), 

125,   156,   158,  232,  235. 
Weil   V.   Golden    (141    Mass.    364; 

6  N.  E.  229),   1799,   1806. 
Weil   V.   State    (48   Tex.   Cr.   App. 
603;  90  S.  W.  644),  949,  1288, 
1555,  1559. 
Weinandt  v.  State    (80  Neb.   161; 
113  N.  w.   1040),  1661,  1662, 
1663,   1703. 
Weir    V.    Allen     (47    Iowa,    482), 

1016,   1028,   1777. 
Weir    V.    Cram     (37    Iowa,    649), 

231. 
Weireter   v.   State    (69   Ind.  269), 

1253,   1637. 
Weis  V.  State  (33  Ind.  204),  83. 
Weis  V.  State   (22  Ohio  St.   486), 

2251,   2252. 
Weisbrodt   v.   State    (50   Ohio   St. 
192;   33  N.  E.  603),  12,  1496. 
Weischelbaum  v.  Hayslip   (127  Ga. 

417;    56  S.  E.  413),   1792. 
Weiser  v.  Welch    (112  Mich.   134; 
70    X.    W.    438),    1955,    1902, 
1973,  1991. 
Weisnian's  Estate   (45  Phila.  Leg. 

Int.    274),    2138. 
Weiss    V.    Green    (26    N.    Z.    942), 

1184. 

Weitzel    V.    Slavin    (13    Ohio    Cir. 

Ct.    Rep.    221;     7    Ohio    Dec. 

155),   1771,   1810. 

Welch   V.   Jugenheimer    (56   Iowa, 

11;  8  N.  W.  673;  41  Am.  Rep. 

77),    1846,    1861,    1966,    1967. 

Welch   V.  McKane    (55   Conn.   25; 

10  Atl.  168),  779. 
W^elch   V.   Marion    (48    Ala.    291), 

812. 
Weldon  v.   Colquitt    (62   Ga.   449; 
35  Am.  Rep.  128),  2116,  2128. 


ecclxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Weldon  v.  State  ( 36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

34;    35  S.  W.    176),   1281. 
VVelker  v.  Potter  (18  Ohio  [N.  S.] 

85),  228. 
Weller  v.  Jersey  City  11.  &  P.  St. 

Ey.  Co.   (57  A.  730),  2095. 
Wellington,    Petitioner     (16    Pick. 

[Mass.]  95),  294. 
Wells,  Ex  parte  (45  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

170;  78  S.  W.  928),  245. 
Wells  V.  State    (118   Ga.   556;   45 

S.   E.   443),   957,    1475,    1490, 

1505. 
Wells  V.  State  (18  Tex.  App.  417), 

1111. 
Wells  V.  State  ( 24  Tex.  App.  230 ; 

5  S.  W.  830),  492,  883, 
Wells  V.   Torrey    (144   Mich.   689; 

108    N.    W.    423;    13    Detroit 

Leg.   X.   378),   282,   414,   415, 

443,  472. 
Wells    V.     Wells     (6     Ind.    447), 

1564. 
Welsford    v.    Weidlein     (23    Kan. 

601),  575,  576. 
Welsh,  In  re    (11    Pa.   Super.    Ct. 

558),   665. 
Welsh  V.   State    (126   Ind.   71;    25 

N.   E.   883;    9   L.   R.   A.  664), 

11,  42,  84,   101,  104,  144,  150, 

152,  209,   312,   313,   486,   503, 

1106,   1160,   1490. 
Welsch    V.    State     (19    Ind.    App. 

389;   46  N.  E.   1050),  356. 
Welton  V.  Missouri  (91  U.  S.  275), 

157,  199,  315. 
Welty  V.  Indianapolis,  etc.,  Pi.  Co. 

(105   Ind.   55;    4   N.   E.   410), 

2173,  2174. 
Wempen   v.   Girard    (84    111.   App. 

130),   1779,   1791. 
Wendell,  In  re  (1  Johns.  Ch.  600), 

2016. 
Wondt  V.  State    (32  Xcl).    182;    19 

N.  W.  351),  1553. 
Wenham  v.  Dodge  (98  ]Mass.  474), 

355,  384,  385. 
Wenz  V.  State    (1   Tex.   App.   36), 

2073. 


W  quinton  v.  State    (51   Tex.  Cr. 

App.   492;    102   S.   W.    1124), 

1698. 
Werdman   v.   People    (7    III,   App 

8),  1124. 
Werneke    v.    State    (50    Ind.    22). 

1240,   1252,   1461,   1564. 
Werneke  v.  State   (49  Ohio,  202), 

1478. 
Werner    v.    Citizens'    St.    Ry.    Co. 

(81   Mo.   368),  2178. 
Werner    v.    Edmiston     (24     Kan. 

147),  223,  1840,  1882,  1913. 
Werner  v.  Kelley  (9  La.  Ann.  60), 

2153. 
Werner  v.   Washington    ( 2   Hayw. 

&     II.     175;     Fed.     Cas.    No. 

17416a),   463. 
Wert  V.  Brown   (^7  Ohio  St.  477; 

25  N.  E.  59),  281. 
Werth  V.  Roche    (92  Me.  383;    42 

Atl.  794),  1799. 
Werthheimer   &    Sons   v.   Habinck 

131    Iowa,    643;     109    N.    W. 

189),  1779. 
Weser  v.  Welty  ( 18  Ind.  App.  664; 

47  N.  E.  639),  2035. 
Wesley  v.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

122  S.  \\.  550),  926. 
Wesnieski    v.    Vanek     (99    K    W. 

258),  1844. 
West  V.   Bishop    (110   Iowa,   410; 

81  N.  W.  696),  488,  943,  944, 

1002. 
West  V.  Columbus   (20  Kan.  633), 

1479. 
West  V.   Greenville    (39   Ala.  69), 

448. 
West  V.  State   (32  Ind.  App.  161; 

69  N.  E.  465),  1699. 
West  V.   State    (70   Miss.  598;    12 

So.    903),    1280,    1464,    1468, 

1513. 
West     V.     State      (28     Tenn.     [9 

Humph.]  66).  136. 
West  V.   State    (40  Tex.   Cr.  App. 

575;  51  S.  W.  247),  844. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccclxiii 


[Jweferences   are   to   pages.] 


West     London    Syndicate     v.     In- 
land   Revenue    Commissioners 

([1898]  2  Q.  B.  507;  07  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  950;    79  L.   T.   289;    47 

W.  R.   125;    14  T.  L.  11.  509), 

1833. 
Westbrook    v.    Miller     (90    X.    Y. 

Supp.  558 ;  98  App.  Div.  590 ) , 

1838,  1843. 
Westbrook    v.    State    ([Miss.]    25 

So.  491),   1544. 
Western     Express     Co.    v.    United 

States    (141    Fed.    28;    70    C. 

C.  A.  510),  794. 
Western  U.  T.   Co.  v.   Mayer    (28 

Ohio  St.  521),  791. 
Western    U.    T.    Co.    v.    Pendleton 

(122   U.   S.   347;    7    Sup.   Ct. 

1120,    reversing    95    Ind.     12; 

48  Am.  Rep.  092),  99,  298. 
Westheimer    &    Sons    v.    Habrinck 

131    Iowa,    043;     109    N.    W. 

189),  1806. 
Westheimer  v.  Weisman   (00  Kan. 

753;   57  Pac.  909),   1798. 
Westinghausen  v.  People  (44  Mich. 

205;   6  N.  W.  045),   198,  790. 
Westmoreland    v.    State     (45    Ga. 

225),  2247. 
We-ston    V.    Carr     (71    Me.    350), 

1077. 
Weston  V.  Monroe   (84  Mich.  341; 

46  N.  W.  440),  878. 
Weston  V.  Territory    (1   Okla.  Cr. 

App.  407;  98  Pac.  300),  1502. 
Wetzler    v.    State     (18    Ind.    35), 

1357. 
Weymire  v.  Wolfe  (52  Iowa,  533), 

1890,   2171,   2179,   2180,  2189. 
W'halen,  Ex  parte  (32  X.  B.  274), 

1717. 
Whalen,  In  re   (47  X.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

313;    19  N.  Y.  915),  2261. 
Whalen   v.   Macomb    (70   111.   49), 

1707. 
Whalen  v.  St.   Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(60  Mo.  323),  2172.  2180. 
Whaley    v.    State     (87    Ala.    83; 

6   So.  380),   1189,   1293. 


Wharton  v.  King    (09   Ala.   365), 

518,  539,  1304. 
Whealkate    Min.     Co.     v.     Mulari 

(152    Mich.    007;    116   N.    W. 

300;    15    Det.    Leg.    N.    278), 

1809. 
Wheaton    v.    Slattery    (96    N.    Y. 

App.  Div.  102 ;  88  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1074),  990. 
Wheeler  v.  Alder-son   (Hagg.  Eccl. 

Rep.  574),  2144,  2147. 
Wheeler  v.  Grand  Trunk,  etc.,  R. 

Co.    (70   N.   H.  ■607;    50   AtL 

103;   54  L.  R.  A.  955),  2176, 

2192,  2212,  2218. 
Wheeler  v.  State  ( 4  Ga.  App.  325 ; 

61    S.   E.   409),    1504,   1050. 
Wheeler  v.   State    (04  Miss.   462), 

124,   488,  495,  929,   930. 
Wheeler  v.  Wheeler  (53  Iowa,  511; 

30   Am.   Rep.   240),   67,  2107. 
Wheelin,  Iti  re    (134  Pa.   554;    19 

Atl.    755;    20   W.   N.   C.    72), 

022. 
Wheeton  v.  Ilardisty   (8  El.  &  BI. 

239;   92  E.  C.  L.  232),  2230. 
Whiffin   V.   Mailing    ([1892]    1    Q. 

B.   302;    50   J.  P.   325;    60  L. 

T.  333;   40  W.  R.  292;    61  L. 

J.  M.  C.  82),  080,  •681. 
Whisenhurst    v.    State     (18    Tex. 

App.  491),  938,  939. 
Whissen  v.   Furth    (73   Ark.   366; 

84    S.    W.    500;    08    L.    R.   A. 

161),    532,   609,   621,   669. 
Whitbread  &  Co.  v.  Grain  ([1907] 

23  T.  L.  R.  402),   1829. 
Whitcomb   v.    State    (2    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  301;  21  S.  W.  976),  768, 

781. 
White,  Ex  parte    (20  X.   B.  552), 

1681. 
White  v.  Atlantic  City    (02  X.  J. 

L.    644;     42    Atl.    170),    639, 

676. 
White  V.  Beckham   (26  X.  S.  50), 

351. 
White  V.  Bracclin   (144  Mich.  332; 

107   X.   W.    1055;    13   Detroit 

Leg.  X.   156),  134. 


ccclxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


White    V.    Buss     (3    Cush.    448), 

1796. 
White  V.  City  of  London  Brewing 

Co,    (58  L.  J.  Ch.  98;   39  Ch. 

D.  559;  60  L.  T.  19;  36  W.  R. 

881;    affirmed    58    L.    J.    €h. 

855;  42  Ch.  D.  237;   38  W.  R. 

82),  1818. 
W^hite    V.    Commonwealth     ( [Ky.] 

50    S.    W.    678;     20    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    1942),   935. 
White  V.  Commonwealth   ( 107  Va. 

901;    59    S.    E.    1101),    1479, 

1652,  1730,  1732,  1733. 
White  V.  Coquetdale   ( 7  Q.  B.  Div. 

238;    50  L.   J.  M.   C.   128;    44 

L.    T.    715;     45    J.    1\    539), 

708. 
White  V.   Cox    (3    Hayw.    [Tenn.] 

79),    2093,   2099,    2100,    2116. 
White  V.  Creamer  (175  Mass.  567; 

56  N.  E.  832),  722. 
White  V.  Farguson   (29  App.  145; 

64  N.  E.  409),  606,  855. 
White  V.  Kent   (11  Ohio  St.  550), 

2035. 
White  V.  McCullough   (  [Xeb.]   123 

X.  W.  1034),  577. 
White  V.   Manning    (46   Tex.  Civ. 

App.    298;    102    S.   W.    1160), 

23. 
White    V.    Mayor,    etc.    (2    Swan. 

[Tenn.]    364),  408. 
White  V.  Morley    ([1899]  2  Q.  B. 

34;    63   J.    P.   550;    66   L.   J. 

Q.    B.    702;    47    W.    R.    883; 

80    L.    T.    761;    15    T.    L.    R. 

360),  380. 
White    V.    Xeilson     (6    F.     [Just. 

Cas.]  51),  1131,  1148. 
White  V.  Nestor    (13  N.  Z.  L.  R. 

751),   1116,   1313,   131G. 
White   V.    Prifogle    (140    Ind.    64; 

44  N.  E.  926),  610,  612,  859. 
White  V.  Provident,  etc.,  Soc.  ( 163 

Mass.    108;    39    N.    E.    771), 

2232. 


White     V.     Southend     Hotel     Co. 

([1897]    1   Ch.  767;    66  L,  J. 

Ch.  387;  76  L.  T.  273;  45  W. 

R.    434;     13    L.    T.    E.    310), 

1816. 
White  V.   State    (103   Ala.   72;    16 

So.  63),   1736. 
White  V.  State    (74  Ark.  491;    86 

S.  W.  296),  2056. 
White  V.  State    (80  Ark.  598;   98 

S.  W.  377),   1017,   1065. 
White   V.    State    (93    Ga.    47;    19 

S.  E.  49),  1180,  1650,  1651. 
White  V.  State  (11  Tex.  App.  476), 

1500,   1759,   1763. 
White   V.   State    ([Tex.  Cr.   App.] 

30  S.  W.  556),  2091. 
White  V.  State  (24  Tex.  App.  230; 

5  S.  W.  857),  929. 
White  V.  State   (32  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

625;  25  S.  W.  784),   1583. 
White  V.  State   (45  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

b^i;  78  S.  W.  1066),  1690. 
White  V.  State   (47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

551;  85  S.  W.  9),  1213,  1283, 

1284,    1286. 
White    V.    White    (1    Swab.    &    T. 

592;    6  Jur.   [N.  S.]   28;    1  L. 

T.    [X.   S.]    197),    2166. 
Whitehors€  v.  State  (43  Ind.  473), 

929. 
Whiteliurst  v.   Fincher    ( 62   L.    'i\ 

433;   54  J.  P.  565),  378. 
Whitehurst  v.  State  (43  Ind.  473), 

1740. 
Whiteneck  v.  Stryker   (2  X.  J.  Eq. 

8),  2135,  2136,  2139. 
Whitesides  v.  GJreenlee  (2  Dev.  Eq. 

[X.  C]   152),  2100. 
Whitfield  v.  Bainbridge    (30  ,}.  P. 

644),  367. 
Whitfield    V.    State     (2    Ga.    App. 

124;     38     S.    E.    385),     1600, 

1607. 
Wliitlock's  License,  In  re   (39  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  34),  480,  703. 
Whitlock      V.     Bartholomew      (91 

Iowa,    246;     59    X.    W.    76), 

572. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


ccclxv 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Whitlow,  Ex  parte   (59  Tex.  273), 

925. 
VVhitlock   V.  Workman    { 15   Iowa, 

351),   1790. 
Whitmore   v.  State    (72   Ark.    14; 

77  S.  W.  598),   1166,   1187. 
Whitney,  In  re    (142   N.   Y.  531; 

37   N.   E.   621,   affirmed   3    N. 

Y.  Supp.  838),  1123. 
Whitney  v.    State    (10    Ind.   404), 

1441. 
Whitney    v.    State     (8    Mo.    165), 

2040. 
Whitney    v.    Swensen     (43    Minn. 

337;    45  N.   W.  609),   1027. 
Whitney    v.    Township,    etc.     (71 

Mich.  234;   39  N.  E.  40),  119, 

131,  132. 
Whittaker,  In  re    (03  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  442;  71  N.  Y.  Supp.  497), 

731. 
Whitten    v.    State     (115    Ala.    72; 

22  So.  483),  2039,  2076. 
Whitten    v.    Covington      (43      Ga. 

421),  418,  439,  471. 
Whittington,   Ex   parte    (34    Ark. 

394),  027,  628,  635. 
Whittelsey   v.    Acme   Brewing   Co. 

(127  Ga.  208;   56  S.  E.  299), 

798. 
Whitton  V.  State    (37  Miss.  379), 

1252,   1255,   1365,  1366. 
Whyte  V.  Williams  (29  Vict.  L.  R. 

69;    24    Austr.    L.    T.    222;    9 

Austr.  L.  R.  98),  701. 
Wichita  v.  Murphy   (78  Kan.  859; 

99  Pac.  272),  1741,  1762. 
Wicker  v.   Siesel    (80   Ga.   724;    6 

S.  B.  817),  799,  804. 
Wickwire  v.  State  (19  Conn.  477), 

1631,   1632. 
Widdlesfield    v.   Metcalfe    (12   Up. 

Can.  247;   affirmed,  8  Can.  L. 

Jr.  74),  1321. 
Wiecke    v.    People     ( 14    111.    App. 

447),   1621. 
Wiedemann   (92  111.  314),  1564. 
Wiggenhorn    v.    Kountz    (23    Neb. 

669;   37  N.  W.  600),  1856. 


Wiggins  V.  Chicago    (68  111.  372), 

471. 
Wiggins    V.    Ferry    Co.     ( 102    111. 

560),  786. 
Wiggins  V.  Warner    (67  Ga.  583), 

558,  627,  628. 
Wigglesworth  v.  Steers   ( 1  Hen.  & 

M.  70;  3  Am.  Dec.  202),  2099, 

2128. 
Wightman     v.     Devere     (33     Wis. 

570),  1864,  1977,  1978. 
Wightman  v.  State  ( 10  Ohio,  452), 

448. 
Wiginton    v.    State    (51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.   492;    102    S.    W.    1124), 

958,   1699. 
Wilber   v.   Dwyer    (69    Hun,   507; 

23    N.    Y.    Supp.    395),    1954, 

1984. 
Wilber  v.  Ress  (78  Neb.  835;   1L2 

N.  W.  379),  849. 
Wilbur,  Ex  parte  (31  N.  B.  678), 

1571. 
Wilbur  V.  Flood  (16  Mich.  40;  93 

Am.  Dec.  203),  2127. 
Wilcox  V.  Bryant    (156  Ind.  379; 

59  N.  E.  1049),  611,  635. 
Wilcox  V.  Jackson   (51  Iowa,  208; 

1  N.  W.  51*^),  2093,  2100. 
Wilcox   V.   People    ( 17,  Colo.   App. 

109;    67  Pac.  343),   1188. 
Wilcox   V.    State    (94    Tenn.    106; 

28  S.  W.  312),  2040. 
Wilcoxson     V.     State     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]   91  S.  W.  581),  80. 
Wildermuth    v.    Cole     (77     Mich. 

483  ;  43  N.  W.  889 ) ,  552. 
Wilds  V.  Brunswick  R.  Co.  ( 62  Ga. 

667;   9  S.  E.  595),  2180. 
Wiles   V.   State    (33   Ind.   206),   8, 

10,    47,    82,    497,    500,    1561, 

1714. 
Wiley  V.   Bluffton    (HI   Ind.   152; 

12  N.  E.  165).  227. 
Wiley  V.  Ewalt   (66  111.  26),  2143. 
Wiley  V.  Owens  (39  Ind.  429),  144, 

397,   412,   428,   429,   443,   444, 

795. 
Wiley  V.  State   (74  Miss.  727;   21 

So.  797),  1181,  1199. 


ccclxvi 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


WUey  V.  Strickland   (8  Ind.  453), 

1018. 
Wilkerson   v.    Commonwealth    (88 

Ky.  29;  9  S.  W.  836;   10  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  656), 2056, 2061,  2068 
Wilkins  v.  State  (113  Ind.  514;  16 

N.  E.  192),  1024. 
Willard    v.    State     (4    Ind.    407), 

1498. 
Willett    V.    Viens     (2    Que.    S.    C. 

514),  1839. 
Williams,  Ex  parte   (87  Ala.  547; 

6  So.  314),  869,  2021. 
Williams    v.    Augusta     (111     Ga. 

849;  36  S.  E.  607),  1322,  1739. 
Williams  v.  Bayonne   (55  N.  J.  L. 

60;  25  Atl.  407),  586. 
Williams  v.  Berry    (8  How.  495), 

1162. 
Williams     v.     Citizens     (40     Ark. 

290),  856,  858,  859. 
Williams    v.    Commonwealth     ( 13 

Bush,  304),  800,  801. 
Williams    v.    Davidson     (64    Kan. 

607;  68  Pac.  650),  1797. 
Williams  v.  Davidson    (  [Tex.  Civ. 

A_pp.]  70  S.  W.  989),  854,  887, 

934. 
Williams   v.    Edmunds    ( 75    Mich. 

92;  42  X.  W.  534),  2188,  2191, 

2193. 
Williams    v.     Foriman     ( 14    Kan. 

248),  1288,  1788. 
Williams    v.    Goss     (43    La.    Ann. 

868;     9    So.    750),    07,    2155, 

2157,  2158,  2166. 
Williams  v.  Iredell  Co.   (132  N.  C. 

300;   43  S.  E.  896),  798. 
Willis  v.  Kalmback    ( [Va.]    64  S. 

E.  342),  901. 
Williams    v.    Lassell    &    Sharman, 

Limited    ([1906]   22  T.   L.  R. 

443),  1822. 
W^illiams  v.  Louis    (14  Kan.  605), 

554,  683,  684,  688. 
Williams    v.    McDonald     (58    Cal. 

527),  605. 


Williams  v.  Macdonald   ([1899]  2 

Q.   B.  308;    63   J.   P.   501;    68 

L.J.  Q.  B.  678;  47  W.  R.  701; 

80  L.  T.  758;  15  T.  L.  R.  343), 

1155. 
Williams   v.   Mabrecht    ( 1    Bailey, 

343),  2093. 
Williams  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.   Co. 

(109  Mo.  475;  18  S.  W.  1098), 

2195,   2196,   2197,   2198,   219!), 

2200. 
Williams  v.  Pagson    ( 14  La.  Ann. 

7),  294. 
Williams   v.   State    (81   Ala.    1;    1 

So.    179;    60    Am.    Rc'iJ.    133), 

2041,  2063,  2068. 
Williams  v.  State   (91  Ala.  14;   8 

So.  668),  1176,  1621. 
Williams  v.  State   (72  Ark.  19;  77 

S.  W.  597),  43,  964,  1697. 
Williams  v.  State    (35  Ark.  430), 

60,  1643,  1713. 
Williams  v.   State    (47   Ark.   230; 

1  S.  W.  149),  1490. 
Williams  v.  State  (89  Ga.  483;   15 

S.  E.  552),  1465,  1469. 
Williams   v.    State    (100   Ga.   511; 

28  S.  E.  624;  39  L.  R.  A.  209), 

1119,  1134. 
Williams   v.    State    (107   Ga.   693; 

33  S.  E.  641),  953,  1379,  1452, 

1654. 
Williams    v.    State     (4    Ga.    App. 

853;  62  S.  E.  671),  1090. 
Williams   v.   State    (48   Ind.  306), 

211,  439,  1253,  1256. 
Williams  v.  State    (12  Lea,  211), 

1583. 
Williams   v.   State    (23   Tex.   App. 

70;  3  S.  W.  661),  1235. 
Williams   v.    State    (23   Tex.   App. 

499;  5  S.  W.  136),  1111. 
Williams   v.    State    (25   Tex.    App. 

76:   7  S.  W.  601),  2039,  2059, 

2090. 
Williams  v.  State  (37  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  238;  39  S,  W.  664), 

1472,  1474. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


ccclxvii 


[References   are   to   pages.] 


Williams    v.    State    (38    Tex,    Cr. 

App.    377;     43     S.     VV.     115), 

1472. 
Williams     v.     State      ( [Tex.     Cr. 

App.  J   57  S,  W.  G50),  1235. 
Williams    v.    State    (44    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    235;     70    S.    W.    213), 

1472. 
Williams    v.    State    (45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  477;  77  S.  W.  215),  949, 

1185,    1284. 
Williams  v.  State  (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

77  S.  W.  783),  845. 
Williams  v.  State  ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

81  S.  W.  1209),  845,  1573. 
Williams    v.    State     (48    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    75;     85    S.    W.    1144), 

1214. 
Williams     v.     State      ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]    107   S.   W.   825),   1473. 
Williams    v.    State    (52    Tex.    Cr. 

App.   371;    107    S.   W.    1121), 

132,  245,  420,  550. 
Williams    v.    State    (52    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    430;     107     S.    W.    825, 

820),  1464. 
Williams    v.    State    (53    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    156;     109    S.    W.    189), 

832,  887,  889. 
Williams  v.  Throop  ( 17  Wis.  463), 

552,    700. 
Williams     v.     Warsaw      ( 00     Ind. 

457),  210. 
Williams   v.    West   Point    (68    Ga. 

816),   812. 
Williams   v.  Williams    ([1904]    P. 

31;    73   L.  J.   P.   31;    6S   J.   P. 

188;    90  L.  T.   174;    20  T.   L. 

R.  213),  2169. 
Williamson  v.  Lane  (52  Tex.  335), 

925. 
Williamson   v.    Norris    ([1899]    1 

Q.  B.  7;   62  J.  P.  790;   01  L. 

J.   Q.    B.    31;    47   W.    R.    94; 

79    L.    T.    415;    15    T.    L.    R. 

18;    19   Cox  C.  C.   203),  512, 

546. 
Williamson    v.    State     (  [Tox.    Cr. 

App.]    40   S.   W.    286),    1197, 

1693,    1694. 


Williamson  v.  State   (41  Tex.  Cr. 

App.    461;     55    S.    W.    568), 

1524,  1526,  1731 
Williamson    v.    State     ([Tex.    Cr. 

App.]   43  S.  W.  983),  1210. 
Williamsport  v.  Wenner    (172  Pa. 

St.  173;   33  Atl.  544),   191. 
Willis  V.  Commonwealth  (32  Cratt. 

929),  2039,   2048,  2061,   2067, 

2081. 
Willis  V,  State    (43  Neb.   102;    61 

N.  W.  254),  2258. 
Willis  V.  State    (37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

82;  38  S.  W.  776),  1197,  1210. 
W^illougiiby  v.  Moulton   (47  N.  H. 

205), '2099,  2108. 
Wilmans     v.    Bordwell     (73    Ark. 

418;   84  S.  W.  474),  854. 
Wilmot    V.    Johnson    ( [Iowa]    123 

N.  W.  330),  980. 
Wilmurt  v.  Morgan    (March   1827 

[N.   J.    Eq.]),    2129. 
Wilson,  In  re    (32  Minn.   145;    19 

N.    W.    723),    40o',    419,    420, 

424,    437. 
Wilson  V.  Abrahams    (1   Hill    [N. 

Y.]    207),   2253. 
Wilson  V.   Bigger    (7  Watts   &  S. 

Ill),   2106,  2108. 
Wilson    V.    Bohstedt     ( 135     Iowa, 

451;     110    N.    W.    898),    861, 

944. 
Wilson   V.   Booth    (57    Mich.   249; 

23  N.  W.  799),   1854,  1975. 
Wilson    V.    Brigger     ( 7    Watts    & 

S.   HI),  2095. 
Wilson    V.    Commonwealth    ( 12    B. 

Mon.    2),     1094,     1102,    1106, 

1110. 
Wilson      V.      Commonwealth      ( 14 

Busii  159),  1502. 
Wilson   V.   Commonwealth    ([Ky.] 

70  S.  W.  1077;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1085),    1343. 
Wilson  V.   Crewe,  J.  J.    ([1905]    1 

K.    B.    491;    74    L.    J.    K.    B. 

394;    69   J.   P.    Ill;    92   L.   T. 

164;     53    W.    R.    382;    21    T. 

L.  R.  233),  711. 


ccclxviii 


TABLE  OP  CASES. 


IReferences  arc  to   pages.] 


Wilson   V.   Hart    {[1866]    L.   R.    1 

Lh.    463),    1813. 
Wilson  V    Herink    ( 64   Kan.   607 ; 

68  Pac.  72),  289. 

Wilson  V.  Hines  (99  Ky.  221;  35 
S.  W.  627;  37  S.  W.  148), 
249,  866. 

Wilson  V.  Lawrence   ( 70  Ark.  545 ; 

69  S.  W.  570),  901. 
Wiltshire   v.   Marshall    (14   Wkly. 

Rep.    602;     14    L.    T.    [N.    S.] 

396),  2104. 
Wilson  V.   Mathis   (145   Ind.  493; 

44  N.  E.  486),  603,  662,  663, 

668. 
Wilson    V.    Peters    (24    X.    S.    W. 

9),   1147. 
Wilson   V.    Shorick    (21    la.    332), 

467. 
Wilson    V.   State    (136    Ala.    144; 

33  So.  831),   1654. 
Wilson    V.    State    (35    Ark.    414), 

134,  136,   157,  347,  509,  1466, 

1467. 
Wilson  V.  State   (64  Ark.  586;  43 

S.  W.  972),  375,  1356. 
Wilson    V.    State     { 19    Ind.    App. 

389;    46    N.    E.    1050),    1147, 

1248,  1257,  1364,  1565,  1615, 

1616,  1620,  1031,  1633. 
Wilson  V.  State  (60  N.  J.  L.  171 ; 

37  Atl.  954),  2060,  2066, 

2069. 
Wilson  V.  State    ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

55    S.    W.    68),     1473,    1495, 

1611. 
Wilson  V.  State  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

107  S.  W.  818),  923. 
Wilson  V.  State  (53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

556;   110  S.  W.  904),  1366. 
Wilson  V.  State   (54  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

13;     111    S.    W.    1018),    1168, 

1605,  1637. 
Wilson  V.  Stratton   (47  Me.   120), 

1787,   1798. 
Wilson    V.    Stuart     (32    L.    J.    M. 

C.    198;    3    B.    &    S.   913;    27 

J.  P.  661;   8  L.  T.  277),  512. 
Wilson  V.  Thompson  (56  Ark.  110; 

19  S.  W.  321),  860. 


Wilson  V.  Twamley    ([1904]   2  K. 

B.  99;    88   L.   T.   803;    52   W. 

R.    529;    20    T.    L.    R.    440), 

1824. 
■\Yilson   V.   Whelan    (91    Ga.   461; 

17  S.  E.  906),  395. 
Wilson    V.    White     (29    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  588;   69  S.  W.  989),  66. 
Winants  v.  Bayonne   (44  N.  J.  L. 

114),    420,    462. 
Winchester,  In  re  (8  Austr.  L.  K. 

[C.  N.]   19),  644. 
Wind    V.    Her    (93    Iowa    316;    61 

N.    W.     1001;     27     L.    R.    A. 

219),  310,  335,   1787,   1799. 
Winder,  In  re  ( 24  Pa.  €o.  Ct.  Rep. 

90),  626,  630. 
Windham   v.   State    (26   Ala.   69), 

371. 
Winerton  v.  State    (65  Miss.  238; 

3   So.  735),  931. 
Wing   V.    Benham    (76    Iowa,    17; 

39  X.  W.  21),  1929,  2011. 
Wing   V.    Burgess    (13    Me.    Ill), 

1039. 
Wing    V.    Commonwealth    (7    Ky. 

L,   Rep.   216),   2033. 
Wing   V.    Ford    (89    Me.    140;    35 

Atl.  1023),  1807. 
Wingo  V.  State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.] 

108  S.  W.  372),  1604,  1707. 
Winn  V.  State   (43  Ark.   151),  16, 

81,   961), 
Winneconne    v.    Winneconne    ( 122 

Wis.    348;    99    N.    W.    1055), 

809. 
Winona  v.  Whipple  (24  Minn.  61), 

139,  170,  444,  787,  807. 
Winoski   V.   Gokey    (49   Vt.   282), 

470,  479. 
Winslow   V.   Gallagher    (27    N.   B. 

25),  2025. 
Winslow  V.  Newlan   (45  111.   145), 

610. 
Winslow  V.  State  ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

98  S.  W.  241 ) ,  953.  1380,  1696. 
Winslow    V.    State     (50    Tex.    Cr. 

App.    465;     98    S.    W.    866), 

1609. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


ccclxix 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Winslow    V,    Winslow    (95    X.    C. 

24),  1)7. 
Winston  v.  State  { 32  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

59,   22  S.  W.  138),  893,  894. 
Winter    v.    State    (133    Ala     176; 

3]   So.  717),  1177,  1180,  1204, 

1205,   1373,    1599,   162. 
Winters,  v.  State  ( 33  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

395;  26  S    W.  839),  370,  373, 

330,  1637. 
Wintermute    v.    Clark     (5    Sandf. 

242).  544. 
Winterton  v.  State   (65  Miss.  238; 

3  So.  735),  928,  929. 
Wintou  V.  State   (77  Ark.  143;  91 

S.  W.  7),  1730,  1731. 
Wintz    V.    Girardy    (31    La.    Ann. 

381),  791. 
Wirth  V.  Roche    (92  Me.   383;    42 

AtL    794),  1782. 
Wisconsin  Keeley  Institute  Co.  v. 

Milwaukee  Co.   (95  Wis.  153; 

70   N.   W.    68;    36    L.    R.    A. 

55),    278,   2023. 
Wiseman's   Estate    (5  Pa.   Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  561),   2135,  2137. 
Wiseman    v.    Dugas     (6    Mon.    S. 

C.  138;   6  Quebec  Q.  B.  133), 

610. 
Wiseman  v.  St.  Laurent    (3  Man. 

S.   C.    108),   570. 
Witherspoon  v.  State  (39  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  65;  44  S.  W.  164,  1096), 

1371,  1651,  1665. 
Wragg  V.  People  (94  III.  11),  216, 

271. 
Wray  v.    Harrison    (116    Ga.    93; 

42  S.  E.  351),  587. 
Wray  v.  Toke    (12  Q.  B.  492;    17 

L.    J.    M.   C.    183;     12    J.    P. 

804),    367,   726. 
Wreidt    v.    State    48    Ind.    579), 

1351,   1353,    1357,   1359,   1362. 
Wright,  Appeal  of   (1  Wilcox  85), 

598,  638. 
Wright,  Ex  parte    ([Tex.]    120   S. 

W.    868),    1304. 
Wright  V.  Board   (75  N.  J.  L.  28; 

66  Atl.   1061),  581. 


Wright  V.   Commonwealth    ([Ky.] 

72  S.  W.  340;  24  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1838),  2038. 
Wright    V.   Defrees    (S    Ind.   298), 

106. 
Wright     V.     Dunham      ( 13     Mich. 

414),  264,  1585. 
Wright  V.  Fawcett   (42  Tex.  206), 

925. 
Wright  V.  Fisher    (65  Mich.  275; 

32  N.  E.  605;  8  Am.  St.  886), 

67,  2094,  2098. 
Wright  V.  Harris   (49  J.  P.  628), 

1267,  1300. 
Wright  V.  Hughes    (119  Ind.  324; 

21   N.  E.  662),   1801. 
Wright  V.  Macon    ( [Gu.]   64  S.  E. 

807),    1333. 
Wright   V.   O'Brien    (98    Me.    196; 

56  Atl.   647),  990. 

Wright   V.  People    (101    111.    126), 

73,  549,  553,  822,  1336. 
Weight    V.    Smith    128    Ga.    432; 

57  S.  E.  684),   1991. 
Wright   V.   .State    (129    Ala.    123; 

29  So.  864),  1602. 
Wright  V.  State   ( 36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

35;   35  S.  W.  287),  1687. 
Wright  V.  State  (37  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

3;    35    S.   W.    150;    38    S.    W. 

811),    959,    1682),    1686. 
Wright    V.     State     (37     Tex.     Cr. 

App.    627;     40    S.    W.    491), 

2079. 
Wright  V.  State    (  [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

90  S.  W.  24),   1280. 
Wright  V.  Tipton    (46   S.   W.   629 

[Texas]),    1898. 
Wright   V.    Treat    (83   Mich.    110; 

47  X.  W.  243)    766,  774,  781, 

1855,  1866,  1884,  1937. 
Wright  V.  Waller    (127  Ala.  557; 

29    So.    57),    2094,    2095. 
Wrockledge    v.    State     (1     Clarke 

[la.]    167),    1289,    1479,   1488, 

1500,   1554,   1765. 
Wrought   Iron,   etc.,   Co.   v.   John- 
son   (84    Ga.    754;    11    S.    E. 

233),  156. 


ecclxx 


TABLE  OP   CASES. 


[References   are    to    pages.] 


Wolcott  V.  Burlingame   (112  Mich. 

311;  70  N.  W.  831),  139,  761. 
Wolcott  V.  Judge   (112  Mich.  311; 

70  X.  W.  831),  498. 
Wolf,   Ex  farte    (14  Neb.   24;    14 

N.    W.    060),    263,    452,    457, 

459. 
Wolf    V.    Johnson    (152    111.    280; 

38  X.  E.  886),  1960,  1984. 
Wolfe    V.    Johnson     (45    111.    App. 

122),  1255. 
Wolf   V,   Lansing    (53    Mich.   367; 

19   N.   W.   38),    09,   397,   403, 

449. 
Wolf   V.   State    (59  Ark.   297;    27 

S.    W.    77;    43    Am.    St.    34), 

19,  967,  1319,  1321. 
Wolfe  V.  State    (38  Tex.   Cr.  Rep. 

537),   1374,   1378. 
Wolf   V.    State    ([Tex.   Cr.    App.] 

85  S.  W.  8),  1623. 
Wolfson  V.  Rubicon  Tp.    (63  Mich. 

49;  29  N.  W.  486),  764. 
Wolters,  Ex  -parte    (65   Cal.  269; 

3  Pac.  894  ),  412,  413,  417. 
Wolton  V.  Missouri  (91  U.  S.  275), 

156. 
Wong   V.   Astoria    (13    Ore.   538), 

216,  271. 
Wong    Sing    v.    Independence     (47 

Ore.  231;   83  Pac.  387),  1490, 

1498. 
Wood,  Ex  parte    ( [Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

81  S.  W.  529),  915. 
Wood    V.    Andes    (11    Hun,    543), 

2172,  2196. 
Wood  V.  Baer    (91  Iowa,  475;    59 

N.  W.  289),  988. 
Wood  V.   Brooklyn    (14  Barb.    [X. 

Y.]    428),   216.   441.  471. 
Wood   V.   Lentz    (116   Mich.    275; 

74  X.  W.  462),   1939. 
Wood    V.    Pindall    (Wright,   507), 

2094,  2099,  2100,  2105,   2108. 
Wood    V.    Ross     (11    Mass.    270), 

1058. 
Wood  V.  School  District    (80  Xeb. 

722;  115  X.  W.  308),  816. 
Wood    V.    State     (34    Ark.    341), 

2078. 


Wood  V.  State  (21  Ind.  276),  1306, 

1498. 
Wood  V.  State  (9  Ind.  App.  42; 

36  X.  E.  158),  1292,  1488, 

1635. 
Wood    V.    State     ([Tex.]     116    S. 

W.  1154),  691. 
Wood  V.   Territory    (1    Ore.   223), 

1177,    1021. 
Wood  V.  Thomas    (38  Mich.  086), 

802. 
Woodbridge,  In   re    (30   Mo.   App. 

612),  885,  886,  893. 
Woodford  v.   Hamilton    (139   Ind. 

481;   39  X.  E.  47),  464,  536, 

1780,  1789,  1791. 
Woodhouse,  i/a;  parte  (3  Low.  Can. 

Rep.  92),  1516. 
Woodley   v.   Simmonds    (00   J.   P. 

150),   1345,    1346. 
Woodlief   V.   State    (21   Tex.   App. 

412;    2  S.  W.  812),  938,  939. 
Woodlock    V.    Dickie    (6    R.    &    G. 

[X.  S.]  86;  6  Can.  L.  T.  142), 

1478. 
Woodring    v.    Jacobson     ([Wash.] 

103  Pac.  809),   1800. 
Woodruff  V.  Xorthern  Pac.  R.  Co. 

(47  Fed.  089),  2182. 
Woodruff  V.  Parham   (8  Wall  123; 

19  L.     Ed.    382),     154,    331, 
790. 

Woods   V.    Board    (128   Ind.   289; 

27   X.  E.  Oil),  2173,   2186. 
Woods    V.    Commonwealth     ( 1    B. 

Mon.   74),   71,    1540. 
Woods  V.  Dailey   (211  111.  495;  71 

X.  E.  1068,"  1974. 
Woods   V.   Garvey    (82    Xeb.    776; 

118  X.  W.   1114),  600. 
Woods  V.  Kirschlavek   ([Xeb.]  118 

X.  W.   1115),   345. 
Woods  V.  Pineville    (19  Ore.  108; 

23   Pac.   880),    64,  462,    1564, 
Woods  V.   Pratt    (5   Blackf.   377), 

603,   611. 
Woods  V.   State    (36   Ark.   36;   38 

Am.  Rep.  22),   109,   822,  934. 
Woods  V.   State    ([Tex.   Cr.  App.l 

20  S.  W.  915),   1461. 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


ceclxxi 


[References    are    to    pages.] 


Woods  V.  State   ([Tex.  Cr.  App.] 

75  S.  W.  37),  940,  1473. 
Woods  V.  Town,  etc.  (19  Ore.  108), 

432. 
Woods  V.  Varley    ([Neb.]    118  N. 

W.  1114),  345. 
Woodson  V.  (jioidon  (Peck  [Tenn.] 

180;   14  Am.  Dec.  743),  2102. 
Woodward    v.    Squires    (41    Iowa, 

077),   1804. 
Woodward  v.  State   (103  Ga.  490; 

30   S.   E.   522),   908. 
Wooldridgo,   In  re    (30   Mo.   App. 

035),  885. 
Wooler    V.    Knott    ([1870]    1    Ex. 

D.    265;    45    L.    J.    Ex.    884; 

35  L.  T.  121;  24  W.  R.  1004; 

40  J.  P.   788),   1820. 
Woolheather   v.   Risley    (38   Iowa, 

480),   1850,   1857,   1861,   1882, 

1912,  1971. 
Woolner   &   Co.   v.   Remnick    ( 170 

Fed.   602),   78,  1386. 
Woolstein  v.  Welch  ( 42  Fed.  566 ) , 

327. 
Woolston,  In  re    (35   N.  Y.   Misc. 

Rep.    735;     72    N,    Y.    Supp. 

406),  889. 
Wooster   v.   State    (6  Baxt.   533), 

71,    1125,    1304,    1320. 
Wooten   V.    State    (  [Tex.]    121    S. 

W.   703),    1009. 
Wooton  V.  Commonwealth   ( 15  Ky. 

L.  Rep.   [abstract]   495),  945, 

957. 
Word  V.  Greenville   ( 8  Baxt.  22S ) , 

203. 
Workam    v.    Workam     (31     Miss. 

154),   2107. 
Worlej'^    V.    tepurgeon     (38     Iowa, 

467),  8,  27,  28,  29,  1350,  1351, 

1907,  1908. 
Wormley  v.  Hamberg  (40  la.  22), 

225. 
Worth  V.  Brown    (40  Sol.  J.  515; 

62   J.   P.   658),   361,    1253. 
Wortham  v.  State   (80  Miss.  205; 

32  So    50),   1181,   1184,   1381, 

1654. 


Wurts    V,    Hoagland     (114    U.    S. 

600;    5   Sup.  Ct.   1086),  97. 
Wyatt   V.   Commonwealth    (2   Ky. 

L.  Rep.  61),  2086. 
Wyatt    V.    Ryan     (113    Ky.    306; 

08    N.    W.    134;    24    Ky.    L. 

Rep.   228),    850,    852. 
Wycott,  In  re   (38  Up.  Can.  533), 

914. 
Wynants    v.    Bayonne    (44    N.    J. 

L.   [15  Vroom]    114),  405. 
Wynehamer   v.   People    (13   N.  Y. 

378;    2   Parker   Cr.   Rep.  421; 

affirming    2    Parker    Cr.    Rep. 

377;   12  How.  Pr.  238  and  re- 
versing   20    Barb.    507),    111, 

112,    125,    149,    199,   300,   316. 
Wynn    v.   Allard    (5    Watts    &    S. 

524),  2172,  2191. 
Wynn  v.  Allrod   (5  W.  &  S.  525), 

2193,   2195. 
Wynne    v.    State     ([Ala.]    40    So. 

459),   1652. 
Wynne  v.  Williamson  (94  Ga.  603; 

20  S.  E.  436),  932. 


Yahn   v.    Merritt    (117    Ala.    485; 

23  So.  71),  291. 
Yakel  v.  State  (30  Tex  App.  391; 

17  S.  W.  943;  20  S.  W.  205), 

1228. 
Yankton    v.    Douglass     (8    S.    D. 

441;  66  X.  W.  923),  1543. 
Yarnall  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,   R.  Co. 

75  Mo.  575),  2178,  2180. 
Yates    V.    City    of    Milwaukee     ( 1 

Wall.   [U.  S.]   497),  408. 
Yates  v.  Nunnelly   (125  Ky.  664; 

102    S.    W.    292;     30    Ky.    L. 

Rep.    984),    936. 
Yates   V.    State    ([Tex.  -Cr.   App.] 

59  S.  W.  275),  892. 
Yazel  V.  State    (170  Ind.  535;   84 

N".  E.  972),  1447. 
Yazoo    City    v.    State     (48    Miss. 

440),  169. 


ccclxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Ileferences    are    to    pages.] 


Yeager,  Ex  parte  (11  Gratt.  655), 

035. 
Yearteau   v.   Bacon    (65   Vt.   516; 

27  Atl.  198),  307. 
Yeoman   v.    State    (81    Xeb.    244; 

115    N.    W.   784),    1090,    1G24. 
Yerger,  Ex  parte  (8  Wall   [U.  S.] 

85,  105),  467. 
Yick   Wo  V.   Hopkins    (118   U.    S. 

356;      6  Sup.  Ct.   1069),   116, 

206,  208,  454. 
Yodlard    v.    Jacksonville     ( 15    111. 

588),   456. 
Yost  V.  Commonwealth    (6  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   110),   1504,   1626. 
Y'oun  V.   Lamont    (56  Minn.   216; 

57    N.    W.    478),    2106,   2107, 

2122,  2123. 
Young,  In  re  (15  R.  I.  243;  3  Atl. 

3),  1044. 
Young  V.  Beveridge   (81  Neb.  180; 

115    N.    W.    766),    86,    1608, 

1707,  1907,  1982. 
Young     V.     Blaisdell     ( 13«     Mass. 

344),   752,  740. 
Young  V.  Commonwealth  (14  Bush 

161),  559,  920,  928,  930,  934, 

957,    1478,    1480,    1588,    1679, 

1680,  1682. 
Young  V.  Higgin   (6  M.  &  W.  49 ) , 

569. 
Young    V.    Miller     ( 145    Ind.    652 ; 

44  K  E.  757),  2137. 
Young    V.    State     (58    Ala.    358), 

1176,    1230,    1252,    1779. 
Young    Y.    State     ([Ala.]     48    So. 

490),    1120. 
Young  V.  State   (34  Ind.  46),  671. 
YoHug  V.  .state    ( [Tex.  'Cr.  App.] 

66    S.    W.    567),    952,     1611, 

1692. 
Young  V.  Stevenson   ( 73  Ark.  480 ; 

86    S.    W.    1000),    510. 
Young  V.  Stevenson   (75  Ark.  181; 

86  S.  W.   1000),  694. 
Young  v.  Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(116  N.  C.  932;  21  S.  E. 

177),  2188. 


Youngs  v.  Youngs  (130  111.  230; 

22  X.  E.  806;  6  L.  R.  A. 

548;  17  Am.  St.  313),  63, 

66,  2154. 
Youngbloo<l    V.    Sexton    (32    Mich. 

406;    20  Am.  Rep.   654),  200, 

202,  479,  483,  793,  800. 
Youngman   v.   State    (38  Tex.  €r. 

App.     459;     42    S.    W.    988; 

43  S.  W.  519),  1743. 
Youngson  v.  Kemp  (22  N.  Z.  009), 

1022. 
Yowell    v.    State     (41    Ark.    355), 

137,  1285. 
Yunger  v.  State    (78  Md.  574;   28 

Atl.    404),    932. 
Yunnarssonn  v.   Sterling    (92   III. 

569),  398. 


Zanone  v.  Mound  City   ( 1 1  Bradw. 

334),   506,    627. 
Zanone   v.  Mound   City    ( 103   Ind. 

552),   636,   649. 
Zarresseller     v      People      (17     HI. 

101),   930,   1498. 
Zeglin    V.    Carver    Co.     (72    Minn. 

17;  74  X.  W.  &01),  497,  816. 
Zeizer  v.  State  (47  Ind.  129),  1256, 

1565,   1631. 
Zeller    v.    Crawfordsville    90    Ind. 

262),  403. 
Zeller  v.  State  (40  Ind.  304),  1357, 

1359,  1615,  1616. 
Ziegler   v.    Commonwealth    ( [Pa.] 

14  Atl.  237),  1349. 
Ziegler    v.    Ziegler     (1    Wkly.    L. 

Bui.   163).  2158. 
Zielke  v.   State    (42   Xeb.   750;    60 

N.   W.    1010),   567,    688,    708, 

799. 
Zigler   V.   Kammel     (30   Wkly.    L. 

Bull.  115;  4  Ohio  L.  D.  472), 

1929. 
Zimmerman    v.    Smiley     (62    Xeb. 

204;  86  X.  W.  1059),  1892. 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


ccclxxiii 


[References  are  to  pages.] 


Zinn  V,  State    ([Tex.]   120  S.  W. 

893),   1609. 
Zinn  V.  State    ([Ark.]    114   S.   W. 

227),    278,    336. 
Zinner     v.     Commonwealth     ( [Pa. 

St.]     14    Atl.    431),    69,    509, 

691,  1267. 
Zinzow,    In    re    (18    N.    Y.    Misc. 

Rep.  653;  43  N.  Y.  Supp. 714), 

581,  591,  592. 
ZoUicoffer    v.     State     ([Tex.     Cr. 

App.]  38  S.  W.  775),  911. 


Zoo    City    V.    Woodbury    County 

([Iowa]    122   Pac.   940),   809. 
Zumhoff  V.  State  (4  Greene  [Iowa] 

526).     109,    256,    1445,    1479, 

1550. 
Zumwalt  V.   Chicago,  etc.,   R.   Co. 

(35   Mo.  App.  661),  2199. 
Zweifel    v.    State     (16    Tex.    App. 

154),  1568. 
Zylstra  v.  Charleston    (1  Bay  [S. 

C]  382),  442. 
Zystra  v.  Charleston    (1   Bay   [S, 

C]  387),  270. 


PART  I. 


INTOXICATING  LIQUORS. 


Intoxicating  Liquors 


CHAPTER  I. 
DEFINITIONS— JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


Art.    I. 
Art.  II. 


Definitions. 
Judicial  Notici. 


ARTICLE  I.— DEFINITIONS. 


SECTION. 

1.  Liquor,  meaning  and  strength. 

2.  Liquor,  continued. 

3.  Mixed   liquors. 

4.  "Intoxicating,"      statute     de- 

fining— Evidence  —  Statute 
constitutional. 

5.  Intoxicating   liquors — Use   as 

a  beverage. 

6.  Intoxicating  liquors — Amount 

necessary     to     produce     in- 
toxication. 

7.  Intoxicating     and     spirituous 

liquors   distinguished. 

8.  Intoxicating    and    non-intoxi- 

cating, how  distinguished. 

9.  Alcohol   an   intoxicant — Judi- 

cial notice. 

10.  Alcohol  continued. 

11.  Fermented  liquor — Cider. 

12.  Compound      liquor  s — ]Mix- 

tures. 

13.  Distilled   liquors. 


spirits — Judicial 


SECTION. 

14.     Spirit      or 

notice. 
Spirituous  liquors. 

guished. 
Malt   liquor    not    inclvided   in 

"vinous  and  spirituous 

liquors." 
Whisky    an    intoxicant — How 

made — Judicial  notice. 
Spirituous     and     into.xicating 

liquors  distinguished. 
Wine      as      an      intoxicating 

liquor. 
Wine,      intoxicating      quality 

when  not  a  question. 
Wine  as  a  spirituous   or  fer- 
mented liquor. 
Wine,     when    a     question     of 

fact — Burden  of   proof. 
Port  wine  an  intoxicant. 
Blackberry    wine    an    intoxi- 

cant. 

1 


15 


26 


10 


18 


20 


21. 

9:9 


§1 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


SECTION. 

SEC 

23. 

Champagne,  when  included  as 
a  liquor. 

44. 

24. 

Sherry  wine. 

45. 

25. 

Spirits      and      wine      distin- 

28. 

Whisky  cocktail — Sale,   when 
a  violation  of  law. 

46. 

29. 

Gin  and  alcoholic  liquor — Ju- 

47. 

dicial  notice. 

48. 

30. 

Brandy    an    intoxicant — Bur- 

den of  proof. 

40. 

31. 

Brandy    peaches,   sale   of   not 

prohibited. 

50. 

32. 

Malt      liquors — Judicial      no- 

51. 

tice. 

52. 

33. 

Beer  and  ale  distinguished — 

53. 

History. 

54. 

34. 

Beer    defined — Presumption — 
Judicial  notice. 

55. 

35. 

Lager  beer  a  malt  liquor  and 

56. 

intoxicant. 

57. 

36. 

Schenk     beer,     intoxicating 

58. 

quality  a  question  of  fact. 

59. 

37. 

Strong  and  spirituous  liquors 

CO. 

— Beer. 

61. 

38. 

Ale. 

62. 

39. 

C  ider. 

63. 

40. 

Medicines — Compounds. 

64. 

41. 

Camphor  gum  not  an  intoxi- 

65. 

cant. 

66. 

42. 

Cinnamon  and  lemon  essence 

67. 

— Cologne. 

68. 

43. 

Common     cordial     a     spirit- 

69. 

uous  liquor — Grodfrey's  Cor- 

70. 

dial. 

71. 

Empire  Tonic  Bitters — Pro- 
prietary medicines. 

Home  bitters — Medicines — In- 
structions— Evidence. 

Busby's  Bitters — Judicial  no- 
tice. 

Mead — Metheglin. 

Wilson's  Rocky  Mountain 
Herb  Bitters. 

Intoxication — Drunkenness  — 
Drunkard. 

Intemperate  habit. 

Habitual   drunkenness. 

Habitual  drunkard. 

Habitual    intemperance. 

Confirmed    drunkard. 

Saloon  defined — ^Limited  to 
one  room. 

Saloon  keeper. 

Tippling  house. 

Liquor  shop. 

Tavern  keeper. 

Sample  room. 

Dramshop — Dramshop  keeper. 

Bar  defined. 

Barroom. 

Barroom  fixtures. 

Barkeeper. 

Dram. 

Dealer. 

Wholesaler   and   retailer. 

Common   seller. 

Rectifier. 

Distiller. 


Sec.  1.     Liquor,  meaning  and  strength. 

In  its  most  comprehensive  significance,  the  term  "liquor" 
implies  a  fluid  substance  such  as  water,  milk,  blood,  sap, 
juice,  but  in  its  more  limited  sense  it  means  spirituous 
fluids,  whether  fermented  or  distilled,  such  as  brandy,  whis- 
ky, rum,  gin,  ale,  beer  and  wine,  and  also  decoctions,  solu- 
tions and  tinctures  made  from  them  or  any  of  them.^    When 


1  State    V.    Brittain,    89    X.    C. 
574;    State   v.   Giersch,   98    N.   C. 


720;   4  S.  E.  193;   People  v.  Cril- 
ley,  20  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    248. 


DEPINITIONS. 


§1 


used  in    ^  ^stiatute  forbidding  th^  sale  of  liquors  it  refers 

only   t^  spirituous   or   intoxicaiing  liquors.     The   strength 

0^  ^^'^^Ji^ors  and  their  intoxicating  powers  depend  upon  the 

^u">»atrty     of  alcohol    which    they    contain.     According    to 

^  >Pahd's  Manual  of  Chemistry,-   spirituous   liquors   contain 

fS'toi  53  to  56  per  cent,  of  alcohol;  wines  from  13  (cham- 

^gne)    to   26    (port)    per  cent.;   currant  and  sherry  wine 

over  10  per  cent ;  cider  an  average  of  about  ly^  per  cent. ; 

Metheglen  about  714  per  cent.,  and  ale  an  average  of  about 

614  pei'  cent.^ 


2  l<54o»   1646. 

3  People  V.  Ci-illey,  20  Barb.  (N. 
YO    24-8-. 

The  meaning  of  the  word 
'"iiqlior"  must  always  be  ascer- 
tained hy  considering  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  used,  and  that  sense  is 
ascertained  by  considering  its  con- 
nection with  the  words  with  which 
it  is  connected.  The  primary 
meaning  assigned  it  in  the  Stand- 
ard Dictionary  is,  "An  alcoholic 
or  intoxicating  liquor;"  and  a 
quotation  is  made  from  Henry 
Ward  Beecher  ( Plain  and  Pleas- 
ant Talk,  Warmth,  p.  11  [D.  &  J. 
'59]),  as  follows:  "He  that  keeps 
warm  on  liquor  is  like  a  man  who 
pulls  his  house  to  pieces  to  feed 
the  fireplace."  No  one  can  mis- 
take the  sense  in  which  the  word 
is  used  in  this  quotation. 

"A  strong  or  active  fluid  of  any 
sort.  Specifically,  an  alcoholic  or 
spirituous  liquid,  either  distilled 
or  fermented;  an  intoxicating 
beverage;  especially  a  spirituous 
or  distilled  drink  as  distinguished 
from  fermented  beverages,  as  wine 
and  beer."  "Spirituous  liquors, 
liquors  produced  by  distillation." 
"Vinous  liquors,  liquors  made  from 
grapes;  wine."  Century  Diction- 
ary,  the  word  "liquor." 


Where  liquor  was  defined  by  a 
statute  as  "any  wine,  spirits,  ale, 
beer,  porter,  cider,  sherry,  or  other 
spiritiious  or  fermented  liquor  of 
an  intoxicating  character,"  it  was 
held  that  "liquor"  meant  a  liquid 
which  is  commonly  knoAvn  and 
adopted  for  use  as  a  drink  or 
Ijeverage  for  luiraan  consumption, 
or  which  is  reasonably  capable  of 
being  used  as  a  substitute  for  such 
beverages,  or  being  converted  into 
such  beverage;  and  in  a  prosecu- 
tion for  a  sale  of  proprietary 
medicines  it  is  not  necessarily 
sufficient  for  the  prosecution  to 
prove  that  it  contains  even  a 
large  percentage  of  alcohol,  if  the 
alcohol  is  essential  for  its  use  as 
a  medicine  or  is  necessary  for  in- 
toxication or  as  a  preservative,  or 
if  the  other  ingredients  are,  as 
compared  with  the  contained  al- 
cohol, of  such  potency  or  of  such 
a  disagreeable  character  that  the 
use  of  the  liquor  as  a  beverage 
could  ordinarily  result  in  danger 
to  life  or  health,  or  in  nausea  or 
sickness;  and  that  in  considering 
Avhether  a  liquid  is  a  liquor  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute,  re- 
gard should  be  had  to  the  uses  to 
which  it  is  usually  put,  the  pur- 
pose    for     which     it     is     usually 


§2 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


Sec.  2.     Liqour — Continued. 

"The  word  'liquor,'  "  said  the  Supreme  Court  of  Flor- 
ida, "may  be  used  in  either  of  two  senses.  The  first  is 
practically  synonymous  with  'liquid;'  the  second,  as  given  in 
Webster's  Dictionary,  is,  specifically,  alcohol  or  spirituous 
fluid,  either  distilled  or  fermented,  as  brandy,  wine,  whisky, 
beer,  etc.*  In  common  parlance  the  word  is  universally 
understood  in  the  hitter  sense  when  used  in  speaking  of  a 
dealer  in  liquors.  This  being  true,  when  the  statute  first 
prescribes  a  penalty  for  dealing  in  intoxicating  liquors, 
and  then  prescribes  a  form  of  indictment  to  be  used  in 
prosecuting  for  a  breach  of  this  law,  using  therein  the 
word  'liquors,'  it  is  beyond  cavil  that  the  word  is  used 
in  the  special  sense  of  intoxicating  liquors,  as  above  de- 
fined, and  that  under  such  an  indictment  the  sale  only  of 
such  liquors  can  be  shown.  "^ 


bought,  and  its  usual  effect  upon 
the  system.  Gleason  \.  Hobson 
[1907]  Vict.  L.  E.  14'8  (Aus- 
tralia ) . 

In  Georgia  proof  that  the  ac- 
cused sold  "liquor"  was  held  suffi- 
cient proof  that  the  fluid  sold  was 
intoxicating,  especially  where  it 
looked  like  rye  whisky.  Carswell 
V.  State   (Ga.  App.),  66  S.  E.  *88. 

*  Liqueur  is  "an  alcoholic  cordial 
sweetened  and  flavored  with  aro- 
matic substances."  Among  the 
commercial  liqueurs  the  following- 
are  the  main  ones:  absinthe, 
allasch,  anisette,  benedietine,  casis, 
chartreusse,  creme  de  menthe, 
crenie  de  rosa,  creme  de  vanilla, 
curacoa,  kirschwasser,  kummel, 
mandarine,  maraschino,  moyan, 
pomeranzen,  ratafia,  trappistine, 
and  vermuth."  Standard  Dic- 
tionary. 

r-  Rrass  v.  State,  4.')  Fhi.  1  ;  34 
So.  307;  State  v.  Ihittain,  S9  N. 
C.  574;  HoUender  v.  Magone,  38 
Fed.  012;    Kizcr   v.    Randleman,   5 


Jones  (X.  C),  428;  iCarswell  v. 
State   ( Ga.  App. ) ,  66  S.  E.  488. 

In  Texas,  by  one  statute,  in- 
toxicating liquors  are  defined; 
and  this  is  held  to  apply  to  the 
statute  relating  to  nuisances. 
State  V.  Frederickson,  101  Me. 
37;  '63  Atl.  535. 

Failure  to  use  the  word  "intoxi- 
cating" before  the  word  "liquors" 
in  the  title  of  an  act  providing 
for  the  prosecution  of  those  sell- 
ing liquor  in  counties  voting 
against  such  sale,  does  not  render 
it  unconstitutional.  Ladson  v. 
State   (Fla.),  47  So.  517. 

"The  term  'liquor'  applies  only 
to  liquors  containing  a  sufficient 
percentage  of  alcohol  to  cause  in- 
toxication." Board  v.  Taylor,  21 
N.  Y.  173,  177;  Roberts  v.  State 
4  Ga.  App.  207;  60  S.  E.  1082; 
,Tam(>s  V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
334;  01  S.  W.  227.  "Its  most 
common  a])plication  is  to  spiritu- 
ous fluids,  Avhetlior  distilled  or 
fermented;      to     decoctions,     solu- 


DEt'INlTIONS. 


S<3 


Sec.  3.    Mixed  liquors. 

A  statute  ioibade  the  sale  of  "mixed  liquors"  in  less 
quantity  than  five  gallons;  and  it  was  held  that  this  meant 
a  mixture  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  an  indictment  charg- 
ing a  sale  of  mixed  liquors  must  set  forth  by  name  the 
general  appellation  of  the  mixture.  It  was  also  held  not 
to  include  a  mixture  of  water  and  milk,  or  water  and  vine- 


tions,  tincture.''  Houser  v.  State, 
18  Ind.  10'6;  State  v.  Giersch,  98 
N.   C.  720;    4  S.  E.   193. 

In  Arkansas  it  has  been  held 
that  the  term  "liquor"  does  not 
include  alcohol.  State  v.  Martin, 
34  Ark.  340;  but  under  the  Re- 
vised Code  of  North  Carolina, 
Chap.  70,  §  4,  forbidding  a  credit 
of  more  than  $10  for  liquor  sold, 
it  has  been  lie  Id  to  include  cham- 
pagne. Kizer  v.  Randleman,  50 
N.  C.  428;  and  in  New  York  it 
is  said,  "The  word  'liquors,'  as 
commonly  used,  includes  all  that 
are  spirituous,  vinous  or  fermented, 
including  malt."  People  v.  Crilley, 
20  Barb.  248.  So  in  Louisiana,  it  is 
held  that  liquors  include  all  fer- 
mented liquors.  Mandeville  v.  Bau- 
dot, 40  La.  Ann.  236;  21  So.  258. 
An  indictment  charging  a  sale 
of  liquor  does  not  charge  any  of- 
fense under  a  statute  prohibiting 
the  sale  of  spirituous,  vinous,  fer- 
mented or  malt  liquors.  State  v. 
Quinlan,  40  Minn.  56;  41  N.  W. 
299;  and  proof  of  a  sale  in  a 
saloon  of  liquor  to  deceased,  where 
it  was  also  shown  that  the  defend- 
ant had  at  least  on  one  occasion 
sold  him  seltzer,  was  held  not  to 
authorize  the  court  to  charoe  the 
jury  that  "the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  may  be  proven  by  circum- 
stantial evidence;  and  where  it  is 
shown  that  the  person  was  sold 
or   furnished   liquor  at   a    license' 


saloon,  the  presumption  is  that 
such  liquor  was  intoxicating." 
Dolan  V.  McLaughlin,  43  Neb. 
449;  64  N.  W.  1076. 

Where  liquor  was  defined  by 
statute  as  meaning  distilled  or 
rectified  spirits,  wine,  fermented 
or  malt  liquors,  it  was  held  that 
evidence  showing  the  defendant 
sold  beer  was  not  sufficient  to 
show  a  sale  of  liquor,  as  it  would 
not  be  presumed  that  beer  means 
fermented  or  malt  liquor.  In  re 
Hunter,  34  Misc.  Rep.  (N.  Y.) 
389;   eO  N.  Y.  Supp.  908. 

Under  the  Tariff  Act  of  March 
3,  1883  (-22  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  '505, 
schedule  H),  prohibiting  any  al- 
lowance for  leakage  in  respect  to 
wines,  liquors,  cordials,  or  dis- 
tilled spirits,  it  is  held  that  beer 
was  not  embraced  within  any  of 
the  terms  used,  quoting  the  defini- 
tion given  in  the  Century  Dic- 
tionary. Hollender  v.  Magone, 
149  U.  S.  58'6;  37  L.  Ed.  860;  13 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  932;  reversing  38 
Fed.  Rep.  912. 

In  Mississippi  the  term  "alco- 
holic or  vinous  liquors,"  used  in 
a  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
such  liquor,  is  held  to  include 
wine  made  from  grapes  and  from 
blackberries,  even  though  there  be 
evidence  it  is  not  intoxicating. 
Reyfelt  v.  State,  73  Miss.  415;  18 
So.  925;  State  v.  York,  74  N.  H. 
125:    P5  Atl.  685. 


§  4  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  6 

gai",  or  tea  and  coffee,  and  that  the  term  must  be  limited 
to  a  mixture  of  intoxicants.'^  A  statute  forbade  the  sale 
of  wine,  brandy,  whisky,  rum,  or  any  spirituous  liquors  in 
a  less  quantity  than  a  quart,  or  any  punch  or  mixed 
liquor  in  any  quantity.  It  was  held  that  the  term 
"mixed  liquor"  as  it  followed  the  word  "punch,"  meant  any 
mixture  of  spirituous  liquor  or  other  liquors  prohibited, 
where  Ihe  basis  or  the  substance  of  the  liquor  sold  is  spir- 
ituous and  not  mixed  by  the  vendor,  to  come  within  the  pre- 
vious prohibition  of  sellina:  spirituous  liquor.'^  A  complaint 
charging  a  sale  of  "mixed  liquor,  a  part,  of  Avhich  was 
intoxicating,"  does  not  charge  a  sale  of  any  well-knowri 
kind  of  intoxicating  liquor,  but  is  sufficient,  not  being  in- 
consistent with  the  general  words  "intoxi-^ating  liquor," 
and  proof  of  a  sale  of  any  of  the  well-known  forms  of  dis- 
tilled spirits  which  are  used  as  a  beverage,  and  which  eon- 
tain  alcohol  mixed  with  water  and  other  substances,  as 
whisky,  would  be  sufficient.^ 

Sec.  4.  "Intoxicating,"  statute  defining — Evidence — Stat- 
ute constitutional. 
A  .statute  which  provides  that  the  word  "intoxicating" 
shall  include  any  liquor  or  mixture  of  liquors  which  shall 
contain  more  than  a  certain  per  cent,  by  weight  of  alcohol, 
which  prohibits  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  which 
prescribes  a  form  of  complauit  or  indictment  that  is  to  be 
sufficient  if  substantially  followed,  is  constitutional  and  a 
valid  exercise  of  the  police  powers  of  the  Sta'^e.*'  Thus  a 
statute  which  provides  that  the  words  "intoxicating 
liquors,"  as  used  therein,  "shall  be  construed  to  mean  al- 
cohol, wine,  beer,  spirituous,  vinous  and  malt  liquors,  and 
all  intoxicating  liquors  whatever"  has  been  sustained  re- 
gardless   of    the    fact    as    to    whether    or    not    the    quantity 

estate  V.  Towiiley,  ",   Har.    {N.  nutate    v.    Guinness,    16    R.    I. 

J.)   311.  401;    It)  Atl.  910;   State  v.  Grave- 

7  State  V.  Bonnott,  liar.    (Del.)  lin,    16    R.    I.   407;    16    Atl.    914 
565.  Jackson    v.    State,    10    Ind.    312 

8  Commonwoaltli  v.  :Mor<,'an,  149  James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  353 
Mass.  314;  21  N.  E.  309.  17  S.   W.  422. 


7  DEFINITIONS.  §  4 

drank  at  any  time  would  have  the  effect  of  causing  intox- 
ication, the  court  saying,  "It  is  immaterial,  in  a  statutory 
sense,  what  effect  alcohol  may  have  on  the  human  system ; 
it  is  an  intoxicating  liquor.  However  much  it  may  be  di- 
luted, it  must  remain  an  intoxicant  Avhen  and  however  it 
is  used  as  a  beverage,  and  no  ma'ter  how  it  may  bo  diluted 
or  disguised,  it  so  remains,  simply  because  the  statute  so 
declares."^"  Such  a  statute  is  not  the  subject  of  construc- 
tion by  the  courts,  the  meaning  of  the  term  "intoxicating 
liquors"  being  declared  by  the  act  itself,  and  for  this  rea- 
son evidence  to  show  the  meaning  of  the  term  is  inadmis- 
sible. Nor  does  such  a  statute  violate  a  cons^itutional 
provision  that  "in  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused 
shall  enjoy  the  right  ...  to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and 
cause  of  accusation."' ^^  It  has  been  contended  that  a  Leg- 
islature has  no  power  to  declare  that  to  be  intoxicating 
which  in  fact  is  not.^"  In  Massachusetts,  however,  it  has 
been  held  that  liquors  not  actuall}^  intoxicating,  but  which 
a  statute  declares  "shall  be  considered  intoxicating  within 
the  meaning  of  the  act,"  may  be  described  as  "intoxi- 
cating" in  an  indictment  under  a  statute  for  keeping  in- 
toxicating liquors  with  intent  to  sell  them  in  the  Common- 
Avealth,  without  a  more  particular  description  of  the  liquors 
kept,  the  court  holding  that  such  an  enactment  "is  within 
the  discretion  of  the  Legislature  to  pass.^^  And  in  Rhode 
Island  it  has  been  held  that  a  complaint  under  such  a 
statute  which  charged  that  the  defendant  unlawfully  did 
"keep  and  suffer  to  be  kept  on  his  premises,  in  his  posses- 
sion and  under  his  'charge,  ale,  wine,  rum,  and  other  strong 

10  State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors,  n  State  v.  Wittmar,  12  Mo.  407; 

76  la.  243;   41   N.  W.  fi;   2  L.  R.  State  v.  Lemp,  16  Mo.  380;   State 

A.  418;    Francis  v.   State    (Tex.),  v.  Houts,  36  Mo.  App.  265. 

110    S.    W.    97;    Mason    v.    State  instate   v.    McKenna,    16   R.    I. 

(Tex.),  U<9  S.  W.  852.  398;    17   All.  51. 

A  statute  making  it  an  offense  is  Commonwealth     v.     Timotliy, 

to  sell  without  license  malt  liquors,  74    Mass.     (8    Gray),    480;    Com- 

does    not    apply    to    a    non-intoxi-  monwealth  v.  Dean,   14  Gray,  99; 

eating   malt   liquor.      Jlanlwic-k   v.  Stato  v.   York,   74  X.   TT.    125;    65 

State,    55     Tex.    Cr.    App.     140;  Atl.  680. 
114  S.  W.  832. 


§  5  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  8 

and  malt  and  intoxicating  liquors  and  mixed  liquors,  a 
part  of  which  was  ale,  Avine,  rum  and  other  strong  and 
intoxicating  liquors,  Avith  intent  to  sell  the  same  in  this 
State,  against  the  statute,"  should  not  be  quashed  for  un- 
certainty because  of  not  stating  whether  it  covered  liquors 
intoxicating  in  fact  or  defined  as  intoxicating  liquors  by 
the  statute;  and  under  such  a  statutory  provision  and 
indictment,  evidence  of  an  expert  is  admissible  on  the  part 
of  the  prosecution  and  defense  to  show  the  amount  of 
alcohol  contained  in  the  liquor  in  controversy.^*  The  in- 
toxicating properties  of  such  a  liquor  may  also  be  proved 
by  witnesses  testifying  to  their  observation  of  its  appear- 
ance, taste  and  odor,  the  kind  of  vessels  in  which  it  was 
contained,  the  labels  or  marks  on  such  vessels,  the  presence 
of  men  engaged  in  drinking,  the  presence  of  the  parapher- 
nalia of  the  room  in  which  it  was  sold,  and  other  like 
pertinent  facts.^^ 

Sec.  5.     Intoxicating  liquor  used  as  a  beverage. 

"Any  liquor  intended  for  use  as  a  beverage,  or  capable 
of  being  so  used,  which  contains  alcohol,  either  obtained  by 
fermentation  or  by  the  additional  process  of  distillation, 
in  such  proportion  that  it  will  produce  intoxication,  when 
taken  in  such  quantities  as  may  be  practically  drank,  is  an 
intoxicant."-*'     The    phrase    "intoxicating    liquors"    is    a 

Instate    V.    :\IeKenna,    10    R.    1.  Chappel,    116    Mass.    7;    Wiles    v. 

3'98;    17   Atl.   51.  State,  33  Ind.  200;  Commonwealth 

15  State   V.   Liquor,   38   Vt.   387.  v.    Bios,    116    Mass.    50;    State   v. 

For  statutory  definitions  of  "in-  Hovits,  3i8  Mo.  App.  205;  State  v. 
toxicating  liquors,"  see  iCommon-  Rush,  13  R.  I.  198;  Common- 
wealth V.  Shea,  14  Gray,  386;  wealth  v.  Anthes,  12  Gray,  29; 
Worley  v.  Spurgeon,  38  Iowa,  467 ;  Jones  v.  Surprise,  '64  X.  H.  243 ; 
State  V.  Stapp,  29  Iowa,  5i51;  9  Atl.  384;  State  v.  Packer,  80 
State    V.    Bindle,    28    Iowa,    512;  N.  C.  439. 

Tredway   v.    Riley,    32    Neb.    495;  kj  Decker   v.  State,  39  Tex.  Civ. 

49   N.    W.   2&8;    29    Am.  St.    447;  App.    20;    44    S.    W.    845;    Pike  v. 

Bell  V.  State,   91   Ga.   227;    18   S.  State,  40  Tex.   Civ.   App.  613;   51 

E.   288;    State  v.   Volmer,  6  Kan.  S.     W.     3-95;      Malone     v.     State 

371;    Commonwealth  v.   Snow,  133  (Tex.),   51   S.   W.   381.      (In   Pike 

Mass.      675;      Commonwealth      v.  v.   State,  supra,  it  was  held  that 


DEFINITIONS. 


§5 


broad  term,  embracing  all  liquors  used  as  a  beverage, 
which,  when  so  used,  may  or  will  produce  intoxication.^' 
The  term  "intoxicating  liquors"  covers  alcoJwl}^  But  the 
courts  cannot  say  that  a  certain  percentage  of  alcohol  in 
a  beverage  renders  the  beverage  intoxicating;  nor  that  a 
particular  ingredient  in  a  compound  does  or  does  not  de- 
stroy the  intoxicating  influence  of  the  alcohol,  or  prevent  it 
becoming  an  intoxicating  beverage.  "Of  course,  the  larger 
per  cent,  of  alcohol,  and  the  more  potent  the  other  in- 
gredients, the  more  probable  does  it  fall  within  or  without 
the  prohibition  of  the  statute,  but  in  each  case  the  question 
is  a  question  of  fact,  and  to  be  settled  as  other  questions  of 
fact.'  "  ^^    But  under  a  statute  defining  intoxicating  liquors 


an  instruction  to  tlie  jury  was 
correct  whicli  defined  intoxicating 
liquors  as  folio  s:  "By  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  as  used  herein,  is 
meant  any  spirituous,  vinous,  or 
malt  liquors,  or  medicated  bitters, 
or  medicated  liquors,  capable  of 
producing  intoxication  wiien  used 
in  sufficient  quantity." )  Frickie 
V.  State,  40  Tex.  Civ.  App.  62'6; 
51  S.  W.  394;  Sebastian  v.  State, 
44-  Tex.  Civ.  App.  508;  72  S.  VV. 
849;  Taylor  v.  State  (Tex.),  49 
S.  W.  845. 

17  People  V.  Hawley,  3  Mich. 
330;  People  v.  Sweetser,  1  Dak. 
308;  46  N.  W.  452;  State  v. 
Oliver,  26  W.  Va.  422;  53  Am. 
Rep.  79;  In  re  Intoxicating 
Liquors,  25  Kan.  761;  37  Am. 
Rep.  2'84. 

IS  Emerson  v.  State,  43  Ark. 
372;  Rucker  v.  State  (Tex.),  24 
S.  W.  902;  In  re  Intoxicating 
Liquors,  25  Kan.  78 1 ;  37  Am. 
Rep.  284;  Shaw  v.  Carpenter,  54 
Vt.  155;  41  Am.  Rep.  837;  Kelley 
Drug  Co.  v.  Truett  (Tex.),  75  S. 
W.    536. 

It  has  been  held  that  wliere  an 
indictment   charges    a    sale   of    al- 


cohol it  does  not  charge  a  sale  of 
"intoxicating  liquor."  State  v. 
Witt,  39  Ark.  216.  The  court  says 
it  does  not  judicially  know  alcohol 
is  intoxicating,  but  this  case,  out- 
side of  its  own  state,  cannot  be 
regarded  as   an  authority. 

"iliat  alcohol  is  an  intoxicant 
is  as  well  known  and  established 
as  any  other  physical  fact.  There 
is  not  one  man  in  10,000  or 
100,000  who,  if  asked  whether 
alcohol  is  into.xicating,  would  not 
reply  immediately  in  the  affirma- 
tive. It  is  not  a  purely  scientific 
fact ;  it  is  a  fact  that  every  per- 
son of  the  commonest  understand- 
ing knows.  Indeed,  it  is  a  matter 
of  common  knowledge  that  alcohol 
is  the  intoxicating  element  of 
various  forms  of  beverages  known 
as  spirituous  or  intoxicating 
liquors.  In  a  prosecution  for  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  wliere 
the  proof  was  of  the  sale  of  pure 
alcohol,  it  was  not  necessary  to 
prove  that  the  alcohol  was  intoxi- 
cating." Snider  v.  State,  81  Ga. 
753;  7  S.  E.  031;   17  Am.  St.  350. 

isTopeka  v.  Zufall,  40  Kan.  47; 
19  Pac.  359;   1   L.  R.  A.  387.     See 


§5 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


10 


to  mean  "alcohol,  wine,  beer,  spirituous,  vinous  and  malt 
liquors,  and  all  intoxicating  liquors  whatever,"  a  beverage 
containing  any  alcohol  is  an  intoxicant,  regardless  of  the 
fact  that  the  amount  drank  at  any  one  time  will  not  have 
that  effect.-"  Ale  and  porter  are  regarded  in  law  as  intox- 
icating liquors,^^  although  they  may  be  in  a  changed  condi- 
tion ;  --  and  this  is  particularly  true  where  the  statute  so 
'defines  or  classes  them.-''  Bay  rum  cannot  be  classed  as  an 
intoxicating  liquor,  even  though  it  contains  enough  liquor 
to  intoxicate,  for  it  is  not  commonly  used  as  a  beveragy.^* 
Proof  of  a  sale  of  heer  in  the  usual  places  where  beer  is 
sold,  or  even  when  not  sold  in  such  places,  raises  a  pre- 
sumption  that   it  is   intoxicating;-^   and   it   is  sufficient   to 


Commonwealth  v.  Morgan,  149 
Mass.  314;  21  N.  E.  369;  State 
V.  May,  52  Kan.  53;  34  Pac.  407; 
State  V.  Biddle,  54  N.  H.  37G. 

20  State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors, 
76  Iowa,  243;  41  N.  W.  6;  2  L. 
R.  A.  408;  Commonwealth  v. 
Snow,  133  Mass.  575;  State  v. 
Guinness,  16  R.  I.  401;  16  Atl. 
910;  State  v.  McKenna,  16  R.  I. 
398;  17  Atl.  51;  James  v.  State, 
4'9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  334;  91  S.  W. 
227;  Roberts  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App. 
207;  '60  S.  E.  1082;  Smith  v. 
State  (Tex.),  120  S.  W.  801; 
Commonwealth  v.  Burns,  38  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  514. 

21  State  V.  Barron,  37  Vt.  60 ; 
Kevins  v.  Ladue,  1  N.  Y.  Code 
Rep.  43;  3  Denio,  43,  437;  Haines 
V.  Hanrahan,  105  Mass.  480. 

22  Shaw  v.  Carpenter,  54  Vt. 
155;   41   Am.  Rep.  S37. 

23  Commonwealth  v.  Chappel, 
116  Mass.  7;  Commonwealth  v. 
Dean,  14  Gray,  99;  State  v.  York, 
74  N.  H.  125;  65  Atl.  685;  Wiles 
v.  State,  33  Ind.  208;  State  v. 
Gravelin,  IB  R.  I,  407;  16  Atl. 
014;  State  v.  Wadsworth,  30 
Conn.  55. 


But  under  the  Ohio  Act  of  May 
1,  1854,  §4,  making  it  an  offense 
to  keep  a  public  resort  where  "in- 
toxicating liquors"  are  sold,  the 
sale  of  ale  is  not  included.  John- 
son V.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  556. 
And  in  Xew  Hampshire,  where 
the  indictment  charged  a  sale  of 
"intoxicating  liquors,"  on  proof  of 
a  sale  of  ale  and  cider  it  was  held 
that  the  court  could  rule  that 
they,  after  fermentation  was  com- 
pleted, were  intoxicating  liquors, 
without  proof  of  the  amount  of 
alcohol  wliich  they  contained ; 
whether  or  not  they  were  intoxi- 
cating was  a  question  of  fact  for 
the  jury.  State  v.  Biddle,  54  N. 
H.   37«. 

24  In  re  Intoxicating  Liquor 
Cases,  25  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Rep. 
284. 

23  State  V.  Stout,  96  Ind.  407; 
Myers  v.  Stat.e,  93  Ind.  251; 
Douglass  V.  State,  21  Ind.  App. 
302;  52  N.  E.  238;  State  v. 
Jenkins,  32  Kan.  477;  4  Pac.  809; 
State  v.  Spiers,  103  Iowa,  711;  73 
Pac.  343;  Mullen  v.  State,  96  Ind. 
304.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Hey- 
wood,     105    Mass.     187.      Contra, 


11 


DEFINITIONS. 


§5 


allege  in  the  indictment  a  sale  of  beer  without  alleging  it 
is  intoxicating ;-«  and  this  is  especially  true  where  a  stat- 
ute so  shows  it.-^  Brandy  is  an  intoxicating  liquor;  ^s  and  a 
sale  of  brandy  Readies  and  cherries  is  a  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors ;-«  but  it  is  not  if  the  liquor  is  very  weak  and  in- 
capable of  producing  intoxication  unless  drank  in  large 
quantities.'"  Cider  is  not  an  intoxicating  liquor  unless  the 
evidence  shows  the  particular  liquor  in  question  was  in- 
toxicating,^^ and  that  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.^^ 
Cologne  is  not  classed  as  an  intoxicating  liquor,^^  nor  are 
drugs."^  Essence  of  cinnamon  may  be  shown  to  be  intox- 
icating,^^ but  extract  of  lemon  is  not  so  classed.^"  Gin  is 
universally  recognized  as  an  intoxicant,"  but  Jiop  ah  is  not 


Kurz  V.  State,  79  Ind.  4'88; 
Plunket  V.  State,  G9  Ind.  68; 
State  V.  Sioux  Falls,  etc.,  Co.,  5 
S.  D.  3>9;  58  N.  W.  1;  2G  L.  R. 
A.  138;  Klare  v.  State,  43  Ind. 
483;  Commonwealth  v.  Bless,  116 
Mass.  50;  Johnston  v.  State,  23 
Ohio  St.,  55'G;  Commonwealtli  v. 
Hardman,  9  Gray,  133.  In  Ken- 
tucky a  beer  having  less  than  two 
per  cent,  of  alcohol  is  not  intoxi- 
cating. Bowling  Green  v.  ;Nrc'Mul- 
leu  (Ky.),  122  S.  W.  823. 

26  Welsh  V.  State,  12i()  Ind.  71; 
25  N.  E.  883 ;   9  L.  R.  A.  6(34. 

27  State  V.  Houts,  3'6  Mo.  App. 
2i65;  State  v.  Lcmp,  10  Mo.  389; 
State  V.  Cloughly,  73  Iowa,  626; 
3!5  N.  W.  652. 

28  State  V.  Lewis,  86  Minn.  174; 
90  N.  W.  318;  Malett  v.  Steven- 
son, 26  Conn.  428;  Snider  v. 
State,  81  Ga.  753;  7  S.  E.  631; 
12  Am.  St.  350;  State  v.  Wads- 
worth,   30  Conn.   55. 

29  Ryall  v.  State.  78  Ala.  410. 
See  Holland  v.  Commonwealth,  7 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  223. 

soRabe  v.  State,  39  Ark.  204 
(six  peaches  to  a  gallon  of  liquor 


tasting  like  alcohol).  In  Ken- 
tucky it  is  held  that  a  sale  of 
brandy  peaches  is  not  a  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors  within  the 
statute.  Holland  v.  Common- 
wealth,  7  Ky.  Law  Rep.  223. 

31  Commonwealth  v.  Chappel, 
116  Mass.  7;  Hewitt  v.  People, 
186  HI.  336;  57  N,  E.  1077;' 
Johnston  v.  State,  23  Ohio  St. 
550;  State  v.  Biddle,  54  N.  H.  379. 

32  State  v.  Page,  m  Me.  418, 
Of  course,  a  statute  may  de- 
clare cider  to  be  an  intoxicating 
liquor.  Commonwealth  v.  Dean, 
14  Gray,  99;  Commonwealth  v. 
Smith,  102  Mass.   144. 

33 /u  re  Intoxicating  Liquor 
Cases,  25  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Rep. 
2iS4. 

3*  Anderson  v.  Commonwealth, 
0  Bush,  569. 

35  State  v.  Muncey,  28  W.  Va. 
494. 

3G  Holcomb  V.  People,  49  111. 
App.  73;  In  re  Intoxicating 
Liquor  Cases,  25  Kan.  751;  37 
Am.   Rep.    284. 

37  Commonwealth  v.  Peckham, 
2  Gray,  514;   Snider  v.  State,  SI 


§5 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


12 


unless  so  shown  bj'  eviderice.^^  Lager  heer  is  so  classed 
without  proof  of  its  intoxicating  quality ;  ^^  especially  if  a 
statute  so  classifies  it/*^  Paregoric  is  not  classed  as  an 
intoxicating  liquor,  but  it  may  be  shown  that  it  is  intox- 
icating/^ and  so  may  be  pop.*'-  Bum  has  always  been 
classed  as  an  intoxicating  liquor.*^  Spirituous  liquors  is  not 
synonymous  with  intoxicating  liquors ;  ''^  and  under  an  indict- 
ment charging  a  sale  of  spirituous  liquor  it  cannot  be  shown 
the  sale  was  of  ale  or  beer  and  that  ale  or  beer  is  intoxicat- 
ing ;  *^  but  under  a  charge  of  a  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor  a 
sale  of  spirituous  liquors  may  be  shown ;  for  spirituous 
liquors  are  intoxicating/*^  Whisky  is  an  intoxicating  liquor, 
which  "is  as  well  known  as  that  fire  will  burn  or  water  will 
drown.  "^'^  Wine  is  judicially  known  as  an  intoxicating 
liquor.*^     Where  a  statute   declares    that    *'by    the    words 


Ga.  753;  7  S.  E.  ^31;  12  Am.  St. 
350;  Dr.  €.  Bouvier  Specialty  Co. 
V.  James    (Ky.),  118  S.  W.  381. 

38  Barnes  v.  State  (Tex.),  44 
S.  W.  491. 

39  State  V.  Church,  G  S.  D.  89 ; 
60  X.  W.  143:  Rail  v.  People,  63 
JSr.  Y.  277;  State  v.  Gravelin,  16 
R.  I.  407;  16  Atl.  914.  Contra, 
People  V.  Schewe,  29  Hun,  122; 
People  V.  Zeiger,  6  Parker  Civ. 
Rep.  355. 

40  State  V.  Rush,  13  R.  I.  198; 
People  V.  O'Riely  (N.  Y.),  8«  N. 
E.  1128;  affirming  129  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  522;  114  N.  Y.  Supp.  258; 
Commonwealth  v.  Chappel,  116 
Mass.  7;  Commonwealtli  v.  An- 
thes,  12  Gray,  29. 

41  In  re  Intoxicating  Liquor 
Cases,  25  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Rep. 
284. 

42  Godfroidson  v.  People,  S>8  111. 
284. 

43  Snider  v.  State.  81  Ga.  753; 
7  S.  E.  631;    12  Am.  St.  350. 

44  Clifford  V.  State.  29  Wis. 
327 ;   Commonwealth  v.  Livermore, 


4  Gray,  18;  Allred  v.  State,  -89 
Ala.  112;  8  So.  5G;  Weisbrodt  v. 
State,  50  Ohio  St.  192;  33  X.  E. 
003. 

45  State  V.  Adams,  51  X.  H. 
568;  Commonwealth  v.  Herrick, 
G  Cush.  465. 

46  State  V.  Pritchard,  16  S.  D. 
166;  91  X.  W.  &83;  Clifford  V. 
State,  29  Wis.  327 ;  State  v.  York, 
74  X.  H.  125;  65  Atl.  CSS. 

The  term  "intoxicating  liquors" 
and  "spirituous  liquors"  when  in- 
serted in  a  license  law  have  been 
held  synonymous.  State  v.  Jef- 
ferson County,  20  Fla.  425. 

47Eagan  v.  State,  53  Ind.  162; 
In  re  Intoxicating  Liquors,  25 
Kan.  761;  37  Am.  Rep.  284;  Car- 
mon  V.  State,  18  Ind.  450;  Edgar 
V.  State,  37  Ark.  219:  State  v. 
Lewis.  ?G  l\'inn.  374:  90  X.  W. 
318:  Schlicht  v.  State,  56  Ind.  173; 
Snider  v.  State.  81  Ga.  753;  7.  S. 
E.   631:    12   Am.   Pt.  350. 

48  Wolf  V.  State  59  Ark.  297; 
27  S.  W.  77:  43  Am.  St.  34; 
Jackson  v.  State,  19  Ind.  312. 


13 


DEFINITIONS. 


^6 


'spirit,'  'spirituous  or  intoxicating  liquors,-  shall  be  in- 
tended all  spiritnous  or  intoxicating  liqnor  and  all  mixed 
liquor,  any  part  of  which  is  spirituous  or  intoxicating, 
unless  otherwise  expressly  declared,"  another  statute  noting 
it  an  offense  to  keep  or  sell  spirituous  liquors  covers  the 
keeping  or  sale  of  intoxicating  ivines:^^  But  a  liquor  which 
does  not  contain  alcohol  is  not  an  intoxicating  liquor  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  liquor  statutes;  and  it  is  therefore 
error  to  charge  the  jury  that  any  liquor  producing  intoxi- 
cation is  intoxicating  liquor  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statutes. ^° 


Sec.   6.     Intoxicating    liquor — Amount    necessary    to    pro- 
duce intoxication. 

It  is  immaterial  how  much  liquor  is  necessary  to  produce 
intoxication  to  render  it  an  "intoxicating  liquor,"  if  it  is 


49  Jones  V.  Surprise,  '64  N.  H. 
243;  9  Atl.  3S4;  State  v.  Fred- 
erickson,  101  Me.  37;   63  Atl.  535. 

■Statutes  frequently  expressly 
include  wine  under  the  head  of  in- 
toxicating liquors.  Commonwealth 
V.  Dean,  14  Gray,  99;  Common- 
wealth V.  Chappel,  116  Mass.  7; 
State  V.  Packer,  SO  N.  C.  439 
(port  wine)  ;  State  v.  Houts,  3(i 
Mo.  App.  265. 

The  Ohio  Act  of  May  1,  1854, 
§  4,  making  it  an  offense  to  keep 
a  place  where  intoxicating  liquors 
are  sold,-  does  not  cover  a  wine 
made  of  the  pure  juice  of  the 
grape  cultivated  in  the  state. 
Johnston  v.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  553. 

50  Thompson  v.  State,  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  97  S.  W.  316. 

Diluted  lager  beer  having  2.05 
per  cent,  of  alcohl  has  been  held 
to  be  an  intoxicating  liquor. 
Queen  v.  McLean,  3  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 
323.  And  so  "blue  ribbon  beer." 
Regina  v.  Walton,  34  C.  L.  J.  746. 

If    a    liquid    is    intoxicating   its 


name  is  immaterial.  James  v. 
State,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App.  334;  91 
S.  W.  227. 

Proof  that  a  particular  liquor 
resembles  intoxicating  liquor  is 
not  proof  that  it  is  intoxicating 
liquor.  Regina  v.  Bennett,  1  Ont. 
405.  But  it  may  be  on  a  charge 
of  a  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor 
when  sold  at  the  bar  of  a  saloon 
in  the  quantity  usually  purchased 
for  ten  cents  per  dram.  Dant  v. 
State,  83  Ind.   60. 

In  North  Dakota  intoxicating 
liquor  is  defined  as  "any  kind  of 
beverage  whatsoever,  which,  re- 
taining the  alcoholic  principle  or 
other  intoxicating  qualities  as  a 
distinctive  force,  may  be  used  as 
a  beverage  and  become  a  substi- 
tute for  the  ordinary  intoxicating 
drinks."  Tliis  is  held  to  include 
a  drug  having  an  alcoholic  base 
that  can  be  used  for  intoxication. 
State  V.  Fargo  Bottling  Works 
Co.   (N.  D.),  124  N.  W.  387. 


§  7  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUOKS.  14 

possible  to  drink  enough  to  intoxicate  a  person  of  ordinary 
habits.^^  But  the  mere  presence  of  alcohol  in  tlie  article 
sold  is  not  sufficient  to  make  it  an  intoxicating  liquor  nor 
to  bring  it  within  the  terms  of  a  statute  prohibiting  ihe 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquor;^-  and  probably  the  true  rule  is, 
aside  from  statutory  definitions,  that  it  must  produce  in- 
toxication when  drank  in  reasonable  quantities,  such  as 
the  human  stomach  can  hold.  The  name  under  which  it  is 
sold  is  immaterial.^^ 

Sec.  7.    Intoxicating  and  spirituous  liquors  distinguished. 

The  word  "intoxicating"'  includes  a  larger  class  of  cases 
than  "spirituous."  They  bear  the  relation  to  each  other 
of  genus  and  species ;  all  spirituous  liquors  are  intoxi- 
'cating,  but  all  intoxicating  liquors  are  not  spirituous.^* 
The  words  are  uot  synonymous.  In  common  parlance  spir- 
ituous liquor  means  dis'illed  liquor,  and  such  is  its  mean- 
ing when  used  in  a  penal  statute.  Fermented  liquor,  though 
intoxicating,  is  not  spirituous.  Accordingly  it  has  been 
held  that  an  indictment  for  unlawfully  selling  "spirituous 
and  intoxica'ing  liquors"  is  not  supported  by  proof  of  sales 
of  liquors  wh'ch  are  intoxicating,  but  not  spirituous,  the 
court  saying  that,  "A  defendant  indicted  for  stealing  a 
black  and  white  horse  might  as  well  be  convicted,  on  proof 
that  he  stole  either  a  black  horse  or  a  white  one,  by  hold- 
ing that  he  was  properly  charged  with  stealing  a  black 
horse  and  also  a  white  one."^' 

51  Wadsworth     v.     Dunnan,     98  v.   State,   5   Ga.   App.    716;    63    S. 

Ala.   610;    13   So.   597.     See  Com-  E.  602   (burden), 

niissioners    v.    Taylor,    21    N.    Y.  Diluted    lager   beer   having   2.05 

173;   Prussia  v.  Guenther,  6   Abb.  per  cent,  of  alcohol,  has  been  held 

(N.  S.)   230   ("sun  smile")  ;  State  to     be      an      intoxicating     liquor. 

V.  Kennard,  74  N.  H.  76;   65  Atl.  Queen  v.  McLean,  3  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

376.  3'23.      See    Regina   v.    Walton,    34 

62  Roberts  v.  State,  4   Ga.   App.  C.  L.  J.  746  ("blue  ribbon  beer")  ; 

207;  60  S.  E.  10<S2.  Commonwealth    v.    Burns,    38    Pa. 

r>3  James   v.   State,  49  Tex.  Civ.  Super.  Ct.  514. 

App.  34M;   91   S.  W.  227.  i'>4  Commonwealth  v.  Herrick,  60 

It  is  error  not  to  so  charge  the  Mass.   (6  Cush.)   465. 

jury,     Ross  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Civ.  sn  Commonwealth     v.    Grey,    68 

App.  604;    108  S.  W,  375;   Stoner  Mass.     (2    Gray)     501;     Common- 


15  DEFINITIONS.  §§  8,  9 

Sec.   8.     Intoxicating    and    non-intoxicating — How    distin- 
guished. 

In  determining  whether  liquors  containing-  alcohol  are 
intoxicating  or  non-intoxicating,  there  is  but  one  safe  line 
of  distinction  to  follow,  and  that  is  that  those  which  con- 
tain so  small  a  percentage  of  alcohol  that  the  human  stom- 
ach cannot  contain  a  sufficient  quantity  of  the  liquor  to 
produce  intoxication,  as  is  sa'd  to  be  the  case  with  re- 
spect to  spruce  beer,  ginger  beer  and  some  others,  must 
be  regarded  as  non-intoxicating,  and  those,  whether  ob- 
tained by  distillation  or  fermentation,  of  which  enough 
can  be  taken  to  produce  inebriation,  must  be  considered 
as  intoxicating.^'' 

Sec.  9.    Alcohol  an  intoxicant — Judicial  notice. 

Alcohol  is  the  intoxicating  principle,  the  basis  of  all  in- 
toxicating drinks.  Whatever  'contains  alcohol  will,  if  a 
sufficient  nuantity  be  taken,  produce  intoxication.^'  That 
it  is  an  intoxicant  is  as  well  known  and  established  as  any 
other  physical  fact.  There  is  not  one  man  in  ten  thousand 
who,  if  asked  whether  alcohol  is  intoxicating,  would  not 
reply  immediately  in  the  affirmative.  It  is  not  a  purely 
scientific   fact ;  it  is   a   fact   that  every   person  of   common 

wealth  V.  Livermore,  70  Mass.    ( 4  Commonwealth  v.  Herrick,  6  Cush. 

Gray)    501;    Allred    v.    State,    89  465. 

Ala.  112;  8  So.  56.  In  Washington  a  sale  of  liquor 

Under  an  indictment  for  a  sale  to  a   minor   which   is   intoxicating 

of    intoxicating   liquor,    a    sale   of  is  an  offense,  though  not  spiritu- 

spirituous   liquors  may   be   shown,  ous.    State  v.  McC'ormick  (Wash.), 

for   spirituous   liquors   are   intoxi-  105  Pac.  1037. 

eating.     Clifford  v.  State,  29  Wis.  no  Board  v.  Taylor,  21  N.  Y.   (7 

327;  State  v.  York,  74  N.  H.  125;  Smith)    173;    People   v.    Zeiger,   • 

65   Atl.    685;    State   v.   Pritchard,  Parker's  Crim.  Cas.    (N.  Y.)    355; 

16  S.  Dak.  16^6;  91  N.  W.  583.  Bertrand  v.  State,  73  Miss.  51; 
But  under  a  charge  of  a  sale  of  18  So.  545;  United  States  v. 
spirituous  liquors  it  cannot  be  Stubblefield,  40  Fed.  454;  Russell 
shown    that    the    liquor    sold    was  v.  Sloan,  33  Vt.  656.     • 

ale  and  that  aJe  was  intoxicating.  ^^  in     re     Intoxicating     Liquor 

State   V.    Adams,    51    N.    H.   56(8;        Cases,  25  Kaa.  767;   37  Am.  Rep. 

284. 


§  10  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  16 

understanding  knows.  Indeed,  it  is  a  matter  of  common 
knowledge  that  alcohol  is  the  intoxicating  element  of  the 
various  forms  of  beverages  known  as  spirituous  and  intox- 
i'Cating  liquors.  It  is  known  by  the  people  generally  as 
well  as  they  know  that  the  sun  produces  heat,  that  sum- 
mer is  succeeded  by  winter,  that  flowers  bloom  in  the 
spring,  that  the  earth  revolves,  or  that  the  blood  circulates 
in  the  human  system.^^  Yet  notwithstanding  this,  it  has 
been  held  that  because  alcohol  is  extensively  used  in  the 
arts,  employed  in  medicine  as  a  solvent,  in  the  preparation 
of  tinctures  and  by  painters  in  making  varnish,  a  court 
cannot  take  judicial  notice  that  it  is  an  intoxicating  bev- 
erage like  whisky,  nor  that  it  is  in  common  use  for  purposes 
of  dissipation,  nor  even  that  it  is  capable  of  being  applied 
to  such  an  use.^^ 

Sec.  10.    Alcohol — Continued. 

In  the  Century  Dictionary  the  definition  and  description 
of  ''alcohol"  is  given,  after  giving  the  derivation  of  the 
word:  "A  liquod,  ethyl  hydrate,  C  H  OH,  formed  by  the 
fermentation  of  aqueous  sugar  solutions,  or  by  the  de- 
structive distillation  of  organic  bodies,  as  wood.  Absolute 
or  pure  alcohol  is  a  colorless,  mobile  liquid,  of  a  pleasant 
spirituous  smell  and  burning  taste,  of  specific  gravity  .793 
at  60  degrees  Fahrenheit,  and  boiling  at  173  degrees 
Fahrenheit."  "Different  grades  of  alcohol  are  sometimes 
designated  in  trade,  according  to  the  source  from  which 
they  are  derived,  as  grain  alcohol,  prepared  from  maize 
or  other  grain;  root  alcohol,  from  potatoes  and  beets;  moss 
■alcohol,  which  is  made  in  larger  quantity  from  reindeer 
moss  and  Iceland  moss  in  Norway,  Sweden  and  Russia." 
"Proof  spirit  contains  49.3  per  cent,  by  weight  of  pure 
alcohol,  or  57.1  per  cent,  by  volume.  Under-proof  and 
over-proof  are  designations  of  weaker  and  stronger  solu- 

•"'8  Snider  v.  State,  81    Ga.   753;  so  state   v.   Witt,   39   Ark.    21i6; 

70  S.  E.  631;   State  v.  Martin,  34       Winn  v.  State,  43  Ark.   151.     See, 
'^rk.  340.  also,    Bennett    v.    People,    30    111. 

389. 


17 


DEFINITIONS. 


§10 


tions.  Distilled  liquors  or  ardent  spirits,  whisky,  brandy, 
gin,  etc.,  contain  40  to  50  per  cent,  of  absolute  alcohol, 
wines  from  7  or  8  to  20,  ale  and  porter  from  5  to  7  and 
beer  from  2  to  10.  "**"  In  common  parlance,  alcohol  is 
not  considered  either  ardent  or  vinous  spirits,  or  liquor 
of  any  kind."^  It  is  the  essmitial  element  in  all  spirituous 
liquors,  and  is  a  limpid,  colorless  liquid.  To  the  taste  it  is 
hot  and  pungent,  and  it  has  a  slight  and  not  disagreeable 
scent.  Alcohol  that  can  be  drunk  has  but  one  source — 
fermentation  of  sugar  and  saccharine  matter.  It  comes 
through  fermentation  of  substances  that  contain  sugar 
proper,  or  that  contain  starch,  w^hich  may  be  turned  into 
sugar.  All  substances  that  contain  either  sugar  or  starch, 
or  both,  will  produce  fermentation.  It  is  a  mistake  to  sup- 
pose, as  many  persons  do,  that  it  is  really  produced  by 
distillation.  It  is  produced  only  by  fermentation,  and  the 
process  of  distillation  simply  serves  to  separate  the  spirit, 
the  alcohol,  from  the  mixture,  whatever  it  may  be,  in 
which  it  exists. ^- 


60  This  same  authority  defines 
methyl  ic  or  methyl  alcohol,  or 
wood  alcohol,  to  be  "alcohol  ob- 
tained by  the  destruction  of  wood. 
When  pure  it  is  a  colorless  mobile 
liquid  (C.  H.g  0.  H.)  with  an 
odor  and  taste  like  ordinary  alco- 
hol (ethyl  hydrate  C,  H.g  O.  H.), 
though  the  commercial  article  has 
a  strong  pyroligneous  smell.  It 
is  inflammable."  Century  Dic- 
tionary, alcohol. 

The  Vermont  statute,  c.  187, 
prohibiting  the  sale  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquor,  is  no  defense  to  an  ac- 
tion for  the  purchase  price  of 
methyl  or  wood  alcohol;  because 
such  alcohol  is  a  poison,  which  is 
not  intended  and  cannot  be  used 
as  a  beverage.  Fabor  v.  Green, 
72  Vt.  117;  47  Atl.  391;  Roberts 
V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  207;  '60  S. 
E.  1082. 


61  State  V.  Martin,  34  Ark.  340; 
Bennett  v.  People,  30  111.  389. 

62  State  V.  Giersch,  98  N.  C. 
720;    4  S.    E.    193. 

A  statute  forbidding  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquor  to  a  minor 
without  the  written  consent  of  his 
parents,  is  violated  by  a  sale  of 
alcohol  to  him  without  such  con- 
sent. Rucker  v.  State  (Tex.), 
24  S.  W.  902;  Shaw  v.  Car- 
penter, 54  Vt.  155;  41  Am. 
Rep.  837;  Emerson  v.  State,  43 
Ark.  372;  Greiner-Kelly  Drug  Co. 
v.  Truett,  97  Tex.  377;  79  S.  W. 
4.  But  it  has  also  been  held  that 
an  indictment  charging  merely  a 
sale  of  "alcohol,"  does  not  charge  a 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  be- 
cause "the  court  does  not  know 
judicially  that  it  is  an  into.xi- 
cating  beverage  like  whisky,  nor 
that  it  is  in  common  use  for  pur- 


§11 


TilAFPIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


18 


Sec.  11.     Fermented  liquor — Cider. 

Fermented  liquor  is  a  liquor  produced  by  fermentation 
and  not  by  distillation;  and  a  statute  reg^ulating  the  sale 

poses  of  dissipation,  nor  even  that       gar    Co.   v.    Gazette    Printing  Co., 
it   is   capable   of  being   applied  to       35     Fed.    570;     United    States    v. 


such  use.  A  bare  charge  of  sell- 
ing 'alcohol'  discloses  no  criminal 
olfense."  State  v.  Witt,  39  Ark. 
216.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  held 
that  courts  will  take  judicial 
notice  that  alcohol  is  intoxicating. 
Snider  v.  State,  81  Ga.  753;  7  S. 
E.  031;    12  Am.  St.  Rep.  350. 

"Pure  alcohol  is  not  in  common 
parlance,  a  spirituous  liquor,  al- 
though it  is  a  basis  of  all  spiritu- 
ous liquors.  But  we  are  not 
prepared  to  say  that  'selling  pure 
alcohol'   is    not    selling    spirituous 


Lohn,    52    S.    W.    38;    2    Ind.    Ty. 
474. 

"It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose 
that  it  [alcohol]  is  really  pro- 
duced by  distillation.  It  is  pro- 
duced by  fermentation,  and  the 
process  of  distillation  simply 
serves  to  separate  the  spirit  from 
the  mixture  in  which  it  exists." 
State  V.  Giersch,  9S  X.  C.  7-20;  4 
S.  E.  193. 

*  As  used  in  the  Tariff  Act  of 
October  1,  1890,  par.  8,  §  1,  the 
term     "alcoholic     compound"     in- 


liquors."      Bennett    v.    People,    30       eludes    a     preparation    of    cherry 


111.  389.  See,  also,  State  v.  Hay- 
wood, 20  W.  Va.  18;  43  Am.  Rep. 
787;  and  Lemly  v.  State,  70  Miss. 
241;    12   So.  22;  20  L.  R.  A.   645. 

"Alcohol  is  the  intoxicating 
principle — the  basis — of  all  intoxi- 
cating drinks.  Whatever  contains 
alcohol  will,  if  a  sufficient  quan- 
tity be  taken,  produce  intoxica- 
tion." Intoxicating  Liquor  Cases, 
25   Ivan.    751;    37    Am.    Rep.    284. 

"But  it  is  a  matter  of  common 
knowledge  that  alcohol  is  the  in- 
toxicating element  in  intoxicating 
liquor,  that  pure  alcohol  is  not 
used  as  a  beverage,  and  that 
all  intoxicating  liquors  that  are 
so  used  contain  alcohol  mixed 
with  other  things,  particularly 
■with  water.  Whisky  is  alcohol 
mixed  with  water  and  other  ele- 
ments, of  which  the  alcxihol  alone 
is  intoxicatinc."  'Commonwealth 
V.  Morgan,  149  Mass.  314;  21  N. 
E.   369.      See,   also,   Eureka   Vine- 


juice  with  the  watery  parts  elim- 
inated and  seventeen  per  cent,  of 
alcohol  added,  tlie  preparation  be- 
ing thicker,  darker,  heavier  and 
stronger  than  the  natural  juice. 
Smith  v.  Rheimstrom,  65  Fed. 
989;  13  C.  C.  A.  261.  So  it  in- 
cludes a  compound  composed  prin- 
cipally of  raisins  and  prunes 
crushed  in  water  and  fermented, 
to  which,  after  fermentation,  a 
mixture  of  alcohol  is  added  to 
preserve  the  compound.  Mackie 
V.  Erhardt,  59  Fed.  771.  The 
immersion  of  aconite  and  bella- 
donna leaves  and  fresh  nuts  of 
bryonia  in  their  natural  condition 
in  alcohol  for  preservation,  does 
not  make  the  mixture  an  "alco- 
holic compound"  within  30  U.  S. 
Stat.  151.  Boericke  &  Runyan  Co. 
V.  United  States,  126  Fed.  1018. 
It  cannot  be  said  as  a  matter 
of  law  that  a  liquor  containing 
only   three    per   cent,    or   more  of 


19  DEFINITIONS.  §  12 

of  spirituous  liquors  has  no  reference  to  sale  of  fermented 
liquors,^^  but  one  regulating  the  sale  of  fermented  liquors 
does  include  the  sale  of  malt  liquors.***  And  regulating  the 
sale  of  malt,  spirituous,  brewed,  fermented  and  vinous 
liquors  covers  a  sale  of  fermented  or  hard  cider.*'^  Fer- 
mented beer  includes  spruce  beer,  ginger  beer  and  molasses 
beer,^«  and  the  ordinarv  beer  of  commerce." 

Sec.  12.     Compound  liquors — Mixtures. 

In  Kansas  a  statute  defined  intoxicating  liquors  to  be 
"all  liquors  mentioned  in  Section  1  of  this  act  [e.  g.,  spir- 
ituous, malt,  vinous,  fermented  and  other  intoxicating 
liquors]  and  all  other  liquors  or  mixtures  thereof,  by  what- 
ever name  called,  that  will  produce  intoxication."  Under 
this  statute,  speaking  of  compounds,  the  Supreme  Court 
of  that  State  said:  "If  the  compound  or  preparation  be 
such  that  the  distinctive  character  and  effect  of  intoxi- 
cating liquor  is  gone,  that  to  use  it  as  an  intoxicating  bev- 
erage is  practically  impossible  by  reason  of  the  other  in- 
gredients, it  is  not  within  the  statute.  The  mere  presence 
of  alcohol  does  not  necessarily  bring  the  article  within  the 
prohibition.     The  influence  of  alcohol  may  be  counteracted 

alcohol   is   intoxicating.      State   v.  nell   v.   State    (Wis.),    123   N.    W. 

Picke,  98   Me.  34S ;   56   Atl.    1052.  115. 

It    is    not    error    to    refuse    to  A    statute    allowing    a    sale    ot 

charge  the  jury  that   a   liquor   is  "pure    alcohol"    in    dry    territory, 

not   intoxicating,   which,   if   drank  does  not  allow  a  sale  of  "whisky." 

in     "reasonable     quantities"     will  Vardeman  v.  .State,   108   Ga.   774; 

not  intoxicate,  because   what  is   a  33  S.  E.  643. 

reasonable   quantity   is    left   unde-  ca  state  v.  Adams,  51  N.  H.  SB'S, 

fined,    it   not    being   equivalent    to  c4  State   v.   Gill,   89   Minn.   502; 

such   quantity   as    may   be   practi-  95  N.   W.   449. 

cally   drank.     Murry  v.   State,   46  es  People    v.     Foster,    64    Mich. 

Tex.  Cr.  Rep.   128;   79  S.  W.  568;  715;     31    X.    W.    598;    People    v. 

Decker  v.   State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  Adams,   95   Mich.   541 ;    55   N.   W. 

20;  44  S.  W.  845.  461.    See  Commonwealth  v.  Smith, 

The    word    "liquor,"    associated  102  Mass.   144    (by  statute), 

with  the  word  "drinks"  in  a  stat-  gg  State  v.  Biddle,  54  N.  H.  379. 

ute  forbidding  the  sale  of  intoxi-  67  state  v.  Watts,  101  Mo.  App. 

eating    liquor,    has    been    held    to  <&58;   74  S.  W.  377. 
mean  an  alcoholic  beverage.     Pen- 


§  12  TR^VFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  20 

by  the  other  elements,  and  the  compound  be  strictly  and 
fairly  only  a  medicine. *^^  On  the  other  hand  the  intoxi- 
cating liquor  remains  as  a  distinctive  force  in  the  com- 
pound, and  such  compound  is  reasonably  liable  to  be  used 
as  an  intoxicating  beverage,  it  is  within  the  statute,  and  this 
though  it  contain  manj^  other  ingredients  and  ingredients  of 
an  independent  and  beneficial  force  in  counteracting  dis- 
ease or  strengthening  the  system.  Intoxicating  liquors  or 
mixtures  thereof:  This,  reasonably  construed,  means  liquors 
which  will  intoxicate  and  which  are  commonly  used  as 
beverages  for  such  purposes,  and  also  any  mixtures  of  such 
liquors  as,  retaining  their  intoxicating  qualities,  it  may 
fairly  be  presumed,  may  be  used  as  a  beverage  and  be- 
come a  substitute  for  the  ordinary  intoxicating  drinks. 
"Whether  any  particular  compound  or  preparation  of  this 
class  is  then  wi'hin  or  without  the  statute  is  a  question  of 
fact,  to  be  established  by  the  testimony  and  determined 
by  the  jury.  The  courts  may  not  say  as  a  matter  of  law 
that  the  presence  of  a  certain  percentage  of  alcohol  brings 
the  compound  within  the  prohibition,  or  that  any  particular 
ingredient  does  or  does  not  destroy  the  intoxicating  influ- 
ence of  the  alcohol  or  prevent  it  from  ever  becoming  an 
intoxicating  beverage.  Of  course,  the  larger  the  percent- 
age of  alcohol  and  the  more  potent  the  other  ingredients, 
the  more  probable  does  it  fall  within  or  wnthout  the  stat- 
ute ;  but  in  each  case  the  question  is  one  of  fact,  and  to  be 
settled  as  other  questions  of  fact.""^ 

68  It  is  a  well  known  fact  that  not  be  gviilty  of  the  offense  of 
some  men  are  so  far  sunk  in  habit-  selling  intoxicating  liquor  to  an 
ual  drunkenness — old  "topers"  fre-  habitual  drunkard?  See  vState  v. 
quently  called — that  they  will  Kezer,  74  Vt.  50;  52  Atl.  1L6. 
readily  drink  cologne  and  other  69  Jn  re  Intoxicating  Liquor 
like  substances  and  medicines  for  Cases,  25  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Eep. 
the  purpose  of  brinsing  on  them-  284,  citing  State  v.  Laffer,  38 
selves  a  state  of  intoxication.  If  Iowa,  426;  Russell  v.  Sloan,  33 
the  vendor  of  these  articles  should  Vt.  659;  Commonwealth  v.  Rams- 
know  that  the  purchaser  was  ad-  dell,  130  Mass.  68;  24  Alb.  L. 
dieted  to  their  use,  was  an  habit-  Jr.  414;  James  v.  State,  21  Tex. 
ual  drunkard  (and  was  buying  App.  353;  17  S.  W.  422;  Parrott 
them  for  that  purpose),  would  he  v.  Commonwealth,  6   Ky.   L.  Rep. 


.21  DEFINITIONS.  §  §  13,  14 

Sec.  13.    Distilled  liquor. 

The  term  "distilled  liquor"  is  never  applied  to  wine,  ale 
or  beer  or  other  fermented  or  malt  liquors.  It  applies 
to  such  liquors  as  are  obtained  by  distillation,  as  whisky, 
brandy,  j^in,  rum,  the  cordials.  In  the  revenue  laws  of  the 
United  States  it  applies  to  all  spirituous  liquors  whether 
rectified  or  not."^ 

Sec.  14,     Spirit  or  spirits — Judicial  notice. 

The  term  "spirit"  or  "spirits"  has  a  general  meaning, 
as  applied  to  fluids,  mostly  of  a  lighter  character  than  or- 
dinary water,  obtained,  but  not  produced,  by  distillation. 
But  as  applied  particularly  to  liquors,  they  signify  an  in- 
flammable liquor  produced  by  distillation,  the  essence,  the 
extract,  Ibe  purest  solution,  the  highly  rectified  spirit,  the 
pure  alcohol  contained  in  them.  The  spirits  of  liquors  is 
really  the  alcohol  in  them;  it  is  this  'characteristic,  this  es- 
sential element,  that  makes  them  spirituous — that  gives 
to  all  liquors  of  whatever  kind,  their  intoxicating  quality 
and  effect.  A  court  will  take  judicial  notice  that  such  a 
liquor  is  intoxicating."^ 

221;  United  States  v.  Stuhblefield,  and  liquors  (except  pure  apple 
40  Fed.  454;  Gastorf  v.  State,  39  cider)  which  will  produce  intoxi- 
Ark.  450;  Wadsworth  v.  Dusman,  cation,  shall  be  deemed  ardent 
9'8  Ala.  (510;  13  So.  597;  State  v.  spirits  within  the  meaning  of  its 
Lillard,  78  Mo.  130;  State  v.  provisions.  An  indictment  based 
Gray,  Gl  Conn.  39;  22  Atl.  675;  upon  this  statute  alleging  a  sale 
Howell  V.  State,  71  Ga.  224;  51  of  "intoxicating  liquors  and  mix- 
Am.  Rep.  259;  King  v.  State,  58  tures  thereof,"  was  held  sufficient. 
Miss.  737;  3i8  Am.  Rep.  344;  Fletcher  v.  Commonwealth,  106 
State  V.  Lat}"er,  38  Iow:i,  422;  Va.  840;  &6  S.  E.  149;  Rose  v. 
Carl  V.  State,  87  Ala.  17;  6  So.  Commonwealth,  106  Va.  850;  56 
ll-S;    4    L.    R.    A.    380;     State    v.  S.  E.    151. 

Percj%    72   N.    J.   L.    37'5;    61    Atl.  to  United  States  v.  Anthony,  14 

148;   affirmed  73  N.  J.  L.  554;   64  Blatchf.  92. 

Atl.    113.  Ti  state  v.  More,  5  Blackf.   118; 

A  statute  forbade  the  s<ile,  with-  State  v.  Giersch,  98  X.  C.   720;   4 

out    a    liceni^e.    of    "wine,    arf^eit  S.  E.   1D3. 

spirits,  malt   liquors,  or  anv  m'x-  i^pirits.      "A     strong     alcoholic 

tures  thereof,"   and   also   presided  liquor,  in  a  restricted  sense,  such 

that    "all    mixtures,    preparations  a  liquor  variously  treated   in   the 


§  15  TR.VPPIC   IN   INTOXICATTNG   LIQUORS.  22 

Sec.  15.     Spirituous  liquors. 

It  has  been  said  of  spirituous  liquors  that  they  "techni- 
cally and  strictly  include  all  liquors  which  contain  alcohol 
in  appreciable  quantities.  In  this  sense  vinous  and  malt 
liquors  are  also  spirituous,  in  that  each  contains  spirits  of 
alcohol;  but  in  ordinary  acceptation  of  the  term,  'spirituous 
liquors,'  imports  distilled  liquors,  and  in  a  statute  requiring 
a  license  to  sell  spirituous,  vinous  or  malt  liquors  the  term 
is  employed  in  i'^s  ordinary  p'^-^se,  as  ind'cated  by  the  use 
of  the  safer  terms  'vinous'  and  'malt,'  which  have  no  office 
to  perform  unless  the  phrase  'snirituous  liquors'  is  con- 
fined to  the  definition  wV-ioh  i+  ^^-^s  in  common  parlance,  denot- 
ing liquids  which  are  the  results  of  distillation."  ^-  The  word 
"Spirituous"  means  containing  and  partaking  of  s-^irit  and 
having  the  refined,  stronsr,  prdpnt  nuality  of  alcohol  in 
greater  or  less  degree.  It  follows  that  the  phrase,  spiritu- 
ous liquors,  implies  such  liauors  as  contain  alcoh'^l,  ard  thus 
have  spirit,  no  matter  by  what  particular  name  denomi- 
nated, or  in  what  liquid  form  or  combination  they  may 
appear.  Hence  also,  d'stilled  liquors,  fermented  liquors 
and  vinous  liquors  are  all,  alike,  spirituous  liquors.  These 
liquors  respectively  may  have  different  degrees  of  spirit  in 
point  of  fineness  and  s^^rength.  Distilled  liquors  mav  be 
stronger  or  weaker  according  to  quantity  and  quality  of  the 
alcohol  in  them,  and  so  of  the  other  kinds  mentioned.'^^ 

process    of    distillation,    and    used  73  State    v.    Giersch,    OS    N.    C. 

as   a  beverage  or    medicinally,   as  720;   4  S.  E.   193. 

brandy,   whisky    and    frin;    in    the  A    statute   making    the   sale   of 

plural,  any  strong  distilled  liquor."  spirituous,  vinous  or  malt  liquors 

Century  Dictionary.  without  a   license   an  offense  does 

'2  Blankenship   v.   State,   93  Ga.  not      apply      to      non-intoxicating 

814;     21     S.     E.     130;      State     v.  liquors.      Hardwick    v.    State,    55 

Gierscli,    98    N.    C.    720;    4    S.    E.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  140;   114  S.  W.  832. 

193.  Fitceet    spirits   of   nitre    are   not 

"Spirituous   liquor"   mixed   with  spirits    within    the    meaning    of    a 

other     ingredients,     even     if     the  statute     forbidding     the     sale     of 

latter     be     not     known,     is     still  spirits,      although      containing     a 

".spirituous      liqxior."        Common-  very   high    percentage    of    alcohol, 

wealth  V.  Bathrick,  <}  Gush.  247.  Nor  is  sal  volatile  and  most  kinds 


23 


DEFINITIONS. 


§16 


Sec.  16.     Spirituous  and  intoxicating  liquors  distinguished. 

All    spirituous    liquors    are    considered    intoxicating,    as 
gin,  whisky,  rum  (^larks  v.  State  [Ala.]  48  So.  864)  ;  but  all 


of  varnish.  Attorney  General  v. 
Bailey,  1  Exch.  2'Sl. 

"Spiritous"  liquor  and  "spiritu- 
ous" liquor  is  the  same  thing. 
Commonwealth  v.  Burke,  15  Gray, 
408.  And  a  charge  of  a  sale  of 
"spiritous"  liquor  is  the  same  as 
a  charge  of  a  sale  of  "spiritu- 
ous" liquor.  Brumley  v.  State, 
11  Tex.  App.  114;  White  v. 
Manning,  46  Tex.  Civ.  App.  298 ; 
102  S.  W.  II16O.  So  an  indict- 
ment is  not  bad  which  charges  a 
sale  of  "spirital"  liquors.  State 
V.  Clark,  3   Ind.  451. 

"Spirits  are  liquors  manufac- 
tured by  distillation.  ThQ  class 
does  not  include  ale,  as  it  is  pro- 
duced by  fermentation."  People 
V.  Crilley,  20  Barb.  246.  Nor 
wine.  State  v.  Moore,  5  Blackf. 
118.  Nor  spirits  of  niter  under 
6  Geo.  IV.,  Chap.  80,  §  132.  At- 
torney General  v.  Bailey,  1  Welsli 
H.  &  G.  281.  But  in  the  reci- 
procity agreement  between  the 
United  States  and  France  the 
phrase  "brandies  and  other  spir- 
its" is  included  absinthe.  United 
States  V.  Luyties,  124  Fed.  977. 

And  it  has  been  held  that  an 
indictment  charging  a  sale  of 
"spirituous  liquors"  is  sufficiently 
certain  without  specifying  the 
kind  of  liquor  sold.  State  v. 
Witt,  39  Ark.  216;  State  v.  Blais- 
dell,  33  N.  H.  388.  And  this  is 
true  under  a  statute  prohibiting 
a  sale  without  a  license  of 
brandy,  rum,  or  other  spirituous 
liquors.     Commonwealtli    v.    Odin, 


23  Pick.  275.  Under  a  statute 
forbidding  a  sale  of  "spirituous 
liquors,"  a  charge  of  a  sale  of 
rum,  brandy  and  gin  is  sufficient 
without  alleging  they  are  spiritu- 
ous liquors,  for  the  former  are 
included  in  tlie  latter.  State  v. 
Munger,  15  Vt.  290.  See,  also, 
Marks  v.  State  (Ala.),  48  So. 
804.  And  in  an  indictment 
charging  an  unlawful  sale  of 
"spirituous  liquors,"  it  is  not  nec- 
essary to  aver  that  it  was  intoxi- 
cating. iState  V.  Reily,  66  N.  J. 
L.  399;  52  Atl.  100«.  But  see 
■rommonwealtli  v.  Elos,  110  Mass. 
56. 

Under  a  statute  forbidding  the 
sale  of  "spirituous  liquor,"  a 
charge  of  a  sale  of  "intoxicating 
liquor"  cannot  be  made  without 
alleging  that  the  liquor  sold  was 
"spirituous  liquor."  All  spiritu- 
ous liquors  are  intoxicating,  but 
all  intoxicating  liquors  are  not 
spirituous.  Commonwealth  v.  Her- 
rick,  6  Cusli.  405 ;  In  re  Kwong 
Wo,  2  B.  C.  336;  Commonwealth 
V.  Grey,  2  Gray,  501;  61  Am.  Dec. 
476 ;  .Commonwealth  v.  Livermore, 
4  Gray,  18;  Clifford  v.  State,  29 
Wis.  327.  But  under  a  statute 
forbidding  the  sale  on  Simday  of 
"spirituous  liquors,"  it  has  been 
held  that  it  comprehends  a  sale 
of  anj'  alcoholic  or  intoxicating 
liquor,  whether  the  alcohol  is 
separated  by  distillation  or  de- 
veloped by  fermentation.  State  v. 
Sharrer,  2  Cold.  323;  but  see 
Gooch    V.    Commonwealth,    8    Ky. 


§16 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


24 


intoxicating  liquors  are  not  spirituous  liquors.    Thus  ale,  beer 
and  wine  are  not  spirituous,  and  ale  and  beer  are  intoxicating, 


L.  Eep.  (abstract)  437;  and 
Marks  v.  State  (Ala.),  48  So. 
5'64.  And  their  use  in  a  license 
to  sell  "spirituous  liquors"  and 
"intoxicating  liquors"  is  a 
synonymous  use.  State  v.  Jeffer- 
son, 20  Fla.  425. 

The  term  "spirituous  liquor" 
does  not  include  alcohol  in  which 
gum  camphor  has  been  dissolved. 
State  V.  Raymond,  20  W.  Va.  18; 
43  Am.  Rep.  787. 

"Ale"  is  not  a  spirituous  liquor; 
and  proof  of  a  sale  of  ale  will  not 
justify  a.  conviction  for  selling 
spirituous  liquor.  Fleming  v. 
New  Brunswick,  41  N.  J.  L.  231; 
Walker  v.  Prescott,  44  N.  H.  511; 
Gooch  v.  Commonwealth,  8  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  (abstract)  437.  The  term 
"spirituous  liquor"  means  dis- 
tilled and  not  fermented  liquor, 
and,  therefore,  does  not  include 
"beer."  Fritz  v.  State,  1  Baxt.  15; 
Sarlls  V.  United  States,  152  U.  S. 
670;  .38  L.  Ed.  556;  14  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  720;  reversing  In  re  McDon- 
ough,  49  Fed.  360;  United  States 
V.  Ellis,  51  Fed.  808;  State  v. 
Quinlan,  40  Minn.  55;  41  N.  W. 
299;  Gnadinger  v.  'Commonwealth, 
4  Ky.  L.  Rep.  514;  King  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 4  Fy.  Law  Rep.  623. 
But  a  statute  forbidding  a  snle 
on  Sunday  of  "spirituous  and 
strong  liquors"  includes  la^er 
beer  if  it  be  proved  to  be  into-^'i- 
catin".  Dillman  v.  People,  4  N. 
Y.  Wkly.  T>\^.  251;  and  a'c, 
Ca^oiga  County  v.  FreeoflT,  17 
How.  Prac.  442;  Nevin  v.  Ladue, 
3  Denio,  43;  Tompkins  County  v. 
Taylor,  Ifl  How.  Prac.  25^9;  Tomp- 


kins County  V.  Taylor,  21  N.  Y. 
173;  Schwab  v.  People,  4  Hun, 
520;  and  a  complaint  charging  a 
sale  of  "spirituous  liquor,  to-wit, 
beer,"  is  equivalent  to  an  allega- 
tion that  the  beer  is  a  "spirituous 
liquor."  State  v.  Brown,  51 
Conn.    1. 

Alleging  a  sale  of  "brandy" 
brings  an  indictment  within  a 
statute  forbidding  a  sale  of  spirit- 
uous liquors.  State  v.  Munger, 
15  Vt.   290. 

The  term  spirituous  liquor  does 
not  cover  "cider."  State  v. 
Oliver,  26  W.  Va.  422:  53  Am. 
Rep.  79;  Allred  v.  State,  89  Ala. 
112;  8  So.  56.  But  it  may  be 
mixed  with  other  spirituous  liquor. 
Commonwealth  v.  Reyburg,  122  Pa. 
St.  299;  16  Atl.  351;  2  L.  R.  A. 
415. 

So  "spirituous  liquor,"  mixed 
with  water  and  sugar,  is  still  a 
spirituous  liquor.  Commonwealth 
V.  White,  10  Met.  14;  Wall  v. 
State,  78  Ala.  417;  and  likewise 
peppermint  essence  containing  fifty 
per  cent,  of  alcohol,  which  is  pur- 
chased, to  the  vendor's  knowledge, 
to  be  used  as  a  beverage.  State 
V.  Kezer,  74  Vt.  50;  52  Atl.  116; 
and  so  a  sale  of  peaches  and 
cherries  preserved  in  brandy. 
Ryall  v.  State,  78  Ala.  410. 

"'^ordial"  is  a  spirituous  liquor. 
State  V.  Bennett,  3  Har.  (Del.) 
5P5.  "^his  case  held,  however, 
that  the  sale  of  Godfrey's  Pordial 
was  not  forbidden  by  a  statute 
prohibiting  a  sale  of  spirituous 
liquor. 

"Spirituous    liquors"     does    not 


25 


DEFINITIONS. 


§lb 


yet  not  spirituous  liquors,  and  this  is  true  of  wine.    "In  ordi- 
nary acceptance  of  the  term  'spirituous  liquors'  imports  dis- 


include  "fermented  liquors."  Klare 
V.  State,  43  Ind.  483;  State  v. 
Moore,  5  Blackf.  US;  Caswell  v. 
State,  2  Humph.  202;  (Contra 
under  (North  Carolina  'Code, 
§§3110,  311G.  State  v.  Giersch, 
88  X.  C.  720 ;  4  S.  E.  193 )  ;  State 
V.  Adams,  51  N.  H.  o'GS;  State  v. 
Thompson,  20  W.  Va.  674;  Tinker 
V.  State,  90  Ala.  647;  8  So.  855. 
A  license  to  sell  wine,  beer,  ale, 
cider,  and  other  fermented  liquors 
will  not  protect  the  holder  of  it 
in  selling  "spirituous  liquors."' 
Commonwealth  v.  Thayer,  5  Met. 
246.  iSee  also  Gooch  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 8  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (ab- 
stract)   437. 

Under  a  statute  forbidding  a 
sale  of  "spirituous  liquors"  with- 
out a  license,  an  indictment 
charging  a  sale  of  "gin"'  without 
a  license  is  sufficient.  State  v. 
Munger,  15  Vt.  290. 

Under  an  indictment  charging 
a  sale  of  "spirituous  liquors,"  a 
conviction  may  be  had  on  proof 
of  a  sale  of  "rum."  Common- 
wealth V.  Odlin,  23  Pick.  275; 
and  an  indictment  charging  a  sale 
of  rum  is  good  under  a  statute 
forbidding  a  sale  of  "spirituous 
liquors."  State  v.  Munger,  15  Vt. 
290. 

A  statute  requiring  a  license 
for  sale  of  wine,  brandy,  rum,  or 
other  spirituous  liquors,  covers  a 
sale  of  "whisky."  People  v.  Web- 
ster, 2  Doug.  (Mich.)  92;  Frese 
V.  State,  23  Fla.  267 ;  2  So.  1 ; 
Wall  V.  State,  78  Ala.  718;  State 
V.  Murphy,  23  N.  W.  390;  48  Pac. 
028:    Marks   v.    State     (Ala.),   48 


Whether  or  not  "wine"  is  a 
spirituous  liquor  has  been  held  to 
be  a  question  for  the  jury.  State 
V.  Stewart,  31  Me.  516;  State  v. 
Lowry,  74  N.  C.  121;  but  the 
rule  is  that  "spirituous  liquors" 
do  not  include  wines.  State  v. 
Oliver,  26  W.  Va.  422;  53  Am. 
Rep.  79;  Caswell  v.  State,  2 
Humph.  402;  State  v.  Moore,  5 
Blackf.  118;  State  v.  Xash,  97  N. 
C.  514;  2  S.  E.  645.  But  in  New 
Hampshire  the  provision  in  the 
General  Laws,  Chap.  109,  §  13, 
prohibiting  the  sale  of  spirituous 
liquors  is  construed  to  include  a 
sale  of  intoxicating  wine.  Jones 
V.  Surprise,  64  X.  H.  243;  9  Atl. 
384.  This  case  is  in  line  with  the 
cases  from  Maine  and  Xorth  Caro- 
lina cited  just  above. 

A  statute  forbidding  the  .sale  of 
"spirituous  liquors"  covers  a  sale 
of  "bitters"  capable  of  producing 
intoxication.  Prinzel  v.  State,  35 
Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  274;  33  S.  W.  350; 
and  also  medicinal  preparations 
that  will  produce  a  like  result. 
Chapman  v.  State,  100  Ga.  311; 
27  S.  E.  789;  State  v.  Gray,  61 
Conn.  39;  22  Atl.  Rep.  675; 
State  v.  Bennett,  3  Har.  (Del.) 
565. 

It  has  been  holil  that  tlie  term 
"ardent  spirits"  does  not  include 
alcohol.  State  v.  Martin,  34  Ark. 
340;  and  the  Federal  stntute 
(Rev.  Stat.,  §2139),  forbidding 
the  introduction  of  ardent  spirits 
or  wines  into  the  Indian  country, 
has  been  held  not  to  include  lasrer 
beer.  Sarlls  v.  United  States,  152 
U.  S.  570;  38  L.  Ed.  5&Q;  14  Sup. 
Ct.    720,    reversing    United    Stntes 


§17 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LJQUORS. 


26 


tilled  liquors,  and  such  is  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  in 
the  statute.  Spirituous  liquors  may  be  intoxicating,  but  the 
term  does  not  include  all  intoxicating-  liquors,  beverages, 
or  other  bitters.  A  given  liquor  may  be  in  a  high  degree 
intoxicating,  and  yet  not  be  'spirituous  liquor'  within  the 
sense  of  the  statute.  Fermented  or  hard  cider  is  an  illus- 
tration.    Cane  beer  is  another.""* 


Sec.  17    Wine  as  an  intoxicating  liquor. 

The  word  "vinous"    is    derived    from    the    Latin  vmum, 
wine,  and  so  named  because  made  from  the  fruit  of  the  vine. 


V.  Ellis,  51  Fed.  Rep.  808.  See 
In  re  McDonougli,  41)  Fed.  360. 
In  Sarlls  v.  United  States,  152 
U.  S.  570;  38  L.  Ed.  556;  14  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  720,  it  is  held  that  the 
term  is  applied  to  liquors  obtained 
by  distillation,  such  as  rum,  gin, 
whisky  or  brandy.  A  statute  for-* 
bidding  the  sale,  without  a  license, 
of  wine,  gin,  rum,  brandy,  whisky, 
cider  spirits,  and  other  kinds  of 
"ardent  spirits,"  means  the  kind  of 
spirits  named  in  the  statute. 
Those  words  were  construed  to  be 
a  general  term,  the  meaning  of 
which  was  designated  by  a  par- 
ticular naming  of  the  spirits  in- 
tended to  be  included  in  the 
words  used;  and  in  an  indictment, 
therefore,  for  selling  ardent  spir- 
its, the  State  must  prove  that  the 
defendant  sold  one  of  the  samples 
named  in  the  statute.  State  v. 
Townley,  3  Har.   (X.  J.)    311. 

The  words  "spiritiious  liquors" 
imply  that  the  beverage  i^  com- 
posed, in  part  or  wholly,  of  alcohol 
extracted  by  distiUation.  It  does 
not  apply  to  a  liquor  whose  al- 
coholic properties  arc  latent  and 
exist  substantially  in  the  same 
form  as  in  the  orisrinal  material 
from   whicli   t'^e  liquor  was  made. 


State  V.  Adams,  51  N.  H.  568. 

TiAllred  v.  State,  89  Ala.  112; 
8  So.  56. 

Under  a  statute  forbidding  the 
sale  of  "spirituous  liquors,"  a 
charge  of  a  sale  of  "intoxicating 
liquors"  cannot  be  made  without 
alleging  the  liquor  sold  was  "spir- 
ituous liquor."  Commonwealth 
V.  Herrick,  6  Cush.  465;  Common- 
wealth V.  Grey,  2  Gray,  501;  61 
Am.  Dec.  476;  Commonwealth  v. 
Livermore,  4  Gray,  18;  Clifford 
V.  State,  29  Wis.  327;  and  proof 
of  a  sale  of  ale  will  not  authorize 
a  conviction  under  a  charge  of 
selling  "spirituous  liquors."  Flem- 
ing V.  New  Brunswick,  41  N.  J. 
L.  231;  Walker  v.  Prescott,  44 
N.  H.  511;  and  so  as  to  beer. 
Fritz  V.  State,  1  Baxt.  15;  Sarlls 
v.  United  States,  152  U.  S.  570; 
3i8  L.  Ed.  556;  14  Sup.  €t.  Rep. 
720;  hi  re  McDonough,  49  Fed. 
360;  State  v.  Quinlan,  40  Minn. 
53;  41  N.  W.  299;  Guadinger  v. 
Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
514;  F^ing  V.  Commonwealth,  4 
Fy.  L.  Rep.  623;  Klare  v.  State, 
43  Iiid.  -IS3;  f-tate  v.  '>l:«^vo.  5 
Blackf.  118;  iCaswell  v.  State,  2 
Humph.  202;  Commonwealth  v. 
^haycr,  5  Met.  246. 


27 


DEFINITIONS. 


§17 


Ex  vi  termini.  The  phrase  means  a  wine  made  from  the 
fermented  juice  of  the  grape.  In  the  second  place,  wine 
may  mean  a  fermented  juice  of  certain  frui.s  resembling 
in  many  respects  the  wine  obtained  from  i^rapes,  but  dis- 
tinguished thereiVora  by  the  source  whence  ii  is  derived, 
as  ginger  wine,  gooseberry  wine,  currant  wine,  etc.'^  Wine 
is  included  in  the  term  "intoxicating^  liquors"  where  a  stat- 
ute by  that  phrase  makes  it  a  criminal  offense  to  sell  with- 
out defining  what  are  intoxicating  liquors;  and  the  same 
is  true  under  a  statute  against  selling  "spirituous  and  in- 
toxicating" liquors.  Tn  either  of  such  cases  it  is  sufficient 
on  the  part  of  the  prosecution  to  prove  that  there  was  an 
unlawful  snle  of  wine.  If.  in  fact,  the  liquor  sold  w^as  not 
intoxica'^ing,  that  is  a  matter  of  defense  and  must  be  estab- 
lished by  sufficient  evidence.'^*'  The  courts  will  not  take 
judicial  notice  tliat  wine  is  not  an  intoxicating  lirpior.'^'' 
If  a  statute  provides  that  spirituous  liquors  shall  i.uelude 
"intoxicating  li({uors"  also,  "and  all  mixed  liquors,  any 
part  of  which  is  *  "  *  intoxicating,"  then  intoxicating 
wines  are  included.'^^ 


"Alder  v.  State.  55  Ala.  10; 
Allred  v.  State,  89  Ala.  112;  8 
So.  56;  Feldman  v.  City  of  Morri- 
son, 1  111.  App.  460;  Harris  v. 
Jenns,  9  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  152;  30 
L.  J.  M.  C.  18.3;  9  W.  R.  36;  .3 
L.  T.  (N.  S.)  40'8;  22  J.  P.  807. 
See  definitions  under  Pure  Food 
Laws,  §  841. 

7c  Jones  V.  Surprise,  64  X.  H. 
243;  9  Atl.  384;  Worley  v.  Spur- 
geon,  3i8  la.  467 ;  Iliggins  v. 
Pdnker,    47    Tex.    393. 

"7  Jackson  v.  State,  19  Tnd.  312. 

Wine  is  still  wine  thrmsli  some 
water  be  added.  Read  v.  Bishop 
of  Lincoln  [18921,  App.  Cas.  at 
p.  '656;  see  Scott  v.  Gilmore,  3 
Taunt.  226;  and  also  Harris  v. 
Jenns,  9  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  1.52;  22  J. 
P.  807 ;  30  L.  J.  M.  €.  183 ;  9  W. 
R.  .36;  3  L.  T.   (N.  S.)   408,  where 


British  wine  which  contains  a 
large  proportion  of  alcohol  is 
treated   as  fermented  wine. 

■?8  Jones  V.  Surprise,  64  N.  H, 
243 ;  9  Atl.  384. 

A  statute  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  "vinous  liquor"  covers  a  sale 
of  domestic  non-intoxicating  wine. 
Hatfield  v.  Commonwealth,  120 
Pa.  St.  395;   14  Atl.  151. 

For  a  list  of  names  of  the 
several  kinds  of  wines,  their  classi- 
fication, the  country  of  their 
origin  and  characteristics,  see  the 
word  "wine"  in  the  Standard  Dic- 
tionary. A  list  of  one  hundred 
and  sixty-three  narres  of  wines 
are  given,  and  yet  it  is  said  not 
to  be  complete.  See,  also.  Wines 
of  the  World,  by  H.  Vizetelly 
[W.  L.  &  Co.,  1875]. 


§§  18;  19  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  28 

Sec.  18.     Wine — Intoxicating  quality — When  not  a  question. 

If  it  be  provided  that  "spirituous,  vinous,  malt  and 
brewed  liquors"  shall  not  be  sold  within  a  certain  district, 
and  the  statute  is  violated,  upon  the  (rial  ol*  the  vendor 
for  its  violation,  he  may  not,  in  support* of  his  plea  of  not 
guilty,  show  by  evidence  that  what  he  sold  was  domestic 
wine,  and  that  it  was  not  intoxicating,  it  being  immaterial 
in  such  case  whether  the  liquor  sold  by  the  defendant 
was  intoxicating  or  not,  or  how  much  -ileohol  it  contaiaed.'^^ 

Sec.  19.     Wine  as  a  spirituous  or  fermented  liquor. 

Notwithstanding  what  has  been  elsewhere  said,  whether 
wine  is  a  spirituous  liquor,  does  not  appear  to  be  well 
established.  As  early  as  1839  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana 
said:  "Spirit  is  the  name  of  an  inflammabi'3  liquor  pro- 
duced by  distillation.  Wine  is  the  fermented  juice  of  the 
grape  or  a  preparation  of  other  vegetables  by  fermentation. 
"We  cannot  so  far  confound  the  signification  of  these  gen- 
eral terms  as  to  call  wine  a  spirituous  liquor."^''  And  to 
the  same  effect  has  been  the  i-uling  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Tennessee,^^  but  in  North  Carolina  the  ruling  has  been 
otherwise.  In  that  State  the  court  held  that  under  a  stat- 
ute which  prohibited  the  sale  of  "spirituous  liquors"  that 
beer  and  Avine  were  included.  The  court  said  :  "We  know  from 
common  observation  and  knowledge,  and  it  is  a  generally 
admitted  fact  that  beer  and  wine  contain  alcohol,  and  gen- 
erally i]i  such  quantity  and  degree  as  to  produce  intoxica- 
tion. These  liquors  are,  therefore,  spirituous,  and  obvi- 
ously come  within  the  meaning  and  are  embraced  by  the 
words  'spirituous  liquors'  as  used  in  the  statute,  for  the 
reason  that  the  word  'spirituous'  means  containing,  par- 
taking of  spirit,  having  the  refined,  strong,  ardent  quality 
of  alcohol  in  a  greater  or  less  degree."*-     In  Maine  it  has 

79  Hatfield  v.  Commonwealth,  si  Caswell  v.  State,  21  Tenn. 
120  Pa.  St.  .39.5;    14  Atl.    151.  402. 

80  State  V.  5Toore,  5  Blnckf.  82  State  v.  Giersch,  »8  N.  C. 
(Ind.)  118;  Adler  v.  Sta+e,  55  720:  4  S.  E.  lf).3.  See.  also.  State 
Ala.  16:  Worlev  v.  Spuro-oon,  3'S  v.  Sharrar,  2  Cnld.  .323.  The  last 
Iowa.  4fi7;  Allred  v.  State,  89  case  is  overruled  in  Fritz  v.  State, 
Ala.  112;   8  So.  56.  1  Baxt.  15. 


29  DEFINITIONS.  §^20,21 

been  held  that  whether  wine  is  a  spirituous  liquor,  is  a 
question  of  fact,  a  jury  matter,  not  a  question  of  law.^^' 
The  general  rule  is  accepted  by  nearly  all  the  courts,  that 
wine  is  neither  a  spirituous  nor  a  fermented  liquor."^* 

Sec.  20.     Wine,  when  a  question  of  fact— Burden  of  proof. 

Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  it  shall  not  extend 
to  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  wine  made  from  fruit  grown 
in  the  State,  it  has  been  held  that  the  (question  whether  wine 
is  an  intoxicating  liquor,  is  one  of  fact  to  be  determined 
hy  the  jury  and  not  one  of  law  of  which  judicial  notice 
is  to  be  taken  by  the  court.  In  such  case  the  burden  of 
showing  that  the  wine  so  made  from  fruit  grown  in  the 
State  is  upon  the  defendant  or  the  party  who  would  be  ex- 
empted from  liability.**'' 

Sec.  21.     Port  wine — An  intoxicant. 

Port  wine  is  a  dark  purple  wine,  having  its  origin  in 
Portugal.     It  takes  its  name  from  Oporto,  the  chief  place 

83  state  V.  Stewart,  31  Me.  51.5.  ing,   first,    the   fermented   juice   of 

•8*  Commonwealth     v.     Grey,     2  the  grape;    second,   the   fermented 

Gray,  501;  61  Am.  Dec.  476;  State  juioe  of  certain  fruits   resembling 

V.     Thompson,    20    W.    Va.     674;  in  many  respects  the  wine  obtained 

Gommonwealtli  v.  Jordan,  18  Pick.  from     grapes,     but     distingaiished 

228;  Clifi'ord  V.  State,  29  Wis.  327;  therefrom    by    naming    the^'source 

Commonwealth     v.     Livermore,     4  whence    it    is     derived,    as    ginger 

Gray,     18;     Attorney    General     v.  wine,     gooseberry     wine,     currant 

Bailey,  1  Exch.  281.  wine,   etc.     Xothing  is  said  about 

85  State  V.   Stewart,   3  Me.  515;  apple    wine    or    pear    wine,    unless 

■State  V.  Page,   66   :SIq.   418;    State  they     are     included     in     the     'etc' 

V.   Stapp,  29   la.   551;    Worley   v.  "^     *     ^-     jf  the  statute  might  in- 

Spurgeon,  38  la.   465.  elude    among    the    'vinous     fluids' 

"Witliout  endeavoring  to  trace  tliose  which  come  from  the  juice 
it  any  further  back,  we  may  say  of  fruits  which  groAV  on  vines  and 
that  it  is  derived  from  tlie  Latin  bushes,  and  are  named  wine,  we 
vinum,  wine,  and  so  named  be-  do  not  think  it  should  be  con- 
cause  made  from  tlie  fruit  of  the  strued  so  liberally  as  to  apply  the 
vine.  Wine  is  defined  in  Wor-  term  'vinous'  to  tlie  juice  of  fruits 
cester's  Dictionary,  after  the  state-  which  grow  on  trees."  Feldman 
ment  of  its  derivation,  and  after  v.  Morrison,  1  Bradw.  (III.  App. ) 
reference  to  the  word  in  the  Ian-  460. 
guage  of  many  nations,  as  mean- 


§§  22,  23  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  30 

of  its  manufacture.  It  is  not  a  spirituous  liquor.*°  After 
proof  of  a  sale  of  liqiior  and  that  the  liquor  was  port  wine, 
a  jury  may  rightfully  find  that  the  liquor  was  an  intoxi- 
cating liquor.  Everybody  who  knows  what  port  wine  is 
knows  that  it  is  a  liquor  and  also  that  it  is  intoxicating. 
A  jury  may  so  find  as  to  matters  of  common  knowledge  and 
experience  without  any  testimony  as  to  such  matters.^'' 

Sec.  22.    Blackberry  wine  as  an  intoxicant. 

It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  when  first 
pressed  from  the  berries  blackberry  wine  contains  no  al- 
cohol. After  it  has  remained  a  certain  time,  the  length 
of  which  depends  upon  the  temperature  and  perhaps  on 
other  causes,  it  will,  especially  if  the  berries  were  full}" 
ripe,  or  if  sugar  has  been  added,  undergo  a  fermentation 
by  which  alcohol  is  generated ;  and  after  a  certain  longer 
time  it  mav  undergo  another  fermentation  in  which  the 
alcohol  will  be  converted  into  vinegar.  So,  whether  at  any 
time  alcohol  is  present  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined 
'by  some  tests  known  to  scientific  men  or  by  evidence  of  its, 
effects  in  producing  intoxication  and  the  like,  and  it  is  not  a 
question  of  law  or  a  matter  of  which  a  court  will  take 
judicial  notice.^* 

Sec.  23.     Champagne  wine,  when  included  as  a  liquor. 

Under  a  statiite  forbidding  the  sale  of  "liquors"  in  cer-. 
tain  quantities,  it  has  been  held  that  under  a  proper  con- 
struction of  the  statute,  both  in  letter  and  spirit,  the  term 
"liquors"  was  broad  enough  in  its  meaning  to  embrace 
champagne  wine.^^ 

s*"'  But  see  previous  sections.  89  Kizer  v.  Rundleman,  50  X.  C. 

87  State    V.    Packer,    80    N.    C.       428. 

430;    state    v.    Moore,    5    Blackf.  Champagne  wine  takes  the  name 

(Ind.)    118.  from   a   district    of   France   where, 

88  State  V.  Lowrj',  74  N.  C.  121;  it  was  first  manufactured,  and 
Lord  V.  State,  104  Ga.  726;  30  S.  where  the  best  cliampagne  is  to 
E.  ■949.  this  day  made.     (  ontury  Diciiwa* 

ary,  wine. 


^1  DEFINITIONS. 


§§24-26 


Sec.  24,    Sherry  wine. 

A  license  to  sell  ''sweets  and  made  wine"  in  England 
does  not  cover  a  sale  of  "sherry"  or  "Best  Sherry,  Brit- 
ish," for  sherry  is  ranked  a  foreign  wine.^'^ 

Sec.  25.     Spirits  and  wine  distinguished— Aqua  vitae. 

Spirits  are   distilled   liqnors.     Wine   is   fermented  liquor 
This  distinction   exists  not  only  in  common  parlance    but 
^is   recognized    by    chemists     and    philologists.      The    word 
"spirit"   is   derived   from  the   Latin   word   ''spiritus"   one 
meaning  of  which  is  life.     The  discovery  of  the  art  of  dis- 
tillation  belongs   to   the    alchemists,    who   made   it    in    the 
course  of  their  investigation  after  what  they  called  elixh- 
vitae,  a  liquid  the  discovery  of  which  was  to  render  man 
immortal.     When,  by  distillation,  they  had  procured  pure 
alcohol,   ,iudging  from   its   effects,   they  for  a   while   were 
deluded   by  tne  hope  that  the  great  secret  had  been   dis- 
covered, and  called  it  aqua  vitae— water  of  life.     Brandy  is 
so  called  by  the  French  eau  de  vie.     The  English  adopting 
the  name,  have  taken  the  word  ''spiritus"  as  the  root  from 
which  to  form  it  instead  of  the  more  common  word  ''vitae  " 
Therefore,  the  words  "spirituous  liquors"  embrace  all  those 
which  are  procured  by  distillation,  but  not  those  procured 
by  fermentation."! 

Sec.  26.     Malt  liquor  not  included  in  "vinous  and  spirit- 
uous." ^ 

A  vinous  liquor  is  a  liquor  made  from  the  juicP  of  the 
grape,  and  the  general  meaning  of  spirituous  liquor  is  that 
of  a  liquor  which  is  in  whole  or  in  part  composed  of  alcohol 
extracted  by  distillation.  Any  liquor  in  which  vinous  or 
spirituous  liquor,  as  thus  defined  by  our  decisions,  are  pres- 
ent as   a   predominating   element,   regardless  of  the   name 

63r5'.''rp  2^. """''' ''  ''■  ^-  "^^ '"'  "^''^^^^'  "^^  "-^^-^  «^--y 

.  ',   "     ■„           •  wine  market  in  the  world 

feherry     is  a  corruption  of  the  ^^  Las  well  v.  State,  21  Tenn     (2 

Spanish   name   "Jarez,"  a.  city   in  Humph.)    402. 
Andalusia,  Spain,  where  tliis  wine 


§  27  TRAFFIC    IX    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  32 

or  other  ingredients  of  the  mixture,  is  embraced  by  the 
words  "vinous  or  spirituous  liquors."  Malt  liquor  has 
neither  vinous  nor  spirituous  liquors  as  an  ingredient  in  it. 
It  has  alcohol,  produced  by  fermentation,  through  which  it 
must  pass  before  it  becomes  a  beverage.  "Vinous  liquor,"  or 
"spirituous  liquor"  and  "malt  liquor"  are  not  synonymous 
terms,  but  each  refer  to  a  liquor  separate  and  distinct  from 
each  other.  Therefore  a  statute  which  prohibits  the  sale 
or  giving  away  of  "vinous  or  spirituous  liquors"  does  not 
include  malt  liquors,  and  no  conviction  can  be  had  there- 
under for  a  sale  of  such  liquor,  where  it  is  not  shown  that 
vinous  or  spirituous  liquors  were  mixed  with  it.^- 

Sec.  27.  Whisky  an  intoxicant — How  made^ — Judicial 
notice. 
Every  person  of  common  intelligence  knows  that  whisky 
is  an  .ntoxicating  liquor,  and  the  courts  will  take  judicial 
notice  of  that  fact.''"  Hence,  an  indictment  which  charges 
an  unlaAvful  sale  of  whisky  is  sufficient,  although  it  does 
not  state  that  it  was  intoxicating  nor  that  it  was  a  "fer- 
mented or  distilled"  liquor.  The  courts  are  presumed  to  be 
acquainted  with  the  meaning  of  the  words  of  the  English 
language,  and  must  take  notice  of  the  fact  that  whisky  is 
a  spirit  distilled  from  grain,  such  as  maize,  wheat  and  rye.^* 

92  King  V.   State,  81   Ala.  02;    S  For    a    discussion   of   the    meaning 

So.   159;   Pennell  v.  State    (Wis.),  of    whisky,    see    President     Taft's 

123  N.  W.  114.  decision   in  the   note   to   Sec.  '842. 

A  statute   making  it  an  offense  94  State   v.    Williamson.   21    Mo. 

to    sell    malt    liquors    without    a  496;   State  v.  Dengolensky,  82  Mo. 

license    does   not    cover    a    sale    of  44;    People   v.    Webster,    2    Doug, 

non-intoxicating       malt       liquors.  (Mich.)     92;    Egan    v.    State,    53 

Hardwick    v.    State,    55    Tex.    Civ.  Ind.     162;     Schlicht    v.    State,    56 

App.    140;    114   S.  W.   832.  Ind.    174;    State   v.    Jones,   3    Ind. 

"Pop"    has    been    held    to    be    a  App.    121;    29    X.    E.    274;    Gault 

malted  liquor,  but  under  evidence  v.    State,    34    Ga.    533;     Frese    v. 

showing  tiiat  it  was  a  malt  liquor  State,  23  Fla.  267;   2  So.   1;  Car- 

and  intoxicating  if  drank  in  suffi-  mon  v.    State,    IS   Ind.   450;   Com- 

cient    quantities.      Godfriedson    v.  monwealth   v.   ^lorgan,    149    Mass. 

People,  88  111.  284.  314;     21    X.    E.    369:     Snider    v. 

93  Edgar  v.  State,  37  Ark.  219;  State,   81    (Ja.    75>3;    7   S.   E.  631; 

Carmon    v.    State,     18     Ind.     450.  12   Am.   St.    350;    State   v.   Lewis, 


33 


DEFINITIONS. 


§28 


Whisky  cannot  be  classed  as  a  drug.'''''  An  alle- 
gation of  a  sale  of  whisky  is  sufficient  to  admit  proof  of  a 
sale  of  "distilled  liquors. "  «« 

Sec.  28  Whisky  cocktail— Sale— When  a  violation  of  law. 
A  charge  of  a  sale  of  whisky  is  sustained  by  proof  of  a 
sale  of  "whisky  cocktail,"  where  the  proof  also  shows  that 
what  is  called  'Vhisky  cocktail"  is  only  a  mode  of  pre- 
paring whisky  as  a  beverage,  and  that  whisky  is  the  pre- 
dominant ingredient.  If  whisky  be  present  as  the  pre- 
dominant element  in  a  mixture,  it  is  immaterial  that  bit- 
ters and  tonics  are  used  to  qualify  or  render  it  more  pal- 
atable as  a  beverage.**^  Mr.  Wharton  says:  "If  pretexts 
such  as  these  are  sustained,  the  worst  vendors  of  the  worst 
liquors  would  be  the  best  protected  by  law.""«     The  court 

44;  In  re  Intoxicating  Liquors, 
25    Kan.    751;    37   Am.    Rep.   284. 

Proof  of  a  sale  of  a  "common 
cordial"  is  sufficient  proof  of  a 
sale  of  whisky  where  it  is  shown 
to  contain  whisky  sweetened  with 
sugar  and  flavored  with  pepper- 
mint. State  V.  Bennett,  3  Har. 
(Del.)    565. 

A  statute  authorizing  a  sale  of 
"pure  alcohol"  does  not  apply  to 
a  sale  of  "rye  whisky"  in  a  dry 
local  option  district.  Vardeman 
V.  State,  108  Ga.  774;  33  S.  E. 
643. 

Where  a  question  is  raised 
whether  the  liquor  sold  was  in- 
toxicating, the  court  must  define 
in  its  instructions  the  meaning  of 
the  words  "intoxicating  liquors;" 
but  if  the  evidence  sliows  a  sale 
of  "whisky,"  it  is  not  necessary 
to  define  those  words.  Smith  v. 
State    (Tex.),   120  S.  W.  «8L 

97  Galloway  v.  State,  23  Tex. 
App.  39«;   5  S.  W.  246. 

98  Wharton's  Criminal  Law,  8th. 
ed.,  §  1507. 


S6  Minn.  174;  90  N.  W.  318; 
Pedigo  V.  Commonwealth,  24  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  1029;  70  S.  W.  ftSg;  Smith 
V.    State    (Tex.),    120   S.    W.   881. 

"That  whisky  will  intoxicate  is 
as  well  known  as  that  fire  will 
burn  or  water  will  drown."  Egan 
V.  State,  53  Ind.   162. 

"An  ardent  spirit  distilled  chief- 
ly from  grain.  The  term  was 
originally  applied  to  spirit  ob- 
tained from  malt  in  Ireland,  Scot- 
land, etc.,  in  which  sense  whisky 
is  synonymous  with  usquebaugh. 
Such  Irish  and  Scotch  whiskies 
are  still  made  from  malt,  and  are 
known  by  numerous  names,  as 
poteen,  mountain  dew,  etc.  In  the 
United  States  whisky  is  com- 
monly made  either  from  Indian 
corn  (corn  whisky)  or  from  rye 
(rye  whisky).  The  name  wheat 
whisky  has,  however,  been  applied 
to  certain  brands,  and  wheat  is 
probably  used  in  the  making  of 
many  diff"erent  kinds  and  quali- 
ties."    Century  Dictionary. 

95  Gault  V.  State,  34  Ga.  533. 

restate  v.  Dengolensky,  82  Mo. 


§  29  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  34 

will  take   judicial  notice    that    a    whisky  °^    or    Manhattan 
cocktail  is  intoxicating/ 

Sec.  29.     Gin    an  alcoholic  liquor — Judicial  notice. 

Gin  is  a  distilled  spirit  or  alcoholic  liquor  manufactured 
from  rye  or  barley,  flavored  with  juniper  berries  and  some- 
times with  hops.-  In  a  prosecution  for  its  unlawful  sale 
it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  in  the  indictment  or  prove 
upon  the  trial  that  it  is  an  intoxicating  liquor;  it  will  be 
sufficient  if  it  is  alleged  and  proven  that  it  was  gin.^  Judi- 
cial notice  will  be  taken  of  that  fact,  and  the  court  may 
so  instruct  the  jury.*  In  so  deciding  it  was  said:  "Jurors 
are  not  to  be  presumed  ignorant  of  what  everybody  else 
knows.  And  they  are  allowed  to  act  upon  matters  within 
their  general  knowledge,  wi+hout  any  testimony  on  these 
matters.  Now,  everybody  w^ho  knows  what  gin  is,  knows 
not  only  that  it  is  a  liquor.  I)ut  also  that  it  is  intoxicating. 
And  it  might  as  well  have  been  objected  that  the  jury  could 
not  find  that  gin  is  a  liquor  without  evidence  that  it  was 
not  a  solid  substance,  as  that  they  could  not  find  that  it 
was  intoxicating  without  testimony  to  show  it  to  be  so. 
No  jury  can  be  supposed  to  be  so  ignorant  as  not  to  know 
w^hat  gin  is.  Proof,  therefore,  that  the  defendant  sold  gin 
is  proof  that  he  sold  intoxicating  liquor. "''  That  the  liquor 
sold  was  gin  is  not  a  subject  requiring  expert  knowledge,  but 
is  a  matter,  as  heretofore  stated,  of  general  knowledge,  and 
may  be  proved  by  any  witness  competent  to  testify  in  any 
other  case." 

"Whisky  cocktail,  whisky  smash,  *  State  v.  Wadsworth,  30  Conn, 

whisky  sour  and  whisky  toddy  are  55;  In  re  Intoxicating  Liquors,  25 

beverages   of  which  whisky  is  the  Kan.   751;    37   Am.  Rep.  284. 

principal      ingredient."        Century  s  Commonwealth     v.      Peckham, 

Dictionary.  68  Mass.    (2  Gray)    514. 

99  United  States  v.  Ash,  75  Fed.  6  Commonwealth  v.  Timothy,  74 

651.  Mass.  (8  Gray ) , .      "The  court, 

1  State  V.  Pigg,  78  Kan.  618;  jury  and  accused  must  have  known 
97  Pac.  859.  that    gin    and    water  i  s    a    drink. 

2  Webster's  Unabridged  Diction-  That  is  the  usual  acceptance  and 
ary.  meaning   of   those   words,    and    in 

3  State  V.  Hunger,  15  Vt.  290.  that   sense   they   must    have   been 


35 


DEPmrTlONS. 


§80 


Sec.  30.    Brandy  an  intexicant — Biirden  of  proof. 

Brandy  is  ranked  as  an  intoxicating  liquor  by  writers 
upon  the  general  subject,  and  that  it  is  a  liquor  of  that 
character  is  generaiiy  and  commonly  known.  The  fact  is, 
therefore,  'one  of  which  the  courts  will  take  judicial  knowl- 
edge J  The  addition  to  the  word  "brandy"  of  the  word 
"black^Derry"  does  no  more  than  designate  it  as  a  particu- 
lar'brandy ;  it  does  not  indicate  that  the  liquor  is  not  'brandy 
of  some  kind.  The  natural  and  reasonable  presumption  is 
that  the  basis  of  the  liquor  is  brandy,  and  therefore  intox- 
icating, and  in  a  prosecution  for  selling  it  in  violation  of 
a  law  against  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  evidence  that 
the  liquor  sold  was  "blackberry  brandy"  is  sufficient  to 
sustain  a  conviction.  If,  in  fact,  the  liquor  sold  was  not 
an  intoxicating  liquor,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  de- 
fendant to  establish  that  fact.® 


taken."  Madden  v.  State,  1  Kan. 
340. 

"An  aromatic  spirit  prepared 
from  rye  or  other  grain  and 
flavored  with  juniper  berries.  The 
two  imported  varieties  are  Dutch 
gin,  also  called  Holland  and 
Schiedam,  and  English  gin,  known 
by  the  name  of  Old  Tom.  Holland 
gin  is  almost  free  from  sweetness 
and  is  generally  purer  than  Eng- 
lish."    Century  Dictionary. 

Cordial  gin  is  "gin  sweetened 
and  flavored  with  aromatic  sub- 
stances so  as  to  form  a  sort  of 
cordial."     Century  Dictionary. 

A  statute  imposing  a  tax  on  the 
business  of  compounding  distilled 
spirits  applies  to  the  manufacture 
of  "Buchu  Gin,"  which  is  made 
by  pouring  pure  "in  on  a  bed  of 
buchu  and  allowing  it  to  perco- 
late through,  and  then  addin<? 
distilled  water  and  syrup,  the  gin 
comprising  some  fifty  per  cent,  or 
more  of  the   compound,  which   is 


forty-six  per  cent,  alcohol  and 
used  as  a  beverage.  Dr.  C.  Bou- 
vier  Specialty  Co.  v.  James  (Ky.), 
118  S.  W.  381. 

7  Thomas  v.  Commonwealth,  90 
Va.  92;  17  S.  E.  788;  Ltate  v. 
Wadsworth,  30  Conn.  &5. 

8  Fenton  v.  State,  100  Ind.  598; 
State  V.  Munger,  15  Vt.  290.  So 
also  of  "peach  brandy."  Howard 
v.  State,  65  S.  E.  107r). 

Brandy.  "A  spiritvious  liquor 
obtained  by  the  distillation  of  wine 
or  the  refuse  of  the  wine  press. 
Tlie  average  proportion  of  alco- 
hol in  brandy  ranges  from  fortj'- 
eiglit  to  fifty-four  per  cent.  The 
name  brandy  is  now  given  to 
spirit  distilled  from  other  liquors, 
and  in  the  ITnited  States  to  that 
which  is  distilled  from  peaches." 
Century   Dictionary. 

British  Brandy.  "A  common 
kind  of  brandy  distilled  in  Eng- 
land from  malt  Honors  and  given, 
the    flavor    and    color    of    French 


5  31 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


36 


Sec.  31.     Brandy  Peaches — Sale  of  not  prohibited. 

Under  a  statute  requiring  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating' 
liquors  it  is  not  a  violation  of  the  statute  to  sell  fruits 
preserved  in  brandy,  for  instance  a  bottle  containing  six 
peaches  surrounded  by  one  gill  of  a  fluid,  or  syrup,  which 
tastes  like  strong  drink.®  In  such  case,  however,  if  one 
puts  a  few  peaches  or  cherries  in  a  bottle  of  liquor  to  evade 
the  law  and  sells  them,  he  is  guilty.^" 


brandy  by  artificial  means."     Cen- 
tury Dictionary. 

Cognac.  "Properly  a  French 
brandy  of  superior  quality  distilled 
from  wines  produced  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Charente,  France. 
Hence,  in  Europe,  any  brandy  of 
good  quality;  in  the  United  States, 
French  brandy."  Century  Diction- 
ary. 

9  Holland  v.  Commonwealth,  7 
Ky.  L.  Rep.   (abstract)   223. 

loRabe  v.  State,  39  Ark.  204; 
Ryall  V.  State,  78  Ala.  410; 
Musick  V.  .State,  51  Ark.  105;  10 
S.  W.  225. 

"The  so-called  'brandy  peaches' 
and  'brandy  cherries'  seem  to  be 
the  latest  and  most  popular  de- 
vice for  dealing  in  spirits  without 
paying  the  special  tax.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  in  the  dis- 
tricts in  which  the  sale  of  liquor 
is  prohil)ited  by  state  law.  The 
witnesses  tell  you  there  is  little 
or  no  demand  for  these  articles 
in  localities  where  there  are 
licensed  dealers  in  liquor,  and 
where  it  can  be  had  without  the 
incumbrance  of  peaches  or  cher- 
ries. The  introduction  of  peaches 
or  cherries  into  liquor  does  not 
necessarily  cljange  its  cliaracter 
any  more  than  did  the  introduc- 
tion of  drugs  in  the  cases  of  the 
'tonics'  and  'bitters'  which  I  have 


mentioned.  There  is  probably  not 
a  package  of  genuine  brandied 
peach  or  cherry  preserves  in  the 
State,  outside  of  those  put  up  by 
housewives  for  family  use.  Be- 
tween the  genuine  brandied  peach 
or  cherry  preserves  put  up  for 
legitimate  domestic  use  as  confec- 
tionery, and  tlie  so-called  'brandied 
cherries,'  described  by  the  wit- 
nesses in  tills  case,  and  sold  by 
the  defendant,  there  is  not  the 
faintest  resemblance.  One  is  an 
edible  and  palatable  preserve,  and 
used  as  such ;  the  other,  as  the 
froof  sliows,  is  neitlier  edible  nor 
palatable,  and  is  not  used  as  a 
preserve  or  for  food,  but  as  a 
stimulating  beverage,  for  the  spir- 
its it  contains.  The  method  of 
making  brandied  peach  preserves 
is  laid  down  in  the  standard  au- 
thorities on  the  subject  of  the 
]ireservation  of  food.  The  fruit, 
after  being  properly  prepared,  is 
boiled  in  a  syrup  made  of  refined 
sugar,  and  i^  then  placed  in  a 
bottle,  the  syrup  poured  over  it, 
and  a  sufficient  quantity  of  pure 
pale  brandy  added  to  impart  to  it 
the  desired  brandy  flavor,  just  as 
brandy  is  used  as  an  ingredient 
in  our  pudding  sance  or  mince 
pies,  for  the  purpose  of  improving 
their  flavor.  It  is  obvious  the  de- 
fendant   sold    no    such    preserves. 


37 


DEFINITIONS. 


32 


Sec.  32.     Malt  Liquors — Judicial  notice. 

The  term  ''malt  liquors"  embraces  porter,  ale,  beer  and 
the  like,  which  are  the  result  or  product  of  a  process  by 


Alcohol  is  used  to  preserve  speci- 
mens of  fruits  for  exliibitions  at 
fairs,  or  to  advertise  tlie  products 
of  the  countrj' ;  but  fruits  so  pre- 
served are  not  put  up  for  sale  and 
are  not  known  in  the  trade. 

"It  is  quite  clear  that  the  so- 
called  brandy  cherries  described 
by  the  witnesses  in  this  case  are 
not  an  edible  preserve  and  are  not 
put  u])  for  ornament.  What, 
then,  is  the  proper  definition  for 
the  brandy  peaches  and  brandy 
cherries  now  so  popular  in  the 
prohibition  districts  of  this  state? 
If  they  are  not  used  as  a  con- 
fectionery, nor  as  a  food,  nor  for 
ornament,  what  is  their  use?  1 
know  not  what  definition  you  gen- 
tlemen may  give  them,  and  it 
rests  with  you  to  define  them  in 
the  light  of  the  evidence;  but 
from  the  proof  in  this  case,  I  con- 
fess it  seems  Ui  me  the  proper 
definition  to  bo :  a  compound  of 
•drugged  whisky  and  poor  peaches 
or  cherries,  the  fruit  being  added 
as  a  mere  disguise,  and  with  a 
view  to  evade  the  payment  of  the 
license  tax  imposed  on  liquor  deal- 
ers by  the  United  States,  and  to 
escape  the  penalties  of  the  State 
law  for  selling  liquors  in  districts 
where  it  is  prohibited.  I  repeat 
that  the  quantity  of  liquor  sold 
is  not  material,  nor  is  the  size, 
form,  or  chemical  composition  of 
the  vessel  or  thini?  that  contains 
the  spirits,  material.  If  a  cocoa- 
nut  or  sourd  was  filled  with  snir- 
its  and  labeled  brandv  cocoanut 
or  brandy  gourd,  it  would  be  idle 


to  say  that  one  selling  liquor  in 
that  way  would  escape  payment 
of  the  license  tax.  So,  if  one 
were  to  stuff  sponges  in  bottles 
and  then  fill  them  with  liquor  and 
label  them  brandy  sponges,  he 
could  not  escape  payment  of  the 
tax  on  the  plea  that  the  sponges 
absorbed  the  liquor  and  that  there 
was,  therefore,  no  liquor  in  the 
bottles.  Such  a  plea  would  not 
be  entitled  to  respectful  considera- 
tion. It  is,  then,  wholly  imma- 
terial whether  the  liquor  sold  is 
contained  in  a  bottle,  cocoanut, 
gourd,  sponge,  peach  or  cherry,  or 
what  label  is  put  upon  it,  if  the 
package  contains  distilled  spirits 
in  a  form  to  be  got  at  by  squeez- 
ing, suction,  or  any  other  process, 
and  the  spirits  in  the  package, 
and  not  the  other  ingredients,  are 
the  inducement  to  its  sale  and 
purchase. 

"To  sum  up  the  law  applicable 
to  the  case,  I  instruct  you  that 
if  you  find  from  the  evidence  that 
the  bottles  of  so-called  'brandy 
cherries,'  sold  by  the  defendant, 
contained  whisky  or  other  dis- 
tilled spirits,  and  they  were  pur- 
chased by  his  customers  not  for 
the  fruit  in  them  l)ut  on  account 
of  the  distilled  spirits  they  con- 
tained, and  for  the  purpose  of 
using  the  spirits  contained  therein 
as  a  beverasre,  and  that  the  con- 
tents of  bottles  were,  in  fact,  used 
as  a  beverage,  and  for  the  pui'pose 
of  obtaining  the  effects  produced 
bv  tlie  use  of  intoxicating  Manor, 
and  that  such  effects  were,  in  fact, 


§32 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


38 


which  grain — usually  barley — is  steeped  in  water  to  the 
point  of  fermentation,  the  starch  of  the  grain  being  thus 
converted  into  saccharine  matter,  which  is  kiln-dried,  then 
mixed  with  hops,  and,  by  a  further  process  of  brewing, 
made  into  a  beverage.'^  A  court  will  take  judicial  notice 
of  the  meaning  of  these  words  as  used  in  a  penal  statute, 
and  may  in  a  proper  case  give  this  definition  in  a  charge  to 
the  jury.  It  will  also  take  judicial  notice  that  "Webster's 
Unabridged  Dictionary"  is  a  standard  authority  as  to  the 
meaning  of  English  words,  and  may  permit  its  definition 
of  these  words  to  be  given  in  evidence  to  the  jury.^- 


produced  by  their  use,  and  that 
the  defendant  knew  these  facts, — 
then  you  will  find  him  guilty.  If 
you  find  these  facts,  it  makes  no 
difference  whether  the  defendant 
opened  the  bottles  or  not  when  he 
sold  them,  nor  whether  the  pur- 
chaser drank  the  contents  of  the 
bottle  at  the  defendant's  counter, 
or  took  it  elsewhere  for  that  pur- 
pose, and  it  makes  no  difference 
that  the  bottles  were  sealad  up, 
and  that  the  sales  were  made  in 
what  has  been  spoken  of  in  the 
course  of  the  trial  as  original 
packages."  United  States  v.  Staf- 
ford, 20  Fed.  720. 

An  indictment  charging  a  sale 
of  '"'brand ied  peaches"  without  a 
license  states  no  offense.  Holland 
V.  Commonwealth,  7  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)    223. 

iiAllred  v.  State,  89  Ala.  112; 
8  So.  56;  People  v.  O'Reily  (N. 
Y.),  88  N.  E.  1128;  affirming  129 
X.  Y.  App.  Div.  522;  114  X.  Y. 
Supp.  258. 

i2Adler  v.  State,  55  Ala.  16; 
State  V.  Starr,  G7  Me.  242;  .see 
State  V.  Volmer,  6  Kan.  371;  State 
V.  Teissedre,  30  Kan.  210.  476:  2 
Pac.  108 ;  State  v.  Mitchell,  134  Mo. 


App. 540;  114S.  W.  1113;  Merki- 
son  V.  .State  (Okla.),  101  Pac.  353; 
Coe  V.  State,  ( Okla. ) ,  1(;4  Pac.  1074. 
That  courts  will  take  judicial  no- 
tice that  beer  is  intoxicating  is  not 
always  uniformly  held.  The  ques- 
tion is  discussed  elsewhere. 

"Malt  liquor"  is  an  alcoholic 
liquor,  or  beer,  ale,  porter,  pre- 
pared by  fermentation  and  an  in- 
fusion of  hops.  State  v.  Gill,  89 
Minn.  502;  95  N.  W.  449;  Adler 
V.  State,  56  Ala.  16;  United  States 
V.  Cohn,  2  Ind.  Ty.  474 ;  52  S.  W. 
38.  It  has  "neither  vinous  nor 
spirituous  liquor  as  an  ingredient. 
It  has  alcohol  produced  by  fer- 
mentation, through  which  it  must 
pass  before  it  becomes  a  beverage." 
Tinker  v.  State,  90  Ala.  647;  8  S. 
E.  855.  It  is  a  broader  term  than 
lager  beer,  and  inclvides  other  bev- 
erages, as  M'ell  as  ale  and  porter. 
Sampton  v.  State,  107  Ala.  76;  18 
S.  E.  207. 

A  statute  forbidding  the  intro- 
duction of  malted  liquors  into  the 
Indian  country  includes  a  malted 
liquor  that  is  not  even  intoxicat- 
ing, such  as  "Rochester  tonic." 
United  States  v.  Cohn,  2  Ind.  Ty. 
474;   52  S.  W.  38.     See,  however, 


39 


DEFINITIONS 


§33 


Sec.  33.    Beer  and  ale  distinguished — History. 

"Beer"  is  a  liquor  made  from  any  farinaceous  grain, 
but  generally  from  barley,  which  is  malted  and  ground, 
and  its  fermentable  substance  extracted  by  hot  water.  This 
extract  or  infusion  is  evaporated  by  boiling  in  caldrons,  and 
hops  or  some  other  plant  of  agreeable  bitterness  added. 
The  liquor  is  then  suffered  to  ferment  in  vats.  "Ale"  is  a 
liquor  made  from  an  infusion  of  malt  by  fermentation.  It 
chiefly  differs  from  beer  in  having  a  smaller  proportion 
of  hops — and  both  are  intoxicating  liquors.  The  manu- 
facture of  beer  and  its  use  as  an  intoxicating  drink  are 
of  very  high  antiquity.  Herodotus  tells  us  that  owing  to 
the  want  of  wine  the  Egyptians  drank  a  liquor  fermented 
from  barley.^^  Ale  or  beer  was  in  common  use  in  Ger- 
many in  the  time  of  Tacitus.  "All  the  nations,"  says 
Pliny,  "who  inhabit  the  west  of  Europe  have  a  liquor 
with  which  they  intoxicate  themselves,  of  corn  and  water, ' ' 
The  manufacture  of  ale  was  earlj'-  introduced  into  England. 
It  is  mentioned  in  the  laws  of  Ina,  King  of  Wessex,  and  is 


Sarells  v.  United  States,  152  U.  S. 
570;  38  L.  Ed.  556;  14  Sup.  Ct. 
720. 

So  a  statute  referring  to  malt 
liquors  includes  "beer;"  and  proof 
of  a  sale  of  beer  has  been  held  to 
support  an  indictment  for  the  sale 
of  malt  liquor.  United  States  v. 
Ducournau,  54  Fed.  138.  A  stat- 
ute declaring  that  the  words  "in- 
toxicating liquor"  shall  apply  to 
any  spirituous,  vinous  or  malt 
liquor,  includes  beer,  for  the  courts 
take  judicial  knowledge  that  beer 
is  a  malt  liquor  prepared  by  fer- 
mentation. State  V.  Staop,  29 
Iowa,  551 :  and  so  of  lager  beer. 
State  V.  Gayette,  11  R.  I.  592; 
Watson  V.  State,  55  Ala.  158; 
Snrlls  V.  United  States  152  U.  S. 
570;  38  L.  Ed.  556;  14  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  720. 


When  the  word  "Iieer"  is  used 
without  any  prefix,  common,  lager 
or  bock  beer  is  meant.  Such  is  the 
common  usage.  State  v.  Kauff- 
man,  68  Ohio  St.  635;  67  N.  E. 
1062;  State  v.  Teissedre,  30  Kan. 
210,  476;  2  Pac.  180.  Contra, 
Netso  V.  State,  24  Fla.  363;  5  So. 
8;    1  L.  R.  A.  825. 

When  a  statute  forbade  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquor,  a  charge  of 
a  sale  of  malt  liquor  is  insuffi- 
cient; for  the  courts  cannot  say 
a  malt  liquor  is  an  intoxicating 
liquor.  Shaw  v.  State,  56  Ind. 
188.  See  Lincoln  Center  v.  Lin- 
ker. 7  Kan.  App.  282;  53  Pac. 
787,  and  Allred  v.  State,  89  Ala. 
112;  8  So.  56.  Contra,  State  v. 
Rcilv,  CO  X.  J.  L.  390;  52  Atl. 
1005. 

13  Lib.  2,  Chap.  77. 


§  34  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  40 

particularly  specified  among  the  liquors  provided  for  a  royal 
banquet  in   the  reign   of  Edward   the    Confessor.^* 

Sec.   34.     Beer  defined — Presumption — Judicial  notice. 

The  word  "beer"  is  defined  to  be:  "1.  A  fermented 
liquor  made  from  any  malted  grain,  with  hops  and  other 
bitter  flavoring  matters.  2.  A  fermented  extract  of  the 
roots  and  other  parts  of  various  plants,  as  spruce,  ginger, 
sassafras,  etc.  Beer  has  different  names,  as  small  beer, 
ale,  porter,  brown  stout,  lager  beer,  etc.,  according  to  its 
strength  or  other  qualities."^"  It  will  be  observed  that 
the  primary  meaning  of  the  word  beer  is  a  liquor  infused 
with  malt,  and  prepared  by  fermentation.  As  a  conse- 
quence when  "beer"  is  called  for  at  a  place  at  which  in- 
toxicating drinks  are  sold,  the  bartender  having  in  view 
the  primarj^  meaning  as  well  as  the  common  use  of  the 
word,  is  justified  in  inferring,  and  must  reasonably  infer, 
that  malted  and  fermented  beer  is  wanted.  If  any  other 
kind  of  beer  is  desired  it  is  expected  that  qualifying  words 
will  be  used,  such  as  spruce  beer,  root  beer,  small  beer, 
ginger  beer,  and  the  like,  thus  attaching  a  remote  and 
secondary  meaning  to  the  word  "beer,"  as  descriptive  oi! 
particular  beveras-es.  When,  therefore,  a  witness  testifies 
to  the  sale  or  giving  away  of  beer  under  circumstances 
which  make  the  sale  or  giving  awav  of  any  intoxicating 
liquor  unlawful,  the  prima  facie  inference  is  that  the  beer 
was  of  that  malted  and  fermented  quality  declared  by  the 
law  to  be  an  intoxica+ing  liquor,  and  the  court  trying  the 
cause  ought  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  inference  which 
thus  arises  from  the  use  of  the  word  "beer"  in  its  primary 
and  general  sense.  The  mere  question,  then,  as  to  whether 
beer  is  an  intoxicating  liquor  is  no^  one  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  jury  in  a  case  arising  under  a  penal  statute.  If 
the  court,  as  a  matter  of  law,  must  know  that  l)eer  is  a 
malt  liquor,  it  is  not  necessary  to  a  conviction  for  the  jury, 

14  McCullock's  Com.  Die,  Vol.  1,  is  Webster's  Unabridged  Diction- 

p.  9;  Nevin  v.  Laduo,  3  Denio,  43;       ary. 
Nevin  v.  Ladue,  3  Denio,  437. 


41 


DEFINITIONS, 


^34 


besides  finding  a  sale  or  gift  of  beer,  to  find  also,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  that  beer— that  is,  malt  beer— is  intoxicating. 
If,  however,  qualifying  words  were  used  in  connection  with 
the  word  "beer,"  such  as  spruce  beer,  when  the  sale  or  gift 
was  made,  then  it  may  be  shown  that  in  fact  it  was  not  an 
intoxicating  drink  by  proving  the  materials  and  the  mode 
of  production  of  what  was  called  for,  and  in  such  case 
whether  or  not  such  beer  was  an  intoxicating  liquor  will 
be  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  jury  from  the 
evidence  in  the  case."     If  the  name  of  a  beer  is  unusual 


16  Myers  v.  State,  93  Ind.  251; 
Mullen  V.  State,  96  Ind.  304; 
Stout  V.  State,  96  Ind.  407;  Dant 
V.  State,  106  Ind.  79;  State  v. 
Volener,  6  Kan.  371;  State  v. 
Teissedre,  30  Kan.  476;  State  v. 
Jenkins,  32  Kan.  477;  Markle  v. 
Akron,  14  Ohio,  586;  State  v. 
Thompson,  20  W.  Va.  674;  Brif- 
fett  V.  iState,  58  Wis.  39;  Ran.  v. 
People,  63  ^,.  Y.  279. 

The  Century   Dictionary   defines 
and  describes  beer   to  be  "An  al- 
coholic liquor  made  from  any  far- 
inaceous grain,  but  generally  from 
barley,  which   is  first  malted  and 
ground,   and   its   fermentable    sub- 
stance extracted  by  hot  water.    To 
this  extract  an  infusion  of  hops  or 
some  other  vegetable  product  of  an 
agreeable  bitterness  is  added,  and 
it    is    thereupon    boiled    for    some 
time,  both  to  concentrate  it  and  to 
extract  the  useful  matter  from  tlie 
hops.     The  liquor   is  then  suffered 
to   ferment   in   vats,    the   time   al- 
lowed for   fermentation   depending 
upon  the  quality  and  kind  of  beer, 
and  after  it  has  become  clear  it  is 
stored    away    or    sent    to    market. 
*      *      *     Ale   and   beer   were   for- 
merly  synonymous   terms,   ale   be- 
ing the  earlier  in  use;   at  present 


beer  is  the  common  name  for  all 
malt  liquors,  and  ale  is  used  spe- 
cifically for  a  carefully  made  beer 
of  a  certain  strength  and  rather 
light  than  dark;  thus  small  beer, 
ginger  beer,  and  the  like  are  not 
ale,  nor  are  stout  and  porter.  A 
distinction  drawn  by  Andrew 
Boorde,  in  1542,  is  that  ale  is 
made  of  malt  and  water,  and 
should  contain  no  other  ingre- 
dients, while  beer  is  made  of  malt, 
hops  and  water."  "Black  Beer  is 
a  kind  of  beer  manufactured  at 
Dantzic.  It  is  of  a  black  color 
and  a  syrupy  consistence."  "Con- 
densed leer  is  a  beer  which  has 
been  reduced  in  a  copper  vacuum 
pan  to  one  eighteenth  of  its  bulk 
in  solids,  added  to  an  equal  quan- 
tity of  alcohol."  "Green  beer  is  a 
beer  which  is  just  made."  "Lager 
hecr,  or  stock  beer  is  a  light  Ger- 
man beer  so  called  because  it  is 
stored  for  rir'ening  before  being 
u?ed.  Tt  is  evtensivelv  manufac- 
tured in  the  United  States." — Cen- 
tury Dictionarv,  "Beer." 

Becriness:  "The  state  of  being 
bperv  or  partially  intoxicated; 
sliffht  intoxication  from  beer." — 
Century  Dictionary. 

Ginger   Beer:     "An   effervescing 


§34 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


42 


or  new,   so  that  the   court  will  not    take    judicial    notice 
whether  it   is  intoxicating,   then   evidence   is  necessary  to 


beverage  made  by  fermenting  gin- 
ger, cream-of-tartar  and  sugar 
with  yeast  and  water." — Century 
Dictionary. 

Small  Beer:  "Weak  beer." — 
Century  Dictionary. 

Yeast  Beer:  "New  beer  with 
which  a  small  quantity  of  ferment- 
ing worth  has  been  mixed  in  the 
cask  in  order  to  make  it  lively." — 
Century  Dictionary. 

Schenk:  "Young,  or  winter 
beer,  a  German  beer  brewed  for  im- 
mediate use.  It  was  formerly 
brewed  only  between  October  and 
April,  but  now  is  manufactured  at 
all  seasons." — Century  Dictionary. 
Becrgnr:  "Sour  beer,  vinegar 
formed  by  the  acetous  fermenta- 
tion of  beer." — Century  Diction- 
ary. 

Beer  preserver:  "A  device  for 
keeping  the  space  above  the  beer 
in  a  cask  or  barrel  filled  with  car- 
bonic acid  gas,  which  is  supplied 
from  a  reservoir." — ^Century  Dic- 
tionary. 

Beer  engine:  "A  hydraulic  ma- 
chine for  raising  beer  and  other 
liquors  out  of  a  cask  in  a  cellar." 
— Century  Dictionary. 

Beer  pump:  "A  pump  for  beer, 
especially  for  raising  beer  f "-om  the 
cellar  to  the  bar  in  a  saloon  or 
public  house." — Century  Dietion- 
ary. 

"  'Boor,'  as  it  is  ordinarily  un- 
dorst'^'^fl.  find  as  it  is  defined  in 
the  dictionarv,  is  a  'fermented 
liquor.'  Tt  is  made  from  tnaltpd 
grains,  with  hops,  or  from  the  ex- 
tract of  roots  and  other  parts  of 
various  plants,  as  spruce,  ginger, 


sassafras,  etc.  It  is  known  under 
various  names,  and  designated  as 
'ale,'  'porter,'  'stout,'  'strong  beer,' 
'small  beer,'  'lager,'  'spruce  beer,' 
etc.  The  courts  take  notice  that 
many  of  the  beverages  sold  under 
the  name  of  'beer'  are  not  intoxi- 
cating, while  the  stronger  kinds, 
as  ale,  porter  and  strong  beer,  are 
of  an  intoxicating  character.  It 
would  seem,  therefore,  that  a  term 
which  includes  both  intoxicating 
and  non-intoxicating  liquors  could  • 
not  be  said,  in  its  ordinary  mean- 
ing, necessarily  to  imply  an  in- 
toxicating drink,  unless  such  im- 
port ha.s  been  given  to  it  either  by 
statute  or  by  the  decision  of  the 
courts."  Blatz  v.  Rohrback,  116 
N.  Y.  450;  2'2  N.  E.  1049;  6  L.  R. 
A.  669. 

"Webster  defines  beer  to  be  'A 
fermented  liquor  made  from  any 
malted  grain,  with  hops  and  other 
bitter  fiavoring  matters.'  In  other 
words,  it  is  a  malt  liquor,  which 
the  same  author  declares  to  be  ''a 
liquor  prepared  for  drink  by  an 
infusion  of  malt,  as  beer,  ale,  por- 
ter, etc'  It  may,  therefore,  be 
said  that  beer  is  a  liquor  infused 
with  malt,  and  prepared  by  fer- 
mentation for  use  as  a  beverage." 
Myers  v.  State.  93  Ind.  251 ;  Doug- 
lass v.  State,  21  Ind.  App.  302;  52 
N.  R  302:  Welsh  v.  State,  126 
Ind.  71-  25  N.  E.  883;  9  L.  R.  A. 
e(M-  ^>vin  V.  La  due,  3  Denio,  43: 
P-ifPn  V.  State,  58  Wis.  39;  16 
y.  W.  30-  46  An.  Re'i.  621; 
TTnited  Stntos  v.  Ellis.  51  Fed. 
808;  Hollendor  v.  Magone,  38 
Fed.  912;  Killip  v.  McKay.  13  N. 


43 


DEFINITIONS. 


U4 


show  it  is  an  intoxicant,  and  whether  or  not  it  comes  with- 
in the  prohibition  of  the  statute  depends  upon  whether  it 


Y.  St.  Rep.  5;  Murphy  v.  Mont- 
clair,  10  Vroom,  673;  State  v.  Oli- 
ver, 26  W.  Va.  422;  53  Am.  Rep. 
79;  Williams  v.  State,  72  Ark.  19; 
77  S.  W.  5U7.  It  generally  con- 
tains 3.40  to  4.94  per  cent,  of  al- 
cohol. State  V.  Schaefer,  44  Kan. 
90;   24  Pac.  92. 

A  statute  prohibiting  the  manu- 
facture or  sale  of  intoxicating  bev- 
erages applies  to  the  manufacture 
or  sale  of  beer.  People  v.  Hawley, 
3  Mich.  330. 

But  the  mere  use  of  the  word 
"beer"  does  not  conclusively  show 
that  it  is  intoxicating;  for  sev- 
eral kinds  of  beer  are  not  intoxicat- 
ing, and  the  word  as  thus  used  does 
not  exclude  the  possibility  that  a 
non-intoxicating  beer  is  meant. 
Hausberg  v.  People,  120  111.  21;  8 
N.  E.  857;  60  Am.  Rep.  549;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Gourdier,  14  Gray, 
390;  Blatz  v.  Rohrback,  116  N.  Y. 
450;  22  N.  E.  1049;  6  L.  R.  A. 
669;  State  v.  Sioux  Falls  Brewing 
Co.,  5  S.  D.  39;  58  N.  W.  1. 

"Beer,"  however,  is  within  the 
meaning  of  "spirituous  and  strong 
liquors."  Maier  v.  State,  21  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  296;  21  S.  W.  974; 
Tompkins  County  v.  Taylor,  21  N. 
Y,  173.  See  Kerkow  v.  Bauer,  15 
Neb.  150;  18  N.  W.  27;  State  v. 
Cloughley,  73  Iowa,  626;  35  N.  W. 
652;  State  v.  Spiers,  103  loAva, 
711;  73  N.  W.  343;  State  v.  Jen- 
kins, 32  Kan.  477 :  4  Pac.  809.  To 
say  to  the  jury  thnt  beer  is  a  malt 
liquor  and  is  intoxieatinj?  is  not 
error.  State  v.  Currie,  8  N.  D. 
545!   80  X.  W.  475. 

When  a  statute  defines  beer  as 


an  intoxicating  or  spirituou.s 
liquor,  it  must  be  so  understood 
and  construed.  State  v.  Dick,  47 
Minn.  375;  50  N.  W.  362;  State  v. 
Heinze,  45  Mo,  App.  403;  Murphy 
V.  Montclair,  10  Vroom,  673;  State 
V.  York,  74  N.  H.  125;  65  Atl.  685. 
And  when  so  declared,  the  use 
merely  of  the  word  "beer"  in  an  in- 
dictment means  an  intoxicating 
liquor.  State  v.  Besheer,  69  Mo. 
App.  72;  State  v.  Watts,  101  Mo. 
App.  658;   74  S.  W.  377. 

"Strong  beer"  and  "Dutch  beer," 
without  explanations,  have  been 
held  to  moan  intoxicating  liquors 
of  a  similar  character,  produced 
from  similar  materials,  and  in  a 
like  manner.  People  v.  Wheelock, 
3  Parker  Co.  Rep.  9. 

Beer  is  not  a  spirituous  liquor. 
State  V.  Quinlan,  40  Minn.  55;  41 
N.  W.  299;  and  a  statute  forbid- 
ding the  sale  of  spirituous  liquors 
on  Sundays  does  not  forbid  the 
sale  of  beer.  Fritz  v.  State,  1 
Baxt.  15;  nor  to  the  sale  to  In- 
dians. Sarlls  V.  United  States, 
152  U.  S.  570;  38  L.  Ed.  556;  14 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  720;  In  re  McDon- 
ough,  49  Fed.  3G0;  Guadinger  v. 
Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L.  Rep.  514; 
King  V.  Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  514. 

A  statute  authorizing  a  city  to 
grant  a  license  to  sell  ale,  beer, 
wine  and  other  fermented  liquors 
cannot  be  construed  to  authorize 
tlie  licensee  to  sell  brandy,  rum  or 
otiier  spirituous  liouors.  Common- 
wealth V.  Jordan,  18  Pick.  228. 

A  statute  declaring  that  all  fer- 
mented drinks  and  wines  of  every 


§34 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


44 


is  intoxicating.^''  And  where  it  is  necessary  to  show  that 
the  liquor  is  intoxicating,  proof  that  it  contains  a  certain 
percentage  of  alcohol — as  it  is  15  per  cent. — does  not  neces- 
sarily show  that  it  is  such  a  liquor  as  the  statute  forbids 
its  sale.  It  must  be  shown  to  be  intoxicating.^^  Belief  that 
it  is  not  intoxicating  is  no  defense.^® 


kind  should  be  taken  as  intoxicat- 
ing includes  beer;  and  for  that 
reason  by  force  of  the  statute  it  is 
intoxicating.  State  v.  Lempe,  16 
Mo.  389. 

The  term  "fermented  beer"  in- 
cludes spruce  beer,  spring  beer, 
ginger  beer  and  molasses  beer. 
State  V.  Biddle,  54  N.  H.  379;  and 
the  use  of  the  word  "beer"  in  an  in- 
dictment means  a  fermented  beer. 
State  V.  Watts.  101  Mo.  App.  658; 
74  N.  W.  377. 

A  Japanese  drink  made  from 
rice,  having  '  alcohol  in  it,  by 
processes  similar  to  those  used  in 
making  beer,  but  resembling  wine 
in  tlie  amount  of  its  alcohol,  can 
not  be  classed  as  l>eer  under  the 
Tariff  Act  of  July  24,  1897,  Chap. 
11,  §1,  Schedule  H,  par.  297  (30 
U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large,  174).  Nishi- 
miya  v.  United  States,  131  Fed. 
650. 

The  sale  of  "table  beer."  slightly 
intoxicating,  is  prohibited  by  a 
statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors.  Queen  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 24  Nova  Scotia,  45.  And 
"botanic  beer,"  containing  sugar, 
herbs  and  \vater,  but  no  hops  or 
malt,  and  having  six  per  cent,  of 
proof  spirit,  is  also  intoxicating 
liquor.  Haworth  v.  Minns,  56  L. 
T.  316;  51  J.  V.  7. 

"Blue  ribbon  beer"  has  been  held 


to  be  intoxicating.  Regina  v.  Wal- 
ton, 34  C.  L.  J.  746. 

"Near  beer"  is  used  to  designate 
all  malt  liquors  with  so  little  al- 
cohol as  it  will  not  produce  in- 
toxication, even  though  drank  to 
excess.  It  includes  all  malt  liquors 
within  the  purview  of  the  general 
prohibiton  act  of  Georgia.  Camp- 
bell v.  Thomasville  (Ga.),  64  S.  E. 
815. 

In  some  cities  in  Georgia  its 
sale  is  strictly  regulated  by  ordi- 
nance. 

As  to  "Mascot  beer,"  see  State 
V.  Wright,  68  N.  H.  351;  44  Atl. 
519. 

17  Connolly  v.  Atlanta,  79  Ga. 
664 ;  4  S.  E.  263. 

IS  Commonwealth  v.  Bios,  IIG 
Mass.  56.  (Schenk  beer  in  this 
case.) 

IS  Commonwealth  v.  O'Kean,  152 
Mass.  584;  26  N.  E.  97;  Ware  v. 
State  (Ga.),  65  S.  E.  333;  Dead- 
wilier  V.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
121  S.  W.  864;  Berkemeier  v.  State 
(Ind.),  88  N.  E.  634. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  statute 
forbidding  the  sale  of  "ale,  porter, 
strong  beer  or  lager  beer"  does  not 
prohibit  the  sale  of  "beer."  Com- 
monwealth V.  Bios,  116  Mass.  56. 

Beer  is  not  a  "spirituous  liquor." 
King  V.  Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  ( abstract )  623 ;  Guadinger  v. 
Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L.  Rep.  514. 


45  DEFINITIONS.  §§35,36 

Sec.  35.    Lager  beer,  a  malt  liquor  and  an  intoxicant. 

Lager  beer  is  and  has  been  sin'ee  its  introduction  into  this 
country  used  as  a  beverage.  Its  constituents  are  enumer- 
ated not  only  in  the  books  of  science,  but  in  the  popular 
cyclopedias.  It  is  a  malt  liquor  of  the  lighter  sort,  and 
differs  from  ordinary  beers  or  ales,  not  so  much  in  its  in- 
gredients as  in  its  process  of  fermentation.  In  a  prosecu- 
tion for  a  sale  of  it  in  violation  of  a  statute  against  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove 
that  it  is  an  intoxicating  liquor.  Evidence  that  such  is  its 
'character  would  be  as  useless  as  to  prove  that  whisky  is  a 
distillation  of  grain,  or  wine  of  the  fermented  juice  of  the 
grape,  or  cider  expressed  juice  of  the  apple.  It  is  u^t 
necessary  to  prove  the  meaning  of  words  in  the  ver- 
nacular language,  nor  the  meaning  of  terms  which,  from 
continuous  use,  have  acquired  a  definite  signification,  gen- 
erally, if  not  universally  knowm.  Courts  cannot  profess 
ignorance  of  the  meaning  of  words  of  popular  use  and 
about  the  significance  of  which  no  intelligent  member  of 
the  community  would  hesitate,  and  they  will  take  judicial 
notice  of  the  fact  that  "lager  beer,"  commonly  used  as  a 
beverage  throughout  the  country  is  a  malt  and  intoxicating 
liquor.^" 

Sec.  36.     Schenk  beer,  intoxicating  quality  question  of  fact. 

Under  a  statute  which  makes  the  sale  of  liquors  capable 
of  producing  intoxication  unlawful  and  criminal,  and  un- 
der which  all  known  spirituous  liquors,  without  specifica- 
tion, form  a  class,  and  specifies  that  "ale,  porter,  strong 
beer,  lager  beer,  and  all  wines  shall  be  considered  as  intox- 

20!State  V.  Goyette,  11  R.  I.  592;  Lager  beer  is  often  called  "stock 

State  V.  Rush,  13  R.  I.  188;  Wat-  beer."      It   is    light    German'  beer, 

son  V.  State,  55  Ala.  158.  and  is  so-called  because,  it  J  §.  stored 

Diluted    lager    beer   having    2.05  for     ripening    before    being    use4. 

per  cent  of  alcohol  has  been  held  People  v.  O'Reilly    (N.  Y.),  88  N. 

to  be  an  intoxicating  liquor.    Owen  E.     1 128 ;     affirming     129     N.     Y. 

V.   McLean,   3   Can.   Cr.   Cas.   323.  App.    Div.   522;    114   N.    Y.  Supp. 

See  Queen  v.  McDonald,  24  Nova  2i5i8. 
Scotia  45. 


K  37  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  46 

icating  liquors  as  Avell  as  distilled  spirits,"  a  sale  of  beer 
not  thus  enumerated,  for  instance  "Schenk  beer,"  is  not 
prohibited  unless  it  is  intoxicating,  and  whether  it  is  in- 
toxicating is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.  The  fact  that 
alcohol  was  discovered  in  it  upon  a  chemical  analysis,  al- 
though undoubtedly  competent  evidence,  does  not  neces- 
sarily prove  that  the  liquor  was  spirituous  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute.  The  apparent  purpose  of  such  a 
statute  is  to  provide  that  distilled  spirits  and  all  liquors 
with  which  distilled  spirits  are  mixed,  and  also  all  the 
liquors  included  by  name  in  the  specific  enumeration 
quoted  shall  be  conclusively  deemed  intoxicating,  and  the 
question  whether  they  are  intoxicating  in  fact  cannot 
be  raised.  But  with  regard  to  all  other  liquors  this  question 
is  one  to  be  determined  by  the  jury  upon  the  evidence  like 
any  other  question  of  fact.-^ 

Sec.  37.     Strong  and  spirituous  liquors — Beer. 

Strong  beer  is  within  the  meaning  of  the  terms  "strong 
and  spirituous  liquors"  in  a  statute  to  suppress  intemper- 
ance, and  likewise  is  any  other  liquor,  whether  fermented 
or  distilled,  of  which  the  human  stomach  can  take  enough 
to  produce  intoxication.  The  construction  of  such  a  stat- 
ute is  not  to  be  founded  upon  the  percentage  of  alcohol 
■which  different  kinds  of  beverages  contain,  as  ascertained 
by  chemical  analysis,  but  rather  by  the  effect  they  produce. 
Such  a  liquor  must  be  strong  enough  with  the  inebriating 
principle  or  element,  w^hether  obtained  by  distillation  or 
fermentation,  to  produce  intoxication.  If  that  be  its  char- 
acter an  unlicensed  vendor  at  retail,  or  one  who  sells  in  vio- 
lation of  the  terms  of  such  a  statute,  incurs  the  penalty  of 
the  statute." 

21  Commonwealth  v.  Bios,  116  Dillmer  v.  People,  4  N.  Y.  Wkly. 
Mass.  56.  Dig.    251;    and   also   ale.      Cayuga 

22  Board  v.  Taylor,  21  N.  Y.  173;  County  v.  Freeoff.  17  How.  Prac. 
Commonwealth  v.  Haywood,  105  442;  Nevin  v.  Jjadue,  3  Denio,  43; 
Mass.    187.  Tompkins    County    v.    Taylor,    19 

"Spirituous  and  strong  liquor"  How.  Pr.  250 ;  Schab  v.  People,  4 
has  been  held  to  include  lager  beer,  Hun,  520;  State  v.  Beswick,  13  R. 
if  it  be  proved  to  be  intoxicating.       I.  211. 


47 


DEFINITIONS. 


§38 


Sec.  38.    Ale. 

Ale  is  a  liquor  very  nearly  related  to  beer,  and  few  in 
America  know  the  difference  between  the  two  liquors.  In 
the  Century  Dictionary  it  is  said  that  ''ale  and  beer  were 
formerly  synonymous  terms,  ale  being  the  earlier  in  use; 
at  present  beer  is  the  common  name  for  all  malt  liquors, 
and  also  is  used  especially  for  a  carefully  made  beer  of 
a  certain  strength  and  rather  light  than  dark;  thus  small 
beer,  ginger  beer  and  the  like  are  not  ale,  nor  are  stout 
and  porter.  A  distinclion  shown  by  Andrew  Boorde,  in 
1542,  is  that  ale  is  made  of  malt  and  water,  and  should 
contain  no  other  ingredients,  while  beer  is  made  of  malt, 
hops  and  water.  "^^ 


23  Century  Dictionary,  Beer.  Nev- 
in  V.  Ladue,  3  Denio,  43,  437. 

"Ale,  a  bright-colored  beer,  made 
from  malt,  which  is  dried  at  low 
heat.  Pale  ale  is  made  from  the 
palest  or  lightest-colored  malt,  the 
fermenting  temporature  being  kept 
below  72  degrees  to  prevent  the 
formation  of  acetic  acid."  Cen- 
tury Dictionary,  ale. 

Bitter  ale,  bitter  beer.  "A  clear, 
strong,  highly  hopped  ale,  of  a 
pleasant  bitter  taste."  Century 
Dictionary. 

Medicated  Ale.  "Ale  which  is 
prepared  for  medical  purposes  by 
an  infusion  of  herbs  during  fer- 
mentation."     Century    Dictionary. 

Adam's  Ale,  Adam's  Wine.  "Wa- 
ter, as  being  the  only  beverage  in 
Adam's  time;  sometimes  called 
Adam."     Century  Dictionary. 

Ginger  Ale.  "An  effervescing 
drink  similar  to  ginger  beer.  The 
name  was  probably  adopted  by 
manufacturers  to  differentiate 
their  productions  from  the  ordi- 
nary ginger  beer."  Century  Dic- 
tionary. 


"Hop  Ale"  is  a  name  frequently 
used  to  cover  up  tlie  actual  qual- 
ities of  the  liquor,  and  thus  evade 
the  liquor  laws.  See  Lincoln  Cen- 
ter v.  Linker,  5  Kan.  App.  242; 
47  Pac.  174. 

Ale  is  a  liquor  made  from  the 
infusion  of  malt  by  fermentation, 
differing  from  beer  in  having  a 
smaller  proportion  of  hops.  State 
v.  Oliver,  26  W.  Va.  422;  53  Am. 
Eep.  79;  Nevin  v.  Ladue,  Denio 
43;  Walker  v.  Prescott,  44  N.  H. 
511;  and  the  court  will  take  ju- 
dicial notice  that  it  is  a  malt  li- 
quor. Wiles  v.  .State,  33  Ind. 
206.  By  statute  it  is  sometimes 
declared  to  be  an  intoxicating  li- 
quor. Commonwealth  v.  Curran, 
119  Mass.  206;  and  a  statute  for- 
bidding the  sale  of  "intoxicating 
liquor"  without  other  definition, 
includes  ale  and  beer.  People  v. 
Hawlev,  3  Mich.  330;  Murphy  v. 
Montclair  Tp.  10  Vroom,  673; 
Johnston  v.  State,  23  Ohio  St. 
556;  Rau  v.  State,  63  N.  Y.  277 
(dicta);  Blatz  v.  Rohrbach,  116 
N.Y.  450;   22N.E.  1049    (dicta); 


§39 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


48 


Sec.  39.     Cider. 

Cider  is  neither  produced  by  distillation  nor  by  fermen- 
tation, and  although  liable  to  fermentation  and  when  sub- 
jected to  distillation  is  capable  of  producing  a  spirituous 
liquor,  yet  the  ultimate  product  is  no  more  like  cider  than 
rum  is  like  the  juice  of  the  sugar-cane  from  which  it  is 
manufactured;  nor  is  it  in  any  proper  sense  a  mixture  of 
any  other  liquor  other  than  water,  which  is  common  to 
all  spirituous  liquors,  wines,  ale,  porter,  beer  and  all  drinks 
of  like  nature.  It  is  wholly  unlike  any  fermented  liquor 
made  from  malted  grain  or  from  the  roots  of  plants  or  bark 
of  trees,  as  spruce,  ginger,  sassafras,  birch  and  sarsaparilla. 
Being  the  unadulterated  juice  of  the  apple,  it  is  no  mix- 
ture, and  under  ordinary  circumstances  is  incapable  of  pro- 
ducing intoxication,  and  it  cannot  be  classed  as  a  spirituous 
liquor,  nor  can  it  with  any  degree  of  propriety  be  called 
wine.-*     And    although   the    courts   have    said    that   jurors 


State  V.  Barron,  .37  Vt.  57;  see 
State  V.  Biddk',  54  X.  H.  379; 
Haines  v.  Hanrahan,  105  Mass.  4-80 ; 
and  without  any  evidence  on  tlie 
point  the  jury  may  find  that  it  is 
an  intoxicating  liquor.  State  v. 
Barron,  .37  Vt.  57.  A  statute  pro- 
liibiting  the  sale  of  any  strong 
or  spirituous  liquor  applies  to  a 
sale  of  ale.  Nevin  v.  Laduc,  3 
Denio  43;  but  a  license  to  sell  ale 
does  not  authorize  a  sale  of  bran- 
dy, rum  or  other  spirituous  liquors. 
Commonwealth  v.  Jordan,  18  Pick. 
228;  for  ale  is  not  a  spirituous 
liquor.  Walker  v.  Prescott.  44  N. 
H.  511;  Fleming  v.  New  Brtms- 
wick,  47  N.  J.  L.  231. 

Formerly  a  liquid  called  "Amer- 
ican Hop  Ale"  was  sold  in  Kan- 
sas. It  was  an  imitation  of  lager 
beer,  ma.de  of  malted  grain,  hops 
and  water,  slightly  fermented,  and 
contained  a  very  slisht  percentage 
of  alcohol.  Lincoln  Center  v.  Lin- 
ker, 7  Kan.  App.  282;  53  Pac.  787. 


It  has  been  held  that  ale  is  not 
a  "strong  liquor,"  as  used  in  a 
statute  forbidding  its  sale  without 
a  license.  People  v.  Crilley,  20 
Barb.  246 ;  and  also  that  it  is. 
Nevin  v.  Ladue,  3  Denio  43,  437; 
Commissioners  v.  Freeoff,  17  How. 
Pr.  442 ;  Commissioners  v.  Taylor, 
21  ^.  Y.  173;  Pvau  v.  People,  63 
X.  Y.  277;  Blatz  v.  Rohrbach,  116 
X.  Y.  450;  22  X.  E.  1049. 

Of  course,  a  statute  may  declare 
it  an  into.xicating  liquor.  State  v. 
Wadsworth,  30  Conn.  55. 

■-'1  State  v.  Biddle.  54  X.  H. 
379;  State  v.  Oliver,  26  W.  Va. 
427;  53  Am.  Rep.  79;  Feldman  v. 
Morrison,  1  111.  App.  460.  Contra, 
Commonwealth  v.  Reyburg,  122  Pa. 
St.  299;    16  Atl.  351. 

"We  do  not  mean  to  intimate  rha.t 
the  mere  imfermented  juice  of  ap- 
ples is  in  anv  circumstance  to  be 
reararded  as  either  a  vinous  or  spir- 
ituous liouor,  but  we  do  not  know, 
and  cannot  say,  as  a  matter  of  law, 


49 


DEFINITIONS. 


§39 


might,  from  Iheir  own  knowledge  alone  determine  that 
whisky,  brandy  and  other  liquors,  which  are  always  intox- 
icating, were  so,  this  cannot  be  so  as  to  that  which  may 
or  ma.y  not  be  an  intoxicating  fluid  when  sold.  Accord- 
ingly, it  has  been  held  that  in  z  prosecution  for  an  alleged 
unlawful  sale  of  cider,  proof  must  be  made  that  it  was  an 
intoxicating  liquor  w'here  the  statute  under  which  the 
prosecution  was  had  made  it  a  criminal  offense  to  sell  ''spir- 
ituous, vinous  and  malt  liquors,"'  cider  not  belonging  to 
nor  being  included  in  either  of  the  classes  thus  named.-'' 
But  if  a  statute  prohibits  by  name  the  sale  of  "cider,"  then 
neither  hard,  fermented  nor  sweet  cider  can  be  sold.-''    And 


that  its  character  may  not  be  so 
changed  by  fermentation  as  to 
bring  it  within  the  meaning  of  the 
term.  Of  course,  an  admixture 
with  spirits  might  render  the  com- 
pound 'spirituous.'  " 

25  Feldman  v.  City  of  Morrison, 
1  111.  App.  460.  Cider  is  not  a 
spirituous  liquor.  iState  v.  Oliver, 
26  W.  Va.  422;  53  Am.  Rep.  79; 
Allred  v.  State,  89  Ala.  112;  8  So. 
56;  but  otherwise  if  mixed  with 
spirituous  liquor.  Commonwealth  v. 
Reyburg,  122  Pa.  St.  299;  16  Atl. 
351;  2  L.  R.  A.  415;  Common- 
wealth V.  Hallett,  103  Mass  452. 
Hard  cider  has  been  held  a  fer- 
mented liquor.  People  v.  Foster, 
64  Mich.  715;  31  N.  \v  595.  peo- 
pie  V.  Adams,  95  Mich.  511:  55  N. 
W,  461;  Eureka  Vinegar  Co.  v. 
Gazette  Printing  Co.,  35  Fed.  570 ; 
Berger  v.  State  (Ark.),  11  S.  W. 
765;  State  v.  Schaefer,  44  Kan. 
90;  24  Pac.  92;  State  v.  McLaf- 
ferty,  47  Kan.  140;  27  Pac.  843. 

Where  a  statute  forbade  the  sale 
of  cider,  and  the  liquor  sold  was 
in  imitation  of  cider,  containing 
two  per  cent  alcohol,  it  was  held 
that   the   seller   had  violated    the 


statute.  Ex  parte  Noel,  6  Leg, 
News   (Canada),  150. 

Under  the  English  statute  of 
1830,  1  Will,  4  c.  64,  the  word 
cider  includes  "cider  and  periy," 
and  this  is  true  under  the  act  of 
1869,  32  and  33  Vict.  c.  27,  §  1, 
and  under  43  and  44  Vict.  c.  20. 
By  the  act  of  1872  and  §  74,  cider 
and  perry  are  declared  to  be  in- 
toxicating liquor.  A  license  is 
necessary  to  sell  it  either  on  or  off 
the  premises.  1  Will.  4  c.  64,  s. 
30 ;  4  and  5  Will.  c.  85,  s.  1 ;  3  and 
4  Vict.  c.  61,  s.  1 ;  and  it  is  subject 
to  excise  duty,  43  and  44  Vict.  c. 
20,  s.  41.  The  maximum  penalty 
for  selling  cider  without  a  license, 
not  to  be  drank  off  the  premises 
is  £10;  and  to  be  drank  on  tha 
premises,  £20.  4  and  5  Will.  4,  c. 
85,  s.  17. 

26  State  V.  Spaulding,  61  Vt. 
505;  17  Atl.  844;  Commonwealth 
V.  Smith,  102  Mass.  144;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Dean,  14  Gray,  99 ; 
State  V.  McNamara,  69  Me.  133; 
State  V.  Roach,  75  Me.  123.  See 
Guptill  V.  Richardson,  62  ]Me.  257 : 
State  V.  Frederickson,  101  Me.  37; 
63  Atl.   535. 


§39 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


50 


where  a  statute  enumerated  ale,  beer,  wine,  alcohol  "and 
all  intoxicating  liquors  whatever,"  cider  was  held  to  be 
included  in  the  phrase  just  vjuoted.-^  Where  a  statute  uses 
the  words  "fermented  liquor"  the  term  will  include  "hard 
cider,"  but  not  "sweet  cider."  "If  the  witness  for  the 
State,"  said  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas,  "had  testified 
that  they  drank  cider — not  hard  cider — then,  under  the 
definition  of  Webster  and  some  of  the  other  lexicographers, 
we  would  not  presume  that  the  cider  was  fermented  and 
intoxicating.  Hard  cider  is  excessively  fermented,  and 
therefore,  presumptively,  hard  cider  is  not  only  fermented, 
but  intoxicating.  Under  the  statute  all  fermented  liquor 
is  presumed  to  be  intoxicating,  and  if  the  defendant  de- 
nies that  the  fermented  liquor  sold  by  him  is  intoxicating, 
it  devolves  upon  him  to  remove  the  presumption  of  law 
by  evidence."-^  Wi  hin  the  limitations  thus  laid  down 
w'hether  or  not  "cider"  is  intoxicating  is  a  question  for  the 
jury  '^  under  the  evidence   introduced  to  show  that  it  is.^° 


27  state  V.  Hutchison,  72  Iowa 
561;   34  N.  W.  421. 

Of  cider  it  lias  been  judicially 
said:  "It  is  common  knowledge 
that  a  fermented  beverage  which 
contains  from  five  to  ten  per  cent 
of  alcohol,  which  is  freely  drank 
by  the  glassful,  will  produce  in- 
toxication. This  is  a  fact  of  daily 
observation  in  communities  where 
such  beverages  are  sold."  Eureka 
Vinegar  Co.  v.  Gazette  Printing 
Co.,  35  Fed.  570. 

A  statute  may  provide  that  "fer- 
mented cider"  is  intoxicating  li- 
quor. State  V.  Waite,  72  Vt. 
108;  47  Atl.  397. 

"If  the  statute  might  include 
among  the  'vinous'  fluids  those 
which  come  fr'^m  the  juice  of  fruits 
which  grow  on  vines  and  bushes, 
and  are  named  wine,  we  do  not 
think  it  could  be  construed  so  lib- 
erally  as   to   apply   the   term   'vi- 


nous' to  the  juice  of  fruits  which 
grow  on  trees.  And  in  common 
parlance  cider  and  beer  are  never 
called  vinous  liq'iors  or  wine." 
Feldman  v.  Morrison,  1  111.  App. 
460. 

A  city  may  require  a  license  to 
sell  cider.  Pikeville  v.  Huffman, 
65  S.  W.  794;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1692. 

2S  State  V.  Schaefer,  44  Kan.  90 ; 
24  Pac.  92;  People  v.  Foster,  64 
Mich.  715;  31  N.  W.  596;  State  v. 
McLafferty,  47  Kan.  140;  27 
Pac.  843;  Eureka  Vinegar  Co.  v. 
Gazette  Printing  Co.,  35  Fed.  570; 
Berger  v.  State  (Ark.),  11  S.  W. 
765;  Commonwealth  v.  Chapel, 
116  Mass.  7. 

29  Commonwealth  v.  Reyburg, 
122  Pa.  St.  299;   16  Atl.  351. 

30  State  V.  Schaefer,  44  Kan.  90; 
24  Pac.  92;  Feldman  v.  Morrison, 
1  111.  App.  460. 


51  DEFINITIONS.  §  40 

And  whether  eider  shown  to  contain  six  per  cent,  of  alcohol 
is  intoxicating  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  and  the  court 
cannot  say  to  it  that  it  is.^^ 

Sec.  40    Medicines — Compounds. 

The  sale  of  medicines  may  or  may  not  be  an  offense,  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances.  "One  au..horized  to  sell  med- 
icines ought  not  to  be  held  guilty  of  violating  the  law 
against  retailing,  because  the  purchaser  of  a  mixture  con- 
taining alcohol  misuses  it  and  becomes  intoxicated:  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  these  laws  cannot  be  evaded  by  selling 
as  a  beverage  intoxicating  liquors  containing  drugs,  barks 
or  seeds  which  have  medicinal  qualities.  If  the  other  in- 
gredients are  medicinal  and  the  alcohol  is  used  as  a  neces- 
sary preservative  or  vehicle  for  them,  if  from  all  the  facts 
it  appears  thai  the  sale  is  of  the  other  ingredients  as  a  med- 
icine and  not  of  the  liquor  as  a  beverage,  the  seller  is  pro- 
tected; but  if  the  drugs  or  roots  are  mere  pretenses  of  medi- 
cine, shadows  and  devices  under  which  an  illegal  traffic  is 
to  be  conducted,  they  will  be  but  shadows  when  interposed 
for  protection  against  criminal  prosecution."^-  An  instruc- 
tion to  the  jury,  therefore,  wholly  ignoring  the  aefendant's 
motive  in  making  a  sale  of  essence  of  ginger,  and  whether 
when  sold  it  was  a  medicine,  known  and  recognized  as  such, 
and  capable  in  its  then  state  of  being  used  as  a  beverage, 
was  held  erroneous;  and  one  asked  by  the  defendant  that 
if  they  "believed  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  sold 
tincture  of  Jamaica  ginger  as  a  medicine,  in  good  faith, 
and  believed  from  the  evidence  that  the  same  was  prepared 
by  the  directions   of  the  United  States  Dispensatory,   and 

31  Topeka  v.  Zufall,  40  Kan.  47 ;  Intoxicuting  Liquor  Cases,  25  Kan. 
19  Pac.  359.  See  also  State  v.  751;  37  Am.  Rep.  284.  Toilet, 
Biddlo,  54  N.  H.  379.  culinary    and    medicinal    prepara- 

32  King  V.  State,  58  Miss.  737 ;  tions  recognized  by  the  United 
38  Am.  Rep.  348;  Commonwealth  States  Dispensatory  as  medicine 
V.  Ramsdell,  130  Mass.  68;  State  are  not  to  be  classed  as  intoxica- 
V.  Raymond,  20  W.  Va.  18;  43  ting  beverages.  Roberts  v.  State, 
Am.  Rep.  787;   Bertrand  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  207;  60  S.  E.  1082. 

73  Miss.  51;    18  So.  545.     In,  re 


§  40  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  52 

that  the  same  was  recognized  by  the  medical  profession  of 
the  United  States"  as  a  medicine,  was  correct.  It  was  also 
held  error  to  exclude  evidence  that  the  essence  was  a  stand- 
ard medicine,  prepared  according  to  a  standard  formula 
laid  down  in  the  United  States  Dispensatory  and  used  by 
physicians  throughout  the  United  States  as  a  medicine  in 
their  practice.^^  In  a  Kansas  case,  perhaps  the  leading  case 
on  this  subject,  Justice  Brewer,  then  on  the  Supreme  Court 
of  that  State,  said:  "If  the  compounds  or  preparations  be 
such  that  the  distinctive  character  and  effect  of  intoxicating 
liquors  are  gone,  that  its  use  as  an  intoxicating  beverage  is 
practically  impossible  by  reason  of  the  other  ingredients,  it  is 
not  within  the  statute.  The  mere  presence  of  the  alcohol  does 
not  bring  the  article  within  the  prohibition.  The  influence  of 
the  alcohol  may  be  counteracted  by  the  other  elements,  and 
the  compound  be  strictly  and  fairly  only  a  medicine.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  intoxicating  liquor  remains  as  a  dis- 
tinctive force  in  the  compound,  and  such  compound  is  rea- 
sonably liable  to  be  used  as  an  intoxicating  beverage,  it  is 

33  Bertrand  v.  State,  73  Miss.  A  combination  of  numerous 
51;  18  So.  545;  Arbuthnot  v.  State  drugs  and  elieinicals  preserved  in 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  120  S.  W.  478;  a  dilution  of  alcoholic  spirits  con- 
Carl  V.  State,  87  Ala.  17;  6  iSo.  taining  33  jier  cent  of  alcohol  has 
118;  4  L.  E.  A.  380;  State  v.  Laf-  been  held  to  be  an  intoxicating  li- 
fer, 38  Iowa  422;  Howell  v.  State,  quor.  Gostorf  v.  State,  39  Ark. 
71  C4a.  224;  51  Am.  Rep.  259;  Peo-  450. 

pie  V.   Van   Alstyne    (Mich.),    122  Where  a  statute  prohibits  a  sale 

N.  W.  193;    16  Det.  Leg.  N.  392;  of  less   quantity  than' a  quart  at 

State   V.    Gray,   61    Conn.    39;    22  a   time,   without   a   license,   of   in- 

Atl.  675;   Russell  v.  Sloan,  33  Vt.  toxicating  liquors,  except  such  as 

656;  State  v.  Lillard,  78  Mo.  136;  "shall  be  compounded  and  intend- 

Wadsworth   v.   Dunnman,   98   Ala.  ed  to  be  used  as  a  medicine,"  the 

610;   13  So.  597;  Gostorf  v.  State,  liquors  excepted  in  this  quotation 

39    Ark.     450;     United    States     v.  are  those  to  be  used  as  medicine. 

Stubblefield,  40  Fed.  454;  Parrott  State  v.  Terry,  72  X.J.  L.  375;   61 

V.   Commonwealth,   6   Ky.   L.   Rep.  Atl.  148;  affirmed  73  X.  J.  L.  554; 

221;   James  v.  State,  21   Tex.  Cr.  64  Atl.  113. 

App.  353;   17  S.  W.  422.  Peruna  has   been   held   to   come 

Lemon  ginger  and  Empire  Tonic  within  the  prohibition  of  a  statute 

Bitters    have    ]>een    held    to    be    a  forbidding  the  sale  of  intoxicating 

medicine.     United  States  v.  Stub-  liquor.      Stells    v.    State,    77    Ark. 

blefield,  40  Fed.  454.  441 ;  92  S.  W.  530. 


53 


DEFINITIONS. 


MO 


within  the  statute,  aud  this  though  it  contain  many  other 
ingredients  and  ingredients  of  an  independent  and  bene- 
ficial force  in  counteracting  diseases  or  strengthening  the 
system. ' "  "^ 


34  In  re.  Intoxicating  Liquor 
Cases,  25  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Rep. 
284.  See  also  .State  v.  Laffer,  38 
Iowa,  422 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Hal- 
lett,  103  Mass.  452 ;  Wall  v.  State, 
78  Ala.  417:  State  v.  Coulter,  40 
Kan.  87;  19  Pac.  368;  State  v. 
Muncey,  28  W.  Va.  404;  Davis  v. 
State,  50  Ark.  17;  6  S.  W.  388; 
Roberts  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  207; 
60  S.  E.  1082.  Sweet  spirits  of 
nitre  and  varnish,  although  con- 
taining a  high  percentage  of  alco- 
hol, are  not  "spirits."  Attorney- 
General  V.  Bailey,  1  Exch.  281. 

Since  paregoric,  bay  rum,  co- 
logne, wood  alcohol  and  the  like 
cannot  be  used  as  beverages,  they 
cannot  be  classed  as  intoxicating 
liquors;  nor  will  the  articles  given 
in  the  United  States  Dispensatory 
which  are  classed  as  medicines  be 
so  classed.  Roberts  v.  State,  4 
Ga.  App.  207;  60  S.  E.  1082; 
Fabor  v.  Green,  7^  Vt.  117;  47 
Atl.   391. 

In  Australia  it  is  held  that  "li- 
quor" means  a  liquid  which  is 
commonly  known  and  is  adapted 
for  use  as  a  drink  or  beverage  for 
human  consumption,  or  which  is 
reasonably  capable  of  being  used 
as  a  substitute  for  such  bever- 
age, or  being  converted  into  such 
beverage.  Hence,  in  a  prosecution 
for  a  sale  of  proprietary  medicine, 
it  is  not  necessarilj'^  sufficient  for 
the  prosecution  to  prove  that  it 
contains  oven  a  large  percentage 
of  alcohol,  if  the  alcohol  is  essen- 


tial for  its  use  as  a  medicine  or  is 
necessary  for  extraction  or  as  a 
preservative,  or  if  the  other  in- 
gredients are,  as  compared  with 
the  contained  alcohol,  of  such  po- 
tency or  of  such  disagreeable  char- 
acter that  the  use  of  the  liquid  as 
a  beverage  would  ordinarily  result 
in  danger  to  his  health  or  in  nau- 
sea or  sickness.  In  considering 
whether  a  liquid  is  a  liquor  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  statute,  re- 
gard should  be  had  to  the  use  to 
which  it  is  usually  put,  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  is  usuallj'  bought 
and  its  usual  effect  upon  the  sys- 
tem. Gleason  v.  Hobson  [1907], 
Vict.  L.  R.  148. 

In  Maine  in  1850  it  was  held 
that  it  was  no  defense  that  the 
liquor  was  old  and  used  solely  for 
medicinal  purposes,  if  the  accused 
had  no  license.  State  v.  BroAvn, 
31  Me.  522.  See  also  Common- 
wealth V.  Kimball,  24  Pick.  366; 
Commonwealth  v.  Sloan,  4  Cusli. 
52. 

Statutes  forbidding  sale  of  li- 
quors to  l>e  drank  on  premises. 
People  V.  Van  Alstyne  (Mich.), 
122  N.  W.  193;  16  Detroit  Leg. 
N.  392. 

Evidence  to  show  members  of  ac- 
cused's family  had  not  been  ill  or 
witness  had  not  heard  of  their  ill- 
ness, though  living  in  the  neigh- 
borhood. Commonwealth  v.  Joslin, 
158  Mass.  482;  33  X.  E.  C.53;  21  L. 
R.  A.  449. 

The  object  cf  our  statutes  regu- 


§41 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


54 


Sec.  41.     Camphor  gum  not  an  intoxicant. 

In  almost  every  home  will  be  found  the  "camphor  bot- 
tle,"   containing    gum    of    camphor    dissolved    in    distilled 


lating  the  sale  of  intoxicating  li- 
quors is  to  prevent  the  use  of  such 
liquors  as  a  beverage,  and  thus 
to  check,  and  if  possible,  to  extir- 
pate the  evils  of  intemperance. 
Hence  the  statutes  are  intended  to 
apply  to  all  intoxicating  liquors 
which  can  be  resorted  to  to  gratify 
the  appetite  for  intoxicating  drink. 
But  there  is  a  large  class  of  medi- 
cines, bitters  and  tinctures,  used 
not  as  a  beverage,  but  as  medici- 
nal remedies,  to  which  such  stat- 
utes are  not  intended  to  apply,  al- 
though such  articles  are  compound- 
ed in  part  of  alcohol,  and  if  used 
in  sufficient  quantities  will  pro- 
duce intoxication.  Such  articles 
are  usually  kept  by  druggists  and 
are  manufactured  in  good  faith  as 
medicine.  They  are  not  intended 
for  and  are  not  used  as  a  drink. 
Some  of  them  are  approved  of  and 
recommended  by  learned  and  skill- 
ful physicians.  They  vary  greatly 
in  their  preparation  in  the  amount 
of  alcohol  used  in  them  and  in 
their  qualities.  Many  of  them  are 
believed  to  be  useful  in  the  cure  of 
diseases;  many  of  them  are  prob- 
ably worthless  or  mischievous. 
Many  mixtures  of  this  sort  pass 
under  the  title  of  patent  or  quack 
medicines.  But  the  law  makes  no 
distinctions  in  regard  to  the  man- 
ufacture, use  and  sale  of  medi- 
cines upon  the  ground  that  thoy 
are  or  are  not  the  products  of 
quackery.  To  prohibit  the  sale  of 
these  articles  for  their  legitimate 
and  real   use  as  remedies  for  dis- 


ease is  not  within  the  object  of  our 
legislation  in  regard  to  intoxica- 
ting liquors.  When,  therefore, 
medicines,  bitters  and  tinctures  are 
made  and  sold  in  good  faith  for 
their  true  and  legitimate  use,  to 
prevent  or  cure  disease,  they  can- 
not be  regarded  as  within  the  class 
of  intoxicating  liquors,  whose  sale 
is  prohibited  or  regulated  by  law. 
But  when  intoxicating  drinks,  in- 
tended to  be  sold  and  used  as  a 
beverage,  are  by  some  tincture  or 
preparation  slightly  disguised  so 
as  to  have  to  some  extent  the 
taste,  flavor  or  appearance  of  med- 
icines or  bitters,  when,  in  fact, 
they  are  really  meant  to  be  sold 
as  intoxicating  drinks,  such  mix- 
tures, however  disguised,  are  with- 
in the  prohibition  of  the  law.  In 
all  such  cases  it  is  a  question  not 
of  law,  but  of  fact,  whether  the 
pretended  medicine  is  in  reality 
and  in  good  faith  made,  sold  and 
used  as  a  medicine,  or  is  only  a 
disguise  for  intoxicating  liquor, 
such  questions  must  be  determined 
by  the  evidence.  Tlie  composition 
and  character  of  the  article,  the 
amount  of  alcohol  in  it,  and 
whether  it  does  readily  or  with 
difficulty  produce  intoxication, 
whether  it  is  agreeable  or  nause- 
ous to  the  taste,  whether  it  is  use- 
ful or  not  as  a  medicine  to  cure 
diseases,  whether  it  is  generally 
kept  and  sold  by  druggists  as  med- 
icine, whether  it  is  frequently  re- 
sorted to  and  used  as  a  beverage, 
this     and     similar     circumstances 


55  DEFINITIONS.  §  42 

spirits,  and  used  exclusively  as  a  medicine  and  kept  ready 
for  use  when  needed,  but  unpalatable  as  a  beverage  and 
not  used  as  such.  The  design  of  our  temperance  statutes  is 
to  prevent  the  evil  of  tippling,  and  it  cannot,  as  a  rule  of 
law  or  of  fair  statutory  construction  be  maintained  that  a 
sale  by  a  druggist  of  gum-camphor  and  alcohol  mixed  by 
him  can  in  any  way  promote  t^nnling;  nor  can  lis  convic- 
tion for  such  a  sale  be  maintained  under  a  statute  which 
provides  that  "no  person  Avithout  a  State  license  therefor 
shall  sell,  offer  or  expose  for  sale  spirituous  liquors,  wine, 
port,  ale  or  beer,  or  any  drink  of  a  like  character."  In 
such  case  it  cannot  be  said  that  it  was  the  design  of  the 
Legislature  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  such  a  mixture  by 
statute.^''  The  mere  presence  of  alcohol  in  an  article  sold 
to  a  customer  by  a  country  mercliant  or  his  clerk,  in  good 
faith  and  not  as  a  shift  or  device  to  evade  the  law,  is  not 
to  be  deemed  an  intoxicating  liquor  within  the  meaning 
of  the  act  to  provide  for  the  licensing  of,  and  against  the 
evils  arising  from,  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  simply 
because  the  customer  to  whom  it  was  sold  drinks  it  and 
becomes  intoxicated.'^** 

Sec.  42.     Cinnamon  and  lemon  essence — Cologne. 

A  judgment  against  a  defendant  for  selling  spirituous 
liquors,  wines,  porter,  ale,  beer  and  drinks  of  a  lilvc  nature, 
where  the  evidence  showed  that  the  defendant  had  sold  a 
bottle  of  the  "essence  of  cinnamon"  to  the  State's  witness; 
that  before  the  sale  the  defendant  said  to  the \  witness  if  he 
wanted  to  drink  it  he  could  not  get  it,  but  if  he  wanted  it 
for  cooking  purposes  he  could  have  it,  and  the  witness  hav- 

woukl    be    regarded     as     evidence  Ark.  450;   Davis  v.  State,  50  Ark. 

tending  to  determine  the  question.  17. 

Russell    V.    Sloan,    33    Vt.    656;  35  state  v.  Haymond,  20  W.  Va. 

Commonwealth    v.    Ramsdell,    130  18;    43    Am.    Rep.    787;    Kizer   v. 

Mass.  68:  State  v.  Bennett,  3  Harr.  Rundleman,  5  Jones    (N.  C),  428. 

(Del.)     565;    Intoxicating    Liquor  36  Walker  v.  Dailey,  101  111.  App. 

Cases,  25  Kan.  75;  State  v.  LafTer,  575.     In  re   Intoxicating  Liquors, 

38    la.    422;    Foster    v.    State,    36  25  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Rep.  284. 
Ark.    258;    Gostorf     v.     State,   39 


§  43  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  56 

ing  answered  he  did  not  want  to  drink  it,  the  defendant 
sold  it  to  him,  and  that  the  witness  did  drink  part  of  it 
and  it  affected  him  so  he  could  not  see  after  night,  was 
affirmed  on  appeal  by  a  divided  court.  In  this  case  the 
theory  of  the  judges  voting  for  affirming  the  judgment  was 
that  it  was  immaterial  what  were  the  ingredients  of  a  prep- 
aration or  mixture,  or  by  what  name  it  was  known,  or 
whether  it  was  patented  or  not,  if  it  would  produce  intox- 
ication, the  sale  of  which  was  prohibited  by  the  statute ; 
and  that  in  this  case  the  jury  was  justified  in  finding  that 
the  particular  "essence  of  cinnamon"  sold  by  the  defend- 
ant did  produce  intoxication  and  that  the  question  whether 
it  was  an  intoxicating  drink  was  one  of  fact  purely.  Those 
judges  voting  for  reversal  of  the  judgment  held  that  there 
was  no  fact  proved  from  which  the  court  or  jury  could  in- 
fer that  essence  of  cinnamon  was  composed  in  whole  or  in 
part  of  spirituous  liquor,  wine,  porter,  ale,  beer,  or  any 
other  drink  of  like  nature,  or  that  it  was  any  mixture  or 
preparation  known  as  bitters  or  otherwise  which  could  pro- 
duce intoxication ;  and  in  the  absence  of  proof  on  this  sub- 
ject the  court  could  not  take  judicial  notice  of  the  ingre- 
dients entering  into  the  composition  of  the  ' '  essence  of 
cinnamon.  "^^  Extract  of  lemon,  as  it  is  usually  known 
and  used,  is  not  classed  as  an  intoxicating  liquor,  although 
it  contains  alcohol. ^^  Nor  does  it  include  cologne,  and  the 
Legislature  has  not  the  power  to  prohibit  its  sale.^** 

Sec.  43.     Common    cordial   a   spirituous   liquor — Godfrey's 
Cordial. 

Under  an  act  which  prohibited  the  sale  of  "any  wine, 
rum,  brandy,  gin,  whisky  or  any  spirituous  liquor  by  any 
measure  less  than  a  quart  or  any  punch  or  other  mixed 
liquor  by  any  measure  whatever,"  an  indictment  for  sell- 

•■57  State   V.   Mimeey,   28   W.   Va.  ^'^  In     re     Intoxicating     Liquor 

494;   Roberts  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  Cases,  supra.     For  essence  of  gin- 

207;  60  S.  E.  1082.  ger,  see  Bertand  v.  State,  73  Miss. 

38Holconibv.  People,  49  111.  73;  51;    IS  So.  545;    Roberts  v.  State, 

In   re   Intoxicating   Liquor    Cases,  4  Ga.  App.  207;  60  S.  E.  1082, 
25  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  284. 


57  DEFINITIONS.  §  44 

ing  spirituous  liquor  was  sustained  by  proof  of  the  sale 
of  common  cordial,  the  proof  showing  that  it  was  made  of 
whisky  sweetened  and  scented  with  peppermint  and  other 
things,  and  that  it  would  intoxicate.  The  contention 
was  that  the  proof  did  not  sustain  a  charge  for  selling 
spirituous  liquor,  but  that  of  a  sale  of  mixed  liquor.  The 
court  held  that  the  mixed  liquor  intended  by  the  act.  fol- 
lowing as  it  did  the  specification  of  punch,  was  a  mixture 
of  spirituous  liquors,  before  prohibited  to  be  sold  separately, 
and  that  where  the  basis  of  substance  of  the  liquor  sold 
was  spirituous  and  not  mixed  by  the  vendor,  it  came  with- 
in the  prohibition  of  selling  spirituous  liquor.  In  answer 
to  the  contention  that  this  construction  would  prohibit 
the  sale  of  medicines,  the  basis  of  which  was  spirituous 
liquor,  such  as  Godfrey's  cordial,  elixir  of  paregoric,  etc., 
the  court  said,  "Not  so.  The  question  will  always  be 
whether  it  is  a  sale  of  medicine  or  liquor.  If  an  apothecary 
sell  brandy,  as  such,  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  law; 
if  brandy  made  up  into  laudanum  or  other  medicines,  it  is 
not  a  violation  of  a  law  prohibiting  the  sale  of  spirituous 
liquor.  It  will  never  be  difficult  to  distinguish..  Common 
store  cordial  is  sweetened  whiskey  sold  as  spirituous  liquor; 
Godfrey's  cordial  is  a  very  different  thing  known  for,  and 
sold  as  medicine,  and  there  can  be  no  danger  from  the  sale 
of  it  of  promoting  tippling,  which  is  the  evil  designed  to 
be  provided  for  by  our  Act  of  Assembly."*" 

Sec.  44.     Empire  tonic  bitters — Proprietary  medicines. 

A  statute  regulating  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  pro-, 
vided  that  it  should  not  apply  to  physicians  putting  up 
their  own  prescriptions  nor  the  sale  of  "proprietary  medi- 
cines." In  construing  it  it  was  held  that  by  the  phrase, 
"proprietary  medicines,"  as  used  in  the  statute,  were  meant 

40  State     V.     Bennett,     8     Harr.  cherry,    and    "Sherman's    Prickly 

(Del.)  565.    Under  a  Kansas  stat-  Ash  Bitters"  was  an   intoxicatin<:: 

ute  it  was  held  that  whether  "Mc-  liquor,  was  a  question  of  fact.    In 

Lean's  Strengthening   Cordial   and  re    Intoxicating   Liquor   Cases,    25 

Blood  Purifier,"  a  mixture  of  whis-  Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Rep.  284. 
ky,  syrup  of  tulu  and  syrup  of  wild 


^  45  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  58 

such  proprietary  medicines  as  were  not  ' '  alcoholic  liquors  or 
compounds,"  but  medicines  as  distinguished  from  "alco- 
holic liquors  and  compounds,"  and  that  a  registered  drug- 
gist could  not  sell  a  preparation  known  as  "Empire  Tonic 
Bitters,"  which  contained  alcohol,  without  first  having  pro- 
cured the  license  of  dram-shop-  keeper.  In  such  a  case  it 
matters  not  that  the  defendant  had  paid  an  excise  tax  re- 
quired by  the  Government  of  the  United  States.^^ 

Sec.   45.     Home    Bitters — Medicine — Instruction — Evidence. 

In  a  prosecution  for  unlawfully  selling  vinous  and  spir- 
ituous liquors  a  charge  to  the  jury  for  the  State  which  in 
effect  said  that  if  the  compound  sold,  called  "Home  Bit- 
ters," was  intoxicating,  and  was  sold  by  the  defendant 
as  a  beverage,  and  not  as  medicine,  they  ought  to  find  the 
defendant  guilty,  and  for  the  defendant,  if  from  the  evi- 
dence they  believed  he  sold  the  compound  in  good  faith 
as  medicine  and  not  as  a  beverage,  they  ought  to  acquit 
him,  although  the  compound  contained  vinous  or  spirituous 
liquors  sufficient  to  intoxicate,  was  held  a  fair  statement  of 
the  law.  The  uses  to  which  such  a  compound  is  ordinarily 
put,  the  purposes  for  which  it  is  usually  bought,  and  its 
effect  upon  the  system  are  material  facts  from  which  maj' 
be  inferred  the  intention  of  the  seller.  If  other  ingredients 
are  medicinal  and  the  alcohol  is  used  as  a  necessary  preserv- 

41  State  V.  Wright.  20  Mo.  App.  pounded    in    part    of    intoxicating 

412;   McRoberts  v.  State,  45  Tex.  liquor    and    sold    for    other    than 

Cr.  App.  268;  92  S.  W.  804;  State  medicinal    purposes    may    be    pro- 

V.  Lillard,  78  Mo.  136.     In  United  hibited.     State  v.   Lillard,  78   Mo. 

States  V.  Stubblefield.  40  Fed.  454.  136. 

Empire  Tonic  Bitters  was  held  to  The  fact  that  Howe's  Aromatic 

be  a  medicine.  Invigorating  Spirit  contains  20  per 

Evidence  tliat  Hostettor's  Bitters  cent  of  alcohol  does  not  necessarily 

tasted   like   whisky   and    produced  show  it  is  not  a  medicine.    Russell 

intoxication  is  proper.     Parrott  v.  v.  Sloan,  33  Vt.  653. 

Commonwealth,  G  Ky.  L.  Rep.  221.  Pervna  has  been  held  to  be  an 

A  State  may  authorize  a   city  to  intoxicating  liquor  imder  proof  of 

suppress  the  sale  of  medicated  bit-  its  intoxicating  f(uality.     Stelle  v. 

ters.  James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  State,  77  Ark.  441;  02  S.  W.  530. 
353.   17  S.  W.  422.     Bitters  com- 


59  DEFINITIONS.  §  46 

ative  or  vehicle  for  them;  if  from  all  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances it  appears  that  the  sale  was  made  of  the  other 
ingredients  as  a  medicine,  and  not  of  the  liquor  as  a  bever- 
age, the  seller  is  protected;  but  if  the  drugs  or  roots  are 
mere  pretense  of  medicines,  shadows  and  devices  under 
which  an  illegal  traffic  is  to  be  conducted,  they  will  be  but 
shadows  when  interposed  for  protection  against  a  criminal 
prosecution/^  It  matters  not  what  name  dealers  or  con- 
sumers apply  to  an  illicit  fluid  so  long  as  the  arbitrary 
name  can  be  translated  into  that  of  an  intoxicating  liquor 
—for  instance,  "rye  whisky."  It  is  the  liquor  and  not  the 
name  which  gives  its  character  to  the  sale  and  renders  it 
lawful  or  unlawful. ^^ 

Sec.   46.     Busby's   bitters— Judicial  notice. 

A  court  can  not  judicially  know  that  "Busby's  Bitters," 
though  shown  to  be  intoxicating,  is  or  contains  either  dis- 
tilled liquor  or  wine,  or  a  liquor  prepared  for  drink  by  the 
infusion  of  malt.  Liquor  of  either  class  may  be  intoxi- 
cating, but  neither  class,  nor  all  of  them  combined,  includes 
all  of  the  intoxicating  liquors,  beverages  or  bitters.  A 
given  liquor  may,  in  other  words,  be  in  a  high  degree  intox- 
icating, and  yet  be  neither  spirituous,  vinous  nor  malt  with- 
in the  sense  of  a  penal  statute.  In  such  case  i^  is  for  a 
jury  to  say  whether  such  bitters  were  vinous,  spirituous  or 
malt,  or  contain  liquors  of  either  or  all  of  these  classes 
in  appreciable  quantities.** 

"King  V.   Stato,  58  Miss.  737;  « Wall   v.    State,    78   Ala.   417; 

^State     V.     Wilson,     80  Mo.     303;  Allred    v.    State,    89    Ala.    112;    8 

James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  352;  So.    56.      For    Sherman's    Prickly 

Cxostorf   V.    State,    39   Ark.   450.  Ash  Bitters,  see  In  re  Intoxicating 

•»■■!  Kinnebrew    v.    State,    80    Ga.  Liquor  Cases,  25  Kan.  751  •  37  Am' 

232.  Rep.  284. 

A  tonic  containin<;  four  per  cent  "You    have   all    heard    of   'blind 

of   alcohol,  which   could  be  drunk  tigers.'     One  of  the  most  common 

in  sufficient  quantities  to   produce  of   these    fraudulent    devices    is    to 

intoxication  was  held  to  be  an  in-  put  a  few  drugs,  barks  or  extracts 

toxicating      liquor.      Johnson       v.  into  a  very  common  liquor  and  put 

State,  4  Tex.  Cr.  App.  419;   M  S.  it  on  the  market  for  sale  as  a  pre- 

W.   554;    State  v.   Stubblefield,  40  tended   medicine,   under   the   name 

^^''•■*^^-  of    'cordial,'     'tonic'     or     'hitters- 


§§47,48  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


60 


Sec.  47.     Mead — Metheglin — Sweets. 

Mead  is  "a  fermeiit  liquor  composed  of  one  part  of 
honey  dissolved  in  three  of  boiling  water,  to  which  malt, 
yeast  and  spices  are  added. ' '  *^  Metheglin  is  "  a  fermented 
drink  made  of  water  and  honey. "  *" 

Sec.  48.     Wilson's  Rocky  Mountain  Herb  Bitters. 

Medicated  bitters,  called  "Dr.  Wilson's  Rocky  Mountain 
Herb  Bitters,"  and  containing  alcohol,  -were  'held  to  be 
within  an  act  which  provided  that  "no  dealer  in  drugs 
and  medicines  shall,  directly  or  indirectly,  sell  or  give 
away  any  intoxicating  liquors  and  medicated  bitters  con- 
taining alcohol  in  any  quantity  less  than  one  gallon,  artid 
in  no  quantity  to  be  drunk  upon  the  premises  without  first 
having  obtained,  in  the  manner  provided  by  law,  a  license 
as  a  dram-shop  keeper. ' '  ^^ 


'Hostetter's  Bitters,'  'Fitzpatrick's 
Bitters,'  'Home  Bitters,'  'Home 
Laxative  Cordial,'  'Reed's  Guilt 
Edged  Tonic'  and  other  compounds 
of  tins  character,  and  have  all 
rightly  been  adjudged  to  be  mere 
sliams  as  medicines,  because  they 
were  sold  and  used  as  intoxicating 
beverages,  and  for  the  liquor,  and 
not  for  the  drugs  and  barks  they 
contained;  and  dealers  in  them 
have  been  dealt  with  precisely'  as  if 
they  had  sold  plain  whisky  with- 
out any  disguise."  United  States 
V.  Stafford,  20  Fed.  720,  citing 
Williams  v.  State.  35  Ark.  430; 
Foster  v.  State,  36  Ark.  258;  Gos- 
torf  v.  State,  39  Ark.  450:  United 
States  V.  Cota,  17  Fed.  734.  Hos- 
tetter's Bittere.  Parrott  v.  Com- 
monwealt^i.  fi  Fv.  T,.  T?ep.  221. 

45  Standard  Dictionary.     A   sec- 
ondary   definition    is:      "A    drink. 


usually  made  of  syrup  of  sarsapa- 
rilla  and  water  impregnated  with 
carbon  dioxide."     Ibid. 

"Odin's  Mead,"  the  mead  that 
Odin  carried  away  from  the  giant 
■Septiuig,  the  inspiration  of  poetry. 

46  standard  Dictionary. 

Under  the  English  statute  the 
word  "sweets"  or  made  wine  mean 
any  liquor  made  by  fermentation 
from  fruit  and  sugar,  or  from  fruit 
or  sugra-  mixed  with  any  other 
material,  and  which  has  undergone 
a  process  of  fermentation  in  its 
manufacture.  52  and  53  Vict.  c. 
42,  §  28.  And  sweets  include  mead 
and  metheglin,  33  and  34  Vict.  c. 
29,  §  3 ;  43  and  44  Vict.  c.  20,  §  40. 

In  this  country  the  courts  do 
not  take  judicial  notice  that  mead 
or  metheglin  is  intoxicating. 
Marks  v.  State  (Ala.),  48  So.  864. 

47  State  v.  Wilson,  80  Mo.  303. 


61 


DEFINITIONS. 


§49 


Sec.   49.     Intoxication — Drunkenness — Drunkard. 

There  are  different  degrees  of  intoxication  or  drunken- 
ness, and  the  word  "intoxication"  is  nearly  synonymous 
with  "inebriet}^"  or  "inebriation."  The  word  '"intoxica- 
tion" is  that  state  or  condition  of  the  person  which  inevi- 
tably follows  by  taking  into  the  body  excessive  (juantities 
of  intoxicating  liquors.^**  It  is  evidenced  liy  an  undue  or 
abnormal  excitation  of  the  feelings,  oi'  passions,  or  by 
rendering  useless  the  capacity  of  the  drinker  to  think  and 
act  correctly  and  effectually.*^  "Whenever  a  man  is  un- 
der the  influence  of  liquor  so  as  not  to  be  entirely  at  him- 
self, he  is  intoxicated;  although  he  can  walk  straight,  al- 
though he  may  attend  to  his  business,  and  may  not  give 
any  outward  and  visible  signs  to  the  casual  observer  that 
he  is  drunk,  yet  if  he  is  under  the  influence  oP  liquor  so  as 
not  to  be  at  himself,  so  as  to  be  excited  from  it,  and  not  to 
possess  that  clearness  of  intellect  and  that  control  of  him- 
self that  he  otherwise  would  have,  he  is  intoxicated."  "^    In 


48  Commonwealth  v.  Whitney, 
11  Cush.  447;  State  v.  Savage,  89 
Ala.  1;  7. 'So.  183;  7  L.  R.  A.  426; 
Mix  V.  McCoy,  22  Mo.  App.  431; 
State  V.  Kelley,  47  Vt.  2!)4;  State 
V.  Robinson,  111  Ala.  482;  20  So. 
30. 

49  Standard  Life,  etc.  Ins.  Co., 
94  Ala.  434;  10  So.  530. 

soElkin  v.  Busehner  (Pa.),  16 
Atl.  102. 

In  this  case  it  was  also  said: 
"One  man  will  say  a  person  was 
drunk  at  the  time  of  a  certain  oc- 
currence. Another  will  say  he  was 
not  drunk;  that  he  was  sober.  A 
great  deal  of  testimony  can  be  ex- 
plained by  the  different  ideas  those 
persons  have  as  to  what  is  meant 
by  drunkenness  or  intoxication. 
There  are  degrees  of  intoxication 
or  drunkenness,  as  every  one 
knows.     A  man  is  said  to  be  dead 


drunk  when  he  is  perfectly  uncon- 
sciousy— powerless.  He  is  said  to 
be  stupidly  drunk  wlien  a  kind  of 
stupor  comes  over  him.  He  is  said 
to  be  staggering  drunk  when  he 
staggers  in  walking.  He  is  said 
to  be  foolishly  drunk  when  he  acts 
like  the  fool.  All  these  are  cases 
of  difTerent  drunkenness — of  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  drunkenness.  So 
it  is  a  very  common  thing  to  say 
a  man  is  badly  intoxicated,  and 
again  that  he  is  slightly  intoxi- 
cated. There  are  degrees  of  drunk- 
enness, and  therefore  many  persons 
may  say  that  a  man  was  not  intox- 
icated because  he  could  walk 
straight;  he  could  get  in  and  out 
a  wagon.  What  is  meant  *  *  * 
by  the  words  in  the  statute  which 
makes  it  a  penal  o.'^'ense,  and  also 
the  party  liable  in  a  civil  action 
for  damages,  for  giving  to  a  man 


I  49  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    UQLORS.  62 

order  that  a  person  shall  be  drunk  it  is  not  necessary  that 
he  be  excited  to  a  frenzy.-^^  In  a  ]\Iichigan  case  the  term, 
"an  intoxicated  person,"  was  thus  defined:  "  Wlien  it 
is  apparent  that  a  person  is  under  the  influence  of  liquor, 
or  when  his  manner  is  unusual  or  abnormal,  and  his  ine- 
briated condition  is  reflected  in  his  walk  or  conversation, 
when  his  ordinary  judgment  and  common  sense  are  dis- 
turbed, or  his  usual  will-power  is  temporarily  suspended, 
when  these  symptoms  result  from  the  use  of  liquor,  and 
are  manifest,  then,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  the 
person  is  intoxicated,  and  any  one  who  makes  a  sale  of 
liquor  to  such  a  person  violates  the  law  of  the  Stale.  It 
is  not  necessary  that  the  person  should  be  called  'dead 
drunk'  or  hopelessly  intoxicated;  it  is  enough  that  his  senses. 
are  obviously  destroyed  or  distracted  by  the  use  of  inti)x., 
icating  liquor. ' ' "'-  The  reasonable  and  very  moderate  use 
of  intoxicating  liquors,  however,  does  not  produce  a  legal 
state  of  intoxication.  It  is  the  unreasonable,  inordinate, 
immoderate,  or  excessive  use  of  intoxicating  liquors  that 
produces  cases  which  the  State  terms  intoxication  or  drunk- 
enness, forbidden  by  the  statute ;  ' '  and  to  say  that  no  liquor 
is    intoxicating,    unless    its    moderate    and    reasonable    use  ^^' 

that  is  'drunk  or  intoxicated'   (be-  "'S  In     determining     what     is     a 

cause  both  words  are  used  in  the  "moderate  and  reasonable  use"  of 

statute)  ;    and    also,    'selling   to   a  intoxicating    liquor    the    capacity 

man    of    known    intemperate    hab-  of  the  individual  to  withstand  the 

its'?"     Then  follows  the  definition  intoxicating  effect  of  liquor   must 

quoted    in    the    text   above,    in    an-  be  considered;   for  what  would  be 

swer  to  this  question.  a    "moderate   and   reasonable   use" 

51  Smith  V.  People,  141  111.  447;  of  intoxicating  liquor  would  pro- 
31  N.  E.  425.  duce   far    less   effect   upon   a   man 

52  Lafler  v.  Fisher,  121  Mich.  who  was  used  to  it  than  upon  a 
60;  79  N.  W.  934;  State  v.  Pierce,  man  who  was  not,  and  even  indi;- 
65  Iowa,  85;  21  N.  W.  195.  The  viduals  not  used  to  it,  its  use  pro- 
word  "intoxicated"  is  synonymous  duces  very  radical  effects.  So  that 
with  "drunk."  Sapp  v.  State,  116  it  might  under  a  statute  forbid- 
Ga.  182;  42  S.  E.  410;  Standard  ding  a  sale  or  gift  to  an  intoxi- 
Life  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jones,  94  Ala.  cated  person  not  be  an  of- 
434;  10  So.  530;  Commissioners  v.  fense  if  sold  or  given  to  one  per- 
Trimble,  150  Mass.  89;  22  N.  E.  son  while  it  would  be  to  another, 
239.  thougli    botii    shortly    previous    to 


63 


DEFINITIONS. 


§49 


will  produce  inebriety,  is  to  declare  that  no  liquor 
whatever  is  intoxicating."^*  But  a  statute  forbidding  a 
sale  to  an  intoxicated  person,  means  a  sale  to  a  person  under 
such  a  state  of  inebriation  as  attracts  observation  and  be- 
comes known  to  others,  or  gives  them  reason  to  believe  the 
person  is  intoxicated,  and  of  this  a  bystander  is  generally  a 
better  judge  than  the  person  himself,  whose  opinion  on  the 
subject,  for  obvious  reason,  is  w^orth  but  little.'"''  The  stat- 
ute, however,  when  it  refers  to  a  person  as  "intoxicated" 
has  no  reference  to  a  person  intoxicated  by  the  use  of  opium, 
haheesh,  or  the  like,  but  to  a  person  made  drunk  by  the  use 
of  the   common    and  usual  intoxicating   beverages.'^" 


the  sale  or  gift,  and  at  the  same 
time  had  drunk  the  same  quantity 
of  the  same  l<ind  of  liquor. 

5-i  Wadsworth  v.  Dunman,  98 
Ala.  610;    13  So.  597. 

55  Halstead  v.  Horton,  38  W.  Va. 
727;  18  S.  E.  953;  State  v.  Kel- 
ley,  47  Vt.  294. 

A  non-expert  witness  may  testify 
whether  a  particular  person  was 
"drunk."  State  v.  Ryan  ( La. ) , 
48  So.  537;  and  so  give  his 
opinion.  State  v.  Stockman,  82 
kS.  €.  3i8S ;  64  S.  E.  595 ;  Quinn  v. 
O'KefFe,  9  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  68;  75 
N.  St.  Rep.  753;  41  N.  Y.  ,Supp. 
116. 

Where  a  contributory  negligence 
was  a  defense  in  a  personal  injury 
case,  an  instruction  that  the  words, 
"intoxicated  condition"  meant  that 
condition  which  the  defendant  was 
incapable  of  giving  attention  to 
what  he  was  doing,  as  a  prudent 
and  reasonable  intelligence  would 
give,  was  held  correct.  Kenney  v. 
Khinolander,  28  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
246;  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  1088;  Nash 
v.  Southern  R.  Co.  136  Ala.  177; 
33  So.  932;  96  Am.  St.  19;  John- 
son V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  Co..  104 
Ala.  246 ;    16  So.  76 ;    53  Am.  St.  39. 


5G  Ring  V.  Ring,  1 12  Ga.  854 ;  38  S. 
E.  330  (allowing  a  divorce  for  habi- 
tual intoxication  of  either  party). 
Youngs  V.  Youngs,  130  111.  230;  22 
N.  E.  806;  6  L.  R.  A.  548;  17  Am. 
St.  313.  A  statute  may  change  the 
rule.  Burt  v.  Burt,  168  Mass.  204; 
46  N.  E.  622;  Dawson  v.  Dawson, 
23  Mo.  App.  169;  Ring  v.  Ring, 
112  Ga.  854;  38  So.  330.  But 
while  this  is  true,  yet  a  complaint 
charging  the  defendant  became  and 
was  found  intoxicated,  is  sufficient, 
without  alleging  upon  what  he  be- 
came intoxicated ;  for  the  presump- 
tion is  that  it  was  upon  the  usual 
intoxicating  beverages.  State  v. 
Kelley,  47  Vt.  294. 

A  statute  forbidding  a  sale  to  a 
person  in  the  "habit  of  getting  in- 
toxicated" does  not  mean  the  habit 
of  drinking  intoxicating  liquors 
immoderately.  The  word  "intoxi- 
cated" was  construed  to  mean  to 
become  inebriate  or  drunk.  Intem- 
perance does  not  necessarily  imply 
drunkenness,  it  being  defined  to  be 
the  use  of  anvthing  beyond  mod- 
eration. Mullinix  v.  People,  76  III. 
211. 

A  law  authorizing  a  city  to  "pre- 
vent   and     restrain     drunkenness" 


§§  50-52. 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


64 


Sec.  50.     Intemperate  habits. 

"A  mail  who  is  in  the  habit  of  getting  drunk  now  and 
then,  or  getting  under  the  influence  of  liquor  every  once 
in  a  while,  is  a  man  of  intemperate  habits. ' '  °^ 

Sec.  51.    Habitual  drunkenness. 

Habitual  drunkenness  is  a  distinct  fact  within  itself;  a 
■condition  of  body  and  mind  produced  by  the  excessive  use 
of  intoxicating  liquors,  confirmed  by  habit.  No  more  than 
in  cases  of  insanity  can  it  be  described  or  defined  by  the 
causes  that  produced  it  in  any  one  instance,  because  the 
indulgence  in  intoxicating  liquors  has  different  effects  upon 
different  persons.^^  A  frequent  and  regular  recurrence  of 
excess  of  indulgence  in  intoxicating  liquor  constitutes  the 
habit  of  habitual  drunkenness.^^ 

Sec.  52.    Habitual  drunkard. 

An  habitual  drunkard  is  a  person  whose  habits  of  drunk- 
enness are  confirmed  and  continual ;  -"^  one  who  has  formed 


empowers  it  to  prohibit  the  sale 
or  giving  of  intoxicating  liquors 
to  an  habitual  drunkard.  Woods  v. 
Pineville,  19  Ore.  108;  23  Pac.  880. 

A  statute  forbidding  the  issu- 
ance of  letters  of  administration 
to  a  person  incompetent  to  admin- 
ister the  affairs  of  the  estate  by 
reason  of  drunkenness  does  not  in- 
clude every  species  of  drunken- 
ness, but  only  when  the  drunken- 
ness produces  such  a  defect  in  the 
person  applying  for  them  as  to 
amount  to  a  lack  of  intelligence  or 
habitual  drunkenness.  In  re  Man- 
ly's  Estate,  12  N.  Y.  Misc.  Eep. 
472;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  258. 

Absolute  drunkenness  as  a  de- 
fense against  contracts  does  not 
mean  complete  insensibility,  nor 
dead  drunk.  Cavinder  v.  Wad- 
dingham,  5  Mo.  App.  457. 

A  witness  may  testify  directly 
concerning  the  habit  of  the  per- 
son   in    question    with    resi)ect   to 


his  use  of  intoxicating  liquors. 
Sheppelman  v.  People,  134  111. 
App.   556. 

■'•"  Elkiu  V.  Buschner  (Pa.),  16 
Atl.   102. 

ns  Trigg  v.  State,  49  Tex.  645. 

■'■'9  Golding  V.  Golding,  6  Mo.  App. 
602 ;  McClanahan  v.  McClanahan, 
104  Tenn.  217;  56  S.  W.  858;  State 
v.  Robinson,  111  Ala.  482;  20  'So. 
30;  Tatum  v.  State,  63  Ala.  147; 
Stanley  v.  State,  26  Ala.  26;  Smith 
v.  State,  55  Ala.  1 ;  Ludwick  v. 
Commonwealth,  6  Harris,  172; 
State  v.  Pratt,  34  Vt.  323 ;  North- 
western Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mus- 
kegon Bank,  122  U.  S.  501 ;  7  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  1221;  30  L.  Ed.  1100; 
Ring  V.  Ring,  112  Ga.  854;  38  S. 
E.  330;  Gallagher  v.  People,  120 
111.  170;  11  N.  E.  335;  DeLesder- 
nier  v.  DeLesdernier,  45  La.  Ann. 
13'64;    14   So.    191. 

soGourlay  v.  Gourlay,  16  R.  L 
705;    19  Atl.   142. 


65  DEFINITIONS.  §  O'^ 

the  habit  and  indulged  in  it,  of  drinking  to  excess  and 
becoming  intoxicated,  whether  daily  or  continuously  or  pe- 
riodically, with  sober  intervals  of  a  greater  or  less  extent.*'^ 
Usually  he  becomes  drunk  whenever  the  temptation  is  pre- 
sented by  being  near  where  liquors  are  sold,®-  and  who  has 
lost  his  power  of  will,  by  frequent  indulgence,  to  control 
his  appetite  for  drink."''  A  person  may  be  more  frequently 
sober  than  drunk  and  still  be  an  habitual  drunkard.*^*  Oc- 
casional acts  of  drunkenness  do  not  make  a  person  an  habi- 
tual drunkard,  nor  is  it  necessary  that  he  be  continually 
in  a  state  of  intoxication.  He  may  be  an  habitual  drunk- 
ard and  yet  be  sober  for  days  and  weeks  together.""'  One 
who  has  so  indulged  his  appetite  for  liquor  as  to  become 
subject  to  delirium  tremens  may  properly  be  regarded  as  an 
habitual  drunkard.""  An  habitual  drunkard,  within  the 
provisions  of  a  statute  allowing  a  divorce  from  such  a  per- 
son, is  one  given  to  inebriety  or  the  use  of  intoxicating 
drink,  and  who  has  lost  the  power  of  will  by  frequent  in- 
dulgence to  control  his  appetite  for  it."^ 

61  Miller  v.  Gleason,  18  Ohio  Cir.  and  rule  of  a  man's  life  is  to  in- 
Ct.  Rep.  374;  10  Ohio  C.  D.  20;  dulge  periodically,  and  with  in- 
C'ommonwealth  v.  McNamee,  112  creasing  frequency  and  violence,  in 
Miss.      286 ;      Brown     v.      Brown,  excessive  fits  of  intemperance,  such 

38  Ark.  324 ;  Ludwick  v.  Common-  a  use  of  liquor  may  properly  cause 
wealth,  18  Pa.  St.  172.  the   finding   of    habitual    drunken- 

62  Magahay      v.      Magahay,      3.5  ness."      Xorthwestern     IMut.     Life; 

Mich.  210;  Tatum  v.  State,  63  Ala.  Ins.  Co.,  122  U.  S.  501;  30  L.  Ed. 

147.  1100;    7   Sup.   Ct.   Rep.   1221;   Ap- 
es Sutton  V.  Grand  Lodge  A.  O.  peal   of  Miskey,   107  Pa.   St.   611; 

U.  W.,  84  Mo.  App.  208.  State  v.  Ryan,  70  Wis.  676;  36  N. 

64  Brown  v.  Brown,  38  Ark.  324;  W.  823;  Ins.  Co.  v.  Foley,  105  U. 
State  V.  Pratt,  34  Vt.  323.  S,  350. 

65  Ludwick  V.  Commonwealth,  (!  66  Menkins  v.  Lightner,  18  111. 
Harris    (Pa.)    172;   Commonwealth  *282, 

v.  Whitney,  5  Gray,  85 ;  McBee  v.  67  Richards      v.      Richards,      19 

McBee,  22  Ore.  320;   20  Pac.  887;  Bradw.  (111.)  465;  McBee  v.  McBee, 

29  Am.  St.   613;    Murphy  v.  Peo-  22  Ore.  329;  29  Pac.  887;  29  Am. 

pie,  90  111.  59;   Mack  v.  Harding,  St.  613;   Bizer  v.  Bizer,  110  Iowa, 

39  La.  Ann.  491;  2  So.  181.  248;    81    N.    W.    465;    Walton   v. 
"Neither    does   a    single   nor   an  Walton,  34  Kan.  195;  8  Pac.  110; 

occasional  excess  make  a  man  an  Burns  v.  Burns,  13  Fla.  376;  Mack 
habitual  drunkard,  but  of  the  habit      v.  Handy,  39  La.  491;  2  So.  181; 


§53 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


66 


Sec.  53.     Habitual  intemperance. 

"Tlie   phrase,    'habitual   intemperance,'   means   the    cus- 
tom or  habit  of  getting  drunk;  the  constant  indulgence  in 


Youngs  V.  Youngs,  130  111.  230;  17 
Am.  St.  313;  Meathe  v.  Meathe, 
83  Mich.  150;  47  N.  W.  109;  Ma- 
hone  V.  Mahone,  19  Cal.  626;  81 
Am.  Dec.  91;  Rude  v.  Nass,  79 
Wis.  321;  48  N.  W.  555;  24  Am. 
St.  717. 

"It  is  not  necessary  that  he 
should  drink  liquors  to  excess  and 
become  intoxicated  every  day,  or 
even  every  week,  but  there  must 
be  such  frequent  repetition  of  ex- 
cessive indulgence  as  to  engender  a 
fixed  habit  of  drunkenness.  Occa- 
sional acts  cf  intoxication  are  not 
sufficient  to  make  one  a  habitual 
drunkard;  there  must  be  the  in- 
voluntary tendency  to  become  in- 
toxicated as  often  as  the  tempta- 
tion is  presented,  which  comes 
from  a  fixed  habit,  acquired  from 
frequent  excessive  indulgence.  The 
man  is  reduced  to  that  pitiable 
condition  in  which  he  'either  makes 
no  vigorous  effort  to  resist  and 
overcome  the  habit,  or  his  will  has 
become  so  enfeebled  by  the  indul- 
gence that  resistance  is  impossible.' 
There  is  generated  in  him,  by  fre- 
quent and  excessive  indulgence,  a 
fixed  habit  of  drunkenness  which  he 
is  liable  to  exhibit  at  any  time 
when  the  opportunity  is  afforLl._J. 
Hs  is  an  habitual  drunkard  because 
he  is  commonly  or  frequently  in 
the  habit  of  getting  drunk,  al- 
though he  may  not  always  be  so. 
When  a  man  has  reached  such  a 
state  that  his  inebriety  has  become 
habitual,  its  effect  upon  his  char- 
acter and  conduct  is  to  disqualify 


him  from  properly  attending  to  his 
business,  and  if  he  be  married  to 
render  his  presence  in  the  marriage 
relation  disgusting  and  intolera- 
ble, especially  if  he  be  an  'habitual 
gross  drunkard,'  as  declared  by  our 
statute."  MeBee  v.  IMcBee,  22  Ore, 
329;  29  Am.  St.  613;  29  Pac.  887. 

Proof  that  a  person  for  any 
considerable  part  of  his  time  was 
so  intoxicated  as  to  deprive  him 
of  his  ordinary  reasoning  faculties, 
is  prima  facie  evidence  that  he  is 
incapacitated,  as  an  habitual 
drunkard,  to  have  control  and  man- 
agement of  his  property,  within  the 
meaning  of  a  statute  giving  the 
care  of  drunkards  to  the  court.  In 
re  Tracy,  1  Paige  580. 

Where  a  statute  forbade  a  liquor 
dealer  selling  to  "habitual  drunk- 
ards," it  was  held  this  term  was 
used  in  its  common  acceptation, 
and  did  not  mean  an  "ha- 
bitual drunkard"  as  defined  in  a 
statute  authorizing  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  guardian  for  such  a  per- 
son, the  capacity  of  a  person  to 
take  care  of  hi-nself  or  property 
being  immaterial.  Campbell  v. 
Jones,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  263;  21  S. 
W.  723. 

Whether  or  not  a  person  is  an 
"habitual  drunkard"  is  a  question 
for  the  jury.  Wilson  v.  White,  29 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  588 ;  69  S.  W.  989 ; 
Kammon  v.  People,  24  111.  App. 
388;  affn-mcd  124  111.  481;  16  N. 
E.  661 ;  Murphy  v.  People,  90  ill. 
59;  Harrison  v.  Ely,  120  111.  83; 
11  N.  E.  334.     The  court  cannot 


67 


DEFINITIONS. 


§53 


such  stimulants  as  wine,  brandy  and  whisky,  whereby  in- 
toxication is  produced;  not  the  ordinary  use,  but  the  habi- 
tual use  of  them.  The  habit  should  be  actual  or  confirmed. 
It  may  be  intermittent.  It  need  not  be  continuous  or  even 
of  daily  occurrence. " ««  The  habit  need  not  be  such  as 
to  render  the  person  at  all  times  incapable  of  attending 
to  his  business.*^®  The  term  as  used  in  the  statutes  does 
not  include  the  excessive  and  habitual  use  of  opiates 
or  drugs.^°  A  statute  allowing  a  divorce  for  habitual  drunk- 
enness includes  fixed  habits  of  drinking  to  excess,  so  much 
so  as  to  disqualify  a  person  from  attending  to  his  business 
during  the  principal  part  of  the  time  usually  devoted  to 
business,^^  and  proof  of  occasional  drunkenness  is  not  suf- 


say  to  the  jury  that  "when  a  per- 
son gets  intoxicated  from  three  to 
five  times  in  two  years  at  some 
particular  time^  then  he  is  in  law 
a  person  who  is  in  the  habit  of 
getting  intoxicated."  Kammon  v. 
People,  124  111.  481;  16  N.  E.  CGI; 
affirming  24  111.  App.  388;  ^State  v. 
Pratt,  34  Vt.  323.  That  one  is  an 
habitual  drunkard  cannot  be  prov- 
en by  opinions;  it  must  be  proven 
by  facts.  Gallagher  v.  People,  29 
III.  App.  397;  affirmed  120  111. 
179;    11  N.  E.  335. 

Drinking  until  senile  dementia 
sets  in  because  of  the  drink  makes 
a  man  an  habitual  drunkard.  Rob- 
ertson v.  Lyon,  24  S.  C.  266. 

"Gross  and  confirmed  drunken- 
ness" by  the  use  of  drugs,  as  a 
ground  for  a  divorce,  does  not  in- 
clude an  occasional  condition  of 
drunkenness,  even  though  the  con- 
firmed and  gross  character  of  the 
use  has  ceased  for  a  time;  but  the 
use  must  be  excessive  and  must 
produce  certain  results.  Burt  v. 
Burt,  168  Mass.  204;  46  N.  E.  622. 
See  Blaney  v.  Blaney,  126  Mass. 
205. 


The  word  "incompetent,"  as  ap- 
plied to  a  drunkard,  does  not  in- 
clude a  drunkard  generally.  In 
such  a  case  incompetency  is  held 
to  apply  to  a  particular  act,  and 
then  only  where  the  evidence  shows 
that  his  understanding  was  cloud- 
ed or  his  reason  dethroned  by  ac- 
tual intoxication.  Wright  v.  Fish- 
er, 65  Mich.  275;  32  N.  E.  605; 
8  Am.  St.  886. 

GsMack  v.  Handy,  39  La.  Ann. 
491;  2  So.  183;  Williams  v.  Goss, 
43  La..  Ann.  868;  9  So.  750;  Burns 
v.  Burns,  13  Fla.  369;  McGill  v. 
McGill,  19  Fla.  341;  .Dennis  v. 
Dennis,  68  Conn.  186;  36  Atl.  34; 
34  L.  R.  A.  449;  57  Am.  St.  95; 
Ring  V.  Ring,  112  Ga.  854;  38  S. 
E.  330. 

69Mahone  v.  Mahone,  19  Cal. 
626;  81  Am.  Dec.  91. 

70  Barber  v.  Barber  (Conn.),  14 
L.  Rep.  375;  Burt  v.  Burt,  108 
Mass.  204;  46  K  E.  622;  Ring  v. 
Ring,  supra. 

71  Wheeler  v.  Wheeler,  53  Iowa 
511;  5  N.  W.  689;  36  Am.  Rep. 
240;  ]\fahone  v.  Mahone,  19  Cal. 
626;  81  Am.  Dec.  91. 


§§  54,  55  TRAFFIC   IN   IN-roXICATING  LIQUORS.  ^^ 

ficient.^-  Such  a  statute  does  not  cover  the  use  of  opiated 
to  excess."'  If  a  man  is  an  habitual  drunkard,  however,  sobeif 
periods  will  not  change  his  status.'^* 


Sec.  54.     Confirmed  drunkenness. 

The  term  ' '  gross  and  confirmed  drunkenness, ' '  occasioned 
by  the  use  of  opium  and  drugs  as  a  cause  for  divorce,  in- 
cludes occasional  condition  of  drunkenness  from  the  use  of 
these  substances,  even  though  the  gross  and  confirmed  use  of 
them  has  ceased  for  some  length  of  time.  Not  only  must 
the  use  be  excessive,  but  it  must  also  produce  a  certain 
result.'^  Confirmed  habits  of  intoxication  means  intoxi- 
cation whenever  the  opportunity  offers.'"' 

Sec.  55.     "Saloon"  defined — Limited  to  one  room. 

In  Georgia  it  has  been  held  that  the  question  whether  two' 
rooms  in  a  i)articular  house  in  which  it  is  proposed  to  sell 
spirituous  liquors  are  in  truth  two  distinct  places,  is  a 
question  of  fact."  But  in  Illinois  it  is  held  that  a  license 
to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  in  "a  saloon"  will  not  author- 
ize the  holder  of  the  license  to  sell  such  liquors  in  two  dif- 
ferent rooms  of  a  building,  the  eourt  holding  that  a  salooa 
is  the  place,  w'ithin  the  meaning  of  the  law,  where  liquor- 
may  be  sold,  and  not  necessarily  the  building  in  which  the 
saloon  is  located.  This  is  in  harmony  wnth  Webster's  defi- 
nition that  a  saloon  is  "popularly  a  public  room  for  spe- 
cific uses,  especially  a  barroom  or  grogshop."  In  other 
words,  the  popular  idea  associated  with  the  word  "saloon" 
is  that  it  is  a   room  rather  than   a  building  wnth   several 

T2Meathe    v.   Meathe,    83    Mich.  S.  E.  80,5;  Berryman  v.  Berryman, 

150;  47  N.  W.  109;  Powers  v.  Pow-  59  Mich.  605;  26  N.  W.  789. 
ers,  20  Neb.  529;  31  N.  W.  1.  75  Burt  v.  Burt,  168  Mass.  204; 

73  Dawson    v.    Dawson,    23    Mo.  46  N.  E.  622. 

App.  169;  Burt  v.  Burt,  168  Mass.  vt;  nianey   v.   Blaney,    126   Mass. 

204;   46  X.  E.  622;   Rin^  v.  Ring,  205. 

112  Gra.  854;   38  S.  B.  330.  77  Sanders  v.  Town  Council,  50' 

74  Brown  v.  Brown,  38  Ark.  324;  Ga.  178, 
Fuller  V.  Fuller,   108  Ga.  256;   33 


69 


DEFINITIONS, 


§55 


rooms. "^  And  in  Nebraska  it  is  said  that  the  word  has 
acquired  a  restricted  meaning,  being  usually  applied  only 
to  places  where  liquors  are  sold  by  retail,  and  that  a  licensed 
saloon  keeper  means  a  person  licensed  to  sell  intoxicating 
liquors.'^  And  in  the  American  and  English  Law  Encyclo- 
pedia it  is  said:  "One  license  will  not  authorize  the  person 
or  persons  licensed  to  conduct  the  business  in  more  than 
one  place.  A  license  is  necessary  for  each  place  in  which  the 
busines  is  conducted.  A  sale  at  any  other  place  than  that 
designated  in  a  license  is  illegal. ' '  ^° 


78  Schwuchow  V.  City  of  Chicago, 
68  111.  442;  Malkan  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago (III.),  75  X.  E.  548. 

79  McDoiigal  V.  Giacomini,  13 
Xeb.  4.31 ;  14  X.  W.  450;  McMintay 
V.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  521;  43 
S.  W.  1010;  Leesburg  v.  Putnam, 
103  Ga.  110;  29  S.  E.  602;  68  Am. 
St.  80 ;  Clinton  v.  Gruesendorf,  79 
Iowa   117;  45  X.  W.  407. 

80  State  V.  Prettyman,  3  Harr. 
(Del.),   570;    State  v.   Walker,    IG 

Me.  241  ;  Commonwealth  v.  East- 
brook,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  293; 
Masson  v.  Severance,  2  X.  H.  501 ; 
Matter  of  Lyman,  40  X.  Y.  App. 
Div.  46;  Zinner  v.  Commonwealth 
(Pa.  1888),  14  Atl.  431. 

The  sale  of  ice  cream  and  soda 
water  does  not  make  a  place  a  "sa- 
loon," eating  house  or  restaurant 
within  the  meaning  of  a  statute 
requiring  such  places  to  have  a  li- 
cense. In  re  Henry,  124  Iowa,  358 ; 
100  X.  W.  43. 

Generally  it  may  be  said  a  sa- 
loon is  a  barroom  or  grogshop, 
which  is  devoted  to  the  retailing 
of  intoxicating  liquors.  Leesburg 
V.  Putnam,  103  Ga.  110;  29  S.  E. 
602;  68  Am.  St.  80;  Cardillo  v. 
People,  26  Colo.  355 ;  58  Pae.  678 ; 
Goozen  v.  Phillips,  49  Mich,  7;   12 


X.  W.  889;  Clinton  v.  Gruesendorf, 
80  Iowa  117;    45  X.  W.  407. 

Yet  it  has  been  held  that  it  does 
not  necessarily  mean  a  place  where 
intoxicating  liquors  are  sold  at  re- 
tail, but  may  apply  to  a  place 
where  persons  resort  to  obtain  food 
or  drink  and  which  is  not  devoted 
to  some  other  business.  Kitson  v. 
Ann  Arbor,  26  Mich.  325;  State  v. 
Mansker,  36  Tex.  364;  Snow  v. 
State,  50  Ark.  557;  9  S.  W.  306; 
Springfield  v.  State  (Tex.),  13  S. 
W.  752 ;  Brewer  etc.  Co.  v.  Bod- 
die,  181  111.  622;  55  X.  E.  49; 
Wolf  V.  Lansing,  53  Mich.  367; 
19  X.  W.  38. 

A  place  where  cider,  birch  beer, 
ginger  ale  and  like  refreshments 
have  been  sold  and  served  in  the 
usual  manner  of  saloons  or  dram- 
sliops,  has  been  held  to  come  with- 
in the  provisions  of  a  statute  mak- 
ing it  a  misdemeanor  to  permit  a 
miner  to  play  pool  in  a  dram-shop 
or  saloon.  Snow  v.  State,  50  Ark. 
557;  9  S.  W.  306. 

And  proof  of  playing  in  a  saloon 
does  not  necessarily  show  the  play- 
ing took  placo  where  intoxicating 
liquors  were  sold  or  for  sale. 
Springfield  v.  State  (Tex.),  13  S.  VV. 
752;   Early  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App. 


§56 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS 


70 


Sec.  56.    Saloon  keeper — Merchant. 

A  saloon  keeper  is  one  who  keeps  a  saloon,  and  he  may 
be  so  described  in  a  certificate  describing  his  business  ;^- 
but  every  man  making  a  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  is 
not  a  saloon  keeper.^"     But  the  United  States  statutes  ^*  re- 


364;  5  S.  W.  122;  and  an  indict- 
ment charging  the  burning  of  a 
saloon  is  not  suflicient,  for  the 
word  also  means- "either  a  spacious 
and  elegant  apartment  for  the  re- 
ception of  a  company,  or  for  works 
of  art,  as  Webster  defines  the 
word,  or  that  the  building  was 
used  as  a  shop  for  the  retail  of  in- 
toxicating liquor."  State  v.  O'Con- 
nell,  26  Ind.  266.  So  proof  that 
a  brewing  company  took  a  lease  on 
a  room  for  a  "saloon"  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  show  that  it  was  a 
place  where  intoxicating  liquors 
were  sold  and  not  a  place  where 
soda  water  was  sold,  as  to  render 
the  lease  ultra  vires  on  the  part  of 
the  corporation.  Brewer  etc.  Co. 
V.  Boddie,  181  111.  6^2 ;  55  N.  E.  49. 
An  act  fixing  the  time  for  the 
opening  and  closing  of  "saloons" 
refers  to  places  where  intoxicating 
liquors  are  sold.  Exparte  Living- 
stone, 20  Nev.  282;  21  Pac.  322; 
Cardillo  v.  People,  26  Colo.  355;  58 
Pac.  678;  Dewar  v.  People,  40 
Mich.  401 ;  29  Am.  Rt-p.  545. 

And  it  has  been  held  that  an 
ordinance  requiring  all  saloons  to 
be  closed  at  11  p.  m.  includes  a 
place  where  intoxicating  liquors, 
beer,  wine,  pop,  cigars,  and  gin- 
ger ale  are  sold.  Clinton  v.  Grues- 
ondorf,  80  Iowa  117;  45  N.  W. 
407. 

An  inclosed  park  in  which  li- 
quors are  sold  is  not  a  saloon. 
State  V.  Barr,  39  Conn.  40. 

A  "barroom"  and  "saloon"  arc 


the  same  and  are  what  are  repre- 
sented by  a  "tippling  house"  or 
"grogshop,"  but  authority  to  reg- 
ulate them  given  a  city  does  not 
authorize  said  city  to  regulate  dis- 
pensaries. Leesburg  v.  Putnam, 
103  Ga.  110;  29  S.  B.  602;  68  Am. 
St.  80. 

A  statute  authorizing  the  court 
to  close  any  place  where  it  is  used 
unlawfully  for  the  manufacture 
and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  for 
saloon  purposes,  applies  only  to 
such  places  as  are  used  for  retail- 
ing, manufacturing  and  keeping  in- 
toxicating liquors.  Craig  v. 
Werthmueller,  78  Iowa  598;  43  X. 
W.  606. 

The  word  "store"  has  been  held 
to  include  a  place  for  the  sale  of 
oysters  and  beer.  Commonwealth 
v.  Whalen,  131  Mass.  419. 

Beer  saloon,  "A  place  where 
beer  is  sold  and  drank."  Century 
Dictionary. 

Beer  shop.  "A  beer  saloon ;  an 
ale  house."     Century  Dictionary. 

B'^cr  house.  "A  house  where 
malt  liquors  are  sold;  an  ale 
house."     Century  Dictionary. 

Beer  garden.  "A  garden  at- 
tached to  a  brewery,  tavern  or  sa- 
Icon.  in  which  beer  is  served." 
Century  Div^tionary. 

82Cahill  v.  Campbell,  105  Mass. 
40. 

83  Sparta  v.  P.oorom,  129  Mich. 
555;   89  N.  W.  435. 

84  Revised  Statutes.  §5110,  sub- 
div.  7. 


71  DEFINITIONS.  §§  57-59 

quiring  "merchants  and  tradesmen"  to  keep  proper  books 
of  account  as  a  condition  to  a  discharge  in  bankruptcy  in- 
cludes a  saloon  keeper  selling  for  cash  and  on  credit.*'"'  A 
statute  authorizing  "merchants"  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors 
in  quantities  not  less  than  a  quart  means  "one  who  is  really 
engaged  in  the  business  of  a  merchant.  If  an  individual, 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  selling  liquor,  should  have  on 
hand  a  few  goods  for  sale  as  a  cover  for  his  real  object, 
and  was  not  actually  and  in  good  faith  engaged  in  mer- 
chandising, he  could  not  bring  himself  within"  its  pro- 
visions *^ 

Sec.  57.    Tippling  house. 

A  tippling  house  does  not  differ  in  meaning  from  a  sa- 
loon. It  is  a  place  where  men  resort  to  purchase  intoxi- 
cating liquor  by  the  drink  or  dram  and  where  the  liquor 
purchased  is  consumed.^^  "To  keep  open"  a  tippling  house 
it  is  npcp<5sn^v  that  linuor  be  sold  or  drunk  there,^^  and  the 
liquor  sold  must  be  intoxicating.^^  It  is  not  necessarily  a 
disorderly  house,  or  s.ynonymous  or  identical  therewith.^" 

Sec.  58.    Liquor  shop. 

Where  "liquor  shop"  was  used  in  a  statute  it  was  held 
that  it  would  apply  to  a  dwelling  house  if  that  was  the 
business  of  the  occupant.** 

Sec.  59.    Tavern  keeper. 

"A  tavern  keeper,"  said  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio, 
"has  for  many  years  past  been  understood  to  import  a  per- 

85 /n  re  Sherwood,  21   Fed.  Cas.  drank    in    small    quantities,    with- 

1285.  out    having    a    license    therefor;" 

86  Commonwealth  v.  McGregor,  but  it  is  quite  manifest  that  a 
9  B.  Mon.  3.  house  may  be  a  tippling  house  re- 

87  Emporia  v.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  gardless  of  the  question  of  a  li« 
622;    Patten   v.   Centralia,   47    III.  cense. 

370;   Koop  V.  People,  47  111.  327;  ss  Fant  v.  People,  45  111.  259. 

Woods  V.  Commonwealth,  1  B.  Mon.  89  Koop  v.  People,  47  111.  327. 

74;  Moore  V.  State,  9  Yerg.  353.  so  Emporia  v.   Volmer,    12   Kan. 

In  the   first  case  cited   it   is  de-  C22. 
fined  as  "a  place  of  public  resort  si  Wooster    v.    State,    6    Baxt. 

where  spirituous,  fermented  or  oth-  533. 
or  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold  and 


§§60,61  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  72 

son  licensed  to  retail  liquor  at  a  house  kept  by  him  for 
public  entertainment.  A  license  to  keep  a  tavern,  there- 
fore, in  its  ordinary  signification,  was  understood  to  be  a 
license  to  retail  liquor  and  keep  a  house  of  entertainment. ' '  ''' 
Such  was  the  definition  given  the  term  in  Ohio  when  taken 
in  connection  with  the  right  to  retail  intoxicating  liquor 
ander  a  license  given  the  keeper  of  a  tavern ;  and  such  was 
the  signification  given  the  term  in  Kentucky  under  like 
circumstances.  But  that  meaning  does  not  obtain  in  other 
States.  Thus  the  terms,  "an  inn"  and  "innholder"  are 
synonymous  with  ' '  tavern ' '  and  tavern  keeper ; "  ''^  but 
it  could  not  be  seriously  claimed  that  an  "innkeeper"  would 
be  entitled  to  a  license  merely  because  he  was  such.®* 

Sec.  60.    Sample  room. 

Under  a  statute  making  it  an  offense  of  burglary  to 
break  into  "a  shop,  store,  warehouse  or  other  building, 
istructure  or  inclosure  in  which  any  goods,  merchandise 
or  other  valuable  thing  w^as  kept  for  use,  sale  or  deposit," 
an  indictment  charging  a  breaking  into  "a  sample  room 
in  the  Arlington  Hotel,  a  building  in"  a  certain  city,  was 
held  insufficient ;  for  it  did  not  show  that  the  room  was 
a  shop,  nor  a  store,  nor  a  warehouse,  nor  "other  structure" 
in  which  goods,  merchandise  or  other  valuable  thing  were 
kept  for  use,  sale  or  deposit.  The  indictment  should  have 
leharged  a  breaking  into  the  hotel.''^ 

Sec.  61.    Dramshop — Dramshop  keeper. 

A  dramshop  is  a  place — as  a  saloon  or  bar — where  in- 
toxicating liquors  are  sold  at  retail,  usually  by  the  drink 

92  Hirn  v.  State,  1  Ohio  St.  15  o*  Norcross  v.  Norcross,  53  Me. 
(overruling  Curtis  V.  State,  5  Ohio  163;  Kelly  v.  Commissioners,  54 
324);  State  v.  Chamblyss,  1  How.  Pr.  327;  State  v.  Cloud,  6 
Cheves,  220;  34  Am.  Dec.  593;  Ala.  628;  Page  v.  State,  11  Ala. 
Braswell  V.  Commonwealth,  5  Bush  849;  Benson  v.  Moore,  15  Wend. 
644;  Commonwealth  v.  Kemp,  14  260;  St.  Louis  v.  Siegrist,  46  Mo. 
B.  Mon.  385.  593 ;  Savier  v.  Chipman,  15  Wend. 

93  Overseers  v.  Woerner,  3   Hill,  260. 

150 ;    Bonner   v.    Wellborn,    7    Ga.  "5  Thomas  v.   State,  97   Ala.  3 ; 

296.  12  So.  409, 


73  DEFINITIONS.  §§62,63 

or  dram."*'  But  under  a  statute  where  a  dramshop  is  de- 
fined to  be  a  place  where  vinous,  malt  and  spirituous  liquors 
are  retailed  in  less  quantities  than  a  gallon,  the  term  covers 
a  drug  store  and  other  places  where  liquors  are  sold  at  re- 
tail.^^  Under  a  lease  prohibiting  a  subletting  for  a  dram- 
shop a  lease  to  one  to  keep  a  "sample  room"  or  "family 
resort,"  w^here  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold  at  retail,  is  a 
breach  of  its  provisions."'  A  dramshop  keeper  is  a  person 
keeping  a  dramshop,  usually  by  statute  under  a  license  to 
sell  at  retail."" 

Sec.  62.     Barroom. 

A  barroom  is  a  room  where  intoxicating  liquors  are  pub- 
licly sold,  to  be  there  drunk.^ 

Sec.  63.     Bar  defined. 

The  word  "bar"  has  a  definite  signification  in  liquor 
statutes,  especially  in  England.  Thus  a  statute  provided 
that  "if  a  child  is  found  in  the  bar  of  any  licensed  prem- 
ises, except  during  the  hours  of  closing,  the  holder  of  the 
license  shall  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  offense  *  *  *  " ; 
and  in  subsection  of  the  same  statute  it  is  declared  that 
"the  bar"  shall  be  deemed  to  mean  "any  open  drinking 
bar  or  any  part  of  the  premises  exclusively  or  mainly  used 
for  the  sale  and  consumption  of  intoxicating  liquor." 
Before  the  stipendiary  magistrate  at  Leeds  the  question 
arose  whether  a  terrace  adjoining  the  back  of  the  tavern,  to- 
ss Brockway  v.  State,  36  Ark.  See  People  v.  Harrison,  191  111. 
629;  Snow  v.  State,  50  Ark.  557;  257;  61  N.  E.  99. 
9  S.  W.  306;  Hewitt  V.  People,  186  98  Bryden    v.    Northrup,    58    111. 

111.  336;  57  N.  E.  1077;   Common-       App.  233. 

wealth    V.    Marzynski,    149    Mass.  99  state   v.    Slate,    24   Mo.    530; 

849;    21    N.    E.   228;    Feldman   v.       State  v.  Owen,  15  Mo.  506. 
Morrison,    1    Bradw.     (111.)     430;  It  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  in- 

State  V.  Minnesota  Club   (Minn.),       struct  the  jury  as  to  the  meaning 
119    N.    VV.    494;     Rank    v.    Peo-       of   the  Avord   dramshop.     Cross  v. 
pie,   80    111.    App.    40;    Strauss   v.       People,  66  111.  App.  170. 
Gaulsburg,  203  111.  234;   67  N.  E.  i  Exparte     Schneider,      11     Ore. 

83,6.  288;    8  Pac.  289;    Bieser  v.   State, 

97  Wright  V.  People,  101  111.  126.       79  Ga.  326;  4  S.  E.  257. 


§  63  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    IJQU0R3  74 

gether  with  a  grassy  slope  leading  towards  a  bowling-green, 
constituted  "the  bar"  within  the  meaning  of  this  statute. 
'  *  The  terrace  was  used  as  a  pleasure  ground  on  which  various 
kinds  of  refreshments  were  supplied,  and  it  was  proved 
that  at  or  about  the  time  of  the  alleged  offense  something 
more  than  forty  per  cent,  of  the  gross  takings  in  this  area 
resulted  from  the  sale  of  food  and  non-intoxicants,  leaving 
less  than  sixty  per  cent  attributable  to  the  sale  of  beer  and 
other  intoxicating  liquors.  It  was  contended,  however, 
that  it  was  mainly  used  for  such  sale  and  consumption,  and 
therefore  formed  'the  bar.'  The  magistrate  in  dismissing 
the  summons,  said  that  even  if  the  place  were  a  mere  re- 
freshment counter,  he  would  hesitate  to  find  that  it  was 
mainly  used  for  the  sale  and  consumption  of  intoxicating 
liquor,  simply  because  the  aggregate  value  of  intoxicants 
sold  exceeded  that  of  the  residue  of  the  articles  consumed. 
And  where,  as  in  the  present  case,  there  was  a  stretch  ot 
pleasure  ground  frequented  by  persons  who  resorted  there 
to  partake  of  light  refreshments  in  the  open  air  while  en- 
joying such  other  amenities  as  the  spot  afforded,  the  license 
holder  was  not  brought  within  the  penal  provisions  of  the 
act  because  many  of  the  people  preferred  ale  to  tea.  The 
place  was  certainly  not  a  'bar'  in  any  sense  or  signification 
which  attaches  or  has  ever  attached  to  that  word  in  com- 
mon parlance  or  English  literature,  and  this  was  important 
in  construing  a  subsection  which  was  intended,  as  he  sup- 
posed, to  prevent  such  evasions  of  the  act  as  would  follow 
a  strict  and  inflexible  interpretation  of  the  word.  The 
word  in  the  subsection  was  'means,'  not  'shall  include,' 
so  that  there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  that  'bar'  was  to 
have  meanings  in  addition  to  its  popular  significance.- 
The  case  w^as  not  brought  within  the  letter,  and  did  not 
fall  within  the  spirit  of  the  act.  At  the  same  time  he 
thought  that  if  a  place  were  on  a  particular  day  or  at  a 
particular  hour  used  exclusively  for  the  sale  and  consump- 
tion of  intoxicants,  the  license  holder  would  not  escape  the 
penal  provisions   of  the  statute  by  proving  that   at   other 

2  See  Portsmouth   v.    Smith,    L.   R.  13  Q.  B.  Div.  p.  198. 


75  DEFINITIONS.  §§  64, 65 

times  or  on  other  occasions  it  was  used  wholly  or  mainly 
for  other  purposes.  If  the  course  of  business  were 
such  that  separate  and  distinct  considerations  were  so  plain- 
ly applicable  to  a  particular  day  or  to  a  definite  period 
of  time  as  to  enable  the  court  to  sever  them  separately,  he 
thought  it  would  plainly  be  open  to  a  court  to  do  so."^ 

Sec.  64.     Barroom — Fixtures. 

A  barroom  is  a  room  containing  a  bar  at  which  liquors 
are  sold,  and  it  is  not  a  dispensary ;  *  and  a  statute  allow- 
ing the  sale  of  domestic  wines  if  not  sold  "in  barrooms  by 
retail"  means  a  room  where  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold."' 
Barroom  fixtures  mean,  as  used  in  an  insurance  policy,  fix- 
tures in  a  barroom  as  attached  to  the  realty.** 

Sec.  65.    Barkeeper. 

A  barkeeper  is  not  a  menial;  he  is  not  on  the  same  foot- 
ing with  a  coachman,  waiter  or  gardener.  He  serves 
guests  ex'clusively  and  keeps  his  emploj'er's  books,  and 
is  therefore  more  properly  considered  a  clerk.  Like  the 
cook  or  the  hostler  he  has  an  appropriate  department,  but 
like  them  he  is  under  the  immediate  direction  of  his  mas- 
ter. "The  duties  of  the  barkeeper  [of  a  taveni]  are  as 
various  in  their  nature  as  any  other  person  employed 
about  a  tavern.  We  know  that  his  services  are  not  con- 
fined to  keeping  the  books  or  attending  to  the  bar  of  the 
house.  It  is  usually  expected  that  he  will  have  an  eye  to 
the  general  conduct  of  the  other  servants,  to  the  marketing, 
and  in  short  to  the  whole  business  of  the  house.  He  is 
usually  the  locum  tenens  of  the  landlord  in  his  absence,  and 
his  business  is  of  domestic  as  well  as  public  eoncern."^ 

3  Memorandum     in     60     Central  Army   and   Navy   Club  v.  District 

Law  Journal,  p.  381.  of  Columbia,  8  App.  Cas.    (D.  C.) 

*  Leesburg   v.   Putnam,    103   Ga.  544. 

110:  20  R.  E.  602;   68  Am.  St.  80.  6  Regard  v.   California   Ins.   Co., 

sBeiser  v.  State.  70  Ca.  326;   4  (Cal.)    11   Pae.  6-04. 

S.  E.  257;  /»i  re  Schneider,  11  Ore.  7  Boniface    v.   Scott,    3   ,S.   &   R. 

288;  8  Pac.  280.  Statutory  defini-  351;  Ex  parte  Meason,  5  Binn,  67. 
tion  27  U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large,  563; 


§§  66-68  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  76 

Sec.  66.     Dram. 

The  common  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"dram"  is  something  that  can  intoxicate,  and  proof  of  a 
sale  of  a  dram,  without  proof  of  the  sale  of  the  ingredients 
constituting  the  liquor  sold  is  sufficient  proof  of  a  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquor.^ 

Sec.  67.     Dealer. 

"A  dealer  is  not  one  who»buys  to  keep  or  makes  to  sell, 
but  one  who  buys  to  sell  again."  Therefore  neither  brew- 
ers of  beer  and  ale  or  distillers  of  alcohol  and  whisky  are 
"dealers,"  but  are  manufacturers.**  A  person  becomes  a 
"dealer"  from  the  moment  when  he  buy  goods  with  an 
intention  to  sell  them  again,^*'  and  the  word  "deal"  under 
the  English  Excise  Act  of  1825  ^^  extends  to  buying  as  well 
as  selling.^- 

Sec.  68.     Wholesaler  and  Retailer. 

Strictly  speaking  the  words  "wholesaler  and  retailer" 
of  liquors  means  a  person  selling  liquor  at  wholesale  and 
retail,  respectively.  Just  where  the  line  is  to  be  drawn 
between  them  cannot  be  well  defined  A  person  who  sells 
by  the  drink  is  clearly  a  "retailer,"  and  one  selling  by 
the  cask,  barrel  or  hogshead  is  a  "wholesaler."  Statutes 
■often  fix  the  amounts  constituting  either  a  retailer  or 
wholesaler,  as  in  Georgia,  where  it  was  held  any  one  sell- 
ing by  the  quart  was  a  wholesaler.^^     And  under  the  United 

8  Lacy  V.  State,  32  Tex.  227.  1°  Regina  v.  Excise  Gommission- 

n  Commonwealth    v.    Rhodes,     1  ers,  2  T.  R.  .381. 
Pittsb.  499;  Taylor  v.  Vincent,  12    ,       n  6  Geo.  4,  c.  81. 

Lea  282;   47  Am.  Rep.  338.  12  Lord  Goleridge,  G.  J.  in  Mac- 

As  to  the  United  States  Internal  kenzie  v.  Day  [1893],  1  Q.  B.,  at  p. 

Revenue  Laws,  see  United  States  v.  291. 

Rennecke,    28    Fed.    847 ;     United  A  dealer  is  one  who  makes  suc- 

States    V.    Smith,    45     Fed.     115;  cessive  sales  as  a  business.    Overall 

United  States  v.  Stevens,  37   Fed.  v.  Bezeau,  37  Mich.  506. 

665;    United    States   v.    Allen,    38  i3  Bieser  v.  State,  79  Ga.  326;  4 

Fed.  736.  S.  E.  257. 


77  DEFINITIONS.  §§  69,  70 

States  revenue  laws  it  has  been  in  times  past  fixed  at  five 
gallons/*  Any  one  who  sells  liquor  in  packages  or  quantities 
to  be  resold  to  the  trade  is  a  wholesaler,  and  one  who  sella 
it  to  consumers  for  the  purpose  of  consumption  is  a  re- 
tailer/'^ But  it  has  been  held  that  a  town  cannot  fix  the 
limit  at  twenty  gallons/** 

Sec.  69,     Common  seller. 

Under  a  jMaine  (and  usually  under  any)  statute  dealing 
with  the  subject  a  common  seller  is  one  who  sells  liquor 
in  small  quantities  to  be  drank  upon  the  premises/^  But  it 
is  not  really  necessary  to  constitute  one  a  common  seller 
that  he  should  sell  the  liquor  to  be  drunk  upon  the  prem- 
ises, for  he  may  be  such  whether  or  not  the  liquor  is  to  be 
drunk  where  sold.  It  is  a  selling  to  such  as  apply  to  him 
for  liquor  by  the  dram  or  small  quantity  that  makes  'lim 
a  common  seller. 

Sec.  70.     Rectifier. 

The  word  "rectifier"  in  the  United  States  statutes  has 
been  thus  defined:  "Any  person  who  rectifies,  purifies  or 
refines  distilled  spirits  or  wines  by  any  process  other  than 
as  provided  for  on  distillery  premises,  and  every  wholesale 
or  retail  liquor  dealer  who  has  in  his  possession  any  still 
or  wash  tub,  or  who  keeps  any  other  apparatus  for  the 
purpose  of  refining  in  any  manner  distilled  spirits,  and 
every  person  who,  without  rectifying,  purifying  or  refining 
distilled  spirits,  shall,  by  mixing  such  spirits,  wine  or  othei? 
liquor  with  any  materials,  manufacture  any  spurious,  imi- 
tation or  compound  liquors  for  sale  under  the  name  of 
whisky,  brandy,  gin,  rum,  wine,  spirits,  cordials,  wine  bit- 

1*  United  States  v.  Clare,  2  Fed.  Purchasing    liquor    in    a    barrel 
55.  and  dividing  it  up  and  putting  it 
15  Webb  V.  Baird,   11  Lea  6G7.  into  smaller  vessels   and   the  sell- 
is  Harris  v.  Livingston,  28  Ala.  ing   it  does   not  necessarily   make 
577.  the     latter     sale     one     of     retail; 
In  the  chapter  on  Licenses  this  Bunch    v.    State     (Ark.)  ;     114    S. 
subject  is  further  discussed.  W.  239.                                      <■ 

17  State  V.  Burr,  10  Me.  43.S. 


§§  70,  71  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  7$ 

ters,  or  any  other  name,  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  rectifier  and 
as  being  engaged  in  the  business  of  rectifying. "  ^^  "Every 
person  who  rectifies,  purifies,  or  refines  distilled  spirits  or 
wines  is  a  rectifier,  except  distillers  who  purify  or  refine 
distilled  spirits  in  their  distilleries  in  the  course  of  original 
or  continuous  distillation  from  sour  mash,  wort  or  wash, 
and  every  person  who,  by  mixing  distilled  spirits,  wines, 
or  other  liquors  with  any  material,  manufactures  any  spu- 
rious, imitation  or  compound  liquor  for  sale  is  also  regarded 
as  a  rectifier, ' '  ^^ 

Sec.  71.    Distiller. 

Under  the  United  States  statutes  a  distiller  is  a  person 
who  produces  distilled  spirits,  or  who  brews  or  makes  mash, 
wort  or  wash  fit  for  distillation  or  for  the  production  of 
spirits,  or  who,  by  any  process  of  evaporation  separates 
alcoholic  spirits  from  any  fermented  substance,  or  who, 
making  or  keeping  mash,  wort  or  wash,  has  also  in  his 
possession  or  use  a  still.-" 


ARTICLE  II.— JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 


SECTION. 

SECTION. 

72     Judicial   knowledge  —  General 

75     Ale. 

Rule. 

76     lieer — Primary     and     sec( 

73     Spirituous,    distilled    or    alco- 

ary  meaning. 

holic  liquors. 

77     IMead  or  metheglin. 

74     Vinous  liquors. 

78     Proof  of  quality  of  liquor, 

Sec.  72.     Judicial  knowledge — General  rule. 

In  a  criminal  prosecution  for  the  violation   of  the  pro- 
visions of  a  statute  against  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 

18  Regulations    and    Instructions  ^^  See  Pamphlet,  p.  196. 
Concerning    the    Tax    on    Distilled  20  u.  S.  Rev.  Stat.,  §  3247.     Reg- 
Spirits,  SeptendK-r  10,  1908,  p.  93.  illations  and  Instructions  Concern- 
See  U.  S.  Revised  Statutes,  §  3244.  ing   the   Tax   on   Distilled   Spirits, 
See  Woolncr  &  Co.  v.  Rennick,  170  September  16,  1908,  p.  4. 
Fed.  662. 


79  JUDICIAL    NOTICE.  §  73 

the  rule  is  that  whatever  is  generally  and  popularly  known 
as  intoxicating  liquor,  such  as  whisky,  brandy,  gin,  etc., 
may  be  so  declared  as  a  matter  of  law  by  the  courts.  What- 
ever, on  the  other  hand,  is  generally  and  popularly  known 
as  medicine,  an  article  for  the  toilet  or  for  culinary  pur- 
poses, recognized,  and  the  formula  for  its  preparation  pre- 
scribed in  the  United  States  Dispensary,  or  like  standard 
authority,  and  not  among  the  liquors  ordinarily  used  as 
intoxicating  beverages,  such  as  tincture .  of  gentian,  pare- 
goric, bay  rum,  eologne,  essence  of  lemon,  etc.,  may  not 
be  so  declared  as  matter  of  law  by  the  courls,  and  this 
notwithstanding  such  articles  contain  alcohol,  and  in  fact 
may  produce  intoxication.  As  to  articles  intermediate  these 
two  classes,  articles  not  known  to  the  United  States  Dispen- 
sary or  other  similar  standard  authority,  compounds  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  with  other  ingredients,  whether  put  up 
upon  a  single  prescription  for  a  single  case  or  compounded 
upon  a  given  formula  and  sold  under  a  specific  name,  as 
bitters,  cordials,  etc.,  whether  they  are  within  or  without 
such  a  stf'tute,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury  and  not  a 
question  of  law  for  a  court.  The  rule  or  test  is  this :  If  the 
eompound  or  preparation  be  such  that  the  destructive  char- 
acter and  effect  of  intoxicating  liquor  is  gone,  that  its  use 
as  an  intoxicating  beverage  is  praetically  impossible  by  rea- 
son of  the  other  ingredients,  then  it  is  outside  of  Ihe  stat- 
ute. But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intoxicating  liquor  re- 
main as  a  distinctive  force  in  the  compound  and  such  com- 
pound is  reasonably  liable  to  be  used  as  an  intoxicating 
beverage,  then  it  is  within  the  statute.^^ 

Sec.  73.     Spirituous,  distilled  and  alcoholic  liquors. 

Courts  take  judicial  notice  that  spirituous,  distilled  and 
vinous  liquors  are  intoxicating  without  any  proof  concern- 
ing their  qualities."     This  is  particularly  true  of  whisky,-^ 

21  Intoxicating  Liquor  Cases.  23  22  Commonwealth  v.  Peckham,  2 

Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Ren.  284;  Rus-  Gray  514;  State  v.  York,  74  N.  H. 

sell  V.  Sloan,  33  Vt.  656;  State  v.  125;  65  Atl.  685. 

Laffer,    38    Iowa    422 ;     Common-  23  Frese  v.  State,  23  Fla.  267 ;  2 

wealth  V.  Ramsdell,  130  Mass.  68.  So.   1;    Carmen  v.  State,   18  Ind. 


§73 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


80 


brandy,'*  apple  brandy-^  and  whisky  cocktails,-*'  and  hence 
It  is  not  error  to  charge  the  jury  that  such  liquors  are  intox- 
icating.-" The  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  speaking  of 
blackberry  brandy,  said:  "Brandy  is  ranked  as  an  intoxi- 
cating liquor  by  writers  upon  the  general  subject,  and  that 
it  is  a  liquor  of  that  character  is  generally  and  commonly 
known.  The  fact  is  therefore  one  of  which  the  courts  will 
take  judicial  knowledge.  The  addition  to  the  term  'brandy' 
of  the  word  'blackberry"'  does  no  more  than  designate  it 
as  a  particular  kind  of  brandy ;  it  does  not  indicate  that  the 
liquor  was  not  brandy  of  some  kind.  The  natural  and  rea- 
sonable presumption  is  that  the  basis  of  the  liquor  was 
brandy  and  therefore  intoxicating.     If  it  was  not  the  ap- 


450;  Eagan  v.  State,  53  Ind.  162; 
Schlicht  V.  State,  56  Ind.  173: 
Hodge  V.  State,  116  Ga.  852;  43 
S.  E.  255;  Freiberg  v.  State,  94 
Ala.  91;  10  So.  703;  Wilcoxson  v. 
State  (Tex.  €r.  App.),  91  S.  W. 
581;  Fears  v.  State,  125  Ga.  740; 
54  S.  E.  661;  Nussdaumer  v.  State, 
54  Fla.  87;  44  So.  712;  Tompkins 
V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  639;  58  S.  E. 
1111;  Brown  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App. 
73;  60  S.  E.  805;  Aston  v.  State 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  49  S.  W.  385: 
Loveless  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cv.  App. 
221;  49  S.  W.  892;  Petersen  v. 
State,  63  Neb.  251;  88  X.  W.  549; 
People  V.  Webster,  2  Doug. 
(Mich.)  92;  State  v.  Jones,  3  Ind. 
App.  121;  28  N.  E.  717;  Callalian 
V.  State,  2  Ind.  App.  417;  28  N.  E. 
717;  Wasson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
107  Ind.  206,  219;  8  N.  E.  97; 
Beatty  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
432:    110  S.  W.  449. 

24  Fenton  v.  State,  100  Ind.  598; 
State  V.  INIunger.  15  Vt.  290;  State 
v.  Wadsworth,  30  Conn.  598;  Dal- 
las Brewing  Co.  v.  Holmes  Bros. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  112  S.  W.  122. 


25  Tliomas  v.  Commonwealth, 
17  S.  E.  788. 

26  United  States  v.  Ash  ( D.  C. ) , 
75  Fed.  651;  Galloway  v.  State, 
23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  398;  5  S.  W. 
246;  iState  v.  Pig,  78  Kan.  C18; 
97  Pac.  859. 

"As  the  courts  are  presumed  to 
be  acquainted  with  the  meaning  of 
English  words,  we  must  take  no- 
tice that  whisky  is  a  spirit  dis- 
tilled from  grain,  and  one  species 
of  the  prohibited  commodit.y.  We 
are  not  required  to  sliut  our  eyes 
to  what  we  do  know,  and  bring  re- 
proach upon  the  administration  of 
the  law  by  giving  way  to  objec- 
tions so  utterly  destitute  of  merit." 
State  v.  Williamson,  21  Mo.  496. 

27  "As  every  person  of  common 
intelligence  knows  that  whisky  is 
an  intoxicating  liquor,  and  there 
was  no  question,  and  could  be 
none,  as  to  that  fact,  the  instruc- 
tion that  it  was  so  was  unobjec- 
tionable." Edgar  v.  State,  37  Ark. 
219;  Fears  v.  State,  125  Ga.  740; 
54  S.  E.  G61. 


81 


JUDICIAL    NOTICP]. 


§73 


pellant  should  have  shown  it.  "-^  Likewise  the  court  ju- 
dicially knows  gin  is  an  intoxicating  and  spirituous  liquor,-'' 
and  so  does  it  know  the  effect  of  drinking  rum.^"  So  the 
court  judicially  knows  that  alcohol  is  an  intoxicating  liquor, 
and  that  fact  need  not  be  proven. ^^  An  indictment  charg- 
ing a  sale  of  whisky  is  a  sufficient  charge  of  a  sale  of  "dis- 
tilled liquor"^-  or  intoxicating  liquor,  and  is  supported 
by  proof  of  a  sale  of  "whisky  cocktail"  ^^  or  by  proof  of 
a  sale  of  a  "common  cordial"  where  it  is  shown  to  be 
whisky  sweetened  with  sugar,  to  which  is  added  a  flavor  of 
peppermint.^*  An  indictment  alleging  a  sale  of  "brandy" 
or  "blackberry  brandy"  is  sufficient  to  show  a  sale  of  spir- 
ituous or  intoxicating  liquor, ^'^  and  the  same  is  true  of  a 
charge  of  a  sale  of  gin  or  rum.^" 


28  Fenton  v.  State,  100  Ind.  598. 

2'J  Commonwealth  v.  Peekham,  2 
Gray,  514;  State  v.  Munger,  15  Vt. 
290;  State  v.  Wadsworth,  30 
Conn.  55;  Commonwealth  v.  Tim- 
othy,  8   Gray  480. 

"Everybody  who  knows  what 
gin  isj  knows  not  only  that  it  is  a 
liquor,  but  also  that  it  is  intoxi- 
cating. And  it  might  as  well  have 
been  objected  that  the  jury  could 
not  find  that  gin  was  a  liquor, 
without  evidence  that  it  was  not  a 
solid  substance,  as  they  could  not 
find  that  it  was  intoxicating,  witli- 
out  testimony  to  sliow  it  to  be  so. 
No  juror  can  be  supposed  to  be 
so  ignorant  as  not  to  know  what 
gin  is.  Proof,  therefore,  that  the 
defendant  sold  gin  is  proof  that 
he  sold  intoxicating  liquor.  If 
what  he  sold  was  not  intoxicating 
liquor,  it  was  not  gin."  Common- 
wealth V.  Peekham,  2  Gray,  514. 

30  State  V.  Munger.  15  Vt.  290; 
State  V.  Mooty,  3  Hill  (S.  C), 
187;  State  v.  Wadsworth,  30  Conn. 
55;  United  States  v.  Angell,  11 
Ped.  34. 


31  Snider  v.  State,  81  Ga.  753; 
7  S.  E.  631.  See  Bennett  v.  Peo- 
ple, 30  111.  389. 

It  has  been  held  that  alcohol  is 
neither  an  ardent  nor  a  vinous 
liquor.  State  v.  Martin,,  34  Ark. 
346 ;  and  it  has  also  been  held  in 
the  same  State  that  the  court  does 
does  not  judicially  know  it  is  an 
intoxicating  liquor.  State  v.  Witt, 
39  Ark.  216;  Winn  v.  State,  43 
Ark.  151.  These  three  Arkansas 
cases  are  of  doubtful  soundness; 
and  so  is  the  Illinois  case  cited. 

32  State  v.  Dengolensky,  82  Mo. 
44. 

33  Galloway  v.  State,  23  Tex. 
App.   398;    5  S.   W.   246. 

34  State  v.  Bennett,  3  Harr. 
(Del.)    565. 

35  State  V.  Munger,  15  Vt.  290; 
State  V.  Wadsworth,  30  Conn.  55 ; 
Fenton  v.  State,  100  Ind.  598. 

36  State  V.  Munger,  15  Vt.  290; 
State  V.  Wadsworth,  30  Conn.  55; 
Commonwealth  v.  Peekham,  2 
Gray,  514;  State  v.  Mooty,  3  Hill 
(S.  C),  187. 


§§74,75  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  82 

Sec.  74.     Vinous  liquors. 

Courts  take  judicial  notice  that  wine  is  intoxicating,  for 
that  is  common  knowledge.^^  This  is  especially  true  of 
"port  wine. "^®  In  Indiana  the  courts  do  not  judicially 
know  wine  is  not  intoxicating.^^  When  a  statute  prohibits 
the  sale  of  "vinous  liquors,"  proof  of  a  sale  of  domestic 
wine  is  sufficient  proof  of  an  offense  committed  by  the  sale 
of  such  wine  without  showing  that  it  is  intoxicating;**'  but 
it  would  seem  that  the  statute  does  not  require  such  liquor 
to  be  "intoxicating"  to  come  within  the  prohibition  of  its 
provisions.  It  has  been  held  that  courts  will  not  take 
judicial  notice  that  "blackberry  wine"  is  intoxicating,*^ 
and  a  similar  ruling  has  been  made  with  regard  to  wine 
generally.*- 

Sec.  75.    Ale. 

The  court  judicially  knows  ale  is  a  malt  liquor,*^  and 
the  better  considered  cases  hold  that  the  courts  will  take 
judicial  notice  that  it  is  an  intoxicating  liquor;**  but  there 
are  cases  which  hold  such  notice  will  not  be  taken,  the 
question  being  one  of  fact,  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury,*^ 
but  no  evidence  is  necessary  for  the  jury  to  so  find.**^     The 

37Cald.vell    v.    State,    43     Fla.  450;   22  N.   E.   1049;   Johnston  v, 

545;   30  So.  814.  State,   23   Ohio   St.   556.      But  see 

38  State  V.  Packer,  80  N.  C.  439.  Navin     v.     Ladue,     3     Denio     43 

39  Jackson  v.  State,  19  Ind.  312;  Wasson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  107 
State  V.  Moore,  5  Blackf.  118.  Ind.  206,  219;   8   N.   E.  97;    Com- 

40  Hatfield  v.  Commonwealth,  missioners  v.  Freeoff,  17  How.  Pr. 
120  Pa.  St.  395;   14  Atl.  151.  442;    Douglass    v.   State,    21    Ind. 

"Laid   V.   State,    104   Ga.    726;  App.   302;    52   N.   E.    238;    People 

30  S.  E.  949;   State  v.  Lowry,  74  v.  Crilley,  20  Barb.  246. 
N.  C.   121.  45  state  v.  Biddle,  54  N.  H.  379; 

42  Commonwealth  v.  Peckham,  State  v.  Barron,  37  Vt.  57 ; 
2  Gray,  514.  Haines    v.    Hanrahan,    105    Mass. 

43  Wiles  V.  State,  33  Ind.  206.  480. 

44  Shaw   V.   State,   56   Ind.    108;  46  State  v.  Barron,  37  Vt,  57. 
Killip'v.  McKay,  13  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.           A  statutory   definition  may  set- 
5;  Commissioners  v.  Taylor,  21  N.  tie  the  question,  as  so  often  hap- 
Y.   173;   Rau  v.  People,  63   N.  Y.  pens.      State    v.    Wadsworth,    30 
277;  Blatz  v.  Rohrback,  116  N.  Y.  Conn.  55. 


83 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


§76 


court  does   not   judicially  know   "hop    ale"   or   "hop jack" 
is  a  malt  liquor.'^ 


Sec.  76.    Beer — Primary  and  secondary  meajiing. 

Whether  or  not  courts  will  take  judicial  notice  that  beer 
is  an  intoxicating  or  malt  liquor  has  been  one  of  much  con- 
trariety of  opinion,  and  this  arises  from  the  fact  that  there 
are  many  kinds  of  beer  well  known  to  be  neither  malt 
nor  fermented  nor  intoxicating  liquors.  Therefore,  upon  a 
proof  of  a  sale  of  "beer,"  and  nothing  more,  many  cases 
hold  that  it  is  not  shown  that  there  was  a  sale  of  either  malt 
or  intoxicating  liquor.*®  But  by  the  better  line  of  cases 
on  proof  of  a  sale  of  "beer,"  even  without  additional  words, 
the  courts  will  construe  it  as  a  sale  of  fermented,  malted 
or  intoxicating  liquors,  and  the  burden  is  upon  the  persons 
claiming  it  is  not  a  malted,  fermented  or  intoxicating  liquor 
to  show  that  fact.***     These  decisions  are  based  on  the  pri- 


^7  Daniel  v.  State,  149  Ala.  44; 
42  So.  22. 

48Weis  V.  State,  .33  Ind.  204; 
Klare  v.  State,  43  Ind.  483; 
Schlosser  v.  State,  55  Ind.  82; 
Plunkett  V.  State,  69  Ind.  68; 
Kurz  V.  ;State,  79  Ind.  488 ;  Netso 
V.  State,  24  Fla.  3G3;  5  So.  857; 
Hausberg  v.  People,  120  111.  21; 
8  N.  E.  857;  Pekin  v.  Smelzel,  21 
111.  464;  Commonwealth  v.  Hardi- 
man,  9  Gray,  136;  Blatz  v.  Rohr- 
bach,  116  N.  Y.  450;  22  N.  E. 
1049;  State  v.  Beswick,  12  R.  I. 
211;  43  Am.  Rep.  26;  State  v. 
Sioux  Falls  Brewing  Co.,  5  S.  D. 
39;  58  N.  W.  1;  26  L.  R.  A.  138; 
People  V.  Hart,  24  How.  Pr.  289; 
White  V.  Manning,  46  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  298;  102  S.  W.  1160  (suit  on 
a  liquor  dealer's  bond  for  selling 
intoxicating  liquor  to  a  minor). 
Eaves  v.  State,  113  Ga.  749;  39 
S.  E.  318;  Dallas  Brewing  Co.  v. 
Holmes  Bros.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
112  S.  W.   122. 


49  State  V.  Church,  6  S.  D.  89 ; 
60  N.  W.  143;  Meier  v.  State,  2 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  290;  21  S.  W.  974; 
Briffitt  V.  State,  58  Wis.  39;  16 
N.  W.  39;  46  Am.  St.  621;  United 
States  V.  Descournau,  54  Fed.  138; 
Adler  v.  State,  55  Ala.  16;  Wat- 
son V.  State,  55  Ala.  158;  State  v. 
Goyette,  11  R.  I.  592;  People  v. 
O'Reily,  129  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  522; 
114  N.  Y.  Supp.  258;  affirmed  (N. 
Y.)  88  N.  E.  1128;  Pedigo  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  24  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  1029;  70  S.  W.  659;  affirm- 
ing 68  S.  W.  1113;  Sothman  v. 
State,  66  Neb.  302;  92  N.  W. 
303;  Coe  v.  State  (Okla.),  104 
Pac.  1074;  Peterson  v.  State,  80 
N.  W.  549;  Markison  v.  State 
(Okla.),  101  Pac.  353;  Ker- 
kow  V.  Bauer,  15  Neb.  155;  18 
N.  W.  27;  State  v.  Mitchell,  134 
Mo.  App.  540;  114  R.  W.  1113; 
Lambie  v.  State,  151  Ala.  86;  44 
So.  51;  State  v.  Carmody.  50  Ore. 
1;    91    Pac.   446,    1081;    Hoagland 


§  76  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  84 

mary  meaning  of  the  word  "beer."  "Webster,"  said  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  "defines  beer  to  be  'a  fermented 
liquor  made  from  any  malted  grain,  with  hops  and  other 
bitter  flavoring  matter. '  In  other  words,  it  is  a  malt  liquor, 
which  the  same  author  declares  to  be  'a  liquor  prepared 
for  drink  by  an  infusion  of  malt,  as  beer,  ale,  porter,  etc' 
It  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  beer  is  a  liquor  infused  with 
malt  and  prepared  by  fermentation  for  use  as  a  beverage. 
As  a  consequence  when  'beer'  is  called  for  at  a  place  at 
which  intoxicating  drinks  are  sold,  the  bartender,  having 
in  view  the  primary  meaning  as  well  as  the  common  use 
of  the  word,  is  justified  in  inferring  and  must  reasonably 
infer  that  malted  and  fermented  beer  is  wanted.  If  any 
other  kind  of  beer  is  desired  it  is  expected  that  qualifying 
words  will  be  used,  such  as  spruce  beer,  root  beer,  small 
■beer,  ginger  beer,  and  the  like,  thus  attaching  a  remote  and 
secondary  meaning  to  the  word  'beer'  as  descriptive  of 
particular  beverages.  When,  therefore,  a  witness  testi- 
fies to  the  sale  or  giving  away  of  beer  under  circumstances 
which  make  the  sale  or  giving  away  of  any  intoxicating 
liquor  unlawful,  the  prima  facie  inference  is  that  the  beer 
was  of  that  malted  and  fermented  quality  declared  by  the 
statute  to  be  an  intoxicating  liquor,  and  the  court  trying  the 
case  ought  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  inference  which 
there  arises  from  the  use  of  the  word  'beer'  in  its  primary 
and  general  sense. "^**  So  where  the  term  "lager  beer"  is 
used  in  testimony  the  inference  is  that  an  intoxicating  beer 
was   meant.^^     In   days   gone   by,    when  the  term   "strong 

V.   Canfield,    160    Fed.    146;    Locke  650;    Douglass    v.    State,    21    Ind. 

V.       Commonwealth       (Ky.),      25  App.  302;   52  N.  E.  238;   State  v. 

Ky.   L.   Rep.    76;    74    S.   W.    654;  Jenkins,  32  Kan.  477;  4  Pac.  809. 

Commonwealth    v.    Hurst     (Ky.),  so  Myers   v.  'State,   03   Ind.   251. 

23    Ky.    L.    Rep.    365;    62    S.    W.  (This  case  overrules  the  prior  In- 

1024;    Peterson  v.   State,   63   Neb.  diana  cases   on    this   point,   which 

251;  88  N.  W.  549;   Killip  v.  Mc-  are  cited  above.)      Stout  v.  State, 

Kay,  13  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  5;   People  96  Ind.   407;   Welsh  v.  State,  126 

V.  Wheclock,  3  Park    (N.  Y.),  9;  Ind.  71;  25  N.  E.  883. 

Murphy  v.  Montclair,  39  N.  J.  L.  si  Dant   v.   State,    106    Ind.    79 ; 

673;    State  v.  Lemp,   16  Mo.  389;  5  X.   E.  870;   Welsli  v.  State,   126 

State  V.  Houts,  36  Mo.  265;  State  Ind.  71;   25  N.  E.  Si83;   Briffitt  v. 

V.  Teissedre,  30  Kan.  476;  '2  Pac.  State,  58  Wis.  39;    16  N.  W.  39; 


85  JUDICIAL   NOTICE.  §§  77, 78 

beer"  was  in  use  to  distinoruish  it  from  small  beer,  courts 
took  judicial  notice  that  it  was  intoxicating.'"'-  Where  a 
statute  declares  that  lager  beer  is  an  intoxicating  liquor  it 
cannot  be  shown  that  it  in  fact  is  not,  for  the  Legislature 
has  fixeil  its  status  by  a  statute  the  courts  cannot  question.^' 
The  courts  cannot,  however,  take  notice  that  rice  beer  is  an 
intoxicant;  that  is  a  question  for  the  jury.^* 

Sec.    77.     Mead— Metheglin. 

The  courts  cannot  take  judicial  notice  that  either  mead 
or  metheglin  is  intoxicating,  or  that  it  is  an  alcoholic,  spir- 
ituous, vinous  or  malt  liquor.'^ 

Sec.  78.     Proof  of  quality  of  liquor. 

If  the  liquor  be  not  judicially  known  as  a  prohibited  liquor, 
then  it  must  be  alleged  that  it  is  an  intoxicating,  spirituous, 
distilled,  malt,  fermented,  alcoholic  or  vinous  liquor  if  the 
terms  used  in  describing  it  are  not  judicially  noticed  as 
being  descriptive  of  such  liquor,  and  these  allegations  estab- 
lished by  proof.'*^     If  a  witness  testifies  that  the  liquor  in 

State    V.    Goyette,    11    R.    I.    592;  People   v.    Crilley,   20   Barb.    246; 

State  V.  Rush,  12  R.  I.  198;  Walk-  People  v.  Henschel,  12  N.  Y.  Supp. 

er  V.  State,  3S  Ark.  656.    Contra,  4G. 

People  V.  Zeiger,  6  Park   (N.  Y.),  ss  Commonwealth   v.  Anthes,    12 

355;    People   v.    Schewe,    29    Hun,  Gray,  29;   Commonwealth  v.  Bub- 

122;    Commonwealth   v.    Bios,    116  ser,    14   Gray,    83;    Commonwealth 

Mass.  56.  V.  Snow,  133  Mass.  575. 

It  has  been  held  that  the  courts  54  Bell  v.  State,  91  Ga.  227;    18 

cannot    take    judicial    notice    that  S.  E.  288. 

"lager  beer"  is  a  beer  within   the  ^5  Marks  v.  State   (Ala.),  48  So. 

provisions  of  a  statute  forbidding  864. 

the  sale  of   beer,   a   decision  inde-  56  Nussbaumer  v.  State,  54  Fla. 

fensible.     People  v.  Hart,  24  How.  87;    4   So.    712;    Car.son   v.    State, 

Pr.  289.  69   Ala.  235;    Queen  v.  McDonald, 

52  Rau   V.    People,    63    Ind.    277.  24   Nova   Scotia,    45;    Ha  worth   v. 

But  in  a  numbel"  of  cases  evidence  Minns,  56  L.  T.  316:   51  J.  P.  7; 

showed  it  was  intoxicating.    Nevin  People    v.    Schewe,    29    Hun,    122; 

v.  Ladue,  3  Denio,  43,  437;   Com-  Nazum    v.    State,    88    Ind.    599; 

missioners  v.  Taylor,  21  N.  Y.  173:  Swalm  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

People    v.    Hawley,    3    Mich.    330:  241;  91  S.  W.  575;  State  v.  Page, 

Markle   v.    Akron,    14    Ohio,    586;  66  Me.  418;  Godfreidson  v.  People, 


§  78  TRAITIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  86 

question  made  him  intoxicated  that  will  not  exclude  tes- 
timony that  others  drank  liquor  drawn  at  the  same,  or 
nearly  the  same  time,  from  the  same  keg,  and  it  did  not 
make  those  drinking  it  drunk  or  intoxicated.^^  When  a 
defendant  claimed  he  sold  only  beer  in  his  shop  and  that 
it  was  not  intoxicating,  it  was  held  that  the  State  could 
show  that  for  several  days  before  the  date  of  sale  persons 
were  seen  to  go  into  the  shop  and  come  out  drunk. ^^  It  is 
also  proper  to  show  the  "bit'ers"  in  question  wpre  bought 
in  the  community  and  drank  as  a  "beverage."  ^^  A  wit- 
ness who  has  frequently  drunk  fermented  liquor  is  quali- 
fied to  testify  that  a  particular  linuor,  wh'ch  he  h^s  tasted, 
is  or  is  not  fermented  liquor,  if  he  is  able  to  distinguish 
them  by  their  taste,  although  having  no  knowledsre  of  the 
science  of  chemistry.""  So  a  witness  may  be  asked  if  he 
thought  the  liquor  given  him  by  the  defendant  was  lager 
beer.**^  A  physician  may  be  asked  his  opinion  as  to 
whether  the  human  stomach  can  contain  enough  beer  to 
intoxicate ;  *^-  and  any  witness  who  has  had  an  opportunity 
for  personal  observation  or  experience  sufficient  ^o  enable 
him  to  form  a  correct  opinion  may  testify  to  the  intoxi- 
cating properties  of  the  bitters  that  are  in  question.''^  But 
where  a  witness  had  drunk  a  great  deal  of  beer,  yet  had 
no  particular  knowledge  of  the  effect  of  beer  on  another,  it 
was  held  that  he  was  not  competent  to  testify  that  a  certain 
quantity  would  either  produce  or  not  produce  intoxication." 

88    111.    284;    State    v.    Haymond.  ss  Commonwealth    v.    O'Donnell. 

20  W.  Va.  18;   43  Am.  Rep.  787;  143  Mass.  178:  9  S.  E.  509. 

Wall  V.   State,   78  Ala.  417;   Gos-  ss  Carl  v.   State,   87   Ala.   17;    0 

torf  V.  State,  39  Ark.  450;   In  re  So.  118. 

Intoxicating  Liquor  Cases,  25  Kan.  go  Merkle  v.  State,  37  Ala.   139. 

751;   37  Am.  Rep.  284;   Allred  v.  ei  Commonwealth     v.     Monahan. 

State,    89    Ala.    112;     8    So.    5C;  140  Mass.  463:  5  N.  E.  259. 

Butler  V.  State,  25  Fla.  347;  6  So.  62  People    v.    Schewe,    29    Hun. 

67;  Prather  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  122;   1  N.  Y.  Cr.  Rep.  360. 

401;   Kinnebrew  v.   State,   80   Ga.  ea  Carson  v.  State,  69  Ala.  235. 

232;  5  S.  E.  56;  Musick  v.  State,  64  Clark   v.   State.   53   Tex.   Civ. 

51  Ark.  165;  10  S.  W.  225.  App.  529;    111- S.  W.  659;   Young 

"Knowles  v.  State,   80  Ala.   9.  v.  Beveridge,  81  Neb..  180;   115  N. 

W.   76G. 


87 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


§78 


The  properties  of  liquor  may  be  shown  by  a  chemical  analy- 
sis,*'!'  and  it  has  been  held  that  any  person  is  competent  to 
testify  that  certain  liquor  was  gin,  if  he  knew,  and  it  was 
not  necessary  that  he  be  an  expert.«°  And  a  non-expert 
witness  may  testify  that  the  wine  in  question  was  intoxi- 
cating" if  he  has  had  any  personal  experience  in  the  use 
of  the  liquor  in  question,  and  he  need  not  be  an  expert.''* 
A  witness  may  testify  as  to  its  quality  from  having  merely 
smelled  it  •'^  and  the  effect  upon  one  who  drank  it.''" 


On  a  cliarfi^e  of  a  sale  of  "hop 
ale"  the  defendant  may  show  by 
the  manufacturer  that  it  is  not  a 
malt  liquor.  Daniel  v.  State,  149 
Ala.  44;  43  So.  22. 

A  witness  may  not  testify  that 
the  liquor  he  bought  from  the  de- 
fendant did  not  taste  like  the  liquor 
given  him  by  the  prosecuting  wit- 
ness which  was  a  part  of  the 
liquid  claimed  to  be  intoxicating. 
Swalm  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
241;  91  S.  W.  575. 

Where  the  witness  said  of  the 
liquor  in  question,  "I  guess  it  was 
intoxicating,"  it  is  not  proven  that 
it  was  an  intoxicating  liquor. 
Schwulst  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  426;  108  S.  W.  698.  (But 
was  not  it  a  question  for  the  jury 
to  determine  in  what  sense  he 
used  the  word  "guess"?  It  is  a 
well-known  fact  that  many  per- 
sons use  this  word  for  a  word  of 
positive   assertion.) 

If  the  evidence  be  conflicting  as 
to  the  character  of  the  liquor,  the 
verdict  of  the  fury  finding  it  to  be 
intoxicating  will  not  be  disturbed. 
Cunningham  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  522;   108  S.  W.  678. 

If  a  witness  testify  of  his  own 
knowledge  that  he  Ijelieved  the 
liquor  sold  was  whisky,  it  is  er- 
ror to  refuse  to  allow  him  to  )>e 
oross>-examined      concerning      his 


knowledge  of  such  whisky.  Beaty 
V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App,  432; 
110  S.  W.  449. 

Of  course,  the  constituents  con- 
stituting the  liquor  may  always 
be  shown.  Regina  v.  Bennett,  1 
Ont.  445. 

65  Nussbaumer  v.  State,  54  Fla. 
87;  44  So.  712;  Regina  v.  Ben- 
nett, 1  Ont.  445;  'Commonwealth 
v.  Magee,  14f  Mass.  Ill;  4  N.  E. 
819;  Commonwealth  v.  Bently,  97 
Mass.  551;  Haworth  v.  Minns,  56 
L.  T.    316;    51   J.  P.   7. 

60  Commonwealth  v.  Timothy,  8 
Gray  480. 

67  Nussbaumer  v.  State,  54  Fla. 
87;  44  So.  712;  Queen  v.  McDon- 
ald, 24  Nova  ,Scotia,  45 ;  Merkle  v. 
State,  37  Ala.  139;  Curtis  v. 
State,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  607;  108 
S.  W.  380. 

68  Carl  v.  State,  87  Ala.  17; 
6  So.  118;  Savage  v.  Common- 
wealth, 84  Va.  582;  5  S.  E.  563; 
Commonwealth  v.  Peto,  136  Mass. 
155;  Commonwealth  v.  White,  15 
Gray,  407. 

69  Haines  v.  Hanrahan,  105 
Mass.  480. 

70  Commonwealth  v.  Reyburg, 
122  Pa.  St.  299;  16  Atl.  351;' 
Brenl.ey  v.  State,  91  Ala.  47;  8 
So.  816:  Fairly  v.  State,  63  Miss. 
333;  McRoberts  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  92  S.  W.  804. 


CHAPTER  IL 
CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  STATUTES. 


SECTION. 

79.  Control  of  liquor  traffic  falls 

under  police  power. 

80.  Definition  and  extent  of  po- 

lice power. 

81.  Police  power,  continued — Leg- 

islative   power. 

82.  Police  power  not  the  power 

of  eminent  domain. 

83.  State   cannot    surrender    po- 

lice power. 

84.  Police   power   impairing  the 

obligation  of  a  contract. 

85.  Police  power  limited  by  Fed- 

eral  Constitution. 

86.  Blackstone's    enumeration    of 

police   powers. 

87.  Sumptuary   argument   insuffi- 

cient to   defeat   liquor   leg- 
islation. 
88  No     natural      right     to     sell 
intoxicating   liquors. 

89.  Right  to  sell  liquors  at  com- 

mon  law — Nuisance. 

90.  Natural  right  not  a  judicial 

question. 

91.  Motive  for  passage  of  law  or 

ordinances. 

92.  Prohibitory    law,    bas<is    of 

constitutionality. 
9.3.     Proliibiting    manufacture   of 
intoxicating   linuors. 

94.  Constitution  prohibiting  the 

granting     of     a     license — 
Ohio  Constitution. 

95.  Effect  of  adoptinsr  constitu- 

tional proliibitorv  measure 
on  prior   statute. 


SECTION. 

96.  Contracts    prohibiting. 

97.  Past    contracts    for    sale    of 

intoxicating  liquors. 

98.  Effect    of    prohibition    upon 

liquors  on  hand  at  time  of 
its    adoption. 

99.  Keeping    liquors. 

100.  Corporate    charters,    change 

— Police  power. 

101.  Prohibition      in      particular 

places  and  localities. 

102.  Confining     liquor     sales     to 

certain  districts. 

103.  Agricultural  fairs. 

104.  Educational   instil  ations. 

105.  Religious  assemblies. 

106.  License,  State  may  refuse. 

107.  State  may  permit  sales  un- 

der a  license — Biblical  pro- 
hibition. 

108.  Fourteenth    Amendment,   ef- 

fect of  or  power  to  regulate 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors. 

109.  Fourteenth      Amendment  — 

Keeping  saloon. 

110.  Privileges     and    immunities 

of  other  States. 

111.  "Import"       defined — Statute 

in    violation    of    Constitu- 
tion. 

112.  Discrimination     against     li- 

quors of  other  States. 

113.  Manufacture     for    shipment 

out  of  state. 

114.  Non-intoxicating     liquors  — 

Declaring  liquors  to  be  in- 
toxicating. 

88 


89 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES. 


SECTIOX. 

115.  Rt'gulation   of  sales  and   sa- 

loons. 

116.  Permitting  pcrsom  iX);  rp  in- 

to    saloon     at     prohibited 
times. 

117.  Delegation    ol    powe      t      ^' 

cense    and    regulate    sales 
of   liquors. 

118.  Compelling     towns      to     en- 

gage in  liquor  traffic. 

119.  Monopoly  of  sale. 

120.  Territorial    power    to    enact 

liquor  laws. 

121.  State     engagin.'^;-     in     liquor 

traffic    — Dispensary    laws. 

122.  Carolina      dispensary      and 

Wilson     laws    construed — 
Discrimination. 

123.  Ex  post  facto  —  Municipal 

legislation. 

124.  No  property  right  in  license 

Annulling  a  license. 

125.  Revocation    of    license. 

126.  Amount  of  license  fees. 

127.  Increasing  amount  of  fee  be- 

fore license  has  expired. 

128.  License     for     and     sale     by 

druggists. 

129.  Limiting    license    to    certain 

class  of  persons. 

130.  Discrimination    in    granting 

license. 

131.  Discretionary  power  to  grant 

a  license. 

132.  Appeal  to  courts  from  grant- 

ing,   refusing    or    revoking 
license. 

133.  Taxes  and  fees. 

134.  Fees   must    be    uniform. 

135.  Bell-Punch    law  — Uniform- 

ity— Discrimination. 

136.  Consent  of  voters  to  license 

— Validity   of   statutes   re- 
quiring. 


.SECTION. 

137.  Assent  of  neighbors  may  be 

required. 

138.  Indian-,     statute  —  Remon- 

strance. 

139.  Sales  to  minors^  drunkards, 

insane  persons  and  In- 
dians. 

140.  Limiting     sales     to     certain 

purpose  5. 

141.  Screens — Validity    and    en- 

forcement of  law  requir- 
ing. 

142.  Sunday     laws  —  Municipal 

ordinance. 

143.  Women     as     employes     and 

visitors  in  saloons. 

144.  Record  of  sales. 

145.  Restitution  of  internal   rev- 

enue— Licenses  and  re- 
ceipts— Exposure  of  li- 
cense. 

146.  Minimum  quantity  that  may 

be  sold  at  one  time. 

147.  Owner    of    premises — Liabil- 

ity under   statute. 

148.  Civil  damages. 

149.  Requiring    licensee    to    give 

bond. 

150.  Inspection     of     licpiors — In- 

gredients. 

151.  "Blind    Pig"    or    "Blind    Ti- 

ger  law. 

152.  Ex   post   facto   law — Change 

of    remedy. 

153.  Local      option   —   Its      two 

phases. 

154.  Local      option     not     special 

legislation. 

155.  Local      option      laws — Dele- 

gated power. 

156.  Local    option    laws — Consti- 

tutionality. 

157.  Local    option   law,   why   not 

unconstitutional. 


§79 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


90 


SECTION. 

158.  Local  option  laws,  why  not 
unconstitutional  —  Contin- 
ued. 

Local  option,  not  in  viola- 
tion of  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment. 

Local  option  —  Alabama 
Constitution  —  Notice  of 
enactment  of  law. 

Local  option  law  in  Terri- 
tories. 

Local  option  not  destruc- 
tive of  property. 

Special  legislation  for  vil- 
lage. 

Local  option  constitutional 
provisions. 

Local  prohibitory  laws,  when 
constitutional. 

Special  legislation. 

Proceedings   in  rem. 

Search  and  seizure  of  li- 
quors  illegally   kept. 

Destruction  of  intoxicating 
liquors. 

Xuisance — Abatement. 

Enjoining  the  maintenance 
of  liquor  establishments. 

Amount  of  penalty — Unusual 
punishment. 


159. 


160. 


161. 

162. 

133. 

164. 

165. 

166. 
167. 
168. 

169. 

170. 
171. 

172. 


SECTION. 

173.  Ex  post  facto  law  defined — 
Heavier  subsequent  pun- 
ishment. 

British  North  American  Act. 

Closing  saloons. 

Evidence,  statute  regulating. 

Jury  trial,  when  it  can  be 
secured  by  appeal. 

Double  punishment  —  State 
and    municipalities. 

Double  punisment — Conflict 
of  jurisdiction. 

Imprisonment  for   debt. 

Support  of  penitentiary — 
Imitation   liquor. 

Removal  of  officers  for 
drunkenness. 

Drunkenness. 

Inebriate  asylums. 

^liscellaneous  decisions. 

When  courts  will  not  con- 
sider constitutional  ques- 
tion. 

Title  of  statutes  —  Valid 
statutes. 

Title  of  statute  —  Invalid 
statute. 

Statute  or  ordinance  only  in 
part  valid. 
190.     Construction  of  statute. 


174. 
175. 

176. 
177. 

178. 

179. 

180. 
181. 

182. 

183. 
184. 
185. 
186. 


187. 


188. 


180. 


Sec.  79.     Control     of    liquor    traffic     falls     under     police 
power. 

The  control  of  the  liquor  traffic  and  all  rules  and  regula- 
tions concerning  the  use  and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors, 
even  the  prohibition  of  their  sale,  falls  within  the  police 
power.  "It  is  the  peculiar  province  of  the  State,  either  by 
legislative  enactment  or  through  authority  delegated  by 
municipalities  to  exert  its  police  powers  for  the  protection 
of  lives,  health  and  property  of  the  citizens,  as  well  as  to 
maintain  good  ordor  and  preserve  public  morals.  Tt  is  every- 
where conceded  that  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  af- 


91 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§79 


fects  all  these  subjects,  and  that  it  is  hence  a  proper  sub- 
ject for  police  regulation."^  "If  it  be  once  granted,"  said 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont,  "that  the  use  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  as  a  drink  is  worse  than  useless  and  intem- 
perance a  legitimate  consequence  of  such  use,  and  that  in- 
temperance is  an  evil,  injurious  to  health  and  sound  mor- 
als and  productive  of  pauperism  and  crime,  it  seems  to  us 
that  a  law  designed  to  prevent  such  consequences  must 
clearly  fall  within  the  class  of  laws  denominated  police 
regulations."-  This  is  a  power  not  possessed  by  the  United 
States.^  It  therefore  becomes  expedient  to  examine  into 
the  character  of  this  power  and  in  a  limited  way  into  its 
extent.* 


'  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  120 
Ind.  483;  22  N.  E.  424;  Cassiday 
V.  Macon  (Ga.),  64  S.  E.  941;  Mc- 
Kinney  v.  Salem,  77  Ind.  213; 
Burnside  v.  Lincoln  County  Court, 
86  Ky.  423;  7  S.  E.  270;  State  v. 
Intoxicating  Liquors,  58  Vt.  594; 

4  Atl.  229. 

2  Lincoln  v.  Smith,  27  Vt.  328; 
Metropolitan  Board  v.  Barrie,  34 
N.  Y.  057 ;  State  v.  Gurney,  37  Me. 
156;  58  Am.  Dec.  150;  Beer  Co.  v. 
Massachusetts,  97  U.  S.  25; 
Schwuchow  V.  Chicago,  68  111.  444 ; 
Bode  V.  State,  7  Gill  326;  Ban- 
croft V.  Dumas,  21  Vt.  456;  Thom- 
asson  V.  State,  15  Ind.  44D; 
Keed  v.  Collins,  5  Cal.  App. 
4194 ;    90  Pac.   973;    License   Cases, 

5  How.  504;  Goddard  v.  Jack- 
sonville, 15  111.  588;  Board  v. 
Scott  (Ky.),  101  S.  W.  944;  30 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  894;  Kotting  v.  Jack- 
sonville, 50  111.  39;  State  v.  All- 
mond,  2  Houst  (Del.)  612;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Intoxicating  Li- 
quors, 115  Mass.  159;  Hedderick 
V.  State,  101  Ind.  504;  1  N.  E. 
47;  51  Am.  Rep.  708;  Jordan  v. 
Evansville,    103    Ind.    512;    72    N. 


E.  544;  Danville  v.  Hatcher,  101 
Va.  523 ;  44  S.  E.  727 ;  Schmidt  v. 
Indianapolis,  168  Ind.  631;  80  N. 
E.  632;  Crowley  v.  Christensen, 
137  U.  S.  86;  34  L.  Ed.  620;  11 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  13;  Giozza  v.  Tier- 
nan,  148  U.  S.  657 ;  37  L.  Ed.  599 ; 
13  Sup.  €t.  721;  Farmville  v. 
Walker,  101  Va.  323;  43  S.  E. 
558;  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S. 
623;  31  L.  Ed.  205;  8  Sup.  Ct. 
273;  Bertmeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall 
129;  21  L.  Ed.  929;  Rfose  v. 
State,  4  Ga.  App.  588;  62  S.  E. 
117;  Cooper  v.  Hot  Springs,  87 
Ark.  12;   111  S.  W.  997. 

3  United  States  v.  DeWitt,  9 
Wall  41. 

■1  Restrictions  which  may  be 
lawfully  imposed  upon  the  liquor 
traffic  might  be  illegal  when  ap- 
plied to  other  pursuits.  State  v. 
Calloway,  11  Idaho  719;  84  Pac. 
27. 

A  court  of  equity  will  not  en- 
join the  enforcement  of  a  liquor 
statute,  although  it  be  void.  J. 
W.  Kelly  &  Co.  v.  Conner  (Tenn.), 
123   S.   W.   622.  t 


§  80  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  92 

Sec.  80.    Definition  and  extent  of  police  power. 

The  definitions  of  the  police  power,  given  by  eminent 
judges,  are  perhaps  the  best  and  most  reliable  definitions; 
at  least  they  are  those  most  relied  upon  by  the  courts. 
Chief  Justice  Shaw  at  an  early  date  gave  what  is  considered 
a  comprehensive  definition  or  description  of  this  power. 
"We  think,"  says  he,  "it  is  a  settled  principle,  growing  out 
of  the  nature  of  well-ordered  civil  society,  that  every 
holder  of  property,  however  absolute  and  unqualified  may 
be  his  title,  holds  it  under  the  implied  liability  that  his  use 
of  it  shall  not  be  injurious  to  the  equal  enjoyment  of  oth- 
ers having  an  equal  right  to  the  enjoyment  of  their  prop- 
erty, nor  injurious  to  the  rights  of  the  community.  All 
property  in  this  Commonwealth  is  *  *  *  held  subject 
to  these  general  regulations  which  are  necessary  to  the 
common  good  and  general  welfare.  Rights  of  property, 
like  all  other  social  and  conventional  rights,  are  subject 
to  such  reasonable  limitations  in  their  enjoyment  as  shall 
prevent  them  from  being  injurious,  and  to  such  reasonable 
rules  and  regulations  established  by  law  as  the  Legis- 
lature, under  the  governing  and  controlling  power  vested 
in  them  by  the  Constitution,  maj'  think  necessary  and  ex- 
pedient. This  is  very  different  from  the  right  of  eminent 
domain — the  right  of  a  government  to  take  and  appropri- 
ate private  property  whenever  the  public  exigency  requires 
it,  which  can  be  done  only  on  condition  of  providing  a  rea- 
sonable compensation  therefor.  The  power  we  allude  to  is 
the  police  power;  the  power  vested  in  the  Legislature  by 
the  Constitution  to  make,  ordain  and  establish  all  manner  of 
wholesome  and  reasonable  laws,  statutes  and  ordinances, 
either  with  penalties  or  without,  not  repugnant  to  the  Con- 
stitution, as  they  shall  judge  to  be  for  the  good  and  wel- 
fare of  the  Commonwealth,  and  of  the  subjects  of  the  same." 
And  he  adds  very  justly:  "It  is  much  easier  to  perceive 
and  realize  the  existence  and  source  of  this  power  than  to 
mark  its  boundaries  or  prescribe  limits  to  its  exercise, "  ^  a 
remark    made    by    many    of   the    eminent    iurists."      "It    is 

5  Commonwealth     v.     Alger,     7  ^  "It  is   always  easier   to   detcr- 

'Cush.   53.  mine    whether    a    particular    case 


93  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  80 

ti-ue,"  said  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  'Hhat 
the  legislation  which  secures  to  all  protection  in  their  rights, 
and  the  equal  use  and  enjoyment  of  their  property,  embraces 
an  almost  infinite  variety  of  subjects.  Whatever  affects 
the  peace,  good  order,  morals  and  health  of  the  community, 
comes  within  the  scope;  and  everyone  must  use  and 
enjoy  his  property  subject  to  the  restrictions  which  such 
legislation  imposes.  Wliat  is  termed  the  'police  power'  of 
the  State,  which,  from  the  language  often  used  respecting 
it,  one  would  suppose  to  be  an  vindetined  and  irresponsible 
element  in  government,  can  only  interfere  with  the  conduct 
of  individuals  in  their  intercourse  with  each  other,  and  in 
the  use  of  their  property,  so  far  as  may  be  required  to  secure 
these  objects."'^  Justice  McLean  in  the  famous  License 
Cases^  said  of  it  that,  "It  is  a  power  essential  to  self- 
preservation,  and  exists,  necessarily,  in  every  organized 
community.  It  is,  indeed,  the  law  of  nature,  and  is  possessed 
by  man  in  his  individual  capacity."^  "The  police  power 
of  a  State,"  said  Chief  Justice  Redfield,  in  discussing  its 
scope,  ''extends  to  the  protection  of  the  lives,  limbs,  health, 
comfort  and  quiet  of  all  persons,  and  the  protection  of  all 
property  within  the  State,  according  to  the  maxim,  Sic 
titere    tuo    est    aliemim    non    laedas,    which    being    of    uni- 

eomes  within  the  general  scope  of  sive  in  their  respective  stations." 
the  power  than  to  give  an  ah-  4  Blackstone  Com.  163. 
struct  definition  of  the  power  it-  "Police  is  a  general  system  of 
self,  which  will  be  in  all  respects  precaution,  either  for  the  preven- 
accurate."  Stone  v.  Mississippi,  tion  of  crimes  and  calamities.  Its 
101  U.  S.  814.  business  may  be  distributed  into 
7  Munn  V.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  145.  eight  heads:  1.  Police  for  the 
«5  How.  588.  prevention  of  offenses;  2.  Police 
"It  is  "the  due  regulation  and  for  the  prevention  of  calamities; 
domestic  order  of  the  kingdom,  3.  Police  for  the  prevention  of  epi- 
whereby  the  inhabitants  of  a  demic  disease;  4.  Police  of  char- 
State,  like  members  of  a  well-gov-  ity;  5.  Police  of  interior  communi- 
erned  family,  are  bound  to  con-  cations;  6.  Police  of  public  amuse- 
form  their  general  behavior  to  the  ments;  7.  Police  for  recent  intelli- 
rules  of  propriety,  good  neighbor-  gence;  $,.  Police  for  registration." 
hood  and  good  manners,  and  to  be  Jeremy  Bentham's  General  View  of 
decent,    industrious,    and    inoflfen-  Public    Offenses,    Edinburg  ed.    of 

Works,  Part  IX,  p.  157. 


§  81  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  94 

versal  application,  it  must,  of  course,  be  within  the  range 
of  legislative  action  to  define  the  mode  and  manner  in 
which  everyone  may  so  use  his  own  as  not  to  injure  others." 
Again:  [By  this]  "general  police  power  of  the  State  persons 
and  property  are  subjected  to  all  kinds  of  restraints  and 
^burdens,  in  order  to  secure  the  general  comfort,  health  and 
prosperity  of  the  State;  of  the  perfect  right  in  the  Legis- 
lature to  do  which,  no  question  ever  was,  or,  upon  acknowl- 
edged general  principles,  ever  can  be  made,  so  far  as  natural 
'persons  are  concerned.  "^*'  And  in  a  celebrated  case  in  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  it  was  said:  "Whatever 
differences  of  opinion  may  exist  as  to  the  extent  and  boun- 
daries of  the  police  power,  and  however  difficult  it  may  be 
to  render  a  satisfactory  definition  of  it,  there  seems  to  be 
no  dou'bt  that  it  does  extend  to  the  protection  of  the  lives, 
health  and  property  of  citizens,  and  to  the  preservation  of 
good  order  and  the  public  morals.  *  *  *  They  belong 
emphatically  to  that  class  of  objects  which  demand  the 
application  of  the  maxim  solus  popitU  suprenia  lex;  and  they 
are  to  be  attained  and  provided  for  by  such  appropriate 
means  as  the  legislative  discretion  may  devise.  "^^ 

Sec.  81.    Police  power  continued — Legislative  power. 

As  to  the  right  to  use  property,  the  lawgiver  may  pre- 
scribe the  mode  and  manner  of  it  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  prevent  the  abuse  of  the  right,  to  the  injury  or 
annoyance  of  others,  or  of  the  public.  The  government 
may,  by  general  regulations,  interdict  such  uses  of  it  as 
would  create  nuisances  and  become  dangerous  to  the  lives 
or  comfort  of  the  citizens.  Unwholesome  trades,  slaughter 
houses,  operations  offensive  to  the  senses,  the  deposit  of 
powder,  the  application  of  steam  power  to  propel  cars,  the 
building  with  combustible  materials,  and  the  burial  of  the 

10  Thorpe  v.  Rutland  etc.  Co.,  27  159  Ind.  503;  05  N.  E.  513;  State 
Vt.  140.  V.   Gerhardt,   145   Ind.  462;    44   N. 

11  Beer  Co,  v.  Massachusetts,  97  E.  469;  33  L.  R.  A.  313;  Sherlock 
U.  S.  25;  Boyd  v.  Alabama,  94  v.  Stuart,  96  Mich.  193;  5-5  N.  W. 
U.  S.  C45;  Boomershine  v.  Uiine,  845;  21  L.  R.  A.  580. 


95  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  81 

dead,  may  all  be  interdicted  by  law,  in  the  midst  of  dense 
masses  of  population,  on  the  general  and  rational  principle 
that  every  person  ought  to  so  use  his  property  as  not  to 
injure  his  neighTjors  and  that  private  interests  must  be 
made  subservient  to  the  general  interests  of  the  'com- 
munity.^- And  this  is  true  in  reference  to  the  traffic  in  in- 
toxicating liquors.  This  is  called  the  police  pow^er,  and 
from  its  very  nature  is  incapable  of  any  very  exact  definition 
or  limitation.  It  is  founded  on  the  law  of  self-defense — of 
the  right  of  soeiet.y  to  protect  itself — and  is  older  than  the 
Federal  Constitution  or  even  than  Magna  Charta  itself.  It 
extends  to  the  protection  of  the  lives,  limbs,  health,  com- 
fort and  quiet  of  all  persons,  and  the  protection  of  all 
property  within  the  State;  and  persons  and  property  are 
subjected  to  all  kinds  of  restraints  and  burdens  in  order 
to  secure  the  general  comfort,  health  and  property  of  the 
citizens  of  the  State. ^•''  Of  the  perfect  right  of  the  Legis- 
lature to  enact  laws  to  accomplish  this  purpose  no  question 
ever  was,  or,  upon  general  principles,  can  be  made,  so  far 
as  natural  persons  are  concerned.  Indeed,  it  has  been  held 
that  a  Legislature  cannot,  by  any  contract,  divest  itself  of  the 
power  to  provide  for  these  objects.  They  belong  emphatically 
to  that  class  of  objects  which  demand  the  application  of  the 
maxim  sahis  'populi  suprema  lex;  and  they  are  to  be  attained 
and  provided  for  by  such  appropriate  means  as  the  legislative 
discretion  may  devise.  That  discretion  can  no  more  be 
bargained  away  than  the  power  itself.^*  The  legislative 
power  to  enact  such  laws  is  only  limited  by  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  and  the  laws  and  treaties  made  under 
it  and  the  Constitution  of  the  various  States.''"' 

12  2    Kent's   Commentaries,   340.  Fell,    42    Md.    71;    Commonwealth 

13  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  v.  Brennan,  103  Mass.  70;  Fre- 
Wall   (U.  S.)   36.  leigh  v.  State,  8  Mo.  606;   Metro- 

14  Boyd  V.  Alabama,  94  U.  S.  politan  Board  etc.  v.  Barrie,  34 
645;  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts.  97  N.  Y.  657;  Thorpe  v.  Rutland,  27 
U.  S.  25:    Patterson  v.   Kentucky,  Vt.    149. 

•97  U.  S.  501;  Stone  v.  Mississippi,  is  Beauchamp  v.  State,  6  Blackf. 

101  U.  S.  814;  McKinney  v.  Town  (Ind.)  299;  Doe  v.  Douglas,  8 
of  Salem,   77   Ind.   213;    State   v.       Blackf.     (Ind.)     10;    McComas    v. 


§  82  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  % 

Sec.  82.    Police  power  not  the  power  of  eminent  domain. 

The  police  power  must  not  be  confused  with  the  power 
of  eminent  domain ;  they  are  separate  and  distinct  attributes 
of  a  State.  ''There  is  a  broad  distinction,"  said  Justice 
Mitchell  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  "between  the 
taking  of  property  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain  for 
a  public  use,  and  the  incidental  injury  or  inconvenience 
which  results  to  property  or  business  on  account  of  the  exer- 
tion of  the  police  power  of  the  State,  when  its  purpose  is  the 
promotion  of  the  public  welfare.  In  the  former  case,  com- 
pensation must  be  made ;  in  the  latter,  no  such  obligation 
arises."^*'  "Nor  does  the  prohibition  of  such  noxious  use 
of  property,"  said  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts,  "a 
prohibition  imposed  because  such  a  use  would  be  injurious 
to  the  public,  although  it  may  diminish  the  profits  of  the 
owner,  make  it  an  appropriation  to  a  public  use,  so  far  as 
to  entitle  the  owner  to  compensation.  If  the  OAvner  of  a 
vacant  lot  in  the  midst  of  a  city  erect  thereon  a  great 
wooden  building  and  cover  it  with  shingles,  he  might  obtain 
a  larger  profit  of  his  land  than  if  obliged  to  build  of  stone 
or  brick  with  a  slated  roof.  If  the  owner  of  a  w^arehouse  in 
a  cluster  of  buildings  could  store  quantities  of  gun  powder 
in  it  for  himself  and  others,  he  might  be  saved  the  great 
expense  of  transportation.  If  a  landlord  could  let  his  build- 
ings for  a  smallpox  hospital,  or  a  slaughter  house,  he  might 
obtain  an  increased  rent.  But  he  is  restrained;  not  because 
the  public  have  occasion  to  make  the  like  use,  or  to  make 
any  use,  of  the  property,  or  to  take  any  benefit  or  profit  to 
themselves  from  it.  but  because  it  would  be  a  noxious  use, 
contrary  to  the  maxim  sic  vtere  tuo  est  alienum  von  laedas. 
It  is  not  an  appropriation  of  the  property  to  a  public  use, 
but  the  restraint  of  an  injurious  use  by  the  owner,  and  is, 
therefore,  not  within  the  principle  of  property  taken  under 

Krug,  81  Ind.  327;  Mont  v.  State,  le  Moore     v.     Indianapolis,     120 

90    Ind.    29;    Hedderich   v.    State,  Ind.   483;    22   N.   E.   424;    Jordan 

101  Ind.  566;  Traegesser  v.  Gray,  v.  Evansville,  163  Ind.  512;  72  N. 

73  Md.   250;    Harrison   v.   Mayer,  E.  544;  67  L.  R.  A.  613. 
etc.,  1  Gill   (Md.)  264. 


97  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OP    STATUTES.  §  83 

the  right  of  eminent  domain.  The  distinction,  we  think,  is 
manifest  in  principle,  although  the  facts  and  circumstances 
of  different  cases  are  so  various  that  it  is  often  difficult  to 
decide  whether  a  particular  exercise  of  legislation  is  at- 
tributable to  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  acknowledged 
powers.  "^^  The  distinction  is  sharply  drawn  in  those  in- 
stances where  property  is  taken  by  a  municipality  in  order 
to  furnish  its  inhabitants  with  water,  or  purer  water.  In 
such  instances  the  municipality  must  proceed  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  some  statute  providing  a  method  of 
procedure,  and  compensation  must  be  paid  for  the  land 
taken,,  notwithstanding  the  object  of  taking  the  property  is 
to  provide  water,  or  purer  water,  for  the  maintena'ce  of  the 
health  of  the  inhabitants  of  such  municipality.  The  health 
of  the  inhabitants  is  involved ;  and  yet  the  power  to  provide 
for  such  health  in  the  future  falls  under  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  and  not  under  the  police  poAver.^^  A 
familiar  illustration  also  is  where  lands  are  assessed  for 
drainage  purposes;  and  although  the  cost  of  the  drainage 
may  be  declared  to  be  a  lien  upon  the  land  benefited,  and 
the  land  sold  to  satisfy  the  lien,  yet  the  power  thus  ex- 
ercised is  the  police  power  and  not  the  power  of  eminent 
domain. ^^ 

Sec.  83.    State  cannot  surrender  police  power. 

It  is  an  axiom  of  constitutional  construction  that  a  State 
cannot  give  or  bargain  away  itf  police  power — "can  no 
more  be  bargained  away  than  the  power  itself;"-*^  and  all 
attempts  of  the  Legislature  to  give  or  bargain   (even  for  a 

17  Commonwealth     v.     Alger,     7  low  v.  Winslow,  95  N.  C.  24 ;  Bry- 

Cush.  53.  ant  v.  Bobbins,  70  Wis.  258 ;  Don- 
is  New  Orleans  W.  W.  Co.  v.  St.  nelly    v.     Decker,    58    Wis.    461 ; 

Tammany   W.   W.    Co.,    120   U.    S.  Nickerson    v.    Boston,    131    Mass. 

69;    6   Sup.   Ct.   405;    affirming    14  306. 

Fed.   194;    Bancroft  v.  Cambridge,  20  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97 

122  Mass.  438.  U.  S.  25;  Boyd  v.  Alabama,  94  U. 

Instate  V.  Charleston,   12  Rich.  S.    ■645;     Kresser    v.    Lyman,    74 

L.  702;    Wurts  v.   Hoagland,     114  Fed.  765. 

U.  S.  606;  5  Sup.  Ct.  1086;  Wins- 


§  84  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  98 

valuable  consideration)  it  away  are  void.^^  And  as  a 
municipality  is  only  a  subordinate  part  of  a  State  for 
governmental  purposes,  neither  can  it  surrender  or  bargain 
away  its  police  power.-- 

Sec.  84.     Police  power  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  con- 
tract. 

The  claim  that  a  Legislature  cannot  impair  the  obligation 
of  a  contract  by  the  exercise  of  its  police  power  has  again 
and  again  been  advanced  to  overturn  a  statute  adopted  by 
it ;  but  always  unsuccessfully  when  the  true  scope  of  the 
power  has  been  borne  in  mind.  Where  he  was  discussing 
the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  change  the  provisions  of 
the  charter  of  a  private  corporation  (and  this  is  where  the 
greatest  number  of  questions  of  this  kind  have  arisen)  Jus- 
tice Cooley  said:  "The  limit  to  the  exercise  of  the  police 
power  in  this  case  must  be  this :  the  regulations  must  have 
reference  to  the  comfort,  safety  or  welfare  of  society;  they 
must  not  be  in  conflict  with  any  of  the  provisions  of  the 
charter,  and  they  must  not,  under  pretense  of  regulation, 
take  from  the  corporation  any  of  the  essential  rights  and 
privileges  which  the  charter  confers.  In  short,  they  must 
be  police  regulations  and  not  amendments  of  the  charter  in 
curtailment  of  the  corporate  franchise."-^  But  wherever  it 
is  necessary  for  the  protection  and  preservation  of  the 
health,  morals  and  property  of  citizens  of  a  State — dis- 
tinguishing between  what  are  puhlici  juris  and  privati  juris-* 

21  stone    V.   Mississippi,    101    U.  ton,    131    Ind.   426;    30  N.   E.  37; 

S.      «14;      Butchers'      Union      v.  Shea  v.   Muncie,    148   Ind.    14;    46 

Crescent     City     Co.,     Ill     U.     S.  N.  E.  138 ;  Patterson  v.  Kentucky, 

746;      5     Sup.     Ct.     «52;      State  97  U.  S.  501;  Haggert  v.  Stethlin, 

V.     Paul,     5     R.     I.      185;     Met-  137  Ind.  43;   35  N.  E.  997;   22  L. 

ropolitan   Board   v.   Barrie,   34  N.  R.  A.  577. 

Y.    657;    Sanio   v.    State,   2    Iowa  22  ]\loore    v.     Indianapolis,     120 

165;   Reynolds  v.  Geary,  26  Conn.  Ind.   483;    22  N.  E.   424;   Shea  v. 

179;    People   v.    Hawley,    3    Mich.  Muncie,    148    Ind.    14;    46    N.    E. 

330;     Jordan    v.    Evansville,     163  138. 

Ind.   512;    72  N.   E.  544;   Lutz  v.  23  Cooley  Const.  Lim.     (6    ed.), 

Crawfordsville,    109   Ind.   466;    10  710. 

N.  E.  411;  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  24  Benson    v.    Mayor,     10   Barb. 

120    Ind.     483;      22     X.    E.    424;  223;    People    v.    Mayor,    33  Barb. 

Cleveland  etc.  R.   Co.   v.   Harring-  102;     Commonwealth    v.    Pennsyl- 


99  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATTTTES  §  85 

— the  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution  forbidding  a 
State  to  pass  a  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract 
cannot  be  invoked  to  uphold  a  law  or  right  which  is  detri- 
mental to  the  health,  to  the  morality,  to  the  safety,  to  the 
comfort,  or  to  the  well  being  of  such  citizens.  The  most 
striking  illustration  of  this  rule  is  where  chartered  brew- 
eries have  insisted  upon  their  chartered  rights  to  manufac- 
ture and  sell  beer — either  with  or  without  restraint — in  the 
State  granting  the  charter,  claiming  that  the  charter  was 
a  contract  that  could  not  be  -changed ;  but  in  every  instance 
the  decisions  have  been  adverse  to  this  claim,  upon  the 
ground  that  the  Legislature — which  is  the  final  arbiter  in 
case  of  doubt-'' — has  decided  that  such  manufacture  and 
sale  are  detrimental  to  the  morality  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  State.-« 

Sec.  85.    Police  power  limited  by  Federal  Constitution. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  police  power  cannot  be 
so  exercised  so  as  to  encroach  upon  the  powers  of  the  Federal 
government  given  it  by  the  Constitution.  The  Federal 
Constitution  and  laws  enacted  in  pursuance  of  its  provisions 
are  supreme,  and  all  State  laws  and  even  the  provisions  of 
State  Constitutions  -'^  must  bow  and  acknowledge  their  au- 
thority. Thus,  in  one  case  it  was  said  of  the  police  powers 
of  a  State:  "The  subjects  upon  which  the  State  may  act 
are  almost  infinite ;  yet  in  its  regulations  with  respect  to  all 
of  them  there  is  this  necessary  limitation,  that  the  State  does 
not  thereby  encroach  upon  the  free  exercise  of  the  power 
vested    in    Congress    by    the    Constitution."-^      But,    as   the 

vania    Coal    Co.,    6G    Pa.    St.    41;  U.  S.  C23;   8  Sup.  Ct.  273;   31   L. 

Hegeman    v.    Western    R.    Co.,    13  Ed.   205;    Giozza   v.    Tiernan,    148 

N.  Y.  9.  U.   S.    657;    13   Sup.   Ct.    721;    37 

25  Thorpe  v.  Rutland  etc.  R.  Co.,  L.  E<I.  5!)n ;  Crowley  v.  Christen- 
27  Vt.  140.  sen,  137  U.  S.  86;   11  Sup.  Ct.  13; 

26  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  34  L.  Ed.  620;  DanVille  v.  Hatcli- 
U.  S.  25;  21  L.  Ed.  029;  Jordan  v.  er,  101  Va.  523;  44  S.  E.  723. 
Evansville,    163    Ind.    512;    72    N.  27  Edwards    v.    Jagers,    19    Ind. 
E.    544;    Sherlock    v.    Stuart,    96  407. 

Mich.   193;    55  N.  W.   462;    21   L.  2s  Western  U.  T.  Co.  v.  Pendle- 

R.  A.  530;   Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123       ton,    122    U.    S.   347;    7    Sup.    Ct. 


§  86  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  100 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  said,  ''All  those 
powers  wliich  relate  to  merely  municipal  legislation,  or  what 
ma}',  perhaps,  more  properly  be  called  internal  police,  are 
not  *  *  *  surrendered  or  restrained,  and  consequently, 
in  relation  to  these,  the  authority  of  a  State  is  complete, 
unqualified  and  exclusive."-^  An  eminent  author  has  thus 
drawn  the  line  of  the  police  power  of  a  State  in  its  relation 
to  the  powers  of  the  United  States:  "If  the  police  power 
extends  only  to  a  just  regulation  of  rights  with  a  view  to 
the  due  protection  and  enjoyment  of  all,  and  does  not  de- 
prive anyone  of  that  which  is  justly  and  properly  his  own, 
it  is  obvious  that  its  possession  by  the  state  and  its  exercise 
for  the  regulation  of  the  property  and  actions  of  its  citizens 
cannot  well  constitute  an  exercise  of  the  national  jurisdic- 
tion, or  afford  a  basis  for  an  appeal  to  the  protection  of  the 
national  authorities. ' '"° 

Sec.  86.     Blackstone 's  enumeration  of  police  powers. 

Each  State  possesses  the  power  to  regulate  its  own  in- 
ternal traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors,  according  to  its  own 
judgment  and  upon  its  own  view  of  the  interest  and  well 
being  of  its  citizens,  if  there  is  no  State  constitutional  re- 
striction. The  power  of  the  States  to  regulate,  or  even 
prohibit  the  retail  of  such  liquors  within  their  limits,  is  not 
in  contravention  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
or  any  law  thereof.  On  the  contrary,  such  a  power  has  been 
expressly  recognized  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.^^  By  virtue  of  its  police  power  every  State  has  the 
power  to  enact  such  laws  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  re- 
straint  and   punishment    of   crime,   the    preservation    of   the 

1126;    reversing    05    Ind.    12;    48  504;  Passenger  Cases,  7  How.  283; 

Am.   Rep.   692.     See  New   Orleans  Slaughter  House  Case,  16  Wall  36; 

Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Louisiana  Light  People  v.   Compagnie  Gen,   107  U. 

Co.,    115    U.    S.    650;    6    Sup.    Ct.  S.  59;  2  Sup.  Ct.  87;  Head  Money 

252.  Cases,   112  U.   S.  580;    5   Sup.  Ct. 

29  New   York   v.    Milm,    11    Pet.  247. 
102.  -"i  License  Cases,  5  How.  U.  S. 

soCooley    Const.    Lim.    (6   ed.),  504. 
707.      See   License    Cases,   5   How. 


101  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  87 

public  health,  peace  and  morals  of  its  citizens."-  This  power 
is  a  very  old  and  comprehensive  one.  Blackstone  enumerated 
within  the  police  regulations  of  the  English  government,  the 
plague,  the  sale  of  poisons,  idle  soldiers  and  marines  wander- 
ing about  the  realm,  gj-psies,  all  kinds  of  nuisances  created 
by  offensive  trades  and  manufacturers,  the  keeping  of  hogs 
in  a  city  or  market  town,  all  disorderly  inns  or  ale  houses, 
bawdy  houses,  gaming  houses,  stage  plays,  unlicensed  booths, 
rope  dancers,  mountebanks  and  the  like,  all  lotteries,  the 
making  and  selling  of  fireworks  and  squibs  and  throwing 
them  about  on  the  streets,  the  making,  keeping  and  carrying 
of  too  large  a  quantity  of  gunpowder  at  one  time,  at  one 
place  or  in  a  vehicle,  eavesdroppers,  common  scolds,  idlere,  dis- 
orderly persons,  rogues,  vagabonds  and  gamblers."^  The 
decisions  of  the  highest  courts  of  this  country  have  sustained 
legislation  as  wide  in  its  scope  as  that  covered  by  the 
enumeraticn  of  Blackstone,  and  this  has  been  especially  true 
of  the  legislation  in  reference  to  the  regulation  of  the  traffic 
in  intoxicating  liquors,  and  in  so  doing  have  held  that  the 
legislative  discretion  in  regulating  the  traffic  is  not  limited 
by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  nor  by  the  consti- 
tutions of  the  various  States.  In  this  country  the  whole 
action  of  the  legislative  power  has  been  uniformly  to  limit,"* 
restrict,  or  absolutely  prohibit  the  traffic. 

Sec,  87.     Sumptuary  argnment  insufficient  to  defeat  liquor 
legislation. 

A  law  to  regulate  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  cannot  be  defeated  upon  the  ground  that  such 
liquors  are  used  as  a  beverage,  and  the  injury  following 
them,  if  taken  in  excess,  is  voluntarily  afflicted  and  is  con- 
fined to  the  person  offending,  and  that  their  sale  should  be 

3- State    V.    Allmond,    5    Houst.  Lockhart,    2.5    Ind.    112;    Welsh    v. 

(Del.),   010;    Jones   v.   People,    14  State,   126  liul.  71;  25  N.  E.  883; 

III.  1!)G.  State   v.   Gerhardt,    145   Ind.    439; 

33  4  Blackstone,   161-171.  44  N.  E.  469;  Cohen  v.  Jarrett,  42 

34  Goddard  v.  Town  of  Jackson-  Md.  571;  Metropolitan  Board  etc. 
ville,     15    111.    588;     Harrison    v.  v.  Barrie,  34  N.  Y.  657. 


§  88  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  102 

without  restrictions,  upon  the  theory  that  what  a  man  shall 
drink,  equally  with  what  he  shall  eat,  is  not  matter  proper 
for  legislation.  This  is  not  so  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that 
it  is  not  true,  that  when  liquors  are  taken  in  excess  the 
injuries  are  confined  to  the  offending  party.  The  injury,  it 
is  true,  first  falls  upon  him  in  his  health,  which  the  habit 
undermines ;  in  his  morals,  which  it  weakens ;  and  with  self- 
abasement,  which  it  creates.  But,  as  it  leads  to  neglect  of 
business,  waste  of  property  and  general  demoralization,  it 
affects  those  who  are  immediately  connected  with  and  de- 
pendent upon  him.  The  statistics  of  every  State  show  a 
greater  amount  of  crime  and  misery  attributable  to  the  use 
of  ardent  spirits  obtained  at  the  retail  liquor  saloons  than 
to  any  other  source.  The  sale  of  such  liquors  in  this  way 
has  therefore  been,  at  all  times,  by  the  courts  of  every  State, 
considered  as  a  proper  subject  of  legislative  regulation. 
Not  only  may  a  license  be  exacted  from  the  keeper  of  a 
saloon  before  a  glass  of  his  liquors  be  disposed  of,  but  re- 
strictions may  be  imposed  as  to  the  class  of  persons  to  whom 
they  may  be  sold,  and  the  hours  of  the  day  and  the  days  of 
the  week  on  which  the  saloon  may  be  opened.  Their  sale  in 
that  form  may  be  absolutely  prohibited.  It  is  a  question 
of  public  expediency  and  public  morality,  and  not  of  State 
or  Federal  law.  The  police  power  of  the  State  is  fully 
competent  to  regulate  the  business — to  mitigate  its  evils  or 
to  suppress  it  entirely."'^ 

Sec.  88.     No  natural  right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors. 

There  is  no  inherent  right  in  a  citizen  to  sell  intoxicating 
liquors  by  retail;  it  is  not  the  privilege  of  a  citizen  of  a 
State  or  of  the  United  States.  It  is  a  business  attended 
with  danger  to  the  community  and  may  be  entirely  pro- 
hibited, or  be  permitted  under  such  conditions  as  will  limit 
to  the  utmost  its  evils  without  violating  the  Constitution  or 
laws  of  the  United  States.  The  manner  and  extent  of  regu- 
lation   rests    in    the    discretion    of    the    governing   authority. 

35  Crawley  v.  Christensen,  137  U.  S.  56;  11  Sup.  Ct.  13;  In  re 
Hoover,  30  Fed.  51 


103  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES.  §  89 

That  authority  may  vest  in  such  officers  as  it  may  deem 
proper  the  power  of  passing  upon  applications  for  permis- 
sion to  carry  it  on  and  to  issue  licenses  for  that  purpose. 
It  is  a  matter  of  legislative  will  only.  As  in  many  other 
cases,  the  officers  thus  designated  may  not  always  exercise 
the  power  conferred  upon  them  with  wisdom  or  justice  to 
the  parties  affected.  But  that  is  a  matter  which  does  not 
affect  the  authority  of  the  State  and  is  one  which  cannot  be 
brought  under  the  cognizance  of  the  United  States.^"  Some 
of  the  cases,  in  the  language  used  in  the  opinions,  limit  the 
power  of  the  State  to  say  a  citizen  shall  not  sell  intoxicating 
liquors,  to  a  sale  as  a  beverage ;  "^  but  these  expressions  are 
used  simply  because  the  cases  involve  instances  of  sales  of 
such  liquor  as  beverages.  In  principle,  the  cases  are  broader. 
The  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  regarded  as  peculiarly 
injurious  (and  experience  in  this  country  proves  the  asser- 
tion) to  those  indulging  in  them;  and,  for  that  reason,  re- 
strictions may  be  imposed  upon  the  sale  of  or  trade  in  in- 
toxicating liquors  not  allowable  in  other  pursuits.^^ 

Sec.  89.    Rig-ht  to  sell  liquors  at  common  law — Nuisance. 

At  common  law  any  person  has  the  right,  without  a, 
license,  to  maintain  ale  houses  and  tippling  houses.  The 
business  of  maintaining  such  houses  and  selling  intoxicating 

36  Crawley  v.  Christensen,  137  v.  Corron,  73  N.  H.  434;  62  Atl. 
U.  S.  86;   11  Sup.  Ct.  13;  State  v.        1044. 

Board    (Wyo.),   105   Pac.   2&5;    In  38  Schwuchow  v.  Chicago,  68111. 

re    Hering     (N.    Y.),    117    N.    Y.  444;    State   v.    Hanson,    16   N.   D. 

Supp.  747;  Reed  v.  Collins,  5  Cal.  347;     113     N.     W.     371;     DeGro- 

App.    494;    90    Pac.    973;    F.    W.  zier    v.    Stephens     (Tex.  i,    105    S. 

Cook   Brewing  Co.  v.  Garber,    168  W.    992;     Guy    v.    Commissioners 

Fed.  942;  Cassidy  V.  Macon  (Ga.),  (N.    C),    29    S.    E.    771;    Jacobs 

64  S.  E.  941;  Gibbs  v.  State  (Vt.),  Pharmacy  Co.  v.  Atlanta,  89  Fed. 

74  Atl.  228.  244;   New  Orleans  v.  Smythe,   116 

37  State  V.  Ludington,  33  Wis.  La.  685;  41  So.  33;  State  v.  Callo- 
107;  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  120  way,  11  Idaho  719;  84  Pac.  27; 
Ind.  483;  22  N.  E.  424;  In  re  People  v.  Gallagher,  4  Mich.  244; 
Clement,  54  N.  Y.  Misc.  Eep.  362;  ]\Tpo'  nn  v.  Bortrd,  73  N.  J.  L. 
IGo    N.     Y.     Supp.     1054;    In    re  382;  64  Ml.  689. 

Brady,  106  N.  Y.  Supp.  961;  State 


§  89  TK.VPFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  104 

liquors  was  not  regarded  as  a  public  offense,  but  was  con- 
sidered to  be  a  means  of  livelihood  which  anyone  was  free 
to  follow.  "It  is,  at  common  law,  lawful  to  keep  a  properly 
regulated  inn,  ale  house  or  tippling  house,  which  severally 
are  indictable  only  when  disorderly.  Hence,  a  fortiori,  the 
simple  selling  of  intoxicating  drinks  is  not  a  common  law 
crime,  but  from  an  early  period  in  English  legislation, 
during  early  colonial  times  and  thence  downward  to  the 
present  day  with  us,  statutes,  in  various  forms  of  provisions, 
have  been  enacted  as  aids  to  the  suppression  of  enormous 
evils  which  the  use  or  abuse  of  inebriating  liquors  has 
wrought.  Indeed,  the  old  English  enactments  of  this  sort  are 
numerous  and  they  have  largeh^  been  the  models  for  legis- 
lation in  our  States."  ^^  It  cannot  be  claimed  that  the  keep- 
ing of  a  tippling  house  or  saloon,  if  properly  conducted,  is 
a  nuisance.  "^Merchants  have  always  dealt  in  wines  and 
other  liquors  in  large  quantities  without  being  subject  to 
prosecution  at  common  law  *  *'  *.  In  the  argument  of 
the  Commonwealth,  such  places  as  the  defendant  is  charged 
with  keeping  are  classed  with  brothels  and  gaming  houses, 
and  it  is  argued  that  they  are  all  equally  nuisances.  But  it 
was  not   so   at   common   law.      Brothels    and    gaming   houses 

39  Bish.   Stat.  Crimes    (3d   ed.),  Cooley's      Blackstone       (Andrews' 

§§984,   985.      That   it  was   lawful  ed.)     *168;     1    Bish.     Crim.    Law 

to   sell   intoxicating  liquors  under  (8th  ed. )    §505;    Sopher  v.  State, 

the  common  law,   see   Stephens  v.  169  Ind.  177;  81  X.  E.  912;   14  L. 

Watson  [1702];   1  Salk  *45 ;  King  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    172;    Crown  Point 

V.     Randall      [1695],     Salk,     *27;  v.    Warner,    3    Hill    150;    Rex.    v. 

Anonymous    [1695],   3    Salk   *2v5;  Fenkner,   2  Keb.   506,   pi.   79;   Ap- 

King  V.  Merriot    [1693],    4    Mod  peal  of  Allyar,   81   Conn.  534;   71 

*144,  and  notes;    Faulkner's   Case  Atl.    794;     Campbell    v.    Jackraan 

[1670],    1    Saund.    *249;    King  v.  Bros.    (Iowa),   118   N.   W.  755. 
Ivyes   [1687],  2  Showers    (K.  B.)  Leading     early    English     States 

*4j8;     Commonwealth    v.    jMcDon-  regulating    the    sale    of    intoxica- 

ough,    13    Allen     581;     Welsh     v.  ting  liquors,   are   12  Edw.  2  c.  6; 

State,   126  Ind.   71;   25  N.  E.  883;  11    Hen.    7,    c.   2;    5   and   6    Edw. 

9  L.  R.  A.  664;  State  v.  Beartheol,  6,  c.  25;    1  Jac.   1,  c.  9;  4  Jac.   1, 

6   Blackf.   474;    39  Am.  Dec.   442;  e.  4;  4  Jac.  1,  c.  5;  7  Jac.  1,  c.  10; 

State  V.  Mullikin,  8   Blackf.  260;  21  Jac.  1,  c  7;   1  Car.  1,  c.  4,  and 

1    Hawkins   P.   C.    (8   ed.)    714;    4  3  Car.  1,  c.  3. 


105  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OP    STATUTES. 


90 


were  held  to  be  nuisances  under  all  circumstances;  but  ale 
bouses  were  not,  unless  tbey  became  disorderly;  and  in  such 
cases  they  were  held  to  be  nuisances  on  account  of  the  dis- 
orderly conduct.  "•*° 

Sec.  90.    Natural  right  not  a  judicial  question. 

Whether  a  statute  regulating  the  traffic  in  intoxicating 
liquors  is  or  is  not  a  reasonable  one,  is  a  legislative  and  not 
a  judicial  question.  Whether  such  f.  statute  does,  or  does 
not,  unjustly  deprive  a  citizen  of  natural  rights,  is  a  ques- 
tion for  the  Legislature  and  not  for  the  courts.  There  is  no 
certain  standard  for  determining  what  are,  and  what  are 
not,  the  natural  rights  of  a  citizen.  The  Legislature  is  just 
as  capable  of  determining  the  question  as  the  courts.  Men's 
opinions  as  to  what  constitute  natural  rights  greatly  differ, 
and  if  the  courts  should  assume  the  function  of  revising 
the  acts  of  the  Legislature  on  the  ground  that  they  invade 
the  natural  rights  of  men,  a  conflict  would  arise  which  could 
never  end,  for  there  is  no  standard  by  which  the  question 
<'Ould  be  finally  determined.-*^  Judge  Cooley  says:  "Nor  can 
a  court  declare  a  statute  unconstitutional  and  void  solely 
on  the  ground  of  unjust  and  oppressive  provisions,  or  be- 
cause it  is  supposed  to  violate  the  natural,  social,  or  political 
rights  of  the  citizen,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  such  in- 
justice is  prohibited  or  such  rights  guaranteed  or  protected 
by  the  Constitution."^-  If  a  subject  is  within  the  legisla- 
tive power,  the  question  whether  that  power  is  wisely  or 
unwisely  exercised  is  not  a  judicial  one.  If  the  power  exists, 
then  the  Legislature  must  determine  the  mode  of  its  exer- 
cise, unless  the  mode  is  prescribed  by  the  organic  law.  If, 
to  descend  from  a  wide  generalization  to  a  narrow  one,  a 
subject  is  within  the  police  power  of  the  state,  the  question 

40  Commonwealth      v.      McDon-  Heddrich   v.   State,    101   Ind.   564; 

ough,    13    Allen,    581;     Sopher    v.  Sharpless  v.  Mayer  etc.,  21  Pa.  St. 

State,  169  Ind.  177;  81  N.  E.  812;  147;   State  v.  Board    (Wyo.),   105 

14  L.  R.  A.    (N.   S.)    172;    Appeal  Pac.  205. 

of   Allyn,    81    Conn.    534;    71    Atl.  42  Cooky's  Const.  Lim.  4tli  ed.  p. 

794;    68   Cent.   L.   Jr.    449.  200. 

*i  License    Cases,    5    How    504 ; 


§  91  TRAJ'FIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  166 

as  to  what  regulations  are  proper  and  needful  is  one  for 
legislative  consideration  and  decision.  It  is  a  cardinal  prin- 
ciple of  law  that  legislative  discretion  cannot  be  controlled 
by  judicial  decisions  and  is  not  subject  to  judicial  sur- 
veillance.'*^ It  is  not  for  a  court  to  say  that  a  constitutional 
law  shall  not  have  effect  because  it  is  in  the  judgment  of 
the  court  unreasonable.** 

Sec.  91.    Motive  for  passage  of  lavr  or  ordinance. 

The  power  of  the  three  departments  of  a  State  govern- 
ment are  not  merely  equal — they  are  exclusive  in  respect  to 
the  duties  assigned  to  each  other.  They  are  absolutely  in- 
dependent of  each  other,  and  one  of  them  cannot  inquire 
into  the  motives  controlling  the  action  of  another.  Hence, 
a  court  cannot  inquire  even  at  the  instance  of  the  State, 
into  the  motives  which  controlled  the  members  of  the  Legis- 
lature in  the  enactment  of  a  law,  or  allow  them  to  be  shown, 
for  the  purpose  of  defeating  its  operation,  or  that  it  was 
passed  by  fraud,  corruption  and  bribery  of  the  members.*^ 
To  institute  such  an  inquiry  would  be  a  direct  attack  upon 
the  independence  of  the  Legislature  and  an  usurpation  of 
power  subversive  of  the  Constitution.*"  And  the  same  rule 
is  applicable  also  to  ordinances  and  other  legislative  acts  of 
municipal  corporations,   with  perhaps  the   qualification  that 

43  Jamieson  v.  Indiana  etc.  Co.,  155  Ind.  374;  58  N.  E.  495;  John- 
128   Ind.   555;    28   N.   E.   7G.  son  v.  Higgins,  3  Met.   (Ky.)   566; 

44  Legal  Tender  Cases,  12  Wall.  State  v.  Fagan,  22  La.  Ann.  545; 
(U.  S.)  561;  State  v.  Hawortli,  Baltimore  v.  State,  15  Md.  376; 
122  Ind.  462;  23  N.  E.  946;  Flint  etc.  v.  WoodhuH,  25  Mich. 
Sopher  v.  State,  169  Ind.  177;  81  103;  State  v.  Hays,  49  Mo.  607; 
N.  E.  812;  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  Bradshaw  v.  Omaha,  1  Neb.  16; 
172.  Humboldt     County     v.     Churchill 

*^  Ex  parte   McCardle,   7    Wall.  County,  etc.,  6  Nev.  30;  People  v. 

(U.   S.)    514;    Doyle  v.   Continen-  Draper,    15    N.    Y.    545;    Sunbury 

tal    Ins.    Co.,    94    U.    S.    535;    Ex  etc.   R.   Co.  v.   Cooper,  33  Pa.   St. 

parte  Newman,  9  Cal.  502;    Lyon  278;  State  v.  Cardozo,  5  S.  C.  297; 

V.  Norris,   15  Ga.  480;   McCullncli  Slack  v.  Jacob,  8  W.  Va.  612. 

V.  State,  11  Ind.  424;  Lilly  v.  City  4o  Wright  v.  Defrees,  8  Ind.  298; 

of  Indianapolis,   149  Ind.  648;    49  McCulloch  v.  State,  11  Ind.  424. 
N.  E.  887;  Coverdale  v.  Edwards, 


107  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP   STATUTES.  §  92 

municipal  ordinances  may  be  impeached  for  fraud  at  the 
instance  of  persons  injured  thereby  ;^^  and  it  has  been  applied 
to  an  ordinance  relating  to  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
within    the    corporate    limits   of   a   municipal    corporation.*^* 

Sec.  92.     Prohibitory  laws — Basis  of  constitutionality. 

Unless  restrained  by  their  constitutions,  it  is  within  the 
power  of  the  State  Legislatures  to  enact  laws  to  prohibit  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  as  a  beverage; 
and  such  laws  do  not  necessarily  infringe  any  right,  priv- 
ilege, or  immunity  secured  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  and  the  amendments  to  it.  The  leading  case  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  upon  this  point  was 
decided  at  the  January  terra,  1847,  of  that  court.  *^  In  that 
case  the  question  was  whether  certain  statutes  of  Massachu- 
setts, Rhode  Island  and  New  Hampshire,  relating  to  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquors  were  repugnant  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States.  In  determining  that  question  it  be- 
came n^cessRrv  to  in^ip'rp  whether  tJiere  was  any  conflict 
between  the  exercise  by  Cor>o're<;s  of  its  power  to  regulate 
commerce  with  foreign  countries  or  among  the  several  States 
and  the  exercise  by  a  State  of  what  are  called  its  police 
powers.  Although  the  members  of  the  court  did  not  fully 
agree  as  to  the  grounds  upon  which  the  decision  should  be 
placed,  thev  were  unanimous  in  holding  that  the  st-atutes 
under  con^jid^r^tion  A^'ere  not  inconsistent  with  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,  or  with  any  act  of  Congress.  In 
so  decidino-.  •  Ch^'ef  Justice  Taney,  who  wrote  the  principal 
opinion,  said:  "If  any  State  deems  the  retail  and  internal 
traffic  in  ardent  snirits  injurious  to  its  citizens  and  calcu- 
lated to  produce  illness,  v'ce  or  debauchery,  I  see  nothing 
in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  to  prevent  it  from 
regulating  and  restraining  the  traffic  or  from  prohibiting  it 
altogether  if  it  thinks  proper."    Mr.  Justice  McLean,  among 

47  1     Dillon     on     ]\riinie.     Corp.  *"!*  People    v.    Creiger,    138    111. 

§311;    Moyer    v.    Villaee    of    Ten-  401;    28  N.   E.   812. 
topolis,  121  Til.  .552;  23  N.  E.  651;  48  License  Cases,  5  How.  504;  12 

Huell  V.  Ball,  20  Iowa,  282:   Free-  L.  Ed.  256. 
port  V.  Mark,  50  Pa.  St.  253. 


§  92  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  108 

other  things,  said:  "A  State  regulates  its  domestic  com- 
merce, contracts,  the  transmission  of  estates,  real  and  per- 
sonal, and  acts  upon  all  internal  matters  which  relate  to  its 
material  and  political  welfare.  Over  these  subjects  the 
Federal  government  has  no  power.  *  *  *  The  acknowl- 
edged police  power  of  a  State  extends  even  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  property.  A  nuisance  may  be  abated.  Everything 
prejudicial  to  the  health  or  morals  of  a  State  may  be 
removed.''  Mr.  Justice  Woodberry  observed;  ''How  can 
they  [the  States]  be  sovereign  in  their  respective  spheres, 
without  power  to  regulate  all  their  internal  commerce,  as 
well  as  police,  and  direct  how,  when  and  where  it  shall  be 
conducted  in  articles  intimately  connected  either  with  public 
morals,  or  public  safety,  or  the  public  prosperity?"  Mr. 
Justice  Greer,  in  still  more  emphatic  language,  said:  "The 
true  question  presented  by  these  cases,  and  one  which  I  am 
not  disposed  to  avoid,  is  whether  the  States  have  a  right  to 
prohibit  the  sale  and  consumption  of  an  article  of  com- 
merce which  they  believe  to  be  pernicious  in  its  etfects,  and 
the  cause  of  disease,  pauperism  and  crime.  *  *  *  With- 
out attempting  to  define  what  are  the  peculiar  subjects 
or  limits  of  this  power,  it  may  be  safely  affirmed  that  every 
law  for  the  restraint  and  effacemeut  of  crime,  for  the 
preservation  of  the  public  peace,  health  and  morals,  must 
come  within  the  category.  *  *  *  It  is  not  necessary, 
for  the  sake  of  justifying  the  State  legislation  now  under 
consideration,  to  relate  the  appalling  statistics  of  misery, 
pauperism  and  crime,  which  have  their  origin  in  the  use  or 
abuse  of  ardent  spirits.  The  police  power,  which  is  exclu- 
sively in  the  States,  is  alone  competent  to  the  correction  of 
these  great  evils,  and  all  measures  of  restraint  or  prohibition 
necessary  to  effect  the  purpose  are  within  the  scope  of  that 
authority."  Up  to  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
the  right  of  the  several  States  to  regulate  and  even  prohibit 
the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  was  considered  as  falling 
within  the  police  regulations  of  the  States,  and  left  to  their 
judgment,  subject  to  no  other  limitations  than  such  as  were 


109  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§92 


imposed  by  the  State  Constitutions,  or  by  the  general  prin- 
ciples supposed  to  limit  all  legislative  power.     It  had  never 
been  seriously  contended  that  such  laws  raised  any  question 
growing  out  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.     This 
was  so  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
at  the  October  term,  1873,  ^«  and  reaffirmed  at  the  October 
term,  1877."°     In  the  case  first  cited  it  was  held  that  the 
right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  one  of  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  which  by 
the    Fourteenth    Amendment    to    the    Constitution    of    the 
United   States   were   forbidden   to   be   abridged.      In   accord 
with  the   foregoing  decisions  there  are  manv  others  of  the 
courts  of  the  United  States  and  of  many  of  the  States  which 
have  held  that  the  constitutional  power  of  a  State  by  a  con- 
stitutional provision  or  legislative  enactment  to  prohibit  the 
manufacture    and   sale   of   intoxicating  liquors   is   no   longer 
an  open  question.   These  cases  rest  upon  the  acknowledged 
right  of  the  States  of  the  Union  to  control  their  purely  "in- 
ternal affairs,  and,  in  so  doing,  to  protect  the  health,  morals 
and  safety  of  their  people,  provided  they  do  not  interfere 
with  the  execution  of  the  powers  of  the  general  government 
or  violate  rights  secured  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.^"* 

49Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall.  State,   25   Ala.   64;    Jones   v    Hil- 

(U.  S.)    129;  21  L.  Ed.  929.  Hard,  69  Ala.  300;  Woods  v.  State, 

50  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  36  Ark.  38;  Ex  parte  McClain,  61 

^-  '^-   ^^-  Cal.   436;    Ex  parte   Campbell,   74 

50    Foster    v.    Kansas,     112     U.  Cal.   20;    15  Pac.  318;   5  Am    St 

S.  201;  5  S.  C.  8;  28  L.  Ed.  629;  518;    State   v.   Wheeler,   25   Conn" 

Barbier  v.  Connelly,  113  U.  S.  27;  290;   Reynolds  v.  Geam,  26  Conn' 

5  S.  C.  357;  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  179;  Oviatt  v.  Pond,  29  Conn   479- 

U.  S.  623;  8  S.  Ct.  273;  31  L.  Ed.  Perdue  v.  Ellis,   18  Ga.   586-   Bell 

235  affirming  29  Kan.  252;  44  Am.  v.  State,  91  Ga.  231;  18  S   E   '?89- 

Rep.  G34;  Kidd  V.  Pearson,  128  U.  Jones  v.  People,  14  III.   196-   Ket- 

S.   1;   9  S.  Ct.  8;    32  L.  Ed.  346;  tering  v.  Jacksonville,  50  111    39- 

In  re  Brosnahan,  18  Fed.  Rep.  62;  Our  House  No.  2  v   State   4  Greene 

Kansas   V.   Bradley,   26  Fed.   Rep.  (Iowa)     172;     Zumhoff   'v.    State 

289;     Kohn  V.    Melcher,    29    Fed.  4    Greene    (Iowa)    526;    Santo    v 

Rep.   423;    United    States    v.    Nel-  State.   2    Iowa    105;    63   Am    Dec 

son,  29  Fed.  Rep.  202;   Lodamo  v.  487;    State    v.    Donehey,    8  'lowa' 


§93 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS 


110 


Sec.  93.    Prohibiting  manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors. 

The  right  of  a  State  to  prohibit  the  manufacture  of  in- 
toxicating liquor    within    her    boundaries    can    be   no   longer 


39G;  State  v.  Stiicker,  58  Iowa 
49G;  12  N.  VV.  483;  State  v.  Car- 
ney, 20  Iowa  82;  State  v.  Bengli- 
men,  20  Iowa  497 ;  ^Martin  v. 
Blattner,  68  Iowa  286;  25  N.  W. 
131;  McLane  v.  Leicht,  69  Iowa 
401;  29  N.  VV.  327;  Jordon  v. 
District  Court,  74  Iowa  762;  38 
N.  W.  430;  Prohibitory  Amend- 
ment Cases,  24  Kan.  700;  State  v. 
Mugler,  29  Kan.  252;  Anderson  v. 
Commonwealth,  13  Bush  (Ky.) 
485;  Sarrls  v.  Commonwealth,  7 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  299;  Preston  v.  Drew, 
33  Me.  558;  Commonwealth  v. 
Kendall,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  414; 
Commonwealth  v.  Clapp,  5  Gray 
( Mass. )  97 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Howe,  13  Gray  (Ma.ss.)  26;  Peo- 
ple V,  Hawley,  3  Mich.  330 ;  People 
V,  Gallagher,  4  Mich.  244;  Aus- 
tin V.  State,  10  Mo.  591;  State  v. 
Pond  93  Mo.  GOG;  6  S.  W.  469; 
Metropolitan  Board  etc.  v.  Bar- 
rie,  34  N.  Y.  657;  People  v.  Wu- 
ant,  2  Park  (N.  Y.)  410;  State  v. 
Gate,  58  N.  H.  241;  State  v.  Ah. 
Chew,  16  Nev.  55;  State  v.  Joyner, 
81  N.  C.  534;  State  v.  Frame,  39 
O.  St.  399;  Gordon  v.  State,  460 
St.  607;  23  N.  E.  63;  Markle  v. 
Akron,  14  Ohio  586;  State  v. 
Guinness,  16  R.  I.  401;  16  Atl. 
010;  State  v.  Gravelin,  16  R.  I. 
407;  16  Atl.  914;  State  v.  Backer, 
3  S.  Dak.  29;  51  N.  W.  1018; 
State  V,  Rancher,  1  Lea  (Tenn.) 
96;  Ex  parte  Bell,  24  Tex.  App. 
428;  6  S.  W.  197;  State  v.  Pres- 
<50tt,  27  Vt.  194;  State  v.  Conlin, 
27  Vt.  318;  In  re  Daughter  27  Vt. 


325;  Lincoln  v.  Smith,  27  Vt. 
328;  State  v.  Lovell,  47  Vt.  493; 
Gill  V.  Parker,  31  Vt.  610;  State 
V.  Lowell,  47  Vt.  493;  Ruston  v. 
Fountaine,  118  La.  53;  42  So.  644; 
Robison  v.  Haug,  71  Mich.  38; 
38  X.  W.  068;  Dupree  v.  State 
(Tex.),  119  S.  W.  301;  107  .S.  W. 
■^m;  State  v.  Walker  (Mo.),  120 
S.  W.  1198,  affirming  129  Mo. 
App.  371;  108  S.  W.  615;  State 
V.  Hooker  (Okla.),  98  Pac.  964; 
F.  W.  Cook  Brewing  Co.  v.  Gar- 
ber,  1G8  Fed.  942 ;  Jones  v.  Yokum, 
(S.  D.),  123  N.  W.  272;  Rooney 
V.  Augusta,  117  Ga.  709;  45  S.  E. 
72;  State  v.  Stoffels,  89  Minn. 
205;  94  N.  W.  675;  August  Busch 
&  Co.  V.  Webb,  122  Fed.  655; 
Rippey  v.  State,  44  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
72;  73  S.  W.  15;  Commonwealth 
V.  Certain  Intoxicating  Liquors, 
115  Mass.  153;  State  v.  Allmond, 
2  Houst.  (Del.)  612;  In  re  Intoxi- 
cating Liquor  Cases,  25  Kan.  751; 
37  Am.  Rep.  284;  Cantini  v.  Till- 
m.an,  54  Fed.  969;  In  re  Hoover, 
30  Fed.  51;  Crowley  v.  Christensen, 
137  U.  S.  86;  11  Sup.  Ct.  13;  34 
L.  Ed.  620;  Meehan  v.  Board,  73  N. 
J.  L.  382;  64  Atl.  689:  Hunzing- 
er  V.  State,  39  Neb.  653;  58  N. 
W.  194;  Shannon  v.  State,  39 
Neb.  658;  58  N.  W.  196;  Equitable 
Life  etc.  Co.  v.  Edwardsville,  143 
Ala.  162;  38  So.  1016;  Soehl  v. 
State,  39  Neb.  695;  58  N.  W. 
196;  Rowles  v.  State,  39  Neb.  659; 
58  N.  W.  197;  State  v.  Skeags, 
154  Ala.  249;  46  So.  268;  Dor- 
man  V.  State,  34  Ala.  216;  People 


Ill 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§93 


questioned  under  the  many  decisions  of  the  courts,  even  of 
liquor  designed   for   transportation  to   and  sale   in    another 


V.  Huntington,  4  N.  Y.  Leg.   Obs. 
187;     Wybhamer    v.     People,     20 
Barb.  567 ;  State  v.  Peckhara,  3  R. 
I.    289;    State    v.    Fitzpatrick,    16 
R.  I.  54;    11  Atl.  767;   Charleston 
V.  Ahrens,  4  Strob.  L.  ( S.  C. )  241 ; 
State    V.     Durein,     70     Kan.     13; 
80  Pac.   987;    78   Pac.   152;    State 
V.  Aiken,  42  S.   C.  222;    20  S.   E. 
221;   26  L.  R.  A.  345    (overruling 
McCullough    V.    Brown,    41    S.    C. 
220;    19    S.   E.    458;    23    L.    R.   A. 
410);    State    v.    Creden,    78    Iowa 
556;    43   N.   W.   673;    7    L.    R.    A. 
295 ;  People  v.  Quant.  12  How.  Pr. 
83;  2  Parker  Cr.  Rep.  410;  Smith 
V.  People,  1  Parker  Cr.  Rep.  583; 
State    V.    Intoxicating   liquors,   5S 
Vt.  594 ;  4  Atl.  229 ;  State  v.  Fitz- 
patrick, 16  r.  I.  54;    11   Atl.  767 
Pearson    v.    International    Distill 
ery,   72   Iowa   348;    34   N.   W.    1 
affirmed   128  U.  S.    1;    9   Sup.  Ct, 
6;  32  L.  Ed.  346;  Lenip  v.  Fuller 
ton,  83  Iowa  192;  48  N.  W.  1034 
13   L.   R.    408;    Commonwealth   v, 
Gagne,    153   Mass.   205;    26   N.   E 
449;    10   L.   R.   A.    442;    Common- 
wealth V.  Gay,  153  Mass.  211;   26 
N.  E.  571;  Commonwealth  v.  Gay, 
153    Mass.    211;    26    N.    E.    852; 
Tredway  v.  Riley,  32  Neb.  495;  49 
N.  W.  268;  29  Am.  St.  447;  State 
V.  Walruff,  26  Fed.  178;  Ex  parte 
Cain,  20  Okla.   125;   93  Pac.  974 
Tanner  v.  Alliance,   29   Fed.   196 
Schwuchow  V.  Chicago,  G8  111.  444 
Streeter    v.    People,    69    III.    595 
State  V.  Jordan,  72  Iowa  377;   34 
N.  W.  285;   State  v.  Teissedre,  30 
Kan.   476;    2   Pac.    650;    Ex  parte 
Burnside,    86    Ky.    423;    6    S.    W. 
276;     Wynehamer    v.    People,     13 


N.  Y.  378;  2  Parker  Cr.  Rep.  421 
affirming  2  Parker  Cr.  Rep.  377 
State  V.  Porterfield,  47  S.  C.  75 
25  S.  E.  39;  Ex  parte  Lynn,  19 
Tex.  App.  293;  Steele  v.  State,  19 
Tex.  App.  425;  Schwulst  v.  State, 
52  Tex.  Civ.  App.  426;  108  S.  W. 
698;  Feibelman  v.  State.  130  Ala. 
122;  30  So.  384;  McLain  v.  State, 
43  Tex.  Civ.  App.  213;  64  S.  W. 
865;  State  v.  Fountain  (Del.), 
69  Atl.  926;  State  v.  Harp, 
210  Mo.  254;  109  S.  W.  578; 
State  v.  Williams  (X.  C), 
61  S.  E.  61;  McAllister  v. 
State  (Ala.),  47  So.  161; 
Plumb  V.  Christie,  103  Ga. 
686;  30  S.  E.  759;  42  L.  R.  A. 
181;  State  v.  Sercy,  20  Mo.  489; 
Powers  v.  Commonwealth,  99  Ky. 
167;  13  S.  W.  450;  In  re  Luent  6 
Greenl.  412;  Commonwealth  v. 
Blackington,  24  Pick.  352;  Edgar 
V.  McDonald  (Tex.  €iv.  App.), 
106  S.  W.  1135;  Hart  v.  State,  87 
Miss.  171;  39  So.  523;  Parker  v. 
State,  99  Md.  189;  57  Atl.  677; 
In  re  Phillips,  82  Neb.  45;  116 
N.  W.   950. 

The  principle  involved  in  a  local 
option  prohibitory  law  is  the 
same  as  that  involved  in  a  general 
prohibition  law.  State  v.  Foun- 
tain   (Del.),   69  Atl.  926. 

A  statute  is  valid  which  pro- 
hibits tlie  sale  of  liquor,  but  makes 
the  guilt  of  the  seller  to  depend 
upon  where  the  liquor  is  drunk. 
Raubold  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1125;  54  S.  W.  17. 

In  Kentucky  the  Legislature 
cannot  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquor 
for      medicinal      purposes.       Com- 


§  93  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  112 

State  where  the  traffic  in  liquor  is  entirely  legitimate.  Such 
a  law  is  valid  as  to  those  engaged  in  the  business  at  the  time 
lof  its  passage,  although  the  effect  is  to  destroy  their  business 
a,nd  to  greatly,  if  not  totally,  impair  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty used  in  the  manufacture.  The  most  striking  cases  of 
this  character  arose  in  Kansas  on  the  adoption  in  that  State 
of  the  present  constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  manu- 
facture and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  except  for  medical 
and  mechanical  purposes.  There  the  complainant  owned  a 
brewery,  with  all  necessary  appliances,  which  could  not  be 
devoted  to  any  other  purpose,  worth,  before  the  adoption  of 
prohibition,  fifty  thousand  dollars,  but  which  was  diminished 
in  value,  b}^  reason  of  the  adoption  of  the  prohibitory  provi- 
sion to  five  thousand  dollars.  As  to  this  property  a  lower 
court  held  the  prohibitory  provision  unconstitutional ;  ^^  but 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  it  valid.  After 
holding  that  the  right  to  manufacture  and  sell  intoxicating 
liquors  was  not  one  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  guar- 
anteed by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  the  court  said:  "It 
is,  however,  contended  that  although  the  State  may  prohibit 
the  manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  sale  or  barter 
within  her  limits,  for  general  use  as  a  beverage,  'no  con- 
vention or  Legislature  has  the  right,  under  our  form  of 
government,  to  prohibit  any  citizen  from  manufacturing  for 
his  own  use,  or  for  export  or  storage,  any  article  of  food  or 
drink  not  endangering  or  affecting  the  rights  of  others.' 
The  argument  made  in  support  of  the  first  branch  of  this 
proposition,  briefly  stated,  is,  that  in  the  implied  compact 
between  the  State  and  the  citizen,  certain  rights  are  reserved 
by  the  latter  which  are  guaranteed  by  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision protecting  persons  against  being  deprived  of  life, 
liberty  or  property  without   due  process   of  law.   and  with 

monwealth  V.  Fowler,  96  Ky.  166;  si  state    v.    Walruff,     26     Fed. 

28  S.  W.  786;  33  L.  R.  A.  839.  178;     Wynehamer    v.    People,     13 

The  State  may  prohibit  the  sale  N.  Y.  378;   2  Park.  Cr.  Rep.  421; 

of  whisky  by  driiprtrists.    Common-  In   re   Peine,   42    Fed.   545;    Com' 

wealth   V.   Reynolds,   89   Ky.    147;  monwealth  v.  Murphy,  10  Gray,  1. 
12  S.   W.   132;   20  S.  W.   167;    11 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  445. 


113  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  93 

which  the  State  cannot  interfere;  that  among  those  rights  is 
that  of  manufacturing  for  one's  use  food  or  drink;  and  that 
while,  according  to  the  doctrines  of  the  commune,  the 
State  may  control  the  taste,  habits,  dress,  food  and  drink  of 
the  people,  our  system  of  government,  based  upon  the  in- 
dividuality and  taste  of  the  citizen,  does  not  claim  to  con- 
trol him  except  as  to  his  conduct  to  others,  leaving  him  the 
sole  judge  as  to  all  that  only  affects  himself.  It  will  be  ob- 
served that  the  proposition,  and  the  argument  made  in  sup- 
port of  it,  equally  concede  that  the  right  to  manufacture 
drink  for  one's  personal  use  is  subject  to  the  condition  that 
such  manufacture  does  not  undergo  or  affect  the  rights  of 
others.  If  such  manufacture  does  prejudicially  affect  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  community,  it  follows  from 
the  very  premises  stated,  that  society  has  the  power  to 
protect  itself  by  legislation  against  the  injurious  con- 
sequences of  that  business.  As  was  said  in  Munn  v.  Illinois,^- 
while  power  does  not  exist  in  the  whole  people  to  control 
rights  that  are  purely  and  exclusively  private,  government 
may  require  'each  citizen  to  so  conduct  himself,  and  so  use 
his  own  property,  as  not  unnecessarily  to  injure  another.' 
But  by  whom,  or  by  what  authority,  is  it  to  be  determined 
whether  the  manufacture  of  particular  articles  of  drink, 
either  for  general  use  or  for  the  personal  use  of  the  maker, 
will  injuriously  affect  the  public  ?  Power  to  determine  such 
questions,  so  as  to  bind  all,  must  exist  somewhere ;  else  socie- 
ty will  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  few,  who,  regarding  only  their 
own  appetites  or  passions,  may  be  willing  to  imperil  the 
peace  and  security  of  the  many,  provided  only  they  are  per- 
mitted to  do  as  they  please.  Under  our  system  this  power 
is  lodged  with  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government.  It 
belongs  to  that  department  to  exert  what  are  known  as  the 
police  power  of  the  State,  and  to  determine,  primarily,  what 
measures  are  appropriate  or  needful  for  the  protection  of 
the  public  morals,  the  public  health,  or  the  public  safety.  It 
does  not  follow  that  every  statute  enacted  ostensibly  for  the 
promotion  of  those  ends  is  to  be  accepted  as  a  legitimate  ex- 

52  ©4  U,  S.  113,  124. 


§  93  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   IJQUORS.  114 

ertion  of  the  police  powers  of  the  State.  There  are,  of  neces- 
sity, limits  beyond  which  legislation  cannot  rightfully  go. 
While  every  possible  presumption  is  to  be  indulged  in  favor 
of  the  validity  of  a  statute,^^  the  courts  must  obey  the  Con- 
stitution rather  than  the  lawmaking  department  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  must,  upon  their  own  responsi'.iility,  determine 
whether,  in  any  particular  case,  these  limits  have  been 
passed.  *To  what  purpose,'  it  was.  said  in  Marbury  v.  Madi- 
son, ^*  'are  powers  limited,  and  to  what  purpose  is  that  limita- 
tion committed  to  writing,  if  these  limits  may  at  any  time  be 
passed  by  those  intended  to  be  restrained  ?  The  distinction  be- 
tween a  government  with  limited  and  unlimited  powers  is 
abolished,  if  those  limits  do  not  confine  the  persons  on  whom 
they  are  imposed,  and  if  acts  prohibited  and  acts  allowed 
are  of  equal  obligation. '  The  courts  are  not  bound  by  mere 
forms,  nor  are  they  to  be  misled  by  mere  pretense.  They 
are  at  liberty — indeed  they  are  under  a  solemn  duty —  to 
look  at  tne  substance  of  things,  whenever  they  enter  upon 
the  inquiry  whether  the  Legislature  has  transcended  the 
limits  cf  its  authority.  If,  therefore,  a  statute  purporting 
to  have  been  enacted  to  protect  the  public  health,  the  public 
morals  or  the  public  safety,  has  no  real  or  substantial  rela- 
tion to  those  objects,  or  is  a  palpable  invasion  of  rights,  se- 
cured by  the  fundamental  law,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  courts 
to  so  adjudge,  and  thereby  give  effect  to  the  Constitution. 
Keeping  in  view  these  principles,  as  governing  the  relations 
of  the  judicial  and  legislative  departments  of  government 
with  each  other,  it  is  difficult  to  perceive  any  ground  for  the 
judiciary  to  declare  that  the  prohibition  by  Kansas  of  the 
manufacture  or  sale,  within  her  limits,  of  intoxicating  li- 
quors for  general  use  there  as  a  beverage,  is  not  fairly 
adapted  to  the  end  of  protecting  the  community  against  the 
evils  which  confessedly  result  from  the  excessive  use  of  ar- 
dent spirits.  There  is  no  justification  for  holding  that  the 
State,  under  the  guise  merely  of  police  regulations,  is  here 
aiming  to  deprive  the   citizen   of  his  constitutional   rights; 

B3  Citing    Sinking    Fund    Cases,  »*  1    Cranch     137,    176. 

99  U.  S.  700. 


115  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF   STATUTES.  §  93 

for  one  cannot  shut  out  of  view  the  fact,  within  the  knowl- 
edge of  all,  that  the  public  health,  the  public  morals,  and 
the  public  safety  may  be  endangered  by  the  use  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors ;  nor  tne  fact,  established  by  statistics?  accessi- 
ble to  every  one,  that  the  idleness,  disorder,  pauperism  and 
crime  existing  in  the  country  are^  in  some  degree  at  least, 
traceable  to  this  evil.  If,  therefore,  a  State  deems  the  abso- 
lute prohibition  of  the  manufacture  and  sale  within  her 
limits  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  other  than  medical,  scien- 
tific and  manufacturing  purposes,  to  .be  necessary  to  the 
peace  and  security  of  society,  the  courts  cannot,  without 
usurping  legislative  functions,  override  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple as  thus  expressed  by  their  chosen  representatives.  They 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  mere  policy  of  legislation.  In- 
deed, it  is  a  fundamental  principle  in  our  institutions,  indis- 
pensable to  the  preservation  of  public  liberty,  that  one  of 
the  separate  departments  of  the  government  shall  not  usurp 
powers  committed  by  the  Constitution  to  another  depart- 
ment. And  so,  if  in  the  judgment  of  the  Legislature,  the 
manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  the  maker's  own 
use,  as  a  beverage,  would  tend  to  cripple,  if  it  did  not  de- 
feat, the  effort  to  guard  the  community  against  the  evils 
attending  the  excessive  use  of  such  liquors,  it  is  not  for 
the  courts,  upon  their  views  as  to  what  is  best  and  safest 
for  the  community,  to  disregard  the  legislative  determina- 
tion of  that  question.  So  far  from  such  a  regulation  having 
any  new  relation  to  the  general  end  sought  to  be  accom- 
plished, the  entire  scheme  of  prohibition  as  embodied  in  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  Kansas  might  fail,  if  the  right  of 
each  citizen  to  manufacture  intoxicating  liquors  for  his 
own  use  as  a  beverage  was  recognized.  Such  a  right  does 
not  inhere  in  citizenship.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  government 
interferes  with  or  impairs  any  one's  constitutional  rights 
of  liberty  or  property,  when  it  determines  that  the  manu- 
facture and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  general  or  in- 
dividual use  as  a  beverage,  are,  or  may  become,  hurtful  to 
society,  and  constitute  therefor  a  business  in  which  no  one 
may  lawfully  engage.     Those  rights  are  best  secured,  in  our 


§  93  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  116 

government,  by  the  observance,  upon  the  part  of  all,  of  such 
regulations  as  are  established  by  competent  authority  to  pro- 
mote the  common  good.  No  one  may  rightfully  do  that 
which  the  lawmaking  power,  upon  reasonable  grounds,  de- 
clares to  be  prejudicial  to  the  general  welfare.  The  conclu- 
sion is  unavoidable,  unless  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of 
the  Constitution  takes  away  from  the  States  of  the  Union 
those  powers  of  police  that  were  received  at  the  time  the 
original  Constitution  was  adopted.  But  as  this  court  has 
declared,  upon  full  consideration,-^"'  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment had  no  such  effect.  After  observing,  among  other 
things,  that  that  amendment  forbade  the  arbitrary  depriva- 
tion of  life  and  liberty,  and  the  arbitrary  spoliation  of 
property  and  secured  equal  protection  to  all  under  the 
like  circumstances,  in  respect  as  well  to  their  personal  and 
civil  rights  as  to  their  acquisition  and  enjoyment  of  proper- 
ty, the  court  said:  'But  neither  the  amendment — broad  and 
comprehensive  as  it  is — nor  any  other  amendment,  was  de- 
signed to  interfere  with  the  powers  of  the  State,  sometimes 
termed  its  police  power,  to  proscribe  regulations  to  promote 
the  health,  peace,  morals,  education,  and  good  order  of  the 
people,  and  to  legislate  so  as  to  increase  the  industries  of 
the  State,  develop  its  resources,  and  add  to  the  wealth 
and  prosperity.'  Undoubtedly  the  State,  when  providing 
by  legislation  for  the  protection  of  the  public  health,  the 
public  morals,  or  the  public  safety,  is  subject  to  the  para- 
mount authority  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
and  may  not  violate  rights  secured  or  guaranteed  by  that 
instrument,  or  interfere  with  the  execution  of  the  powers 
confided  to  the  general  government. ^"^  Upon  this  ground — if 
we  do  not  misapprehend  the  position  of  defendants — it  is 
/contended  that,  as  the  primary  and  principal  use  of  beer 

55  In   Barbier    v.    Connolly,    113  ing  v.  Michigan,  116  U.  S.  446;   6 

U,  S.  27;  5  Sup.  Ct.  357.  Sup.  Ct.  454;  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins, 

5G  Citing    Henderson    v.    Mayor,  118  U.  S.   C56;    6   Sup.  Ct.   1064; 

92   U.    S.    250 ;     Railroad    Co.     v.  Morgan's  Steamship  Co.  v.  Louisi- 

Husen,  95  U.  S.  465;  New  Orleans  ana  Board,  118  U.  S.  455;   6  Sup. 

Gas  Co.  V.  Louisiana  etc.  Co.   115  Ct.   1114. 
U.  S.  650;   6  Sup.  Ct.  252;   Wall- 


117  CONSTITUTIONAUTY   OF  STATUTES.  S  33 

is  a  beverage;  as  their  respective  breweries  were  erected 
when  .t  was  lawful  to  engage  in  the  manufacture  of  b  er 
for  every  purpose;  as  such  establishments  will  become  of  no 

m  value,  ,f  not  employefl  in  the  manufacture  of  beer  for 
every  purpose ;  the  prohibition  upon  their  being  so  emp Led 

ITatf  '  ".'f'  °'  "■■"P"*^  '"'  P»"'»  use°without  ': 
pensat.on,  and  depr.vmg  the  citizen  of  his  property  without 
lue  process  of  law  In  other  words,  although  the  State 
n  the  exercse  of  her  police  powers,  may  lawfully  proh  b  i 
he  manufacture  and  sale,  within  her  limits,  of  intox,™,'  n g 
Kiuors  to  be  used  as  a  beverage,  legislation' having  tha  ob 
annen'tT'  "™"'  '^  '"'"""'^  '"''"^  "«>-  ->'«  «t  the  time 

ation TfirT  "t  """"/-'--g  P-P-e^,  ™less  compen- 
sation IS  first  made  for  the  diminution  in  the  value  of  their 
property  resulting  from  such  prohibitory  enactments      Th  I 

be.     It  cannot  be  supposed   that  the   States  intended    bv 
adoptmg  that  amendment,  to  impo.se  restraints  upon  the'  el 

r  mill  "oTtr"'"  ""■  ""  "^'^^''^  "'  '"^  -^^'y.  '-'". 
morals  of  the  community.     •     •     .     The  prineinle  that 

no   person   shall    be   deprived    of   life,   liberty,' or   prop  rty 
C  titutlr  "T"  "!  ■'"  ^'^  ^"■''°'"^^'  -  ™^stanee,  in  t^ 

tte     f  tleL     r"'"'/''   '*  ""'  ="''  °*  "X'  States  at  the 
me  of  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment    and  it 
iias  never  been  regarded  as  incompatible  with  the  principle 

so!;:,^trt  "i^"""  "^™'''^'  *»  "^^  p--  ^^  -^"tTof 

Z  Ei  oh     '     "Zr'^  '"  ""'^  ™™*^y  -^  "eld  under  the 
implied  obligation  that  the  owner's  use  of  it  shall  not  be 

XT  *"  T  »— i'y-""  "A  prohibition  si  p^ 
Till  •  !■  '"■'"""■'■'  '"'■  P"'-P°^^^  that  are  declared,  by 
la  et  f  fh  '™'  ''  '"^■""°"'  *"  *'>^  '■»«'«',  morals  or 
■       Hno.  '""■""'"'y'  -^xraot  in  any  .i„st  sense  be  deemed 

a  taking  or  appropriation  of  property  for  the  public  benefit 
''7  Here  the  court  examines  Pit        tt    q    «(;n         ^  r, 

W„  .  Ke„t„.„  „  „.  s'  !:l.  Sa/'C  Wa  r;r  "•  '"'"' 
i"  ertilizinsr   Co.   v.    HvHo   T»o^i,    ot 


Fertilizing  Co.   v.   Hyde   Park,   97 


§  93  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  118 

Such  legislation  does  not  disturb  the  owner  in  the  control 
or  use  of  his  property  for  lawful  purposes,  nor  restrict  his 
right  to  dispose  of  it,  but  is  only  a  declaration  by  the  State 
that  its  use  by  any  one,  for  certain  forbidden  purposes,  is 
prejudicial  to  the  public  interests.  Nor  can  legislation  of 
that  character  come  within  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  in 
any  case,  unless  it  is  apparent  that  its  real  object  is  not 
to  protect  the  community  or  to  promote  the  general  well- 
being,  but,  under  the  guise  of  police  regulation,  to  deprive 
the  owner  of  his  liberty  or  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  The  power  which  the  States  have  of  prohibiting 
such  use  by  individuals  of  their  property  as  will  be  preju- 
dicial to  the  health,  morals,  or  the  safety  of  the  public  is  not 
■ — and  consistently  with  the  existence  and  safety  of  organized 
society  cannot  be — burdened  with  the  condition  that  the 
State  must  compensate  such  individual  owners  for  pecuniary 
losses  they  may  sustain,  by  reason  of  their  not  being  per- 
mitted, by  a  noxious  use  of  their  property,  to  inflict  injury 
upon  the  community.  The  exercise  of  the  police  power  by 
the  destruction  of  property  which  is  itself  a  public  nuisance, 
or  the  prohibition  of  its  use  in  a  particular  way,  whereby 
its  value  becomes  depreciated,  is  very  different  from  taking 
property  for  public  use,  or  from  depriving  a  person  of  his 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  In  the  one  case  a  nui- 
sance only  is  abated ;  in  the  other,  an  offending  property  is 
taken  away  from  an  innocent  owner.  It  is  true  that  when 
the  defendants  in  these  cases  purchased  or  erected  their 
breweries  the  laws  of  the  State  did  not  forbid  the  manu- 
facture of  intoxicating  liquors.  But  the  State  did  not  there- 
by give  any  assurance,  or  come  under  an  obligation  that 
its  legislation  on  that  subject  would  remain  unchanged.  In- 
deed, as  was  said  in  Stone  v.  Mississippi,  ^'^  the  supervision 
of  the  public  health  and  the  public  morals  is  a  governmen- 
tal power,  continuing  in  its  nature,  and  'to  be  dealt  with 
as  the  special  exigencies  of  the  moment  may  require,'  and 
that  'for  this  purpose  the  largest  legislative  discretion  is 
allowed,  and  the  discretion  cannot  be  parted  with  any  more 

oa  101  U.  S.  814. 


119 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES. 


§93 


than  the  power  itself/'^"  So  in  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts: 
"If  the  public  safety  or  the  public  morals  re(iuire  the  discon- 
tinuance of  any  manufacture  or  traffic,  the  hand  of  the  Legis- 
lature cannot  be  stayed  from  providing  for  its  discontinu- 
ance by  any  incidental  inconvenience  which  individuals  or 
corporations  may  suffer."^" 


5997  U.  S.  32. 

60  97  U.  S.  25;  Mugler  v.  Kan- 
sas, 123  U.  S.  623 ;  8  Sup.  Ct.  273 ; 
31  L.  Ed.  205;  affirming  29  Kan. 
252;   44  Am.  Rep.  634. 

In  Bartmeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall. 
129;  13  Am.  L.  Reg.  220,  the  court 
refused  to  consider  the  question 
above  discussed,  saying  it  was  too 
grave  a  question  to  be  discussed 
unless  squarely  presented  by  the 
record. 

See  also  Kaufman  v.  Dostal,  73 
Iowa,  691;  Whitney  v.  Township 
Board.  7.  Mich.  234;  39  N.  W. 
196;  Menken  v.  Atlanta,  78  Ga. 
©58;  Tredway  v.  Riley,  32  Neb. 
495;  49  N.  W.  268;  29  Am.  St. 
447;  Pearson  v.  International 
Distillery,  72  Iowa  348;  34  N.  W. 
1;  affirmed  128  U.  S.  1 ;  9  Sup. 
Ct.  6;  32  L.  Ed.  346;  Heck  v. 
State,  44  Ohio  St.  536;  9  N.  E. 
305 ;  Stickrod  v.  Commonwealth, 
86  Ky.  285;  5  S.  W.  580;  9  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  563;  State  v.  Fitzpatrick, 
16   R.   I.  54;    11   Atl.   767. 

Upon  this  question  Justice  Coo- 
ley  has  well  observed:  "Perhaps 
there  is  no  instance  in  which  the 
power  of  the  Legislature  to  make 
such  '•egulations  as  may  destroy 
the  value  of  property,  without 
compensation  to  the  owners,  ap- 
pears in  a  more  striking  light 
than  in  the  case  of  these  statutes. 
The  trade  in  alcoholic  drinks  be- 
ing   lawful,    and    the    capital    em- 


ployed in  it  being  fully  protected 
by  law,  the  Legislature  then  steps 
in,  and  by  an  enactment  based  on 
general  reasons  of  public  utility, 
annihilates  the  traffic,  destroys  al- 
together tlio  emploj'ment,  and  re- 
duces to  a  nominal  value  the 
property  on  hand.  Even  the 
keeping  of  that,  for  the  purpose 
of  sale,  becomes  a  criminal  of- 
fense; and,  without  any  change 
whatever  in  his  own  conduct  or 
employment,  the  merchant  of  yes- 
terday becomes  the  criminal  of 
to-day,  and  the  very  building  in 
which  he  lives  and  conducts  the 
business  which  to  that  moment 
was  lawful  becomes  the  subject  of 
legal  proceedings,  if  the  statute 
shall  so  declare  to  be  proceeded 
against  for  a  forfeiture.  A  stat- 
ute which  can  do  tliis  must  be 
justified  uix)n  the  highest  reasons 
of  public  benefit;  but,  whether  sat- 
isfactory or  not,  the  reasons  ad- 
dress themselves  exclusively  to 
the  legislative  wisdom."  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.    (6  ed.),  719. 

Several  decisions  hold  that  the 
fact  that  the  liquor  is  manufac- 
tured for  export  does  not  prevent 
the  State  from  declaring  the  man- 
ufacture illegal  or  prohibiting  its 
manufacture.  Kid  v.  Pearson,  128 
U.  S.  1;  9  Sup.  Ct.  6;  32  L.  Ed. 
346;  State  v.  Jordan,  72  Iowa, 
377;  34  N.  W.  285;  People  v. 
Hawley,   3   Mich.   330;    Tanner   v. 


§  94  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  120 

Sec.  94.     Constitution  prohibiting  the  granting  of  license — 
Ohio  Constitution. 

The  Constitution  of  Ohio  provides  that  "  no  license  to  traf- 
fic in  intoxicating  liquors  shall  hereafter  be  granted  in  this 
State,  but  the  General  Assembly  may  by  law  provide 
against  evils  resulting  therefrom,"  and  it  was  held  that  a 
statute  providing  for  a  license  to  sell  liquor  was  unconstitu- 
tional.^^ And  a  statute  providing  that  "whoever  shall 
engage  or  continue  in  the  business  aforesaid  of  selling  intoxi- 
cating liquors  in  or  upon  land  or  premises  not  owned  by 
him,  and  without  the  written  consent  of  the  owner  thereof, 
shall  be  held  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,"  and  also  providing 
that  the  assessments  made,  by  the  act  on  the  business  should 
be  a  lien  on  the  premises,  occupied  by  the  tenant  was  in 
effect  a  license  law,  and  was  void.*'-  But  the  provision  does 
not  prevent  the  I  legislature  levying  a  tax  upon  the  business 
of  selling  liquor,  the  constitutional  provision  merely  being  a 
declaration  that  the  Legislature  shall  not  countenance  the 

Alliance,    29    Fed.    196;    State    v.  tilling  of   liquors  from   grain,  ex- 

Fitzpatrick,   16   S.   I.   54;    August  cept  under  the  direction,  and  with 

Busch    &    Co.    V.    Webb,    122    Fed.  his  consent,  of  the  governor  of  the 

Thornton — Intoxicants — JFH       32  State    has    been    held    to    be    con- 

655;    Ex    parte    Rippey,    44    Tex.  stitutional,  not  being  a  delegation 

Cr.   App.   7'2;    73   S.  W.   15;  'Com-  of    legislative    power.      Ingram    v. 

monwealth  v.  Certain  Intoxicating  State,   39   Ala.   247;    84  Am.   Dec. 

Liquors,  115  Mass.   153;   Edgar  v.  792.     But  it  has  been  held  that  a 

McDonald       (Tex.       Civ.       App.),  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  all 

106  S.  W.    1135;   Clark  v.  Tower,  liquors  except  those  manufactured 

65  Atl.  3;   104  Md.  175;   Beer  Co.  under  the  authority  of  the  select- 

v.  Massachusetts;    97    U.    S.    525;  men    of    the    town    for    sacrament, 

Ex  parte  Lynn,  19  Tex.  App.  293;  medicinal,  chemical  or  mechanical 

Steele  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  425 ;  Tises,   was   valid.      State    v.    Bren- 

Metropolitan  Board  v.   Barrie,   34  nen,     25     Conn.     278;      State     v. 

N.  Y.  657.  Wheeler,  25  Conn.  290. 

A   statute   declaring   liquors    to  ei  State    v.    Hipp,    38    Ohio    St. 

1)0  a  nuisance  is  valid  as  to  liquors  199. 

on  hand  before  its  enactment.  Kid  62  King    v.    Cappellar,    42    Ohio 

V.   Bearson,   128   U.   S.    1 ;    9   Sup.  St.    218;     Butzman    v.    Whitbeck, 

Ct.  6;   32  L.  Ed.  346.  42  Ohio  St.  223.     Contra,  State  v. 

A    statute    prohibiting    the    dis-  Freme,  39  Ohio  St.  399. 


121  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  95 

sale  by  legal  sanction.*'^  The  Legislature  may  also  provide 
that  this  tax  shall  constitute  a  lien  on  the  business."  This 
provision  applies  both  to  wholesale  and  retail  sales,"^  and  it 
does  not  by  implication  prevent  the  enactment  of  prohibitory 

legislation.'^'^ 

Sec.  95.     Effect    of    adopting    constitutional    prohibitory 
measure  on  prior  statutes. 

Where  a  State  adopts  a  constitutional  provision  prohibit- 
ing the  sale  and  manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors  as  a 
beverage,  all  statutes  then  in  force  are  annulled  "  unless  the 
constitutional  provision  provides  that  it  shall  not  affect  ex- 
isting statutes  or  laws.*"*  But  a  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion prohibiting  the  sale  and  manufacture  of  intoxicating 
liquors  except  for  medical  and  mechanical  purposes  does  not 
prevent  the  State  licensing  and  regulating  the  sale  of  such 
liquors  for  medicinal  and  mechanical  purposes,  the  same  as  if 
such  a  provision  had  never  been  adopted.**^  In  Kentucky  the 
Constitution  provides  for  a  local  option  election,  and  provides 
that  "  nothing  herein  shall  *  *  *  repeal  any  law  in  force, " 
and  this  was  held  not  to  prevent  the  repealing  of  a  law  pro- 
hibiting the  sale  of  liquors  before  an  election  was  held.'^'^ 
The  adoption   of   a  constitutional   prohibitory  law  or  provi- 

esAdler    v.    Whitbeck,    44    Ohio  parte  Cain,  20  Okla.  125;  93  Pac. 

St.    539;    9    X.    E.    072;    Anderson  974;    Arie    v.    State,    1    Okla.    Cr. 

V.    Brewster,   44    Ohio   St.    57G;    9  6&6;    100  Pac.  233;   Ex  parte  Mc- 

N.  E.   683.  Xaught,  1  Okla.  Cr.  260;   100  Pac. 

64Adler  v.   \Yhitbeck,  supra.  271. 

65  Senior  v.  Rattorman,  44  Ohio  68  State  v.  Dorr,  82  Me.  212:    19* 

St.   661;    11    X.   E.   321;    affirming  Atl.   171;   State  v!  Walker    (Mo.), 

17   Wkly.   L.   Bull.    115.  120.S.  W.  1198;  affirming  129  Mo. 

86  Gordon  v    State,  46   Ohio   St.  App.  371;   lOS  S.  W.  615. 

607;  23  X.  E.  63 ;  6  L.  R.  A.  749;  «"  Stat«    v.     Kennedy,    16   R.   I. 

State  V.  Amery,  12  R.  I.  64.  409;    17    Atl.    5;    State    v.    Kane, 

67  State  V.  Touks,  15  R.  I.  385;  15  R.  I.  395;   6  Atl.  783;  State  v. 

5  Atl.  036;  Draper  v.  State   (Ga.),  Clark,    15   R.   I.   383;    5  Atl.   635: 

€4  S.  E.   117;    King  v.  Cappellar,  People  v.  Collins,  3  Mich.  343. 

42  Ohio  St.  218;  State  v.  ^ochran  7o  Brown   v.    Commcawealth,   98 

(Ore.),     104    Pac.    419;     Butzman  Ky.  652;  34  S.  W.  12. 
V.  Whitbeck,  42  Ohio  St.  223;  Ex 


§  96  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  122 

sion  does  not  prevent  the  Legislature  enacting  laws  in  aid 
thereof  or  in  addition  thereto.'^ 

Sec.  96.     Contracts  prohibiting. 

A  State  may  prohibit  the  making  of  contracts  in  the  fu- 
ture for  the  sale  or  purchase  of  intoxicating  liquors;  and 
may  prohibit  a  recovery  of  the  price  of  liquors  sold.'-  It 
may  also  forbid  an  action  to  recover  the  possession  of  liquor 
sold.^^  A  State  may  forbid,  it  has  been  held,  the  mainte- 
nance of  an  action  to  recover  the  price  of  liquor  bought 
outside  the  State  with  intent  to  sell  it  within  the  State  in 
contravention  of  the  laws  there  forbidding  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors.^*  But  it  has  also  been  held  that  a  State  can- 
not forbid  the  enforcement  of  a  contract  entered  into  before 
the  passage  of  the  Wilson  law  (1890)  by  an  agent  soliciting 
purchases  of  liquor  to  be  delivered  in  another  State;  and 
upon  such  contracts,  notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  a 
statute  declaring  them  void,  a  recovery  can  be  had.  "  And 
a  law  compelling  the  plaintiff  to  prove,  in  an  action  on  a 
contract  of  sale  of  liquor,  that  it  was  law^fully  sold  or  lawful- 
ly kept  and  owned  by  him,  is  invalid.'*^  A  statute  forbidding 
a  recovery  of  the  possession  of  intoxicating  liquors  will  be 
construed  to  mean  liquor  liable  to  seizure  and  forfeiture  for 

-1  State   V.    Hooker    (Okla.),   98  246;    61   Atl.   131;    Barrett  v.  De- 

Pac.    964.       See    also    Dupree    v.  lano    (Me.),    14   Atl.   288;    Meser- 

State    (Tex.),   119   S.   W.  301,   an-  vey  v.  Gray,  55  Me.  540;  Thurston 

swering    (Tex.   Civ.   App.),   107   S.  v.  Adams,  41  Me.  419. 

W.   926.  "^  Thurston    v.    Adams,    41    Me. 

A  person  who  has  not  complied  419. 

with  the  laws  concerning  the  sale  74  Barrett  v.   Delano    (Me.),    14 

of   liquors   in   force    on    the   adop-  Atl.    288;    Meservey    v.    Gray,    55 

lion     of  a     prohibitory     constitu-  Me.  540;  Corbin  v.  Houlehan,  100 

tional    provision    cannot    question  Me.  246;   61  Atl.   131. 

the  validity  of  such  provision.     F.  "  Durkee    v.    Moses,   67    N.    H. 

W.   Cook   Brewing   Co.    v.    Garber,  115;     23     Atl.     793;      (overruling 

168   Fed.   942.  Dunbar   v.   Locke,   62   N.    H.    442, 

The      Oklahoma      constitutional  and   Jones   v.   Surprise,   64   N.   R. 

provisions   relating   to   prohibition  243;  9  Atl.  384).    /n  re  opinion  of 

are  self-executing.    Ex  parte  Cain,  Superior  Court,  5  Fost.  537. 

20  Okla.  125;  93  Pac.  974.  to  People    v.    Toynbee,    2    Park. 

72  Corbin  v.  Houlehan,   100  Me.  (N.  Y.)  329. 


123 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES. 


§97 


a  violation  of  the  liquor  law;  for  otherwise  it  would  be  void, 
violating  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  providing  that 
any  person  for  an  injury  done  him  in  his  person  or  property 
shall  have  a  remedy  by  due  course  of  lawj^ 

Sec.  97.    Past  contracts  for  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors. 

Contracts  for  the  sale  or  purchase  of  intoxicating  liquors 
that  were  valid  at  the  time  and  place  where  completed,  can- 
not be  rendered  invalid  by  any  subsequent  legislation  con- 
cerning intoxicating  liquors.  ''^  This  is  particularly  true  of  a 
recovery  upon  a  breach  of  the  condition  of  a  bond  given 
pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  a  license  law,  even  if  prohi- 
bition is  brought  about  by  the  adoption  of  a  prohibitory 
constitutional  provision.""  Even  the  repeal  of  the  law  giv- 
ing the  right  of  action  can  not  take  away  the  cause  of  action 
arising  previous  to  its  repeal.^" 


"Preston  v.  Drew,  33  Me.  558; 
54  Am.  Dec.  639. 

Where  ;i-  statute  forbade  the  sale, 
except  for  certain  purposes,  of  in- 
toxicating liquors,  and  exempted 
certain  property,  not  intoxicat- 
ing liquor,  from  sale  on  le- 
gal process  for  the  payment  of 
debts,  the  question  whether  such 
liquors  can  he  sold  on  execution 
involves  no  constitutional  ques- 
tion. Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Ange- 
vine,  60  Kan.  167;   C5  Pac.  879. 

Although  a  contract  for  the  sale 
of  liquor  may  be  void,  because  un- 
lawful, yet  the  vendor  may  re- 
cover the  proceeds  of  such  sale 
where  they  have  been  collected 
by  his  agent,  even  the  agent  who 
sold  the  liquors.  Hertzler  v.  Geig- 
ley,  196  Pa.  St.  419;   46  Atl.  366. 

In  South  Carolina  only  the 
State  can  question  the  validity  of 


a  sale  of  liquors.  Ex  parte  Neal, 
etc.  Co.,  58  S.  C.  269;  36  S.  E. 
584. 

A  statute  rendering  void  all 
contracts  for  the  sale  of  liquors 
to  be  delivered  in  any  other  State 
or  county  to  enable  the  purchaser 
to  violate  the  provisions  of  such 
statute  by  there  being  reshipped 
back  into  the  State  where  sold,  is 
constitutional.  Reynolds  v.  Geary, 
26  Conn.  179. 

78  State  V.  Williams,  10  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  346;  30  S.  W.  477;  Cor- 
bin  V.  Houlehan,  100  Me.  246;  61 
Atl.  131. 

79  Coggeshall  v.  Groves,  16  Pt.  I. 
18;    11   Atl.  296. 

80  State  v.  Williams,  10  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  346;  30  S.  W.  477;  DeGra- 
zier  v.  Stephens  (Tex.),  105 
S.   W.  092. 


§  98  TR.VFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  124 

Sec.  98.     Effect   of   prohibition   upon   liquors   on  hand  at 
time  of  its  adoption. 

It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  doubt  that  a  State  may  for- 
bid the  future  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  within  her  boun- 
daries. The  rig-ht  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  one  of 
the  rights  of  citizenship.^^  A  more  serious  question,  how- 
ever, is  the  effect  upon  the  ownership  of  liquors  on  hand 
within  the  State  at  the  time  a  prohibitory  law  is  adopted. 
If  the  o\\Tiership  of  the  liquor  was  obtained  when  a  law 
was  in  force  requiring  a  license  to  sell  them,  and  the  law 
providing  that  a  license  must  be  obtained  before  a  sale  could 
be  made,  and  this  law  is  repealed,  thus  leaving  it  impossi- 
ble to  sell  the  liquors,  there  is  no  question  that  the  repealing 
law  is  valid,  and  that  the  license  immediately  ends;  for  no 
one  has  a  vested  right  in  a  license,  as  has  been  elsewhere  dis- 
cussed.^- The  effect  upon  liquors  he  has  on  hand  is  to 
effectually  prevent  the  ex-licensee  selling  them  or  in  any 
way  disposing  of  them ;  and  of  this  fact  he  cannot  complain, 
for  he  purchased  them  with  the  knowledge  (which  he  was 
bound  to  have)  that  the  law  authorizing  the  granting  of  a 
license  could  at  any  time  be  repealed  and  the  liquors  left 
upon  his  hands.  But  the  law  goes  still  further.  Although 
it  \xaH  lawful  for  the  owner,  at  the  time  he  purchased  liquors 
or  acquired  property  in  them,  to  sell  or  otherwise  dispose  of 
them,  yet  a  subsequent  law  may  absolutely  forbid  him  either 
selling  or  giving  them  away,  and  thus  in  a  limited  extent  con- 
fiscating the  liquor.  A  law  making  the  keeping  or  sale  of  liquors 
already  on  hand  unlawful  is  not  an  ex  post  facto  law,  and 
is  valid,  although  at  the  time  of  the  acquisition  of  ownership 

81  Baremeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall.  Kan.  700;  Calder  v.  Kurby,  5 
129;  State  v.  Doss,  70  Ark.  312;  Gray,  597;  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachu- 
67   S.  W.  867.  setts,    97    U.    S.    25;    Wheeler    v. 

82  See  also  Moore  v.  Indianapo-  State,  64  Miss.  462;  1  So.  632; 
lis,  120  Ind.  483;  22  N.  E.  424;  Powell  v.  State,  69  Ala.  10;  Ter- 
Metropolitan  Board  v.  Barrie,  34  ritory  v.  Miguel,  18  Hawaii,  402; 
N.  Y.  659;  Fell  v.  State,  47  Md.  State  v.  Bolt,  31  La.  Ann,  663;  33 
71;  20  Am.  Rop.  83;  Brown  v.  Am.  Rep.  224;  State  v.  Chester,  IS 
State,   82   Ga.   224;    7   S.   E.   915;  S.  C.  464. 

Prohibitory  Amendment  Cases,  24 


125  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  98 

in  them  the  sale  or  keeping  of  them  was  not  an  offense.**' 
There  are  a  few  eases  which  hold  that  a  prohibition  law  is 
unconstitutional,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  liquors  on  hand  at 
the  date  of  the  adoption,  its  effect  being  to  deprive  a  party 
of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law.^*     But  it  may  be 
laid  down  as  a  well-established  rule  at  the  present  day  that 
the  owner  of  liquors  which  he  has  on  hands  at  the  time  of 
the  adoption  of  a  prohibitory  law  cannot  successfully  com- 
plain of  the  law,  although  deprived  of  his  power  to  sell  or 
give  them  away.^'     The  property  in  liquors  still  remains  in 
the  owner.     But  a   much  more  serious  question  arises  when 
the  statute  attempts  to  make  the  liquors  on  hand  "contra- 
band" or  to   confiscate   them.     In   a   recent   case   this   exact 
phase  was  incidentally  discussed.     "It  has  been  said,"  the 
court  observed,  "that  intoxicating  liquors  are  property,  and 
that  a  law  prohibiting  their  sale  as  a  drink  is  the  exercise  of  a 
despotic  power,   calling  for  an  unconstitutional  interference 
with  the  rights  of  property,  and  necessarily  impairing  and 
even  destroying  those  rights,  which,  it  is  claimed,  is  against 
natural   right   and   justice    and   beyond   the   pale   of   consti- 

S3  State    V.   Paul,   5    R.   I.    185;  Prohibitory  Amendment  Cases,  24 

State  V.  Keeran,  5  R.  I.  497;  Rose  Kan.  700;   Heck  v.  State,  44  Ohio, 

V.  State,   171    Ind.   662;    87   N.  E.  536;   9  N.  E.  305;   Menken  v.  At- 

103;    Grumbauch   v.    Lelande,    154  lanta,   78   Ga.   668;    2   S.   E.   559; 

Cal.  679;  98  Pae.  1059;  McClana-  Savage  v.   Commonwealth,   84  Va. 

ban    V.    Breeding     (Ind.),    88    N.  582;    5    S.    E.    olio;    Kissinger    v. 

E.    695;    Viefhaus    v.    Bohenstehn,  Hinkhouse,   27    Fed.  883;    Weil   v. 

71  Ark.  419;  75  S.  W.  585;  Stick-  Calhoun,   25   Fed.   865;    Tanner  v. 

rod  V.  Commonwealth,  86  Ky.  285 ;  Alliance,    29    Fed.    196;    Shear    v. 

5  S.  W.  580;  9  Ky.  L.  Rep.  563.  Bolinger,  74  Iowa,  757;   37  N.  W. 

84VVynehamer   v.   Pe<jple,    13   N.  164;    Drake    v.    Jordan,    73    Iowa, 

Y.  378;  2  Parker  Cr.  Rep.  421;  af-  707;    36  N.   W.   653;    Kaufman  v. 

firming  2  Parker  Cr.  Rep.  377;  12  Dostal,   73   Iowa,   691;    36   N.   W. 

How.    Pr.    238;    and    reversing   20  643;    McLane  v.   Leight,   69   Iowa, 

Barb.    567;    People    v.    Tonybee,    2  401;     Oviatt    v.    Pond,    29     Conn. 

Parker    Cr.    Rep.    329.      See    also  479;    Moore    v.    Indianapolis,    120 

Berry     v.     De     Maris      (X.     J.),  Ind.  483:    22  N.  E.  424;   Burnside 

70  Atl.  337.  v.  Lincoln  County,  86  Ky.  423;   7 

sr-Mugler  v.  Kansas,   123  U.   S.  S.  E.  276;  Brown  v.  State,  82  Ga. 

623;  8  iSup.  €t.  273;  Kidd  v.  Pear-  224;  7  S.  E.  915. 
son,    128   U.   S.   1;    9   Sup.  Ct.   6; 


§  98  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  126 

tutional  authority.  It  is  not  to  be  assumed  by  us  that  in- 
toxicating liquors,  under  the  act,  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
property,  at  least  in  a  certain  sense.  The  act  does  not  de- 
clare that  they  are  not  property,  and  there  is  no  language 
which  should  receive  a  construction  to  forbid  them  being  prop- 
erty. Though  there  is  a  prohibition  not  to  sell  them,  yet  that 
cannot  prevent  a  man  from  having  a  property  in  them  for 
his  own  use,  without  any  intention  to  sell  them;  and  they 
may  be  transported  through  the  State,  Avhere  there  is  no  in- 
tention to  violate  the  law ;  indeed,  the  act  itself  authorizing 
the  toAvn  agents  to  sell  them  for  certain  specified  purposes, 
thereby  admits  them  to  be  property  for  such  purposes. ' '  ®" 
The  Supreme  Court  of  West  Virginia,  however,  held  that 
a  clause  in  the  statutes  which  forbade  any  one  to  keep  in  his 
possession  spirituous  liquor  for  another  was  unconstitutional. 
"The  keeping  of  liquor  in  his  possession,"  continued  the 
court,  "by  a  person,  whether  for  himself  or  another,  unless 
he  does  so  for  the  illegal  sale  of  it,  or  for  some  other  im- 
proper purpose,  can  by  no  possibility  injure  or  affect  the 
health,  morals,  or  safety  of  the  public,  and,  therefore,  the 
statute  prohibiting  such  keeping  in  possession  is  not  a  legiti- 
mate exertion  of  the  police  power.  It  is  an  abridgment  of 
the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citizen  without  any  le- 
gal justification,   and   therefore  void.  "^^      The   courts   have 

8«  "Those  who  engage  in  the  traf-  parte  Burnside,  &6  Ky.  423;  7  S. 
fic,after  theenaetment  of  such  a  law  VV.  276;  Edgar  v.  McDonald  (Tex. 
[a  statute  requiring  a  license  to  Civ.  App. ),  106  S.  W.  1135. 
sell],  must  be  regarded  as  having  s^  state  v.  Oilman,  33  W.  Va. 
notice  from  the  beginning,  that  the  136;  10  S.  E.  283;  Lincoln  v. 
power  of  regulation  is  a  continuing  Smith,  27  Vt.  328;  Kidd  v.  Pear- 
one,  and  that  the  State  reserves  to  son,  128  U.  S.  1;  9  Sup.  Ct.  6; 
itself  the  right  to  deal  with  the  Pearson  v.  International  Distillery, 
subject  as  the  special  exigencies  of  72  Iowa,  348;  34  N.  W.  1;  State 
the  moment  may  require."  Moore  v.  Allmond,  2  Houst.  (Del.)  612; 
V.  Indianapolis,  120  Ind.  483;  22  State  v.  Wheeler,  25  Conn.  290; 
N.  E.  424.  Citing  Stone  v.  Missis-  Oviatt  v.  Pond,  29  Conn.  479; 
sippi,  101  U.  S.  814;  Kidd  v.  Pear-  State  v.  Paul,  5  R.  I.  185;  Preston 
son,  128  U.  S.  1;  9  Sup.  Ct.  6;  v.  Drew,  33  Me.  558;  54  Am,  Dec. 
Pearson  v.  International  Distillery,  639. 
72   Iowa,   348;    34   N.   W.    1;    Ex 


127  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES.  §  99 

gone  so  far,  however,  as  to  hold  that  liquors  kept  in  viola- 
tion of  law  may  be  the  subject  of  larceai.y,  and  when  sold 
the  proceeds  may  be  the  subject  of  embezzlement.^**  This  is 
practically  upon  the  same  ground  that  a  thief  cannot  insist  he 
cannot  be  convicted,  because  the  person  from  whom  he  stole 
the  article  which  is  the  subject  of  the  larceny,  also  stole  it 
from  another.  A  statute,  however,  which  authorizes  a  seizure 
and  destruction  of  liquors  that  were  on  hand  before  its  en- 
actment, is  invalid,  because  it  deprives  its  owner  of  his  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law.^** 

Sec.  99.    Keeping  liquor. 

A  Legislature  has  no  power  to  prevent  an  inhabitant  of  a 
State  keeping  in  store  intoxicating  liquors  for  others;  for 
such  a  law  is  an  invasion  of  the  constitutional  provision 
guaranteeing  to  every  person  the  free  use  and  exercise  of  his 
property.^"  But  a  city  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping 
within  the  city  of  intoxicating  liquors,  with  the  intent  to  il- 
legally sell  them  is  valid,^^  and  so  is  a  statute.^-  These  cases 
turn  upon  the  intent  of  the  person  having  them  to  violate 
the  law.  This  feature  of  a  statute  is  noticeable  when  it  is 
held  that  an  attempt  to  make  it  illegal  to  bring  into  a  county 

88  Commonwealth  v.  Smith,  129  valid.  Lindley  v.  State  (Ark.), 
Mass.  104.  120  S.  W.  987. 

89  Berry  v.  DeMaris  { N.  J.  L. ) ,  so  Ex  parte  Brown  ( Tex.  Cr. 
70  Atl.  337.  App.),    42    S.    W.    554;    State    v. 

An  ordinance  prohibiting  sale  on  Oilman,  33   W.  Va.   146;    10  S.  E. 

Sunday   is   not  an   impairment  of  283;    6   L.    R.    A.   847;    Brown    v. 

the  right  given  by  a  license  to  sell  Social  Circle,   105  Ga.  834;   32   S. 

liquors.      State    v.    Bolt,    21     La.  E.    141;    Papworth    v.    Fitzgerald, 

Ann.  G63 ;  33  Am.  Rep.  224.  106  Ga.  378 ;  32  S.  E.  363 :  Tucker  v. 

There  is  no  vested  right  to  con-  Moultrie,  122  Ga.  160;  50  S.  E.  61. 

tinue  in  the  pursuit  of  the  liquor  9i  Rooney   v.   Augusta,    117    Ga. 

business   where   a   person   was  en-  709;   45  S.  E.  72;   La  Fitte  v.  Ft. 

gaged    in    it    when    a    prohibitory  Collins,  42  Colo.  293;  95  Pac.  927. 

law   was  enacted.     Grumbauch   v.  92  state    v.    Williams     (N.    C), 

Lelande     (Cal.),     98     Pac.     10io9;  61    S.    E.    61;    Ex    parte    Dupree 

Viefhaus   v.    Bohenstehn,   71    Ark.  (Tex.),    105  S.   W.   493;    State  v. 

419;  75  S.  W.  585.  Four  Jugs,  58  Vt.  240;   2  Atl.  586; 

A  statute  providing  for  the  de-  Ex  parte  Byrd   (Tex.),  105  S.  W. 

struction  of  contraband  liquors  is  49^. 


§  100  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  128 

more  than  one-half  gallon  of  liquors  except  for  delivery  to 
a  druggist  for  medicinal  purposes,  is  void,  because  it  pre- 
vents a  citizen  from  himself  using  them,  and  thus  unduly 
restricts  his  right  as  a  citizen  to  the  use  of  liquor.^^  So  a 
statute  providing  that  the  keeping  of  more  than  one  quart  of 
liquor  at  a  time  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  keeping 
for  sale  is  constitutional.'-'* 

Sec.  100.     Corporate  charter  changed — Police  power. 

While  it  is  true  that  the  charter  of  a  private  corporation 
which  contains  a  grant  of  powers  and  privileges  is  a  con- 
tract within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision  that 
no  State  shall  pass  any  ''law  impairing  the  obligation  of 
contracts,"  yet  a  Legislature,  acting  under  the  police  power 
of  the  State,  has  the  power  to  alter,  amend  or  repeal  such 
a  charter  if  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  protection  ol^  the 
lives,  health  and  property  of  the  citizens  of  the  State,  the 
maintenance  of  good  order,  and  the  preservation  of  the  public 
morals,  even  though  the  power  to  do  so  was  not  reserved  in 
the  charter,  and  by  the  doing  of  it  the  property  rights  of  the 
corporation  are  interfered  with.  By  such  a  charter  the  cor- 
poration is  endowed  with  the  same  power  as  a  natural  person 
to  do  that  which  its  charter  authorizes;  and  by  implica- 
tion with  the  same  power  as  an  individual  to  deal  with  and 
sell  its  property  when  manufactured.  But  the  authority  of 
the  Legislature  over  the  property  of  a  corporation  is  not 
lost,  because  no  power  is  reserved  to  repeal  or  amend  its 
charter.  Any  laws  the  sovereign  power  may  find  it  neces- 
sary or  salutary  to  enact,  regulating,  controlling,  restricting 
or  prohibiting  the  sale  of  a  particular  kind  of  property  for 
the  general  benefit,  apply  as  well  to  the  property  of  corpo- 
rations as  to  individuals.  Such  laws  are  in  the  nature  of 
police  regulations,  and  individuals  and  corporations  are  alike 
subject  to  them.  Indeed,  all  property  is  held  subject  to  such 
restriction,  and  it  is  immaterial  that  the  restriction  is  im- 
posed after  the  property  is  acquired  or  becomes  valuable,  or 

ns  State  V.  Williams  (N.  C),  Gl  s*  State    v.    Barrett,    138    N.    C. 

S.  E.  61.  130^  50  S.  E.  506. 


129  CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  STATUTES.  §  101 

after  the  charter  is  granted,  or  before  it  became     necessary 
in  the  judgment  of  the  Legislature  to  pass   a  law  on  the 
subject.    Any  such  law  limits,  restrains,  impairs,  and  in  some 
cases  destroys  the  uses,  which  were  previously  enjoyed,  of 
the  property  so  made  the  subject  of  legislation,  but  the  extent 
to  which  it  may  do  so  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  such 
law  or  its  equal  application  to  all  owners  of  such  property. 
Such  laws  are  presumed  to  be  passed  for  the  common  good, 
and  to  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  public,  and 
cannot  be  said  to  impair  any  right  or  do  any  injury  in  the 
proper   legal   sense   of   these   terms."'     Whatever   differences 
of  opinion  may  exist  as  to  the  extent  and  boundaries  of  the 
police  power,  and  however  difficult  it  may  be  to  render  a 
satisfactory  definition  of  it,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that 
it   does   extend   to   the   protection   of  the   lives,   health   and 
property  of  the  citizens  and  to  the  preservation  of  good  or- 
der and  the  public  morals.     The  Legislature  cannot,  by  any 
contract,  divest  itself  of  the  power  to  provide  for  these  ob- 
jects.    They  belong  emphatically  to    that    class    of    objects 
which  demand  the   application   of  the  maxim,  solus  populi 
suprema  lex;  and  they  are  to  be  attained  and  provided  for 
by  such  appropriate  means  as  the  legislative  discretion  may 
devise.      That   discretion    can   no   more   be   bargained    away 
than  the  power  itself.®*' 

Sec.  101.    Prohibition  in  particular  places  and  localities. 

By  an  act  of  Congress  it  is  provided  that  no  license  shall 
be  granted  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor  at  any  place 
within  one  mile  of  the  Soldier's  Home  property  in  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia."     In  various  States  statutes  of  like  tenor 

95  Commonwealth  V.  Intoxicating  U.  S.  814;  McKinney  v.  Town  of 
Liquors,  115  Mass.  153;  People  v.  Salem,  77  Ind.  213;  State  v.  Fell, 
Hawley,  3  Mich.  330;  Vanderbuilt  42  Md.  7L;  Commonwealth  v. 
V.  Adams,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  349;  Brennan,  103  Mass.  70;  Freleigh 
Coates  V.  New  York,  7  Cow.  (N.  v.  State,  8  Mo.  606;  Metropolitan 
Y.)   585,  604,  606.  Board,   etc.,    v.    Barrie,    34   N.    Y. 

96  Boyd  V.  Alabama,  94  U.  H.  657;  Stone  v.  Mississippi,  101  U. 
645;  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  S.  814;  State  v.  Paul,  5  Pv.  I.  185. 
U.  S.  25;  Store  v.  Mississippi,  101  97  2G  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.,  p.  797. 


§  101  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  130 

and  prohibiting  the  sale  of  such  liquors  at  or  near  educa- 
tional institutions,  churches,  camp-meetings,  agricultural 
fairs,  places  of  exhibition  and  amusement,  public  State  build- 
ings and  near  railroads  during  construction  have  been  en- 
acted and  enforced.  In  Indiana  a  statute  of  this  character 
provides  that  "whoever  sells  or  exposes  for  sale,  gives,  bar- 
ters or  in  an}^  way  disposes  of  any  spirituous,  vinous,  malt 
or  other  intoxicating  liquor,  or  any  article  of  traffic  what- 
soever ;  or  shall  erect,  bring,  keep,  continue,  or  maintain  any 
booth,  tent,  wagon,  shed,  huckster  shop,  or  other  place  for 
the  sale  of  spirituous,  vinous,  malt  or  other  intoxicating  li- 
quor, or  any  other  article  whatever;  or  being  the  pro- 
prietor, owner,  or  occupant  of  any  real  property,  shall  lease 
or  permit  the  same  to  be  occupied  for  any  such  purpose,  or 
any  place  within  one  mile  from  the  place  where  any  religious 
society  or  assemblage  of  people  is  collected  or  (collecting  to- 
gether for  religious  worship,  or  any  agricultural  fair  or  ex- 
hibition, or  picnic,  or  cemetery  or  other  place  where,  on  the 
30th  day  of  May,  commonly  known  as  Memorial  Day,  any 
public  exercises  are  being  held  in  commemoration  of  dead 
soldiers  and  sailors,  in  such  cemetery  or  swch  soldiers'  and 
sailors'  graves  are  being  or  about  to  be  decorated  by  the  pub- 
lic or  any  portion  thereof,  shall  be  fined  in  any  sum  not  more 
than  fifty  dollars  nor  less  than  ten  dollars,  and  imprisoned  in 
the  county  jail  not  exceeding  ten  days. "  "^  Under  a  statute  of 
this  character  the  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island  held  that 
in  the  ascertainment  of  the  distance  between  the  points 
named  in  the  statute,  measurement  must  be  made  in  a  direct 
line,  in  that  case,  from  any  part  of  the  building  or  place 
where  the  liquors  were  sold  to  any  part  of  the  school  build- 
ing; in  other  words,  that  in  ascertaining  the  distance  between 
the  points  the  nearest  direct  distance  between  them  was  that 
which  was  contemplated  by  the  statute  and  that  which  must 
control.''^  Substantially  this  is  the  rule  adopted  by  the  courts 
of  Massachusetts.^  If  the  law  in  such  case  provides  that  liquor 

98lncl.    R.    S.    1881,    §2100;     1  i  Commonwealth  v.  Emerson,  140 

Burns'  R.  S.  1908,  §2497.  Mass.  434;  5  N.  E.  155;  Common- 

^^  in  re  Linuor  Locations,  13  R.  wealth   v.   Jones,    142   Mass.   573; 

1.  733.             '  8  N.  E.  603. 


131  CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF   STATUTES.  §  101 

shall  not  be  sold  within  a  given  distance  of  a  certain  factory 
building,  the  fact  that  the  operation  of  the  factory  ceases 
to  be  continued  by  the  corporation  named  in  the  statute,  but 
is  operated  by  a  new  and  different  corporation  organized  for 
that  purpose,  will  not  vitiate  the  provisions  of  the  statute.- 
And  the  same  is  true  if  a  church  or  schoolhouse  is  named  in 
the  statute,  and  the  building  is  thereafter  destroyed  or  re- 
moved, or  a  vacation  of  the  school  is  being  had.=*    In  the  first 
instance  the  law  is  not  a  charter  privilege  which  can  be'  dis- 
solved by  the  dissolution  of  the  corporation.     The  reason  for 
the  continuation  of  the  law  is  just  as  great  after  the  old  com- 
pany ceases  to  exist  .ns  before,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  its 
purpose  is  to  protect  the  owners  and  employes  of  the  factory 
against  the  evils  incident  to  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors, 
and  the  same  kind  of  business  is  continued  in  the  same  place 
by  the  owners  of  the  same  property.     And  in  the  second  in- 
stance, as  well  as  that  of  the  church  or  school,  the  provisions  of 
the  law  are  not  only  for  the  benefit  of  the  emplovers  and  em- 
ployes   of   the   factory   and   for  the   people    attending   the 
church  and  the  pupils  being  taught  in  the  school,  but  also 
for  all  persons  within  the  entire  area  of  country  extend- 
mg  the  distance  named  in  the  statute  in  every  direction  from 
the  buildmgs  named.    The  operation  of  the  law  in  either  ease 
cannot  be  affected  by  any  subsequent  event  except  by  legis- 
lative action.     The  only  power  that  can  repeal   or  suspend 
such  a  law  is  the  one  by  which  it  was  established— the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  in  \vhieh  alone  is  vested  the  constitutional  an- 
thority  to  make  and  unmake  laws." 

sAsherst  v.  State,  79  Ala.  276.  iting  a  sale  to  an   inmate  of  the 

3  Carlisle  v.  State,  91  Ala.  1;  8  home  except  upon  the  written  per- 
bo.  386;  Love  v.  Porter,  93  Ala.  mit  of  the  superintendent,  is  valid. 
384;  9  S.  E.  585;  State  v.  Eaves,  State  v.  Barringer,  110  N.  C  S^S- 
106  N.  C.  752;  lis.  E.  370;  State  14  S.  E.  781. 

V.  Barringer,  110  N.  C.  525;   14  S.  So    a    state   law   forbidding   the 

E.   ^81;   Tillery  v.  State,  78  Tenn.  location  of  a  drinking  place  within 

(10  Lea)  35.  ^jn^    nij,^    ^f   ^    soldier's    home    is 

4  Love  V.  Porter,  93  Ala.  384;  9  valid.  Whitney  v.  Township,  etc., 
•  •  ^^^-  71  Mich.  234;  .^9  N.  W.  40;  Driggs 
^  A  statute  prohibiting  the  loca-  v.  State,  52  Ohio  St.  37 ;  38  N.  E. 

tion  of  a  saloon  within  three  miles       882. 

of  an  orphan's  home;   and  probih-  A  statute  prohibiting  sales  with- 


§  102  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  132 

Sec.  102.     Confining"  sale  of  liquors  to  certain  districts. 

Aside,  in  the  discussions,  from  all  questions  of  local  op- 
tion, the  Legislature  may  require  what  liquors  are  sold  to  be 
sold  in  certain  districts  of  a  community  and  prohibit  their  sale 
in  others.  Perhaps  an  extreme  phase  of  this  question  is  a  law 
prohibiting  sales  except  on  licensed  premises,  but  we  here  allude 
to  districts  in  a  city  or  town.  It  is  nothing  uncommon  for 
the  Legislature  (or  by  empowering  a  municipality  to  do  so) 
to  forbid  sales  in  resident  sections  of  a  city  and  confine  them 
to  the  business  districts.  Such  provisions  have  been  univer- 
sally held  constitutional.^  And  a  statute  confining  sales  in  a 
county  to  cities  and  towns  therein  is  valid.**  Laws  forbidding 
sales  in  cities  and  towns  and  within  certain  distances  thereof, 
but  allowing  it  in  the  remaining  parts  of  a  'county  are  valid.^ 
And  where  special  charters  for  cities  were  admissible,  a  char- 
ter providing  that  the  Board  of  County  Control  should  have 
no  power  to  grant  a  license  in  a  certain  designated  part  of 
the  city  by  name,  except  in  a  park  in  the  prohibition  terri- 
tory, for  which  prohibitory  territory  a  license,  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  authorities,  might  be  granted,  was  held  con- 
stitutional, not  containing  a  discrimination  forbidden  either 
by  the  State  or  Federal  Constitutions.'* 

in  half  a  mile  of  the  city  limits  is  Henderson    v.    Galveston     (Tex.), 

valid.      Paul    v.    State    (Tex.    Cr.  114  S.  W.  108. 

App.),     106     S.     W.     448;     so    to  6  State  v.   Berlin,  21   S.  C.  292; 

one  prohibiting  sales,  exchanges  or  53  Am.  Rep.  677;  United  States  v. 

gifts     of      liquors      in      brothels,  Ronan,   33   Fed.   117. 

Schmeltz  v.  State,  8  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  ?  state  v.  Rauscher,   1   Lea,  96; 

Rep.    82;     State   v.    Somerville,    1  State  v.  Muse,  4  D.  &  B.  L.    (N. 

Ohio  N.  P.  422.  C.)    319;   State  v.  Stovall,  103  N. 

c  Rowland    v.     Greencastle,     157  C.  416;    8   S.   E.  900;    Whitney  v. 

Tnd.  591;  62  N.  E.  474;  Gorrell  v.  Tov\Tiship  Board,  71  Mich.  234;  39 

Newport,    1    Tenn.    Ch.   App.    120;  N.    W.    40;    Dorman    v.    State,    34 

Howell  v.  State,  71  Ga.  224;   Shea  Ala.  216. 

V.  Muncie,  148  Ind.   14;   46  N.  E.  The  same  is  true  of  a  town  or 

138;    Otte  v.   State,  29   Ohio   Cir.  city   when   it   adopts  by  local   op- 

Ct.  Rep.  203;  Paul  v.  State   (Tex.  tion,    prohibition,    Avhile    sales    in 

Civ.  App.),  106  S.  W.  448;  Moore  other  parts  of  the  county  are  per- 

v.  Danville,  232  111.  307;  83  N.  E.  mitted.     Ex  parte  Massey,  49  Tex. 

845;    Williams    v.   State,    52   Tex.  Cr.  App.   60;    92  S.  V.   1083. 

Civ.   App.   371;    107   S.   W.    1121;  8  Williams  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  371;   107  S.  W.  1121. 


133  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  103 

Sec.  103.     Agricultural  fairs. 

Agricultural  societies  are  justly  considered  of  public  bene- 
fit, and  large  numbers  of  people  congregate  at  them, 
and  from  the  very  nature  of  such  assemblies  regulations  for 
the  preservation  of  order  are  necessary,  and  for  this  reason 
a  Legislature  under  the  police  power  of  the  State  has  the 
power  to  enact  such  laws  and  provide  for  such  regulations 
as  will  preserve  good  order  and  promote  the  interest  and 
comfort  of  those  who  assemble  at  them  for  purposes  of 
pleasure  or  for  the  advancement  of  agricultural  interests. 
Such  a  statute  deprives  no  one  of  any  vested  right  nor  inter- 
feres with  any  one's  "regular  business."  Therefore  a  law 
which  forbade  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  within  half  a 
mile  of  such  grounds  was  held  constitutional.*'  And  the  fact 
that  such  a  fair  is  organized  for  profit  and  awards  premiums 
for  articles  placed  on  exhibition,  will  not  vitiate  the  law.^*^ 
A  law  of  this  character  which  provides  that  "whosoever  sells 
intoxicating  liquors  within  two  miles  of  the  place  where  an 
agricultural  fair  is  being  held"  shall  be  fined,  includes  sales 
made  by  one  whose  place  of  business  is  permanently  located 
within  such  distance;  and  the  fact  that  it  applies  to  the  liquor 
dealer  whose  place  of  business  is  just  within,  and  does  not 
apply  to  the  one  that  is  just  without,  the  prescribed  limit 
does  not  make  it  unconstitutional  for  want  of  uniformity.  A 
law  is  general  and  uniform  that  applies  to  all  persons  and 
things  coming  within  its  provisions  throughout  the  State.  Its 
uniformity  consists  in  the  fact  that  no  person  or  thing  of 
the  description  of  any  person  affected  by  it  is  exempt  from 
its  operation."  If  a  statute  in  such  cases  makes  exceptions, 
a  prosecution  under  it  can  not  be  maintained  where  the  in- 
dictment does  not  negative  the  exception  of  facts  which  un- 
der the  statute  are  excepted.^- 

9  State    V.    Stovall,    103    N.    C.  lo  state    v.    Long.    48    Ohio    St. 

416;  S  S.  E.  900;  Earle  v.  Latonia,       509;  28  N.  E.  1038. 
etc.,  Ass'n   (Ky.),  106  S.  W.  312;  n  Heck    v.    State,    44    Ohio    St. 

32  Ky.  L.  Rep.  469,  586.  536 ;  9  N.  E.  305. 

12  State  V.  Gappy,  50  Ind.  291. 


§  104  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  134 

Sec.  104.    Educational  institutions. 

A  statute  which  provides  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  to  man- 
ufacture, sell  or  give  away  intoxicatinn;  liquors  within  a 
given  distance  of  any  :ommon  school  or  incorporated  educa- 
tional institution  is  constitutional,  and  the  fact  that  it  pro- 
vides that  it  shall  not  apply  t  >  the  sale  of  such  liquors  within 
the  limits  of  an  incorpor'Ated  town  will  not  deprive  it  of  its 
character  as  a  general  law ;  -  '^  nor  will  it  be  deprived  of  its 
general  character  because  it  exempts  those  persons  who  al- 
ready have  established  places  of  business  within  the  pre- 
scribed limits."  In  Massachusetts,  under  a  statute  which 
provided  that  "no  license  shall  be  granted  for  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  in  any  building  or  place,  on  the  same 
street,  within  400  feet  of  any  building  occupied,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  by  a  public  school,"  it  was  held  that  the  distance 
between  the  schoolhouse  and  building  is  to  be  determined  by 
measuring  from  the  nearest  point  of  such  house  to  the  other, 
and  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  building  should  be  sit- 
uated on  the  line  of  the  same  street ;  in  other  words,  that  the 
measureruent  is  to  be  made,  not  from  the  nearest  point  of 
the  room,  but  the  "building  or  place"  in  which  the  sale  is 
made  to  the  school  building,  aud  that  the  word  "place"  as 
used  in  the  statute  is  intended  to  cover  the  case  where  there 
is  no  building,  but  where  a  tent,  booth,  excavation  in  the 
ground,  or  some  other  locality,  is  resorted  to  for  the  purpose 
of  selling  such  liquor.^'  Under  that  statute  it  was  also  held 
that  if  the  defendant's  saloon  did  not  front  on  the  street  on 
which  the  schoolhouse  was  located,  but  had  in  the  rear  a  lot, 
in  the  fence  around  which  a  gate  had  been  put,  and  through 
which  and  across  this  lot  persons  were  accustomed  to  go  from 
the  defendant's  jn'omises  to  the  street  on  which  the  school- 
is  Boyd  V.  Bryant,  35  Ark.  69;  Lea)  3&8;  Howell  v.  State,  71  Ga. 
Wilson  V.  State,  .".5  Ark.  414;  224;  51  Am.  Rep.  259;  Butler  v. 
White  V.  Bracelin,  144  Mich.  332;  State,  89  Ga.  821;  15  S.  E.  763. 
107  N.  W.   1055;    13   Detroit  Leg.  instate   v.    Ranscher,    G9   Tenn. 

N.    156;    State    v.    Ranscher,    69        (1  Lea)   96. 

Tenn.     (1    Lea)     90;     Murphy    v.  i^  Commonwealth   v.   Jones,    142 

State,    77    Tenn.     (9     Lea)     373;        Mass.  578;   8  X.  E,  60). 
Hutchcr    V,    State,    80    Tenn.     (12 


1^5  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES  §  104 

house  was  situate.!,  it  was  a  question  for  the  jury  whether 
there  was  such  a  general  use  by  all  persons  of  the  gate  and 
passageway  as  to  make  th-^  premises  on  the  same  street  as  the 
sehoolhouse.^^  A  local  law  which  prohibits  the  sale  of  such 
liquors  within  a  given  distance  of  ;i  sehoolhouse  not  only 
protects  the  school  there  taught  from  the  evils  of  the  liquor 
traffic,  but  also  all  persons  within  tho  entire  area  of  the 
community  extending  the  distance  named  in  every  direction 
from  the  center  of  th3  house  in  which  the  school  is  taught, 
and  the  removal  of  the  school  to  another  building  in  the 
neighborhood,  because  of  the  destruction  of  the  sehoolhouse 
or  the  taking  of  a  vacation  by  the  school,  will  not  in  any  way 
change  or  affect  the  operation  of  the  law.  Its  operation  in 
the  prescribed  territory  can  not  be  affected  by  any  subse- 
quent event,  except  by  legislative  action.  The  only  power 
that  can  repeal  or  suspend  such  a  law  is  the  one  by  which  it 
has  been  established — the  General  Assembly — in  which  alone 
is  vesttd  the  constitutional  authority  to  make  and  unmake 
laws.^'  In  Arkansas  and  Tennessee  laws  have  been  enacted 
making  it  unlawful  to  sell  such  liquors  within  a  given  dis- 
tance of  any  incorporated  university,  college,  academy,  or 
institution  of  learning.  It  has  been  held  that  these  laws  do 
not  apply  to  the  common  schools  provided  for  by  the  Legis- 
lature, even  though  they  are  taught  in  the  building  of  a 
college  or  academy,'^  and  that  to  sustain  a  conviction  for  sell- 
ing such  liquors  within  the  prescribed  distance  of  such  incor- 
porated institution  of  learning,  the  certificate  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  must  have  previously  been  registered  in  the 
office  of  the  county  register.^^  A  statute  prohibiting  sales 
within  four  miles  of  a  sehoolhouse,  except  in  towns  of  a  ce>. 

10  Commonwealth      v.      Everson,  682.     Such  a  statute  is  valitl.  Dor- 

140  Mass.  572;  5  N.  E.  155.  man  v.  State,  34  Ala.  216. 

17  Love  V.  Porter,  93  Ala.  384;  lo  Brewer  v.  State,  75  Tenn    (7 

9    So.   585;    Dorman   v.    State,   34  Lea)    682;    Dorman   v.    State,    34 

Ala.  216;  Tilley  V.  State,  78  Tenn.  Ala.   216;    Webster   v.    State,    110 

(10  Lea)    35.  Tenn.  491;  82  S.  W.  179;  State  v. 

IS  DoRois  V.  State.  n4  Ark,  381  ;  Pausohor.    09   Tonn.    (1    T^a)    ftfi; 

Blackwell  v.   State,   36   Ark.    178;  Hatcher    v.    State,   80    Tenn.    (12 

Brewer  v.  State,  75  Tenn.  (7  Lea)  Lea)    368. 


§  105  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  136 

tain  designated  population,  is  valid,  and  not  open  to  th*' 
abjection  that  it  grants  unequal  privileges.-" 

Sec.  105.     Religious  assemblies. 

An  enforeible  law  may  be  enacted  making  it  a  misde- 
meanor for  any  person  to  sell,  give,  barter,  or  in  any  way  dis- 
pose of  intoxicating  liquors  within  a  given  distance  from  the 
place  where  any  religious  society  or  assemblage  of  people 
collect  together  for  religious  worship,-^  and  where  the  stat- 
ute makes  an  exception  as  to  such  persons  as  carry  on  their 
regular  business  at  their  usual  places  of  transacting  the 
same,  a  person  may  not  rent  property  within  the  prohibited 
limit  for  the  purpose  of  selling  such  liquors  during  the  con- 
tinuance of  a  meeting  of  such  society  without  violating  the 
statute.--  Such  a  law  has  been  held  valid,  notwithstanding  a 
part  of  the  territory  so  specified  is  within  the  limits  of  a  town 
whose  charter  had  prior  to  enactment  of  such  law  empow- 
ered the  town  to  license  liquor  selling.-^  Under  a  local  law 
of  this  character  which  prohibits  the  sale  of  such  liquors  with- 
in a  given  distance  of  the  Methodist  and  Baptist  Churches  of 
a  town,  a  conviction  may  be  had  on  proof  of  a  sale  at  a  place 
which  is  within  the  district  named  of  either  one  or  both  of 
such  churches,  the  court  holding  that  the  manifest  purpose 
of  the  law  was  to  protect  worshiping  assemblies  from  annoy- 
ing disturbances  which  sometimes  attend  the  sale  of  such 
liquors,    and   that    protection    was    intended   to   be    extended 

20  Sate  V.  Frost,  103  Tenn.  685;  Blackwell   v.   State,   36   Ark.    178; 

54  S.  W.  986.     See  Jung  Brewing  Trammell  v.  Bradley,  37  Ark.  374; 

Co.  V.  Frankfort,  100  Ky.  409;   38  Meyer  v.   Baker,   120   111.   567;    12 

S.  W.  710;   18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  855.  N.  E.  79;   State  v.  Midgett,  85  N. 

A    statute    authorizing    a    local  C.  538;  State  v.  Partlow,  91  N.  C. 

board  to  enter  an  order,  upon  pe-  550;    49   Am.   Rep.   652;    State   v. 

tition  of  a  majority  of  the  voters  Snow,  117  N.  C.  774;  23  S.  E.  322; 

in  the  district,  to  prohibit  the  sale  West     v.      State,      28      Tenn.      (9 

of  liquors  within  three  miles  of  an  Humph.)   66;  Meyer  v.  Baker,  120 

educational    institution    is    consti-  111.  567;  12  N.  E.  70. 

tutional.     Trammell  v.  Bradley,  37  22  State  v.  Solomon,  33  Ind.  450. 

Ark.  374.  23  state  v.  Snow,  117  N.  C.  774; 

21  Boyd  V.  Bryant,  35  Ark.  69;  23  S.  E.  322. 
Wilson    V.    State,    35    Ark.    414; 


137  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES.  §  105 

equally  and  alike  to  the  two  churches.  In  other  words,  the 
legislative  intent  was  to  establish  a  prohibition  district,  which 
should  include  an  area  extending  the  distance  named  in  every 
direction  from  the  churches,  and  that  district  necessarily  in- 
cluded every  foot  of  ground  which  was  less  than  the  required 
distances  from  the  churches.-*  It  has  been  held,  however, 
that  such  a  law  was  ambiguous  and  inoperative,  where  it  pro- 
hibited the  sale  of  such  liquors  within  a  given  distance  "of 
Mt.  Zion  Church  in  Gaston  County,"  and  it  appeared  on  the 
trial  of  an  indictment  for  a  violation  of  it  that  there  were 
two  churches  of  that  name  in  the  county .-°  Nor  can  an  in- 
dictment, under  such  a  statute,  for  selling  such  liquors  with- 
in a  prescribed  distance  of  a  church  be  sustained  where  the 
evidence  shows  that  the  sale  was  made  within  the  prescribed 
distance  of  a  house  conveyed  primarily  for  educational  pur- 
poses, with  permission  to  hold  divine  services  therein  on  suit- 
able occasions.^"  Nor  can  there  be  a  conviction  under  such  a 
statute  unless  the  sale  is  completed  within  the  prohibited 
district,  so  that  the  title  to  the  liquor  sold  passes  there  from 
the  vendor  to  the  purchaser.-^  But  a  conviction  was  sus- 
tained where  the  evidence  showed  that  the  defendant  was  a 
practicing  physician  within  the  prescribed  territory;  that  he 
was  a  member  of  a  firm  of  saloon  keepers  in  a  town  outside 
thereof;  that  he  sent  by  messenger  from  his  place  of  resi- 
dence to  his  partner  a  dollar  for  a  quart  of  a  particular  whis- 
ky for  medicinal  purposes;  that  his  partner  at  the  saloon 
delivered  to  the  messenger,  upon  receipt  of  the  dollar,  the 
quart  of  whisky,  which,  by  the  messenger,  was  carried  and 
delivered  to  the  physician.  In  that  case  it  was  held  that  the 
sale  was  not  complete  until  the  whisky  had  been  delivered  to 
the  physician.-^  A  Pennsylvania  statute  forbidding  the  sale 
of  any  kind  of  articles  of  traffic,  spirituous  liquors,  wine, 
porter,  beer,  or  any  fermented,  mixed  or  strong  drink,  within 

24  Carlisle   v.   State,   91   Ala.  1;            27  Carl    v.    State,   43   Ark.   353; 
8  So.  386.  Bage   v.   State,   50  Ark.   20;    G   S. 

25  State    V.    Partlow,    91    N.  C.       W.   15;    Herron  v.  State,  .51   Ark. 
550;  49  Am.  Rep.  652.  133;    10  S.  W.  25. 

2«  State    V.    Midgett,    85    N.    C.  28  Yowell  v.  State,  41  Ark.  355, 

538. 


§  106  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  138 

three  miles  of  any  place  of  religious  worship  during  meetings 
held  for  that  purpose  has  been  construed  as  applying  to  the 
sale  of  such  articles  as  would  have  a  tendency  to  produce  intoxi- 
cation and  consequent  disturbance,  and  not  to  articles  of  food 
which  could  not  have  that  tendency."^  The  fact  that  the  statute 
permits  a  sale  of  mead  with  the  consent  of  those  in  charge  of 
the  meeting  does  not  render  the  prohibitory  clause  invalid.^" 
It  cannot  be  objected  that  a  statute  of  this  kind  regulates  the 
internal  affairs  of  a  near-by  city  or  town.^^  And  a  statute 
prohibiting  within  a  certain  distance  of  a  church  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  except  in  licensed  stores  and  taverns,  is 
valid,  the  exception  not  rendering  it  invalid.^- 

Sec.  106.     License  state  may  require. 

As  the  Legislature  has  the  power  to  prohibit  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  much  more  so  has  it  the  power  to  re- 
quire all  vendors  of  such  liquors  to  have  a  license  to  sell 
them,  and  punish  all  persons  making  sales  without  a  license 
first  obtained.  "If  the  State  has  power  to  prohibit,  it  cer- 
tainly has  the  power  to  regulate  the  traffic,"  said  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Maryland,  "by  determining  who,  and  what 
character  of  persons,  shall  be  licensed  to  deal  in  the  article. 
*  *  *  Having  full  and  complete  control  over  the  sub- 
ject, as  an  article  of  internal  commerce,  the  State  can  pre- 
scribe what  conditions  it  may  think  proper  upon  which  license 
can  be  obtained.  It  becomes  simply  a  question  of  degree  of 
prohibition."  ^^    A  statute  requiring  a  license  to  sell  and  ex- 

29  Fetter  v.  Wilt,  46  Pa.  St.  457;  Am.  Dec.  22G;  Pierce  v.  State,  13 
Kramer  v.  Marks,  64  Pa.  St.   151.  N.  H.  5.36;   Ingersoll  v.  Skinner,  1 

30  Meyers  v.  Baker,  120  111.  567;  Denio,  540;  Metropolitan  Board  v. 
12  X.  E.  79.  Barrie,  34  X.  Y.  657;   Thomasson 

31  Sexton  V.  Board  (X\  J.),  v.  State,  15  Ind.  449;  Territory  v. 
69  Atl.  470.  Grinnell,  2  Ariz.  339;   16  Pac.  209; 

32  State  V.  Muse,  4  Dev.  &  B.  State  v.  Searcy,  20  Mo.  489 ;  Pvohr- 
(N.  C.)    319.  backer  v.  Jackson,  51   Miss.   725; 

33  Cohocs  V.  .Jarrett,  42  Md.  571 ;  Streeter  v.  People,  69  111.  695;  An- 
Crowley  v.  Christensen,  137  U.  S.  derson  v.  Brewster,  44  Ohio  St. 
86;  11  Sup.  Ct.  13;  34  L.  Ed.  620;  576;  9  X.  E.  683;  Schuller  v.  Bor- 
Peoplc  V.  Meyers,  95  X.  Y.  223;  deaux,  64  Miss.  59;  8  So.  201; 
Keller  v.   State,    11    Md.  520;    69  Schwuchow  v.  Chicago,  68  111.  444 ; 


139 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OP   STATUTES. 


§106 


acting  a  fee  for  its  issuance  is  not  in  conflict  with  a  consti- 
tutional provision  providing  that  "no  tax  shall  be  levied 
except  in  pursuance  of  law."^*  Nor  does  an  ordinance  re- 
quiring a  fee  to  be  paid  for  the  license  violate  a  provision  in  a 
Constitution  providing  that  every  person  shall  pay  a  tax  in 
proportion  to  the  value  of  his  property;  for  a  license  fee  is 
not  a  tax.''^  So  a  provision  in  a  Constitution  providing  tliat 
the  Legislature  may  levy  a  license  tax,  but  must  graduate  the 
amount  thereof  to  be  collected  from  the  persons  pursuing  the 
several  trades,  professions  and  occupations,  does  not  prohibit 
the  exacting  of  a  license  from  a  social  club  that  restricts  its 
sales  to  its  members  without  intending  to  make  a  profit  on 
its  sales.-'*''  A  license  law  does  not  infringe  a  constitutional 
provision  guaranteeing  the  acquiring,  possessing  and  protec- 
tion of  property.'-'  Xor  is  such  a  law  void  because  it  ap- 
plies the  license  fees  to  the  payment  of  the  State's  debts, '^'* 


Mugler  V.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  G23; 
8  Sup.  €t.  273-  31  L.  Ed.  205, 
affirming  29  Kan.  252 ;  44  Am.  R  p. 
634;  License  Cases,  5  How.  504; 
12  L.  Ed.  256;  Commonwealth  v. 
Schowenhutt,  3  Phila.  20;  Smith 
V.  People,  1  Parker  Cr,  Rep.  583; 
Charleston  v.  Ahrens,  4  Strobh. 
241;  State  v.  Peckham,  3  R  I. 
289;  Woleott  v.  Burlingame,  112 
Mich.  311;  70  N.  W.  831;  In  re 
Intoxicating  Liquor  Cases,  25  Kan. 
751;  37  Am.  Rep.  284;  State  v. 
Buechler,  10  S.  D.  156;  72  N.  W. 
114;  Cantini  v.  Tillman,  54  Fed. 
0-6^;  State  v.  Bixman,  162  Mo.  1; 
62  S.  W.  828;  Commonwealth  v. 
Blackington,  24  Pick.  352;  Sasser 
V.  Martin,  101  Ga.  447;  29  S.  E. 
278;  In  re  DeWalt,  186  Pa.  204; 
42  W.  N.  C.  114;  40  Atl.  470; 
State  V.  Porterfield,  47  S.  C.  75; 
25  S.  E.  39;  State  v.  Mattle,  48 
La.  Ann.  728;  19  So.  748;  Durein 
V.  Kansas,  208  U.  S.  226;  28  Sup. 


Ct.  567;  52  L.  Ed.  — ,  affirming 
70  Kan.  1;  78  Pac.  152;  80  Pac. 
987;  State  v.  Williams,  146  N.  C. 
618;  61  S.  E.  61;  In  re  Boyle,  190 
Pa.  St.  577;  42  Atl.  1025;  45  L. 
R.  A.  399 ;  Joliff  v.  State,  53  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  -61;  109  S.  W.  176;  Web- 
ber V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  109 
S.  W.  182;  Commonwealth  v.  Fred- 
ericks,  119  Mass.   199. 

3*  Henry  v.  State,  26  Ark.  523 ; 
Ex  parte  Hurl,  49  Cal.  557;  State 
V.  Hudson,  78  Mo.  302;  Pleuler  v. 
State,  11  Neb.  547;   10  N.  W.  481. 

35  King  V.  Jacksonville,  2  Scam. 
305;  Thomasson  v.  State,  15  Ind. 
449;  Mason  v.  Lancaster,  4  Bush. 
406. 

36  State  V.  Boston  Club,  45  La. 
Ann.  585;  12  So.  895;  20  L.  R.  A. 
185. 

37  In  re  Lunt,  6  Greenl.  412. 

3s  Keller  v.  State.  11  Md.  625; 
69  Am.  Dee.  226;  Winona  v.  Whip- 
ple, 24  Minn.  61. 


§  107  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  140 

and  it  is  not  an  unlawful  restraint  of  trade.^^  The  enact- 
ment of  a  statute  requiring  a  license  does  not  exhaust  the 
power  of  the  Legislature;  and  it  may  enact  further  laws  re- 
stricting the  right  to  sell  while  licenses  issued  under  the 
former  law  are  still  in  force.***  So  it  is  competent  for  the 
Legislature  to  fix  a  yearly  fee  for  the  license  and  require 
all  taking  out  a  license  for  that  part  of  the  year  unexpired 
when  the  statute  was  adopted  to  pay  a  full  yearly  fee.*^  Nor 
can  it  be  successfully  claimed  that  the  statute  is  invalid  be- 
cause it  requires  a  license  of  those  engaged  in  the  sale  of 
liquors  and  not  of  those  engaged  in  the  sale  of  groceries, 
dry  goods,  and  the  like.*-  The  State  may  authorize  a  mu- 
nicipality to  exact  a  license.*^ 

Sec.  107,     State  may  permit  sales  under  a  license — Biblical 
prohibition. 

It  has  been  contended  that  a  State  has  no  power  to  license 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.  In  one  such  instance  the 
claim  was  made  ''that  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  be 
drank  as  a  beverage  at  the  place  of  sale  is  so  destructive  to 
the  public  health  and  so  inherently  immoral  that  no  law  up- 
holding it  can  be  valid  either  under  the  Constitution  of  this 
State  or  of  the  United  States."  In  this  same  instance  it  was 
argued  that  as  the  people  of  the  State,  in  the  preamble  of 
their  Constitution,  gratefully  acknowledged  "the  good  prov- 
idences of  God,  in  having  permitted  them  to  enjoy  a  free 
government,"  that  that  was  a  recoonition  of  God  as  the  source 
of  that  government;  that  the  Bible  contains  the  "Word  of 
God,"  which  condemns  the  use  and  sale  of  intoxicating  li- 
quors as  a  beverage,  and  therefore  that  the  State  cannot  per- 
mit it  in  any  terms.  To  this  contention  the  court  said : 
"There  was  a  time  in  the  early  history  of  the  Common- 
wealth when  the  Bible  w^as,  'in  the  defect  of  a  law  in  any 

39  Rochester  V.  Upman,  19  :Minn.  4i  Carroll    v.    Wright,    131    Ga. 

108;   State  v.  Hardy,  7  Xeb.  377;  728;   63   S.  E.  260. 

Commonwealth    v.    Schoenhutt,    3  42  Carroll    v.    Wright,    131    Ga. 

Phila.  20;   15  Leg.  Int.  4.  728;  63  S.  E.  260. 

40  Reithmiller  v.  People,  44  Mich.  43  State  v.  Harper,  42  La.  Ann. 

280;  6  N.  W.  667.  312;  7  So.  446. 


141  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES  §  107 

particular  case,'  a  rule  of  political  government.**    But  even 
then  it  was  never  considered  to  contain  any  absolute  prohibi- 
tion of  such  a  business  as  that  for  which  the  license  now  in 
question  was  granted.     As  early  as  1643  it  was  provided  by 
the  colonial  laws  that  no  person  or  persons  should  sell  wine 
or  'strong  water  in  any  place  within  these  libertyes,  without 
license  from  the  particular  court  or   any  two  magistrates.' 
*     *     *     In  the  face  of  this  long  history  of  dealing  with 
the  use  and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  as  a  beverage,  to  be 
drank  at  the  place  where  they  are  purchased,  it  is  idle  to 
claim  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  understood  or  in- 
tended that  anything  contained  in  it  should  be  regarded  as 
prohibiting  altogether  the  licensing  of  such  a  business.     Our 
Constitution  vests  'the  legislative  power  of  this  State'  in  the 
General   Assembly.      That  power   covers   the   whole  field   of 
legitimate  legislation,  except  so  far  as  limitations  are  to  be 
found  in  ether  provisions  of  this  Constitution  or  in  that  of 
the   United    States.      The    latter   provides   that   the    'United 
States  shall  guarantee  to  every  State  in  the  Union  a  republi- 
can  form  of  government.'     Connecticut  is  therefore  impli- 
edly bound  forever  to  maintain  such  a  form  of  government. 
She  put  her  legislative  power  in  the  hands  of  the  General 
Assembly.     She  put  only,  because  she  could  put  only,  such 
power  of  that  nature  as  was  consistent  with  a  republican  form 
of  government.     In  constitutional  republics,  as  was  observed 
by  Chief  Justice  Chase  in  a  case  where  arguments  somewhat 
resembling  those  now  made  at  our  bar  were  advanced,  'there 
are  undoubtedly,  fundamental  principles  of  morality  and  jus- 
tice which  no  Legislature  is  at  liberty  to  disregard;  but  it  is 
equally  undoubted  that  no  court,  except  in  the  clearest  case, 
can  properly  impute  the  disregard  of  those  principles  to  the 
Legislature.'  "  ^^     "However  broad  the  scope  that  has  been 
given  to  the  guaranty  of  due  process  of  law  by  such  decisions 
as  those  to  which  reference  has  been  made,  that  there  is  noth- 
ing unrepublican  nor  beyond  the  legitimate  sphere  of  legis- 
lative power,  in  the  maintenance  of  such  a  system  as  that 

44  Citing    'Colonial     Records     of  45  License    Tax    Cases,    5    Wall. 

Connecticut,  I,  509.  462;   18  L.  Ed.  497. 


§  107  TRAPPIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  142 

long  established  here  for  governmental  license  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  is  plain  from  the  fact,  of  which  judicial  no- 
tice must  be  taken,  that  most  free  governments  have,  at  all 
periods  of  time,  made  that  business  a  subject,  not  of  prohibi- 
tion, but  of  regulation.  Either  mode  of  treatment  is  equally- 
legitimate.  At  common  law  it  was  a  business  lawful  and  open 
to  any  man.  Our  statutes  do  not  enlarge,  but  restrict,  this 
right."  *^  In  an  Indiana  case  the  same  contention  was  made, 
that  a  licensing  statute  \vas  unconstitutional  "for  the  reason 
that  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  is  dangerous  and  hurt- 
ful to  society,  and  therefore  wrong,  and  the  licensing  thereof 
cannot  be  upheld  under  the  Constitution."  "Counsel  for 
the  State  repeatedly  assert  that  the  right  to  engage  in  the 
retail  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  an  inherent  or  inalienable 
right.  Therefore  they  argue  that,  if  the  right  to  traffic  in 
intoxicating  liquors  exists  in  this  State,  it  must  arise  out  of 
some  valid  legislative  grant,  and  that  a  statute  granting  such 
right  is  in  violation  of  the  general  import  or  spirit  of  the  State 
Constitution,  and  therefore  must  be  held  invalid.  They  assert 
that  the  object  of  the  liquor  license  law  of  this  State  is  to 
restrict  a  supposed  common  law  right;  but  they  affirm  that 
no  such  right  existed  under  the  common  law,  and  therefore 
there  is  no  cause  for  the  passage  of  such  laws  by  the  Leg- 
islature. *  *  *  They  further  argue  that,  if  the  saloon 
business  is  dangerous  and  hurtful  to  the  public,  it  must  be 
deemed  and  held  to  be  a  common  nuisance,  and  if  the  act  of 
1875  creates  the  right  of  the  liquor  dealer  to  engage  in  the 
business  of  retailing  intoxicating  liquors,  to  be  drank  as  a 
beverage  on  the  premises  where  sold,  such  act  operates  to 
license  a  wrong  of  the  nature  of  a  public  nuisance,  and  there- 
fore should  be  held  to  be  unconstitutional  by  the  court,  and 
the  license  granted  thereunder  to  appellant  in  this  case  is 
no  protection  to  him  in  maintaining  a  nuisance."  After 
stating  that  it  is  the  unrestricted,  unregulated  traffic  in  in- 
toxicating liquors  that  has  been  fraught  with  evils  resulting 
in  demoralizing  influences  upon  private  morals  and  the  peace 

40  Appeal  of    Allyn,  81  Conn.  534;       »See     also     Campbell     v.     Jackson 
71  Atl.  T'W;  6«  Cent.  L.  Jr.  449.       Bros.    (Iowa),  118  N.  W.  755. 


143  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OP   STATUTES.  §  107 

and  safety  of  the  public/^  the  court  proceeds:  "Such  being 
the  tendency  of  the  traffic,  the  British  Parliament,  several 
centuries  ago,  as  we  have  heretofore  shown, ^^  and  the  Legisla- 
ture of  this  State,  as  well  as  the  Legislatures  of  sister  States, 
following  the  example  of  our  ancestors,  have  deemed  it  essen- 
tial that  the  business  should  be  permitted  to  exist  only  under 
such  restrictions  and  regulations  as,  in  their  judgment,  would 
serve  to  secure  society  or  tlie  public  against  the  dangers  and 
evils  of  the  traffic,  or,  in  other  words,  operate  to  mitigate  or 
minimize  as  much  as  possible  such  dangers  and  evils.  This 
has  been  the  legislative  policy  adopted  and  pursued  from 
the  very  beginning  of  our  territorial  existence  down  to  the 
present  time.  Should  w^e  now  deny  the  power  of  the  Leg- 
islature, under  our  Constitution,  to  permit  the  traffic  in  intox- 
icating liquors  to  exist  under  such  restrictions  and  regula- 
tions as  that  body  may  consider  fit  and  proper  to  impose,- we 
would  have  no  constitutional  warrant  for  so  holding.  Such 
a  decision  would  be  nothing  more  than  the  exercise  of  the 
mere  arbitrary  will  of  the  judges  composing  this  tribunal.  It 
would  be  nullification  by  the  judiciary  of  a  long  and  well- 
settled  legislative  policy.  If  such  a  revolution  is  desired  it 
must  be  inaugurated,  not  by  the  courts,  but  by  the  peo- 
ple, through  their  representatives  in  the  General  Assembly. 
The  legislative  and  judicial  departments  of  our  State  govern- 
ment, under  the  Constitution,  are  separate  and  distinct  from 
each  other.  Each  is  forbidden  by  our  fundamental  law  to 
exercise  the  functions  of  the  other.  Therefore,  the  courts 
cannot  make  laws  or  regulations  pertaining  to  the  health,  mor- 
als or  safety  of  the  public.  The  making  of  these  laws,  the 
same  as  others,  is  a  question  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  legisla- 
tive department  and  not  by  the  courts.  Neither  is  a  court 
authorized  to  adjudge  a  thing  to  be  a  public  nuisance  which 
is  not  regarded  as  such  by  law."  After  reviewing  the  early 
State  legislation  and  the  action  of  the  Constitutional  Con- 

4T  Citing  State  v.  Gerhardt,  145  48  By  Act  of  1552,  5  and  6  Edw. 

Ind.  439 ;   44  N.  E.  469 ;   33  L.  R.       VI,  c.  25. 
A.  313,  and  Schwuchow  v.  Chicago, 
68  111.  444. 


§  107  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  144 

vention  of  1851  to  insert  a  clause  in  the  State  Constitution 
concerning  the  sale  of  ardent  spirits,  the  court  proceeds:  "By 
these  deliberate  acts  of  the  convention  which  formed  and 
molded  our  present  Constitution,  that  body  appears  to  have 
left  the  question  in  regard  to  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors 
in  the  hands  of  the  legislative  department,  where  the  conven- 
tion found  it  at  the  time  it  convened.  Its  action,  therefore, 
in  the  matter  fully  serves  to  contradict  or  break  down  the 
contentions  of  counsel  for  the  State,  that  the  Legislature,  in 
continuing  its  former  policy  to  restrict  and  regulate  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquors,  by  passing  the  act  of  1875  *^  violated 
the  general  import  and  spirit  of  our  present  Constitution. 
Since  the  adoption  of  the  latter,  and  prior  and  subsequently 
to  the  passage  of  the  act  of  1875,  the  Legislature  has  enacted 
other  laws  regulating  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  by  im- 
posing restrictions  and  conditions  upon  the  traffic.  The  valid- 
ity of  these  laws  and  of  municipal  ordinances  of  similar  im- 
port and  effect,  has  been  repeatedly  sustained  by  this  court, 
and  the  question  of  the  constitutional  validity  of  such  laws 
as  the  act  of  1875  is  no  longer  an  open  one  in  this  juris- 
diction."^" "The  infirmity  of  the  argument  presented  by 
counsel  for  the  State  is  that  therein  they  assume  that  to  be 
true  which  is  not,  viz.,  that  the  statute  in  controversy  grants 
the  right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors,  which  right  or  privilege 

49  A  licensing  statute.  25  N.  E.  458 ;  Welsh  v.  State,  126 

50  Citing  Thomasson  v.  State,  15  Ind.  71;  25  N.  E  883;  9  L.  R.  A. 
Ind.  449;  Harrison  v.  Lockhart,  25  664;  Indianapolis  v.  Bieler,  138 
Ind.  112;  Wiley  v.  Owens,  39  Ind,  Ind.  30;  36  N.  E.  857;  State  v. 
429;  O'Dea  v.  State,  57  Ind.  31;  Gerhardt,  145  Ind.  439;  44  N.  E. 
Walter  v.  Columbia  City,  61  Ind.  469;  33  L.  R.  A.  313;  Flynn  v. 
24;  McKinney  v.  Salem,  77  Ind.  Taylor,  145  Ind.  533;  44  N.  E. 
213;  Hedderich  v.  State,  101  546;  Daniels  v.  State,  150  Ind. 
Ind.  564;  Vinson  v.  Monticel-  438;  50  N.  E.  74;  Boomersliine  v. 
lo,  118  Ind.  103;  19  N.  E.  Uline,  159  Ind.  500;  6'5  N.  E.  513; 
734;  Emerick  v.  Indianapolis,  Jordan  v.  Evansville,  163  Ind.  512; 
118  Ind.  279;  20  N.  E.  795;  72  N.  E.  512,  544;  67  L.  R.  A. 
Bush  V.  Indianapolis,  120Ind.  476;  613;  Schmidt  v.  Indianapolis,  168 
22  N.  E.  422;  Moore  v.  Indianap-  Ind.  631:  80  N.  E.  632;  Green- 
olis,  120  Ind.  483;  22  N.  E.  424;  castle  v.  Thompson,  168  Ind.  493; 
Decker  v.  Sargeant,  125  Ind.  404;  81  N.  E.  497. 


145  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF   STATUTES.  §  107 

SO  granted  is  in  derogation  of  the  common  law.    Upon  this 
unfounded  or  empty  assumption  they  base  their  argument. 
We  may  repeat  what  has  been  herein  fully  shown  under  the 
authorities  cited,  that,  from  the  beginning  of  the  common  law 
(in  force  in  this  State  by  adoption)  on  down  to  the  present 
time,  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  at  retail  or  otherwise 
was,  under  the  law,  regarded  as  lawful,  unless  declared  to 
be  unlff^'ful  by  a  positive  act  of  the  legislative  department. 
Reducing  counsel's  argument  to  a  simple  proposition,  it  may 
be  said  to  be  more  in  the  nature  of  a  quarrel  with  the  Leg- 
islature, because  that  body  did  not  enact  the  law  in  dispute 
more  fully  and  more  'completely  along  the  lines  of  absolute 
prohibition,  than  it  is  a  legal  argument.     "With  the  wisdom 
or  policy  of  such  laws  as  the  act  of  1875  we,  as  a  court,  have 
no  concern.     The  judgment  of  the  Legislature  in  respect  to 
the  expediency  or  wisdom  of  laws  enacted  by  it  is  not  a  mat- 
ter subject  to  judicial  review. "^^     "It  is  not  the  province 
of  the  judges  of  this  court,  nor  of  those  of  the  lower  courts, 
in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties,  to  criticize  the  policy 
of  the  legislative  department,  which  the  latter  has  adopted  in 
dealing  with  the  liquor  traffic.     In  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice all  courts  must  be  controlled,  so  far  as  applicable,  by  the 
laws  which  the  Legislature  has  constitutionally  enacted,  with- 
out regard  to  the  individual  views,  in  respect  to  the  wisdom  or 
expediency  of  such  laws,  of  the  persons  who  may  preside  over 
such  courts.      Neither  boards  of  commissioners  nor  courts  can 
be  held  responsible  for  granting  a  license  under  the  laws  to  sell 
intoxicating  liquors  to  an  applicant  therefor  who  is  to  be  legally 
entitled  to  such  license.     In  discharging  this  duty  such  boards 
of  commissioners  and  courts  but  carry  out  the  mandate  of 
the  law,  above  which  no  one  can  rise,  and  not  the  individual 
views  of  those  who  preside  over  them.     It  must  be  evident  to 
every  unprejudiced  mind  that  a  court  cannot  nullify  an  act 
of  the  Legislature  on  the  mere  assertions  of  persons  assailing 
it  that  a  license  granted  thereunder  permits  the  licensee  to 

51  The    court    quotes    at    length       577,   where   similar  views  are  ex- 
from  Haggart  v.  Stehlin,  137  Ind.       pressed. 
43;   29  N.  E.   1073;    22  L.  R.  A. 


§  107  TRAPPIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  146 

maintain  a  public  nuisance  per  se  by  merely  selling  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  without  violating  any  of  the  laws  of  the  State 
in  conducting  the  place  in  which  such  liquors  are  sold,  for,  as 
heretofore  shown,  whatever  is  authorized  by  an  act  of  the 
Legislature,  which  that  body  is  competent,  under  the  Con- 
stitution to  pass,  is  not,  in  the  eyes  of  the  law,  a  nuisance. 
While  all  citizens  of  this  State  have  a  perfect  right  to  cry 
out,  or  declare  upon  the  rostrum  or  before  the  Legislature, 
or  other  assembled  bodies,  that  the  liquor  traffic  cannot  be 
legalized  without  committing  a  sin,  and  while  their  argument 
might  be  sufficiently  potent  to  induce  the  Legislature  to  pro- 
hibit absolutely  the  traffic,  they  could  be  of  no  avail  before 
a  court  which  can  neither  make  nor  unmake  laws.  It  is  true 
that  there  is  a  diversit}^  of  opinion  among  the  people  in  re- 
spect to  the  manner  in  which  the  Legislature  should  deal  with 
the  question  in  regard  to  intoxicating  liquors.  There  are 
very  many  good  people  who  declare  that  the  absolute  pro- 
hibition of  the  traffic  is  the  only  system  which  the  State 
should  aaopt,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  very  many  others, 
equally  as  good,  express  views  to  the  contrary,  and  assert 
that  the  qualified  prohibition  system  w^hich  has  been  adopted 
by  the  Legislature  is  the  better  plan.  With  this  mooted  legis- 
lative question  judges  of  courts,  in  their  official  relations,  are 
not  concerned.  The  only  standard  which  they  can  recognize, 
to  measure  their  duty  in  dealing  with  the  question  of  granting 
a  license  in  the  case  before  them,  is  the  one  prescribed  by 
law,"  "If  it  could  be  said  tkat  the  Legislature,  under  our 
Constitution,  in  dealing  with  the  traffic,  must  be  confined  to 
the  passage  of  a  prohibitory  measure,  then  the  eminent  men 
who  formulated  our  fundamental  law,  members  of  the  Legis- 
lature and  courts,  have  been  for  many  years  quite  ignorant 
and  uninformed  in  respect  to  the  power  of  the  Legislature 
in  dealing  with  the  question.  Especially  may  this  be  said  in 
regard  to  the  Legislature  of  1881,  which  passed  a  joint  reso- 
lution proposing  to  engraft  a  prohibitory  amendment  upon  our 
present  Constitution."  ^^ 

52  Sopher  v.  State,  169  Ind.  177;  Tn  the  course  of  its  opinion,  the 

bi  N.  E.  912;  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  court,  in  addition  to  those  already 
172.  noted,  cites  Thurlow  v.   Common- 


147 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES. 


§108 


Sec.  108.  Fourteenth  Amendment,  effect  on  power  to  regu- 
late sale  of  intoxicating  liquors. 
The  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  provides  that,  "No  State  shall  make  or  enforce 
any  law  which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States;  nor  shall  any  State  deprive  any 
person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of 
law;  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws;"  and  this  provision  has  been  re- 
peatedly invoked  in  questions  arising  concerning  the  validity 
of  license  and  other  laws  regulating  the  sale  and  control  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  but  without  avail.  This  is  particularly 
true  of  that  part  of  the  amendment  concerning  the  abridg- 


wealth,  5  How.  504;  12  L.  Ed. 
256;  Pervear  v.  Commonwealth,  5 
Wall.  475;  18  L.  Ed.  608;  Crowley 
V.  Christensen,  137  U.  S.  86;  11 
Sup.  Ct.  13;  34  L.  Ed.  620;  In  re 
Hoff.,  107  U.  S.  488-505;  "l^c,  Sup. 
Ct.  50G;  49  L.  Ed.  848;  Pabst 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Crenshaw,  198  U. 
8.  17;  25  Sup.  Ct.  552;  49  L.  Ed. 
925;  Vance  v.  W.  A.  Vandercook 
Co.,  170  U.  S.  438;  18  Sup.  Ct. 
674;  42  L.  Ed.  1100;  Cronin  v. 
Adams,  192  U.  S.  108;  24  Sup.  Ct. 
219;  48  L.  Ed.  365. 

Under  the  Rhode  Island  consti- 
tution prohibiting  the  manufacture 
and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  as 
a  beverage,  a  licensing  statute  can- 
not be  enacted  concerning  sales  of 
liquors  as  a  beverage.  State  v. 
Tonks,  15  R.  I.  385;  5  Atl.  636; 
but  the  legislature  may  license  and 
regulate  sales  for  medicinal  and 
mechanical  purposes.  State  v. 
Clark,  15  R.  I.  383;  5  Atl.  635; 
State  V.  Kane,  15  R.  I.  395 ;  6  Atl. 
783;  State  v.  Kennedy,  16  R.  I. 
409;    17  Atl.  51. 

The  Ohio  constitution  provides 
that  "no   license   to  traffic  in  in- 


toxicating liquors  shall  hereafter 
be  granted  in  this  State."  Under 
tliis  a  statute  providing  for  a  li- 
cense is  void.  State  v.  Hipp,  38 
Ohio  St.  199.  And  an  act  making 
it  a  misdemeanor  to  sell  intoxicat- 
ing liquors  in  on  upon  the  land  or 
premises  of  another  without  his 
written  consent;  and  providing 
that  the  assessments  on  the  busi- 
ness shall  be  a  lien  on  the  prem- 
ises occupied  by  the  tenant,  is  in 
efl'ect  a  license  law  and  void.  King 
v.  Cappellar,  42  Ohio  St.  218; 
Butzman  v.  Whitbeck,  42  Ohio  St. 
223.  Contra  State  v.  Freme,  39 
Ohio  St.  399.  But  this  provision 
does  not  prohibit  the  levying  of  a 
tax  on  the  traffic.  Adler  v.  Whit- 
beck, 44  Ohio  St.  539;  9  N.  E.  672; 
Anderson  v.  Brewster,  44  Ohio  St. 
576;  9  N.  E.  683;  and  making  it 
a  lien  on  the  property  in  which  it 
is  conducted.  Adler  v.  Whitbeck, 
supra.  This  provision  applies  both 
to  wholesale  and  retail  licenses 
Senior  v.  Ratterman,  44  Ohio  St. 
661;  11  N.  E.  321;  affirming  17 
Wkly.  L.  Bull.  115. 


§  108  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  148 

ment  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  The  right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  one  of 
such  privileges  or  immunities.^^  "The  privileges  and  im- 
munities of  citizens  of  the  United  States,"  said  Chief  Justice 
Fuller,  "are  privileges  and  immunities  arising  out  of  the 
nature  and  essential  character  of  the  national  government, 
and  granted  or  secured  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquor  is  not  one  of 
the  rights  growing  out  of  such  citizenship.^*  The  amendment 
[fourteenth]  does  not  take  from  the  States  their  powers  of 
police  that  were  reserved  at  the  time  the  original  Constitution 
was  adopted.  Undoubtedly  it  forbids  any  arbitrary  depriva- 
tion of  life,  liberty  or  property,  and  secures  equal  protection 
to  all  under  like  circumstances  in  the  enjoyment  of  their 
rights;  but  it  was  not  designed  to  interfere  with  the  power 
of  the  State  to  protect  the  livps,  liberty  and  property  of  its 
citizens,  and  to  promote  their  health,  morals,  education  and 
good  order."  ^''■'  In  another  ease  Justice  Fields  said:  "There 
is  no  inherent  right  in  a  citizen  to  *  *  *  sell  intoxicating 
liquors  by  retail;  it  is  not  a  privilege  of  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  *  *  *.  The  manner  and  extent  of  regula- 
tion rest  in  the  discretion  of  the  governing  authority  *  *  *. 
It  is  a  matter  of  legislative  will  only.    As  in  many  other  cases, 

53  Jordan  v.  Evansville,  163  Ind.  ley,  6  Fed.  289;  Hoboken  v.  Good- 

512;   72  N.  E.  544;   State  v.  Lind-  man,  ©S  N.  J.  L.  217;     51Atl.  1092; 

grove,    1   Kan.   App.    51;    41    Pac.  Meelian  v.  Board,  73  N.  J.  L.  382; 

688;  Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall.  64  Atl.  689;   State  v.  Richardson, 

129;    21    L.    Ed.    929;    Mugler    v.  48  Ore.  309;  85  Pac.  225;  State  v. 

Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623;  8  Sup.  Ct.  Brennan,   2  S.   D.   384;    50   K   W. 

273;   31   L.  Ed.  205;   affirming  29  ©25;  State  v.  Hodgson,  66  Vt.  134; 

Kan.  452;  44  Am,  Rep.  634;  Crow-  28    Atl.    1089;     Craig    v.    Werth- 

ley  V.   Christensen,   137  U.  S.  86;  mueller,  78   Iowa,   598;   43   N.  W. 

11    Sup.    Ct.    13;    34    L.    Ed.    620;  606;    Pabst   Brewing  Co.   v.   Crcn- 

Giozza  V.  Tiernan,  148  U.  S.  657;  shaw,  120  Fed.  144;  Lloyd  v.  Dol- 

13   Sup.  Ct.   721;   37   L.  Ed.   599;  lison,   23   Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  571; 

Mette  V.  McGuckin,  18  Neb.  323;  State  v.  Jordan,  72  Iowa,  377;  34 

25  N.  W.  338 ;  Farmville  v.  Walk-  N.  W.  285. 

er,  101  Va.  323;   43  S.  E.  558;   61  R4  Citing  Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa,  18 

L.  R.  A.  125;  Danville  v.  Hatcher,  Wall.  29. 

101  Va.  523;  44  S.  E.  723;  Kidd  v.  ^r.  Giozza  v.  Tiernan,    148  U.  S. 

Pearson,   128  U.  S.   1 ;   9  Sup.  Ct.  657;    13   Sup.   Ct.   721;   37  L.  Ed. 

6 ;  32  L.  Ed.  346 ;  Kansas  v.  Brad-  599. 


149 


CONSTITUTIONiVLITY    OF   STATUTES. 


§108 


the  officers  may  not  always  exercise  the  power  conferred  upon 
them  with  wisdom  or  justice  to  the  parties  affected.  But  that 
is  a  matter  that  does  not  affect  the  authority  of  the  State,  nor 
is  it  one  which  can  be  brought  under  the  cognizance  of  the 
courts  of  the  United  States. "°°  Thus,  where  a  person  had 
been  engaged  in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  beer,  having  a 
large  brewery,  and  the  State  adopted  a  constitutional  provi- 
sion forbidding  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  beer  in  the  State, 
and  thereafter  he  was  arrested  under  this  law  for  having  sold 
the  beer  that  he  had  made  in  his  brewery,  it  was  held  that 
the  law  was  valid,  and  that  it  did  not  invade  his  rights,  priv- 
ileges or  immunities  as  a  citizen. ^^  And  a  law  which  prohibits 
sales  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  in  violation  of  any  provi- 
sions of  this  amendment.^*  And  this  is,  of  course,  true  of 
any  law  requiring  a  license  or  regulation  of  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors. ^^     And  a  law  requiring  a  saloon  keeper  to 


56  Crowley  v.  Christensen,  137 
U.  S.  86;  11  Sup.  Ct.  13;  34  L. 
Ed.  '620;  Danville  v.  Hatcher,  101 
Va.  523,  527;  44  S.  E.  723. 

"It  has  been  repeatedly  de- 
cided that  the  subject  is  wholly 
within  the  police  power  of  the  leg- 
islature, and  that  the  tralBc  is  not 
one  of  the  privileges  or  immunities 
of  citizenship  guaranteed  and  pro- 
tected by  the  United  States  Con- 
stitution or  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment thereto."  Mugler  v.  Kansas, 
123  U.  S.  G23;  8  Sup.  Ct.  273;  31 
L.  Ed.  205;  Kidd  v.  Pearson,  128 
U.  S.  1;  9  Sup.  Ct.  6;  32  L.  Ed. 
246;  Huckless  v.  Childrey,  135  U. 
S.  622;  10  Sup.  Ct.  972;  34  L.  Ed. 
304;  Ex  parte  Campbell,  74  Cal. 
20;  15  Pae.  318;  5  Am.  St.  Rep. 
418;  Cantini  v.  Tillman,  54  Fed. 
969;  Kansas  v.  Bradley,  26  Fed. 
289;  In  re  Hoover,  30  Fed.  51; 
Reynolds  v.  Geary,  26  Conn.  179; 
State  v.  Lindgrove,  1  Kan.  App. 
51;  41  Pac.  688;  Trageser  v.  Gray, 
73  Md.  250;   20  Atl.  905;   25  Am. 


St.  587;  9  L.  R.  780;  iState  v. 
Berlin,  21  S.  C.  292;  53  Am.  Rep. 
677;  State  v.  Aiken,  42  S.  C.  222; 
20  S.  E.  221  (overruling  McCul- 
lough  V.  Brown,  41  S.  C.  220;  19 
S.  E.  458;  23  L.  R.  A.  410)  ;  State 
V.  Brennan,  2  S.  D.  384;  50  K  W. 
625;  State  v.  Hodgson,  66  Vt.  134; 
28  Atl.  1089;  Ex  parte  Burnside, 
86  Ky.  423;  6  S.  W.  276;  Wyne- 
hamer  v.  People,  13  N.  Y.  378;  2 
Parker  Cr.  421;  affirming  2  Parker 
Cr.  377;  State  v.  Porterfield,  47 
S.  €.  75;  25  S.  E.  39. 

57  Mugler  V.  Kansas,  123  U.  S. 
623;  8  Sup.  Ct.  273;  31  L.  Ed. 
205;  affirming  29  Kan.  452;  44 
Am.  Rep.  634. 

58  Crowley  v.  Christensen,  137  U. 
S.  86;  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  13;  34  L. 
Ed.  620;  Cantini  v.  Tillman,  54 
Fed.  969;  In  re  Hoover,  "0  Fed. 
51;  Kansas  v.  Bradley,  26  Fed. 
289. 

59  Crowley  v.  Christensen,  supra; 
Kansas  v.  Bradley,  26  Fed.  289; 
In  re  Hoover,  30  Fed.  51. 


§  108  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  150 

give  a  bond  conditioned  not  to  sell  to  certain  prohibited  per- 
sons and  providing  a  civil  penalty  for  its  infringement,  and 
also  requiring  a  payment  of  a  tax  in  advance,  is  valid.''°  And 
so  is  a  law  valid  which  provides  that  no  suit  shall  be  brought 
in  any  court  of  the  State  to  recover  the  price  of  liquors  sold 
in  any  other  county  or  State  with  intent  to  enable  any  person 
to  violate  any  provision  of  such  law."^  Nor  does  this  amend- 
ment prevent  the  enactment  of  a  law  forbidding  a  sale  by 
any  person  except  a  druggist  for  medicinal  or  other  specified 
purpose;*^-  nor  does  a  statute  violate  this  amendment  which 
creates  a  board  of  commissioners  for  a  city  and  and  empowers 
them  to  issue  only  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  good 
moral  character  and  temperate  habits  licenses  to  retail  intoxi- 
cating liquors;*'^  nor  does  a  law  preventing  sales  within 
cities  and  towns  under  license  and  pro'hibiting  them 
outside  thereof;®*  nor  is  one  prohibiting  sales  by  private  in- 
dividuals and  establishing  State  dispensaries  for  dispensing- 
liquors  f^  nor  does  a  law  restricting  the  privilege  of  securing 
a  license  to  certain  classes  of  citizens  of  the  State  and  restrict- 
ing purchases  and  sales  by  them  to  purchases  and  sales  for 
mechanical,  medicinal  and  sacramental  purposes  only,  on  the 
ground  that  it  prevents  citizens  of  other  States  selling  liquors 
within  the  State  f'^  nor  is  a  statute  making  it  discretionary 
with  a  board  to  issue  a  license  f'  nor  is  one  providing  that 
no  person  paying  a  manufacturer's  tax  shall  pay  a  wholesale 
dealers'  tax,  and  providing  a  punishment  for  carrying  on  the 
business  without  paying  the  tax,  defining  a  wholesale  dealer 
as  one  who  sells  in  quantities  of  more  than  three  gallons,  or 

GoGiozza  V.  Tiernan,   148  U.  S.  65  State  v.  Aiken,  42  S.  C.  222; 

657;    13   Sup.  Ct.  721;    37   L.   Ed.  20   S.    E.   221;    overruling  McCul- 

599.  lough  V.   Brown,  41   S.  C.  220;    19 

61  Reynolds  v.   Geary,   26   Conn.  S.   E.   458;    23   L.   R.   A.  410,  and 
179.  State  v.  O'Donnell,  19  S.  E.  748. 

62  State    V.  Lindgrove,    1    Kan.  eg  Kohn  v.  :M€lcher,  29  Fed.  433. 
App.  51;  4  Pac.  688.  67  Gray    v.    Connecticut,    159    U. 

63Trageser  v.  Gray,  72  Md.  250;  S.  74;    15  Sup.  Ct.  985;  40  L.  Ed. 

20  Atl.  905;  25  Am.  St.  587;  9  L.  80;    State  v.   Gray,   61    Conn.  39; 

R.  A.  780.  22   Atl.   G7'o;    Welsh  v.  State,   12<> 

8*  State  V.  Berlin,  21  S.  C.  292;  Ind.'  71;   25  N.  E.  8S3.  • 
53  Am.  Rep.  677. 


151  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OP   STATUTES.  §  109 

more  than  a  dozen  quarts,  and  extending  its  criminal  provi- 
sions to  clerks  and  agents;"^  nor  is  one  restricting  the  license 
to  citizens  of  the  State."''     Bnt  a  statute  providing  that  any 
fruit  grower  may  make  and  sell  wine  "on  the  premises  where 
the  fruit  is  grown  and  the  wine  made"  in  quantities  not  less 
than  one  quart,  and  may  also  sell  like  quantities  in  places 
where  intoxicating  liquors  are  authorized  to  be  sold  in  the 
State,  yet  not  in  any  district  where  the  sale  is  prohibited,  is 
void  in  so  far  as  it  authorizes  a  sale  of  wine  grown  on  the 
premises  where  made  and  prohibits  a  sale  of  wine  made  out  of 
the  State,  it  being  a  violation  of  the  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties of  citizens  of  other  States.'^"     A  statute,  however,  which 
requires  of  a  foreign  manufacturer  of  beer  brought  within 
the  State  for  sale  to  make  an  affidavit  showing  that  only  cer- 
tain  ingredients   were    used    in   its    manufacture    is   valid, 
although  no  such  an  affidavit  is  required  of  a  home  manufac- 
turer, since  it  is  practically  impossible  for  the  State  to  send 
its  agents  into  another  State  there  to  inspect  and  watch  the 
process  of  manufacture,"    So  a  statute  is  valid  which  permits 
a   manufacturer   to   sell    at   wholesale    to   dealers   outside    a 
municipality  adopting  prohibition,  not  being  a  discrimination 
between  parties  living  within  and  without  the  municipality, 
and  between  manufacturers   and   dealers/^'     A  statute   for- 
bidding the  shipping  into  a  State  whisky  marked  with  the 
name  of  the  consignee  State,  or  for  the  purpose  of  so  marking 
it,  is  constitutional/^*     So  a  statute  regulating  the  sale  of  a 
non-intoxicant  beer  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  amendment.'* 

Sec.  109.     Fourteenth  Amendment— Keeping  saJoon. 

A  municipal  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping  of  a  place 
for  the  sale  at  retail  of  intoxicating  liquors  will  not  conflict 

G8  People     V.     Lyng,     74     Mich.  72  Lloyd  v.  Dollison,  23  Ohio  Cir 

579;   42  N.  W.   139.  Ct.  Rep.  571. 

69  Austin  V.  State,  10  Mo.  591;  73  Brown-Forman  Co.  v.  Com- 
Mette  V.  McGurekin,  18  Neb.  323;  monwealth  (Ky.),  101  S  W  321- 
25  N.  W.  338.  30  Ky.  L.  Rep."  793. 

70  State    V.    Deschamp,    53    Ark.  74  Campbell  v.  Thomasville   (Ga 
490;    14  S.  W:  653.  App.),  64  S.  E.  81. 

71  Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Cren- 
shaw, 120  Fed.  144. 


§  110  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  152 

with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  which  provides  that  "no  State  shall  deprive 
any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of 
law."  Such  an  ordinance  undertakes  only  to  prevent  the 
keeping  within  the  corporate  limits  a  place  where  intoxicating 
liquors  are  sold  at  retail.  Under  it  a  man  may  sell  his  stock 
in  trade  in  any  way  he  can,  except  in  such  a  way  as  will  make 
him  a  "keeper"  of  a  place  for  the  retail  of  such  liquors. 
Such  an  ordinance  is  only  a  police  regulation  in  the  interest 
of  the  public  morals  and  for  the  public  good;  and,  although 
it  may  in  some  measure  affect  the  value  of  property  or  inter- 
fere with  its  use  in  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  obtained,  it 
will  not  thereby  "deprive"  the  owner  of  such  liquors  of  his 
property.'^^ 

Sec.  110.  Privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  other 
states. 
Section  2  of  Article  IV,  of  the  Federal  Constitution  pro- 
vides that,  "The  citizens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to 
all  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several 
States."  This  clause  is  very  similar  to  the  provision  in  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  providing  that,  "No  State  shall  make 
or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  im- 
munities of  citizens  of  the  United  States;"  and  a  number  of 
decisions  concerning  the  regulation  of  intoxicating  liquors 
have  been  based  on  the  first  quoted  clause.  It  has  been  held 
that  this  clause  does  not  restrict  the  State  from  confining  the 
right  to  a  license  to  its  own  citizens  and  prohibiting  sales 
without  such  license.^*'  Nor  is  an  act  void  which  forbids  an 
action  to  be  maintained  in  any  court  of  the  State  to  recover 
the  price  of  liquors  sold  in  another  State  with  intent  to  enable 
any  person  to  violate  the  provisions  of  the  act  forbidding  the 

"Tanner  v.  Village  of  Alliance,  Gray,  73  Md.  250;  20  Atl.  905;  25 

29  Fed.  196.  Am.  St.  587;  9  L.  R.  A.  780;  Sin- 

T6  Cantini    v.   Tillman,    54    Fed.  clair  v.  State,  69  N.  €.  47;  Cohn  v. 

969;    State  v.   Allmond,   2   Houst.  Melcher,  29  Fed.  433;  Campbell  v. 

(Del.)    612;    Welsh  v.   State,   126  Jackman  Bros.  (Iowa),  118  N.  W. 

Ind.  71;  25  N,  E.  883;  Trageser  v.  755. 


153  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §111 

retail  of  liquors  in  the  enacting  State.'^^  A  statute  which 
applies  alike  both  to  local  and  foreign  agents  selling  intoxi- 
cating liquors  in  the  State  is  valid."  A  statute  providing, 
if  a  place  to  sell  or  manufacture  liquors  is  established,  that 
in  either  a  criminal  or  civil  proceeding  the  court  shall  at  once 
enter  a  judgment  for  its  abatement,  and  that  the  fixtures  used 
in  making  sales  or  in  manufacturing  liquors  shall  be  ordered 
sold,  does  not  violate  this  provision  of  the  Constitution.^^  In 
such  an  instance  the  fact  that  the  remedy  is  given  in  chan- 
cery does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  statute.**" 

Sec.  111.     "Import"  defined — Statute  in  violation  of  Con- 
stitution. 

A  statute  of  a  State  which  provides  that  before  it  shall  be 
lawful  for  any  dealer  or  dealers  in  intoxicating  liquors  to 
offer  any  such  liquors  for  sale  within  the  limits  of  the  State, 
such  dealer  or  dealers  introducing  any  such  liciuors  shall  first 
pay  a  certain  tax  per  gallon  upon  each  and  every  gallon 
thus  introduced,  does  not  violate  that  clause  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  which  says  that,  "No  State  shall 
levy  any  imposts  or  duties  on  imports  or  exports,"  if  the  tax 
is  not  different  from  that  charged  upon  like  liquors  manu- 
factured in  the  State.  The  term  "import"  as  used  in  this 
clause  of  the  Constitution  does  not  refer  to  articles  imported 
from  one  State  into  another  but  only  to  articles  imported  from 
foreign  countries  into  the  United  States;  hence,  the  uniform 
tax  imposed  by  a  State  on  all  sales  made  in  it,  whether  they 
be  made  by  the  citizens  of  it  or  the  citizens  of  some  other 
State,  and  whether  the  goods  so  sold  are  produced  in  the  State 
enacting  the  law,  or  in  some  other  State,  is  valid.     Such  a 

77  Reynolds  v.  Geary,  2G  Conn.  79  Craig  v.  Werthmueller,  78 
179;      United     Breweries     Co.     v.       Iowa,  598 ;  43  N.  W.  606. 

Colby,  170  Fed.  100.  so  state  v.  Jordan,  72  Iowa,  377; 

78  People     V.     Lyng,     74     Mich.       34  N.  W.  285. 

579;  42  N.  W.  139;  Commonwealth  A  court   of  equity  will   not  en- 

V.   Shaffer,    128    Pa.    St.    575;    18  join    the    enforcement   of    a    void 

Atl.  390;   24  W.  N.  C.  539;   State  liquor  statute.     J.  W.  Kelly  &  Co. 

V.  Hodgson,  66  Vt.  134;  28  Atl.  v.  Conner  (Tenn.),  123  S.  W.  622. 
1089. 


§  111         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  154 

statute  does  not  discriminate  against  productions  of  sister 
States  and  is  not  an  attempt  to  regulate  commerce  but  a 
proper  and  legitimate  exercise  of  the  taxing  power  of  the 
State.^^  A  State  statute  which  imposes  a  tax  upon  persons 
not  residing  or  having  their  principal  place  of  business  within 
the  State,  w^ho  engage  therein  in  the  business  of  selling  or 
soliciting  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  be  shipped  into 
the  State  from  places  without  it,  but  does  not  impose  a  similar 
.tax  upon  persons  selling  or  soliciting  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  manufactured  in  the  State,  is  a  regulation  in  restraint 
of  commerce  repugnant  to  the  constitutional  provision  here 
referred  to;  and  the  defect  cannot  be  justified  on  the  ground 
that  the  statute  is  an  exercise  by  the  Legislature  of  the  police 
power  of  the  State  for  the  discouragement  of  the  use  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  and  the  preservation  of  the  health  and 
morals  of  the  people.  This  would  be  a  perfect  justification  of 
the  law  if  it  did  not  discriminate  against  citizens  of  other 
States  in  the  matter  of  commerce  between  the  States  and  thus 
usurp  one  of  the  prerogatives  of  the  national  Legislature. 
The  police  power  cannot  be  set  up  to  control  the  inhibitions 
of  the  Federal  Constitution  or  the  powers  of  the  United  States 
government  created  thereby.^-  And  the  same  is  true  of  a 
statute  which  forbids  carriers  to  bring  any  intoxicating  liquors 
into  the  State  from  any  other  State  or  territory.  The  police 
power  of  a  State  cannot  obstruct  foreign  commerce  or  inter- 
cept commerce  beyond  the  extent  of  its  exercise,  and,  under 
color  of  it,  objects  not  within  its  scope  may  not  be  secured  at 
the  expense  of  the  protection  afforded  by  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution.^^ 

81  Woodruff  V.  Parkham,  8  Wall.  M.  Schendler  Bottling  Co.  v. 
(U.  S.)  123;  Hinson  v.  Lot,  8  Welch,  42  Fed.  561;  State  v.  In- 
Wall.   (U.  S.)    148.  toxicating  Liquors,  82  Me.  558;   19 

82  Walling  V.  Michigan,   116   U.  Atl.  913. 

S.  446;  6  Sup.  Ct.  454.  In    the    License    Cases,    5    How. 

83  Bowman  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  504;  12  L.  Ed.  256,  it  was  held 
Co..  125  U.  S.  465;  8  Sup.  Ct.  689;  that  a  statute  of  Rhode  Island  for- 
United  States  v.  Fiscus.  42  Fed.  bidding  a  sale  of  liquor  in  less 
395;  In  re  Beine,  42  Fed.  545;  quantities  tlian  ten  gallons  was 
Tuchman  v.  Welch,  42   Fed.  548;  valid,  even  as  applied  to  liquor  in 


155  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  112 

Sec.  112.    Discrimination  against  liquors  of  other  states. 

Much  litigation  has  grown  out  of  laws  enacted  by  many  of 
the  States  discriminating  against  the  products  and  manufac- 
tures of  other  States.  A  fruitful  cause  of  such  litigation  has 
been  the  effort  to  i)rotect  the  local  manufacture  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  and  especially  the  wine  industry.  As  a  rule, 
when  such  laws  have  been  put  to  the  test  they  have  been  held 
to  be  in  conflict  with  that  clnrsp  of  Article  I.  Section  8,  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  provides  that  Con- 
gress shall  have  power  to  regulate  commerce  among  the  several 
States,  and  that  part  of  Article  IV,  Section  2.  which  provides 
that  the  citizens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  States.  The  test  of 
such  a  statute  is  "whether  there  is  any  discrimination  in  favor 
of  the  State  or  citizens  of  the  State  which  enacted  the  law. 
Wherever  there  is  such  discrimination  it  is  fatal."  In  sup- 
port of  such  laws  the  contention  has  been  that  they  were 
within  the  police  powers  of  the  States.  In  answer  to  this  con- 
tention the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  held  that 
the  only  way  in  which  commerce  between  the  States  can  be 
legitimately  affected  by  State  laws,  is  when,  by  virtue  of  its 
police  power,  and  its  jurisdiction  over  persons  and  property 
within  its  limits,  a  State  provides  for  the  security  of  the  lives, 
limbs,  health  and  comfort  of  persons  and  the  protection  of 
propertv:  or  Avhen  it  does  those  things  which  may  otherwise 
incidentally  affect  commerce,  such  as  the  establishment  and 
regulation  of  hisrhwavs.  canals,  railroads,  wharves,  ferries,  and 
other  commercial  facilities:  the  passage  of  inspection  laws  to 
secure  the  due  quality  and  measure  of  products  and  com- 
irndities;  the  passaae  of  laws  to  resrulate  or  restrict  the  sale 
of  articles  deemed  injurious  to  health  or  morals  of  the  com- 
munity ;  the  imposition  of  taxes  upon  persons  residing  within 
the  State  or  belonging  to  its  population  and  upon  vocations 

the     original     packages     imported  particular   point,   is   no  longer   an 

from  France,   not  being  a   regula-  authority.      State    v.    Peckham,    3 

tion  of  commerce:   but  in  view  of  R.  I.  289,  follows,  in  principle,  the 

the  later  decisions  of  the  Federal  License  Cases. 
Supreme  Court,  this  case,  on  this 


§  112  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  156 

and  employments  pursued  therein,  not  directly  connected 
with  foreign  or  interstate  commerce  or  with  some  other  em- 
ployment or  business  exercised  under  the  authority  of  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States ;  and  the  imposi- 
tion of  taxes  upon  all  property  within  the  State,  mingled  with 
and  forming  part  of  the  great  mass  of  property  therein.  But 
in  making  such  internal  regulations  a  State  cannot  impose 
taxes  upon  persons  passing  through  the  State  or  coming  into 
it  merely  for  a  temporary  purpose,  especially  if  connected 
with  interstate  or  foreign  commerce ;  nor  can  it  impose  such 
taxes  upon  property  imported  into  the  State  from  abroad,  or 
from  another  State,  and  not  yet  become  part  of  the  common 
mass  of  property  therein ;  and  no  discrimination  can  be  made, 
by  any  such  regulations  adverse  to  the  persons  or  property  of 
other  States;  and  no  regulation  can  be  made  affecting  inter- 
state commerce.^*  In  accordance  with  this  statement  of  the 
law,  it  has  been  uniformly  held  that  a  State  statute  requiring 
the  payment  of  a  license  tax  from  persons  dealing  in  goods, 
wares  and  merchandise  which  are  not  the  growth,  produce  or 
manufacture  of  the  State,  and  requiring  no  such  license  tax 
from  persons  selling  similar  goods  which  are  the  growth, 
produce  or  manufacture  of  the  State,  is  an  unconstitutional 
regulation ;  ^^  and  this  rule  of  law  has  been  applied  in  relation 
to  a  tax  upon  non-resident  sellers  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  be 
shipped  into  a  State  from  places  without  it.^*^    In  the  language 

84  Robbins  v.  Shelby  County  Tax-  Fed.  Rep.  492;   In  re  Rebman,  41 

ing  District,  120  U.  S.  489,  493 ;  7  Fed.  Rep.  867 ;   Vines  v.  State,  67 

Sup.  Ct.  592.  Ala.  73;    Powell  v.   State,  69  Ala. 

85Wolton  V.  Missouri,  91   U.   S.  10;    State   v.    Nash,    97    Ala.    514; 

275;   Machine  Co.  v.  Gage,  100  U.  McCreary   v.    State,   73   Ala.   480; 

S.  679;   Walling  v.  Michigan,  102  Wrought   Iron,  etc.,   Co.   v.   John- 

U.    S.    123;    County   of   Mobile   v.  son,   84   Ga.    754;    11    S.    E.    233: 

Kimball,    102   U.   S.    691;    Webber  State  v.  Nash,  97  N.  C.  514. 
V.  Virginia,  103  U.  S.  344;  Hinson  so  Gray  v.  Baltimore,   100  U.  S. 

V.  Lott,  8  Wall.  148;  Weil  v.  Cal-  434;   Walling  v.  ^Michigan,   116  U. 

houn.  25   Fed.  Rep.  865:    Kohn  v.  S.   446;    6    Sup.    Ct.   454;    Robbins 

Melchor,  29  Fed.  Rep.  433;   Stock-  v.  Shelby  Co.  Taxing  District,  120 

ton  V.  Baltimore,  32  Fed.  Rep.  9;  U.  S.  489;    7  Sup.   Ct.  592;   Leisy 

Swift    V.    Sutphin,    39    Fed.    Rep,  v.  Hardin,  135  U.  S.  100;   10  Sup. 

631;  Baird  v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.,  41  Ct.    681;    Lyng   v.    Michigan,    135 


157  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  112 

of  Justice  Harlan,  "it  must  be  regarded  as  settled  that  no 
State  can,  consistently  with  the  Federal  Constitution,  impose 
upon  the  products  of  other  States,  brought  therein,  for  sale 
or  use,  or  upon  citizens,  because  engaged  in  the  sale  therein, 
or  the  transportation  to,  of  the  products  of  other  States  more 
onerous  public  burdens  or  taxes  than  it  imposes  upon  the  like 
products  of  its  own  territory."*''  There  is  good  reason  for 
this  conclusion,  for,  if  the  power  of  a  State  to  exact  a  license 
tax  of  any  amount  is  admitted,  then  no  avithority  would  re- 
main in  the  United  States  to  control  its  action,  however  un- 
reasonable or  burdensome.  Imposts  operating  as  an  absolute 
exclusion  of  the  goods  would  be  possible,  and  all  the  evils  of 
discriminating  State  legislation  favorable  to  the  interests  of 
one  State  and  injurious  to  the  interests  of  other  States  and 
countries,  which  existed  previous  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  might  follow.^^  The  law  as  here  stated 
is  not  only  applicable  to  the  States  but  also  to  the  municipal 
corporations  within  them,  the  courts  holding  that  an  ordi- 
nance which  requires  a  license  fee  from  citizens  of  another 
State,  or  their  agents,  who  offer  goods  within  the  corporate 
limits  which  have  not  been  produced,  manufactured  or  grown 
within  the  State,  is  void,  because  it  assumes  to  establish  a 
regulation  affecting  commerce  between  the  States.^'  In  Iowa 
and  Ohio,  however,  it  has  been  held  that  the  State,  as  a  police 
regulation,  may  prohibit  the  sale  of  any  kind  of  intoxicating 
liquors  and  allow  the  sale  of  another  kind,  and  the  prohibition 
of  wines  made  from  fruits  grown  in  other  States  is  no  in- 
vasion of  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  those 

U.  S.    161;  10  Sup.  Ct.  725;  State  129;  9  Sup.  Ct.  1;  Stountebugh  v. 

V.   Marsh,   37   Ark.   356;    State   v.  Hennick,  V29  U.  S.  141;  9  Sup.  Ct. 

Deschamp,  53  Ark.  490;    14  S.  W.  256;   McCall  v.  California,  136  U. 

653.  S.    104;    10    Sup.    Ct.    881;    In   re 

87  Gray  v.  Baltimore,   100  U.  S.  Kimmell,  41  Fed.  Rep.  775;    Grafty 

434;  State  v.  Marsh,  37  Ark.  356.  v.  Rushville,  107  Ind.  502;  8  N.  E. 

8S  Wclton  V.  Missouri,  91  U.  S.  609 ;    McLaughlin   v.   Soutli   Bend, 

275.  126  Ind.  471;    2-6  N.   E.   1«5;    In- 

ssRobbins  v.  Shelby  Co.  Taxing  dianapolis  v.  Bieler,  138   Ind.  30; 

District,  120  U.  S.  489;  7  Sup.  Ct.  36  N.  E.  857. 
592;    Asher   v.    Texas,    128    U.   S. 


§112 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


158 


States,  and  not  repugnant  to  Article  IV,  Section  2,  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  In  so  deciding  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Ohio  said :  "If  the  State  has  the  power,  as  a  police 
regulation,  tc  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  it  may, 
w  it5.  discretion,  prohibit  the  sale  of  one  kind  of  liquor  and 
allow  the  sale  of  another  kind.  It  may  say  that  certain  wines 
may  not  be  sold.  Because  the  sale  of  all  things  which  may  be 
deleterious  to  the  public  is  not  prohibited,  is  no  good  reason 
why  the  sale  of  such  as  are  prohibited  is  invalid.  And  be- 
cause the  sale  of  wines  manufactured  from  fruit  grown  in  this 
State  is  allowed,  and  the  sale  of  wines  manufactured  from 
fruit  grown  in  Illinois  is  prohibited,  is  no  'invasion  of  the 
privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  Illinois,  because 
this  State,  in  the  exercise  of  its  police  authority,  has  the  power 
to  determine  what  kind  of  intoxicating  liquors  it  will  pro- 
hibit the  sale  of,  and  what  kind  it  will  allow."®" 


00  state  V.  Stucker,  58  la.  496; 
12  N.  W.  483;  McGuire  v.  State, 
42  0.  St.  530;  McLaury  v.  Watel- 
sky,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  394;  87  S. 
W.   1045. 

An  ordinance  fixing  saloon  lim- 
its and  allowing  saloons  outside  of 
them  to  continue  until  their  li- 
censes expired,  is  valid  and  not  an 
unjust  discrimination  among 
liquor  dealers  outside  such  limits. 
Andreas  v.  Beaumont  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  113  S.  W.  614;  State  v. 
Board   (Wyo.),  105  Pac.  295. 

In  these  cases  it  has  been  held 
that  a  statute  authorizing  the  sale 
of  domestic  wine — wine  made  in 
the  State — and  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  wine  made  out  of  the  State,  was 
invalid.  State  v.  Deschamp,  54 
Ark.  490;  14  S.  W.  653;  McCreary 
V.  State,  73  Ala.  480  (see  Powell 
V.  State,  69  Ala.  10);  Ex  parte 
Kinnebrew,  35  Fed.  52  (cider)  ; 
Weil  V.  Calhoun,  25  Fed.  865; 
Glover  v.  State,  126  Ga.  594;   55 


S.  E.  592;  Commonwealth  v.  Pe- 
tranich,  L83  Mass.  217;  66  N.  E. 
807.  (Rule  extended  to  cider.) 
State  V.  Scampini,  77  Vt.  92; 
59  Atl.  201;  State  v.  Hazleton,  78 
Vt.  567;   63  Atl.  305. 

So  a  statute  limiting  the  sales 
to  wine  made  from  grapes  grown 
on  the  premises  is  invalid.  State 
V.  Deschamp,  54  Ark.  490;  14  S. 
W.  6i53,  though  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  held 
that  a  statute  autliorizing  the 
manufacture  of  wine  or  liquor  for 
one's  own  use,  and  prohibiting  the 
keeping  and  sale  of  all  other 
liquors,  is  valid.  Vance  v.  W.  A. 
Vandercook  Co.,  170  U.  S.  468; 
18  Sup.  Ct.  674;  Douthit  v.  State, 
98  Tex.  344;  83  S.  VV.  795;  modi- 
fying 82  S.  W.  352. 

Where  a  statute  excepted  from 
its  prohibitory  provisions  "the 
manufacture,  sale  and  use  of  do- 
mestic wines  or  cider,"  it  was  so 
constrred  as  to  except  other  wines, 


159 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES. 


§113 


Sec.  113,    Manufacture  for  shipment  out  of  state. 

A  statute  which  provides  that,  "No  person  shall  manufac- 
ture or  sell     *     *     *     directly  or  indirectly,  any  intoxicating 


in  order  to  hold  it  constitutional; 
in  other  words,  the  word  "domes- 
tic" was  stricken  out  by  construc- 
tion. Ex  parte  Kinnebrew,  35 
Fed.  52;  Glover  v.  State,  126  Ga. 
594;  55  S.  E.  592. 

In  Kenti'cky,  where  an  ordi- 
nance required  a  license  fee  from 
all  selling  beer  brewed  out  of  the 
city,  it  was  presumed,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  averment  in  the  plead- 
ings, that  a  like  fee  was  required 
of  local  manufacturers,  in  order 
to  uphold  the  ordinance.  Jung 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Frankfort,  100  Ky, 
409;  38  S.  W.  710. 

In  Texas  it  was  decided  that 
liquor  sellers  are  not  denied  the 
privileges  ai  d  immunities  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  because 
producers  of  domestic  wines  are 
given  certain  exemptions  while 
such  wines  are  in  their  hands,  from 
the  tax  imposed  and  bond  required 
by  the  statute  regulating  the  sale 
of  liquors.  Cox  v.  State,  202  U.  S. 
446;  26  Sup.  Ct.  71;  50  L.  Ed. 
1099,  affirming  37  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
607 ;  85  S.  W.  34. 

In  Vermont  it  is  held  that  a 
statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors,  but  permitting 
farmers  to  sell  cider  by  the  bar- 
rel, made  from  their  own  grown 
apples,  is  valid  and  is  not  class 
legislation.  State  v.  Hamilton,  78 
Vt.  467;  63  Atl.  7. 

A  statute  permitting  a  manu- 
facturer having  his  place  of  busi- 
ness in  a  prohibitory  district  to 
^here    sell    the    liquors    he    there 


manufactures,  and  forbidding  oth- 
ers to  sell  there,  does  not  dis- 
criminate against  a  non-resident 
or  wholesale  dealer  or  manufac- 
turer; and  is  therefore  valid. 
Jung  Brewing  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  98  S.  W.  307;  30 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  267. 

If  the  general  law  of  a  State 
authorizes  domestic  wines  to  be 
sold,  a  city  cannot  prohibit  their 
sale.  Duren  v.  Stephens,  126  Ga. 
496;  54  S.  E.  1045;  but  it  may 
require  their  inspection  and  re- 
quire a  fee  paid  for  the  inspec- 
tion. It  cannot  require  the  in- 
spection of  wines  made  by  the 
owner  of  grapes  grown  on  his  own 
land,  unless  he  opens  a  place  of 
business  to  make  sales  of  them. 
Stephens  v.  Henderson,  120  Ga. 
218;    47   S.   E.   498. 

A  State  cannot  impose  a  license 
on  sales  of  liquor  in  another 
State,  to  be  there  delivered.  State 
V.  Stilsing,  23  Vroom,  517;  20  Atl. 
65. 

A  statute  declaring  certain  li- 
quors intoxicating,  when  they  are 
not,  does  not  violate  this  provision 
of  the  Constitution.  State  v. 
Frederickson,  101  Me.  37;  63 
Atl.  535.  A  State  may  prohibit 
the  soliciting  or  taking  orders  for 
sale  of  liquors  to  be  delivered 
within  its  boundaries,  though  the 
solicitor  is  a  non-resident  and 
the  liquors  are  without  its  boun- 
daries. State  V.  Miller  (W.  Va.), 
66  S.  E.  522. 


§  113  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  160 

liquors,  except  as  hereafter  provided,"  and  in  a  subsequent 
section  further  provides, ' '  that  nothing  contained  in  this  law 
shall  prevent  any  persons  from  manufacturing  in  this  State 
liquors  for  the  purpose  of  being  sold  according  to  the  provi- 
sions of  this  chapter,  to  be  used  for  mechanical,  medicinal, 
culinary  or  sacramental  purposes,"  will  not  authorize  the 
manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  transportation  out  of 
the  State.  The  first  clause  of  such  a  statute  is  a  sweeping 
provision  against  the  manufacture  and  sale;  not  a  dealing 
which  is  composed  of  both  steps,  and  consequently  must  in- 
clude manufacture  as  well  as  sale,  or,  c  converso,  sale  as  well 
as  manufacture,  in  order  to  incur  the  denunciation  of  the 
statute,  but  is  against  either  the  sale  or  the  manufacture.  The 
conjunction  is  disjunctive.  The  sale  is  forbidden,  the  manu- 
facture is  forbidden,  and  each  is  forbidden  independently  of 
the  other.  The  unqualified  prohibition  of  any  and  all  manu- 
facture of  such  liquors  by  the  clause  is  subsequently  modified 
by  four  exceptions,  viz. :  Sale  for  mechanical  purposes,  to  an 
extent  limited  by  the  wants  of  the  particular  locality  of  the 
seller ;  sale  for  medicinal  purposes,  to  the  same  extent ;  sale 
for  culinary  purposes,  to  the  same  extent ;  and  sale  for  sacra- 
mental purposes,  to  the  same  extent.  The  effect  of  such  a 
statute  is  simply  and  clearly  to  prohibit  all  manufacture  of 
intoxicating  liquors  except  for  one  or  more  of  the  four  pur- 
poses specified.  "For  the  purpose,"  says  the  statute.  The 
excepted  purpose  is  all  that  saves  it  from  being  ah  initio,  and, 
through  each  and  every  step  of  its  progress,  unlawful.^^  Such 
a  statute  does  not  conflict  with  Section  8,  Article  I,  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  Ignited  States,  by  undertaking  to  regulate 
commerce  among  the  States,  for  it  does  not  exercise  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  State  over  persons  or  property  or  transactions 
within  the  limits  of  other  States ;  nor  does  it  act  upon  liquors 
as  exports,  or  while  they  are  in  process  of  exportation  or  im- 
portation. Its  avowed  object  is  to  prevent  not  the  carrying 
of  intoxicating  liquors  out  of  the  state,  but  to  prevent  their 
manufacture,  except  for  specified  purposes,  within  the  state. 
The  prohibition  of  the  statute  is  directed  alone  to  the  manu- 

oiKidd   V.   Pearson,   128   U.   S.  1 ;  9  Sup.  Ct.  6. 


161  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  113 

facture  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  purposes  other  than  for 
sale  according  to  the  provision  of  the  statute.  If  the  law  is 
obeyed,  no  liquor  will  be  manufactured  for  transportation. 
Its  operation  is  to  prevent  the  production  of  an  article  which 
might  be  lawfully  transported  out  of  the  state.  No  distinction 
is  more  popular  to  the  common  mind,  or  more  clearly  ex- 
pressed in  economic  and  political  literature,  than  that  between 
manufacture  and  commerce.  Manufacture  is  transformation 
— the  fashioning  of  raw  materials  into  a  change  of  form  or 
use.  The  functions  of  commerce  are  different.  The  buying 
and  selling  and  the  transportation  incidental  thereto  consti- 
tute commerce;  and  the  regulation  of  commerce,  in  a  consti- 
tutional sense,  embraces  the  regulation  at  least  of  such 
transportation.  Commerce  consists  in  the  interchange  of  com- 
modities or  property  which  is  the  subject  of  trade.  It  does 
not  consist  in  the  impossible  interchange  of  things  not  in  ex- 
istence. They  must  be  articles  of  trade  before  commerce  can 
exist.*^-  Nor  does  such  a  statute  conflict  with  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  by  de- 
priving the  manufacturers  of  intoxicating  liquors  of  their 
property  without  "due  process  of  law."  The  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  has  decided  that  a  State  has  the  right 
to  prohibit  or  restrict  the  manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors 
within  her  limits;  to  prohibit  all  sale  and  traffic  in  them  in 
the  State;  to  inflict  penalties  for  such  manufacture  and  sale, 
and  to  provide  regulations  for  the  abatement  as  a  common 
nuisance  of  the  property  used  for  such  forbidden  purposes; 
and  that  such  legislation  by  a  State  is  a  clear  exercise  of  her 
undisputed  police  power  which  does  not  abridge  the  liberties 
or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  nor  deprive 
any  person  of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  nor  in 
any  way  contravene  any  of  the  provisions  of  said  amend- 
ment."^   And  a  statute  may  require  a  manufacturer  of  liquor 

92  Kidd  V.  Pearson,  128  U.  S,  1 ;  93  Mugler  v.  Kansas,   123   U.   S. 

9    Sup.    Ct.    6;    Pearson    v.    Inter-  623;     8    Sup.    Ct.    273;     Kidd    v. 

national  Distillery,   72   Iowa  348;  Pearson,    128    U.    S.    1;     9    Sup. 

34  N.  W.  1;   State  v.  Fitzpatrick,  Ct.  6. 
16  R.  I.  54;    11   Atl.   7G7. 


§  114  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUOES.  162 

in  another  State,  before  selling  it  in  the  State  enacting  the 
law,  to  produce  his  affidavit  showing  the  ingredients  entering 
into  the  composition  of  the  liquor,  filthough  no  such  an  affi- 
davit is  required  of  a  home  manufacturer;  for  a  State  cannot 
send  its  agents  into  another  State  to  there  inspect  the  manu- 
facture of  liquor  to  be  shipped  into  it.®* 

Sec.  114.    Non-intoxicating  liquors — Declaring  a  liquor  to 
be  intoxicating. 

The  power  of  the  State  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  beverages 
seems  to  be  unlimited.  Thus,  as  has  been  elsewhere  discussed, 
States  have  prohibited  the  sale  of  cider,  a  liquor  usually  not 
considered  intoxicating,  at  least  in  most  communities,  al- 
though, as  is  well  known,  "hard"  cider  if  drank  in  excessive 
quantities  will  produce  intoxication,  usually  of  a  serious  char- 
acter. All  such  laws  have  been  upheld.  And  so  it  has  been 
held  that  the  Legislature  may  prohibit  the  sale  of  malt  liquor, 
whether  intoxicating  or  not.'^^  As  is  well  known,  a  malt  liquor 
is  made  that  is  wholly  or  very  nearly  devoid  of  intoxicating 
effects.  So  the  State  may  prohibit  the  sale  of  a  non-intoxi- 
cating wine,  such  as  is  usually  called  grape  juice.®''  And  it 
would  seem  there  is  no  liquor  that  the  State  may  not  declare 
shall  not  be  sold;  or  that  it  may  not  declare  shall  be  con- 
sidered intoxicating.®^  But  in  all  instances  where  the  question 
has  been  considered  the  liquor  in  question  was  what  is  usually 
considered  intoxicating,  or  one  that  is  usually  considered  to 
contain  alcohol,  though  the  alcohol  is  known  to  be  a  very  small 

9*  Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Cren-  appearance.      State      v.      Dannen- 

shaw,    120   Fed.   144.  berg    (N.  €.),  66  S.  E.  301;   Bar- 

95Feibelman  v.   State,   130   Ala.  ber  v.   Griffith    (N.   C),  06  S.   E. 

122;  30  So.  384;   Bell  v.  State,  91  565;   Cassidy  v.  Mason    (Ga.),  64 

Ga.  227;   18  S.  E.  288;   Redding  v.  S.   E.   941. 

State,  01   Ga.  231;    18  S.  E.  289;  so  See  State  v.  Frederickson,  101 

Penel      v.      State,      123      N.      W.  Me.  37;   63  Atl.  535. 
115;      Campbell     v.     Thomasville,  07  The    Legislature    may    define 

(Ga.      App.),      64      S.      E.      815  intoxicating  liquors,  and  it  usually 

(regulating     sale).     It     may     re-  does.      State    v.    Guinness,    16    E. 

quire    a    license    for    the    sale    of  I.  401 ;  16  Atl.  910;  State  v.  Grav- 

"near    beer,"    a    non-intoxicating  elin,   16  R.  407;    16  Atl.  914. 
liquor,    resembling    malt    beer    in 


163  CONSTITUTIONi\JLITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  115 

percentage  of  the  entire  bulk.  Possibly,  under  the  plea, 
especially  snstainel  by  proof,  that  the  usual  soda  water  is  detri- 
mental to  liealth,  the  sale  might  be  prohibited,  for,  as  is  well 
known,  as  a  food  for  the  sustenance  of  life,  it  possesses  no 
nourishing  (jualities.  But  if  the  liCgislature  should  undertake 
to  prohibit  the  sale  of  milk,  the  courts  would,  without  hesita- 
tion, declare  the  act  void,  although  the  Legislature  may — or  it 
may  empower  a  mvmicipality  to — regulate  its  sale  in  order  to 
secure  for  the  purchaser  a  pure  and  healthy  product.  That  is 
the  extent  of  the  power  of  the  Legislature  with  reference  to 
its  sale.°« 

Sec.  115.    Regulation  of  sales  and  saloons. 

It  has  from  time  immemorial  been  thought  that  the  business 
of  selling  intoxicating  liquors  was  one  dangerous  to  the  public 
morals,  and  such  is  the  experience,  in  northern  climes  at  least ; 
and  it  has  been  the  uniform  practice  to  subject  it  to  regula- 
tions, require  a  license  from  some  public  functionary  before 
it  is  engaged  in,  and  to  punish,  as  a  crime,  the  pursuit  of  it 
without  a  license.^^  The  power  of  the  State  not  only  extends 
to  the  prohibition  of  sales  or  the  requiring  of  a  license,  but 
the  prohibition  of  sales  on  cer+ain  davs,  as  election  days,^  or 
on  Sundays.-  In  the  first  instance  it  is  deemed  by  the  Legis- 
lature a  necessary  precaution  in  order  to  prevent  disorders, 
secure  undisturbed  elections  and  protect  electors  from  vio- 
lence; and  in  the  second  instance  it  cannot  be  seriously  con- 
tended that  the  pompellinsr  of  thr-  observance  of  Sunday  by 

98  The   oleomargarine   cases   fur-  U.  S.  80;    11   Sup.  Ct.   13;   Camp- 

niah  illustrations  on  this  point,  as  bell    v.    Jackman    Bros.     (Iowa), 

well  as  the  pure  food  laws.     Peo-  118    N.    W.    755;    State    v.    Gibbs 

pie  V.  Arensberg,   105  N.  Y.   123;  (Vt.),  74  Atl.  229. 

People      V.      Arensberg,      103      N.  A  statute  is  not  invalid  because 

Y.    388;    57    Am.   Rep.   741;    Com-  it  requires  a  saloon  to  be  removed 

monwealth   v.   Miller,   131   Pa.   St.  to    the    ground     floor     and     rear- 

118;   Commonwealth  v.  Gray,   150  ranged.     Nelson  v.   State,   17  Ind. 

Mass.  327;  23  N.  E.  47;  Bayles  v.  App.  403;  46  N.  E.  941. 

Newton,  50  N.  J.  L.  549;    14  Atl.  i  Thomasson    v.    State,    15    Ind. 

604;  State  v.  Newton,  50  N.  J.  L.  44^;    State    v   Roberts,    74   N.    H. 

534.  470;    60  Atl.   722. 

89  Burch    V.    Savannah,    42    Ga.  2  state    v.    Bott,    31    La.    Ann. 

596;    Crowley  v.   Christensen,    137  663;    33   Am.   Rep.    224. 


§  115  TRAFFIC   IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS,  164 

requiring  saloons  closed  has  anything  to  do  with  the  Christian 
religion.  It  is  a  day  of  almost  universal  rest,  when  men  are 
not  at  their  labors  and  have  a  tendency  to  assemble  in  crowds, 
conditions  under  which  universal  experience  teaches  us  that 
men  are  more  given  to  drinking  and  rowdyism  than  when 
employed.  There  are  other  days  when  the  sale  of  liquor  is 
frequently  prohibited — as  on  Memorial  Day,  July  Fourth, 
Thanksgiving  Day,  Christmas  and  New  Year's  Day.  So  the 
Legislature  may  prohibit  the  use  of  screens,  as  elsewhere 
noted,  and  require  the  complete  exposure  of  the  bar  where 
liquors  are  dispensed.  It  may  also  require  all  saloons  or 
places  where  liquors  are  sold  to  front  on  a  public  street  and 
forbid  them  fronting  on  alleys  or  private  courts.  It  may  also 
prohibit  the  playing  of  musical  instruments  in  saloons,  or  any 
kind  of  music ; '  and  prohibit  their  being  open  certain  hours 
of  the  night.*  Where  a  statute  prohibited  the  keeping  open 
on  Sunday  for  trade  any  store,  shop,  building  or  place  of 
business,  and  exempting  hotels,  restaurants,  livery  stables  and 
stores  in  making  sales  of  medicines  and  supplies  for  the  sick, 
news  stands,  engaged  in  the  quiet  sale  and  delivery  of 
papers,  magazines  and  non-intoxicating  liquors,  but  prohibited 
the  opening  of  a  play  house,  theater,  dance  hall,  circus,  merry- 
go-round,  pool  or  billiard  room,  bowling  alley,  variety  hall, 
and  any  place  of  public  amusement,  and  prohibited  horse 
racing,  it  was  held  constitutional  as  to  saloons,  and  not  void, 
on  the  ground  that  it  took  property  without  due  course  of 
law.^  The  State  may  forbid  the  keeper  of  a  saloon  to  permit 
anyone  entering  it  during  prohibited  hours  or  days,  and 
punish  him  if  he  does.''  So  it  may  require  him  to  keep  his 
license  posted  in  a  conspicuous  place  in  the  saloon  or  in  his 
house.'^     And  after  a  license  has  been  granted  the  State  may 

^Ex  parte  Smith,  38   Cal.  702;  estate    v.    Calloway,    11    Idaho 

State  V.  G«rhardt,   145   Ind.   ^W;  719;    84    Pac.    27;    State    v.    Ger- 

44  N.  E.  46.9;  33  L.  R.  A.  313.  hardt,    145    Ind.    439;    44    N.    E. 

*Ex  parte  Smith,  38  Cal.  702.  469;   33  L.  R.  A.  313. 

5  State  V.  Dolan.  13  Idaho,  693 ;  ^  Ex    parte    Bell,    24    Tex.    App. 

92  Pac.  995;   Ex  parte  Jacobs,   13  428;    6   S.  W.   197;   Bell   v.   State, 

Idaho  720:  92  Pac.  1003;  State  v.  28  Tex.  App.  96;   12  S.  W.  410. 
Bott,   31    La.    Ann.    663;    33   Am. 
Rep.   224. 


165  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  116 

pass  a  law  prohibiting  sales  to  minors,  drunkards,  intoxicated 
and  insane  persons ;  ^  or  sales  on  certain  hours."    A  statute 
making  the  place  of  delivery  the  place  of  sale  of  whisky  is 
eonstitutional.^o    The  Legislature  may  authorize  police  officers 
"to  enter  upon  the  premises  of  anyone  licensed  to  sell,  to 
ascertain  the  manner  in  which  such  person  conducts  his  busi- 
ness, and  to  preserve  order."  "    So  the  Legislature  may  pro- 
hibit the   giving  away  or  selling  food   to   be  eaten  on   the 
premises  where  liquor  is  sold;  ^^  and  it  may  authorize  a  city 
to  enact   an   ordinance  to  that  effect.^^     So  the   State  mav 
provide  that  all  moneys  paid  for  liquors  sold  in  violation  of 
a  statute  shall  be  held  under  a  valid  promise  to  repay  them 
on  demand.^*    So  a  Legislature  may  authorize  a  municipality 
to  prescribe  saloon  limits.^** 

Sec.  116.     Permitting^   persons  to   go   into   saloon   at  pro- 
hibited times. 

In  Indiana  a  statute  makes  it  unlawful  for  a  proprietor 
of  a  saloon  "to  permit  any  person  or  persons  other  than  him- 
self and  family  to  go  into  such  room  [the  saloon]  and  place 
where  intoxicating  liquors  are  to  be  so  sold  upon  such  days 
and  hours  when  the  sale  of  such  licpiors  is  prohibited  by  law. 
The  fact  that  any  person  or  persons  are  permitted  to  be  in 
or  go  in  and  out  of  such  room  upon  any  day  or  hour  when 
the  sales  of  such  liquors  are  prohibited  by  law,  shall  be  prima^ 
facie  evidence  of  guilt  upon  trial  of  a  cause  charging  the 
proprietor  of  such  room  with  violating  the  law  in  the  sale  of 
such  liquors  upon  such  days  or  hours."     This  statute  was 

8  Commonwealth  v.  Sellers,   130.  i-'  People    v.    Warder,    6    N     Y 
Pa.  St.  32;    18  Atl.  541.                           App.    Div.    520;    39    N.'   Y.    Supp 

9  Smith    V.    Knoxville,    3    Head       582. 

245;   Hedderich  v.  State,   101  Ind.  i a  state  v.  Clarke,  8  Fost    176- 

564;     1    N.    E.    47;    51    Am.    Rep.        61   Am.  Dec    611. 

768 

n  United   Breweries   Co.   v    Co' 

10  State   V.   Herring.    145    X.    C.  by,    170   Fed.    100.     The   action   io 
418;  58  S.  E.  1007.  recover    the   money   is   a   civil   ^c- 

11  Commonwealth  v.  Doucey,  126  tion  of  which  a  Federal  court  m-n- 
Mass.    260.      In    this   case    it   was  take   jurisdiction. 

an  ordinance   that  authorized   the  i**  Andreas        v.        Beaumont, 

mayor  and  aldermen  to  enter  up-        (Tex.  Civ  App.),  113  S.  W.  6.14. 
on  the  licensed  premises. 


§  117  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  166 

held  to  be  constitutional.^^  ''As  the  closing  features  of  Sec- 
tion 3  apply  only  to  the  prohibited  days  and  hours,  we  fail 
to  recognize  how  any  great  hardships  can  result  from  the 
enforcement  of  this  law.  In  answer  to  the  contention  that 
the  enforcement  of  the  requirements  of  this  section  might 
inadvertently  result  in  interfering,  during  such  interdicted 
time,  with  other  business  that  may  be  conducted  by  the  pro- 
prietor in  the  same  room  where  such  liquors  are  sold,  or  may 
restrict  him  in  the  enjoyment  in  his  own  house  of  the  society 
of  his  friends,  it  may  be  said  that  when  he  accepted  his 
license,  under  the  statute,  and  embarked  in  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  thereunder,  he  must  be  deemed  to  have  con- 
sented to  all  proper  conditions  and  restrictions  which  had 
been  imposed  by  the  Legislature,  or  which  might  in  the 
future  be  imposed  in  the  interest  of  public  morals  and  safety, 
relative  to  the  traffic  in  such  liquors,  or  to  the  place  wherein 
he  was  granted  a  permit  to  sell  the  same,  notwithstanding 
their  burdensome  character."  "It  is  true  that  the  part  rela- 
tive to  the  exclusion  of  persons  is  somewhat  sweeping,  making 
but  one  exception ;  however,  criminal  statutes  are  not  always 
literally  construed,  and  possibly  an  emergency  might  arise  of 
great  necessity,  to  admit  some  one  other  than  those  mentioned 
in  the  section,  and,  while  such  admission  might  infringe  upon 
the  letter  of  the  statute,  it  would  not  come  within  its  spirit, 
and  the  court,  under  the  particular  circumstances,  might 
make  the  necessary  exception ;  but  as  to  this  point  we  do  not 
decide.  We,  therefore,  sustain  the  validity  of  the  section  and 
adjudge  that  it  defines  a  public  offense."'" 

Sec.  117.    Delegation  of  power  to  license  and  regulate  sale 
of  liquors. 

Municipalities — cities  and  towns — are  simply  smaller  divi- 
sions of  a  State  for   its  better  government.     They   are  the 

15  state  V.  Beach,   147   Tiul.  74;  430;    40   X.   E.   469;    33   L.   R.   A. 

43  N.  B.  949;  Decker  v.  .Sargeant.  313. 

1'25  Ind.  404;  25  N.  E.  438;   Dnv-  An     ordinance     may     prescribe 

is  V.   Fasig,   128   Ind.   271;    27   N.  that   the   lighting  up   of   a   saloon 

E.  726.  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  that 

10  State    V.    Gerhardt,    145    Ind.  it  is  open.     Piqua  v.   Zimmerlinj 

35   Ohio   St.   507. 


167  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  117 

creatures  of  the  Legislature — may  be  created  or  may  be  legally 
annihilated.  To  them  the  Legislature  may  confide  its  police 
powers  for  the  regulation  of  local  affairs  and  concerns,  and 
when  given,  it  may  be  taken  away  without  any  cause  what- 
ever. It  has  always  been  considered  that  in  affairs  local  to  a 
small  territory,  a  city  or  town  is  a  better  agency  to  suppress 
vice  and  disorder  and  to  regulate  matters  requiring  the  use  of 
local  police  powers  than  the  State  at  large.  Such  has  been 
the  history  and  practice  of  the  English  Parliament  from  time 
immemorial,  and  of  American  Legislatures  from  the  first  set- 
tlements of  this  country.  It  does  not  require  the  citation  of 
authority  to  gain  assent  to  this  proposition,  for  it  is  univer- 
sally admitted  in  jurisprudence.^^  "It  seems  to  be  generally 
conceded,"  said  Judge  Bell,  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 
Hampshire,  "that  powers  of  local  legislation  may  be  granted 
to  cities,  towns,  and  other  municipal  corporations.  And  it 
would  require  strong  reasons  to  satisfy  us  that  it  would  have 
been  the  design  of  the  framers  of  our  Constitution  to  take 
from  the  Legislature  a  power  which  has  been  exercised  in 
Europe  by  governments  of  all  classes  from  the  earliest  history, 
and  the  exercise  of  which  has  probably  done  more  to  promote 
civilization  than  all  other  causes  combined;  which  has  been 
constantly  exercised  in  every  part  of  our  country  from  its 
earliest  settlement,  and  which  has  raised  up  among  us  many 
of  our  most  valuable  institutions. "  ^^  Not  only  may  the  Legis- 

17  Jordan  v.   State,  2  Tex.  App.  lin,    40    Kan.    410;    19    Pac.    801; 

425;   Moundsville  v.   Fountain,  27  State  v.  King.  37  Iowa,  4'62;   Van 

W.  Va.  182;  State  v.  Bott,  31  La.  Hook   v.    Schea,   70   Ala.   361;    45 

Ann.     663;     33     Am.     Rep,     224;  Am.  Rep.  8i5;   O'Hare  v.   Chicago, 

St.  Paul  V.  Troyer,  3  Minn.,  291;  125   111.   App.   73;    Timm   v.   Cale- 

Flack  V.   Fry,   32   W.   Va.   364;    9  donia  Station,  149  Mich  323;   112 

S.   E.   240;    Mason   v.   Trustees,   4  X.    W.   942;    14    Det.   L.   N.   442; 

Bush   406;     Board    v.    Watson,   5  Cohen   v.    Rice    (Tex.  Civ.    App.), 

Bush    6G0;     State    v.    Harper,    42  101  S.  W.  1052. 
La.   Ann.   312;    7   So.   446;    Baton  is  State  v.  Noyes,  30  N.  H.  279, 

Rouge     V.     Butler,     118    La.     73;  292;     Cohen    v.    Rice     (Tex.    Civ. 

42     So.     650;     Commonwealth    v.  App.),   101     S.     W.    1052;     Gower 

Fredericks,    119    Mass.    199;     Chi-  v.    A^-oo.    12R    Mn.    Anp.    427:    107 

cage  etc.,  Co.  v.  Chicago,  88  111.  221 ;  S.  W.  999 ;  Schwuchow  v.  Chicago, 

30  Am.  Rep.  545;  State  v.  Frank-  68  111.  444;   State  v.  Aiken,  42  S. 


§117 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


168 


lature  delegate  the  power  to  exact  a  license  for,  or  regulate, 
or  prohibit  the  sales  of  intoxicating  liquors  and  also  regulate 
the  place  wherein  liquors  are  sold,  but  it  may  also  empower 
them  to  exact  a  license  for,  regulate,  or  prohibit  the  sales  of 
liquors  beyond  its  limits  but  in  territory  adjacent  thereto.^^ 
"It  is  certainly  within  the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  declare 
that  no  unlicensed  dramshop  shall  be  kept  within  a  desig- 
nated number  of  feet  of  the  corporate  limits;  otherwise  all 
that  need  be  done  to  evade  the  law  would  be  to  keep  a  foot 
or  two  beyond  the  corporate  boundaries.  If  the  Legislature 
has  any  power  at  all  to  designate  limits  over  which  the  juris- 
diction of  municipal  corporations  shall  extend,  then,  neces- 
sarily, the  subject  must  be  within  its  discretion;  and,  if  this 
be  so,  its  judgment  upon  the  question  must  be  conclusive."^** 


C.  222;  20  S.  E.  221;  Columbus 
City  V.  Cutcomp,  61  Iowa  672;  17 
N.  W.  47;  Lutz  v.  Crawfords- 
ville,  109  Iml.  460;  10  N.  E.  411; 
Metropolitan  Board  v.  Barrie,  34 
N.  Y.  '657;  Shea  v.  Muncie,  148 
Ind.  14;  46  N.  E.  138;  State  v. 
Bott,  31  La.  Ann.  663;  33  Am. 
Rep.  224;  State  v.  Clarke,  8  Fost. 
176;  -61  Am.  Dec.  611;  Swartz  v. 
Dover  (X.  J.  L.),  62  Atl. 
1135;  affirming  70  X.  J.  L.  502; 
57  Atl.  394;  Hart  v.  De  Missis- 
groni,  3  Quebec  L.  R.  170;  Ex 
parte  Covey,  21  Low.  Can.  Jr.  182; 
Kitson  V.  Ann  Arbor,  26  Mich. 
325;  Campbell  v.  Thomasville 
(Ga.  App.),  64  S.  E.  815. 

19  (Jover  V.  Agee,  128  Mo.  App. 
427;   107  S.  W.  9i^9. 

20  Lutz  V.  Crawfordsville,  109 
Ind.  466;  10  X.  E.  411;  Jordan  v. 
Evansville,  163  Ind.  512;  72  X.  E. 
544;  67  L.  R.  A.  613;  Gower  v. 
Agee,  128  Mo.  App.  4-27;  107  S. 
W.  999;  Falmouth  v.  Watson.  5 
Bush  660;  Emerick  v.  Indian- 
apolis,   118   Ind.    279;    120   X.    E. 


795;  State  v.  Schraeder,  51  Iowa 
197;  1  X.  W.  431;  State  v.  Dougli- 
erty,  2  Idaho,  1105;  29  Pac.  855; 
Hunzinger  v.  State,  39  Xeb.  653; 
58  X.  W.  194;  Shannon  v.  State, 
39  Xeb.  658;  58  X.  W.  196;  Soehl 
V.  State,  39  Xeb.  -659;  58  X.  W. 
196;  Rowels  v.  State,  39  Xeb. 
659;    59,  X.   W.    196. 

That  the  Legislature  may  em- 
power a  city  to  pi'olnbit  thi  sale 
of  liquor,  see  In  re  Phillips,  82 
X'eb.  45;  116  X".  W.  950;  State  v. 
Superior  Court,  49  Wash.  268; 
94  Pac.  1086;  Duren  v.  Stepliens, 
126  Ga.  496;  54  S.  E.  1045; 
Stephens  v.  Henderson,  120  Ga. 
218;  47  S.  E.  498;  Gunnerssohn  v 
Sterling,  92  111.  569;  Osburn  v. 
Marietta,  118  Ga.  53;  44  S.  E. 
807;  Straus  v.  Galesburg,  203  HI. 
234;67X.  E.  836,  affirming  89  IlL 
App.  504;  McXulty  v.  Toopf 
(Ky.),  75  S.  W.  258;  25  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  430;  Florence  v.  Brown 
(iS.  C),  26  S.  E.  880;  Pap- 
worth  V.  Fitzgerald,  106  Ga.  378; 
32    S.    E.    363;    Tucker    v.    Moul- 


169  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  117 

Where  a  constitutional  provision  confers  on  county  courts  the 
superintendence  of  internal  police  of  their  counties,  the  Legis- 
lature may  give  a  city  or  town  the  exclusive  power  to  grant 
licenses  to  sell  liquors  within  its  boundaries.-^  The  Legislature 
may  authorize  a  municipality  to  prohibit  the  use  or  keeping 
of  liquors  in  any  refreshment  saloon  or  restaurant  within  its 
boundaries.--  So  an  act  authorizing  a  city  to  prohibit  the 
sale  of  liquors  within  a  resident  portion  of  a  municipality  is 
valid  and  is  not  void  on  the  ground  that  it  authorizes  the 
grant  of  special  privileges.-^  A  Legislature  may  empower  a 
city  to  prohibit  sales  or  gifts  of  liquors,  although  the  general 
law  does  not  prohibit  them,  notwithstanding  a  provision  in  the 
State  Constitution  forbids  it  authorizing  a  municipality  to 
enact  an  ordinance  inconsistent  with  the  general  laws  of  the 
State.^*  But  if  the  Constitution  prohibits  sales  of  liquor  the 
Legislature  cannot  authorize  a  city  to  license  such  sales.-'^ 
So,  where  the  Constitution  prohibited  the  Legislature  to  pass 
any  statute  "regulating  the  internal  affairs  of  cities,"  it  was 
held  not  to  prohibit  the  passage  of  a  general  act  establishing 
an  excise  department  in  cities,  for  it  was  a  grant  of  original 
powers  to  a  department  of  a  city,  the  creation  of  which  was 
entrusted  to  the  city  itself;  -"  under  this  clause  the  power  to 
act  may  be   conferred,   but  the   machinery  for   its   exercise 

trie,    122   Ga.    160;    50    S.   E.   61;  If  a  city   charter   is   in   conflict 

United    States    Distilling    Co.    v.  with    an    earlier    general    statute 

Chicago,     112    111.     19;     1    N.    E.  of  the  State  on  the  subject  of  the 

166;   Littlejohn  v.  Stells,   123  Ga.  sale  of  liquors,  it  will  repeal  pro 

427;  51  S.  E.  390;  Ex  parte  Mog-  tanto,   as   to   such    city,   such   ear- 

ensen,   5   Cal.   App.   596;    90   Pac.  lier  law.     State  v.   King,  37   Iowa 

1063.  462. 

21  Ward  V.  County  Court,  51  25  Yazoo  City  v.  State,  48  Miss. 
W.  Va.  102;   41  S.  E.  154.  440;     State    v.    Topeka,    30    Kan. 

22  State  V.  Clarke,  8  Fost.  176;  653;  2  Pac.  587;  31  Kan.  452;  2 
61  Am.  Dec.   611.  Pac.    597;    State    v.    Leavenworth, 

23  Shea  V.  Muncie,  148  Ind.  14;  36  Kan.  314;  13  Pac.  591;  see 
46  N.  E.  138;  Ex  parte  King,  52  Dewar  v.  People,  41  Mich.  401; 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  383;  107  S.  W.  29  N.  W.  545;  Mt.  Pleasant  v. 
549;  Paul  v.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  Vansice,  43  Mich.  361;  5  N.  W. 
App.),  106  S.  W.  448.  378;  38  Am.  Eep.  193. 

^*  Ex    parte     Cowert,     92     Ala.  26  State    v.    Trenton,    51    N.    J. 

94;    9  So.  225.  L.  498;    18  Atl.   116. 


§  117  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  170 

cannot  be  prescribed.'^  Since  the  Legislature  may  author- 
ize a  municipality  to  exact  licenses  for  sales  of  liquors,  it 
may  also  take  away  the  power,  and  may  even  annul  those 
granted  without  making  any  provisions  for  a  return  of  the 
fees  paid  for  them,  or  for  an  amount  of  such  fees  as  are 
proportionate  to  that  part  of  the  terms  of  such  licenses  re- 
maining unexpired  at  the  time  of  their  revocation.^®  And 
the  Legislature  may  also  confer  upon  municipalities  the 
exclusive  and  sole  power  to  require  a  lieense.^^  The  Con- 
stitution of  South  Carolina  gives  the  Legislature  the  exclusive 
right  to  license  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  but  this  does 
not  prevent  the  Legislature  authorizing  a  city  to  prohibit 
the  sale  of  liquors  within  its  limits.^**  The  amount  of  a 
license  fee  may  be  graded  according  to  population,  as  one 
amount  for  a  city  and  another  for  a  town.^^  Where  a  Con- 
stitution provided  that  any  city  might  "make  and  enforce 
within  its  limits  all  such  local  police,  sanitary,  and  other 
regulations  as  are  not  in  conflict  with  the  general  laws,"  it 
was  held  that  an  ordinance  inflicting  a  penalty  for  a  refusal 
to  pay  a  license  fee  for  the  carrjnng  on  of  his  business  as  a 

27  state  V.  Camden,  40  N.  J.  L.  313;  58  S.  E.  715;  Winona  v. 
156.  Whipple,   24   Minn.   61. 

28  Gutzweller  v.  People,  14  111.  A  city  may  be  empowered  to 
142.  This  is  upon  the  principle  prohibit  sales  on  Sunday.  State 
that  no  one  has  a  vested  right  in  v.  Bott,  31  La.  Ann.  663;  33  Am. 
a  license  or  right  to  sell   liquors.  Rep.  224. 

Parsons  v.   People,   32   Colo.   221;  so  Florence    v.    Brown     (S.    C), 

76  Pac.  666.  26    S.    E.    880. 

A  statute  authorizing  a  munic-  A  city  may  require  a  license  to 

ipaiity    to    suspend    a    dispensary,  be  taken  out  at  periods  less  than 

thereby    entirely    prohibiting    the  one  year.     Ex  parte  Hurl,  49  Cal. 

sale  of  liquors,  or  to  permanently  557;   Ex  parte  Benninger,  64  Cal. 

discontinue  it,  thereby  putting  in-  291;   30  Pac.  846. 

to  operation  the  license  laws  both  3i  Amador    County   v.   Kennedy, 

of  the  city  and   State,   is  invalid,  70   Cal.   458;    11    Pac.   757;    Amu- 

because  it  is  a  delegation  of  such  dor  County  v.  Isaacs,  11  Pac.  758; 

legislative    power   as    the    Legisla-  State   v.   Dohertv,   2   Idaho    1105; 

ture    cannot    make.      Mitchell    v.  29   Pac.   855;   Hunzinger  v.  State, 

State.    133    Ala.    65;    32    So.    687.  39  Neb.  653;   58  N.  W.   194, 

20  State  V,   Harden,   62  W.   Va. 


171  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  118 

saloon  keeper  was  valid.''-  A  city  may  be  empowered  to 
adopt  an  ordinance  requiring  her  police  to  enter  saloons  to 
see  if  the  law  is  being  violated. ^^ 

Sec.  118.     Compelling  towns  to  engage  in  liquor  traffic. 

A  law  which  authorizes  county  commissioners  to  appoint  an 
agent  to  purchase  liquors  at  the  expense  of  a  town  within  the 
county  Avithout  the  assent  of  the  town,  either  expressed  or 
implied,  and  without  giving  indemnity  to  the  town  for  the 
faithful  execution  of  the  duties  of  the  agent,  is  not  consti- 
tutional. So  far  as  municipal  corporations  are  endowed  with 
the  power  of  contracting  and  of  acquiring  and  disposing  of 
property,  it  stands  on  the  same  ground  of  exemption  from 
legislative  control  and  interference  as  a  private  corporation. 
This  being  true,  such  a  town  cannot  be  held  liable  for  a 
debt  contracted  in  the  purchase  of  liquors  by  such  an  agent. 
It  cannot  be  claimed  that  the  town  is  liable  for  such  a  debt 
on  the  ground  that  it  arises  ex  contractu.  This  is  so  because 
it  is  a  fundamental  element  in  contracts  that  the  party  to 
be  bound  must  have  assented  to.  the  contract,  either  ex- 
pressly or  by  implication.  To  require  the  town  to  pay 
such  a  debt  would  be  in  violation  of  the  well  established 
principle  that  the  property  of  an  individual  or  of  a  cor- 
poration may  not  be  taken  without  compensation.  If,  through 
the  artificial  contrivance  of  a  municipal  corporation,  of 
which  the  inhabitants  of  a  State  must  be  members,  nolentes 
volentes,  such  consequences  can  be  wrought  out,  most  persons 
would  invoke  the  exercise  of  the  annihilating  power  of  the 

32  Ex    parte    JlcXally,    73    Cal.  subject    to    State    laws,    and  can- 
632;    15   Pac.   36S.  not    contravene    them.      Ex    parte 

33  Commonwealth  V.  Doucey,  126  Sweetman,  5  Cal.  App.  577;  90 
Mass.  269.  But  the  Legislature  Pac.  1069;  Ex  parte  Huillade,  5 
cannot  confer  power  upon  a  mu-  Cal.  App.  Ill;  90  Pac.  1071; 
nicipality  or  board  which  itself  Cooper  v.  Greenfield,  169  Ind.  14; 
must  exercise.  State  v.  Baum,  33  81  N.  E.  56;  State  v.  Robinson, 
La.  Ann.  9F1;  Feek  v.  Blooming-  101  Minn.,  277;  112  N.  W.  269. 
dale,  82  Mich.  393;  47  N.  W.  A  city  cannot  license  a  sale  the 
37;    10  L.  R.  A.  69.  State     law     forbids.      Cooper     v. 

Ordinances    adopted    by    a    city       Greenfield,  169  Ind.  14;   81  N.  E. 
under    its    powers    to    license    are       56. 


§  119  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  172 

government  over  such  corporations  rather  than  of  the  power 
of  the  police  regulation,  in  virtue  of  which  alone  such  a  law, 
if  sustainable,  can  be  sustained.^* 

Sec.  119.    Monopoly  of  sale. 

Monopolies  are  not  in  harmony  with  the  genius  of  our 
laws  nor  of  our  Constitutions ;  and  it  is  a  universal  rule  that 
a  Legislature,  aside  from  the  sale  by  State  dispensaries, 
cannot  create  a  monopoly  in  the  sale  of  liquors.  Such  is  the 
case  when  an  act  attempts  to  create  a  board  of  commis- 
sioners for  a  certain  city  to  sell  liquors,  giving  them  the 
exclusive  sales  therein  and  permitting  them  to  take  the 
profits  of  such  sales  for  their  own  use.^^  But  such  an  act 
authorizing  a  city  or  town  to  have  the  exclusive  right  to  sell, 
and  profits  thereof,  within  its  boundaries,  is  not  objection- 
able, on  the  ground  that  it  creates  a  monopoly.^®  An  ordi- 
nance prohibiting  the  service  of  liquors  with  meals,  but  pro- 
viding that  the  city  council  may  grant  permits  to  hotel 
keepers  to  thus  serve  liquors,  is  not  unconstitutional  as 
creating  a  monopoly  of  sales,  or  as  an  unjust  discrimination 
among  citizens  of  the  State.^^  And  a  statute  limiting  the 
number  of  saloon  licenses  in  a  municipality  is  not  invalid, 
for  it  is  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  police  power;  ^^  and  so 
is  an  ordinance  limiting  the  number  of  saloons  to  a  block.^^ 
Nor  is  it  such  a  discrimination  as  renders  the  transaction 
void  to  grant  a  second  license  at  a  lower  rate  than  a  previous 

31  Atkins  V.  Town  of  Randolph,  ss  Decie    v.    Brown,     167    Mass. 

31  Vt.  226.  290;   45  N.  E.  765;   Moss  v.  War- 

35  Mitchell  V.  State,  133  Ala.  ran  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  ;  123  S.  W. 
65;    32   So.   687.     See   Grumbauch  1157. 

V.  Leande,   154   Cal.   679;    98  Pac.  An  act  confining  sales  of  liquor 

1059.  to  the  business  portions  of  a  city 

36  Plumb  V.  Christie,  103  Ga.  is  not  void  on  the  ground  that 
686;  30  S.  E.  759;  42  L.  R.  A.  it  creates  a  monopolj'.  Shea  v. 
181;  Deal'  v.  Singletory,  105  Ga.  Muncie,  148  Ind.  14;  46  N.  E. 
466;    30   S.   E.   765;    Guy  v.    Com-  138. 

missioners,    122    N.    C.    471;     29  39  Meyer    v.     Decatur,     125     111. 

S.  E.  771:     See  §  112,  note.  App.    556    [1908J. 

37  7,1  re  Kidd,  5  Cal.  App.   159; 
89  Pac.  987. 


173  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.     •  §  120 

one ;  nor  can  such  previous  licensee  recover  back  the  excess 
of  the  fee  he  paid  over  and  above  the  amount  of  the  fee 
paid  by  the  subsequent  licensee.*'' 

Sec.  120.     Territorial  power  to  enact  liquor  laws,  . 

A  territory  has  no  powers,  legislative,  executive  or  judi- 
cial, except  such  as  are  conferred  upon  it  by  act.  of  Congress. 
It  can  have  over  its  subjects  no  greater  powers  than  Con-: 
gress  itself  has,  and  such  powers  may  be  as  limited  as  Con- 
gress may  determine.  It  has  no  powers,  in  fact,  except  such 
as  are  expressly  or  by  implication  conferred  by  Congress 
itself.  The  sovereignty  of  a  territory,  so  called,  comes  from 
Congress,  not  the  people.  If  Congress  have  no  power  under 
the  Constitution,  it  can  confer  none  upon  the  territory.  It 
has  been  aptly  said  that  a  "territory  is  an  outlying  province 
of  the  national  government,"  subject  to  its  direct  control 
through  congressional  supervision  of  territorial  legislation. 
That  it  has  national  sovereignty  over  the  territories  has 
never  been  denied.  It  is  expressly  provided  that  Congress 
shall  have  power  "to  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations 
respecting  a  territory."  From  this  provision  it  must  follow 
that  the  legislative  powder  of  a  territory  is  limited,  not  only 
by  the  powers  of  Congress  granted  by  the  Constitution  itself, 
but  it  must  be  confined  to  the  powers  also  expressly  or  by 
necessary  inference  conferred  by  statute  of  Congress  upon 
the  legislative  assembly.  Independent  of  this  rule,  however, 
it  has  been  held  that  it  is  one  of  the  police  powers  of  a 
territory  to  license  and  regulate  the  traffic  in  intoxicating 
liquors.  In  this  regard  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  and  acts  of  Congress,  so  far  as  applicable,  are  the 
only  limitations  upon  the  legislative  powers  of  a  territory. 
Such  laws  are  looked  upon  as  police  regulations  when  estab- 
lished by  the  Legislature  of  a  territory  for  the  prevention 
of  intemperance,  pauperism  and  crime,  and  for  the  abate- 
ment of  nuisances.  The  power  to  pass  such  laws  is  inherent 
in  a  State  or  territory.*^  '         . 


40  Silver  v.  Sparta,  107  Ga.  275 ;  ^i  United     States     v.     Stephens, 

33  S.  E.  31.  12    Fed.    52;     Nelson    v.     United 


§  121  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  174 

Sec.  121.     State    engaging    in    liquor    traffic — Dispensary 
laws. 

Whether  or  not  a  State  can  go  so  far  in  its  regulation  of 
the  use  or  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  as  to  prohibit  all  sales 
by  individuals,  establish  its  own  agencies  for  their  sale  and 
appoint  its  own  agents  to  conduct  such  sales,  has  been  vari- 
ously decided.  The  dispensary  law  of  South  Carolina, 
enacted  in  1893,  forbade  any  private  individual  to  keep  in- 
toxicating liquore  in  the  State,  vested  the  exclusive  right  in 
the  State  to  sell  such  liquors,  and  designated  certain  officers 
to  make  such  sales.  In  the  first  decisions  where  the  validity 
of  this  law  was  drawn  in  question,  the  courts  held  it  uncon- 
stitutional, being  an  invasion  of  that  clause  in  the  State 
Constitutions  declaring  that  no  person  should  be  despoiled 
or  deprived  of  his  liberty  or  estate  except  by  the  judgment 
of  his  peers.  The  State  was  engaged  in  the  traffic  for  a 
iprofit."  It  was  said  that  the  statute  created  a  monopoly  in 
the  State,  and  the  police  power  did  not  extend  so  far  as  to 
create  a  monopoly.  But  in  a  subsequent  case  the  law  was 
held  valid,  and  the  earlier  cases  overruled.*^  So  a  law 
empowering  a  city  or  town  to  establish  and  operate  dispen- 
saries for  the  buying  or  selling  of  intoxicating  liquors  has 
been  held  valid.**     In  Georgia  a  law  authorizing  the  State 

States,  30   Fed.   112;    Territory  v.  26    L.    R.    A.    345.      These    points 

Ck)nn€ll,  16  Pac.  (Ariz.)  209;  Ter-  are   not    involved    in    the    decision 

ritory   v.    O'Connor,   5    Dak.    307;  of    the    United    States      Supreme 

37    N.    W.    765;    41    N.    W.    740;  Court  which  passed  upon  another 

36  L.  R.  A.  355;  United  States  v.  provision  of  the  statute.     Scott  v. 

Cohn      (Ind.      T.),      52      S.      W.  Donald,  165  U-  S.  58;   17  Sup.  Ct. 

38;   Ex  parte  Brown,  38  Tex.  Cr.  2'85.      See   Cantini   v.   Tillman,   54 

App.    29-5;     Endelman    v.    United  Fed.     069;     State     v.     Holleyman 

States,    86    Fed.    456;    Minnehaha  (S.  C),  31   S.  E.  362. 

County    v.    Champion,    37    N.    W.  **  Childers  v.  Shepherd     (Ala.), 

766;    Thornton     v.     Territory,     3  39  So.  235;  Mitchell  v.  State,  133 

Wash.    r.  482;    17  Pac.  896;   Ter-  Ala.  65;   32  So.  687. 

ritory    v.   Miguel,   18   Hawaii  402.  An    act    for    a    particular    town 

42McCullough   v.   Brown,   41    S.  was    held    invalid.       Newman     v. 

C.  220;   19  S.  E.  458;  23  L.  R.  A.  State     (Ala.),    39    So.    648;     Lee 

410;   State  v.  O'Donnell,  41   S.  C.  v.  State,  143  Ala.  93;  39  So.  720; 

553;   19  S.  E.  748.  Harlan  v.  State,  136  Ala.  150;  33 

*3  State  V.  City   Council   of   Ai-  So.  858;  Elba  v.  Rhodes,  142  Ala. 

ken,  42  S.  C.  222;  20   S.  E.  221;  689;  38  So.  807. 


175 


CONSTITUTIONAIJTY   OF   STATUTES. 


§121 


to  engage  in  the  liquor  traffic,  and  prohibiting  private  citi- 
zens engaging  therein,  was  held  not  to  violate  that  provision 
of  the  Federal  Constitution  relating  to  interstate  com- 
merce.*^ But  in  Indiana  a  statute  of  this  kind,  at  an  early- 
day,  was  held  unconstitutional,  on  the  ground  that  it  created 
a  monopoly  in  the  State  in  a  business  from  which  its  citizens 
were  excluded.*"^  In  North  Carolina  such  a  law  has  been 
held  valid,  not  being  a  monopoly,  since  the  whole  community 
shares  in  the  profits.*^  In  Alabama,  where  prohibition  pre- 
vailed in  a  county,  a  statute  authorizing  a  town  therein,  in 
its  discretion,  to  open  a  dispensary  for  the  sale  of  liquors 
under  its  agency,  was  hela  valid,  the  act  of  the  town  in  de- 
ciding to  open  a  dispensary  in  no  sense  being  a  delegation 
of  legislative  power  and  not,  therefore,  a  repeal  of  the  pro- 
hibitory provisions  of  the  statute.  The  statute  was  also  gen- 
erally held  valid.** 


45  Plumb  V.  Christie,  103  Ga. 
686;  30  S.  E.  759;  42  L.  R.  A. 
181;  Deal  v.  Singletory  (Ga.), 
30  S.  E.  765;  Chamlee  v.  Davis, 
115  Ga.  266;  41  S.  E.  691;  Butler 
V.  Merritt,  113  Ga.  238;  38  S.  E. 
751. 

46Beebe  v.  State,  6  Ind.  501; 
63  Am.  Dec.  391. 

47  Garsed  v.  Greensboro,  126  N. 
C.  159;   35  S.  E.  254. 

It  has  been  held  that  the  Board 
of  Directors  of  a  State  Dispensa- 
ry in  South  Carolina  cannot  close 
it.  State  V.  Board,  70  S.  C.  509; 
50  S.  E.  203. 

The  State  dispensaries  in  South 
Carolina  are  subject  to  the  li- 
quor revenue  laws  of  the  United 
States.  South  Carolina  v.  United 
States,  199  U.  S.  437;  26  Sup. 
Ct.  110;  affirming  39  Ct.  of  CI. 
257. 

*»  Ex  parte  Hall  (Ala.),  47 
So.  199.  See  Mitchell  v.  State, 
133  Ala.  65;  37  So.  407. 


A  statute  levying  a  tax  to  en- 
force the  dispensary  law  is  valid 
under  a  clause  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, authorizing  the  levying  of 
a  tax  "for  litigation,  quarantine 
and  court  expenses."  Murphy  v. 
Landron,  76  S.  C.  21;  56  S.  E. 
850. 

That  the  local  option  and  dis- 
pensary laws  of  Georgia  are  gen- 
eral laws  and  valid.  See  Dispen- 
sary Commissioners  v.  Hooper, 
128  Ga.  99;   56  S.  E.  997. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  statute 
limiting  sales  to  such  liquors  as 
should  be  manufactured  for  sac- 
ramental, medicinal,  chemical  and 
mechanical  uses  under  author- 
ity of  the  selectmen  of  a  town 
was  valid,  not  being  void  on  the 
ground  that  it  established  an  ex- 
clusive privilege  repugnant  to  the 
prohibition  of  the  Constitution. 
State  V.  Brennan,  25  Conn.  27«; 
State  V.  Wheeler.  25  Conn.  290. 

A    statute    giving    those    agents 


§  122  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  176 

Sec.  122.     Carolina  dispensary  and  Wilson  laws  construed — 
Discrimination. 

What  is  known  as  the  State  Dispensary  Law  of  South 
Carolina  did  not  purport  to  prohibit  either  the  importation, 
the  manufacture,  the  sale,  or  the  use  of  intoxicating  liquors. 
By  it  liquors  and  wines  were  recognized  as  commodities  which 
might  be  lawfully  made,  bought  and  sold.  While  it  was  true 
that  the  first  section  of  the  law  made  it  penal  to  manufacture, 
sell,  barter,  deliver,  store  or  keep  in  possession  any  spirituous 
malt,  vinous,  fermented,  brewed  or  other  liquors  which  con- 
tained alcohol  to  be  used  as  a  beverage,  and  declared  all  such 
liquors  to  Le  contraband  and  against  the  morals,  good  health 
and  safety  of  the  State,  and  authorized  them  to  be  seized 
wherever  found,  without  warrant,  and  turned  over  to  the  State 
commissioners,  yet  those  enactments  were  not  absolute  but 
were  made  subject  to  the  subsequent  provisions  of  the  law. 
When  those  provisions  were  examined  it  was  found  that,  so  far 
from  the  importation,  manufacture  and  sale  of  such  liquors 
being  prohibited,  those  operations  were  turned  over  to  State 
functionaries,  by  whom  alone,  or  under  whose  direction,  they 
were  to  be  carried  on.  By  them  liquors  and  wines  were  recog- 
nized as  commodities  which  might  be  lawfully  made,  bought 

of   a   city  managing   a   dispensary  The   State   has   power   to   estab- 

a  personal  interest  in  the  sales,  is  lish     and     maintain     dispensaries 

void.     Mitchell  v.   State,   133  Ala.  under    its   own   agents   or   officials 

65;   32   So.  087.  created  for  that  purpose.     Plumb 

Power    given    to    commissioners  v.     Christie,      103     Ga.     686;      30 

to    suspend     the     dispensary     or  S.  E.  759;   42  L.  R.  A.   181;   Deal 

discontinue  it  permanently,  tnere-  v.   Singleton,   105   Ga.   406;    30   S. 

by   making   the   sale   of   liquor   in  E.   765. 

the  territory  valid,  or  putting  into  Eflect  of  act  of  February  16, 
effect  a  license  law,  is  unconstitu-  1907,  winding  up  South  Carolina 
tutional,  being  an  unlawful  delega-  dispensaries  on  the  relation  of 
tion  of  legislative  power,  and  a  venUors  of  liquors  to  them.  Mur- 
city  ordinance  prohibiting  the  ray  v.  Wilson  Distilling  Co.,  213 
sale  except  as  allowed  by  such  U.  S.  151;  29  Sup.  Ct.  458.  Sale 
void  statute,  is  also  invalid,  be-  to  dispensary  on  credit  in  Louisi- 
cause  it  cannot  be  enforced  ac-  ana.  Cottonwood  v.  H.  M.  Avis- 
cording  to  its  original  intent.  tin  &  Co.  (La.),  48  So.  345. 
Mitchell  v.  State,  133  Ala.  05; 
32    So.    687. 


177  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES,  §  122 

and  sold,  and,  therefore,  the  subject  of  foreign  and  interstate 
commerce.  In  February,  1895,  two  suits  at  law  were  instituted 
in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  District  of 
South  Carolina  to  recover  damages  caused  by  the  action  of  the 
defendants,  State  constables  acting  under  the  law,  in  seizing 
and  carrjung  away  several  packages  of  wines  and  liquors  be- 
longing to  the  plaintiffs.  One  of  the  packages  consisted  of  a 
case  of  domestic  California  wine  which  came  by  rail  from 
Savannah,  Georgia,  whither  it  had  been  imported  by  the  plain- 
tiff ;  another  was  a  case  of  whisky  made  in  Maryland  and  im- 
ported by  the  plaintiff  by  way  of  a  Baltimore  steam  packet 
line;  and  the  other  consisted  of  a  barrel  of  beer,  made  at 
Rochester,  New  York,  and  imported  into  the  State  by  way  of 
the  Old  Dominion  Steamship  Line.  The  suits  were  tried  and 
determined  by  the  court  with  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff.  Writs  of  error  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  were  sued  out  and  allowed.  In  that  court  the 
records  presented  the  question  of  the  validity,  under  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  of  the  South  Carolina  dispen- 
sary law.  The  court  conceded  that  the  law  in  question  was 
passed  in  the  bona  fide  exercise  of  the  police  power  and  dis- 
claimed any  imputation  to  the  lawmakers  of  South  Carolina 
of  a  design,  under  the  guise  of  a  domestic  regulation,  to  inter- 
fere with  the  rights  and  privileges  of  either  her  own  citizens 
or  those  of  her  sister  States,  which  w^ere  secured  to  them  by  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States.  The  court,  how- 
ever, held  that  the  law  was  void  as  a  hindrance  to  interstate 
commerce  and  an  unjust  preference  of  the  products  of  the 
enacting  State.  It  was  first  sought  to  defend  the  act  as  an 
inspection  act  within  the  meaning  of  that  provision  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  permits  the  States  to 
impose  excise  duties  as  far  as  they  may  be  absolutely  necessary 
for  executing  their  inspection  laws.  In  answering  this  con- 
tention, after  a  full  review  of  the  authorities  upon  the  sub- 
ject, the  court  said:  "It  is  not  an  inspection  law.  The 
prohibition  of  the  importation  of  the  wines  and  liquors  of 
other  States  by  citizens  of  South  Carolina  for  their  own  use 
is  made  absolute,  and  does  not  depend  on  the  purity  or  im- 


§  122  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  178 

purity  of  the  articles.  Only  the  State  functionaries  are  per- 
mitted to  import  into  the  State,  and  thus  those  citizens  who 
wish  to  use  foreign  wines  and  liquors  are  deprived  of  the 
exercise  of  their  own  judgment  and  taste  in  the  selection  of 
commodities.  To  empower  a  State  chemist  to  pass  upon 
what  the  law  calls  the  'alcoholic  purity'  of  such  importa- 
tions by  chemical  analysis,  can  scarcely  come  within  any 
definition  of  a  reasonable  inspection  law."  In  the  next 
place,  it  w^as  sought  to  sustain  the  legislation  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Wilson  Law.  In  answering  this  contention 
the  court  said:  "It  is  not  a  law  purporting  to  forbid  the 
importation,  manufacture,  sale  and  use  of  intoxicating 
liquors  as  articles  detrimental  to  the  welfare  of  the  State 
and  to  the  health  of  the  inhabitants,  and  hence  it  is  not 
within  the  scope  and  operation  of  the  Act  of  Congress  of 
August,  1890.  That  law  was  not  intended  to  confer  upon 
any  State  the  power  to  discriminate  injuriously  against  the 
products  of  other  States  in  articles  whose  manufacture  and 
use  are  not  forbidden,  and  which  are,  therefore,  the  subjects 
of  legitimate  commerce.  When  that  law  provided  that  'all 
fermented,  distilled  or  intoxicating  liquors  transported  into 
any  State  or  territory,  remaining  therein  for  use,  consump- 
tion, sale  or  storage  therein,  should,  upon  arrival  in  such  State 
or  territory,  be  subject  to  the  operation  and  effect  of  the  laws 
of  such  State  or  territory  enacted  in  the  exercise  of  its  police 
powers,  to  the  same  extent  and  in  the  same  manner  as  though 
such  liquids  or  liquors  had  been  produced  in  such  State  or  terri- 
tory, and  should  not  be  exempt  therefrom  by  reason  of  being 
introduced  therein  in  original  packages  or  otherwise,  evi- 
dently equality  or  uniformity  of  treatment  under  State  laws 
was  intended.  The  question  whether  a  given  State  law  is  a 
lawful  exercise  of  the  police  power  is  still  open  and  must 
remain  open  to  this  court.  Such  a  law  may  forbid  entirely 
the  manufacture  and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  and  be 
valid.  Or  it  may  provide  equal  regulations  for  the  inspec- 
tion and  sale  of  all  domestic  and  imported  liquors  and  be 
valid.  Bu<^  the  State  cannot,  under  the  Congressional  legis- 
lation referred  to,  establish  a  system  which,  in  effect,  dis- 


179  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  123 

criminates  between  interstate  and  domestic  commerce  in 
commodities  to  make  and  use  which  are  admitted  to  be  law- 
ful.'""* 

Sec.  123.    Ex  post  facto  laws — Municipal  ordinance. 

A  law  is  retrospective,  retroactive  or  ex  post  facto,  which 
makes  acts  committed  prior  to  its  enactment  criminal,  or, 
as  applied  to  past  transactions,  which  creates  a  new  duty  or 
impairs  vested  property  rights  acquired  under  existing 
law ;  ^°  therefore,  an  ordinance  of  a  municipal  corporation 
providing  for  an  increased  license  fee  and  declaring  that  all 
sales  of  intoxicating  liquors  thereafter  made  by  persons  fail- 
ing to  comply  with  its  provisions  shall  be  unlawful,  is  not 
an  ex  post  facto  law.^^  A  license  issued  under  a  law  regu- 
lating the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  has  neither  the  quali- 
ties of  a  contract  nor  of  property,  but  merely  forms  a  part 
of  the  internal  police  system  of  the  State.^-  No  one  can 
acquire  a  vested  right  or  prevent  a  change  of  policy  by  the 
State,  or  by  a  municipal  corporation  acting  under  a  charter 
from  it,  where  the  varying  interests  of  society  may  require 
and  where  the  privilege  under  which  he  is  acting  is  merely 
a  statutory  one.-"'^  The  power  to  grant,  withhold  or  annul 
licenses  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  an  exercise  of  the 
(police  power,  and  no  limitation  can  be  placed  upon  it  by 
any  statutory  provision."  A¥hen  the  premise  is  once  estab- 
lished that  one  cannot  acquire  any  vested  or  contractual 
interest  in  the  police  regulation,  the  conclusion  must  follow 
that  subsequent  regulations  on  the  same  subject  cannot  be 
retrospective  in  a  technical  sense.    The  contracts  which  the 

40  Scott    V.    Donald,    165    U.    S.  ^i  Moore    v.    City    of    Indianap- 

58;    17    S.   Ct.    265;    67    Fed.    854.  olis,  120  Ind.  483;   22  N.  E.  424; 

In  ex  parte  Jervey,   66   Fed.   957,  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97   U. 

the  Circuit  Court  held   that  §33,  S.  25;   State  v.  Paul.  5  R.  I.  185. 

forbidding  anyone  to  bring  liquor  02  Metropolitan  Board  v.  Barrie, 

into  the  State  was  void;  and  so  in  34  N.  Y.  657. 

Donald  v.  Scott,  67  Fed.  854;  and  ^^  Cooley  Const.  Lim.,  5th  ed.,  p. 

so  in  Jervey  v.   The  Carolina,   66  473. 

Fed.  1013.  54  State    v.     Bonnell,     119     Ind. 

50  Anderson's  Law  Diet.,  p.  897.  494;  21  N.  E.  1101. 


§  124  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  180 

Constitution  protects  are  those  that  relate  to  property  rights, 
not  governmental.^^ 

Sec.  124.     No   property   right    in    a   license — Annulling    a 
license. 

There  is  no  such  property  right  in  a  license  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors  as  prevents  its  revocation  by  the  authority 
issuing  or  granting  it.  This  rule  arises  out  of  the  fact  that 
a  State  cannot  divest  itself  of  its  right  to  exercise  its  police 
power — cannot  bargain  it  away — a  power  "ever  present  and 
available,  to  be  exercised  by  the  State  as  emergencies  may 
require;"  and  "neither  the  State,  nor  any  of  its  agencies  to 
whom  the  power  has  been  delegated,  can  divest  itself  of  the 
right  to  impose  such  other  or  additional  restrictions  upon 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  as  the  maintenance  of  good 
order  or  the  preservation  of  the  public  morals  may  require." 
Again,  in  this  same  case,  it  is  said:  "If,  by  authorizing  a 
license  or  permit  for  one  year,  the  State  could  deprive  itself 
of  the  right  to  impose  new  restrictions  upon  the  licensee 
during  that  period,  a  law  authorizing  licenses  might  bind 
successive  Legislatures  for  three,  five,  or  even  ten  years.  If 
the  legislative  discretion  could  be  fettered  or  bargained 
away  for  one  year,  it  could,  upon  the  same  principle,  be 
bargained  away  for  an  indefinite  period.  It  is  *  *  * 
abundantly  settled  that  a  license  or  permit  issued  in  pur- 
suance of  a  mere  police  regulation  has  none  of  the  elements 
of  a  contract,  and  that  it  may  be  changed,  or  entirely  re- 
voked, even  though  based  upon  a  valuable  consideration, 
A  license  issued  under  the  law  resrulating  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  has  neither  the  qualities  of  a  contract  nor  of 
property,  but  merely  forms  a  part  of  the  internal  police 
system  of  the  State.  No  one  >can  acquire  a  vested  right  in 
a  mere  statutory  privilege  so  as  to  bind  the  State,  or  prevent 
a  change  of  policy,  as  the  varying  interests  of  society  may 
require."  "The  enactment  of  a  law  placing  restrictions 
upon  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  requiring  the  pay- 
ment of  a  specified  sum  of  money,  and  that  a  license  be 

55  stone  V.   Mississippi,    104   U.  S.  814. 


181  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  124 

obtained  before  the  business  of  selling  can  be  lawfully 
entered  upon,  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  proposition  on  the 
part  of  the  State  to  contract  for  privileges,  or  to  sell  indul- 
gences, but  rather  as  a  public  proclamation,  announcing 
that  the  State  regards  the  unrestricted  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  as  prejudicial  to  the  general  welfare,  and  that  in  the 
exercise  of  its  police  power,  the  traffic  has  been  placed  under 
regulation  and  restraint.  Those  who  engage  in  the  traffic 
after  the  enactment  of  such  a  law,  must  be  regarded  as 
having  notice  from  the  beginning,  that  power  of  regulation 
is  a  continuing  one,  and  that  the  State  reserves  to  itself 
the  right  to  deal  with  the  subject  as  the  special  exigencies 
of  the  moment  may  require.  They  are  bound  to  know  that 
the  license  or  permit  has  no  force  or  vitality  except  as  it 
derives  it  from  the  law  under  which  it  was  issued,  and  that 
if  the  public  good  requires  that  the  law  be  modified  or 
repealed,  no  incidental  inconvenience  which  they  msiy  suffer 
can  stay  the  hand  of  the  State.  No  one  can  acquire  a  vested 
right  in  the  law.  Even  if  it  were  conceded  that  a  permit 
was  possessed  of  some  of  the  characteristics  of  property,  or 
that  it  was  a  thing  of  value,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  it  would 
still  offer  no  impediment  against  the  exertion  of  the  police 
power. "^®  "Even  though  the  enforcement  of  an  ordinance 
may  operate  to  destroy  a  business  theretofore  lawful,  and 
to  seriously  impair  the  value  of  property  acquired  under  the 
sanction  of  a  special  law  or  charter,  these  r!onsir''°^"+''^TT;i  do 
not  render  the  ordinance  invalid  or  prevent  its  enforcement, 
when  the  protection  of  the  public  health  or  the  promotion 
of  the  general  welfare  requires  it.""  "T^lie  licensee."  said 
the  court,  in  the  case  from  which  this  lengthv  nuotation  has 
been  made,  "acquired  no  vested  right  under  the  previous 
ordinance  which  was  taken  away,  nor  was  there  anv  con- 
tract relation  existing,  the  obliscation  of  which  was  impaired. 
When  the  promise  is  once  established  that  one  can  acquire 

58  "The      aeknowledeed      police      Mn^ler  v.  Katisas,  123  U.  S.  623. 
Vower  of  the  State  extends  often      658;  8  Snp.  Ct.  273. 
to    the    destniction    of   property."  "  citing  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hvde 

License  La\vs.   5  How.   504,   577;       Park,  P7  V.  S.  659-.  and  Beer  Co. 

V.  Massachusetts,  97  U.   S.  25. 


§124 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


182 


no  vested  right  or  contractual  interest  in  a  police  regulation, 

the  conclusion  follows  that  subsequent  regulations  on  the 
same  subject  cannot  be  retrospective  in  a  technical  sense."  ^* 


58  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  120 
Ind.  483;   22  N.  E.  424. 

Th«  court  concludes  its  opin- 
ion with  this  quotation  from  Stone 
V.  Mississippi,  101  U.  S.  814. 
"The  contracts  which  the  Consti- 
tution pi'otects  are  those  that  re- 
late to  propery  rights,  not  gov- 
ernmental." 

See  also  Fitzgerald  v.  Witch- 
ard  (Ga.),  61  S.  E.  227  (where 
the  license  fee  was  increased  af- 
ter the  license  was  issued ) ,  Cas- 
sidy  V.  Macon  (Ga.),  66  S.  E.  941. 

This  Indiana  case  is  abundantly 
sustained  by  other  cases  to  the 
same  effect.  Thus:  "The  law  is 
now  settled  that  the  Legislature 
has  the  power  to  revoke  licenses 
granted  to  retail  liquor.  Such  a 
license  is  in  no  sense  a  contract 
by  the  State,  county  or  city  with 
the  person  taking  out  the  license. 
It  is  simply  a  permit  granted  by 
the  authorities  to  do  business  un- 
der the  license;  and  the  license 
may  be  revoked  by  the  Legisla- 
ture at  any  time."  Brown  v. 
State,  82  Ga.  224;  7  S.  E.  915; 
Calder  v.  Kurby,  5  Gray  597; 
Commonwealth  v.  Brennan,  103 
Mass.  70;  Martin  v.  State, 
23  Neb.  371;  36  N.  W.  554; 
Plenler  v.  State,  11  Neb. 
547;  Burnside  v.  Lincoln 
County  Court;  80  Ky.  423;  7  S.  E. 
276;  Metropolitan  Board  v.  Bar- 
rie,  34  N.  Y.  657 :  State  v.  Holmes, 
38  N.  H.  225;  Freleigh  v.  State, 
8  Mo.  606:  State  v.  Sterling,  8 
Mo.  697;  Baltimore  v.  Clunet,  23 
Md.    449;    Fell    v.    State,    42    Md. 


71;  20  Am.  Rep.  83;  McKinney  v. 
Salem,  77  Ind.  213;  State  v.  Bur- 
goyne,  7  Lea  173;  Bass  v.  Nash- 
ville, Meigs  (Tenn.),  421;  33  Am. 
Dec.  154;  State  v.  Morris,  77  N. 
C.  512;  Sprayberry  v.  Atlanta, 
87  Ga.  120;  13  S.  E.  197;  Stone 
V.  Mississippi,  101  U.  S.  814; 
Justice  V.  Commonwealth,  81  Va. 
209;  State  v.  Woodward,  89  Ind. 
110.  (The  last  five  cases  are  cases 
of  lottery  licenses.)  Frost  v. 
State,  64  Miss.  188;  1  So.  49; 
Lacroix  v.  State,  50  Conn.  321;  47 
Am.  Rep.  648;  Schwuchow  v.  Chi- 
cago, 68   111.  444. 

"The  granting  of  a  license  is 
not  the  execution  of  a  contract, 
and  the  counsel  for  appellants  are 
in  error  in  assuming,  as  they  do, 
that  a  license  issued  pursuant  to  a 
general  law  of  the  State  is  a  con- 
tract. The  enactment  of  a  law 
regulating  the  liquor  traffic  is  an 
exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the 
State.  The  police  power  is  a  gov- 
ernmental one,  and  permits  ob- 
tained under  laws  enacted  in  its 
exercise  are  not  contracts.  In 
enacting  laws  for  the  regulation 
of  the  business  of  retailing  liquor, 
a  sovereign  power  is  asserted,  and 
its  exercise  does  not  confer  upon 
any  officer  authority  to  make  a 
contract  which  will  abridge  this 
great  and  important  attribute  of 
sovereignty.  Sovereigns  may  make 
contracts  which,  under  our  Con- 
stitution, will  preclude  them  from 
impairing  vested  rights  by  subse- 
quent legislation,  but  this  result 
never    follows    the    e.xercise    of    a 


183 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES. 


§124 


As  illustrating  these  statements,  though  not  giving,  by  any 
means,  all  of  the  cases  on  the  subject,  it  may  be  stated  that 


purely  police  power.  The  right 
to  legislate  for  the  promotion  and 
security  of  the  public  safety,  mor- 
als and  welfare  cannot  he  surren- 
dered or  bartered  away  by  the 
Legislature.  A  license  to  retail 
liquor  is  nothing  more  than  a  mere 
permit;  it  is  neitlier  a  contract 
nor  a  grant.  The  person  who  re- 
ceives it  takes  it  with  the  tacit 
condition  and  full  knowledge  that 
the  matter  is  at  all  times  with- 
in the  control  of  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  State."  McKinney 
V.  Salem,  77  Ind.  213;  Shea  v. 
Muncie,  148  Ind.  14;  4G  N.  E.  138; 
Metropolitan  Board  v.  Barrie,  34 
N.  Y.  659;  Voight  v.  Board,  59 
N.  J.  L.  358;   36  Atl.  686. 

"Notwithstanding  his  payment 
of  large  sums  of  money  for  license 
fees  both  to  the  county  and  the 
city,  his  license  could  be  revoked 
without  refunding  his  money." 
Haggart  v.  Stehlin,  137  Ind.  43; 
35  N.  E.  997;  Shea  v.  Muncie, 
148  Ind.  14;  46  N.  E.  138;  State 
V.  Bonnell,  119  Ind.  494;  21  N. 
E.  1101;  State  v.  Isabel,  40  La. 
Ann.  340;  4  So.  1 ;  State  v.  Mul- 
lenhoff,  74  Iowa,  271;  37  N,  W. 
329. 

There  is  an  occasional  case  hold- 
ing that  a  license  cannot  be  an- 
nulled, because  it  partakes  of  the 
nature  of  a  contract.  State  v. 
Baker,  32  Mo.  App.  98;  Watts 
V.  Commonwealth,  78  Ky.  329; 
Adams  v.  Hickett,  27  N.  H.  289; 
59  Am.  Dec.  376;  State  v.  An- 
drews, 28  Mo.  14;  Holt  v.  Com- 
missioners, 31  How.  Pr.  334,  note- 
People    V.    Kansas,    31    How.    Pr. 


334,  note;  Gibbs  v.  State,  74  Atl. 
229;  State  v.  Doss,  70  Ark  312; 
67  S.  W.  867. 

That  licenses   are  not  contracts 
to    sell    intjo.vicating    liquors    be- 
tween the   State   and  licensee,   see 
Powell  V.  State,  69  Ala.  10;   Reed 
V.  Ball,  42  Miss.  472;    Coulson  v. 
Harris,    43    Miss.    728;    People    v. 
Bashford,    112    N.   Y.    Supp.    502; 
affirmed    (X.    Y.   App.   Div.),    112 
N.    Y.    Supp.     1143;     Schweirman 
V.  Highland,  113  S.  W.  507;  State 
V.  Louis    (La.),  49  So.  167;   State 
V.    Grunald    (La.),    49     So.     162; 
State   V.    Flanders     (La.),   49    So. 
169;    Arie   v.    State    (Okla.),    100 
Pac.    23;    Ashembauch    v.    Carry, 
73     Atl.     436;     Moran     v.     Com- 
monwealth,    130     Mass.     138;     39 
Am.     Rep.     442;     Columbus     City 
v.   Cutcomp,   61   Iowa   672;    17  N. 
W.    47;     La     Croix     v.    Fairfield 
County,   49    Conn.   591;    Moran  v. 
Goodman,  130  Mass.   158;   39  Am. 
Rep.   443;    Baker  v.   Pope,  2   Hun 
556;    Franklin  v.  Schermerhorn,  8 
Hun    112;    Kresser   v.   Lyman,    74 
Fed.    765;    La    Croix    v.    Fairfield 
Co.,   50   Conn.   321;    47   Am.   Rep. 
648;    Gutzweller  v.  People,   14  111. 
142;   State  v.  Carney,  20  Iowa  82; 
Prohibitory  Amendment  Cases,  24 
Kan.   700;    State   v.   Bott,   31    La. 
Ann.  663;  33  Am.  Rep.  224;  Hadt- 
ner  v.  Williamsport,  15  W.  N.  C. 
138;    State   v.    Chester.    39    S.    C. 
307;   17  S.  E.  752;  Smith  v.  Knox- 
ville,    3    Head    245;     Rowland     v. 
State,    12   Tex.   App.   418;   Martin 
V.   State,   23   Xeb.   371;    36  N.  W. 
554;    Guy  v.   Cumberland  Co.    (N. 
€.),  29  S.  E.   771. 


§  124  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  184 

a  statute  allowing  a  recovery  from  a  person  already  licensed 
to  sell  liquors,  for  an  injury  caused  by  a  person  to  whom  he 
has  sold  licjuor  until  he  became  intoxicated,  is  valid. ^'^  So 
is  a  law  taking  away  the  right  to  manufacaire  liquors  under 
a  license  not  yet  expired  ;*'°  and  likewise  declaring  an  un- 
expired license  void  and  requiring  of  dealers  to  take  out 
another  license  at  a  higher  rate  ;*'^  and  so  one  authorizing  a 
board  to  revoke  a  license  without  providing  for  a  trial  ;^' 
or  to  raise  the  fee  for  the  unexpirpd  term;**^  or  to  prohibit 
sales  on  Sundays.*'*  So  a  law  prohibiting  sales,  enacted 
while  a  license  is  in  force,  is  valid  :^^  as  is  a  law  authorizing 
a  municipality  to  require  an  additional  license  of  those 
already  licensed  hy  the  State,"*'  or  requiring  saloons  to  be 
closed  by  a  certain  hour  in  the  evening.*''^  In  the  considera- 
tion of  the  validity  of  statutes  or  ordinances  annulling 
licenses  in  force,  the  question  that  no  provision  is  made  for 
a  return  of  a  proportionate  amount  of  the  license  fee  is  not 
to  be  considered,  for  that  fact  does  not  render  the  statute  or 
ordinance  void."^    The  fact  that  a  State  has  enacted  a  statute 

59  Moran  v.  Goodman,  130  Mass.       lumbus  City  v.  Cutcomp,  61  Iowa 
138;    39   Am.   Rep.   443;    Baker   v.       672;    17  N.  W.  47. 

Pope,    2    Hun    556;     Franklin  v.           es  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  120  Ind. 

Schermerhorn,    8   Hun    112.  4«3;    22    N.    E.    424;    Rowland   v. 

60  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97       State,  12  Tex.  App.  418;   Hadtner 
TJ.   S.   525;    24   L.   Ed.   989.  v.   Williamsport,    15   Wkly.   N.   C, 

01  Kresser    v.    Lyman,    74    Fed.  138. 

765;   Brown  v.  State,  82  Ga.  224;  64  state    v.    Bott,    31    La.    Ann. 

7  S.  E.  915;  Gutzweller  v.  People,  3G3;    33    Am.    Rep.    224;    State   v. 

14  111.   142;   Fell  v.  State,  42  Md.  Calloway,    11    Idaho   719;    84   Pac. 

71;    20    Am.    Rep.    83;    Common-  27. 

wealth  V.  Brennan,   103  Mass  70;  65  Calder  v.  Kurby,  5  Gray,  597; 

Metropolitan   Board   v.   Barrie,   34  State  v.  Chester,  39  S.  C.  307;    17 

N.     Y.     667;      Hadtner     v.'    Wil-  S.   E.   752. 

liamsport,    15    Wkly.    N.    C    138;  66  Hadtner   v.    Williamsport,    15 

Caldner    v.    Kurhy,    5    Gray    597;  W.  N.  C.  138;  Moore  v.  Indianap- 

Prohibitory  Amendment  Cases,  24  olis,   120   Ind.  483;   22  N.  E.  424. 

Kan.   700;   Columbus  Citv  v.  Cut-  67  Smith    v.    Knoxville,    3    Head 

comp,    61    Iowa,    672;     17    N.    W.  245. 

47.  68  Gutzweller   v.   People,    14   111. 

62  La    Croix     v.      Fairfield,     50  142;     Rowland    v.    State,    12    Tex. 

Conn.  321;   47  Am.  Rep.  648;   Co-  App.  418;   Peyton  v.  Hot  Springs 


185 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§125 


requiring  a  license  to  sell  liquor,  or  regulating  its  sale,  does 
not  prevent  it  changing  the  law  not  only  with  respect  to 
the  regulations  but  also  with  respect  to  the  license. '''•* 

Sec.  125.     Revocation  of  license. 

Since  a  license  is  not  a  contract,  the  Legislature  may  pro- 
vide that  on  -conviction  of  the  licensee  of  a  violation  of  the 
liquor  law — or  on  his  conviction  of  a  violation  of  any  other 
law,  especially  one  involving  moral  turpitude — his  license 
shall,  by  the  act  of  conviction,  be  avoided  or  annuUed.'^'^ 
So  statutes  under  which  licenses  have  been  granted  may  be 
repealed  and  thereby  the  licenses  be  annulled  without  im- 
pairing the  obligation  of  an.y  contraet  between  the  State  and 
licensee.^i  A  statute  authorizing  a  license  board  to  revoke 
a  license  without  providing  for  a  trial  has  been  held  valid.''- 
Even  though  the  money  paid  for  a  license  has  been  appro- 
priated to  a  particular  purpose  and  no  provision  is  made  for 
its  return,  vet  the  act  revoking  the  license  is  valid." 


Co.,  53  Ark.  236;  13  S.  W.  764: 
see  also  Lydick  v.  Korner,  15  Neb. 
500;  20  N.  W.  26,  and  Martel  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  94  111.  67;  State 
V.  Chester,  39  S.  C.  307;  17  S.  E. 
752. 

69  Reithmiller  v.  People,  44 
Mich.  280;  6  N.  W.  667;  People 
V,  Brown  (Mich.),  48  N.  W. 
l'o8 ;  Heck  V.  State,  44  Ohio  S.  536 ; 
9  N.  E.  305. 

Of  course,  law  ex  post  facto  in 
effect  and  rendering  a  licensee 
criminally  liable  for  past  offense 
is  invalid.  State  v.  Isabel,  40 
La.  Ann.  340;   4  So.   1. 

70  Hildreth  v.  Crawford,  65  Iowa 
339;  21  N.  W.  667;  La  Croix 
V.  Fairfield  Co.,  50  Conn.  321; 
47  Am.  Rep.  648;  Martin  v.  State, 
23  Neb.  371;  36  N.  W.  554; 
Schwuchow  V.  Chicago,  68  111.  444. 

71  Littleton      v.       Burgess,       13 


Wyo.  '261;  82  Pae.  864;  Brown 
V.  State,  82  Ga.  224;  7  S.  S.  915; 
People  V.  Flynn,  110  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  279;  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  655; 
reversing  48  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  159; 
96  N.  Y.  Supp.  653 ;  Fell  v.  Mary- 
land. 42  Md.  71;  20  Am.  Rep. 
83;  Carbondale  v.  Wade,  106  111. 
App.  '654. 

As  a  rule,  however,  a  statute 
concerning  licenses  will  be  held 
to  apply  only  to  those  issued 
thereafter,  imless  its  explicit 
terms  requires  it  to  be  applied  to 
those  issued  before  its  passage. 
State  V.  Andrews,  26  Mo.  171. 

72  La  Croix  v.  Fairfield  Co.,  50 
Conn.  321;  47  Am.  Rep.  648;  Co- 
lumbus City  V.  Cutcomp,  61  Iowa 
672:   17  N.  W.  47. 

73  Gutzweller  v.  People,  14  111. 
142;  Calder  v.  Kurby,  5  Gray 
597 ;    Commonwealth    v.    Brennan, 


§126 


TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


186 


Sec.  126.    Amount  of  license  fees. 

A  larger  license  fee  may  be  required  in  a  city  than  in  a 
town,  or  in  a  large  city  in  population  than  in  a  small  one 
A  classification  according  to  population  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  amount  of  license  fee  that  may  be  charged  is 
legitimate  and  a  valid  classification/^  Practically,  there  is 
no  limit  on  the  amount  of  a  fee  that  may  be  exacted  for  a 
license.  The  amount  is  a  matter  for  the  Legislature  and  not 
the  courts;  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  Legis- 
lature may  prohibit  altogether  the  sale  of  liquors,  unless 
some  positive  clause  of  the  Constitution  forbids  the  prohibi- 
tion ;  and  as  a  method  of  prohibition  or  guasi-prohibition  it 
may  fix  the  amount  of  the  license  fee  so  high  as  to  make  it 
an   unprofitable   adventure   to   engage   in   selling  liquors." 


103  Mass.  70;  Metropolitan  Board 
V.  Barrie,  34  N.  H.  057;  State  v. 
'Chester,  39  S.  C.  307;  17  S.  E. 
752;  Rowland  v.  State,  12  Tex. 
App.   418. 

A  few  early  cases  held  that  a 
license  cannot  be  revoked,  on  the 
ground  that  the  licensee  has  a 
vested  right  in  it.  Adams  v. 
Hickett,  27  N.  H.  289;  59  Am. 
Dec.  376;  Holt  v.  Commissioners, 
31  How.  Pr.  334,  note;  People  v. 
Krushaw,  31   How,  Pr.   344,  note. 

A  statute  authorizing  a  revoca- 
tion of  a  liquor  license  on  convic- 
tion of  the  licensee  of  having  vio- 
lated the  liquor  laws,  is  constitu- 
tional. Krueger  v.  Colville,  49 
Wash.  295;  95  Pac.  81;  People  v. 
Flynn,  110  K  Y.  App.  Div.  279; 
96  N.  Y.  Supp.  655;  reversing  48 
N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  159;  96  N.  Y. 
Supp.  653. 

A  statute  requiring  the  licen- 
see, in  a  proceeding  to  revoke  his 
license,  to  rleny  under  oath  every 
alleged  violation  set  out  in  the  pe- 
tition   and    raise    an    issue    as   to 


any  material  fact,  or  the  license 
issued  be  cancelled,  is  unconstitu- 
tional, in  that  it  permits  the  tak- 
ijig  of  property  without  due  pro- 
cess of  law.  In  re  Collian,  82  N. 
Y.  App.  Div.  445;  81  N.  Y.  Supp. 
567. 

Where  an  order  prohibiting 
sales  of  liquor  in  a  particular 
district  is  set  aside,  and  then  a 
license  issued  for  such  district; 
and  thereafter  a  prohibition  order 
is  again  issued,  the  order  annuls 
such  license  and  is  valid.  State 
V.  Doss,  70  Ark.  312;  67  S.  W. 
867. 

71  State  V.  Circuit  Court,  50  N, 
J.  L.  585;  15  Atl.  272.  See  State 
V.  Keaough,  68  Wis.  135;  31  N. 
W.  723  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Smoul- 
ter,  126  Pa.  St.  137;  17  Atl.  532; 
Commonwealth  v.  Miller,  126  Pa. 
St.  137;  17  Atl.  623;  Foster  v. 
Burt,  76   Ala.  229. 

~^'  Dennohy  v.  Chicago,  140  III. 
627:  State  v.  "Roberts,  74  N.  H. 
476;  69  Atl.  722;  12  N.  E,  227; 
Coffer  v.  Elizabeth  town   (Ky.),  99 


187 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§127 


Nor  can  it  be  urged  that  the  cost  of  issuing  the  license  is 
out  of  all  proportion  to  the  amount  of  the  fee  charged,  for 
"liquor  dealers  are  subjected  to  the  payment  of  a  special 
tax  because  the  object  of  this  class  of  legislation  is  to  restrict 
the  business.  *  "  *  The  theory  of  the  legislation  upon 
this  subject  is  that  the  business  is  one  which  requires  re- 
straint because  it  is  harmful  to  society."^**  And  if  the 
Legislature  has  empowered  a  city  to  exact  a  license  fee,  not 
limiting  it  in  amount,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  ordinance 
is  void  because  the  fee  is  a  large  one.''^ 


Sec.  127.     Increasing  amount  of  fee  before  license  has  ex- 
pired. 

Since  no  one  has  a  natural  right  to  sell  intoxicating 
liquors,  nor  a  vested  right  in  a  license,  a  license  may  be 
revoked  before  it  has  expired;  or  a  larger  fee  may  be  re- 


S.  W.  608;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  700 
($1,000)  ;  United  States  Distilling 
Co,  V.  Chicago,  112  111.  19;  IN. 
E.  166;  Tenney  v.  Lenz,  IG  Wis. 
.566;  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  42  La. 
Ann.  9;  7  So.  58;  In  re  Guerrero, 
09  Cal.  88;  10  Pac.  261;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Fowler,  96  Ky.  166; 
28  S.  W.  786;  Commonwealth  v. 
Fowler,  98  Ky.  648;   34  S.  W.  31. 

76  Emerich  v.  Indianapolis,  118 
Ind.  279;   20  N.  E.  705. 

77  Indianapolis  v.  Bieler,  138 
Ind.  30;  36  N.  E.  857   ($1,000). 

An  ordinance  requiring  $25  a 
month  has  been  held  valid.  Ex 
parte  Benninger,  64  Cal.  291;  30 
Pac.  846 ;  and  also  one  i-equiring  a 
license  to  be  taken  nut  every 
ninety  days.  In  re  Hurl,  49  Cal. 
557;  or  $200  annually.  Ex  parte 
McNally,  73  Cal.  632;  15  Pac. 
368. 

A  statute  requiring  $500  for 
a  license  every  year  in  cities  and 
towns    where    total    vote    exceeds 


150,  $300  in  all  other  cities  and 
towns,  and  $100  for  hotel  and  tav- 
ern keepers  three  or  more  miles 
distant  from  any  city  or  town  was 
held  to  be  reasonable  and  not  an 
unjust  discrimination.  State  v. 
Doherty,  2  Idaho  1105;  29  Pac. 
855.  So  an  ordinance  imposing  a 
license  fee  of  $1,000  is  valid. 
State  V.  Hardy,  7  Neb.  377;  In- 
dianapolis v.  Bieler,  138  Ind.  30; 
36  N.  E.  857. 

License  fees  may  be  graded  ac- 
cording to  the  population  of  cit- 
ies, or  one  amount  for  a  city  and 
another  for  a  town.  Amador 
County  V.  Kennedy,  70  Cal.  458; 
11  Pac.  757;  Amador  County  v. 
Isaacs,  11  Pac.  758. 

A  statute  dividing  the  city  li- 
cense fees  between  the  city  and 
the  county  is  valid,  although  the 
cit.v  by  its  original  charter  was 
entitled  to  the  whole  of  the  fee. 
Winona  v.  Whipple,  24  Minn.  61. 


§§  128,  129        TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  188 

quired  for  the  time  it  has  j^et  to  run.  And  a  city,  unless 
expressly  restrained  by  statute,  has  the  power  to  make  such 
an  exaetion.'^^ 

Sec.  128.    License  for  and  sales  by  druggists, 

A  State  has  full  power  to  require  all  druggists  selling  in- 
toxicating liquors  to  take  out  a  license ;  and  fixing  the  license 
fee  at  fifty  dollars  is  not  an  unconstitutional  abuse  of  its 
power,  though  in  certain  localities  it  may  have  the  effect 
to  absolutely  prohibit  a  druggist  selling  such  liquors.'^"  And 
a  statute  requiring  all  sales  by  a  druggist  to  be  based  upon 
a  physician's  prescription  is  valid. ^^  The  Legislature  may 
even  prescribe  the  form  of  the  prescription,  and  make  it  an 
offense  to  sell  liquor  upon  any  other  form.^^ 

Sec.  129.     Limiting  licenses  to  a  certain  class  of  persons. 

Not  only  may  a  State  require  a  license  of  all  persons  sell- 
ing intoxicating  liquors — even  in  case  of  a  single  sale — ^^but 
it  may  limit  the  right  to  obtain  such  a  license  to  a  certain 
class  of  persons,  and  in  doing  so  violate  no  provisions  of  the 
Constitution.  "The  general  rule  undoubtedly  is,  that  any 
person  is  at  liberty  to  pursue  any  lawful  calling,  and  to  do 

78  Moore     v.     Indianapolis,     120  ^o  Commonwealth  v.   Fowler,   96 

Ind.  483;   22  N.  E.  424;   Kowland  Ky.   166;   28  S.  W.  786;   Common- 

V.   State,    12   Tex.   App.   418.     See  wealth  v.  Fowler,  98  Ky.  648;   34 

also  Silver  v.  Sparta,  107  Ga.  275;  S.  W.  21;   State  v.  .Forcier,  65  N. 

33    S.    E.    31.       Contra,     State    v.  H.  42;  17  Atl.  577 ;  State  v.  Hein- 

Baker,  32  Mo.  App.  98.  emann,    80    Wis.    253 ;    49    N.    W. 

The   passage   of    a    law   increas-  818;    27    Am.    St.    34;    Seattle   v. 

ing  the  amount  of  the  license  fee  Foster,    47    Wash.    172;     91    Pac. 

operates  as   a   revocation   of   a   li-  642. 

cense    already    issued,    unless    the  so  Edgar  v.   State,   46   Tex.   Civ. 

additional  amount  is  paid.     Eow-  App.  171;  102  S.  W.  439.   Ex  parte 

land  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  418.  Fedderwitz,     130    Cal.     xviii;     62 

A  city,  after  a  county  license  is  Pac.   935.     See   Sweeney  v.  Webb, 

issued,  may  pass  an  ordinance  re-  33  Tex.  Civ.  App.   324;    76  S.  W. 

quiring  the  licensee,  if  he  desires  766;   77  S.  W.   1135. 

to  sell,  to  take  out  a  city  license.  si  Hotsnn       v.       Commonwealth 

Hadtner  v.  Williamsport,  15  Wkly.  (Ky.),  105  S.  W.  955;   32  Ky.  L, 

N.  C.  138.  Rep.  392. 


189  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  129 

SO  in  his  own  way,  not  encroaching  upon  the  rights  of  others. 
This  general  I'iglit  cannot  be  taken  away.  It  is  not  com- 
petent, therefore,  to  forbid  any  person  or  class  of  persons, 
whether  citizens  or  resident  aliens,  offering  their  services  in 
lawful  businesses,  or  to  subject  others  to  penalties  for  em- 
ploying thera.^^-  But  here,  as  elsewhere,  it  is  proper  to  recog- 
nize distinctions  that  exist  in  the  nature  of  things,  and 
under  some  circumstances  to  inhibit  employments  to  some 
one  class  while  leaving  them  open  to  others.  Some  employ- 
ments, for  example,  may  be  admissible  for  males  and 
improper  for  females,  and  regulations  recognizing  the  im- 
propriety and  forbidding  women  engaging  in  them  would  be 
open  to  no  reasonable  ohjection.^^  The  same  is  true  of 
young  children,  whose  employment  in  mines  and  manufac- 
tories is  commonly,  and  ought  always,  to  be  regulated.^* 
And  some  employments  in  which  integrity  is  of  vital  im- 
portance it  may  be  proper  to  treat  as  privileges  merely,  and 
to  refuse  the  license  to  follow  them  to  any  who  are  not 
reputable."*^  This  quotation  illustrates  the  s'cope  of  the 
State  acting  within  its  police  powers  in  the  designation  of 
what  certain  classes  shall  not  be  permitted  to  follow  certain 
occupations,  and  also  in  limiting  the  right  to  follow  other 
occupations  to  a  certain  class.  It  is  with  the  latter  that  we 
are  here  concerned.  A  statute  restricting  the  issuance  of  a 
license,  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors,  to  an  inhabitant  of  the 
State  who  is  a  male  twenty-one  years  of  age,  and  who  must 
be  of  good  moral  character,  is  constitutional,  although  one 
merely  a  citizen  be  deprived  of  the  right  to  obtain  a  license.*® 
The  State  may  even  go  farther  than  this  and  limit  the  license 

82  Citing    Baker   v.    Portland,    5  449 ;    Robinson  v.   Miner,   68  Mich. 

Sawyer    &66.  549;  37  N.  W.  21;  hi  re  Ruth,  32 

S3  Citing     Blair     v.     Kilpatrick,  Iowa  250;    In  re    BickerstalT,    70 

40    Ind.   312.     In  re   Oiiong  Woo,  Cal.  35;    11  Pac.  393;   Schwuchow 

13    Fed.    229,     and     Bergman     v.  v.  Chicago,  68    111.  444 ;    In  re  Lunt, 

Cleveland,  39  Ohio  St.  651.  6    Greenl.    412;     City    Council    v. 

84  Citing  Commonwealth  v.  Ham-  Ahrens,   4   Strobh.    241 ;    State   v. 

ilton,  120  Mass.  383.  Trageser,    73    Md.     250;     20    Atl. 

fisCooley    on    Const.    Lim.        (6  905;   25  Am.  St.  587;   9  L.  R.  A. 

ed.),  744.  780;    Boomershine    v.    Uline,    159 

86Thomasson  v.   State,   15   Ind.  Ind.  500;    65  N.  E.  513. 


§130 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


190 


to  such  persons  as  qualified  physicians  or  registered  drug- 
gists.*' So  a  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquor  by  any 
person  not  importing  it,  is  valid.^^  A  statute  restricting  the 
right  to  a  license  to  males  has  been  held  valid.*" 


Sec.  130.    Discrimination  in  granting  licenses. 

Neither  the  Legislature  nor  a  municipality  has  the  power 
to  discriminate  between  citizens  of  the  same  class  in  the 
granting  of  a  license.^"*  It  must  treat  them  all  alike.  It 
has,  however,  as  has  been  elsewhere  noted,  the  power  to  limit 
the  granting  of  a  license   to   persons  of  good  moral  ehar- 


87  Koester  v.  State,  36  Kan.  27 ; 
12  Pac.  339;  Sarrls  v.  Common- 
wealth, 83  Ky.  327;  7  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  473.  In  re  Intoxicating  Li- 
quor Cases,  25  Kan.  751;  37  Am. 
Rep.  284;  McAllister  v.  State, 
(Ala.),  47  So.  161;  State  v.  Lind- 
gron,  1  Kan.  App.  51;  41  Pac. 
688. 

A  druggist  cannot  complain  that 
he  is  put  upon  the  same  plane  as 
a  retailer  of  liquors  as  a  beverage. 
Rosenham  v.  Commonwealth,  7 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  590. 

88  Wynehamer  v.  People,  20 
Barb.    567. 

An  ordinance  of  a  city  author- 
izing an  exclusive  contract  with  a 
particular  person  for  the  sale  of 
liquors  in  a  particular  city  park 
has  been  held  valid  and  not  to  cre- 
ate a  special  privilege  within  the 
clause  of  a  Constitution  providing 
that  no  law  conferring  "irrevoca- 
ble grant  of  special  privileges  or 
immunities  can  be  passed  by  the 
General  Assembly,"  and  that  "the 
General  Assembly  shall  not  pass 
any  local  or  special  law  granting 
to  any  corporation,  association  or 
individual  anv  special  or  exclusive 
right,     privilege     or     immunity." 


State  V.  Schweickardt,  109  Mo. 
496;    19   S.  W.  47. 

89  Blair  v.  Kilpatrick,  40  Ind. 
312;  Blair  v.  Rutenfram,  40  Ind. 
318;  Walsh  v.  State,  126  Ind.  71; 
25  N.   E.  883;   9   L.   R.  A.   664. 

A  statute  providing  that  no 
person  except  certain  tavern  own- 
ers shall  sell  intoxicating  liquors 
in  a  named  district  without  a  li- 
cense is  void,  because  it  confers 
special  rights;  the  exception  hav- 
ing the  eirect  to  protect  holders 
of  licenses  then  in  force.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Petrie  Co.,  90  S,  W. 
987;    28   Ky.   L.   Rep.  940. 

An  ordinance  discriminating  be- 
tween persons  of  the  same  class 
is  void.  Popel  v.  Monmouth,  81 
111.  App.  512. 

A  male  cannot  complain  of  a 
statute  that  he  has  violated  be- 
cause it  does  not  permit  a  female 
to  take  out  a  license.  Wagner  v. 
Garrett,  118  Ind.  114;  20  N.  E. 
706;  Linkenhelt  v.  Garrett,  118 
Ind.   599;    20  N.  E.  708. 

80*  State  v.  New  Orleans,  113 
La.  371;  30  So.  999;  Cairo  v. 
Feuchter  Bros.,  59  111.  App.  112; 
affirmed  159  111.  155;  42  N.  E. 
308. 


191  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTL^.  §  130 

acter;  and  in  so  doing  it  does  not  violate  any  constitutional 
provisions.  For  no  one  has  an  inherent  right  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors.°°  But  it  may  not  select  out  certain  persons 
of  those  having  good  moral  character  and  authorize  the 
granting  to  him  a  license  to  the  exclusion  of  others  in  the 
same  class,  though  it  may  require  qualifications  in  addition 
to  those  of  a  good  moral  character;  but  those  in  that  class 
must  be  all  treated  alike.  And,  as  has  been  elsewhere  said, 
statutes  may  prohibit  the  granting  of  a  license  to  women, 
or  to  anyone  who  cannot  obtain  the  consent  of  those  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  place  to  be  licensed;*'^  or  to  those  not 
citizens  or  residents  of  the  city  or  county  wherein  granted.^^ 
Nor  is  a  statute  void  which  gives  a  city  the  power  to  re- 
quire a  license  to  sell  liquors  within  four  miles  of  the  cor- 
porate limits,  on  the  ground  that  it  discriminates  between 
persons ;  ^^-  nor  is  an  ordinance  void  which  imposes  a  larger 
license  tax  on  retailers  of  liquor  than  on  retailers  of  other 
articles.'**  A  city  may  classify  occupations  for  the  purpose 
of  the  imposition  of  license  taxes  according  to  annual  sales.^'^ 
An  ordinance,  so  long  as  it  does  not  discriminate  between 
persons,  that  imposes  different  rates  for  licenses  according 
to  the  locality  in  which  the  saloon  licensed  is  located,  is 
valid. ^•^  A  statute  requiring  of  liquor  dealers  a  bond,  con- 
ditioned not  to  sell  liquor  to  drunkards  after  notice,  and 
imposing  a  State  and  county  tax,  payable  a  year  in  advance, 
is  valid,  not  discriminating  against  citizens  engaged  in  the 
liquor  trade  nor  denying  to  any  person  the  equal  protection 
of   the   law.^^     Requiring   of   vendors    of   liquors   a   license 

90  Crowley    v.    Christonsen.     137  s*  Ex  parte  Bur],  49  Cn].  557. 
U.    S.    86;     11    Sup.    Ct.    13;    Ex           95  Williamsport   v.   Wenner,   172 
parte  Christensen,  85  Cal.  208;  24       Pa.  St.   173;  33  Atl.  544. 

Pac.  747.  96  East    St.    Louis    v.    Wehrung, 

91  Crowley    v.    Christensen,    su-       46  III.  392.     Contra,  Board  v.  Ren- 
P^^-  fro    (Ky.),  58  S.  W.  795;   22  Ky. 

92Kohn  V.  Melcher,  29  Fed.  433;  L.   Ren.  806;   51   L.  R.  A.  897. 
DeGrazier  v.  Stephens   (Tex.),  105  07Giozza  v.   Tiernan,   148  U.  S. 

^-  W.  992.  657;    13  Sup.  Ct.  721;   37  L.  Ed. 

93  Jordan  v.  Evansville.  163  Ind.  599. 
512;    72   N.   E.   544;    67   L.   R.  A. 
613. 


§  130  TKAPFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  192 

cannot  be  objected  to  on  the  ground  that  the  requirement 
lays  upon  them  a  tax  w^hich  compels  them  to  pay  more 
toward  the  support  of  the  government  than  others  not  so 
engaged  are  compelled  to  pay/**^  So  a  statute  dividing 
liquor  dealers  into  two  classes  and  providing  regulations  ap- 
plicable to  one  and  not  to  the  other,  is  valid.^^  So  a  tax  on 
wholesale  dealers  in  malt  liquors  and  not  on  wholesalers  of 
spirituous  and  vinous  liquors  is  valid,  being  merely  a  classi- 
fication of  occupations,  a  thing  not  prohibited  by  the  Con- 
stitution.^ So  a  statute  prohibiting  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  all  liquors  except  cider  and  wine  made  in  the  State 
has  been  held  not  such  a  discrimination  as  renders  it  void.^ 
So  a  statute  requiring  all  liquor  dealers  to  pay  a  license  fee 
of  ten  dollars  for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  an  asylum 
for  inebriates  is  valid,  not  imposing  an  unequal  tax.^  A 
statute  requiring  a  license  to  sell  liquors,  but  excepting  per- 
sons selling  at  wholesale  in  quantities  exceeding  five  gallons 
per  sale  is  valid.*  So  a  statute  forbidding  any  person  except 
the  proprietor  and  his  family  being  in  a  saloon  during  hours 
when  sales  are  prohibited  is  valid.'"'  A  statute  may  prohibit 
sales  in  less  quantities  than  four  gallons  in  a  single  pack- 
age except  in  licensed  saloons,  and  not  be  open  to  the  charge 
of  an  unjust  discrimination.*^  A  section  of  a  statute  author- 
ized a  city  to  exact  a  license  for  sales  in  less  quantities  than 
one  gallon,  another  se'ction  fixed  the  fee  for  a  year,  and  a 
third  section  prescribed  a  penalty  for  sales  of  such  quanti- 
ties without  a  license  except  druggists  who  secure  a  permit 
to  sell  for  medicinal  purposes.  The  city  enacted  an  ordinance 
providing  that  any  person,  not  a  licensee  or  holding  such  a 

98  Keller  v.   State,   11   Md.   525;  3  State  v.  Cassidy,  22  Minn.  312; 

69  Am.  Dec.  226.  21  Am.  Rep.  765;   State  v.  Klein, 

«9Meehan  v.  Board,  75  N.  J.  L.  22   Minn.  328. 

557;   70  Atl.  363;    affirming  73  N.  *  State    v.    Bock,    167    Ind.    559; 

J.  L.  382;   64  Atl.  689.  79  N.  E.  493. 

1  Cooper  V.  Hot  Springs,  87  Ark.  5  state  v.  Calloway,  11  Idaho 
12;   111  S.  W.  997.  719;    84   Pac.   27. 

2  State  V.  Brennan,  25  Conn.  6  People  v.  Harrison,  191  HI. 
278;  State  v.  Wheeler,  25  Conn.  257;  61  N.  E.  99;  affirming  92  111. 
290.  App,     643;     McAllister     v.     State 

(Ala.),  47  So.  161. 


193  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES.  §  130 

permit,  who  should  sell  liquors  in  any  quantities  should  be 
fined.  This  ordinance  was  held  invalid  because  it  unjustly 
discriminated  between  persons  of  the  siinie  chiss,  by  per- 
mitting persons  having  licenses  to  sell  li(iuors  in  quantities 
of  less  than  a  gallon  to  sell  in  (juantities  of  a  p,allon  or 
more,  and  yet  prohibited  all  others  selling  in  quantities  of  a 
gallon  or  more."  Where  a  liquor  law  applies  to  all  persons 
alike  it  does  not  deny  amy  person  the  equal  protection  of 
the  law,^  and  a  statute  forbidding  saloons  to  be  open  on 
Sundays  and  excepting  certain  other  places  from  its  opera- 
tions is  valid,  not  being  a  discrimination  betAveen  different 
persons. *•  A  statute  provided  that:  "The  failure  to  carry 
prohibition  in  a  county  shall  not  prevent  an  election  for  the 
same  from  being  immediately  thereafter  held  in  a  justice's 
precin'ct  or  subdivision  of  such  county  as  designated  by  the 
commissioners'  court,  or  of  any  town  or  city  in  such  county; 
nor  shall  the  failure  to  carry  prohibition  in  a  town  or  city 
prevent  an  election  from  being  immediately  thereafter  held 
for  the  entire  justice's  precinct  or  county  in  whi<ih  said 
town  or  city  is  situated ;  nor  shall  the  holding  of  an  elefction 
in  a  justice's  precinct  in  any  way  prevent  the  holding  of  an 
election  immediately  thereafter  for  the  entire  county  in 
which  the  justice's  precinct  is  situated ;  but  when  prohibition 
has  been  carried  at  an  election  ordered  for  the  entire  teounty, 
no  election  on  the  question  of  prohibition  shall  be  there- 
after ordered  in  any  justice's  precinct,  town  or  city  of  said 
county  until  after  prohibition  has  been  defeated  at  a  sub- 
sequent election  for  the  same  purpose,  ordered  and  held  for 
the  entire  county,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this 
title ;  nor  in  any  case  where  prohibition  has  carried  in  any 
justice's  precinct  shall  an  election  on  the  question  of  pro- 
hibition be  ordered  thereafter  in  any  town  or  city  of  such 
precinct  until  after  prohibition  has  been  defeated  at  a  sub- 
sequent election  ordered  and  held  for  such  entire  precinct." 

7  Monmouth    v.    Popel,    183    111.       28  Atl.  1089;  Corbin  v.  Houlehan, 
634;    50  N.   E.   348;    affirming   81        100  Mo.  246;  6  Atl.  131. 

111.  App.  512.  9  State  v.  Dolen,  13  Idaho,  693; 

8  State  V.  Hodgson,  66  Vt.  134;       92  Pac.  995;   Ex  parte  Jacobs,  13 

Idaho,  720;  92  Pac.  1003. 


§  131  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  194 

It  was  held  that  the  act  was  valid  and  not  objectionable  on 
the  ground  that  it  discriminated  in  favor  of  prohibitionist 
and  denied  to  anti-prohibitionist  the  equal  protection  of  the 
law.'"  Requiring  licensees  to  sell  liquors  to  give  bonds  condi- 
tioned to  pay  all  civil  damages  incurred  by  the  licensees  in 
making  illegal  sales  is  not  an  unjust  discrimination."  But 
a  statute  forbidding  liquor  dealers  to  become  sureties  on 
such  bonds  is  void,  because  i<^  is  an  unjust  discrimination, 
the  Legislature  not  having  the  power  to  make  the  right  to 
sign  the  bond  to  depend  upon  the  business  in  which  one  is 
engaged.  "The  right  to  contract  a  debt  or  other  personal 
obligation  is  included  in  the  right  to  liberty,  and  one's  pay- 
ment of  his  debts,  and,  therefore,  the  basis  of  one's  credit, 
and  the  right  to  contract  a  debt,  or  to  enter  into  a  bond  or 
other  writing  or  obligation,  is  also  a  right  of  property.  Sigii- 
ing  bonds  for  other  parties  may  be  the  result  of  friendship, 
or  because  of  business  interests ;  but  the  right  to  pledge 
one's  estate  is  as  much  a  right  of  property  as  either  the 
title  or  possession."^-  A  statute  is  not  void  because  by 
local  option  it  gives  the  county  the  opportunity  to  prohibit 
druggists  of  the  county  selling  liquors  therein,  and  yet  does 
not  prohibit  them  selling  in  other  counties.^^ 

Sec.  131.    Discretionary  power  to  grant  a  license. 

Many  statutes  make  it  discretionary  with  the  issuing  com- 
mittee or  board  to  grant  a  license  to  sell  liquors,  and  these 
statutes  have  been  repeatedly  assailed.  They  have  been 
assailed  on  the  ground  that  the  State  has  rendered  the  sale 

loRippy  V.  State,  68  S.  W.  687.  The    imposition    of  a  license  of 

11  Bell    V.   State,    28   Tex.    App.  $500    on     retailers    and    $100    on 

S6;    12    S.    W.    410;    McGuire    v.  wholesalers,  but  providing  that  a 

Glass   (Tex.),  15  S.  W.  127;   Ken-  wholesale  license  should  not  be  re- 

nedy  v.  Garrigan   (S.  D.),   121  N.  quired  of  retailer  selling  at  whole- 

W.   783.  sale,    is    void,    as    an    unjust    dis- 

13  Kuhn  V.  Common  Council,  70  crimination,   enabling   the   retailer 

Mich.  534 :  38  N.  W.  470.  thereby  procuring  his  wholesale  li- 

13  People   V.    Shuler,     36     Mich.  cense  for  nothing.     Curo  v.  Fuch- 

,161;    9'8   N.    W.    1>&6;    10    Detroit  ter    Bros.,    54    111.    App    112;    af- 

L.  News,  1004.  firmed  159  111.  155;  42  N.  E.  308. 


195  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES.  §  132 

of  liquors  under  license  a  lawful  transaction,  and  to  engage 
in  the  business  of  selling  liquors  is  a  lawful  occupation, 
and,  therefore,  the  Legislature  has  no  power  to  inv&et  the 
licensing  board  or  committee  with  discretionary  power  to 
grant  a  license  to  one  person  and  refuse  it  to  another  who 
is  equally  fit  to  engage  in  the  business  of  selling  liquors. 
But  these  statutes  have  been  almost  universally,  if  not 
quite,  upheld.  It  is  said  that  no  one  has  an  inherent  right 
to  engage  in  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors;  and  the  State 
may,  therefore,  empower  a  local  board  to  exercise  its  dis- 
cretion in  licensing  or  refusing  a  license  to  applicants  for 
permits.^^  Such  a  law  does  not  deny  to  persons  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.^"  A  statute  making  it  discretionarj'^ 
with  a  licensing  board  to  accept  or  reject  the  bond  tendered 
by  the  applicant,  where  a  bond  is  required  before  the  license 
can  be  granted,  is  constitutional.^"  So  one  prohibiting  the 
clerks  of  the  circuit  courts  issuing  licenses  to  anyone  until 
the  grand  jury  of  the  county  recommends  such  one,  is  con- 
stitutional.^^ But  a  statute  providing  that  the  local  board 
shall  refuse  to  issue  a  license  to  any  person  whom  the 
members  of  it  know  to  be  unfit  to  conduct  the  business,  and 
authorizing  the  county  treasurer  to  require  a  new  bond  in 
any  contingency  which  he  may  think  requires  it,  is  invalid, 
because  it  submits  one  to  the  will  of  his  neighbor.^^ 

Sec.  132.     Appeal  to  courts  from  granting,  refusing  ar  re- 
voking licenses. 

The  granting  or  refusing  to  grant  a  license  is  purely  an 
administrative  part  of  the  power  of  a  government  and  not 

14  7m  re  Hoover,  30  Fed.  51;  af-  isDuay   v.    Shepard,    150   Mich, 

firmed  in  United  States  v.  Ronan,  647;    114  N.   W.   238;    14   Detroit 

33  Fed.  117;  Gray  v.  Connecticut,  Leg.  N.  700;   Burke  v.  Collins,  18 

150   U.    S.    74;    15    Sup.  Ct.   9S5;  S.   D.    190;    99    N.    VV.    1112;    Ex 

40  L.   Ed.   80;    State   v.    Gray   61  parte  Christensen,  S5  Cal.  208;  24 

Conn.  39;  22  Atl.  675;  Thurlow  v.  Pac.  747;  Ex  parte  Holinquist,  27 

Massachusetts,    5    How.    504;     12  Pac.    1090;    Plenler    v.    State,    11 

L.  Ed.  256.  Xeb.   547;    10   X.  W.   481. 

Instate  V.   Gray,   61   Conn.   30;  1 7  Cohen  v.  Jarrett,  42  Md.  571. 

22  Atl.  675.  18  Robison    v.    Mines,    68    Mich. 

540;    37  N.  W.  21. 


§  132  TR.VFFIC   IN   INTOXICxVTING   LIQUORS,  196. 

a  judicial  part  of  it.  But  the  tendency  of  the  Legislature, 
largely  due  to  the  failure  of  administration  boards  to  prop- 
erly perform  their  duties,  owing  in  part  to  an  indifference 
on  their  part  to  the  proper  execution  or  enforcement  of  the 
law,  or  because  of  politically  corrupt  influence — political 
cowardice,  if  you  so  please  to  call  it — or  because  of  the 
ignorance  or  inefficiency  of  those  charged  with  the  duty  of 
granting,  refusing  or  revoking  licenses,  has  been  to  cast  upon 
the  courts  the  burden  of  hearing  applications  for  licenses, 
remonstrances  thereto,  and  petitions  for  their  revocation.  In 
other  lines  of  the  administration  of  the  affairs  of  a  State  there 
has  been  a  decided  growth  in  the  tendency  to  place  the 
burden  upon  the  courts  in  such  matters  in  the  last  quarter 
of  a  century.  In  the  early  judicial  history^  of  this  country  such 
statutes  were  regarded  wath  jealousy  by  the  courts,  as  casting 
upon  them  a  burden  belonging  to  another  department  of  the 
Government ;  and  the  courts  felt  that  it  was  not  within  the 
power  of  the  Legislature  to  assign  them  duties  properly  be- 
longing to  the  administrative  department  of  the  Government. 
In  addition  to  this,  as  the  judiciary  is  the  weakest  branch  of 
the  three  great  departments  of  the  State,  it  was  necessary 
for  it  to  regard  with  jealousy  all  encroachments  upon  its 
domains  and  to  refuse  to  take  on  burdens  not  of  a  judicial 
character.  But  in  recent  years  there  has  been  a  manifest 
yielding  on  this  point.  More  and  more  the  Legislature  has 
sought  to  cast  upon  the  courts  the  administration  of  the 
affairs  of  the  government ;  and  more  and  more  the  courts 
have  yielded  and  sought  for  reasons  to  uphold  such  statutes. 
The  action  of  the  Legislature  is  a  high  compliment  to  the 
integrity  of  the  courts  and  a  signal  manifestation  of  its  con- 
fidence in  their  ability  and  integrity.  There  will  be  found 
many  cases  where  the  right  to  have  a  license  has  been  de- 
termined on  appeal  from  licensing  boards  to  the  courts.^** 

19  As     in     Virginia,     Lester     v.  TOS;   Miller  v.  Wade,  58   Ind.  91; 

Price,  83   Va.   G48;    3  S.   E.   529;  Goodwin   v.   Smith,    72    Ind.    113; 

in    Nebraska,    State    v.    Borsfield,  Castle  v.  Bell,   145  Ind.  8;   44  N. 

24  Neb.  517;    3D   N.   W.   427;    in  E.    2;     in     Kentucky,    Hoglan    v. 

Indiana,   Groscap   v.   Rainier,    111  Commonwealth,    3    Bush    147;    in 

Ind.   361;    12  N.  E.  694;    State  v.  Pennsylvania,  In  re  Goldman,  138 

Sopher,    157    Ind.    360;    61    N.   E.  Pa.  St.  321;   22  Atl.   23. 


197 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES. 


§132 


The  usual  line  of  reasoning,  in  order  to  sustain  these  statutes 
■allowing  an  appeal  to  the  courts,  is,  that  before  a  license 
can  be  issued  the  licensing  board  must  find  certain  facts — 
as,  the  applicant  is  a  resident  of  the  State,  or  a  man  of 
good  moral  character,  or  that  the  necessary  and  qualified 
persons  have  signed  his  application  or  given  their  consent — 
and  that  the  finding  of  such  facts  is  such  a  judicial  act  or 
determination  as  authorizes  the  court  to  hear  and  pass  upon 
the  sufficiency  of  the  proof  to  sustain  them,  and,  therefore, 
in  ascertaining  these  facts  the  court  acts  judicially  and  not 
administratively.  Therefore,  statutes  allowing  appeals  in 
such  instances  have  been  upheld,  even  though  there  v/as  in- 
volved the  question  of  an  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  part 
of  the  licensing  board  in  refusing  the  license.-*' 


20  Appeal  of  Moynihan,  75 
Conn.    358;    53   Atl.   903. 

The  inebriate  law  of  Minnesota 
was  held  invalid  so  far  as  it  con- 
ferred powers  on  the  Probate 
Judge  in  relation  to  the  commit- 
ment of  inebriates.  Foreman  v. 
Hennepin  County,  64  Minn.  371; 
67  N.  W.   207. 

Judicial  powers  cannot  be  con- 
ferred upon  administration  offi- 
cers. State  V.  Bates,  96  Minn. 
110;  104  N.  W.  709;  People  v. 
■Colleton,  59  Mich.  573;  26  N.  W. 
771. 

A  statute  requiring  a  court  to 
appoint  an  Excise  Board  for  a 
city  does  not  require  the  exercise 
of  judicial  power.  Schwarz  v. 
Dover,  72  X.  J.  L.  311;  62  Atl. 
1135;  affirming  70  N.  J.  L.  502; 
57  Atl.   394. 

In  West  Virginia  the  section  of 
the  Constitution  committing  to 
county  courts  the  superintendence 
of  internal  police  under  such  reg- 
ulations as  may  be  prescribed  by 


law,  and  that  no  license  for  sale 
of  liquor  in  any  municipality 
shall  be  granted  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  authorities,  is  iiot  self- 
executing,  and  is  operative  only 
when  there  is  a  law  in  force  con- 
ferring such  jurisdiction  in  spec- 
ified instances  on  the  court.  State 
V.  Harden,  62  W.  Va.  313;  58  S. 
E.  715;  <)0  S.  E.  394.  Such 
clause  will  not  be  construed 
as  to  deny  the  power  in 
the  Legislature  t(j  withhold 
or  take  from  the  ..power  to  grant 
or  refuse  licenses;  for  that  ren- 
ders the  word  "regulating"  use- 
less for  any  purposes.  State  v. 
Harden,  supra. 

A  statute  providing  that  no  li- 
cense shall  be  issued  if  a  majority 
of  the  voters  in  the  township 
remonstrate  against  its  issuance, 
does  not  violate  the  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  providing  that  all 
judicial  powers  shall  be  vested 
in  the  courts.  Hoop  v.  Affleck, 
162   Ind.   564;    70   N.   E.  978. 


(§133  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  198 

Sec.  133.    Taxes  and  fees. 

It  is  no  longer  a  quesaon  of  doubt  that  the  State  may 
not  only  levy  a  tax  against  intoxicating  liquors  and  the 
property  used  in  connection  with  their  sale,  but  also  upon  the 
liquor  business,  whether  the  business  be  one  of  wholesale  or 
retail.  It  may  even  go  farther  and  declare  who  are  liquor 
dealers.-^  Not  only  is  this  true,  but  the  legislation  cannot 
he  held  unconstitutional  where  it  levies  a  lump  sum  upon 
each  person  engaged  in  selling  liquors,  on  the  ground  that 
it  violates  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  providing  for 
a  uniform  rate  of  taxation,  because  that  provision  relates 
to  the  general  levy  alone.  "An  excise  is  a  direct  tax; 
but,  in  this  case,  taxation  was  not  the  object  of  imposing 
it,  and  the  Legislature  was  not  bound  to  appropriate  its 
proceeds  to  any  object  for  which  the  State  is  forbidden  to 
raise  money  by  local  or  special  taxation.  It  was  imposed 
in  the  exercise  of  the  rightful  police  power  of  the  State, 
and  is  an  incident  of  a  legitimate  police  regulation.  Hence, 
it  is  not  within  the  prohibition  *  *  *  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, prohibiting  local  and  special  taxation  for  State  pur- 
poses."^- The  tax  may  be  levied  upon  the  sales,  although 
by  that  method  one  dealer  pays  more  tax  than  another. 
Such  was  the  case  with  the  "register"  or  "bell   punch" 

21  Indianapolis    v.    Bieler,     138  Carr   v.    State,   5   Tex.   App.    153; 

Ind.   40;   20  N.   E.   71)5;   Kiirth  v.  State  v.   Rock,  9   Tex.   309. 

iState,   87   Tenn.    134;    5    So.   593;  That     a     "dispensary"     law     is 

State    V.    Rouch     (Ohio),    25    N.  not    a   tax    law,   see    Farmville   v. 

E.    59;    Senior    v.    Ratterman,   44  Walker,    101    Va.    323;    43    S.    E. 

Ohio  St.  mi;   11  N.  E.  321;  Port-  558. 

wood  V.  Baskett,  {i4   Aliss.  213;    1  22  Thomasson   v.    State,    15   Ind. 

So.   105;   Emerick   v.  Indianapolis,  449;    Parsons    v.    People,    32    Col. 

118  Ind.  279;  20  X.  K.  795;  West-  221;    7G   Pac.   G&fi;    State  v.  Hud- 

inghausen  V.  People,  44  Mich.  265 ;  son,    78   Mo.    302;    Senior   v.   Rat- 

6  N.  W.  645;   Ex  parte  Marshall,  tcrman,   44    Ohio   St.   661;    11    N. 

64  Ala.  266;   Albrecht  v.  State,  8  E.   321;    Lovingston   v.    Board,  99 

Tex.   App.    216;    Hodgson   v.   New  111.    564;    Brown-Foreman    Co.    v. 

Orleans,    21    La.    Ann.    301;    Du-  Commomvealth       (Ky.),      101      S. 

Toch's  Appeal,  62  Pa.  491;   Stranb  W.  321;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  793;   Ken- 

V.   Gordon,   27    Ark.    625;     Harris  ny   v.  Harwell,   42   Ga.  416;    Boh- 

V.  State,  4  Tex.   App.   131;    Ixtng-  ler     v.     Schneider,     49     Ga.     195; 

ville   V.   State,   4  Tex.    App.    312;  Brown  v.  State,  73  Ga.  38. 


J  99  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  133 

law  of  Texas,  which  was  held  valid.-'  Tha  State  may 
•constitutionally  make  it  a  penal  offense  lor  a  failure  to  pay 
the  tax  ;■*  and  may  authorize  its  usual  tax  collecting  officers 
to  collect  the  tax.-^  The  tax  must  not,  however,  discrim- 
inate against  the  citizens  or  products  of  other  States.-®  A 
tax  upon  the  keeper  of  a  brewery  is  authorized  by  a  provi- 
sion of  the  Constitution  permitting  a  tax  to  be  levied  and 
an  income  tax  imposed  on  all  persons,  occupations,  trades 
and  callings.-^  The  State  may  impose  a  tax  upon  distilled 
spirits  in  United  States  bonded  warehouses.-*  But  a  tax 
cannot  be  levied  upon  beer  manufactured  for  sale  within 
the  State  if  beer  manufa'ctured  for  sale  without  the  State  is 
exempted  from  it.-"  And  an  inspection  fee  cannot  be  de- 
manded for  inspecting  liquors  manufactured  for  sale  within 
the  State  while  no  inspection  or  foe  is  required  for  those 
manufactured  within  for  sale  without  the  State.^°  The 
State  may  delegate  to  municipalities  the  power  to  levy  a 
tax  on  dealers  in  intoxicating  liquors,  such  a  law  not  in- 
fringing that  provision  of  the  Constitution  wherein  the 
power  of  taxation  is  given  to  the  Legislature.^^  It  may 
even  declare  the  tax  a  lien  upon  the  property  of  the  dealer.'^ 
or  lessor.^'    A  statute  assess-ing  a  tax  on  liquors  against  the 

23  Albrecht  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  28  Thompson   v.    (Commonwealth, 

216;    Napier    v.    Hodges,    31    Tex.  123  Ky.  302;  94  S.  W.  &54;  29  Ky. 

287;    State    v.    Volkman,    20    La.  L.   Rep.   705;   Rosenfield  Bros.  Co. 

Ann.  585.  v.  Commonwealth    ( Ky. ) ,   29   Ky. 

24Tonella  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  L.   Rep.    1179;    96   S.   W.   134. 

325;    Longville    v.    State,    4    Tex.  29  State  v.  Bengsch,  170  IMo.  81, 

App.  312.  70  S.  W.  710. 

25Adler   v.    Whitbeck,    44    Ohio  so  state   v.    Eby,    170    :Mo.   497; 

St.  53-9;   9  N.  E.  672.  71   S.   W.  52. 

26  Tiernan  v.  Rinker,  102  U.  S.  3i  United  States  Distillinrr  Co.  v. 
123;  Welton  v.  Missouri,  91  U.  S.  Chicago,  112  111.  19;  IN.  E.  166. 
275 ;  Walling  v.  Michigan,  1 16  U.  32  Newton  v.  McKay  ( Iowa ) , 
-S.  446;  6  Sup.  Ct.  454;  Lyng  v.  102  N.  W.  827;  Bolton  v. 
Michigan,  136  U.  S.  161;  10  Sup.  McKay  (Iowa),  102  V.  W.  1131; 
Ct.  725 ;  Schmidt  v.  Indianapolis,  Carstairs  v.  Cochran,  95  Md.  4'88 ; 
168  Ind.  631;  80  N.  E.  632;   Peo-  52  Atl.  601. 

pie  V.  Lyng,   74  Mich.  579;    42  N.  3.!  Anderson  v.  Brawstir,  4 1  01»io 

W.  139.  St.  576;  9  N.  E.  683. 

27  State     V.     Volkman,    20     La. 
Ann.  &85. 


§133 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


200 


person  having  them  in  his  possession,  requiring  him  to  pay 
the  tax,  and  giving  him  a  lien  on  the  liquor  for  the  amount 
he  pays,  is  valid  under  a  provision  of  the  Constitution  de- 
claring that  every  person  holding  property  in  the  State 
should  contribute  to  a  public  tax  according  to  his  actual 
worth.  It  is  a  tax  on  the  owners  of  the  property  and  not  a 
tax  on  the  property  itself  or  on  the  possessor  of  the  liquors, 
he  being  merelv  the  agent  of  the  State  to  collect  the  tax.^* 


34  Carstairs  v.  Cochran,  95  Md. 
488;  52  Atl.  601. 

See  Parsons  v.  People,  32  Col. 
221;  76  Pac.  666,  where  $25  li- 
cense fee  per  annum  was  construed 
to  he  an  "annual"  tax. 

It  is  no  objection  that  the 
taxes  are  not  assessed  according 
to  the  business  transacted.  Young- 
blood  V.  Sexton,  32  Mich.  406; 
nor  is  it  an  objection  that  the 
statute  is  in  conflict  with  the 
constitutional  provision  for  a  uni- 
form rate  of  taxation.  Straub  v. 
Gordon,  27  Ark.  625;  Brown  y. 
Chicago,  110  111.  186;  Burlington 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  31  Iowa  102; 
Palmouth  v.  Watson,  5  Bush  660; 
Ash  V.  People,  1 1  Mich.  347 ;  John- 
son V.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St. 
491;  Commonwealth  v.  Byrne,  20 
Gratt.   165. 

If  the  apparent  scope  of  the  li- 
cense law  is  not  to  prohibit  the 
sale  of  liquors,  but  to  regulate  it, 
with  a  view  of  obtaining  a  reve- 
nue, it  is  not  constitutional  on  tlie 
ground  that  it  abridges  the  right 
of  citizens  in  the  pursuit  of  their 
employment.  In  re  Bickerstafl",  70 
Cal.   35;    11    Pac.    303. 

The  Ohio  "Dow"  liquor  law  was 
sustained  on  the  theory  that  it 
was  a  revenue  measure  and  not  a 
license  measure,  the  Constitution 
of     that    State     prohibiting     the 


granting  of  licenses.  Rayman 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Brister,  179  U.  S. 
445;  21  Sup.  Ct.  201;  45  L.  Ed. 
269;  affirming  92  Fed.  28;  Adler 
V.  Whitbeck,  44  Oliio  St.  539;  9 
jST.  E.  '672;  Anderson  v.  Brewster, 
44  Ohio  St.  576;  9  N.  E.  683. 
Earlier  statute  invalid.  State  v. 
Sinks,  42  Ohio  St.  345.  See  also 
to  the  same  effect  Youngblood  v. 
Sexton,  32  Mich..  406;  20  Am. 
Rep.  0i54 ;  People  v.  Lyng,  74 
Mich.  579;    42  N.  W.   131). 

A  statute  of  South  Dakota  pro- 
vided for  an  annvial  license  fee  of 
$400,  the  license  year  beginning 
Julj^  1st.,  to  be  paid  the  county 
treasurer,  or  a  pro  rata  sum  if 
the  license  be  granted  after  July 
1st.  The  statute  required  the  ap- 
plicant for  a  license  to  file  a  bond, 
allowed  the  city,  town  or  town- 
ship to  levy  and  collect  an  addi- 
tional license  fee,  to  be  paid  be- 
fore the  applicant  began  business. 
A  license  could  be  refused  if  the 
authorities  deemed  him  an  unfit 
person,  in  which  event  his  money 
was  returned  on  a  warrant  issued 
by  the  Board  of  County  C-ommis- 
sioners.  The  fees  paid  the  coun- 
ty treasurer  were  placed  by  him 
to  the  credit  of  the  county's  gen- 
eral fund,  and  of  each  license 
fee  received  he  was  renuird  to 
"transmit  the  sum  of  $150  to  the 


201 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES. 


§134 


Sec.  134.    Taxes  must  be  uniform. 

It  is  axiomatic  in  constitutional  law  that  taxes  must  be 
uniform  and  not  discriminatory.^^  A  law  taxing  all  of  a 
class  alike  is  valid,  though  it  taxes  those  of  another  class  at 
a  different  rate.  Thus,  a  law  taxing  all  liquor  dealere  within 
five  miles  of  a  town  at  one  price  and  those  at  wayside  inns 
at  less  is  valid,  because  each  forms  a  distinct  class.^*'  But 
where  a  statute  levied  an  annual  tax  of  $25  on  all  liquor 
dealers,  and  provided  that  no  one  should  engage  in  selling 
liquor  without  obtaining  the  written  consent  of  two-thirds 
of  all  the  bona  fide  residents  within  three  miles  of  the  place 
where  the  sales  were  to  be  made,  and  then  made  it  discretion- 
ary with  the  licensing  board  to  issue  a  license,  it  was  held 
that  the  statute  was  not  general  and  of  a  uniform  operation 
throughout  the  State,  and  was,  therefore,  unconstitutional.^^ 


State  Treasurer,"  to  be  credited 
to  the  general  fund  of  the  State. 
It  was  held  that  the  statute  was 
a  police  regulation,  and  the  li- 
cense fee  a  tax  within  the  provi- 
sion of  the  Constitution  requiring 
uniformity  in  taxation.  State  v. 
Buechler,  10  S.  D.  156;  7'2  N.  VV. 
114. 

Under  a  statute  authorizing  a 
city  "to  raise  revenue  by  levying 
and  collecting  a  license  tax  on 
any  occupation  or  business,"  and 
empowering  it  "to  license,  regulate 
and  prohibit"'  liquor  sales  and  the 
amount  to  be  paid  for  licenses,  a 
city  can  both  impose  an  occupa- 
tion tax  upon  liquor  dealers  and 
exact  a  license  fee,  but  it  cannot 
compel  the  payment  of  the  occ\i- 
pation  tax  before  it  will  issue  a 
license.  State  v.  Bennett,  19  Nob. 
191;   26  N.  W.  714. 

Under  a  power  to  license  a  city 
cannot  levy  a  tax.  Du  Boi:^t  )wn 
V.  Rochester,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Btp. 
442. 

Where   a   Constitution   provided 


that  articles  manufactured  of  the 
produce  of  the  State  should  not 
be  taxed  except  for  inspection  fees, 
but  gave  the  Legislature  power 
to  tax  "privileges"  as  it  saw  tit, 
it  was  held  that  a  tax  might  be 
imposed  upon  a  liquor  dealer, 
though  he  sold  liquor  manufac- 
tured out  of  the  products  of  the 
State.  Kurth  v.  State,  S6  Tenn. 
134;    5   S.  W.   593. 

A  statute  providing  for  the  ar- 
rest of  a  liquor  dealer  who  does 
not  pay  his  tax  and  the  sheriff 
can  find  no  property  to  levy  up- 
on, is  valid.  'Commonwealth  v. 
Byrne,  20  Gratt.   165. 

35  Bohler  v.  Schneider,  49  Ga. 
195;  Smith  v.  State,  90  Ga.  133; 
15  S.  E.  682.  See  Richland  Co.  v. 
Richland  Center,  59  Wis.  591;  18 
N.  W.  497;  Thomasson  v.  State, 
15    Ind.   449. 

36  Territory  v.  Connell,  2  Ariz. 
339;    16  Pac.  209. 

37  Smith  v.  State,  90  Ga.  123; 
15  S.  E.  682. 


§  134  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  202 

A  tax  of  one  amount  to  sell  generally  and  another  amount 
to  sell  malt  liquors  is  valid,  even  though  the  Constitution 
provides  that  taxes  on  "liquor  dealers"  shall  be  uniform  as 
to  the  class  on  which  they  operate. ^^  So  a  tax  on  persons  of 
one  amount  on  those  dealing  in  distilled  liquors  on  land  and 
another  amount  on  persons  following  like  occupations  on 
■steamboats  is  valid.'^"  Still,  in  the  same  State,  a  tax  regu- 
lated by  the  amount  of  business  done  has  been  held  in- 
valid;*" while  in  two  other  States  practically  the  same  kind 
of  tax  has  been  held  valid. *^  A  statute  authorizing  cities 
to  levy  a  tax  on  the  occupation  of  liquor  selling  is  not 
illegal  because  the  State  does  not  levy  a  tax  on  other  occu- 
pations."*" So  one  tax  may  be  levied  upon  breweries  and  dis- 
tillers and  another  on  saloons.^^  So  a  statute  imposing  a  tax 
on  wholesalers  but  excepting  manufacturers,  is  valid.**  The 
fact  that  a  statute  enables  one  county  to  levy  the  tax  in  a 
certain  amount  and  another  county  in  another  amount  does 
not  render  the  statute  invalid.*^  Nor  is  a  tax  on  the  occu- 
pation of  selling  liquor  void  because  it  must  be  paid  in 
advance  and  a  license  obtained  to  sell,  while  on  other  occu- 
pations the  tax  is  payable  only  quarterly  and  no  license 
required.*'^  Nor  is  a  statute  unconstitutional  which  requires 
a  State  officer  to  secure  registrars  of  sales  of  liquor,  and 
providing  that  he  shall  first  supply  the  cities  of  the  State, 
and  liquor  sellers  therein  must  purchase  and  use  them.*'^ 

38  Tiernan  v.  Harrison,  109  111.  a  levy  that  they  are  not  consulted 
■593;  Adler  v.  Whitbeek,  44  Ohio  in  their  levy.  Youngblood  v.  Sex- 
St.  539;  9  N.  E.  672.  ton,    32    Mich.    406;    20   Am.    Eep. 

39  Kaliski  v.  Grady,  25  La.  Ann.  654. 

576.  43  Adler    v.    Whitbeek,    44    Ohio 

40  East    Feliciana    v.    Gurth,    26       St.  539 ;   9  N.  E.  672. 

La,   Ann.   140;    State  v.  Rolle,  39  44  Senior  v.  Ratterman,  44  Ohio 

La.   Ann.   991;    31    Am.   Rep.   234.  St.    661;    11    N.   E.  321;    affirming 

41  Marxhouser  v.  Oommon-  17  Wkly.  L.  Bull.  115;  Fahey  v. 
wealth,  29  Gratt.  863;  Albrecht  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  146;  11  S.  W. 
State,   8   Tex.   App.   215;    34   Am.  108;    11   Am.   St.   182. 

Rep.    737 ;    Helfrick    v.    Common-  45  Fahey  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App. 

wealth,   29   Gratt.   844;    Gaiocchio  146;    11    S.   W.    108;    11    Am.  St. 

V.   State,   9   Tex.   App.   387.  182. 

42  Holberg    v.    Macon,    55    Miss.  4o  Fahoy    v.   State,   supra. 

112.    It  is  not  a  valid  objection  to  4-  Helfrick      v.     Commonwealth, 

a  statute  requiring  cities  to  make       29  Gratt.  844. 


203  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  135 

Sec.    135.    Bell-pimch    law  —  Uniformity  —  Discriminating 
practice. 

In  some  of  the  States  there  is  v*-hat  is  known  as  the 
"Bell-punch  Law,"  which  is  a  device  for  registering-  the 
number  of  sales  made  by  a  retail  liquor  dealer,  and  is  much 
like  the  ordinary  cash  register  in  common  use  by  other  retail 
merchants.  They  are  used  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
the  amount  of  tax  to  be  paid  by  such  liquor  dealers  for  the 
privilege  of  conducting  their  business.  These  laws  have  been 
sustained  against  attacks  made  on  the  ground  that  they  were: 

(1)  unequal  and  lacked  uniformity  in  a  constitutional  sense; 

(2)  as  being  an  unjust  and  partial  discrimination  against  liquor 
dealers  in  the  cities.  As  to  the  ground  of  inequality  and  want  of 
uniformity  of  taxation,  the  court  in  the  case  first  cited  said : 
"Viewed  in  its  twofold  aspect,  the  law  in  question  is  free 
from  objection  on  this  account.  It  levies  a  specific  occupa- 
tion tax  of  $250  on  every  dealer  in  the  State,  exempting  no 
person  or  section  from  its  operation,  and  requires  every 
dealer  alike  to  pay  the  tax  as  a  prerequisite  to  his  selling, 
and  then  it  provides  that  after  a  certain  arnount  of  sales 
have  been  made,  lays  an  additional  burden  on  those  of  the 
class  whose  prosperity  in  business  best  enables  them  to  bear 
it."'*^  As  to  the  second  ground,  the  Virginia  court  said: 
"Absolute  equality  and  justice  are  unattainable  in  tax  pro- 
ceedings. The  most  that  can  be  done  is  to  approximate  them 
as  near  as  possible.  It  has  been  repeatedly  held  by  this 
court  that  the  provisions  requiring  equality  and  uniformity 
of  taxation,  apply  onlj^  to  a  direct  tax  on  property,  and  not 
to  license  taxes,  which  do  not  admit  of  a  tax  strictly  equal 
and  uniform  in  the  sense  contended  for.  But,  if  it  be  eon- 
ceded  that  the  rule  must  apply  to  all  subjects,  yet  it  can 
only  be  applied  as  far  as  practicable.  If  a  ^ven  subject  be 
only  susceptible  of  a  modified  application  of  the  principle, 
it  must  receive  this  and  not  "be  rejected,  because  the  rule 
cannot  be  applied  with  perfect  precision  to  its  whole  extent 
in  all  its  results."  *^    In  Texas,  it  was  held  that  under  such  a 

48  Albrecht  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  *^  Helfrick  v.  Commonwealth,  29 

216;  34  Am.  Rep.  737.  Gratt.    (Va.)   S44. 


§  130  iKAPFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  204 

law  a  defendant  could  not  be  convicted  upon  an  indictment 
charging  him  Avith  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  without 
turning  the  crank  of  the  register  if  the  evidence  showed  that 
the  sale  was  made  by  his  bartender  in  his  absence,  and  that 
the  sale  was  made  without  any  complicity  on  the  part  of 
the  defendant.^"  And  in  Virginia  it  was  held  that  a  person 
selling  such  liquors  at  a  time  after  the  passage  of  the  register 
act,  which  was  declared  to  be  in  force  from  its  passage,  but 
before  the  registers  provided  for  in  the  act  were  supplied, 
was  not  liable  to  the  punishment  provided  for  by  the  act, 
but  only  the  punishment  imposed  by  the  former  revenue 
law^s."^ 

Sec.  136.     Consent  of  voters  to  license — Validity  of  statute 
requiring. 

It  is  a  maxim  of  constitutional  construction  that  the  power 
to  make  laws  cannot  be  delegated  by  the  Legislature  to  any 
other  body  or  authority.  The  maxim,  however,  is  not 
violated  when  municipal  corporations  are  vested  with  cer- 
tain powers  of  legislation.  This  is  so  because  it  is  proper 
that  such  corporations  should  have  the  right  to  make  regu- 
lations for  their  local  government,  and  that  they  are  sup- 
posed to  be  better  judges  than  the  Legislature  of  what  they 
need.  But  such  powers  as  are  conferred  upon  such  corpora- 
tions must  be  executed  by  the  municipality,  and,  so  far  as 
they  are  legislati\^e,  cannot  be  delegated  to  any  subordinate 
or  to  any  other  authority.  The  same  restriction  which  rests 
upon  the  Leg-islature  as  to  the  legislative  functions  con- 
ferred upon  it  by  the  Constitution,  rests  upon  a  municipal 
corporation  as  to  the  powers  granted  to  it  by  the  Legis- 
lature.^^ Accordingly,  the  principle  is  a  plain  one  that  the 
public  powers  or  trusts  devolved  by  law  or  charter  upon  the 
council  or  governing  body  to  be  exercised  by  it  when  and  in 
such  manner  as  it  shall  .judge  best,  cannot  be  delegated  to 

50  Gaiocchio  v.  Stale,  9  Tex.  52  Chicago  v.  Stratton,  I6'2  III. 
App.  387.  494;   45  N.  E.   116;   Swift  v.  Peo- 

51  Marxhonsen  v.        Common-  pie,   162  111.   534 ;    44  N.  E.  28. 
wealth.  2D  Gratt.  (Va.)   853. 


205  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  136 

others.^^  But  there  can  be  no  valid  objection  to  an  ordi- 
nance, which  confers  an  authority  or  discretion  as  to  its 
execution,  to  be  exercised  under  and  in  pursuance  to  the 
ordinance  itself.  Upon  this  theory  it  has  been  held  that  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  the  granting  of  license  to  keep  dram- 
shops within  a  described  portion  of  a  city  unless  the  appli- 
cant presents  a  petition  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  legal 
voters  of  that  portion  of  the  city,  is  not  invalid  as  delegating 
to  such  voters  the  power  to  license  dramshops,  and  that  such 
an  ordinance  is  not  invalid  as  permitting  arbitrary  dis- 
crimination between  applicants  because  one  may  be  able  to 
get  the  petition  and  another  cannot.  Voters  of  the  par- 
ticular locality  may  have  good  and  just  motives  for  signing 
or  refusing  to  sign  a  petition ;  and  it  will  not  be  presumed 
that  they  were  actuated  by  a  bad  rather  than  a  good  motive. 
They  may  be  willing  that  one  saloon  shall  be  kept  but,  be  op- 
posed to  more.  Having  signed  a  petition  for  one  it  would  not 
be  unjust  discrimination  against  the  second  applicant  to  refuse 
to  sign  his  petition.  They  might  be  willing  to  have  saloons 
in  a  particular  part  of  the  district  but  not  in  others.  Cer- 
tainly it  would  not  be  discrimination  to  sign  the  petition  of 
one  for  the  unobjectionable  locality  and  refuse  to  sign  for 
the  other.^^  So  a  statute  prohibiting  the  issuance  of  a  license 
to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  at  any  particular  place  if  the 
•owners  of  the  greater  part  of  the  land  lying  within  two 
hundred  feet  of  such  place  object,  is  not  unconstitutional, 
not  depriving  the  applicant  for  a  license  of  his  property 
without  due  process  of  laAV."'"^  Likewise  a  statute  and  an 
ordinance  passed  in  pursuance  thereof,  forbidding  the 
issuance  of  a  license  to  anyone  for  a  particular  place  unless 
upon  the  petition  of  a  majority  of  the  property  or  house 
holders  within  three  hundred  feet  of  such  place  is  valid,  and 
is  not  void  on  the  ground  that  the  statute  and  ordinance 
confer  arbitrary  powers  upon  such  property  or  house  holders 

■"3  1  Dillon  on  Munic.  'Corp.,  4tli  55  American      Woolen      Co.      v. 

ed.,   Sec.  96.  Smithfield,   2.8  R.   I.   546;    68   Atl. 

54  Swift  V.  People,  1 62  111.  534;  719;    Green    v.    Smith,    111    Iowa  • 

44   N.   E.    52i8;    30   L.   R.   A.   470;  183;   82  N.  W.  448. 
reversing  60  111.   App.   395. 


§  137  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  206 

aud  the  city  council  to  refuse  to  grant  applications  for 
licenses  in  particular  neighborhoods.^"  So  a  Federal  statute 
prohibiting  a  distillery  within  six  hundred  feet  of  a  reictify- 
ing  establishment  is  valid,  not  being  an  undue  interference 
with  either  the  disposition  or  use  of  property.^^  In  a  Cali- 
fornia case  it  was  said  upon  this  question :  "It  is  well  settled 
that  the  governing  power  may  prohibit  the  manufacture  and 
traffic  in  liquor  altogether,  provided  only  that  it  does  not 
interfere  with  interstate  commerce.  Aud  if  the  governing 
power  can  prohibit  a  thing  altogether,  it  can  impose  such 
conditions  upon  its  existence  as  it  pleases. "^^  In  a  lower 
Federal  court  the  California  ordinance  was  held  unconstitu- 
tional,^^ but  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  it 
valid.*"^  So  a  statute  is  valid  which  requires  the  applicant 
to  first  procure  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  all  male  per- 
sons over  twenty-one  years  of  age  in  the  city,  district  or 
town,  and  all  female  persons  over  eighteen  years  of  age 
within  such  city,  district  or  town ;  and  it  cannot  be  success- 
fully urged  that  it  is  unconstitutional  because  females  are 
not  voters.*'^ 

Sec.  137.    Assent  of  neighbors  may  be  required. 

A  statute  or  municipal  ordinance  regulating  the  'carrying 
on  of  a  business  harmless  in  itself  and  useful  to  the  com- 
munity violates  the  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  if  it  makes 

56  New  Orleans  v.  Macheca,  112  eo  Crowley  v.  Cliristensen,  137 
La.  559;   36  So.  747;  citing  Crow-       U.   S.   86;    11   Sup.    Ct.    13. 

ley  V.  Christensen,  137  U.  S.  86;  A  statute  is  valid  which  forbids 
11  Sup.  Ct.  13;  34  L.  Ed.  6'20;  the  granting  of  a  license  if  a  ma- 
New  Orleans  v.  Smythe,  11<6  La.  jority  of  the  voters  in  the  dis- 
086;  41  So.  33.  trict   for   which   it   is   applied   for 

57  Mason  v.  Rollins,  2  Biss.  99 ;  shall  remonstrate  against  its  is- 
Fed.  Gas.  No.  9^252.  suance.     Hoop  v.  Affleck,   162  Ind. 

58  Ex  parte  Christensen,  85  Cal.  5f>4 ;  70  N.  E.  978 ;  Cain  v.  Allen, 
208;  24  Pac.  747.  168    Ind.   8;    79   N.    E.   201,   896; 

50 /n    re    Christensen,    43  Fed.  Regadanz  v.  Haines,  168  Ind.  140; 

243.     The  court  relied  upon  Yick  79  N.  E.  352. 

Wo   v.    Hopkins,    118   U.    S.  356;  oi  Rohrbacher     v.     Jackson,     51 

G  Sup.  Ct.   1069.  Miss.  73'5. 


207  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES.  §  137 

arbitrary  and  unjust  discriminations  against  some  of  those 
who  may  be  engaged  in  it.  But  a  statute  or  municipal  ordi- 
nance which  requires  all  retail  liquor  dealers  to  procure  a 
license,  and  makes  it  an  offense  to  retail  intoxicating  liquors 
without  such  license,  and  at  the  same  time  forbids  any  such 
license  to  be  issued  unless  the  written  consent  of  a  'certain 
number  of  persons  is  obtained  does  not  violate  such  amend- 
ment. The  sale  of  such  liquors  by  retail  and  in  small  quan- 
tities may  be  absolutely  prohibited  or  regulated  by  State 
and  municipal  legislation,  without  violating  the  Constitution 
or  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  provided  such  legislation 
does  not  conflict  with  interstate  commerce.  This  is  so  be- 
cause the  business  of  retailing  intoxicating  liquors  is  one 
that  is  hurtful  to  society.  "By  the  general  concurrence  of 
€very  civilized  and  Christian  community,  there  are  few 
•sources  of  crime  and  miserj'-  to  society  equal  to  the  dram- 
shop, where  intoxicating  liquors  in  small  quantities,  to  be 
dnmk  at  the  time,  are  sold  ind\scriminately  to  all  parties 
applying.  The  statistics  of  everv  State  show  a  greater 
amount  of  crime  and  misery  attributable  to  the  use  of  ardent 
spirits  obtained  at  these  retail  saloons  than  to  any  other 
source.  The  sale  of  such  liquors  in  this  way  has,  therefore, 
been  at  all  times,  by  the  courts  of  every  State,  considered 
as  the  proper  subject  of  legislation.  Not  only  may  a  license 
be  exacted  from  the  keeper  of  the  saloon  before  a  glass  of 
his  liquor  can  be  disposed  of.  but  restriction  may  be  imposed 
as  to  the  class  of  persons  to  whom  they  may  be  sold,  and 
the  hours  of  the  day  and  the  days  of  the  week  on  which 
the  saloons  may  be  opened.  Their  sale  in  that  form  may  be 
absolutely  prohibited.  It  is  a  question  of  public  expediency 
and  public  morality,  and  not  of  Federal  law.  The  police 
power  of  the  State  is  fully  competent  to  regulate  the  busi- 
ness— to  mitigate  its  evils  or  to  suppress  it  entirely.  There 
is  no  inherent  right  in  a  citizen  to  sell  intoxicatinsr  liquors 
by  retail;  it  is  not  a  privilege  of  a  citizen  of  the  State  or  of 
the  United  States.  As  it  is  a  business  attended  with  damages 
to  the  community,  it  may.  as  already  stated,  be  entirely  pro- 
hibited or  be  permitted  under  such  conditions  as  will  limit  to 


§  138  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  208 

the  utmost  its  evils.  The  manner  and  extent  of  regulation 
rest  in  the  discretion  of  the  governing  authority.  *  *  * 
It  is  a  matter  of  legislative  will  only."  Where  the  political 
power  of  a  State  for  the  safety  of  its  people  takes  the  respon- 
sibility of  saying  that  a  certain  occupation,  for  instance, 
that  of  selling  intoxicating  liquors,  is  hurtful,  and  will  not 
be  permitted  in  its  boundaries  unless  certain  conditions  are 
complied  with,  the  occupation  so  stigmatized  is  no  longer  a 
right,  privilege  or  immunity  within  the  meaning  of  the  Con- 
stitution.*^^ 

Sec.  138.    Indiana  statute  remonstrances. 

In  Indiana,  local  option  was  formerly  secured  by  a  remon- 
strance. The  statute  under  which  this  is  accomplished  pro- 
vides that :  "If  three  days  before  any  regular  session  of  the 
board  of  commissioners  of  any  county,  a  remonstrance  in 
writing,  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters  of  any 
township  or  ward  in  any  city  situated  in  said  county,  shall 
be  filed  with  the  auditor  of  the  county  against  the  granting 
of  a  license  to  any  applicant  or  against  such  granting  to 
all  applicants  for  the  sale  of  spirituous,  vinous,  malt  or 
other  intoxicating  liquors,  under  the  law  of  the  State  of 
Indiana  with  the  privilege  of  allowing  the  same  to  be  drunk 
on  the  premises  where  sold  within  the  limits  of  said  town- 
ship, or  city  or  ward,  it  shall  be  unlawful  thereafter  for  such 
board  of  commissioners  to  grant  license  to  any  such  appli- 
cant therefor  during  the  period  of  two  years  from  the  date 
of  filing  such  remonstrance ;  or  if  such  remonstrance  shall 
be  against  all  applicants,  then  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  said 

62Yick  Wo   V.  H-pkins,   118   U.  528;    38   L.   R.   A.  470;    reversing 

S.  356;  6  Sup.  C't.  1069;   Purdy  v.  60  111.  App.  395;  In  re  Hoover,  30 

Suiton,    56    €al.    133;     Ex    parte  Fed.  Rep.  51;   States  v.  Ronan,  37 

Christensen,  85  Cal.  2C8;    24  Pac.  Fed.  117;  Kohn  v.  Melcher,  29  Fed. 

747;  State  v.  Brown,  19  Fla.  563;  433;  DeGrazier  v.  Stephens  (Tex), 

Groesch    v.    State,    42    Ind.    547;  105  S.  W.  9<)2;  State  v.  Settles,  34 

Rohrbacher  v.   Jackson,    51    Miss.  :Mont.  448;   87  Pac.  445;   see  Peo- 

735;    Crowley  v.   Christensen,   137  pie  v.  Haug,  68  Mich.  549;   37  N. 

U.   S.   86;    11   Sup.   Ct.   13;    Swift  W.  21. 
V.  People,   162  HI.  534;    44  X.   E. 


209  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES.  §  138 

commissioners  to  grant  a  license  to  any  applicant  therefor 
during  a  period  of  two  years  from  the  date  of  filing  .-^uch 
remonstrance  against  all  applicants.""''  It  has  been  neld 
that  this  statute  is  not  unconsiitutional  because  it  'confers 
upon  the  people  the  power  to  suspend  the  operation  of  the 
laws,  and  that  the  result  of  the  remonstrance  therein  pro- 
vided serves  as  a  restriction  upon  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
board  to  grant  a  license.  In  so  deciding  the  court  said: 
"This  provision  was  not  enacted  with  the  view  of  absolutely 
.prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquors  but  only  as  a  restriction  to 
the  granting  of  a  license,  and  thereby  better  restraining  the 
traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors.  All  laws  which  regulate  or 
restrict  the  sale  of  such  liquors,  by  imposing  burdens  or 
conditions  upon  the  business  are  in  their  nature  or  character 
to  an  extent,  at  least,  prohibitory.  An  absolute  prohibitory 
law  deprives  all  within  its  reach  from  engaging  in  the  busi- 
ness; a  local  option  [law]  prohibits  all  within  a  given  locality 
from  selling  within  that  locality;  while  a  license  law  pro- 
hibits all  within  the  State,  who  have  not  obtained  a  license, 
from  engaging  in  the  business  of  retailing  intoxicating 
liquors.  Each  of  these  is  a  restriction  upon  the  common 
law  right  of  the  individual  citizen.  Acting  upon  the  just 
assumption  that  the  restricted  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
results  in  much  evil,  and  that  it  is  detrimental  to  society, 
the  lawmaking  power  of  each  State  in  the  Union  has,  in  the 
exercise  of  its  police  power,  assumed  to  control,  regulate  or 
prohibit  the  business,  as  seemed  to  it  best."*'*  Also  that  it  is 
not  unconstitutional  as  being  class  legislation,  since  all 
applicants  under  the  statute  are  subject  to  the  same  condi- 
tion, and  are  granted  or  refused  license  upon  the  same 
terms.**^ 

63  Acts   (Ind.)    1905,  p.  7.  Ind.  8;   79  N.  E.  201,  896;   Rega- 

64  Welsh  V.  State,  126  Ind.  71;  danz  v.  Haines,  168  Ind.  140;  79 
25  N".  E.  883;  State  v.  Gerhart,  N.  E.  352;  Boomershine  v.  Cline, 
145  Ind.  439;  44  N.  E.  469.  159  Ind.  500;   65  N.  E.  513.     See 

65  Hoop  V.  Affleck,  162  Ind.  564;  also  Green  v.  Smith,  111  Iowa, 
70  N.  E.  978;   Cain  v.  Allen,   168  183;  82  N.  W.  448. 


§  139  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  210 

Sec.  139.    Sales  to  minors,  dninkards,  insane  persons  and 
Indians. 

Under  the  general  police  power  a  State  may  prohibit  sales 
or  gifts  to  minors;*"'  or  to  an  inmate  of  an  orphan's  home 
except  upon  written  permission  of  the  superintendent  of  the 
home  f'^  or  to  students  of  institutions  of  learning  f^  or  to 
persons  of  intemperate  habits  f^  or  to  an  insane  person 
without  the  consent  of  his  parent  or  guardian  ;^°  and  a  statute 
requiring  a  bond  giving  a  cause  of  action  upon  it  for  a  viola- 
tion of  such  statute  is  valid/^  A  statute  may  even  go  so  far  as 
to  make  it  an  offense  to  permit  a  minor  to  visit  or  stay  in  a 
saloon,  upon  the  ground  that  it  keeps  from  him  the  tempta- 
tion to  drink."  So  Congress  may  prohibit  the  sale  or  gift 
of  liquor  to  an  Indian,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  regulation 
of  commerce  with  an  Indian  tribe ;"  and  a  State  statute  pro- 
hibiting a  sale  to  an  Indian  whether  he  has  or  has  not 
severed  his  tribal  relations,  and  whether  he  has  or  has  not 
become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by  complying  with  the 
provisions  of  the  United  States  "Land  and  Severalty  Act" 
of  1887,  is  valid.^* 

66  Allen  V.  State,  52  Ind.  486;  to  Kelly  v.  Burke,  132  Ala.  235; 
Altenburg   v.    Commonwealth,    126       31  So.  512. 

Pa.   St.   '602;    17    Atl.    799;    Gold-  7i  Giozza  v.  Tiernan,   148   U.  S. 

sticker  V.  Ford,  69  Tex,  385 ;  Leisy  657;    13  Sup.  Ct.   721;   37   L.   Ed. 

V.  Hardin,  135  U.  S.   100;    10  Sup.  59-9. 

Ct.  681;  34  L.  Ed.  128;   Common-  t2  Goldsticker   v.    Ford,   &2   Tex. 

wealth   V.   Zelt,    138   Pa.    St.   615;  385. 

21  Atl.  7;  27  VVkly.  X.  C.  131;   11  "United  States   v.    Holliday,   3 

L.   R.  A.  602;   Stephens  v.  State,  Wall.    407;    United    States    v.    4-3 

47  Tex.  Cr.   App.  604;    85  S.   W.  Gallons  of  Whisky,  93  U.  S.   188. 

797 ;  Lodano  v.  State,  25  Ala.  64.  See    also    American    Fur    Co.    v. 

67  State  V.  Barringer,  110  N.  C.  United  States,  2  Pet.  358; 
525;   14  S.  E.  781.  United      States      v.      Shaw     Mux, 

68  Peacock  v.  Limburger,  95  Tex.  2  Sawy.  364 ;  Nelson  v.  United 
258;  67  S.  W.  518.  States,   30   Fed.    112. 

69  Leisy  v.  Hardin,  supra;  Com-  74  state  v.  Wise,  70  Minn.  99; 
monwealth  v.   Zelt,   supra;  Alten-  72  N.  W.  i843. 

berg  V.  Commonwealth,  126  Pa.  St.  Under  a  statute  entitled  "An  act 

602;   17  Atl.  799;  24  Wkly.  N.  C.       to  regulate  the  sale  of   intoxicat- 
145.  ing  liquor"  may  be  inserted  a  pro- 


211  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §§  140,  141 

Sec.  140.    Limiting  sales  to  certain  purposes. 

The  State  in  limiting  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor  to 
sales  made  for  medicinal,  chemical,  mechanical  or  sacra- 
mental purposes,  does  not  exceed  its  powers;  and  a  statute 
thus  limiting  sales  for  such  purposes  is  contitutional,  and 
the  power  thus  exercised  is  within  the  scope  of  the  legisla- 
tive powers.'^"'  Limiting  sales  to  pure  wine  for  sacramental 
purposes  does  not  render  the  statute  void/'' 

Sec.  141.     Screens — Validity  and   enforcement   of   law  re- 
quiring. 

Several  of  the  States  have  adopted  what  is  known  as  the 
"Screen"  Law  which,  like  that  of  Indiana,  provides  that 
the  room  in  which  intoxicating  liquors  are  to  be  sold  at 
retail  under  a  license  issued  for  that  purpose  "shall  be  situ- 
ated upon  the  ground  lioor  or  basement  of  the  building 
where  the  same  are  sold,  and  in  a  room  fronting  the  street 
or  highway  upon  which  the  building  is  situated,  and  said 
room  shall  be  so  arranged,  either  with  window  or  glass  door, 

vision  prohibiting  sales  to  minors  Sheasley     (Kan.),     78    Pac.    997; 

and  drunkards.  Williams  v.  State,  Bowman     v.    State,    38    Tex.    Cr. 

48  Ind.  306:  State  V.  Adamson,  14  App.    14;    40    S.    \V.    7»6;    41    S. 

Ind.  296;    Thomasson  v.  State,   15  W.  635;    Columbus   v.   Schaerr,    5 

Ind.  449.  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  100. 

75  State    V.    Allmond,    2    Houst.  76  state    v.    Allmond,    2    Houst. 

(Del.)    612;   Kidd  v.  Pearson,  128  (Del.)   612;   Bowman  v.  State,  38 

U.  S.   1;   9  Sup.   Ct.  6;    32  L.  Ed.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  14;  40  S.  W.  796. 

.346;   Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  An   ordinance   limiting  sales   to 

€■23;    8  Sup.   Ct.  273;    31    L.   Ed.  sacramental,     chemical,     mechani- 

205;    affirming   2^9    Kan.    252;    44  cal    or    medicinal    purposes,    to  be 

Am.    Rep.   634 ;    Ray   v.   State,   47  made   by   druggists   wlio   were   re- 

Tex.  Cr.  App.  407;  83  S.  W.  1121;  quired  to  furn-'-h  the  city  clerk  a 

Durein  v.  State,  208  U.  S.  613;  28  written  statement  of  the  kind  and 

Sup.  Ct.  567;    50.   L.   Ed.  — ;    af-  quality    thereof,    the    purchasers' 

firming  70  Kan.   1 ;    78  Pac.   152 ;  names   and   date   of   sale,   verified 

80  Pac.   987;    Beer   Co.  v.   Massa-  by   the   oath    of   every   servant   in 

chusetts,  97   U.  S.   25;   21   L.   Ed.  the   employ   of   the   druggist,   was 

929 ;  /»i  re  Prohibition  Amendment  held    to    be    an    invasion    of    the 

Cases,  24  Kan.  700 ;  State  v.  Bren-  sanctity   of    private    business    and 

nen,     25     Conn.     278;      State     v.  void.      Clinton    v.    State,    58    111. 

Wheeler,    25   Conn.   290;   State  v.  102. 


§  141  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  212 

as  that  the  whole  of  said  room  may  be  in  view  from  the 
street  or  hig-hway,  and  no  blinds,  screens  or  obsiructions  to 
the  view  shall  be  arranged,  erected  or  placed  so  as  to  pre- 
vent the  entire  view  of  said  room  from  the  street  or  high- 
way upon  which  the  same  is  situated  during  such  days  and 
hours  when  the  sales  of  such  liquors  are  prohibited  by  law. ' '  '^ 
Such  a  statute  is  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  police  power 
of  the  State  and  does  not  conflict  with  a  constitutional  pro- 
vision seicuring-  "the  persons,  houses,  papers  and  possessions 
of  every  person  from  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures," 
nor  with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  declaring  that,  "No  person  shall  be  de- 
prived of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of 
law. ' '  ''^  Nor  will  the  fact  that  the  law  does  not  define  what 
constitutes  an  obstruction  of  the  view,  invalidate  it/"  Even 
broader  legislation  than  this  has  been  sustained,  for  in 
Massachusetts,  a  statute  which  provided  that  no  person 
licensed  to  sell  spirituous  and  intoxicating  liquors  should 
maintain  or  permit  to  be  maintained,  upon  premises  used  by 
him  under  his  license  during  the  time  for  which  the  license 
■was  granted,  screens  or  blinds  which  would  interfere  with 
a  view  of  the  business  'conducted  upon  the  premises,  was 
held  valid  and  prosecutions  for  its  violation  sustained.®*^  If 
one  may  be  compelled  to  thus  conduct  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  in  open  view  of  the  public  without  violating 
the  provisions  hereinbefore  named,  then  no  good  reason  can 
exist  for  holding  that  such  provisions  would  be  violated  by 
a  statute  which  compels  the  seller  of  such  liquors  to  expose 
the  interior  of  his  building  where  sales  are  made  at  all  times 
when  by  the  law  he  is  forbidden  to  make  them.  The  pur- 
pose of  such  a  statute  is  to  remove  the  temptation  to  violate 
the  statute  on  the  forbidden  days,  and  to  make  it  easy  for 
an  officer  or  other  person  to  determine  whether  a  saloon  is 
doing  business  contrary  to  law.^^     Such  a  statute  includes 

77  Burns    R.    S.    1908,    §  8327.  so  Commonwealth     v.     Oostello, 

78  Robinson    v.    Hang,    71    Mich.        133   Mass.    192;    Commonwealth  v. 
38.  Casey,  134  Mass.  194. 

70  State  Y.  Doyle,  15  R.  I.  325;  si  Robinson   v.    Haug,    71    Mich. 

4   Atl.   764.  38;   46  N.  E.  941. 


213  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  141 

vendors  of  intoxicating  liquors  acting  under  licenses  granted 
before  as  well  as  those  licensed  after  its  passage.^-  The  sub- 
stantive part  of  the  offense  under  it  is  the  obstruction  of  the 
view  vO  all  parts  of  the  interior  of  the  room,  and  an  indict- 
ment for  a  violation  of  its  provisions  need  not  allege  that 
the  defendant  has  violated  the  conditions  of  his  license  or 
that  he  has  sold  intoxicating  liquors  in  violation  of  law.^^ 
And  where  the  statute  provides  in  addition  that  the  licensee 
must  permanently  close  all  entrances  to  the  licensed  prem- 
ises other  than  those  on  the  public  street  upon  which  they 
are  located,  it  will  be  violated  if  the  licensee  fails  to  close  a 
side  entrance  to  the  licensed  room.^*  And  it  has  been  held 
that  if  a  licensed  dealer  covers  one  of  several  windows  to 
the  room  in  which  he  is  doing  business  so  as  materially  to 
interfere  with  a  view  of  the  business  conducted  therein,  or 
of  the  interior  thereof,  it  is  a  violation  of  the  law,  although 
a  view  of  the  premises  can  at  the  same  time  be  obtained 
through  other  windows. ^^  And  likewise  it  has  been  held 
that  such  a  dealer  cannot  place  or  maintain  upon  the 
licensed  premises  a  curtain  which  interferes  with  a  view  of 
any  part  of  the  interior  of  the  same,  whether  such  part  is  used 
for  the  sale  of  liquor  or  not.^"  The  law  will  not  be  violated  by 
maintaining  a  partition  between  a  front  and  rear  room 
where  a  license  gives  authority  to  sell  in  both  of  such 
rooms,^^  but  in  such  case  it  will  be  violated  if  the  entrance 
from  the  front  to  the  rear  room  is  by  a  door  and  the  view 
of  that  door  is  hindered  by  screens  on  the  windows  of  the 
front  room.^^    The  fact  that  a  place  is  being  conducted  under 

82  Nelson  v.  State,  17  Ind.  App.  85  Ngig^^j  y  State,  17  Tnd.  App. 
403;  46  N.  E.  941;  Commonwealth  403;  48  N.  E.  941;  Commonwealth 
V.  Rourke,  141  Mass.  321;  6  N.  v.  McDonnoush,  150  Mass.  504; 
E.    383;    Commonwealth    v.    Saw-  22  N.  E.   112. 

telle,  150  Mass.  320;   23  N.  E.  -54.  86  Commonwealth    v.    Worcester, 

83  Commonwealth      v.      Costello,       141   Mass.  58;    6   N.  E.  700. 

133  Mass.   192;  Commonwealth  v.  st  Commonwealth  v.  Barnes,  140 

Auberton,    133    Mass.    404;    Com-  Mass.   447;    Shultz   v.    Cambridge, 

monwealth   v.  Gibbons,   134  Mass.  38  Ohio  St.  G59. 

197.  88  Commonwealth    v.    Kane,    143 

8*  Commonwealth     v.      Fernden,  Mass.  92, 
141  Mass.  28;  6  N.  E.  239. 


§  142         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  214 

and  by  authority  of  a  license  from  the  United  States  cannot 
be  made  a  defense  to  a  prosecution  for  a  violation  of  the 
"screen"  law;"^  nor  that  the  illegal  act  was  done  by  the 
liquor  seller's  servant  in  his  absence ;°°  nor  that  the  licensee 
was  not  in  fact  carrying  on  business  at  the  time  of  the  alleged 
violation. ^^  As  has  already  been  said  the  substantive  part  of 
the  offense  is  the  obstruction  of  a  view  to  the  interior  of  the 
licensed  premises.°- 

Sec.  142.     Sunday  laws — Municipal  ordinances. 

The  law  iixcs  the  day  recognized  as  the  Sabbath  Day  all 
over  Christendom,  and  that  day,  by  divine  injunction,  is  to 
be  kept  holy — "On  it  thou  shalt  do  no  work."  It  is  a  civil 
institution,  older  than  our  State  governments,  and  respected 
as  a  day  of  rest  by  their  Constitutions,  and  the  regulation 
of  its  observation  as  a  civil  institution  has  always  been  con- 
sidered to  be,  and  is,  within  the  power  of  the  State  Legis- 
lature as  much  as  any  other  regulation  or  law  which  has  for 
its  object  the  preservation  of  good  morals  and  the  peace  and 
good  order  of  society.  In  this  country  Christianity  is  not 
the  legal  religion  of  State  as  established  by  law;  but  this  is 
not  inconsistent  with  the  idea  that  it  is  in  fact  and  ever  has 
been  the  religion  of  the  people.  This  fact  is  everyrvhere 
prominent  in  all  our  civil  and  political  history,  and  has  been 
from  the  first,  recognized  and  acted  upon  by  the  people,  as 
well  as  by  constitutional  conventions,  by  Legislatures,  and 
by  courts  of  justice."''    The  authority  to  prohibit  the  sale  of 

89  state  V.  Mathis,  IS  Ind.  App.  tutional.      Washington    v.    Galla- 

608;   48  N.   E.  645;    State  v.  Ma-  gher,   7    Oliio   N.   P.  511;    5    Ohio 

this,  20   Ind.  App.  699;   48  K  E.  S.    &    C.    P.    Dec.    562.      See     late 

1109;     State    v.    Sleutz,    27    Ind.  case,    Bennett    v.    Pulaski     (Tenn. 

App.  557;   61  N.  E.  793.  Ch.   App.),   52  S.   W.   913;    47   L. 

00  Commonwealth  v.  Kelley,  140  R.    A.    278;     Meehan     v.     Board 

Mass.   441.  (X.  J.  L.),  70  Atl.  363;   73  N.J. 

»i  Commonwealth    v.    Auberton,  L.  382;   64  Atl.  689. 

133  Mass.  404;   Commonwealth  v.  93  Holy       Trinity       Church      v. 

Casey,    134   Mass.    194.  United    States,     143    U.    S.    457; 

92  Commonwealth  v.  Moore.   145  Frolichstein  v.  City  of  Mobile,  40 

Mass.  244.  Ala.  725;   Shover  v.  State,  6  Eng. 

A  screen  ordinance  held  consti-  (Ark.)    529;    Ex    parte    Andrews, 


215 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§142 


intoxicating  liquors  upon  Sunday,  or  any  other  day,  is  not 
only  constitutional  but  is  also  found  in  the  general  police 
power  of  the  State. =**  Since  the  Legislature  possesses  this 
constitutional  and  police  power  it  may  properly  delegate 
the  same  to  a  municipal  corporation,  and  an  ordinance  of  a 
city  passed  pursuant  to  such  power  conferred  upon  it  by  its 
charter,  requiring  that  every  saloon  and  restaurant,  and  the 
bar  of  every  tavern,  inn,  and  other  place  where  liquors  are 
sold  by  retail  shall  be  closed  during  Sunday  and  that  no 
person  shall  sell  for  money  or  in  any  manner  dispose  of  any 
intoxicating  liquor  within  the  limits  of  the  city  on  Sunday 
and  providing  that  any  person  guilty  of  violating  any  of 
the  provisions  of  the  ordinance,  shall,  upon  conviction 
thereof,  be  punished  by  fine  and  imprisonment,  will  not  be 
unconstitutional  and  may  be  enforced."''    Such  an  ordinance 


18  Cal.  679;  State  v.  McMalion,  53 
Conn.  411;  Hall  v.  State,  4  Hair. 
(Del.)  132;  Karswich  v.  Atlanta, 
44  Ga.  204;  Sanders  v.  State,  74 
Ga.  82;  Siebold  v.  People,  86  111. 
33 ;  Voglesong  v.  State,  9  Ind. 
113;  Thomasson  v.  State,  15  Ind. 
449;  Foltz  v.  State,  33  Ind.  215; 
Johna.s  v.  .State,  78  Ind.  332; 
State  V.  Hogrewer,  152  Ind.  652; 
Megowan  v.  Commonwealth,  2 
Met.  (Ky.)  3;  State  v.  Judge,  39 
La.  Ann.  132;  State  v.  Fearson, 
2  Md.  310;  Commonwealth  v. 
Moore,  145  Mass.  244;  People  v. 
Roby,  52  Mich.  577;  People  v. 
Bellet,  99  Mich.  151;  Brimhall  v. 
Van  Campen,  8  Minn.  13;  Elken 
V.  State,  63  Miss,  129;  State  v. 
Ambos,  20  Mo.  214;  State  v.  Huff- 
schmidt,  47  Mo.  73;  State  v.  Sin- 
nott,  15  Neb.  472;  Houtsch  v. 
Jersey  City,  29  N.  J.  L.  (5 
Dutch.)  316;  Lindenmiller  v. 
People,  3  Barb.  (N".  Y.)  548; 
Health  Department  v.  Trinity 
Church,    145    N.   Y.    32;    .State   v. 


Wooll,  SO  X.  C.  708;  Common- 
wealth V.  Naylor,  34  Pa.  St.  86; 
State  V.  Scharrer,  2  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  323;  Keller  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  App.  259;  Ihon  v.  Common- 
wealth, 31  Gratt.  (Va.)  887; 
State  V.  Wecker,  71  Wis.  577;  Ixk 
dano  V.  State,  25  Ala.  64. 

9*  Frolichstein  v.  Mobile,  40 
Ala.  725;  Ex  parte  Andrews,  18 
Cal.  678;  Ex  parte  Bird,  19  Cal. 
130;  Kurtz  v.  People,  83  Mich. 
279;  State  v.  Ludwig,  21  Minn. 
202;  State  v.  Ambs,  20  Mo.  214; 
,St.  Louis  V.  Cafferata,  24  Mo.  94; 
Lindenmiller  v.  People,  3  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  548;  Bloom  v.  Richards, 
2  Ohio,  387;  Specht  v.  Common- 
wealth, 8  Penn.  St.  312;  Hudson 
V.  Geary,  4  Pv.  I.  485;  State  v. 
Dolan,  13  Idaho,  693;  92  Pac. 
995;  Ex  parte  Jacobs,  13  Idaho, 
720;  92  Pac.  1003;  State  v.  Bott. 
31  La.  Ann.  663;  33  Am.  Rep. 
224. 

95  Mayor  v.  Rouse,  8  Ala.  515; 
Mayor    v.    Allaire,    14    Aia.    400: 


§142 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


216 


is  in  no  sense  an  attempt  to  enforce  the  observance  of  that 
day  as  a  religious  institution,  and  hence  is  not  repugnant  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Federal  and  State  Constitutions  for- 
bidding the  establishment  of  any  religion.  The  purpose  of 
such  an  ordinance  is  to  prevent  the  violation  of  the  laws  of 
the  State  as  well  as  preserve  a  public  respect  for  the  Lord's 
Day.^®  The  argument  that  such  an  ordinance  violates  the 
inherent  right  of  the  Jew  or  any  other  religious  denomina- 
tion to  observe  his  Sabbath,  which  is  the  last  instead  of  the 
first  day  of  the  week,  is  not  tenable.  He  is  left  the  absolute 
and  unrestrained  freedom  of  disposing  of  Saturday,  his 
Sabbath,  as  he  may  deem  proper,  or  to  worship  God  accord- 
ing to  the  dictates  of  his  own  conscience.  He  is  thereby  re- 
quired to  observe  the  Christian  Sabbath,  and  he  is  not 
checked  in  his  right  to  pursue  other  avocations,  but  is 
merely  restrained  from  pursuing,  on  that  day,  a  traffic  which 
in  its  results  may  interfere  with  the  absolute  right  and  the 
undeniable  privilege  of  others  to  observe  that  day  in  their 


Van  Buren  v.  Wells,  53  Ark.  368 
Hood  V.  Von  Glahm,  88  Ga.  405 
Littlejohn  v.  Stells,  123  Ga.  4r27 
SI  S.  E.  390;  Schwuchow  v.  Chi- 
cago, 68  111.  444;  Wragg  v.  Penn 
Township,  94  111.  11;  Levy  v. 
State,  6  Ind.  281;  Ambrose  v. 
State,  6  Ind.  351;  Williams  v. 
Warsaw,  60  Ind.  457;  Bloomfield 
V.  Trumble,  54  la.  399;  Rice  v. 
iState,  3  Kan.  135;  Megowan  v. 
Commonwealth,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  3; 
Kemper  v.  Commonwealth,  85  Ky. 
219;  Meriden  v.  Silverstein,  36 
La.  Ann.  912;  Schafer  v.  Mumma, 
17  Md.  331;  People  v.  Detroit,  82 
Mich.  471;  State  v.  Ludwig,  21 
Minn.  202;  St.  Louis  v.  Bentz, 
11  Mo.  61;  Brownville  v.  Cook,  4 
Neb.  101;  Howe  v.  Plainfield,  37 
ISr.  J.  L.  145;  Wood  V.  City,  14 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  428;  Brooklyn  v. 
Toynebee,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  282; 
Piqua  V.  Zimmerlin,  350  St.  507; 


Portland  v.  Schmidt,  13  Ore.  17; 
Wong  V.  Astoria,  13  Ore.  538; 
Charleston  v.  Benjamin,  2  Strob. 
(,S.  C.)  508;  State  v.  Bott,  31 
La.  Ann.  663;  34  Am.  Rep.  224; 
Greenwood  v.  State,  6  Baxt. 
(Tenn.)  409;  Gabel  v.  Houston, 
29  Te.x.  335;  Ex  parte  Douglass, 
1  Utah,  108;  Logan  v.  Buck,  3 
Utah,  301. 

96  State  V.  Bott,  31  La.  Ann. 
663;  State  v.  Ambs,  20  Mo.  214; 
Bloom  V.  Richards,  2  Ohio  St. 
387;  McGatrick  v.  Watson,  3 
Ohio  St.  566;  Cincinnati  v.  Rice, 
15  Ohio,  225;  Commonwealth  v. 
Wolf,  3  S.  and  R.  (Pa.)  50;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Fischer,  17  S.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  160;  Specht  v.  Common- 
wealth, -8  Penn.  St.  312;  Hudson 
V.  Greary,  4  R.  I.  485;  Nashville 
V.  Luck,  80  Tenn.  499;  Gabel  v. 
Houston,   29  Tex.   335. 


217  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  143 

own  manner,  with  peace  and  tranquillity,  and  without  inter- 
ference from  anyone  or  from  any  source.'-*'  The  Legislature 
may  make  it  an  offense  to  keep  a  saloon  open  on  Sunday, 
without  regard  to  the  transaction  of  business  or  making 
of  sales  in  it ;  ^^  and  it  may  make  the  keeping  open  of  a 
barroom  for  the  sale  of  liquors  one  offense,  and  the  act  of 
selling  another  offense,  or  each  sale  a  separate  and  distinct 
offense.'-*'*  So  a  statute  requiring  saloons  to  be  closed  during 
certain  hours  of  the  night  is  valid.^ 

Sec.  143.    Women  as  employes  and  visitors  in  saloons. 

A  statute  which  prohibits  the  employment  of  women  as 
waiters  or  conversationalists  in  places  where  intoxicating 
liquors  are  sold  is  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  police  powers 
of  the  State  and  is  upheld  by  the  courts.  Under  such  a 
statute  it  has  been  held  that  the  proprietor  of  such  a  pla)ce 
was  liable  for  a  violation  of  it,  where  the  evidence  showed 
that  immediately  after  the  enactment  of  the  statute  he  dis- 
charged his  female  employes  and  then  entered  into  a  part- 
nership with  them  to  continue  the  business  at  the  same 
place,  they  to  render  the  same  kind  of  service  after  their  dis- 
charge as  before,  the  court  saying  that  such  an  arrangement 
was  an  infraction  of  the  spirit  of  the  law.  In  that  case  it 
was  held  that  the  indictment  Avas  not  subject  to  be  quashed 
because  of  a  misjoinder  owing  to  the  fa'ct  that  it  charged 
the  employment  of  several  women  and  not  severally  each  of 
them;  also  that  the  indictment  need  not  show  that  neither 
of  such  employes  was  within  the  proviso  as  to  the  wife  and 
daughter  of  the  employer.-  It  has  also  been  held  that  an 
ordinance  of  a  municipal  corporation  which  makes  it  an 
offense  for  the  proprietor  of  a  place  where  intoxicating 
liquors   are   sold   to   employ  females   to   serve   his   customers 

97  state    V.    Bott.    31    La.    App.  o«  Commonwealth     v.     McCann, 

i6«3;    33   Am.   Rep.   224;    Town   of  (Ky.),    2D    Ky.    L.    Rep.    707;    M 

Minden     v.     >Solverstein,     36     La.  S.  W.  645. 

Ann.    912.  i  Heddericli    v.    State,    101    Ind. 

ssEx    parte    Brown     (Tex.     Cr.  564;  1  N.  E.  47;  51  Am.  Rep.  768. 

App.),  61   S.  W.  396.  2  Walter    v.    Commonwealth,   88 

Pa.   St.    157. 


§  143  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  218 

with  such  liquors  was  valid  where  the  Legislature  had  dele- 
gated to  such  corporation  the  power  to  regulate  such  places 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  corporation ;  and  that  such  an 
ordinance  does  not  conliict  with  any  provision  of  the  Federal 
Constitution ; "  and  in  Montana  it  has  been  held  that  a  law 
prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquors  in  any  place  where  women 
or  minors  are  employed  is  constitutional,  being  a  proper 
exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  State.*  But  in  California, 
where  the  Constitution  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  dis- 
qualified by  sex  from  pursuing  any  lawful  vocation,  it  has 
been  held  that  an  ordinance  forbidding  proprietors  of  drink- 
ing saloons  to  permit  any  female  to  be  employed  therein  was 
unconstitutional ;  ^  and  in  Idaho  it  has  been  held  that  an  ordi- 
nance was  unconstitutional  which  provided  that  it  shall  be 
unlawful  for  any  person  maintaining  any  saloon,  barroom, 
or  drinking  shop,  or  any  apartment  thereto  attached,  to  per- 
mit any  female  to  enter  therein.*'  But  a  statute  prohibiting 
the  issuance  of  a  license  to  anyone  who  has  employed  in  the 
past  females  as  waitresses  is  not  unconstitutional  as  an  ex 
post  facto  law,  not  being  an  unusual  law.'^  A  statute  pro- 
hibiting the  presence  of  women  in  public  saloons  after  mid- 
night is  not  unconstitutional ;  ^  and  under  the  provisions  of 
the  California  Constitution  above  referred  to,  it  has  been 
held,  in  a  later  decision,  that  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the 
sale  of  liquors  where  female  waitresses  are  employed  is 
valid.^  Nor  is  a  statute  invalid  that  fixes  the  license  fee  at  a 
higher  figure  for  places  where  females  act  as  bartenders, 
actresses,   dancers,   singers,   and  the  like.^°     Nor   one   for- 

3  Bergman  v.  Cleveland,  39  0.  7  Foster  v.  San  Francisco,  102 
St.  651;  People  v.  Case,  153  Mich.  Cal.  483;  37  Pac.  763;  41  Am.  St, 
98;   116  N.  W.  558.  194;  Ex  parte  Hayes,  98  Cal.  555. 

4  State  V.  Reynolds,  14  Mont.  » Ex  parte  Smith,  38  Cal.  702. 
383;  36  Pac.  449;  Ex  parte  Hays,  ^  Ex  parte  Hayes,  98  Cal.  555; 
»8  Cal.  555 ;   33  Pac.  337.  33    Pac.    337 ;    20    L.    R.    A.    701 ; 

s/n  re  Maguire,  57  Cal.  604;  Ex  parte  Smith  (Cal.),  33  Pac. 
40  Am.  Rep.   125.  338. 

estate    v.    Nelson     (Idaho),    67  ^o  Ex    parte    Felchin,    96    Cal, 

L.   R.   A.   808.      Contra.   Common-       .360;  31  Pac.  224;  31  Am.  St.  223. 
wealth   V   Pine    (Ky.),    94    S.    W. 
32;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  593. 


219  CONSTITLTIONALITV    Of    STATUTES.  §144 

l)idding  a  female  under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  to  re- 
main in  or  about  a  saloon,  even  though  it  except  from  the 
provisions  open  and  public  restaurants  or  dining-rooms,  that 
"being  a  classification  which  the  State,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
police  power,  can  make;  "  nor  can  such  a  statute  be  objected 
to  successfully  pn  the  ground  that  a  female  attains  her  age 
at  eighteen  instead  of  twenty-one ;  for  the  right  to  enter  and 
remain  in  a  saloon  is  not  one  of  the  equal  privileges  granted 
to  every  citizen.^-  An  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeper  of 
a  drinking  place  to  allow  infants  and  females  to  remain 
there  over  five  minutes,  or  to  drink  therein,  has  been  held 
valid.^^ 

Sec.  144.    Record  of  sales. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  city  ordinance  which  prohibits  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  except  by  druggists  selling  for 
chemical,  sacramental,  mechanical  or  medical  purposes,  and 
requiring  them  to  furnish  the  city  clerk  a  verified  state- 
ment in  writing  showing  the  kind  and  quantity  sold,  when 
■and  to  whom  sold,  and  also  requiring  this  statement  to  be 
verified  by  the  oath  of  every  servant  in  the  druggist's  em- 
ploy, is  void,  because  it  invades  the  sanctity  of  private  busi- 

11  State  V.  Baker,  50  Ore.  381;  males.  People  v.  Case,  153  Mich. 
<92  Pac.  1076;   13  L.  R.  A.   (K  S.)        08;    116   N.    W.    558. 

1040.  13  Commonwealth         v.         Price 

12  State  V.  Baker,  50  Ore.  381;  (Ky.),  94  S.  W.  32;  29  Ky.  L. 
'92  Pac.  1076;   13  L.  11.  A.   (N.  S.)        Rep.    593.      But    a    city    has    not 

1040.  power  to  adopt  an  ordinance  of 
A  male  litigant  cannot  object  this  kind.  Joplin  v.  Jacobs,  119 
to  a  statute  because  it  excludes  Mo.  App.  134;  m  S.  W.  219;  Pea- 
females  from  tlie  jury.  McKin-  cock  v.  Limburger  (Tex.  Civ. 
ney  v.  State,  3  Wyo.  719;  30  Pac.  App.),  67  S.  W.  518. 
293;  16  L.  R.  A.  710.  So  one  forbidding  a  saloon 
A  statute  prohibiting  the  keep-  keeper  to  permit  a  female  under 
ing  a  wine  room,  to  which  wo-  twenty-one  years  of  age  to  re- 
men  resort,  in  connection  with  a  main  in  or  about  a  saloon,  inde- 
saloon.  is  valid.  Adams  v.  Cro-  pendent  of  the  purpose  of  her 
nin,  29  Colo.  48i8 ;  69  Pac.  590;  visit,  is  valid.  State  v.  Baker, 
and  so  is  one  forbidding  the  50  Ore.  381;  92  Pac.  lOI'Q;  13 
owner   of  a   saloon  to   sell   to  fe-  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)    1040. 


§145 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


220 


ness."  No  doubt  the  same  court  would  have  held  the 
ordinance  void  if  it  had  been  a  statute.  And  in  Hawaii  it 
was  held  that  a  statute  requiring  a  saloon  keeper  to  keep 
books  of  account  of  his  business  was  unconstitutional.^^ 


Sec.  145.     Registration  of  internal  revenue  license  or  re. 
ceipts — Exposure  of  license. 

A  State  may  require  all  persons  taking  out  United  States 
internal  revenue  licenses  to  sell  liquors  to  have  them  recorded 
in  a  public  office  of  the  State,  and  it  is  no  valid  objection  that 
such  a  statute  will  tend  to  diminish  the  number  of  licenses  that 
will  be  taken  out,  thereby  diminishing  the  receipts  of  the  Fed- 
eral Government  of  the  amount  of  fees  it  would  have  received 
if  no  such  State  law  had  been  enacted.  Such  a  statute  brings 
into  action  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  powers  and 
tends  to  aid  in  the  enforcement  of  the  law  against  unlawful 
traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors.^*'     So  a  statute  requiring  a 


14  Clinton  v.  Phillips,  58  111. 
102. 

15  King  V.  Lau  Kiu,  7  Hawaii, 
489. 

In  Iowa  statutes  requiring  re- 
ports seem  to  be  upheld.  State 
V.  Chamberlain,  74  Iowa,  266;  37 
X.  W.  326;  and  in  Michigan  it 
has  been  held  that  a  statute  re- 
quiring druggists  in  prohibition 
districts  to  report  all  the  sales  to 
the  prosecuting  attorney  of  the 
county,  did  not  violate  that  pro- 
vision of  the  constitution  prohib- 
iting unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures,  nor  of  another  provision 
providing  that  no  person  shall  be 
compelled  to  incriminate  himself, 
nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or 
property  without  due  process  of 
law.  It  was  said  to  be  a  legiti- 
mate exercise  of  the  police  power 
respecting    the    sale   of    intoxicat- 


ing liquors.  People  v.  Henwood, 
123  Mich.  317;  82  N.  W.  70.  See 
Seattle  v.  Foster,  47  Wash.  22: 
m  Pac.  642. 

A  statute  requiring  all  liquors 
shipped  into  "dry"  territory  to  be 
carried  by  regular  carriers,  in  pack- 
ages plainly  marked  with  the  con- 
signor's and  consignee's  name  and 
address  plainly  marked  thereon, 
and  also  with  kind  and  amount  of 
liquor  marked  in  plain  letters 
thereon;  and  also  requiring  the 
carriers  to  keep  a  record  of  all 
such  packages  carried,  under  a 
forfeiture  of  the  liquor,  is  con- 
stitutional, being  a  valid  exer- 
cise of  the  police  power  of  the 
State.  Commonwealth  v.  Intoxi- 
cating Liquors,  172  Mass.  S'll;  v52 
N.  E.  389. 

16  State  V.  Hanson  (N.  D.),  113 
N.  W.  371. 


221  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES.  §§  146,  147 

licensee  to  keep  his  license  posted  np  in  his  place  of  busi- 
ness so  the  public  can  see  it,  is  valid. ^^ 

Sec.  146.    Minimum  quantity  that  may  be  sold  at  one  time, 

A  city  may  prohibit  sales  of  a  less  quantity  than  a  speci- 
fied amount,  as  one  gallon.  Where  an  ordinance  forbade 
sales  of  "malt,  hop,  tea  tonic,  ginger  ale,  cider,  or  any 
other  drink  of  like  nature"  in  a  less  quantity  than  a  gallon, 
the  ordinance  was  held  valid. ^^  And  a  statute  limiting  the 
sale  to  ten  gallons  wns  held  not  to  be  a  grant  of  an  ex- 
clusive privilege,  but  the  exercise  of  a  power,  the  policy  or 
expediency  of  which  cannot  be  questioned  by  the  courts ;  ^' 
and  so  is  a  statute  prohibiting  druggists  selling  less  than  a 
quart  except  upon  a  physician's  prescription.-"  Interdicting 
sales  by  small  measure  is  regulation  and  not  prohibition.-^ 

Sec.  147.     Owner  of  premises — Liability  under  statutes. 

The  State  of  Kansas  has  a  statute  which  in  express  terms 
makes  the  real  estate  of  a  person  convicted  of  selling  in- 
toxicating liquors  contrary  to  law  subject  to  a  lien  for  the 
amount  of  the  tines  and  costs  adjudged  against  him,  and 
it  also  provides  that  such  judgment  shall  be  a  lien  upon 
leased  premises  occupied  by  the  convicted  ^person,  and  used 
for  the  purposes  of  the  alleged  traffic,  when  the  owner  of  the 
real  estate  knowingly  suffers  them  to  be  used  and  occupied 
for  the  illegal  sale  of  such  liquors.--  Under  this  statute  the 
real  estate  of  the  convicted  person  can  be  sold  to  satisfy 

17  Ex  parte  Bell,   24   Tex.  App.  A    person    indicted    for    selling 

428;    6   S,   W.    197.  less    than    five   gallons   without   a 

18 /n  re  John,  55  Kan.  »>94;   41  license    cannot    question    the    val- 

Pac.   956.  idity  of  the  statute  or  ordinance 

19'Stickrod  v.  Commonwealth,  5  so   far    as    it    applies   to    sales   in 

S.  W.  580;   9  Ky.  L.  Rep.  5o3.  quantities  of  five  gallons  and  up- 

20  Commonwealth  v.  Fowler,  9G  wards,  which  may  be  made  with- 
Ky.  166;  28  S.  W.  7i86;  53  L.  E.  out  a  license.  State  v.  Priester, 
A.    839.  43  Minn.  373;  45  N.  W.  712. 

21  Paul  V.  Gloucester  Co.,  50  N.  22  State  v.  PelTerle,  33  Kan. 
J.  L.  '585;    15   Atl.  272;    1  L.  R.  718;    7  Pac.  Rep.  597. 

A.  86. 


§  147  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  222 

the  fine  and  costs  in  the  usual  manner  of  enforcing  judg- 
ments, but  the  lien  against  the  owner  can  only  be  enforced 
by  a  civil  action.  The  lien  is  a  statutory  one  which  attaches 
to  the  leased  premises  at  the  time  the  judgment  of  con- 
viction is  rendered  against  the  lessee. -••  The  statute  has 
been  held  to  be  constitutional,  and  that  full  force  and  effect 
must  be  given  to  it,-*  and  that  all  conveyances  of  the  leased 
premises  made  after  the  date  of  the  lessee's  conviction  are 
made  subject  to  the  lien  created  by  it.-"*  In  an  action  to 
enforce  such  a  lien  and  establish  the  ownership  of  the  prop- 
erty against  which  the  lien  is  sought  to  be  enforced,  a  deed 
purporting  to  convey  the  property  to  the  defendant  is  ad- 
missible in  evidence,  where  the  description  therein  given  of 
the  property,  taken  in  connection  with  well-known  facts 
that  are  in  evidence,  fairly  designates  the  property  described 
in  the  petition.  In  such  an  action  the  landlord  can  only  be 
made  liable  when  he  has  knowingly  permitted  the  occupant 
to  use  the  premises  for  the  unlawful  sale  of  such  liquors ;  but 
knowledge  sufficient  to  excite  the  suspicions  of  a  prudent 
man,  and  to  put  him  upon  inquiry,  is  equivalent  to  knowl- 
edge of  the  ultimate  fact.  In  such  an  action  if  the  title  to 
the  real  estate  is  in  the  name  of  the  wife,  it  is  proper  to 
join  the  husband  as  a  party  defendant.-'^  In  Ohio,  under 
the  "Dow  Law,"  the  State  was  given  a  lien  upon  the  realty 
upon  which  the  saloon  was  located  for  the  amount  of  the 
license  fees;  and  this  act  was  held  constitutional,  even 
though  the  licensee  was  only  a  tenant  of  the  licensed  prem- 
ises.^^  And  in  Iowa,  a  law  making  a  judgment  secured  by 
reason  of  a  violation  of  the  liquor  law  a  lien  on  the  property 
of  a  third  person  who  consents  to  its  use  for  the  unlawful 
sale  and  manufacture  of  liquors,  was  held  constitutional,  not 
being  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  without 
compensation.-^ 

23  Snyder  v.  State,  40  Kan.  543 ;  26  Cordes  v.  State,  37  Kan.  48 ; 

•20  Pac.  Rep.    123.  U   Pac.   Rep.   493. 

2* 'State  V.  Snyder,  34  Kan.  425;  27  Anderson     v.      Brewster,     44 

S  Pac.  Rep.  425.  Ohio  St.  576;  9  N.  E.  &83. 

25  Snyder  v.  State,  40  Kan.  543 ;  28  Polk    County     v.     Hierb,    37 

20  Pa«.  Rep.   123.  Iowa  361;  see  also  Newton  v.  Mc- 


223  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES,  §  148 

Sec.  148.     Civil  damages. 

Statutes  are  in  force  perhaps  in  every  State  giving  to 
designated  persons  a  right  of  damages  for  sales  of  liquor 
made  to  habitual  drunkards  or  intoxicated  persons  which 
result  in  the  death  of  such  persons,  or  where  such  persons 
by  reason  of  their  intoxicated  state  cause  damages  or  in- 
juries to  others.  These  statutes  have  been  universally  upheld 
as  a  valid  exercise  of  the  power  of  the  State. -^  It  is  no 
defense,  as  these  cases  hold,  that  the  person  of  whom  com- 
plaint is  made  had  a  license  to  sell,  issued  by  the  State,  for 
the  license  does  not  authorize  anyone  to  transgress  the  laws 
of  the  State.  Nor  is  it  a  valid  objection  to  the  statute  which 
makes  the  defendant  liable  for  the  full  damage  done  by  the 
intoxicated  person  when  the  liquor  he  sold  or  gave  the  in- 
toxicated person  was  only  a  part  of  the  liquor  that  made 
him  drunk.  "The  business  of  the  defendant,"  said  the 
court,  "as  conducted  by  him.  being  in  open  violation  of  the 
statute,  a  provision  that  holds  him  responsible  for  an  injury 
to  which  his  unlawful  conduct  contributes,  cannot  be  said 
to  be  in  conflict  with  any  right  guaranteed  by  the  Constitu- 
tion. *  *  *  3y  causing,  in  conjunction  with  others,  the 
injury  for  which  the  action  is  brought,  by  an  act  in  clear 
violation  of  the  statute,  he  becomes  a  joint  tort  feasor,  and, 
as  at  common  law,  is  liable  for  the  entire  damages  resulting 
from  such  injury.  "^°  A  statute  may  be  drafted  broad 
enough  to  make  the  liquor  seller's  lessor  liable,  where  the 
liquor  is  sold  on  or  in  conneiction  with  leased  premises,  and 
when  the  lessor  knew  the  purposes  for  which  the  premises 
were  to   be   used,    or   had   good   reasons   to   know.^^      And   a 

Kay  (Iowa),  102  N.  W.  827;  Bol-  33  Wis.  107;  Bedore  v.  Newton, 
ton  V.  McKay  (Iowa),  102  N.  W.  54  N.  H.  117;  Stanton  v.  Simp- 
1131.  son,  48  Vt.  628;  State  v.  Luding- 
29  Moran  v.  Goodman,  130  ton,  33  Wis.  107;  Howes  v.  Max- 
Mass.  1&8;  39  Am.  Rep.  443;  Ba-  well,  157  Mass.  333;  32  N.  E. 
ker  V.  Pope,  2  Hun  55i6;  Frank-  152;  Kennedy  v.  Garrigan  (S. 
lin  V.  Schermerhorn,  8  Hun  112;  D.),  121  N.  W.  783. 
Horning  v.  Wendell,  57  Ind.  171;  so  Sibila  v.  Bahney,  34  Ohio  St. 
Sibila    V.     Bahney,     34    Ohio    St.  399. 

399;      Werner     v.     Edmiston,     24  3i  Bertholf    v.     O'Reilly,    74    x*. 

Kan.   147;    Kreiter  v.   Nichols,  28  Y.  509;   30  Am.  Rep.  323. 
Mich.    490;     State    v.    Ludington, 


§§  149,  150       TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  224 

statute  is  valid  which  makes  the  liquor  dealer  liable  for  a 
sale  to  a  husband  after  notice  by  his  wife  given  him  not  to 
sell  to  her  husband,^^  or  to  a  minor,""'  or  liable  for  injuries 
inflicted  by  an  assault  made  by  the  person  who  was  made 
drunk  by  his  selling  liquor  to  him  in  violation  of  law.''* 
The  fact  that  the  defendant  may  be  punished  criminally  for 
the  same  act  is  immaterial.-'^  Even  as  applied  to  an  agent 
of  a  town  appointed  to  sell  liquors  the  statute  is  valid,  if  he 
goes  beyond  his  authority  and  makes  an  unlawful  sale.^* 

Sec.  149.     Requiring  licjensee  to  give  bond. 

A  licensee  may  be  required  to  give  a  bond  with  sureties 
to  keep  the  law,  and  making  him  liable  thereon  for  all  penal- 
ties assessed  against  him,  and  providing  he  will  not  sell  in 
any  other  place  than  the  place  designated  in  his  license,  or 
will  not  do  so  without  giving  notice  and  executing  a  new 
bond.^"  So  a  statute  making  the  licensee  and  his  sureties 
civilly  liable  for  damages  occasioned  by  an  illegal  sale  is 
valid.^^ 

Sec.  150.    Inspection  of  liquors — Ingredients. 

A  State  has  full  power  to  require  that  malt  liquors  shall 
be  manufactured  of  certain  kinds  of  cereals  and  absolutely 
prohibit  their  sale  if  they  are  not,  and  the  fact  that  manu- 
facturers, before  its  enactment,  had  the  privilege  to  manu- 
facture malt  liquors  from  other  cereals,  is  no  argument 
against  the  validity  of  such  a  statute.    The  State  may  also 

32  Bell  V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  The  Pennsylvania  statute  em- 
OB;  12  S.  W.  410;  McGuire  v.  powering  the  judge  to  assess  the 
Glass  (Tex.),  15  S.  W.  127.  damages  is  valid,  and  not  invalid 

33  Cramer  v.  Danielson,  90  because  it  violates  the  right  ol 
Mich.  531;   58  N.  W.  476.  trial   by  jury.     Mardorf  v.   Hemp 

34Kreiter  v.   Nichols,   28   Mich.        (Pa.),  6  Atl.  754. 

496;    Sibila  v.    Bahney,    34    Ohio           37  People    v.    Brown,    85    Mich. 

St.  399.  119;  48  N.  W.  158;  Bell  v.  State, 

35Bedore  v.   Newton,   54  N.   H.       28  Tex.   App.   96;    12  S.  W.  410; 

117.  McGuire   v.    Glass     (Tex.),    15    S. 

36  Stanton    v.    Simpson,    48    Vt.       W.    127. 

628.  38  Bell  V.  State,  supra. 


225  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §§151,152 

require  all  su'eh  liquors  to  be  inspected,  and  a  charge  ex- 
acted therefor.  This  is  upon  the  ground  that  the  manufac- 
ture and  sale  of  malt  liquors  is  detrimental  to  the  public 
health  and  morals  of  the  citizens  of  the  State;  and  the 
statute  is  a  valid  exercise  of  the  State's  police  power.  And 
it  is  no  objection  that  other  liquors  are  not  subject  to  like 
rules  and  regulations,  as  the  State  might  so  subject  them  i  f  it 
saw  fit,  since  the  State  may  absolutely  prohibit  the  sale  or  manu- 
facture of  liquors,  and  such  a  statute  is  only  a  regulation  of 
their  sale  or  manufacture.^**  So  a  statute  requiring  a  foreign 
manufacturer  of  beer  bringing  it  within  the  State  for  sale 
to  make  an  affidavit  showing  that  only  'certain  ingredients 
were  used  in  it  is  valid,  for  the  State's  agents  cannot  go 
abroad  to  inspect  such  beer.^° 

Sec.  151.     "Blind  Pig"  or  "Blind  Tiger"  laws. 

In  several  instances  the  so-called  "Blind  Pig"  or  "Blind 
Tiger"  laws  have  been  held  constitutional.  They  involve  no 
particular  constitutional  questions.  Usually  they  contain, 
more  drastic  provisions  than  other  liquor  laws.*^ 

Sec.  152.     Ex  post  faxjto  law — Change  of  remedy. 

The  right  to  a  particular  mode  of  procedure  is  not  a 
vested  one  which  the  State  cannot  change  or  abolish.  The 
general  rule  is  that  a  change  in  the  remedy  is  not  within  the 
inhibition  of  the  Constitution  against  the  enactment  of  an 
ex  post  facto  law.^-     And  this  is  true  in  criminal  as  well  as 

39  State  V.  Bixman,  162  Mo.  1;  42  South  v.  State,  86  Ala.  617; 
62S.  W.:828;  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  6  So.  52;  Perry  v.  State,  87  Ala. 
Cranshaw,  198  U.  S.  17;  25  Sup.  30;  6  So.  4Q5;  Robinson  v.  State, 
Ct.  552;  49  L.  Ed.  925;  affirming  84  Ind.  452;  Sage  v.  State,  127 
120  Fed.  144.  See  State  v.  Ind.  15;  26  X.  E.  667;  Sullivan 
Bengsch,  170Mo.  81;     70S.  W.  710.  v.    City    of    Oneida,    61    111.    242; 

40  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  Cran-  Worniley  v.  Hamberg,  40  la.  22; 
shaw,   120   Fed.   144.  Tilton  v.  Swift,  40  la.  78;  County 

41  State  V.  Stoffels,  89  Minn.  of  Kossuth  v.  Wallace,  60  la. 
205 ;  94  N.  W.  675 ;  Schwulst  v.  508 ;  15  N.  W.  305 ;  Drake  v.  Jor- 
State,  &Z  Tex.  Cr.  App.  331;  108  dan,  73  la.  707;  36  X.  W.  653; 
S.  W.  69«;  Smith  v.  State,  42  State  v.  Ah  .Turn,  9  Mont.  167; 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  414;   57  S.  W.  815.  23   Pac.   76;    Lazare  v.   State,   19 


§  152  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  226 

in  civil  eases.*^  Remedies  must  always  be  under  the  control 
of  the  Legislature,  and  it  would  create  endless  confusion  in 
legal  proceedings  if  every  case  was  to  be  conducted  only  in 
accordance  with  the  rules  of  practice,  and  heard  only  by 
the  courts,  in  existence  when  its  facts  arose.  The  Legisla- 
ture ma}'^  abolish  courts  and  create  new  ones,  and  it  may 
■j^rescribe  altogether  different  modes  of  procedure  in  its  dis- 
cretion, though  it  cannot,  in  doing  so,  dispense  with  any  of 
those  substantial  protections  with  which  the  existing  law 
surrounds  a  person  accused  of  crime.**  Upon  this  theory  it 
has  been  held  that  a  statute  passed  after  an  action  was  in- 
stituted to  abate  a  nuisance  under  a  prohibitory  liquor  law, 
which  provided  for  the  closing  for  one  year  of  the  building 
in  which  a  nuisance  was  kept  and  for  the  taxing  of  an 
attorney's  fee  to  the  defendant  Avas  not  unconstitutional,  the 
court  holding  that  the  statute  related  to  the  remedy  only 
and  that  the  attorney's  fee  pro^nded  for  was  a  part  of  the 
■costs  and  not  a  part  of  the  penalty  fixed  for  violating  the 
law.*^  Nor  is  a  statute  violative  of  such  a  constitutional 
provision  which  provides  that  a  judgment  rendered  against 
anyone  for  the  violation  of  an  act  for  the  suppression  of  in- 
temperance, shall  be  a  lien  upon  the  property  of  a  third 
person,  occupied  and  used  with  his  knowledge  and  consent, 
for  the  unlawful  sale  or  manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquor.*^ 
Nor  is  an  ordinance  passed  and  promulgated  subsequent  to 
the  issuance  of  a  license  to  a  retailer  of  intoxicating  liquor 
which  provides  a  penalty  for  its  violation  by  a  person  who 
shall  keep  his  saloon  open  after  ten  o'clock  at  night,  subject 
to  the  objection  that  it  is  an  ex  post  facto  or  retroactive  law, 
unless  the  act  sought  to  be  punished  was  committed  ante- 
cedent to  the  passage  of  the  ordinance.'*^ 

Ohio   St.   43;   State   v.    Cooler,   30  45  Drake  v.  Jordan,  73  la.  707; 

«.  C.  105;  State  v.  Manning,  14  36  X.  W.  653;  Campbell  v.  Man- 
Tex.  402.  dersclieid,   74   la.    708;    39   X.   W. 

43  Drake  v.  Jordan,  73   la.  707 ;       92. 
3.6   X.   W.    653 ;    Marion   v.   State,  46  pdk  Co.  v.  Hierb,  37  la.  31 ; 

20  Xeb.  233;  29  X.  W.  918.  Harten  v.   State,  32   Kan.   637;   5 

44Cooley'3  Const.  Lim.,  4th  ed.,       Pac.    212;     State    v.    Snyder,    34 
p.     331;     Robinson    v.    State,    84       Kan.  425;   8  Pac.   860. 
Ind.    452.  47  State   v.   Isabel,   40  La.   Ann. 

340. 


227  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES.  §§153,154 

Sec.  153.    Local  option — Its  two  phases. 

The  securing  of  a  local  option  is  brought  about  in  two 
ways:  the  one  is  for  the  Legislature  to  absolutely  prohibit 
the  sale  of  liquor,  unless,  at  an  election  duly  called,  the 
electors  of  a  particular  district — a  'city,  a  town,  a  township, 
a  county,  or  a  designated  part  of  a  county — shall  by  a 
majority  vote  declare  in  favor  of  the  sale  of  liquor  under  a 
license  law  there  enforced ;  the  other  is  that  the  sale  of  liquor 
is  permitted  under  a  license  law  ^**  until  the  electors  of 
the  district,  at  an  election  duly  called,  by  a  like  vote  de- 
clare that  it  shall  not  be  sold.  In  the  decisions  no  distinction 
is  drawn  between  these  two  methods  when  the  validity  of 
the  statutes  providing  for  a  local  option  law  is  drawn  in 
question.  If  the  one  method  is  valid,  the  other  is.  As  the 
Legislature  may  adopt  a  prohibitory  law,  so  much  of  the 
statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  liquors  is  valid ;  and  only  that 
part  of  the  statute  which  permits  a  sale  if  the  electors  shall 
declare  in  favor  of  it,  has  been  seriously  contested.*" 

Sec.  154.     Local  option  not  special  legislation. 

In  the  Constitutions  of  many  of  the  States  there  are 
clauses  to  the  effect  that  "in  all  cases  where  a  general  law 
can  be  made  applicable  no  special  law  shall  be  enacted," 
and  the  courts  of  the  States,  as  a  rule,  have  held  that  it  is 
for  the  Legislature  alone  to  judge  whether  a  law  on  any 
given  subject  can  be  made  applicable  to  the  whole  State; 
or,  in  other  words,  that  such  clauses  leave  a  discretion  with 
the  Legislature  to  determine  in  what  instances  a  special  law 
should  be  passed,  and  that  having  so  determined  the  ques- 
tion cannot  be  reviewed  by  the  courts."^"    In  harmony  with 

48  Xo   State   in   the    Union   per-  Johnson   v.    Railroad    Co.,   23    111. 

mits    the    unrestricted    retail    sale  202;     People    v.    Wallace,    70    III. 

of   intoxicating   liquors.  &80;     Gentile    v.    State,    29     Ind. 

49 State    V.    Fontain     (Del.),   69  499;  State  v.  Tucker,  46  Ind.  355; 

Atl.    926.  Wiley   v.   Bluffton,   111   Ind.    152; 

soBourland  v.  Hildreth,  26  €al.  12   N.    E.    165;    Pennsylvania   Co. 

162;  Brooks  V.  Hyde,  37  Cal.  366;  v.      State,      142      Ind.     498;      41 


§  154  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  228 

this  rule  of  statutory  construction  it  has  been  held  that  a 
law,  which  provides  that  if  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters  in 
a  <30unty  shall  vote  against  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
no  license  shall  be  granted  within  the  county  for  the  sale 
thereof,  does  not  contravene  a  constitutional  provision  that 
"the  Legislature  shall  not  pass  private,  local  or  special 
laws  regulating  the  internal  affairs  of  towns  and  counties." 
Such  an  inhibition  is  not  intended  to  secure  uniformity  in 
the  exercise  of  delegated  police  powers,  but  to  forbid  the 
passing  of  a  law  vesting  in  one  town  or  county  a  power  of 
local  government  not  granted  to  another.'^'^  The  question  of 
license  or  no  license,  and  whether  the  sale  of  particular 
kinds  of  liquors  Avithin  the  limits  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion shall  be  permitted,  is  properly  one  of  local  police  power 
and  may  be  left  to  the  municipal  authorities  of  towns,  cities, 
townships  and  counties,  or  the  qualified  voters  thereof.'^- 
This  subject,  although  not  embraced  within  the  power  to 
make  By-Laws  and  ordinances,  is  one  that  falls  within  the 
class  of  police  regulations  which  may  be  entrusted  by  the 
Legislature  to  municipal  authority.^* 

N.    E.    942;     Ex    parte    Pritiz,    9  wealth  v.  Bennett,   108  Mass.  27; 

la.    30;    State   v.    Squires,   26   la.  Commonwealth     v.     ilartin,      108 

340;   State  v.  Hitchcock,  —  Kan.  Mass.   29. 

178;    Darling    v.    Rogers,    7    Kan.  f-s  Erlinger    v.    Bonean,    51    III. 

•592;  Boyd  v.  Bryant,  35  Kan.  ©9;  94;    Commonwealth   v.    Turner,    1 

State    V.    County    Court,    etc.,    50  Cush.  493 ;  .State  v.  Cook,  24  Minn. 

Mo.    317;    State    v.    Bobbins,    51  247;     State    v.    Simmons,    3    Mo. 

Mo.    82;     Hall    v.    Bray,    51    Mo.  414;  State  v.  Xoyes,    10   Fos.    (N. 

2SS;  St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  62  Mo.  H.)   279;   Tanner  v.  Trustees,  etc., 

247;    State  v.   Pond,   93  Mo.   606;  5  Hill    (N.  Y.),  121;  Locker's  Ap- 

Ex  parte  Swann,  90  Mo.  44;  Hull  peal,  72  Pa.  St.  491;    Bancroft  v. 

V.    Miller,    4    N"eb.   503;    State    v.  Dumas,    21    Vt.    456;     Savage    v. 

Parkinson,   5   Nev.   15;    Welker  v.  Commonwealth,      84       Va.      619; 

Potter,    18    Ohio     (N.    S.     ),    85;  Slingec  v.  Henneman,  3t8  Wis.  504; 

Walker    v.    Cincinnati,     21     Ohio  Fonts  v.  Hood  River,  46  Ore.  492; 

(N.   S.),   14.  81  Pac.  370;  Gober  v.  State   (Tex. 

'•'Paul  V.   (Gloucester,   50   N.   J.  Cr.    App.),    123   S.   W.  427. 

L.   CS5;    Ex  parte  McGuire    (Tex.  In  a  number  of  instances   local 

Cr.  App.),  123  S.  W.  425.  option  laws  enacted  for  particular 

62  Anderson    v.    Commonwealth,  districts  of  a  State  have  been  de- 

77  Ky.   (13  Bush)    485;  Common-  clared     unconstitutional,     because 


229 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§155 


Sec.  155.     Local  option  laws — Delegated  power. 

The  principle  is  well  established  that  the  power  to  make 
laws  conferred  by  the  Constitution  on  a  Legislature,  cannot 


special  legislation.  Arroyo  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  «9 
S.  W.  503;  Griffin  v.  Eaves,  114 
Ga.  fio;  3'9  S.  E.  913;  Harris  v. 
■State,  114  Ga.  436;  40  S.  E.  315; 
People  V.  Cooper  83  111.  585; 
Berry  v.  Cramer,  5i8  N.  J.  L. 
■278;  33  Atl.  201;  Maize  v.  State, 
4  Ind.  342;  Meshmeier  v.  State,  11 
Ind.  482. 

A  statute  fixing  a  minimum  li- 
cense fee  in  respect  of  population, 
but  authorizing  the  fixing  of  a 
greater  fee  by  popular  vote  in 
towns,  townships,  boroughs,  and 
in  cities  wherein  licenses  are  re- 
quired, which  latter  license  the 
court  of  common  pleas  grant,  is 
a  special  law  and  void.  Berry  v. 
Cramer,  58  N.  J.  L.  278;  33  Atl. 
201. 

Where  a  statute  authorized  the 
electors  of  a  certain  county  to 
determine  whether  the  provisions 
of  an  act  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
liquors  should  be  put  i~  force, 
but  also  provided  tliat  tiie  act 
should  not  interfere  with  certain 
option  laws  in  different  parts  of 
the  county  then  in  force,  it  was 
held  that  the  act,  intending  to 
apply  only  in  the  event  there 
should  be  a  vote  in  favor  of  the 
sale  of  liquors,  was  constitutional, 
the  act  operating  uniformly 
throughout  the  county.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Nieson  ( Ky. ) ,  50 
S.  W.  66;   20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1825. 

A  statute  authorizing  cities 
having  a  population  of  2,500  to 
prohibit  the   sale  of   liquors   does 


not  contravene  a  provision  of  the 
constitution  dividing  cities  into 
classes  by  making  a  new  class.  Ex 
parte  Handler,  176  Mo.  383;  75 
S.  W.  920. 

The  fact  that  in  the  districts 
adopting  local  option,  where  the 
electors  vote  "no  license,"  dili'erent 
penalties  for  violations  of  the  act 
are  imposed  in  such  districts  than 
would  be  imjjosed  in  other  dis- 
tricts for  oft'enses  of  the  same 
character  in  the  event  of  the  pas- 
sage of  subsequent  acts  for  such 
other  districts,  does  not  render 
the  act  invalid,  where  the  Legis- 
lature has  the  power  to  provide 
dilTerent  laws  and  diflferent  pen- 
alties touching  the  same  cliarac- 
ter  of  ofi'enses  in  the  various  sub- 
divisions of  the  State.  Such  a 
law,  however,  must  operate  uni- 
formly on  all  citizens  of  the  sub- 
division to  which  it  applies,  or  on 
tlie  class  of  citizens  to  be  af- 
fected by  it,  and  must  make  a 
reasonable  classification  of  those 
persons  within  the  limits  of  its 
operation.  State  v.  Fontaiu 
(Del.),  69  Atl.  926;  Ex  parte 
Handler,  176  Mo.  383;  75  S.  W. 
©20. 

Tlie  Legislature  cannot  delegate 
the  authority  to  a  city  to  set 
aside,  vacate,  suspend  or  repeal 
the  general  laws  of  a  State,  even 
by  a  direct  provision,  and  there- 
fore i  provision  that  if  any 
ordinance  of  the  city  adopted 
pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the 
city  charter,  if  in  conflict  with  a 


U55 


TRAFFIC    IX   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


230 


be  delegated  by  the  Legislature  to  tlie  people  of  the  State, 
or  any  portion  of  them.     When  a  Legislature  passes  a  law, 


state  law,  should  supersede  it, 
is  void.  Arrayo  v.  State  (Tex.), 
69  S.  VV.  503. 

Excepting  from  tlie  provisions 
of  a  local  option  law  sales  of 
liquors  for  sacramental  or  medi- 
cinal purposes  does  not  render  the 
act  void.  Ray  v.  State,  47  Tex. 
•Cr.  App.  407;  83  S.  W.  1121;  nor 
is  the  act  void  if  it  excepts  from 
the  operation  domestic  wines. 
Hancock  v.  State,  114  Ga.  439; 
40  S.  E.  317;  Roberts  v.  State, 
114  Ga.  541;  40  S.  E.  750;  Aug- 
ust Busch  &  Co.  V.  Webb,  122  Fed. 
655. 

A  local  option  statiite  is  not 
void  simply  because  it  applies 
only  to  municipalities.  Lloyd  v. 
Dollison,  23  Ohio  €ir.  Ct.  Rep. 
571. 

Where  a  general  statute  per- 
mitted the  sale  in  any  county  of 
the  State  of  domestic  wines  in 
quantities  of  one  quart  or  more 
by  the  manufacturers,  a  subse- 
quent statute  prohibiting  "the 
sale  and  furnishing  of  spirituous, 
malt  or  intoxicating  liquors"  with- 
in a  certain  county  was  held  void, 
because  special  legislation. 
O'Brien  v.  State,  100  Ga.  51;  35 
S.  E.  112;  Embry  v.  State,  110 
Ga.  311;    35  S.   E.   IIG. 

A  statute  providing  for  local 
option  is  not  void  because  it  de- 
fines what  are  intoxicating  li- 
quors. People  v.  McBride,  234  111. 
146;  84  X.  E.  865;  nor  is  it  void 
liecause  it  fixes  no  date  for  hold- 
ing an  election,  nor  because  the 
board  of  supervisors  cannot  act 
until  a  petition  for  an  election  is 


filed    with    them.      Thalheimer    v. 
Board   (Ariz.),  94  Pac.  1129. 

A  clause  in  a  statute  providing 
that  it  shall  not  take  effect  in 
March,  1903,  unless  a  majority 
vote  cast  on  the  question  of  local 
option  shall  be  negative,  when  it 
shall  go  into  effect  in  December, 
1906;  and  other  provisions  as  to 
elections  shall  take  effect  at  once, 
is  valid.  State  v.  Scampini,  77 
Vt.  92;  59  Atl.  201.  A  statute 
repealing  a  liquor  law,  but  pro- 
viding that  it  should  not  go  into 
effect  unless  a  majority  vote  was 
in  favor  of  the  repeal,  is  valid. 
In  re  McGonnell's  Appeal,  209  Pa. 
St.  327;  58  Atl.  615;  reversing 
24   Sup.   Ct.   Rep.   642. 

It  is  no  objection  to  a  local 
option  law  on  the  ground  that 
it  is  class  legislation,  that  it  dis- 
criminates in  favor  of  those  vot- 
ei^s  who  favor  pfrohibition  and 
against  those  who  do  not.  Swee- 
ney V.  Webb,  33  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
324;  7'6  S.  W.  766;  77  S.  W. 
1135. 

A  statute  allowing  the  voters 
of  a  county  to  determine  whether 
local  option  shall  prevail  through- 
out the  county  is  not  void  because 
certain  portions  of  the  county, 
under  a  previous  statute,  had  al- 
ready determined  that  local  op- 
tion should  pervail  in  such  por- 
tions. Gayle  v.  Owen  County 
Court,  83  Ky.  61;  6  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
789. 

Under  a  constitutional  provis- 
ion that  all  license  fees  shall  go 
to  the  school  fund  of  the  State, 
it  cannot   be   insisted  that  a  law 


231  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  155 

it  must  pass  entirely  upon  the  question  of  its  expediency; 
and  it  cannot  say  that  a  law  shall  be  deemed  expedient  pro- 
vided that  the  people  afterwards,  by  a  popular  vote,  or 
otherwise,  declare  it  to  be  expedient.  A  statute  to  take 
effect  upon  a  subsequent  event  must,  when  it  comes  from 
the  hands  of  the  Legislature,  be  a  law  in  presenii  to  take 
effect  in  fiituro.  On  the  question  of  the  expediency  of  the 
law  the  Legislature  must  exercise  its  own  judgment,  defi- 
nitely and  finally.  This  well  established  i)rinciple  has  been 
"the  bone  of  contention"  in  the  courts  in  many  of  the 
different  States  of  the  Union  in  passing  upon  the  constitu- 
tionality of  what  are  known  as  "local  option  laws."  Some 
of  the  earlier  decisions  held  that  such  laws  were  unconstitu- 
tional because  their  operation  was  made  to  depend  upon  the 
contingency  of  a  popular  vote.  The  leading  case  upon  this 
point  was  decided  in  1847.^*  That  case  was  followed  by  the 
courts  of  California,  Delaware,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Michigan, 
New  York,  and  some  others.-"'"'  It  Avas,  however,  after  an 
able  argument  and  examination  of  the  course  of  judicial 
decision  upon  the  subject,  overruled.'"'''  The  great  weight  of 
judicial  decision  now  is  to  the  effect  that  such  laws,  when 

permitting     the     voters     of      the  Meshmeier,     11     Ind.    482;    Sauto 

county    to    prohibit    the    sale    of  v.  State,  2  la.    LC5 ;   OS  Am.  Dec. 

liquor    in    such    county    is    uncon-  487;    Geebric  v.  Statc^  5  la.   491; 

stit.utional.     Lemon  v.  Peyton,  64  State    v.    Beneke,    0    Iowa,    203; 

Miss.    161;    8   So.    235;    Portwood  State  v.  Weir,  3",  la.  134;   11  Am. 

V.    Paskett,    64    Miss.    213;    1    So.  Rep.  115;   Weir  v.  Cram,  37  Iowa, 

105.  649;    People    v.    Collins,    ?,    Mich. 

A  local  option  statute  prohibit-  343;   Barto  v.  Himrod,  4  Sel.   (N. 

ing  the  contesting  of  the  validity  Y. )    483;   Lessman  v.  Territory,  3 

of    a    local    option    election    in    a  Wash.  Tcr.  453;   Thornton  v.  Ter- 

prosecution    for    the    violation    of  ritory,   3    Wash.    Ter.    482 ;    Stall- 

the     law     is     constitutional.       Ex  worth  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  345 ; 

-parte    McGuire     (Te.x.    Cr.    App.),  Turner    v.    Saxon     (Wash.    Ter.), 

123  S.  W.  425.  20  Pac.  Rep.  685.     See  In  re  Mu- 

s*  Parker    v.    Commonwealth,    6  nicipal    Suffrage    to    W^omen,    160 

Barr.    (Penn.)    507.  Mass.   586;    36   N.   E.   488;    23   L. 

r.5  Houghton   V.   Austin,   47    Cal.  R.   A.   113. 
04G;   Ex  parte  Wall.  48  C.il.  279;  ■-■':  Locke's     Appeal,     72    Pa.     St. 

Rice    V.    Foster,    4    Harr.     (Del.)  491. 
479;  Maizer  v.  State,  4  Ind.  342; 


§  155  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  232 

general  in  their  application,  do  not  violate  the  constitu- 
tional provision  that  the  power  to  make  laws  is  vested  in 
the  Legislature.  The  constitutional  objection  to  such  a  law 
is  met,  if  the  act,  when  it  came  from  the  Legislature,  re- 
ceived the  governor's  approval,  was  properly  published,  and 
was,  of  itself,  a  complt.o  and  perfect  enactment.  In  such 
case  the  popular  will  is  expressed  under  and  by  virtue  of  a 
law  that  is  in  force  and  effect,  and  the  people  neither  make 
nor  repeal  it.  By  this  vote,  petition  or  remonstrance,  as  the 
case  may  be,  they  onl.y  determine  whether  a  certain  thing 
shall  be  done  under  the  law,  and  not  whether  the  law  shall 
take  effect.  The  law  has  full  and  absolute  vitality  when  it 
[passes  the  Legislature;  and  the  people,  under  the  rule  of 
•action  therein  given  for  their  government,  proceed  to  act. 
The  same  rule — the  same  law — is  given  to  all  the  people  of 
the  State,  to  all  parts  of  it;  the  same  method  for  obtaining 
the  expression  of  the  people  maintains  throughout  the  State. 
As  a  result  a  different  regulation,  of  a  police  nature,  may, 
under  such  a  law,  exist  in  one  town,  city  or  county  from 
that  which   exists  in  another.^^     In  such   case   the   maxim 

57  Weil  V.  Calhoun,  25  Fed.  108  Mass.  27;  Commonwealth  v. 
Rep.  865;  Ex  parte  Cowert,  92  Dean,  110  Mass.  3o7;  State  v. 
Ala.  94;  9  So.  225;  Boyd  v.  Bry-  Cook,  24  Minn.  247;  Sehulherr  v. 
ant,  35  Ark.  69;  37  Am.  Rep.  6;  Bordeaux,  64  Miss.  59;  State  v. 
State  V.  Wilcox,  4^2  Conn.  364;  Kline,  50  Ore.  426;  93  Pac.  237; 
Caldwell  v.  Barrett,  73  Ga.  604;  In  re  O'Brien,  29  Mont.  530;  75 
Menken  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  78  Pac.  196;  Lemon  v.  Peyton,  64 
Oa.  668;  Groesch  v.  State,  42  Ind.  Miss.  161;  State  v.  Pond,  93  Mo. 
547;  Ginz  v.  State,  42  Ind.  218;  606;  6  S.  W.  469:  Everse  v.  Hud- 
State  V.  Gerhardt,  145  Ind.  439;  son,  36  Mont.  135;  92  Pac.  462; 
44  N.  E.  469;  State  v.  Forkner,  Ex  parte  .Swarm,  »6  Miss.  44; 
94  la.  1;  62  N.  W.  683;  Ander-  State  v.  Gloucester,  50  N.  J.  L. 
son  V.  Commonwealth,  13  Bush,  585;  Sandford  v.  Court,  7  Vroom 
485;  Commonwealth  v.  Weller,  77  72;  13  Am.  Rep.  422;  Glovers- 
Ky.  (14  Bush)  218;  29  Am.  Rep.  ville  v.  Howell,  70  N.  Y.  287; 
407;  Garrett  v.  Aby,  47  La.  Ann.  Gordon  a-.  State,  46  Ohio  St.  607; 
"618;  Lowry  v.  Commonwealth  23  N.  E.  63;  6  L.  R.  A.  749;  Ex 
(Ky.),  36  S.  W.  1117;  18  Ky.  L.  parte  Lynn,  19  Tex.  App.  293 
Rep.  481;  Howard  v.  Haines,  2o  Steele  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  425 
Md.  541;  Fell  v.  State,  42  Mrl.  State  v.  Swisher,  17  Tex.  441 
71;     Commonwealth     v.     Bennett,  Ex  parte  Kennedy,   23   Tex.  App. 


233 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§155 


delegata    potestas    non    potest    delegari    has    no    applica- 
tion.^® 


77;  Evans  v.  State,  —  (Tex.), 
117  S.  W.  167;  Bancroft  v.  Du- 
mas, 21  Vt.  456;  State  v.  Parker, 
26   Vt.   3o7. 

58  People    V.     Collins,     3     Mich. 
343;    Paul  v.    Gloucester   County, 
60    N.    J.    L.     (21    Vroom)     583; 
Feek     v.      Bloomingdale    Tp.,     82 
Micli.  393;    47   N.  W.   37;    10  L. 
E.    A.    69;     Friesner    v.    Common 
Council,   91   Mich.   504;    52  N.   W. 
18;    State   v.    Pond,   93   Mo.   606; 
ii  S.  W.     469 ;   Ex  parte  Swan,  96 
Mo.    44;     9    S.    W.    10;     State    v. 
Moore,  107  Mo.  78;  16  S.  W.  937; 
iState  V.  Watts,   111   Mo.  553;   20 
S.   W.   237;    State   v.   Dugan,    110 
Mo.   138;    19  S.  W.    195;   State  v. 
Rouch,  47  Ohio  St.  478;  25  N.  E. 
59;   Van  Wert  v.  Brown,  47   Ohio 
St.   477;    25   N.   E.   59    (reversing 
4    Ohio  Cir.   Ct.    407);    Common- 
wealth V.  Locke,  29  Leg.  Int.  172 ; 
affirmed  72  Pa.  St.  491 ;   Leger  v. 
Eice,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8210;   Hobart 
V.  Butte   Co.,    17  Cal.   23;    Robin- 
son V.  Bidwell,  23  Cal.  37'9;  Guild 
V.   Chicago,    82   111.   472;    Erlinger 
V.   Boneau,   51    111.   94;    People   v. 
Salomon,  51  111.  87 ;  Lytle  v.  May, 
49    Iowa,    224;    Clark    v.    Rogers, 
fil   Ky.   43;    Wales   v.    Belcher,    3 
Pick.    508;     State    v.    Noyes,    10 
Fost.    279;    Morgan   v.   Monmouth 
Plank    Road    Co.,    2    Dutch.    99; 
Warner   v.    Hoagland,    22    Vroom 
©2;    16  Atl.  106;   Noonan  v.  Hud- 
son   County,    22    Vroom    454;    18 
Atl.   117;  23  Vroom    398;   23  Atl. 
255;    Johnson    v.    "Rich,    10    K   Y. 
Leg.  Ob=^.  33;   Gv^nt  v.  '^outer,  24 
Barb.    232;     Clarke    v.    Rochester, 
5  Abb.   Prac.   107;    Smith  v.  Mc- 


Carthy, 56  Pa.  St.   359;   State  v. 
Copland,    3    R.    I.    33;    Louisville, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  V.  Davidson,   1   Sneed, 
637;  162  Am.  Dec.  424;   Rutter  v. 
Sullivan,  25  W.  Va.  427 ;  State  v. 
O'Neill,    24    Wis.    149;    Smith    v. 
Janesville,     26     Wis.    291;     King 
V.      Walsh,      6      Can.      Cr.      Cas. 
452;       Randall       v.      Tillis,       43 
Fla.    43;     29    So.    540;     Fonts    v. 
Hood  River,  46  Ore.  492;   81  Pac. 
370;    State   v.    Handler,    178    Mo. 
38;     76    S.    W.    984;     Hoover    v. 
Thomas,    35   Tex.    Civ.   App.   535; 
80  S.  W.  8i59;   In  re  McGonnell's 
License,  209  Pa.  St.  327;   58  Atl. 
615;    reversing  24  Pa.   Super.   Ct. 
'642;     August     Busch     &     Co.     v. 
Webb,   122  Fed.   655;   Territory  v. 
O'Connor,  5   Dak.   397;   41   N.  W. 
746;    Minneha   County   v.   Champ- 
tion,   5   Dak.  43;    41   N.   W.   754; 
Thalheimer      v.      Board      (Ariz.), 
94  Pac.  1129;   People  v.  McBride, 
234  111.  146;   84  N.  E.  865;   State 
V.    Peckham,    3    R.    I.    289;    State 
V.  Stevens,  8  Ohio  Dec.  6;   5  Ohio 
N.   P.    354;    Stevens  v.    State,   61 
Ohio,  597 ;  56  N.  E.  478 ;  State  v. 
Barber   (S.  D.),  101  N.  W.  1078; 
Ray   V.    State,    46    Tex.    Cr.    App. 
176;    83    S.    W.    1121;    Common- 
wealth V.  Neason  (Ky.),  50  S.  W. 
66 ;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1825 ;  Ex  parte 
Handler,    176   Mo.   383;    75   S.   W. 
920;  Childers  v.  Shepherd   (Ala.), 
39    So.    235;    Lowry    v.    Common- 
wealth  (Ky.),  36  S.  W.  1117;    18 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  481;   Savage  v.  Com- 
monwealth,  84   Va.   619;    5   S.   E. 
565;      People      v.      Kemmis,      153 
Mich.     117;      116     N.     W.     554; 
People     V.      McBride,      234      HI. 


§  156  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  234 

Sec.  156.     Local  option  laws,  constitutionality. 

At  the  expense  of  a  repetition  it  may  be  s'.ated  that  the 
great  weight  of  authority  now  is  to  the  etfect  that  a  local 
option  law,  if  it  is  a  complete  enactment  in  itself,  re- 
quiring nothing  further  to  give  it  vitality  and  depending 
upon  popular  vote  for  nothing  but  a  determination  of  the 
territorial  limits  of  its  operation,  is  a  valid  and  constitu- 
tional exercise  of  legislative  power.  That  a  statute  may  be 
conditional,  and  its  taking  effect  made  to  depend  upon  sub- 
sec^uent  events,  is  now  well  settled.^''  The  question  of  license 
or  no  license  is  one  properly  of  local  police  and  may  be 
constitutionally  left  to  the  decision  and  discretion  of  the 
lawfully  created  agencies  representing  and  acting  for  the 
local  public,  Avhich  are  immediately  affected  by  the  retail  liquor 
traffic,  such  as  county  courts,  and  the  municipal  authorities 
of  towns  and  cities.  Likewise,  a  Legislature  may  create 
other  agencies  to  determine  such  local  question  even  to  the 
referring  of  it  to  the  qualified  voters  of  the  town,  city,  or 
civil  district  in  which  the  necessarj^  steps  may  be  taken  to 
test  the  sense  of  such  voters  on  the  subject  of  such  retail 
traffic. *^°  In  other  words,  a  Legislature  has  the  constitu- 
tional power  to  confer  upon  the  qualified  voters  of  a  local 

146;     84    N.     E.     865;     State     v.  ClilT    v.    State     (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

Johnson,  86  Minn.  121;   90  N.  W.  77      S.      W.      24;       affirmed      67 

161;    State    v.    Harp     (Mo.),    109  Tex.   391;    79   S.   W.    1;    Ex  parte 

S.    W.    578;    /n    re    O'Brien,    29  Heyman,   45    Tex.    Cr.    App.   532; 

Mont.  530;   75  Pac.   196;   Sweeney  78    S.    W.    349;    State   v. .  MacEl- 

V.  Webb,  97   Tex.   250;    76   S.   W.  rath,   49    Ore.   294;    SQ   Pac.   803; 

766;     77    S.    W.    1135;     State    v.  Feek     v.      Township      Board,      82 

iSkeggs,  154  Ala.  249;  46  So.  268;  Mich.    393;    47    N.   W.   37;    10   L. 

Kennedy    v.    Warner,    100    N.    Y.  R.   A.  69;    Commonwealth  v.   Bot- 

Supp.    616;    51    N.    Y.    Misc.    362;  toms    (Ky.),   22  Ky.   L.  Rep.  410; 

State    V.    Peckham,    3    R.    I.    289;  57   S.   W.   493. 

Ray    V.    State,   47    Tex.    Cr.    App.  59  Commonwealth   v.    Weller,    14 

407;     83    S.    W.    1121;     State    v.  Bush    (Ky.),    218;    29    Am.    Rep. 

Fountain      (Del.),    69     Atl.     926;  407. 

Adams  V.  Kelley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) ,  co  Anderson    v.    Commonwealth. 

45    S.  W.  859;   Stephens  v.  State,  13    Bush     (Ky.),    485;     Common- 

47   Tex.   Cr.   App.  604;    85   S.   W.  wealth  v.    Hoke,    14   Bush    (Ky.), 

797;      State     v.     Richardson,     48  485. 
Ore.     309;     85     Pac.     225;     Oak 


235  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  157 

community  the  power  to  decide  Mdiether  the  retail  traffic  in 
intoxicating-  liquors  shall  be  permitted  to  be  licensed  in  such 
town,  city  or  community  or  not.**^ 

Sec.  157.    Local  option  laws,  when  not  unconstitutional. 

As  a  rule,  the  Legislatures  of  the  various  States  have 
exercised  the  power  to  prohibit  the  retail  traffic  in  liquors 
by  any  other  than  persons  specially  licensed  for  the  purpose, 
and  have  delegated  to  designated  local  agencies,  such  as 
county  courts,  and  the  authorities  of  incorporated  towns  and 
cities,  the  discretion  to  grant  or  refuse  licenses,  as  they 
should  deem  most  conducive  to  the  well-being  of  the  local 
public.  A  local  option  law,  where  the  right  to  sell  liquor 
under  a  license  is  provided  for,  does  not  differ  in  principle 
from  the  legislation  restraining  the  liquor  traffic  by  re- 
quiring the  obtaining  of  a  license  to  carry  on  the  traffic.  It 
merely  extends  the  restriction  by  adding  another  agency, 
with  power  to  refuse  to  permit  a  license  to  be  granted.  The 
voters  may,  by  exercising  the  power  given  them  in  such  a 

61  Weil     V.     Calhoun,     25     Fed.  J.  L.  72;    13  Am.  Rep.  4'22;   State 

Rep.    805 ;     Boyd    v.    Bryant,    3.5  v.  Circuit  Court,  52  N.  J.  L.  585 ; 

Ark.  69;   37  Am.  Rep.  6;   State  v.  15  Atl.  272;   Gloversville  v.  How- 

Wilcox,    42    Conn.    364;     19    Am.  ell,  70  N.  Y.  287;  Gordon  v.  State, 

Rep.    530;    Territory   v.    O'L'onner,  46    Ohio    St.    603;    23    N.    E.    (il ; 

6  Dak.  397;   41   N.  W.   746;   Cald-  Locke's    Appeal,    72    Pa.    St.    491; 

well  V.  Barrett,  73  Ga.  604;  Ham-  13  Am.  Rep.  71<);  Holley  v.  State, 

mond    V.    Hanes,    25    Md.    541;    90  14  Tex.  App.  505;  Ex  parte  Lynn, 

Am.    Dec.    77;    Fell    v.    State,    42  19      Tex.     App.      293;      State     v. 

Md.    71;    20    Am.    Rep.    83;    Sly-  Parker,      26      Vt.      357;      Savage 

mer  V.   State,   62   Md.   240;    Com-  v.     Commonwealth,    84    Va.    619; 

monwealth  v.   Bennett,   108   Mass.  5     S.     E.   565;    Denton    v.     Vann, 

27;    11    Am.    Rep.    304;    Common-  8    Cal.    App.    677;    97    Pac.    675; 

wealth    V.    Dean,    110    Mass.    357;  Baxter  v.   State,  49   Ore.   353;   88 

Peek   V.    Bloomingdale,     82     Mich.  Pac.  677;    80  Pac.  3'69;   People  v. 

393;  47  X.  W.  37;  State  v.  Cooke,  Bashford  (X.  Y.),  112  N.  Y.  Supp. 

24  Minn.   247;    31   Am.  Rep.    344;  582;  affirmed,  128  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

Schuler  v.  Bordeaux,  64  Miss.  59;  351;    112  XL   Y.  Supp.   1143;    Hall 

8   So.   201;    Lemon   v.   Peyton,  '64  v.  Dunn   (Ore.),  97  Pac.  811.    See 

Miss.    161;    8    So.    235;    State    v.  Ruhland  v.  Waterman   (R.  L),  71 

Pond,   93   Mo.  606;    6   S.  W.   469;  Atl.    L 
State    V.    jMorris    County,    36    N. 


§  158  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  236 

local  option  law,  render  the  granting  of  licenses  unlawful. 
But  in  doing  so  they  do  not  make  law.  They  do  no  more 
than  county  courts  and  municipal  authorities  have  always 
done — they  exercise  a  police  power  conferred  upon  them  by 
Legislature.  If  they  vote  against  it,  the  traffic  is  not  thereby 
made  unlawful.  That  was  so  before,  unless  the  dealer 
had  a  license.  The  voters  under  a  local  option  law  have  the 
power  to  say  no  license  shall  be  issued.  This  is  no  new 
power.  It  has  always  existed  in  some  agency  of  the  law, 
and  a  local  option  law  merely  transfers  the  power,  or  a 
part  of  it,  to  another  depository.  But  it  leaves  a  residium 
in  the  county  courts  and  municipal  authorities.  They  may 
still  exercise  the  power  as  formerly  until  the  voters  have 
exercised  the  power  vested  in  them  to  prohibit  the  traffic. 
And  when  the  voters  refuse  to  exercise  their  power  to  pro- 
hibit, the  county  courts  and  municipal  authorities,  having 
the  power  to  grant  licenses,  still  have  a  right  to  refuse  to 
grant  them,  just  as  they  did  before  the  local  option  law  was 
adopted.  In  other  words,  a  local  option  law  is  a  permanent 
and  continuing  law  in  all  parts  of  the  State  which  adopts  it. 
It  is  not  adopted,  suspended  or  repealed  by  the  vote  of  the 
people,  if  any  city,  town  or  civil  district  vote  against  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquor.  The  vote  determines  the  ques- 
tion of  local  police  as  to  whether  the  sale  of  liquors  shall  be 
licensed  or  not."- 

Sec.  158.     Local  option  laws,  when  not  unconstitutional — 
Continued. 

A  local  option  law  will  not  violate  a  constitutional  provi- 
sion which  vests  the  legislative  authority  of  a  State  in  a 
general  assembly  composed  of  a  senate  and  house  of  rep- 
resentatives, nor  a  constitutional  provision  which  vests  the 
administrative  affairs  of  the  State  in  certain  designated 
officers,  by  committing  either  of  such  powers  to  the  people.*'^ 

csWall.     Cases,     48    Cal.    279;  J.   L.    (21   Vroom)    583;    State   v. 

Commomvealth   v.   Hoke,   14   Bush  Fountain    (Del.),   m   All.   926. 
(Ky.)     f>fi8;    vState    v.    Cooke,    24  oa  Groesch    v.     State,     42     Ind. 

Minn.    247;     .31    Am.    Rep.    344;  547. 
Paul  V.  Gloucester  County,  50  N. 


237  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  158 

And  it  makes  no  difference  with  the  constitutionality  of 
such  a  law  whether  the  action  of  those  operating  under  it  is 
called  an  exercise  of  legislative  or  administrative  power. 
In  either  case  such  action  is  had  by  authority  of  the  Legis- 
lature, conferred  by  the  Constitution,  and  when  by  such 
action  an  order  has  been  made  it  is  the  law  that  prohibits 
and  not  the  action  of  the  authorities.*'*  Nor  will  it  violate 
a  constitutional  provision  which  prohibits  the  enactment  of 
laws  local  in  their  nature,  nor  one  which  provides  that  all 
laws  of  a  general  nature  shall  have  a  uniform  operation 
throughout  the  State.**'  A  special  act  or  statute  is  one  which 
at  common  law  the  courts  will  not  notice  unless  it  is  pleaded 
and  proved  like  any  other  fact.**"*  A  law  which  applies  gen- 
erally to  a  particular  class  of  cases  is  not  a  local  or  special 
law.**'  It  is  only  in  a  qualified  sense  that  any  law  ican  be 
said  to  be  of  uniform  operation  throughout  the  State.  A 
law  for  the  punishment  of  crime,  the  provisions  of  which 
are  alike  applicable  to  all  parts  of  the  State,  must  neces- 
sarily lack  uniformity  in  one  sense  in  its  operation,  not  only 
as  to  persons  but  also  as  to  localities.  It  operates  in  those 
places  where  its  provisions  are  violated  and  upon  those  per- 
sons who  transgress  them.  Under  the  same  circumstances 
and  <?onditions  its  operation  is  uniform.  The  law  which 
affords  civil  remedies  is  uniform  in  its  provisions,  and  under 
the  like  circumstances  is  uniform  in  its  operation  through- 
out the  State.  It  is  not  required  that  every  man  shall  resort 
to  that  remedy,  or  that  in  each  locality  there  shall  be  the 
same  number  or  any  number  of  persons  who  shall  resort  to 
the  remedy,  in  order  to  make  the  law  uniform  in  its  opera- 
tion in  the  sense  in  which  the  terms  are  used  in  the  Constitu- 
tion. Such  is  the  case  under  all  circumstances  when  one  or 
more  persons  are  by  law  required  to  do  some  act  or  acts, 
upon  or  in  'consequence   of  which   the  law  is  to   operate.®^ 

61  Feek   v.   Tovvnsliip   Board,    8'2  66  Hingle  v.   State,   24   In/d.   28 ; 

Mich.   393;    47   N.   W.   37.  Toledo,    etc.    R.    Co.    v.    Nordyke, 

65  Groesch  v.  State,  42  Ind.  547 ;  27  Ind.  95. 

Ex  parte  Swann,  96  Mo.  44;  State  6t  Consumers     etc.    Co.    v.    Har- 

V.  Circuit  Court,  50  N.  J.  L.  585;  less,  131   Ind.  446;    29  N.  E.  1062. 

Gordon  v.  State,  46  Ohio  St.  607 ;  68  Groesch  v.  State,  42  Ind.  547. 
23   N.  E.   63. 


S  159  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  238 

Such  an  inhibition  is  noL  intended  to  secure  uniformity  in 
the  exercise  of  delegated  police  powers,  but  to  forbid  laws 
vesting  in  one  town,  city,  township  or  county  a  power  of 
local  government  n  )t  granted  to  another.*^**  In  Michigan,  it 
has  been  held  that  in  the  absence  of  such  a  constitutional 
restraint,  there  is  the  underlying  principle  of  natural  right 
and  justice  which  prevents  the  Legislature  from  enacting 
laws  for  a  particular  locality  different  from  those  applicable 
to  other  portions  of  the  State  or  from  suspending  the  opera- 
tion of  general  laws  as  to  an^^  particular  locality,  and  that  a 
local  option  law  was  v^alid  because  it  w^as  in  furtherance  of 
the  right  of  local  self-government."*'  The  constitutional  pro- 
vision that  the  operation  of  laws  throughout  a  State  shall 
be  uniform  applies  only  in  the  sense  that  their  operation 
shall  be  the  same  in  all  parts  of  the  State  under  the  same 
circumstances/'^  Uniformity  in  the  operation  of  a  law  is 
not  destroyed  because  the  electors  in  one  or  more  towns, 
cities,  townships  or  counties  of  a  State  may  not  see  fit  to 
avail  themselves  of  the  provisions  of  a  local  option  law  ^^ 

Sec.  159.     Local    optian,    not    in    violation    of    Fourteenth 
Amendment. 

A  local  option  law^  wdll  not  contravene  Section  1,  Article 
XIV,  of  the  United  States  Constitution,  which  declares  that, 
**No  State  shall  deny  to  any  person  within  its  limits  the 
equal  protection  of  the  law."  Such  a  law  applies  within  the 
territory  or  locality  where  it  is  adopted,  without  discrimina- 
tion in  favor  of  or  against  persons  or  classes  of  persons 
within  such  territory  or  lecality.^^  Under  this  amendment 
a  Chinaman,  a  negro,  a  Hottentot,  or  a  white  man  has  the 

69  state  V.  Circuit  Court,  50  '^  State  v.  Circuit  Court,  50  N. 
N.  J.  L.  58o;    15   Atl.   272.  J.  L.  585;   15  Atl.  272. 

70  Feek  v.  Bloomingdale,  &2  "3  State  of  Missouri  v.  Lewis, 
Mich.   393;    47   N.   W.    37.  101   U.   S.   30;    Hayes  v.  State  of 

7iGroesch  V.  State,  42  Ind.  547;        Missouri,    120   U.    S.   6«;    7    Sup. 
City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Xevin.  151       Ct.  350;   Ex  parte  Swann,  »6  Mo. 
Ind.    139;    47    N.    E.    526;    50   N.       44. 
E.   80;    Ex  parte  Swann,  96   Mo. 
44;    9   S.   W.   10. 


239  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  159 

right  to  the  protection  of  the  Unite    States  within  the  limits 
of  its  jurisdiction,  in  any  occupation  which  he  has  the  right 
to  carry  on.    He  may  not  be  deprived  of  life  or  liberty,  nor 
can  his  property  be  taken  without  just  compensation  or  due 
process  of  law.     Tie  may  have  equal  protection  in  his  enjoy- 
ment of  his  personal  or  civil  rights;  he  may  pursue  happi- 
ness in  his  own  way ;  have  equal  access  to  the  courts  and  be 
subjected  to  no  greater  liability  or  punishment  than  is  im- 
posed on  others  for  similar  crimes.     These  are  instances  of 
the  rights  which  may  not  be  abridged,  and  of  the  privileges 
and  immunities  in  the  enjoyment  of  which  he  is  entitled  to 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.     But  when  the   political 
power  of  a  State,  for  the  safety  of  its  people,  takes  the 
responsibility  of  saying  that  certain  occupations  are  hurtful 
and   will   not   be   permitted   in   its   boundaries,   unless  that 
declaration  is  so   unreasonable   as  to   violate   and   outrage 
natural  justice  it  is  a  purely  political  responsibility,   and 
there  is  an  end  of  the  matter.     Salus  popuU  suprema  lex 
and  the  only  appeal  is  to  the  force  of  public  opinion  or  its 
expression  in  the  ballot  box.    The  occupation  so  stigmatized 
is  no  longer  a  right,  privilege  or  immunity.'^'*    Is  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors  an  occupation  of  that  sort?     Let  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  answer:    "The  right  to 
sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  not   one   of  the  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  which,  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  the  States  are  forbidden  to  abridge." 
"The  weight  of  authority  is  overwhelming  that  no  such  im- 
munity heretofore  existed  as  would  prevent  State  Legisla- 
tures  from   regulating    or    even   prohibiting   the   traffic   in 
intoxicating  liquors."''^    In  the  >ease  last  cited,  Mr.  Justice 
Bradley  said:    "No  one  has  ever  doubted  that  a  Legislature 
may  prohibit  the  vending  of  articles  deemed  injurious  to  the 
safety  of  society,  provided  it  does  not  interfere  with  vested 
rights  of  property.    When  such  rights  stand  in  the  way  of 
public  good  they  can  be  removed  by  awarding  compensation 

74 /n  re  Hoover,   30    Fed.    Rep.  75  License    Cases,    5    How.     (U. 

51;    Barbier   v.    Connolly,    112   U.       S.)   673. 
S.   27. 


§159 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


240 


to  the  owner.  When  they  are  not  in  question  the  claim  of  a 
right  to  sell  a  prohibited  article  can  never  be  deemed  one 
•oi  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citizen.''  It  is  ap- 
parent from  the  cases  cited  that  the  extent  to  which  the  laws 
of  a  State  may  regulate  or  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  is  a  matter  resting  almost  entirely  within  the  dis- 
icretion  of  the  Legislature,  that  discretion  being  limited  only 
by  the  provisions  of  the  State  Constitution.  Accordingly, 
it  has  been  held  that  where  there  is  no  express  constitu- 
tional provision  against  it  a  Legislature  may  pass  what  is 
known  as  a  local  option  law.  It  is  not  necessary  for  the 
sake  of  justifying  such  a  law  to  array  the  appalling  statistics 
of  the  misery,  pauperism  and  crime  which  have  their 
origin  in  the  use  or  abuse  of  ardent  spirits.  The  police 
power,  which  in  this  instance  belongs  exclusiveh^  to  the 
States,  in  regard  to  this  matter  is  sufficient  alone  and  may 
be  relied  upon  to  correct  these  great  evils  by  such  measures 
•of  restraint  or  prohibition  as  may  be  necessary  to  affect  that 
purpose.^''  True  enough,  there  are  some  cases  which  are 
against  this  conclusion.  But  the  great  weight  of  authority 
and  the  better  reasons  are  in  favor  of  the  constitutionality 
of  such  laws.''' 


16  Ex  parte  Wall,  48  €al.  279; 
Eice  V.  Foster,  4  Harr.  (Del.) 
47«;  Maize  v.  State,  4  Ind.  342; 
State  V.  Weir,  33  Iowa  134;  Lam- 
mert  v.  Lidwell,  62  Mo.  188; 
Parker  v.  Commonwealth.  6  Pa. 
St.  507;  State  v.  Swisher,  17  Tex. 
441;  Ex  parte  Lynn,  19  Tex.  App. 
293;  Steele  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App. 
425. 

"Boyd  V.  Bryant,  36  Ark.   69 
State    V.    Wilcox,    42    Conn.    364 
State  V.  Brennan,  2  S.  Dak.  384 
50  N.   W.    625;    Groesch   v.   State, 
42    Ind.    547 ;    Anderson    v.    Com- 
monwealth,   13    Bush    (Ky.)    485; 
Commonwealth  v.  Waller,  14  Bush 


(Ky.)  218;  Fell  v.  State,  42  Md. 
71;  Commonwealth  v.  Bennett,  108 
Mass.  27 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Dean, 
110  Mass.  357;  State  v.  Cooke, 
24  Minn.  247;  Rohrbacker  v.  Jack- 
son, 51  Miss.  735;  State  v.  Noyes, 
30  N.  H.  279;  State  v.  Common 
Pleas,  etc.,  36  N.  J.  L.  72;  Cin- 
cinnati, etc.  R.  Co.  V.  Commis- 
sioners, etc.,  1  Ohio  St.  77 ;  Ban- 
croft V.  Dumas,  21  Vt.  456;  State 
V.  Parker,  26  Vt.  357;  Smith  v. 
Janesville,  26  Wis.  291;  State  v. 
Fountain  (Del.),  69  Atl.  926; 
Lloyd  V.  Dollisin,  23  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 
Rep.  571;  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v. 
Crenshaw,   120  Fed.   144. 


241  CONSTITUTIONAIJTY    OF    STATUTES.  §  160 

Sec.  160.     Local  option — Alabama  Constitution — Notice  of 
enactment  of  law. 

The  Alabama  Constitution  provides  that  no  local  law 
shall  be  enacted  by  the  Legislature  unless  a  notice  thereof 
shall  first  be  published  in  the  locality  affected,  stating  the 
substance  of  the  proposed  law.  In  pursuance  of  this  provi- 
sion a  notice  was  given  wherein  it  was  stated  that  an  appli- 
cation would  be  made  to  the  Legislature  to  enact  a  law 
preventing  the  sale  of  vinous,  malt  and  spirituous  liquors, 
except  in  cities  or  towns,  within  five  miles  of  the  insane 
hospitals  situated  at  T.  and  M.  It  was  held  that  the  notice 
given  was  a  sufficient  compliance  with  this  constitutional 
provision.'^**  But  a  notice  of  an  intention  to  introduce  an 
act  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquor  "outside  of  incorporated 
towns"  in  a  certain  county,  and  also  providing  that  liquors 
should  not  be  sold  in  an  incorporated  town  except  pursuant 
to  an  election  held  to  determine  the  question  of  sale  or  no 
sale,  is  not  sufficient  to  authorize  the  enactment  of  a  law 
for  such  county  to  regulate  the  license  and  sale  of  liquor 
and  providing  for  the  issuance  of  a  license  in  any  part  of 
the  county  on  a  petition  signed  by  a  majority  of  the 
qualified  voters  in  the  precinct.'***  Yet  a  notice  of  an  in- 
tention to  introduce  a  bill  "to  establish  a  dispensary  in  the 
icity  of  T.  for  the  sale  of  spirituous  liquors  and  other  intoxi- 
cating liquors"  is  sufficient  to  authorize  the  enactment  of  a 
law  establishing  a  liquor  dispensary  in  the  city,  authorizing 
the  city  to  operate  it,  invest  money  therein,  select  a  salaried 
dispenser,  conduct  the  business  there  under  prescribed  regu- 
lations, prohibit  others  from  engaging  in  the  sale  of  liquors 
in  the  city,  and  giving  the  city  the  exclusive  right  to  sell 
liquors  therein.'^*'  Under  the  provision  of  this  Constitution 
the  Legislature  cannot  enact  a  local  law  where  the  notice  of 
an  intention  to  apply  therefor  shows  that  the  proposed  act 
would  be  unconstitutional  when  enacted.^"     A  notice  that 

T8  state    V.    Williams,    143    Ala.  79  Uniontown    v.    State     (Ala.), 

501;    39  So.   276.  39    So.    814;     State    v.    Williams 

78*Hudgins    v.    State,    145    Ala.  (Ala.).  39  So.  816. 

499;   39  So.  717;   Elba  v.  Rhodes,  so  Alfonl       v.       Hicks       (Ala.), 

142  Ala.  689;   38  So.  807.  38    So.    752. 


§§  161,  162        TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  242 

an  application  would  be  made  "to  repeal  the  prohibition 
law  of  L.  oeat"  was  held  to  authorize  the  enactment  of  a 
law  repealing  tne  law  named  (which  forbade  the  sale  of 
liquors  'at  or  within  eight  miles  oi  the  court  house  of  the 
town  of  L.'"*  only  so  far  as  it  applied  to  the  "corporate 
limits  of  the  town  of  L."^^ 

Sec.  161.     Local  option  law  in  territories. 

A  statute  providing  for  the  proliibition  of  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  in  the  several  counties  of  a  territory  by 
local  option  cannot  be  defeated  because  it  deprives  a  citizen 
of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law;  nor  because  it 
conflicts  wi  h  the  Organic  Act  of  the  territory;  nor  that  it 
conflicts  Avith  the  revenue  laws  of  the  United  States  grant- 
ing license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors ;  nor  that  it  conflicts 
with  the  act  of  Congress  prohibiting  the  Legislature  from 
passing  any  law  "impairing  the  rights  of  private  property;" 
nor  that  it  conflicts  with  the  act  of  Congress  prohibiting 
local  or  special  legislation;  nor  that  it  conflicts  with  the  act 
of  Congress  in  delegating  legislative  power.  Such  a  statute 
is  of  a  police  nature  and  a  rightful  subject  of  legislation 
within  the  power  conferred  upon  a  territory  by  its  Organic 
Act,  and  being  local  in  its  character  may  be  left  to  each 
county  of  the  territory  to  determine  when  it  shall  be  en- 
forced therein. ^- 

Sec.  162.    Local  option  not  destructive  of  property  rights. 

A  local  option  law  does  not  violate  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision that  "no  man's  property  shall  be  taken  by  law  with- 
out just  compensation."  Such  a  law  rests  in  no  degree 
upon  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  It  does  not  contemplate 
either  the  taking  or  the  damaging  of  anything.  It  is  an 
exercise  of  the  police  powers  of  a  State,  pure  and  simple. 
The  incidental  effect  upon  the  value  of  property  does  not 
result  from  any  interference  with  the  property,  but  solely 

81  Brenner   v.   State,    (Ala.),   35  82  Territory  v.   O'Connor,  5   Da. 

So.    1031.  Ter.    397;     Thalheimer    v.    Board 

(Ariz.),  94  Pac.  1129. 


243  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  163 

from  the  owners  of  property  to  adjust  their  old  business  to 
the  new  law.  These  effects,  if  they  can  be  called  damage  at 
all,  are  damnum  ahsgiie  injuria.  The  law  does  not  take  or 
damage  the  property  of  the  owners  for  the  public  use,  but 
only  prevents  them,  to  a  certain  limited  extent,  from  taking 
or  damaging  the  public  for  their  use.  This  is  their  real 
grievance,  and  for  that  they  have  no  remedy.  Where  busi- 
ness and  law  conflict,  it  is  the  business  that  must  give  way, 
not  the  law.  The  owner  of  property  acquires  and  holds  his 
property  subject  to  the  right  of  the  Legislature,  under  the 
police  power  to  control  it  whenever  the  public  peace,  the 
publi'C  morals,  or  the  public  health  is  involved.  Nor  will 
such  a  law  be  invalid  because  of  the  abridgement  of  the 
rights  of  the  dealers  in  intoxicating  liquors.  No  one  has  a 
right  to  deal  in  such  liquors  save  as  a  privilege  from  the 
State.«^ 

Sec.  163.     Special  legislation  for  villages. 

A  statute  which  provides  that  all  incorporated  villages 
within  a  State,  having  within  their  limits  a  college  or  uni- 
versity, shall  have  power  to  provide  b}''  ordinance  against 
the  evils  resulting  from  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
within  the  limits  of  the  corporation  cannot  be  defeated  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  special  legislation.^*  A  law  framed  in 
general  terms,  restricted  to  no  locality  and  operating  equally 
upon  all  of  a  group  of  objects,  which,  having  regard  to  the 
purposes  of  the  legislation,  are  distinguished  by  character- 
istics sufficiently  marked  and  important  to  make  them  a 
class  by  themselves,  is  not  a  special  or  local  law,  but  a 
general  law.^^  Under  such  a  law  enacted  under  a  title  pro- 
viding that  such  incorporated  villages  may  regulate  the  sale 

83  Menken    v.    City    of    Atlanta,  st  Bronson    v.    Oberlin,   41    Ohio 

78   Ga.   668 ;    Burnside   v.   Lincoln  St.   476. 

County   Court,   86    Ky.   423 ;    6   S.  ss  Groesch  v.  State,  42  Ind.  547 ; 

W.  276;    Ex  parte  Lynn,   19   Tex.  Consumer's    Co.    v.    Harles.s,    131 

App.  293;   Steele  v.  State,  ID  Tex.  Ind.    446;    29    N.    E.    1062;    State 

App.  425;   Ex  parte  Kennedy,  23  v.  Parsons,  40  N.  J.  L.   123;   Mc- 

Tex.  App.  77 ;  Savage  v.  Comnioa-  gee  v.  State,  30  Ohio  St.  54 ;  State 

wealth,  84  Va.  619;   5   S,  E.  565.  v.  Powers,  38  Ohio  St.  54. 


§  164  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  244 

of  intoxicating  liquors  therein,  a  village  council  will  exceed 
its  power  if  it  passes  an  ordinance  which  prohibits  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquors  to  all  persons  and  for  all  purposes 
except  mechanical  and  medicinal.  Construing  the  words  of 
such  a  statute,  together  with  its  title,  the  conclusion  must 
Tbe  that  the  pow^r  conferred  by  the  statute  is  that  of  regu- 
lating the  sale  and  not  of  prohibiting  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquor.  Regulation  and  prohibition  are  essentially 
and  irreconcilably  different  things.^" 

Sec.  164.     Local  option  constitutional  provisions. 

In  some  of  the  States  express  provisions  of  their  Consti- 
tutions provide  for  the  adoption  of  a  local  option  law.  Such 
is  the  case  in  Delaware.  The  Constitution  of  that  State 
empowers  the  Legislature  to  submit  to  a  popular  vote  the 
question  of  license  or  no  license,  and  requires  it  to  provide 
laws  to  carry  out  and  enforce  such  power,  enact  laws  con- 
cerning the  manufacture  of  liquors  under  the  limitations  of 
the  Constitution,  and  provide  necessary  penalties.  The 
Legislature  adopted  a  law  for  the  submission  of  the  ques- 
tion, and  provided  therein  penalties  and  processes  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  act  in  case  a  popular  vote  in  a  district 
should  adopt  its  provisions ;  and  it  was  held  that  this  was  a 
valid  statute  and  not  invalid  on  the  ground  that  such  penal- 
ties and  processes  would  he  enforceable  only  in  the  event  a 
majority  of  the  electors  of  any  district  voted  for  "no 
license;"  for  the  casting  of  a  majority  vote  for  "no  license" 
was  only  a  contingency  upon  which  the  Legislature  had  pro- 
vided that  the  penalties  should  become  operative. ^'^  The 
Constitution  of  Texas  provides  that  each  county  shall  be 
divided  into  four  commissioners'  precincts,  and  from  each 
precinct  shall  be  elected  one  commissioner.  It  also  provides 
that  the  Legislature  shall  enact  a  law  whereby  the  qualified 

R6  Miller   V.    Jones,   80   Ala.    &9 ;  W.    269;    Bronson    v.    Oberlin,    41 

Sweet  V.  City  of  Wabash,  41   Ind.  Ohio    St.    470;    Heise    v.    Common 

7 ;  Cantrell  V.  Sainer,  59  Iowa  26 ;  Council,    6    Rich.    Law     (S.    C), 

12  N.  W.  753;   People  v.  Gadway,  404. 

61   Mich.  285;   28  N.   VV.   101;    In  s- state     v.      Fountain      (Del.), 

re  Hauck,    70   Mich.    396;    38    N.  69  Atl.  926. 


245  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  164 

voters  of  any  county,  justice's  precinct,  or  town,  or  such 
subdivision  of  a  county  as  may  be  designated  by  the  com- 
missioner's court,  may,  from  time  to  time,  determine  whether 
the  sale  of  liquors  shall  be  prohibited  within  its  limits.  It 
was  held  that  the  statute  could  not  be  successfully  attacked 
on  the  ground  that  it  failed  to  vest  in  the  commissioner's 
court  the  full  measure  of  discretion  concerning  the  sub- 
divisions in  which  elections  might  he  held  which  the  Con- 
stitution authorized  the  Legislature  to  grant,  because  the 
constitutional  power  to  grant  such  full  discretion  included 
the  lesser  power  to  grant  the  limited  discretion  conferred 
by  statute.  It  was  also  held  that  the  statute  was  not  invalid 
because  of  a  failure  to  allow  the  voters  of  cities  and  towns 
to  repeal  prohibition  as  to  them,  where  it  had  been  carried 
as  to  the  'county  as  an  entirety.^^  But  an  act  attempting  to 
authorize  the  commissioners'  court  to  designate  a  portion  of 
a  county  composed  of  seven  justices'  precincts  for  holding  a 
local  option  election  is  void.-^  Under  this  provision  it  is 
held  that  the  Legislature  may  provide  for  a  vote  to  deter- 
mine whether  all  sales,  except  for  sacramental  and  medicinal 
purposes,  shall  be  prohibited.^"  But  an  act  is  unconstitu- 
tional, under  this  provision,  which  undertakes  to  provide 
that  C.  0.  D.  contracts  of  sale  and  shipment  of  liquor  into 
local  option  territory  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  made 
where  the  goods  are  delivered  and  paid  for.^^  This  provi- 
sion of  the  Constitution  does  not  prohibit  the  establishment 
of  saloon  limits  within  a  city ;  "^  but  it  prohibits  the  Legis- 

ss  Sweeney    v.    Webb,    45    Tex.  9i  Keller    v.    State     (Tex.),  87 

Cr.   App.    170;    76   S.   W.   766  Ex  S.   W.   &&9. 

parte    Ileyman     (Tex.    Cr.    App.),  92  Williams    v.    State,    52    Tex. 

78  S.  W.   349.  Cr.    App.    371;    107   S.    W.    1121; 

89  Ex  parte  Wells,  45  Tex.  Cr.  Ex  parte  King,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
App.  170;  78  S.  W.  928;  Ex  parte  383;   107  S.  W.  549. 

Hedman    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),    78    S.  Under    the    provisions    a    com- 

W.    349;    the    validity   of   such    a  missioner's    precinct   is    a    "politi- 

statute  was  conceded  in  argument.  cal    subdivision     of     the     county" 

90  Bowman  v.  State,  38  Tex.  within  the  Constitution  for  hold- 
Cr.  App.  14;  40  S.  W.  796;  41  ing  an  election.  Cofield  v.  Brit- 
S.  W.  635.  ton    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),   109  S.   W. 

49'3. 


§164 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


246 


lature  empowering  a  commissioners'  court  to  create  new  sub- 
divisions."^ The  Constitution  of  Delaware  provides  that  the 
Legislature,  from  time  to  time,  may  enact  a  law  for  submis- 
sion to  a  vote  of  the  electors  of  the  several  districts  of  the 
State  the  question  whether  the  sale  of  liquors  shall  be 
licensed  or  prohibited  therein.  The  second  sentence  of  the 
same  section  provides  that  whenever  a  majority  of  the 
members  of  each  house  in  any  district  shall  request  the  sub- 
mission of  the  question  of  license  or  no  license  to  the  electors 
of  the  district  which  they  represent,  the  Legislature  must 
provide  for  the  submission  of  the  question  in  the  district  at 
the  next  general  election.  It  was  held  that  the  second 
sentence  did  not  limit  nor  qualify  the  first  sentence ;  but 
under  the  first  sentence  the  question  of  license  or  prohibi- 
tion could  be  submitted  at  a  special  election;  and  under  the 
second  sentence  it  must  be  at  a  general  election.*** 


S3  Ex  parte  Heyman  (Tex.),  78 
S.  W.  439. 

In  Maryland  the  Constitution 
provides  that  no  bill  shall  be 
come  a  law  unless  passed  in  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives of  the  State  by  a  major- 
ity of  the  members  elected,  and 
under  this  it  is  held  that  a  sl;i1- 
ute  relating  to  local  option  in 
a  certain  county  wherein  reference 
is  made  to  an  earlier  and  existing 
statute,  providing  that  in  a  cer- 
tain event  "said  act  shall  apply 
therein  as  heretofore,"  was  valid, 
not  violating  this  provision  of  '^^be 
Constitution,  but  being  merely'  a 
recognition  of  the  existing  pol- 
ic}'  of  the  county,  and  not  hiding 
an  attempt  to  re-enact  the  for- 
mer law.  Temmick  v.  Owings,  70 
Md.   24^;    16   Atl,   719. 

The  provisions  of  the  Tsxas 
Constitution  are  not  self-execut- 
ing. A  statute  authorizing  it  is 
necessary    to    secure    an    election. 


Adams  v.  Kelley,  17  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  479;   45  S.  W.  8'59. 

91  State  V.  Fontain  (Del.),  09 
Atl.  926. 

The  local  option  of  Texas  in  ex- 
cepting from  its  provisions  sales 
of  liquors  for  sacramental  and 
medicinal  purposes  does  not  come 
in  conflict  witli  tlie  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  of  that  State  re- 
quiring the  Legislature  to  enact 
laws  whereby  the  electors  of  a 
district  may  determine  whether 
the  sale  of  liqviors  shall  be  pro- 
hibited. Eay  v.  State  (Tex.),  Sr, 
S.    W.    1121. 

The  statute  of  South  Carolina 
giving  tlie  Legislature  the  exclu- 
sive riglit  to  license  the  sale  ot 
liquors,  and  prohibiting  it  to  del- 
egate the  power  to  cities,  does  not 
prevent  it  from  authorizing  c'itj(!.s 
to  forbid  the  sale  of  liquors 
therein.  Florence  v,  Brov/n,  49 
S.  C.  3.32;  26  S.  E.  '8«0;  27  S.  E. 
273. 


247 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§165 


Sec.  165.     Local  prohibitory  laws,  when  constitutional. 

A  Legislature  has  the  power  to  enact  local  prohibitorj- 
laws  forbidding  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  within  certain  described  localities.  This  power  has 
been  exercised  in  the  protec'ion  of  educational  institutions,^^ 
churches  and  religious  assemblies,^"  fairs  and  places  of  amuse- 
ment,^'^ public  or  State  buildings  and  institutions,^*  manu- 
factories,"'' and  railroads  during  construction.^     Such  a  law 

The  Constitution  of  Kaasas  for- 
bidding the  sale  of  jntcixicatin^ 
liquors  except  for  medicinal,  sani- 
tary and  mechanical  purposes, 
does  not  prevent  the  Legislature 
enacting  a  law  to  further  restrain 
or  prohibit  the  liquor  traffic  nor 
prevent  it  imposing  conditions 
on  the  conduct  of  its  manufac- 
ture or  sale  for  medical,  sanitary 
and  mechanical  purposes,  short  of 
prohibition.  State  v.  Durein 
(Kan.),  80  Pac.  987,  amrming  70 
Kan.  1;  78  Pac.  152;  State  v. 
Sheesley,  71  Kan.  857;  78  Pac. 
9'97. 

Although  a  Constitution  re- 
quires the  Legislature  to  adopt  a 
local  option  law,  it  may  adopt  a 
law  prohibiting  the  keeping  of  a 
disorderly  house  where  intoxicat- 
ing liqiiors  are  sold  or  kept  for 
sale  without  a  license.  Joliff  v. 
-State  (Tex.),  109  S.  W.  176; 
Webber  v.  State  (Tex.),  109  .S. 
W.    182. 

05  Love  v.  Porter,  93  Ala.  384; 
9  So.  5&5;  DeBois  v.  State,  34 
Ark.  381;  Boyd  v.  Bryant,  35 
Ark.  G9;  Wilson  v.  State,  35  Ark. 
414;  Blackwell  v.  State,  36  Ark. 
178;  Trammell  v.  Bradley,  37 
Ark.  374;  Commonwealth  v.  Whe- 
lan,  134  Mass.  20<);  Commonwealth 
V.  Jenkins,  137  Mass.  572;  Com- 
monwealth V.   Everson,    140  Alass. 


432;  5  X.  E.  155;  Commonwealth 
V.  Jones,  142  Mass.  573;  8  N.  E. 
603;  In  re  Liquor  Locations,  13 
R.  I.  733;  State  v.  Ranscher,  69 
Tenn.  (1  Leu)  96;  Brewer  v. 
State,  75  Tenn.  (7  Lea)  68'2; 
Harney  v.  State,  76  Tenn.  ( 8  Lea ) 
113;  Murphy  v.  State,  77  Tenn. 
(9  Lea)  373;  Tillery  v.  State,  78 
Tenn.  (10  Lea)  35;  Lea  v.  State, 
78  Tenn.  (10  Lea)  35;  State  v. 
Tarver,  79  Tenn.  (11  Lea)  658: 
Halcher  v.  State,  80  Tenn.  (12 
Lea)  3'r>8;  Boyd  v.  State,  80  Tenn. 
(12   Lea)    687. 

96  Carlisle  v.  State,  91  Ala.  1; 
Boyd  v.  Bryant,  35  Ark.  69;  Go- 
well  V.  State,  41  Ark.  355;  State 
V.  Midgett,  85  X.  C.  538;  Fet- 
ter V.   Wilt,  46  Pa.  St.  457. 

97  State  V.  Cappy,  50  Ind.  291 ; 
Heck  V.  State,  44  Ohio  St.  536; 
9  N.  E.  305;  Commonwealth  v. 
Cavanaugh,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  344; 
State  V.  White,  7  Baxt.  158. 

98Brinson  v.  State,  89  Ala.  105; 
8  So.  527:  Ex  parte  McClain,  61 
Cal.  436;  44  Am.  Rep.  554;  State 
V.  Barringer,  110  X.  C.  525;  14 
S.   E.   781. 

99  Ashurst  V.  State,  79  Ala.  176: 
McArthur  v.  State,  69  Ga.  444: 
State  V.  Joyner,  81  X.  €.  534. 

1  State  V.  Hampton,  77  N.  €. 
52C. 


§  165  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  248 

does  not  contravene  a  constitutional  provision  that  the 
general  assembly  shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special  law 
where  a  general  law  can  be  made  applicable.-  In  such  a  case 
it  is  for  the  Legislature  alone  to  judge  whether  a  law  on 
any  given  subject  can  be  made  applicable  to  the  whole  State.^ 
It  has  been  held  that  an  exemption  from  the  penalties  of  such 
a  statute  of  persons  who  at  the  time  of  enacting  it  already 
had  established  places  of  business  within  the  prescribed 
limits  would  not  deprive  the  statute  of  its  character  as  a 
general  law ;  *  and  also,  that  a  statute  making  it  unlawful 
to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  within  given  distance  of  any  in- 
corporated institution  of  learning  will  not  deprive  it  of  the 
character  of  a  general  law  by  a  section  providing  that  it 
shall  not  apply  to  the  sale  of  such  liquors  within  the  limits 
of  an  incorporated  town.'"'  A  law  of  this  character  which 
authorizes  a  county  court  to  make  an  order  prohibiting  the 
sale  or  giving  away  of  intoxicating  liquors  within  a  given 
distance  of  any  ichurch  or  schoolhouse,  upon  the  petition  of 
a  majority  of  the  residents  in  such  limits,  has  been  held  not 
to  violate  the  rule  that  the  Legislature  cannot  delegate  the 
power  to  make  laws,  the  court  holding  that  a  Legislature 
has  the  power  in  enacting  a  law  to  delegate  the  power  to 
determine  the  facts  or  state  of  things  upon  which  it  intends 
to  make  its  own  action  depend  in  enacting  such  a  law.® 
It  has  also  been  held  that  the  prohibiting  of  the  manufacture 
of  intoxicating  liquors  within  three  miles  of  an  orphan's 
home  without  the  written  permission  of  the  superintendent 
of  the  home  was  a  constitutional  exercise  of  the  police 
powers  of  the  State  and  operated  on  those,  who,  at  and 
before  the  time  of  its  enactment,  were  engaged  in  the 
manufacture   of  intoxicating  liquors  within  the  prescribed 

2  Boyd  V.   Bryant,   35    Ark.    69;  etc.,    50    Mo.    415;    State   v.    Rob- 
Heck   V.   State,   44    Ohio   St.   5.36;  bins,  51   Mo.  S2. 
9  N.  E.  ,305.  4  Meyer  v.  Baker,  120   111'.  567; 

3Cooley  Const.  Law,  4th  ed.,  p.  12   N.   E.    79;    Kramer   v.   Marks, 

105;     Gentile    v.    State,    29     Ind.  04  Pa.  St.   151. 

409;    Marks   v.   Trustees,   etc.,    37  s  state  v.  Ranscher,  69  Tenn.   (1 

Ind.     163;     State    v.    Tucker,    40  Lea)    96. 

Ind.   355;   State  v.   County  Court,  e  Boyd   v.    Bryant,    35    Ark.   QQ. 


24.9  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  166 

territory,  and  the  fact  that  upon  the  destruction  of  a  portion 
of  the  buildings  connected  with  the  home  the  inmates  were 
removed  temporarily  to  another  place  while  the  buildings 
were  reconstructed  did  not  have  the  effect  to  suspend  the 
operation  of  the  statute/ 

Sec.  166.     Special  legislation. 

Statutes  regarding  the  regulation  or  prohibition  of  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  must  be  of  a  general  character ; 
they  cannot  be  of  a  local  character  if  the  Constitution  forbid 
the  passage  of  local  laws.  But  in  many  of  the  States  the 
Legislature  may  enact  a  law  for  a  single  county ;  and  when 
dt  may  do  so  the  only  restraint  upon  it  is  that  the  law 
enacted  must  bear  alike  on  all  persons  within  the  county.* 
And  a  statute  authorizing  the  submission  of  the  question  of 
local  option  to  a  vote,  which  excepts  wine  used  in  sacra- 
mental and  medicinal  purposes,  cannot  .be  regarded  as  a 
special  law  by  reason  of  such  exception.®  So  a  statute  for- 
bidding sales  in  a  private  room,  but  whieli  excepts  hotels 
from  itG  provisions,  is  not  a  law  granting  special  privileges 

TiState  V.   Baninger,   110   X.  C.  wards  v.   State,   123   Ga.   542;    51 

525;    U  S.  E.  781.  S.   E.   &30;    IJenning  v.   State,   123 

A    local    option    statute    is    not  Ga.  546;   51  3.  E.  632;   Bagley  v. 

unconstitutional  because  it  makes  State,  103  Ga.  388;   29  S.  E.  123; 

the  election  returns  conclusive  evi-  Caldwell    v.    State     (Ga.),    29    S. 

dence   of   the    result    of    the    elec-  E.   263. 

tion    and    the    regulating    of    the  '■'  Sparks     v.     State      (Tex.     Cr. 

proceedings,  unless  appealed  from  App.),     45     S.     W.    493;     Wilson 

and  set  aside.     Steckard  v.  Reade,  v.    Hines,    99    Ky.   221 ;    35    S.    W. 

(Tex.),     121     S.     W.     1114;     Ev-  627;    37    S.    W.    148;    McLain    v. 

ans   V.    State    (Tex.),    117    S.    W.  State,   43   Tex.   Cr.   App.   213;    64 

167;   Saylor  v.  Duel,  236  111.  429;  S.      W.     865;      State     v.      Barber 

86  N.   E.   119.  (S.    D.),    101    N.    W.    1078;    Ray 

A   statute    regulating    the    stor-  v.    State,   46   Tex.    Cr.    App.   511; 

age  of  liquors   in  districts  adopt-  '83   S.   W.    1121;   August  Busch  & 

ing    local    option    is    valid.      Ex  Co.  v.  Webb,  122  Fed.  655;   Swee- 

parte    Massey     (Tex.),    92'  S.    W.  ney   v.   Webb,    36    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

1083.  324;   7'6  S.  W.  766;    Creekmore  v. 

8  Guy  V.  Commissioners,   122  N.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),    12    S.    W. 

C.   471;    29   S.    E.    771;    Sasser  v.  628;   11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  566. 
Martin    (Ga.),    29   S.   E.  278;    Ed- 


§  166  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS,  250 

which  do  not  belong  to  all  the  citizens."  Likewise  a  statute 
is  not  special  legislation  which  excepts  from  its  provisions 
druggists,  manufacturers,  persons  giving  away  liquors  in  pri- 
vate dwelling  houses  and  railway  companies  selling  liquors  in 
their  dining  and  buffet  cars  under  a  license. ^^  Where  a 
section  of  a  statute  pointed  out  a  method  for  obtaining  a 
license,  but  excepting  from  its  provisions  incorporated  cities 
and  towns  having  by  their  charters  the  right  to  issue  a 
license,  and  in  another  section  fixed  the  county  license  at  a 
certain  amount,  and  the  Constitution  prohibited  the  enact- 
ment of  a  special  law  where  "provision  has  been  made  by 
an  existing  law,"  it  was  held  that  a  special  law  prescribing 
the  manner  in  which  a  license  should  be  granted  in  a  given 
county  and  imposing  'conditions  not  contained  in  the  first 
section,  and  fixing  the  license  fee  at  another  amount,  was 
valid,  not  being  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  provision 
quoted.^-  But  where  a  statute  provided  that  there  should 
be  paid  for  the  right  to  manufacture  for  sale  distilled  liquors 
and  to  sell  distilled  and  vinous  liquors  brought  into  the 
State,  "a  special  license  tax  of  ten  cents  for  every  gallon," 
and  an  emergency  clause  declaring  there  was  "a  deficiency 
in  the  revenue  of  the  State,"  and  the  actions  of  the  State's 
officers  indicated  it  was  a  revenue  measure,  and  a  section 
gave  permission  to  wine  growers  in  the  State  to  sell  their 
own  wine  on  their  own  premises,  it  was  held  that  the  statute 
was  a  revenue  measure  and  not  a  statute  governing 
the  liquor  traffic ;  and  not  applying  to  licpior  manufactured 
for  export  nor  to  domestic  wines  or  pure  alcohol,  it  contra- 
vened a  clause  in  the  Constitution  requiring  taxes  to  be 
uniform  on  the  same  class  of  subjects  within  the  limits  of 
the  territory  in  which  the  tax  was  levied." 

10  Sandys  v.  Williams,  SO  Pac.  is  State  v.  Bengsch,  170  Mo. 
042;  Kru.se  v.  Williams,  80  Pac.  81;  70  S.  W.  710.  So  far  as 
648.  domestic  and  foreign  liquors  ship- 

11  Ohio  V.  Dollison,  194  U.  S.  ped  into  the  State  were  eonsid- 
445;  24  Sup.  Ct.  703;  48  L.  Ed.  ered,  it  was  held  that  the  stat- 
1062;  affirming  68  Ohio  St.  688;  ute  was  not  void  for  want  of  uni- 
70  X.   E.    1131.  formity,  botji  being  taxed  the  same 

i2Sasser  v.  ^Martin  (Ga.),  29  amount;  it  was  also  held  that 
S.  E.  278.  as  the  Constitution  expressly  pro- 


251 


COXSTITl  TIONALITY    OF    STATUTES. 


§167 


Sec.  167.    Proceedings  in  rem. 

A  statute  which  prohibits  the  retail  sale  of  intoxicating' 
liquors  and  which  authorizes  proceedings  in  rem  against  rum. 
shops  is  not  unconstitutional.  The  legislative  right  to  pass 
laws  to  protect  the  health,  the  morals,  the  property  and  the 
lives  of  the  people  is  not  onl}^  the  prevailing  object  with  all 


vided  what  property  should  be 
exempt  from  taxation,  the  attempt 
of  the  Legislature  to  exempt  do- 
mestic wines  rendered  the  whole 
act  void.  Bowman  v.  State,  38 
Tex.  'Cr.  App.  14;  40  S.  W.  796; 
41   S.   W.   635. 

An  ordinance  excepting  from  its 
operation  a  particular  lot  in  the 
city  on  which  is  a  dramshop  is 
void,  on  the  ground  tliat  it  dis- 
criminates in  favor  of  the  lot. 
Moore  v.  Danville,  232  111.  307; 
83  N.   E.  845. 

A  State  prohibition  law  provid- 
ing that  it  shall  become  opera- 
tive in  counties  where  local  op- 
tion prevails  on  January  1,  1908, 
and  in  all  other  counties  on  Jan- 
uary 1,  1909,  is  a  general  and 
not  a  local  law.  Stale  v.  Skeggs 
(Ala.),  46  So.  268. 

An  act  of  Georgia  giving  local 
option  to  Douglass  County,  not 
undertaking  to  effect  therein  the 
domestic  wine  act,  was  not  a  law 
violating  the  provisions  of  the 
Constitution  forbidding  special 
legislation  in  a  case  provided  for 
by  an  existing  general  law.  Han- 
cock V.  State,  114  Ga.  439;  40  S. 
E.  317;  Roberts  v.  State,  114  Ga. 
541;   40  S.  E.  750. 

The  Texas  statute  of  April  5, 
1907  (Acts  1^07,  p.  156.  c.  77), 
prohibiting  the  storing  of  liquor 
for  sale  in  local  option  districts, 
nor  the  local  option  law,  is  neither 


a  local  or  special  law.  Ex  parte 
Dupree  (Tex.),  105  S.  W.  493; 
Ex  parte  Bj^rd  (Tex.),  105  S.  W. 
496. 

A  statute  amending  the  gen- 
eral dispensary  law  of  South  Car- 
olina and  levying  a  small  tax  on 
counties  voting  out  the  dispen- 
sary with  the  exception  of  two 
counties  which  never  had  dispen- 
saries, is  not  a  special  law,  but 
is  a  general  law  with  special  pro- 
visions. Murphy  v.  London,  76 
S.  C.  21 ;   56  S.  E.  850. 

A  sale  by  an  incorporated  so- 
cial club  without  license  to  its 
members,  being  a  violation  of  the 
genei-al  State  law,  a  subsequent 
statute  confirming  the  incorpo- 
ration of  a  club  under  the  gen- 
eral law  and  enlarging  its  pow- 
ers so  as  to  enable  it  to  sell  to 
its  members,  without  a  license 
tlierefor,  is  a  special  law  and 
void.  Beauvoir  Club  v.  State,  148 
Ala.    643;    42    So.    1040. 

The  Act  of  Minnesota.  Acts 
18f)5,  c.  259,  prohibiting  sale  of 
liquors  in  a  town  after  the  elec- 
tors had  by  a  majority  vote  de- 
clared for  prohibition,  is  consti- 
tutional. State  v.  Johnson,  86 
^Umi.   121:    90  N.  W.   161. 

The  Alabama  prohibition  law 
(Sp.  Acts  1907.  p.  71)  is  a  gen- 
eral and  not  a  local  law.  State 
v.   Pitts    (Ala.),  49   So.   441. 


§  167  TRxVFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  252 

civilized  institutions,  but  it  is  also  the  very  foundation  upon 
which  our  social  system  rests,  and  he  who  violates  these  laws 
may  not  only  forfeit  property  and  personal  liberty,  but  also 
life  itself.  It  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  protection  to 
society  that  the  majesty  of  the  law  must  be  enforced  against 
offending  members  and  against  offending  property.  If  prop- 
erty becomes  a  nuisance,  if  prejudicial  to  the  health  or 
morals  of  the  public,  it  may  be  abated  or  destroyed  by  legal 
sanction.  This  power  is  in  harmony  with  self-preservation 
and  is  essential  to  every  organized  community.  Under  our 
Federal,  as  well  as  under  our  State  Constitutions,  it  is  not 
uncommon  to  pass  laws  declaring  articles  to  be  forfeited 
when  they  are  used  for  illegal  or  criminal  purposes.  This  is 
the  case  under  the  laws  prohibiting  counterfeiting,  smuggling 
and  piracy ;  so  also  with  obscene  books  and  pictures."  That 
proceedings  in  rem,  against  property  used  for. unlawful  pur- 
poses, may  be  sanctioned  by  laws  without  doing  violence  to 
the  Constitution,  is  conclusive!}^  settled  by  the  highest 
judicial  tribunal  in  our  country.^ ^  In  a  leading  case  upon 
this  point.  Judge  Story  said:  "The  thing  is  here  pri- 
marily considered  as  the  offender,  or  rather  the  offense 
is  attached  primarily  to  the  thing,  and  this,  whether 
the  offense  be  malum  prohibitum  or  malum  in  se.  The 
same  principle  applied  to  proceedings  in  rem,  or  seizures 
in  admiralty.  Many  cases  exist  where  the  forfeiture  for 
acts  done  attach  solely  in  rem,  and  there  is  no  accompanying 
penalty  in  personam.  Many  cases  exist  where  there  is  both 
forfeiture  in  rem  and  a  personal  penalty.  But  in  neither 
class  of  cases  has  it  ever  been  decided  that  the  prosecutions 
were  dependent  upon  each  other.    But  the  practice  has  been. 

1*  Chir  House  No.  2  v.  State,  4  gar    v.    Boyle,     9     Cranch,      191; 

Greene    (Iowa)    172.  United    States    v.    6    Packages    of 

15  Paulina's     Cargo     v.     United  Goods,    6    Wheat.     (U.    S.)     520; 

State,  7  Cranch   (U.  S.)    52;  Car-  United    States    v.    .350    Chests    of 

go  of  Aurora  v.  United  States,  7  Tea,  12  Wheat.    (U.  S.  4-86;  Unit- 

Cranch    (U.  S.)    382;   The  Venus,  ed    State    v.    422   Casks   of   Wine, 

8    Cranch.     (U.    S.)     253;    United  1     Pet.     (U.      S.)      547;      United 

States  V.   1,960   Bags   of  Coffee,  8  State   v.   84   Boxes   Sugar,   7    Pet. 

Cranch  (U.  S.)   398;   30  hhds.  Su-  (U.   S.)    453. 


253  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  168 

and  so  this  court  understands  the  law  to  be,  that  a  proceed- 
ing in  rem  stands  independent  of,  and  wholly  unaffected  by, 
any  criminal  proceeding  in  2J('''-s'f' "«"«•"  ^*^ 

Sec.  168.     Search  and  seizure  of  liquors  illegally  kept. 

The  Legislature  may  declare  that  intoxicating  liquors 
kept  in  violation  of  a  statute  are  contraband  goods  and 
authorize  their  seizure  and  destruction  under  the  processes 
of  the  courts.  "Certain  articles  which  are  treated  as  prop- 
erty while  used  for  lawful  purposes,"  said  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Maine,  "may  be  subjects  of  forfeiture  and  destruc- 
tion, under  proper  statutory  provisions,  if  their  use  is 
deemed  pernicious  to  the  best  interests  of  the  community. 
And  when  such  articles  are  attempted  to  be  used  for  unlaw- 
ful purposes,  or  in  an  unlawful  manner,  and  the  attempts 
are  so  concealed  that  ordinary  diligence  fails  to  make  such 
discovery  as  to  enable  the  law  to  declare  the  forfeiture, 
statutes  authorizing  searches  and  seizures  have  been  held 
legitimate.  The  exercise  of  this  power  must  be  properly 
guarded,  that  abuses  may  be  prevented,  and  that  a  citizen 
shall  not  be  deprived  of  his  property  without  having  an 
accusation  against  him  setting  out  the  nature  and  charge 
thereof,  and  but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law 
of  the  land;  and  he  shall  be  secure  in  his  person,  houses, 
papers  and  possessions  from  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures.  It  is  not  perceived  that  the  statute  under  which 
the  suit  in  this  case  is  attempted  to  be  defended  violates 
any  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  which  have  been 
adverted  to."^'     But  the  law  must  give  the  owner  of  the 

16  The  Palmyra,  12  Wheat.  ( U.  16  R.  154;  11  Atl.  773;  State  v. 
g  )   1  Snow,   3   R.   I.   64;   In  re  Liquors 

17  Gray  v.  Kimball,  42  Me.  299,  of  Horgan,  16  R.  I.  542;  18  Atl. 
307;  State  v.  Kapinsky  (Me.).  279;  In  re  Liquors  of  McSorley, 
73  Atl.  830;  Santo  v.  State,  2  15  R.  L  '608;  10  Atl.  659;  State 
Iowa  165;  63  Am.  Dec.  487;  State  v.  Dowdell,  98  Me.  460;  57  Atl. 
V.  Miller,  48  Me.  576;  Lincoln  v.  846;  State  v.  American  Express 
Smith,  27  Vt.  328;  Gill  v.  Par-  Co.,  118  Iowa,  447;  92  N.  W.  66; 
ker,  31  Vt.  610;  State  v.  Wheeler,  Sothman  v.  State,  66  Neb.  302; 
25  Conn.  290;  Allen  v.  Staples,  6  92  N.  W.  303;  Dupree  v.  State 
Gray  491;  Oviatt  v.  Pond,  29  (Tex.),  119  S.  W.  301 ;  107  S.  W. 
Conn.   479;    State   v.    Fitzpatrick,  926. 


§168 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


254 


property  an  apportiinity  to  defend  it,  and  give  him  notice  of 
its  seizure;  and  if  it  does  not  it  is  invalid/*  Yet  a  statute 
may  authorize  the  seizure  without  a  warrant  of  liquors  un- 
lawfully kept,  or  even  in  process  of  an  unlawful  sale  or 
transportation,^^  although  a  statute  authorizing  an  officer 
to  close  a  saloon  unlawfully  kept  open  and  to  arrest  the 
keeper  without  warrant  has  been  held  unconstitutional  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  an  undue  interference  with  persons  or 
property  without  due  process  of  law,  and  prohibits  the 
issuance  of  warrants  unsupported  by  oath.-''  A  statute  giving 
a  court  of  chaneeiy  power  to  abate  a  liquor  nuisance  is  con- 
stitutional, the  proceedings  of  a  court  of  chancery  being 
"due  process  of  law"  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitu- 
tional guaranty.-^     So  a  statute  authorizing  the  issuance  of 


18  Fisher  v.  McGirr,  1  Gi-ay  1 ; 
61  Am.  Dec.  381;  State  v.  Snow, 
3  R.  -I.  '64;  Hibbard  v.  People,  4 
Mich.  125;  State  v.  Snow,  3  K. 
I.  M;  Greene  v.  James,  2  Cur- 
tis C.  C.  187;  People  v.  Haug, 
68  Mich.  549;  37  N.  W.  21;  Ex 
parte  Dupree  (Tex.),  105  S.  W. 
403;  Ex  parte  Byrd  (Tex.),  105 
S.  W.  496. 

19  State  V.  O'Neil,  58  Vt.  140; 
2  All.  586;  Jones  v.  Root,  6  Gray 
435;  Mason  v.  Lothrop,  7  Gray, 
354;  State  v.  LeClair,  86  Me. 
522;   30  Atl.  7. 

20  People  V.  Haug,  68  Mich. 
549;  37  N.  W.  21;  Bessemeir  v. 
Edge    (Ala.),  50  So.  270. 

The  Nebraska  Bill  of  Rights, 
declaring  that  the  right  to  be 
heard  in  all  civil  cases  in  the 
court  of  last  resort,  by  appeal, 
error  or  otherwise,  shall  not  be 
denied,  does  not  apply  to  a  pros- 
ecution for  the  seizure  and  de- 
struction of  contraband  liquors. 
Sothman  v.  State,  66  Neb.  302; 
92  N.   W.   303. 


Where  an  officer  secretly  en- 
tered, on  Sunday,  the  stairway 
of  the  defendant,  removed  some 
bricks  from  the  wall,  and  through 
this  aperture  saw  defendant  sell 
liquors  in  violation  of  law,  it  waa 
held  that  his  evidence  was  admis- 
sible and  was  not  obtained  in  vi- 
olation of  the  constitutional 
provisions  against  unreasonable 
searches  and  seizures,  those  pro- 
visions not  applying  to  unau- 
thorized acts  of  private  persons 
or  petty  officers.  Cohn  v.  State 
(Tenn.),    109   S.  W.    1149. 

A  statute  providing  for  a 
search  of  premises  and  seizure  of 
property  under  a  search  war- 
rant, but  making  no  provisions 
for  a  disposition  of  the  property 
seized,  is  unconstitutional,  be- 
cause it  deprives  the  owner  of 
his  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  Beavers  v.  Godwin  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  90  S.  W.  930. 

21  State  V.  Jordan,  72  Iowa 
377;  34  N.  W,  285. 


255  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP    STATUTES.  §  169 

a  warrant  to  seize  liquors  upon  an  affidavit  made  upon  in- 
formation and  belief  is  valid.^-  But  a  statute  which  fails 
to  require  the  indictment,  information,  complaint  or  affidavit 
to  describe  the  place  to  be  searched  as  required  by  a  bill  of 
rights  is  invalid ;  and  so  is  one  which  provides  for  the 
replevin  of  goods  seized  on  giving  bond,  but  makes  the 
value  put  upon  the  property  seized  uncontrovertible  in  an 
action  brought  on  such  bond  to  recover  its  value.-^ 

Sec.  169.    Destruction  of  intoxicating  liquors. 

The  Legislature  maj^  provide  that  liquors  kept  in  violation 
of  law  may  be  destroyed  under  a  judgment  of  the  court ;  and 
the  act  is  not  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  with- 
out just  compensation.-*  The  destruction  of  the  property  is 
a  part  of  the  punishment  inflicted  for  a  violation  of  the  law, 
and  is  no  more  a  taking  of  property  without  compensation 
than  is  the  infliction  of  a  fine  for  the  same  criminal  act. 
*'So,  in  the  case  under  consideration,  the  law  imposes  the 
forfeiture  of  the  liquors,  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  town,  but 
as  a  punishment  for  keeping  them  for  an  unlawful  purpose. 
Forfeitures  have  frequently  been  imposed  by  laws  of  Con- 
gress, as  well  as  by  the  laws  of  this  State,  none  of  which 
have  ever  been  adjudged  unconstitutional."-^     While  most 

22  Rose  V.  state,   171   Ind.  60*2;  cases     in     People    v.    Toynbee,     2 

87  N.  E.  103.  Parker  C.   C.   329;    2   Park.  €.  C. 

23Dupree   v.   State    (Tex.),    119  490;    1   Kern.    (N.   Y.)    378;    Peo- 

S.     W.     301,     answering      (Tex.)  pie    v.     Wynehamer,    2    Park.    C. 

107  S.  W.  926,  C.  377;  2  Park.  C.  C.  421;  3  Kern. 

24  State    V.    Snow,    3    R.    I.    64;  (N.  Y.)    378,  and  Miller  v.  State, 

Commonwealth      v.      Intoxicating  3    Ohio    St.    475 ;    King   v.    Gard- 

Liquors,    107    Mass.    396;     Fisher  ner,  25   Xova   Scotia  48;    McMan- 

V.  McGirr,  1  Gray  1;  61  Am.  Dec.  us    v.    State,    65    Kan.    720;     70 

381;    In  re   Intoxicating   Liquors,  Pac.   700. 

15  R.   I.  '608;    10  Atl.  €59;   State  25  state    v.    Brennan,   25    Conn. 

V.   Brennan,   25  Conn.   278;    State  278. 

V.   Wheeler,  25   Conn.   290;    Craig  This    method    of   inflicting   pun- 

V.    Werthmueller,    78    Iowa    598;  ishment  for  a  violation  of   liquor 

43  N.  W.  606;  Oviatt  v.  Pond,  20  laws   is   very   old,    dating  back   to 

Conn.   479;    Lincoln   v.    Smith,   27  the    first    English    statute   on   the 

Vt.      328.     See      some      doubting  subject     of      regulating      tippling 


§170 


TBxVFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


256 


of  the  statutes  require  a  conviction  and  judgment  author- 
izing the  destruction  of  the  liquors  before  tliey  can  be 
destroyed ;  -'^'  yet  a  statute  may  authorize  their  destruction 
upon  seizure  where  absolute  prohibition  prevails  and  before 
the  conviction  of  the  owner.-^  A  statute  authorizing  the 
seizure  and  destruction  of  liquors  seized,  under  process 
issued  and  by  authority  of  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  police 
court,  but  providing  no  appeal  from  such  judgment,  is  not 
for  that  reason  unconstitutional.-* 


Sec.  170.    Nuisance — Abatement, 

Not  only  has  the  State  the  power  to  regulate  or  prohibit 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  but  it  has  the  power  to 
declare  that  the  keeping  of  them — even  though  not  for  sale, 
it  would  seem — and  the  buildings  wherein  they  are  kept, 
shall  be  deemed  a  nuisance.-^    In  Iowa,  a  statute  provided,  if 


Louses  Stat.  12  Edw.  II,  c.  6, 
A.   D.   13 IS. 

It  may  be  said  that  by  the 
judgment  of  conviction  the 
ownership  of  the  property  vests 
in  the  State,  and  the  State  then 
destroys  its  own  property.  Gray 
V.  Kimball,  42  Me.  299;  McCoy 
V.  Zane,  65  Mo.  1. 

In  Iowa  it  has  been  held  that 
goods  shipped  into  the  State  "C 
O.  D."  may  be  seized  while  in  the 
hands  of  the  carrier.  State  v. 
American  Express  Co.,  118  Iowa 
447 ;  92  N.  W.  66 ;  while  in  Maine 
it  is  held  that  they  cannot,  unless 
intended  for  unlawful  sale.  State 
V.  Intoxicating  Liquors,  98  Me. 
464;   57   Atl.   798. 

26  State  V.  McMaster,  13  N.  D. 
58;  99  N.  W.  58. 

2TMcManus,  65  Kan.  720;  70 
Pac.  700. 

28Stahl  V.  Lee  (Kan.),  80 
Pac.  963.  The  statute  involved 
in  this   decision  authorized  cities 


to  seize  and  destroy  contraband 
liquors. 

If  a  jury  trial  can  be  obtained 
by  an  appeal,  the  statute  is  not 
void  because  the  owner  of  the 
property  cannot  obtain  a  jury 
trial  in  the  lower  court.  State  v. 
Fitzpatrick,  16  R.  I.  54;  11  Atl. 
7'67. 

An  ordinance  cannot  author- 
ize the  seizure  and  carrying  away 
of  liquors  before  the  question  is 
judicially  determined.  Darst  v. 
People,  51  111.  286;  2  Am.  Rep. 
301. 

29Mugler  V.  State,  123  U.  S. 
623;  8  Sup.  Ct.  273;  State  v. 
Crawford,  28  Kan.  276;  Little- 
ton V.  Fritz,  65  Iowa  488;  22  N. 
W.  641;  64  Am.  St.  19;  McLane 
V.  Leicht,  69  Iowa  401 ;  29  N.  W. 
327 ;  Our  House  v.  State,  4  Greene 
(Iowa)  172;  McLaughlin  v. 
State,  45  Ind.  338;  Zumhoff  v. 
State,  4  Greene  (Iowa)  526; 
Streeter    v.    People,    69    111.    59i5; 


257  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  170 

in  either  a  civil  or  criminal  ease,  the  existence  of  a  nuisance 
be  established  where  intoxicating  liquors  was  involved,  the 
court  should  enter  a  judgment  abating  the  nuisance  and 
direct  a  seizure  and  destruction  of  the  liquor  and  a  removal 
and  sale  of  the  fixtures  and  furaiture  used  on  the  premises 
for  either  the  manufacture  or  sale  of  the  liquor.  This  was 
held  to  be  a  valid  statute.  "The  appellees,"  said  the  court, 
"contend  that  though  they  did  create  and  maintain  nuisances 
as  alleged,  no  decree  should  be  entered  against  them  for  the 
seizure  and  destruction  of  their  liquors,  nor  for  the  removal 
and  sale  of  furniture  and  fixtures,  because  the  law  author- 
izing the  same  is  in  conflict  with  Amendments  TV  and  XIV 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  Sections  8  and 
9,  Bill  of  Rights,  and  Article  III,  Constitution  of  Iowa. 
Their  contention  is  that  property  of  an  individual  cannot 
be  confiscated  or  forfeited  by  legislative  enactment,  but  only 
by  the  judgment  of  a  court,  in  accordance  with  due  process 
of  law,  and  that  by  said  laws  the  Legislature  forfeits  the 
property  in  question  and  does  not  leave  such  forfeiture  to 
the  court.;  that  property  cannot  be  forfeited  by  an  action 
against  the  person,  but  must  be  by  action  against  the  thing, 
and  that  in  a  criminal  ease  for  nuisance  the  property  is  not 
involved,  and  that  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  his  day  in 
court  upon  the  question  of  forfeiture  of  his  property.  We 
understand  the  law  to  be  that  property  of  individuals  cannot 
be  forfeited  by  legislative  enactment;  that  such  forfeitures 
can  only  be  by  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction, in  a  proper  case,  after  due  notice.  This  statute  does 
not  forfeit  property  by  legislative  enactment,  but,  as  in 
many  other  instances,  authorizes  and  requires  the  courts,  in 
cases  where  it  has  been  established  upon  judicial  investiga- 
tion that  property  is  such,  or  has  been  so  used,  as  to  con- 
stitute a  nuisance,  to  abate  the  nuisance  by  destroying  and 
selling  the  property.  It  is  only  *by  the  judgment  of  a  court 
that  any  person  may  rightfully  destroy  liquors  found  upon 

Commonwealth  v.  Howe,  13  Gray       E.    389;    McMantis    v.    State,    05 
26;    Commonwealth    v.    Intoxicat-       Kan.  720;   70  I'ac.  700. 
ing  Liquors,  172  Mass.  311;  52  H. 


§  171  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  258 

the  defendant's  premises  described,  or  remove  therefrom  and 
sell  the  furniture,  fixtures,  etc.,  therein.  In  actions,  either 
criminal  or  equitable,  wherein  the  existence  of  a  nuisance 
is  established  under  the  law  in  question,  the  action  is  against 
the  thing  in  the  place,  as  well  as  against  the  persons.  In 
either  case  the  question  is  whether  the  place  was  a  nuisance, 
and,  if  so,  then  whether  the  person  was  engaged  in  keeping 
it.  Such  actions  are  against  the  thing,  as  well  as  the  per- 
sons, and  the  person  has  due  notice,  and  his  day  in  court, 
in  which  to  defend  against  the  forfeiture  of  his  prop- 
erty as  well  as  the  punishment  of  himself.  "^°  The  abate- 
ment may  be  authorized  by  proceedings  in  ehancery.^^  The 
Legislature  may  even  authorize  a  municipality  to  declare  the 
keeping  of  liquors  to  be  a  nuisance.^- 

Sec,  171.  Enjoining  the  maintenance  of  liquor  establish- 
ments. 
Statutes  have  been  enacted  prohibiting  the  sale,  keeping 
and  manufacture  of  liquors  and  authorizing  the  courts  to 
enforce  their  provisions  by  injunctions,  and  to  punish  those 
violating  such  injunctions  for  contempt  of  court.  These 
statutes  are  held  to  be  within  the  constitutional  power  of 

30  Craig     v.    Werthmueller,    78  Webb,    44   Kan.    71,    23    P.    1073; 
Iowa  59(8;    43  N.  W.   606.  Monroe    v.    City    of   Lawrence,    44 

31  State  V.  Jordan,  72  Iowa  377;  Kan.   607;    24  P.    1113);    Stahl  v. 
34  N.   W.  2'8i5;    Carleton  v.  Regg,  Lee    (Kan.),  80  Pac.   983. 

149   Mass.   550;    22  N.   E.  55.  In    New    Hampshire,    upon    de- 

In    such    instance     no     Federal  mand    of    the    defendant,    a    jury 

question   is   involved.     Schmidt   v.  must   be  called    to   determine   the 

Cobb,   119   U.    S.  286;    7   Sup.  Ct.  fact  of  the  nuisance  before  a  judg- 

1373.  ment  of  abatement  can  be  entered. 

32Goddard    v.    Jacksonville,    15  But    that    is    a    practice    peculiar 

111.   588;    '60    Am.    Dec.    773;    To-  to   that  .State.      State   v.    Currier 

peka  v.   Raynor,  60  Kan.  860;   58  (N.  H.),   19  Atl.  1000. 
Pac.    557;    61    Kan.    10;    55    Pac.  A    private    individual    may    de- 

509    (citing   Franklin  v.   Westfall,  stroy     liquors     which     the     State 

27   Kan.    614;    City   of   Topeka   v.  makes    a    nuisance,    if   he   can    do 

Myers,    34    Fan.    500;    8    P.    726;  so    without    committing    a    breach 

Same   v.    Zufall,    40    Kan.    47,    19  of  the  peace.     State  v.  Paul,  5  R. 

P.  359;    Junction   City   v.    Keefle,  I.    185. 
40  Kan.  27'5;   19  P.  735;  Same  v. 


259 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OP    STATUTES. 


§172 


the  Legislature  to  enact  them.^^  A  statute  empowering  any 
citizen  of  the  State,  although  he  may  not  have  suffered  any 
special  damage,  to  maintain  an  action  to  abate  a  liquor  nui- 
sance is  constitutional.^* 

Sec.  172.    Amount  of  penalty — Unusual  punishment. 

A  statute  providing  a  fine  on  second  conviction  of  $300, 
or  in  lieu  thereof  three  years'  imprisonment,  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional.^^ And  a  statute  providing  for  a  fine  of  not  less 
than  $100  nor  more  than  $500,  or  imprisonment  of  not  less 
than  six  months,  or  both  such  fine  and  imprisonment,  in  the 
discretion  of  the  court,  is  not  an  excessive  fine  nor  the  in- 
fliction of  cruel  and  unusual  punishment.^''  A  statute  may 
authorize  a  revocation  of  his  license  on  conviction  of  the  de- 
fendant of  having  violated  the  law  under  which  it  was 
issued. ^^  So  long  as  a  city  keeps  wnthin  the  limitations  of 
a  statute  authorizing  it  to  regulate  the  sale  of  liquors  and  im- 

lowa  591;  22  N.  W.  646;  Pon- 
tius V.  Bowman,  GG  Iowa  88 ;  23 
K  W.  277;  Martin  v.  Blattner, 
68  Iowa  286;  25  N.  W.  131;  Mc- 
Lane  v.  Granger,  74  Iowa  152; 
37  N.  VV.  123.  See  State  v.  Paul, 
5  R.  I.   185. 

35  State  V.  Hodgson,  66  Vt.  134; 
28  Atl.  1089. 

30  Cardillo  v.  People,  26  Colo. 
355;  58  Pac.  678.  See  McDonald 
V.  Commonwealth,  173  Mass.  322; 
5>3  X.  E.  814;  State  v.  Phillips, 
73  Minn.  77;  and  State  v.  Dur- 
nam,  73  Minn.  150:  75  X.  W. 
1127;  People  v.  Crotty,  22  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  77;  47  N.  Y.  Supp. 
845;  Ex  parte  Bates,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
Rep.  548;  40  S.  W.  269.  See 
State  V.  Edwards,  109  La.  236; 
33   So.  209. 

37  Krueger  v.  Colville,  49  Wash. 
295;  95  Pac.  81;  Commonwealth 
V.  Brothers,  158  Mass.  200;  33 
N.   E.    386. 


33  State  V.  Thomas,  74  Kan.  360; 
86    Pac.    499. 

An  action  will  not  lie  to  re- 
strain the  enforcement  of  a  con- 
stitutional statute.  Plumb  v. 
Christie,  103  Ga.  G86;  30  S.  E. 
759;  42  L.  R.  A.  181;  Deal  v. 
Singletary  (Ga.),  30  S.  E. 
765.  See  Christian  Moer.  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.   Hill,   166   Fed.   1140. 

A  statute  imposing  a  heavy  fine 
and  also  imprisonment  for  viola- 
tion of  an  injunction  restrain- 
ing a  violation  of  the  liquor  laws 
is  not  unconstitutional,  and  does 
not  violate  the  provisions  of  a 
Constitution  that  excessive  fines 
shall  not  be  imposed,  nor  cruel 
or  unusual  punisliment  inflicted. 
Ex  parte  Keeler,  45  S.  C.  537 ;  23 
S.  E.  865;  McLane  v.  Granger, 
74  Iowa   152;    37  N.   W.   123. 

34  Littleton  v.  Fritz,  65  Iowa 
48«;  22  N.  W.  641;  54  Am.  Rep. 
19;    Pontius    V.    Winebrenner,    65 


§  173  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  260 

posing  a  fine  for  the  violation  of  the  ordinance  regulating 
such  sale,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  amount  of  the  fine  is 
excessive  because  it  is  high.'^^  Where  the  Constitution  pro- 
vided that  "no  municipal  ordinance  shall  fix  a  penalty  for  the 
violation  thereof  at  less  than  that  imposed  by  statute  for 
the  same  off'ense, "  and  a  statute  provided  a  penalty  for  an 
unlawful  sale  of  licpior  at  ''not  less  than  $50  nor  more  than 
$100,  or  be  confined  in  the  county  jail  for  not  less  than  ten 
days  nor  more  than  forty  days,  or  both  so  fined  and  im- 
prisoned in  the  discretion  of  the  court  or  jury,"  it  was  held 
that  an  ordinance  providing  for  the  same  offense  a  fine  of 
"not  less  than  $60  nor  more  than  $100"  was  void,  because  it 
violated  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  quoted  above.^^ 
A  statute  which  fixes  no  maximum  penalty,  leaving  the 
■amount  to  the  discretion  of  the  court,  is  valid.*" 

Sec.  173.  Ex  post  facto  law  defined — Heavier  subsequent 
punishment. 
The  phrase  ex  post  facto  is  technical,  and  has  relation 
only  to  criminal  laws;  it  does  not  embrace  statutes  respect- 
ing private  rights  or  civil  remedies.*^  The  words  have  a 
definite,  technical  signification.  The  plain  and  obvious 
meaning  of  a  constitutional  provision  that  no  ex  post  facto 
law  shall  be  passed  is,  that  the  licgislature  shall  not  pass 
any  law,  after  an  act  done  by  any  citizen,  which  shall  have 
relation  to  that  act,  so  as  to  punish  that  which  was  inno- 

38  Areola  v.   Wilkinson,  233  III.  persons  then  under  indictment  for 

250;   84  N.  E.  264.  violating  the  liquor  laws  shall  be 

sft  Kehr  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky. ),  released   on   payment  of   all   costs 

2<)   Ky.   L.   Eep.    1234;    83    S.    VV.  and   a  fee   to   the   prosecuting   at- 

633.  torney  directing  the  court  to  dis- 

A  State   authorizing  the   reduc-  mis"  tlie  ease    is  unconstitutional, 

tion  of  costs  does  not  deprive  the  as    an    intereference    with   the   ju- 

party  against  whom  they  are  re-  dicial    department    of  the   govern- 

duced   of   the  equal    protection   of  ment.       State    v.     Sloss,    25    Mo. 

the  laws,  it  applying  to  all  cases  291;    69   Am.   Dec.   467.     See  also 

coming      within      the      prescribed  State  v.  Hodgson,  66  Vt.  134;   28 

class.     Green  v.  Sklara,  188  Mass.  Atl.   1089. 

363;    74  N.   E.   595.  4 1  Andrews  v.  Russell,  7  Blackf. 

40  State    V.    Kight,     103    Minn.  (Ind.)     474;    Poll:    Co.    v.    Hierb, 

371;    119  N.  W.  56.  37   Iowa  361. 
A    statute    providing    that    all 


261  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  173 

cent  when  done;  or  add  to  the  punishment  of  that  which 
was  criminal ;  or  to  increase  the  malignity  of  a  crime ;  or  to 
retrench  the  rules  of  evidence,  so  as  to  make  conviction 
more  easy.^-  Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  a  statute, 
regulating  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors,  which  provides 
that  one  who  has  been  convicted  of  a  violation  of  its  pro- 
visions, who  shall  again  commit  the  same  offense,  is  to  be 
punished  with  an  increased  penalty,  is  not  ex  post  facto, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  even  when 
applied  to  one  who  committed  the  first  offense  prior  to  the 
taking  effect  of  the  statute.*^  The  true  principle  in  this 
respect  is  well  expressed  by  Judge  Cooley,  as  follows: 
"And  a  law  is  not  objectionable  as  ex  post  facto  which,  in 
providing  for  the  punishment  of  future  offenses,  authorizes 
the  offender's  conduct  in  the  past  to  be  taken  into  account, 
and  the  punishment  to  be  graduated  accordingly.  Heavier 
penalties  are  often  provided  by  law  for  a  second  or  any 
subsequent  offense  than  for  the  first,  and  it  has  not  been 
deemed  objectionable  that  in  providing  for  such  heavier 
penalties  the  prior  conviction  authorized  to  be  taken  into 
account  may  have  taken  place  before  the  law  was  passed. 
In  such  cases  it  is  the  second  or  subsequent  offense  that  is 
punished,  not  the  first."  "  In  such  case  the  offender  is  pun- 
ished, not  for  what  he  had  done  before  the  statute  took 
effect,  but  for  his  subsequent  violation  of  the  law  with  the 
increased  penalty  before  his  eyes.*=  The  true  construction 
of  such  a  statute  is,  that  the  second  offense  must  be  com- 
mitted after  the  first  in  order  to  warrant  the  enhanced  pen- 
alty. It  is  not  enough  that  there  be  two  successive  of- 
fenses by  the  same  person,  which  are  severally  and  suc- 
cessively prosecuted  to  conviction;  though  the  second  indict- 

*2Calcler  v.  Bull,  3  Ball.  (U.  ^I'Cooley's  Const.  Lim.,  4th  ed., 
S.)  3S{3;  Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6  p.  331  ;  Ex  parte  Ginterrez,  45 
€ranch  (U.  S.)  87;  Ogden  v.  Cal.  429 ;  People  v.  Butler,  3  Cow. 
Saunders,  12  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  213;  (N.  Y.  347;  Hyser  v.  Common- 
Society,  etc.  V.  Wheeler,  2  Gall.  wealth,  116  Ky.  410;  25  Ky.  L. 
(U.  S.)  105;  .Strong  v.  State,  1  Rep.  608;  76  S.  W.  174. 
Blackf.    (Ind.)    193.  45  state  v.  Woods,  tiS  Me.   409; 

43  Boss's  Case,  2   Pick.    (Mass.)  State  v.  Hodgson,  m  Vt.  134;  28 

1'65.  Atl.   1089. 


U74 


tkj\pfic  in  intoxicating  liquors. 


262 


ment  charge  the  first  conviction  as  a  part  of  the  crime.  The 
reasonable  construction  of  such  a  statute  is  that  "when 
a  statute  makes  a  second  offense  belong,  or  subject  to  a 
heavier  punishment  than  the  first,  it  is  always  implied  that 
such  second  offense  ought  to  be  committed  after  a  convic- 
tion for  the  first;  for  the  gentler  method  shall  first  be  tried, 
which,  perhaps,  may  prove  effectual. ' '  *''  The  doctrine  that 
when  a  statute  imposes  a  greater  punishment  upon  second 
and  subsequent  convictions  of  an  offense,  that  the  former  con- 
viction must  be  alleged  in  the  indictment  and  proved  at  the 
trial,  or  the  same  can  only  be  punished  as  a  first  offense,  is 
sustained  by  the  great  weight  of  the  authorities.*^ 


Sec.  174.     British  North  American  Act. 

The  British  North  American  Act  on  the  subject  of  reg- 
ulating intoxicating  liquors  overrides  all  provincial  acts 
when  they  conflict  with  it.**  If  the  local  act  conflicts  with 
such  statute,  it  is  said  to  be  unconstitutional.*" 


*fi  People  V.  Butler,  3  Cow.  347. 

47  Wharton's  Crim.  Plead,  and 
Prac.  (9th  ed.),  §935;  1  Bishop's 
Crim.  Law,  §§959-964;  Clark's 
Crim.  Proc.,  pp.  203,  204;  Evans 
V.  State,  150  Ind.  651;  50  N.  E. 
S20;  State  v.  Gorham,  65  Me. 
270;  Maguire  v.  State,  47  Md. 
485 ;  Plumbly  v.  Conunonwealth, 
43  Mass.  (2  Met.)  413;  Tuttle 
V.  Commonwealth,  08  Mass.  (2 
Gray)  506;  Commonwealth  v. 
Holley,  69  Mass.  (3  Gray)  458; 
Garvey  v.  Comn'.onwealth,  74 
Mass.  (8  GrajO  382;  Common- 
wealth V.  Miller,  74  Mass.  (3 
Gray )  484 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Harrington,  130  Mass.  35;  State 
V.  Adams,  64  X.  11.  440;  13  Atl. 
785;  Ranch  v.  Commonwealth,  78 
Pa.  ,St.  490;  State  v.  Edwards,  109 
Lea  236;   37  So.  209. 

A  statute  doubling  the  penalty 
for  a  refusal  to  furnish  the  as- 
sessor information  of  the  presence 


of  intoxicating  liquor,  after  de- 
mand made  by  him,  for  taxation, 
is  valid.  Adler  v.  Whitbeck,  44 
Ohio  St.  539;    9  N.  E.  672. 

A  statute  requiring  the  defend- 
ant, on  a  second  conviction  for 
violating  the  liquor  law,  to  exe- 
cute a  bond  for  his  "good  be- 
havior" for  twelve  months,  is 
constitutional.  Hyser  v.  Common- 
wealth, 116  Ky.  410;  25  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  608;   76  S.  W.  174. 

48  Regina  v.  Justices,  2  Pug. 
(X.  B.)  53'5;  License  Commis- 
sioners V.  Prince  Edward  County, 
26  Grant  (Ont.),  432;  License 
Conmiissioners  v.  Norfolk,  14 
Ont.    749. 

Thus  a  brewer  having  a  license 
under  it  may  sell  without  having 
a  local  license.  Regina  v.  Young, 
8  Ont.  476;  Regina  v.  Guittard, 
30  OTit.  283. 

40  QucLMi  v.  McDougall,  22 
Nova  Scotia,  442. 


263  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §§175,176 

Sec.  175.     Closing  saloons. 

A  statute  requiring  saloons  to  be  closed  on  Sunday  (and 
holidays)  is  constitutional."'"  So  a  statute  empowering  the 
Board  of  Police  Commissioners  of  a  city  to  order  all  drinking 
saloons  to  be  closed  ''temporarily"  whenever  iu  their  judg- 
ment public  peace  required  it,  and  inHicting  a  penalty  for 
disobedience  of  the  order  "during  such  period"  as  they 
shall  forbid,  is  valid;  but  an  order  closing  such  places  "un- 
til further  notice"  is  invalid,  because  indefinite.  The  pow- 
er thus  given  is  one  enabling  the  board  to  only  close  the 
saloons  temporarily  and  for  a  definite  interval.''^  So  stat- 
utes requiring  saloons  to  be  closed  at  night  during  such 
hours  as  are  not  usually  devoted  to  business — as  from  9 
p.  M.  to  5  or  6  A.  M. — ^are  valid.^"  So  a  statute  forbidding 
anyone  except  the  proprietor  or  his  employes  to  enter  his 
saloons  between  9  o'clock  p.  m.  and  5  o'clock  a.  m.  or  at  any 
time  on  Sunday  (or  holidays)  is  valid. ^' 

Sec.  176o    Evidence,  statutes  regulating 

Many  of  the  States  have  statutes  declaring  wliat  shall  con- 
stitute prima  facie  evidence  of  the  existence  of  certain  facts 
enumerated  in  them.     For  instance,  in  Maine,  the  faet  that 

The   Nova   Scotia   act   was   held  Power      to      close      saloons      on 

constitutional.      Brown    v.    Moore,  Sunday  could  not  be  delegated  to 

32  S.  C.  C.   (jST.  S.)   93;  Attorney-  police   juries.      State   v.   Baun,   33 

General      v.       Manitoba      License  La.  Ann.  081;  overruling  State  v. 

Holders'   Assn.    [1902],    App.    Cas.  Bott,    31    La.    Ann.    603;    33    Am. 

73;    Queen  v.    Ronnan,    23    Nova  Rep.    224. 

Scotia,   421 ;    Queen    v.    McKenzie,  52  Decker   v.   Sargeant,    125   Ind. 

23  Nova  Svotia,  6;  Queen  v.  King,  404;  25  N.  E.  4.-)8;  State  v.  Wash- 

25  Nova  Scotia,  4»8.  ington,   14  N.  J.  L.  605;   45  N.  J. 

For    Quebec    Act,    see    Ex    parte  L.    318;     43    Am.    Rep.    402;     Ex 

O'Neil,  9  Can.   Cr.  Cas.   141.  parte    Wolf,    14    Neb.    24;     14   N. 

50  State  v.  Grossman,  214  Mo.  W.  060;  Morris  v.  Rome,  10  Ga. 
233;  113  S.  W.  1074;  Common-  532;  Smith  v.  Knoxville,  3  Head, 
wealth  V.  McCann  (Ky.),  94  245;  Word  v.  Greenville,  8  Baxt. 
S.  W.  645;  29  Ky,  L.  Rep.  707.  228;  Gilham  v.  Wells,  64  Ga.  192. 
So  in  British  Columbia.  Sauer  5:,  Tlioma^  v.  Sanders  (Fla.), 
V.  Walker,  2  B.  C.  93.  47  So.  7»6. 

51  State  V.  Strauss,  49  Md.  2S8. 


§176 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


264: 


a  person  has  paid  the  Federal  tax  on  liquor-sellers,  and  in 
Massachusetts  the  fact  that  he  keeps  posted  on  his  prem- 
ises a  United  States  tax  receipt  as  a  dealer  in  liquors,  is  made 
by  statute  prima  facie  evidence  that  such  a  person  is  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  selling  liquor/'*  Such  statutes  have 
often  been  assailed  as  unconstitutional,  on  the  ground  that 
they  violate  the  guarantee  of  due  process  of  law  and  a 
trial  by  jury;  and  that  they  deprive  an  accused  of  the  pre- 
sumption of  innocence,  but  without,  perhaps,  an  exception, 
they  have  been  sustained  as  constitutional/^  In  New  York 
a  statute  provided  that  whenever  any  person  was  seen  to 
drink  in  a  shop,  etc.,  spirituous  liquors  which  were  for- 
bidden to  be  drunk  therein,  it  should  be  prima  facie  evi- 
dence that  such  liquors  were  sold  by  the  occupant  of  the 
premises  or  his  agent  with  the  intent  that  the  same  should 
be  drunk  therein.     A  defendant  was  an  occupant  of  prem- 


54  Public    Laws    Me.    [1887],    c. 
140;   Acts  Mass.   [1.887],  c.  414. 

55  State  V.  Dowdy,  145  N.  C. 
432;  58  S.  E.  1002;  State  v 
Toler  (N.  C),  58  S.  E.  1005, 
Rice  on  Ev.,  §§807,  808;  Whar 
ton  on  Crim.  Ev.,  §  7I5a;  Rob 
ertson  v.  People,  20  Colo.  279 
State  V.  Cunningham,  25  'Conn 
195;  Clopton  v.  Commonwealth 
(Va.),  63  S.  E.  1022;  State  v. 
Thomas,  47  Conn.  546;  36  Am. 
Rep.  .98;  Gage  v.  Cavalier,  125  111. 
447;  1/  N.  E.  777;  Chicago,  etc., 
R.  €o.  V.  Jones,  149  111.  361;  37 
N.  E.  247;  American,  etc.,  Bank 
V.  Gueder,  150  111.  33G;  37  N.  E. 
227;  Morgan  v.  State,  117  Ind. 
'569;  19  N.  E.  154;  Voght  v. 
State,  124  Ind.  358;  24  N.  E. 
680;  State  v.  Gerhardt,  145  Ind. 
439 ;  44  N.  E.  46.9 ;  State  v.  Beach, 
147  Ind.  74;  46  N.  E.  174;  Santo 
v.  State,  2  la.  165;  63  Am.  Dec. 
457;    Allen  v.  Armstrong,    16   la. 


508;  State  v.  Harley,  54  Me.  562; 
Fisher    v.     MoGirr,  Gray      1 ; 

Commonwealth  v.  Williams,  6 
Gray  (Mass.),  1;  Common- 
wealth V.  Rome,  14  Gray  (Mass.), 
47;  Holmes  v.  Hunt,  122  Mass. 
505;  23  Am.  Rep.  381;  Wright  v. 
Dunham,  13  Mich.  414;  Ess  v. 
Bonton,  64  Mo.  105;  State  v. 
Kingsley,  108  Mo.  135;  18  S.  \\ . 
994;  State  v.  Buck,  120  Mo.  479; 
25  S.  W.  573;  State  v.  Sattley, 
131  Mo.  464;  33  S.  W.  41;  Hand 
v.  Ballon,  12  JST.  Y.  541;  Howard 
V.  Moot,  64  N.  Y.  262;  Board, 
etc.,  V.  Merchant,  103  N.  Y.  143; 
8  X.  E.  484;  People  v.  Cannon, 
139  X.  Y.  32;  34  N.  E.  759;  Dun- 
can v.  Clement,  119  IST.  Y.  Supp. 
375  (conclusive  evidence)  ;  State 
V.  Higgins,  13  R.  I.  330;  43  Am. 
Rep.  26;  State  v.  Waldron,  16  R. 
I.  191;  14  Atl.  847;  Delaphlame 
V.  Cook,  7  Wis.  43;  People  v.  Mc- 
Bride,  234  111.  146;  84  N.  E.  865. 


265  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    STATUTES.  §  176 

ises  where  liquor  could  not  be  sold  to  be  drunk  thereon, 
and  was  prosecuted  for  selling  the  same  in  violation  of  the 
statute.  The  only  evidence  of  a  sale  by  the  accused  occu- 
pant was  the  fact  that  a  person  was  seen  to  drink  upou 
the  premises.  The  defendant  was  convicted.  It  was  claimed 
for  him  that  the  act  was  unconstitutional  on  the  ground 
that  it  violated  the  constitutional  guaranties  of  due  process 
of  law  and  trial  by  jury.  The  claim  was  not  sustained,  the 
court  holding  that  the  general  power  of  the  Legislature  to 
prescribe  rules  of  evidence  and  methods  of  proof  was  un- 
doubted, and  had  not  been  illegally  exercised  in  that  ease.^^ 
In  Massachusetts  it  was  held  in  a  criminal  prosecution  for 
a  violation  of  an  excise  law,  that  a  statute  which  provided 
that  the  delivery  of  any  spirituous  and  intoxicating  liquors 
in  or  from  any  building  or  place  other  than  a  dwelling 
house,  "shall  be  deemed  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  sale,"  was 
constitutional  and  valid.^^  In  Maine  it  was  held  that  an 
act  which  provided  that  "whenever  an  unlawful  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquor  is  alleged  and  a  delivery  proved  it  shall  not 
be  necessary  to  prove  payment,  but  such  delivery  shall  be 
sufficient  evidence  of  sale"  was  constitutional.^^  In  Con- 
necticut a  statute  for  the  suppression  of  intemperance  pro- 
vided that  on  the  trial  of  a  complaint  for  keeping  spirituous 
liquors  in  violation  of  the  statute,  proof  of  finding  of  such 
liquor  in  the  possession  of  the  accused,  under  certain  speci- 
fied circumstances,  should  be  received  and  acted  upon  by 
the  court  as  presumptive  evidence  that  the  liquor  was  kept 
or  held  for  sale  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  the  statute,  was 
held  constitutional  and  valid ;  ^®  and  a  like  ruling  has  been 
made  in  Iowa ;  ^°  and  a  like  one  in  Rhode  Island."     It  has 

50  Board,  etc.,  v.   Merchant,   103  59  .State      v.      Cunningham,      25 

N.  Y.  143;  8  N.  E.  4-84;  People  v.  Conn.    195;    State   v.    Thomas,    47 

Cannon,    139   N.  Y.   32;    34  N.   E.  Conn,  546.     So  in   Kansas.    State 

759.  V.     Sheppard,    64    Kan.    451;     67 

5T  Commonwealth    v.    Williams,  Pac.   870. 

6  Gray  (Mass.)    1;  Commonwealth  eo  Santo  v.  .State,  2  la.   165;   63 

V.  Wallace,  7  Gray   (Mass.)     222;  Am.  Dec.  487.     So  in  North  Caro- 

Commonwealth  v.   Rowe,   14   Gray  lina.     State  v.  Jiarrett,  138  N.  C. 

(Mass.)    ■i-l.  630;  50  S.  E.  506. 

58  State    V.    Day,    37    Me.    244;  ei  state    v.    Iliggins,    13    R.    I. 

State  V.  Hurley,  54  Me.  562.  330;    43   Am.   Rep.   26. 


§  176  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    uIQUORS  «266 

also  been  held  in  Rhode  Island  tnat  uncier  a  statute  which 
provides  that  "it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  prove  an  actual 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  in  any  building:,  place  oi  tene- 
ment, in  order  to  establish  the  character  of  sucn  premises 
as  a  common  nuisance,  but  the  notorious  character  of 
any  such  premises  shall  be  evidence  *  *  *  that  such 
premises  are  nuisances,"  that  the  word  character  is  used 
in  the  statute  was  synonymous  with  "reputation,"  and  as 
thus  construed  the  statute  was  constitutional.^-  Such  a 
statute  does  not  violate  a  constitutional  provision  that  "in 
all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right 
*  *  *  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. ' '  ^^ 
The  power  of  giving  greater  effect  to  evidence  than  it 
possessed  at  common  law  has  been  frequently  exercised  by 
Legislatures.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  seizure  under  a  law 
in  which  it  was  provided  that,  if  a  property  be  claimed 
by  any  person  in  any  such  case,  the  onus  probandi  should 
be  upon  the  claimant,  where  proper  cause  was  shown  on 
the  part  of  the  prosecution,  it  was  holden  that  the  stat- 
ute might  allow  less  evidence  than  would  otherwise  justify 
a  condemnation,  and  the  probable  cause  shown  for  the  prose- 
cution was  sufificient  to  refute  the  presumption  of  inno- 
cence and  throw  the  burden  of  proof  upon  the  claimant."* 
In  another  case  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  it  appeared  that  a  district  judge  had  instructed  the 
jury  that  proof  that  an  Indian  trader  had  carried  ardent 
spirits  into  an  Indian  country  and  had  them  with  his  other 
goods,  was  prima  facie  evidence  of  their  having  been  carried 
there  in  violation  of  a  law  of  Congress,  and  threw  the 
burden  of  proof  upon  the  trader,  although  the  judge,  at  the 
same  time,  told  the  jury  that  he  might  lawfully  carry  them 
there  for  some  purpose,  as  for  medicinal  use.  And  this 
ruling  was  said  by  Judge  Washington,  who  delivered  the 
opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court,  to  meet  their  entire  ap- 
proval.*'^    If   such   evidence   at   the    common    law   is    prima 

62  State    V.     Wilson,    15  R.     I.           64  The  Summary,  8  Wheat.    (U. 

ISO;    1   Atl.    415.  S.)    407. 

83  State    V.    Waldron,    16  R.    I.           65  American   Fur   Co.  v.    United 

191;    14  Atl.  847.  States,  2  Peters,  3&8. 


267  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  176 

facie  evidence  of  an  unlawful  intent  so  as  to  throw  the  bur- 
den of  proof  upon  an  accused,  there  is  no  reason  why  the 
Legislature   may   not   well  say   that   proof  of   certain   facts 
mentioned  in  a  statute  shall  be  deemed  affirmative  evidence 
of  a  like  intent.     In  most  States  there  are  no  common  law 
offenses.     In  such  States  only  such  offenses  as  are  defined 
by  some  statute  are  punishable  as  crimes  or  misdemeanors. 
As   incident   to   the   power   of   defining   crimes   and   misde- 
meanors and  of  declaring  what  shall  constitute  a  criminal 
offense  a  Legislature  may  assume  to  determine  what  shall 
in  certain  cases  be  deemed  sufficient  evidence  of  the  commis- 
sion of  an  offense,  or  of  some  criminal  act  necessary  to  be 
proven  in  a  criminal  prosecution.     Such  bodies  have  assumed 
to  determine  what  shall  be   sufficient   evidence   in   cases  of 
rape,   seduction,   receiving   stolen   goods,   keeping   places   for 
the   purpose   of   gaming,    obstructing   the   highways,   and  in 
many  other  cases  which  might  be  enumerated.*"*     The  power 
to   enact   such  provisions   is    founded   upon   the   jurisdiction 
of  the  Legislature  over  rules  of  evidence  both  in  civil  and 
criminal  cases.     A  statute  of  this  character,  however,   that 
alters  the  legal  rules  of  evidence  and  receives  less  or  dif- 
ferent testimony  than  the  law  required  at  the  time  of  the 
commission  of  the  offense,  in  order  to  convict  the  offender, 
is  ex  post  facto  and  invalid."     If  a  statute  provided   that 
certain  facts  are  conclusive  proof  of  guilt,  it  would  be  un- 
constitutional, as  also  would  one  which  makes  an  act  prima 
facie  evidence  of  crime  which  has  no  relation  to  a  criminal 
intent,   and   no   tendency   whatever   to   establish   a   criminal 
'act.**^     If,    however,    a   Legislature   in   prescribing   rules    of 
evidence  in  any  class  of  cases,  leaves  a  party  fair  opportu- 
nity to  establish  his  case  or  defense   and  give  in  evidence 
to   the   court  or  jury   all    the   facts   legitimately   bearing  on 

06  Morgan    v.     State,     117     Ind.  07  Caldcr  v.  Bull,  3  Dall.  390. 

569;  19  N.  E.  154;  Commonwealtli  ««  State    v.    Beswick,    13    R.    I. 

V.  Minor,   88   Ky.   422;    11    S.   W.  211;   State  v.  Kantz,  13  R.  I.  528. 

472;    10    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1008;    but  But   see   Duncan   v.    Clement,   119 

see  Duncan  V.  Clement,  119  N.  Y.  N.  Y.  Supp.  375. 
Supp.   37.3. 


U76 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


268 


the  issues  of  the  ease  to  be  considered  and  weighed  by  the 
tribunal  trying  it,  such  acts  of  the  Legislature  are  not  un- 
constitutional.*'^ Such  a  statute  must  not  make  it  obligatory 
on  the  jury  to  find  a  defendant  guilty  upon  such  evidence 
whether  they  believe  him  to  be  so  or  not.  Properly  con- 
strued such  statutes  mean  that  such  evidence  is  competent 
and  sufficient  to  justify  a  jury  in  finding  a  defendant 
guilty.-^" 


69  state  V.   Beach,   147   Ind.   74; 

46  N.  E.   174. 

70  State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors, 
80  Me.  57 ;   12  Atl.  794. 

A  statute  declaring  that  the 
place  of  delivery  shall  be  the 
place  of  sale,  and  that  any  place 
to  which  liquor  is  shipped  for  the 
purpose  of  delivering  it  to  the 
purchaser  shall  be  held  to  be  the 
place  of  sale,  is  constitutional. 
State  V.  Patterson,  134  N.  C.  612; 

47  S.  E.  '808. 

The  Legislature  may  provide 
that  a  licensee  transgressing  cer- 
tain restrictions  shall  be  found 
guilty  of  selling  without  a  license. 
Crabb  v.  State,  47  Fla.  24;  36  So. 

im. 

So  a  statute  may  provide  in  a 
prosecution  for  its  violation,  the 
State  may  give  in  evidence  any 
one  or  more  ofi'enses  of  the  same 
character  committed  prior  to  the 
date  charged  in  the  indictment 
and  not  barred  by  the  statute  of 
limitations;  but  such  a  statute 
cannot  be  considered  on  appeal  as 
applicable  to  trials  occurring 
prior  to  its  enactment.  Kittrell 
V.  State,  89  Miss.  &&6 ;  42  So.  609. 

Where  the  court,  in  refusing  t ) 
direct  an  acquittal,  said  the  tes- 
timony showed  the  defendant 
gave  another  quart  of  whisky  in 
lieu   of   one   dollar   promised,   and 


that  it  was  a  circumstance  to  be 
considered  by  the  jury  as  show- 
ing an  unlawful  use,  but  subse- 
quently instructed  the  jury  that 
they  should  take  nothing  from 
him  but  the  law,  and  that  they 
were  the  sole  judges  of  the  facts, 
it  was  held  that  the  constitutional 
provisions  respecting  matters  of 
fact  had  not  been  violated.  State 
V.  Arnold,  80  S.  C.  383;  61  S.  E. 
891. 

A  statute  making  the  fact  that 
persons  were  m  a  saloon  on  a  day 
when  liquors  could  not  be  sold, 
prima  facie  evidence  of  an  un- 
lawful sale,  is  constitutional. 
State  V.  Gerhardt,  145  Ind.  439; 
44  X.  E.  469;  33  L.  R.  A.  313. 
See  Piqua  v.  Zimmerlin,  35  Ohio 
St.   507. 

A  statute  requiring  druggists  to 
sell  only  on  prescriptions,  and 
making  his  failure  to  produce 
them  before  the  grand  jury  when 
required  as  misdemeanors,  is  con- 
stitutional. State  V.  Davis,  108 
Mo.  '666;  IS  S.  W.  894;  32  Am. 
St.  Pvep.  640;  117  Mo.  614;  23 
S.  W.  759. 

So  a  statute  casting  upon  a 
physician  prescribing  whisky  for 
a  patient  the  burden  to  show  that 
the  whisky  was  used  as  a  modi- 
cine,  is  valid;  but  so  much  of  it 
as    makes    him    liable    where    he, 


269  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  177 

Sec.  177.    Jury  trial,  when  it  can  be  secured  by  appeal. 

A  statute  which  authorizes  a  justice  of  the  peace  or  other 
inferior    court    to    try    and    determine    whether    intoxicating 
liquors  which  have  been  seized  shall  be  forfeited,  and  pro- 
vides that  liquors  against  which  jud'zmont  of  forfeiture  has 
been  entered  by  such  inferior  tribunal  shall  be  "forfeited" 
or  destroyed,  unless  an  appeal  be  taken,  is  not  violative  of  a 
constitutional  provision  guaranteeing  the  right  of  a  trial  by 
jury  to  the  defendant  in  all  criminal  prosecutions  because 
it  gives  no  time  to  procure  sureties  and  perfect  a  recogni- 
zance.    In  such  case  the  Legislature  has  a  discretion  which 
it  must  be  left  to  exercise,  unless  it  clearly  exercises  it  in  an 
unreasonable  and  oppressive  manner.     By  the  right  of  ap- 
peal the  right  of  a  jury  trial  is  preserved  if  the  provisions 
for  it  and  the  conditions  imposed  are  reasonable.     The  ques- 
tion therefore  is  largely  a  question  of  reasonableness,   and 
upon   such    a  question    it   is  natural,    almost   inevitable,   for 
men  to  differ.     For  this  reason  it  will  not  do  for  a  court 
to  condemn  a  provision  for  an  appeal,  or  the  conditions  of  a 
recognizance,    simply    because   they   are   more   stringent   or 
more  burdensome  than  the  court  would  have  prescribed  if 
it  had  enjoyed  the  power  and  privilege  of  legislating.    Some 
latitude  must  be  allowed  for  differences  of  opinion.     "Forth- 
with,"  as   used   in  such  a  statute,   does  not  imply   that  a 
reasonable  time  is  not  to  be  allowed,  since  that,  like  all  other 
directions  to   judicial  tribunals,   is   to  be  judicially   carried 
out  with  due  regard  to  individual  rights.     A  statute,  how- 
ever,  will  be  unconstitutional  as  impairing  the  right  to  be 
tried  by  a  jury,  if  it  provides  that  a  person  claiming  an  ap- 
peal from  a  judgment  rendered  against  him  by  a  court  of 
inferior  jurisdiction  for  a  violation  of  the  liquor  laws,  be- 
fore his  appeal  is  allowed,  shall  give  a  bond  with  sufficient 
sureties,  conditioned  that  he  will  not,  during  the  pendancy 
of  the  appeal,  violate  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  statute 
under  which  he  has  been  convicted,  it  being  held  that  such 
a  condition  was  "foreign  to  the  purposes  for  which  an  ap- 

acting  in  good  faith,  made  a  mis-       wealth  v.  Minor,  88  Ky.   422;    11 
take  in  fact,  is  invalid.    Common-       S.  W.  472;  10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1008. 


§  178  TR.^J'FIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  270 

peal  bond  could  be  properly  required."  The  right  to  ap- 
peal in  such  cases  must  not  be  burdened  with  unreason- 
able restrictions  and  conditions."^ 

Sec.  178.    Double  punishment — State  and  municipalities. 

There  has  been  much  diversity  in  the  decisions  of  the 
courts  as  to  whether  the  constitutional  provision  that  "no 
person  shall  be  put  in  jeopardy  twice  for  the  same  offense," 
and  like  provisions  in  the  Constitutions  of  different  States 
prohibit  the  enactment  of  a  law  authorizing  municipal  cor- 
porations to  pass  an  ordinance  punishing  an  offense  w^hich, 
by  the  common  law  or  by  the  State  law,  is  a  crime  and  pun- 
ishable by  the  State  authorities  as  such.  There  are  decisions 
in  many  States  that  a  Legislature  can  not  constitutionally 
confer  such  authority  on  a  municipal  corporation.  Deci- 
sions to  this  effect  may  be  found  which  either  expressly 
hold  or  give  great  countenance  to  this  view  of  the  law.  Such 
decisions  may  be  found  in  Arkansas,  Georgia,  Louisiana, 
Michigan,  Missouri,  North  Carolina,  Pennsylvania,  Rhode 
Island,  South  Carolina,  Tennessee  and  Texas."-     On  the  oth- 

71  Zn  re  Liquors  of  McSoley,  15  21  Ga.  80;  Jenkins  v.  Thomasville, 

R.  I.  608;    10  Atl.  €59;  Voight  v.  35    Ga.    145;    Vinson   v.    Augusta, 

Board,  69   N.  J.   L.  358 ;    36   Atl.  38  Ga.  342 ;  Reich  v.  State,  53  Ga. 

68i6;    State  v.    Fitzpatrick,    16   R.  73;    Municipality,  etc.,  v.  Wilson, 

I.  54;  11  Atl.  767;  Hill  v.  Dalton,  5  La.  Ann.  747;  Slaughter  v.  Peo- 

72   Ga.   314;    Saco   v.    Wentworth,  pie,  2  Doug.    (Mich.)    334;    People 

37  Me.  165;  Saco  v.  Woodsum,  39  v.   Jackson,  8    Mich.    110;    Wayne 

Me.  258;   Beers  v.  Beers,  4  Conn.  Co.  v.  Detroit,  17  Mich.  390;  Peo- 

535;   State  v.   Brennan's    Liquors,  pie  v.  Detroit,   18  Mich.  445;  Jef- 

25  Conn.  278;  Emporia  v.  Volmer,  ferson  City  v.  Couture,  9  Mo.  683; 

12  Kan.  622 ;  Jones  v.  Bobbins,  74  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo.  330 ;  State 

Mass.     (8    Gray)     329;    State    v.  v.  Brittain,  89  N.  C.  574;   Barter 

Fitzpatrick,    16   R.  I.  54;    11   Atl.  v.     Commonwealth,     3     P.    &     W. 

773.     Change  of  venue.     People  v.  (Pa.)    253;   State  v.  Pollard,  6  R. 

McBride,  234   111.    146;    84   N.   E.  I.    290;    Zystra    v.    Charleston,    1 

©65.  Bay.     (S.     C.)     387;     Raleigh    v. 

""iEx  parte  Smith,    1   Hemstead  Dougherty,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)   11; 

(9   U.    S.    0.    C),   201;    Slattery,  Smith    v.    San    Antonio,    27    Tex. 

Ex  parte,  3   Ark.   484;    Rector  v.  646;    Hamilton    v.    State,    3    Tex. 

State,  6  Ark.   187;    Darr  v.   How-  App.  i643;   see  Campbell  v.  Thom- 

ard,  6  Ark.  041;    Lewis  v.   State,  asville   (Oa.),  64  S.  E.  815. 
21  Ark.  209;  Savannah  v.  Hussey, 


271 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OP   STATUTES. 


§178 


er  hand,  decisions  may  be  found  in  many  States  that  a  Leg- 
islature has  the  power  to  authorize  a  municipal  corporation 
to  punish  either  any  or  some  offenses  which,  by  the  com- 
mon law  or  statute  law,  are  crimes  punishable  by  the  State 
courts,  and  that  a  person  may  be  twice  punished,  once  by 
the  State  for  the  crime  and  once  by  the  corporation  for  the 
violation  of  its  ordiance,  on  the  ground  that  each  punish- 
ment  is  for  a  different  offense.  Decisions  which  hold  thus, 
or  which  give  much  countenance  to  it  are  to  be  found  in 
Alabama,  Georgia,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Ken- 
tucky, Maryland,  Michigan,  JMinnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska, 
New  Jersey,  New  York,  Oregon,  South  Carolina,  Tennessee, 
Texas  and  Utah.'^^  And  again  decisions  may  be  found  in 
some  States  which  countenance  the  position  that  when  a 
State  law  inflicts  a  certain  penalty  for  the  commission  of 
crime,  and  an  ordinance  of  a  municipal  corporation  passed 
by  legislative  authority  also  punishes  the  same  crime,  if  com- 
mitted in  the  city,  the  State  authorities  and  the  municipal 
authorities  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  to  punish  the  of- 
fender, but  he  can  be  punished  only  once  by  the  State 
or  municipal  authorities,  whichever  first  institutes  proceed- 
ings.'^* It  will  be  at  once  perceived  on  reading  these  cases 
that  they  cannot  be  reconciled.     The  one  class  proceeds  upon 


73  McLaughlin      v.      Stevens,      2 
Cranch.    (U.  S.  C.  C.)    148;   May- 
or,    etc.,    V,    Rouse,    8     Ala.    615 
( liquor  case )  ;   Mayor,  etc.,  v.  Al- 
lane,    14   Ala.    400;    Hood   v.   Von 
Glahn,  88  Ga.  405 ;  Wragg  v.  Peo- 
ple, 94  111.  11;  Robbins  v.  People, 
05  111.  175;   Davenport  v.  Bird,  34 
la.  524;  Ambrose  v.  State,  6  Ind 
351    (liquor  case)  ;    Rice  v.  State 
3    Kan.    135;    March   v.    Common 
wealth,    12    B.    Mon.     (Ky.)     25 
Shafer   v.   Miamma,    17    Md.   336 
People   v.   Detroit,   82   Mich.   471 
State    v.    Charles,    16    Minn.    478 
State   v.    Budwig,  21    Minn.   202 
State   v.   Lee,   29    Minn.   445;    St 
Louis    v.    Bentz,    11    Mo.    62;    St 
Louis    v.    Cafferetta,    24    Mo.    94 


Brownville  v.  Cook,  4  Neb.  101; 
Howe  V.  Plainfield,  38  N.  J.  L. 
(8  Vroom)  145;  State  v.  Plunket, 
3  Har.  (N.  J. )  5;  Rogers  v.  Jones, 
1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  261;  Brooklyn 
V.  Trymble,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  2&3; 
State  V.  Bergman,  6  Ore.  341; 
Wong  V.  Astoria,  13  Ore.  538; 
State  V.  Williams,  11  S.  C.  288; 
Greenwood  v.  State,  6  Baxt. 
(Tenn. )  567;  Hamilton  v.  State, 
3  Tex.  647 ;  Ex  parte  Douglass, 
1  Utah,  108;  Logan  City  v.  Buck, 
3   Utah.   301. 

74  Kansas,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
3  Kan.  164;  State  v.  Gordon,  10 
Mo.  383;  State  v.  €owan,  29  Mo. 
330;   State  v.  Wister,  62  Mo.  593. 


§  178  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  272 

the  ground  that  the  Constitution  provides  that  no  person 
shall  be  tried  for  a  crime  except  on  indictment,  and  that 
all  such  crimes  must  be  tried  by  jury  of  twelve  men,  and 
that  these  are  deemed  as  fundamental  requirements,  the  ob- 
servation of  which  is  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  our 
liberties.  Yet  these  fundamental  principles  are  violated 
when  a  Legislature  authorizes  a  municipal  corporation  by 
ordinance  to  make  any  or  all  crimes  committed  within  a 
municipal  corporation  punishable  by  fine  or  imprisonment 
upon  summary  proceedings  before  a  mayor  or  police  court. 
If  the  Legislature  has  such  power,  then  these  fundamental 
and  important  principles  of  the  Constitution  are  made  to- 
tally inoperative  in  an^^  town  or  city  in  the  State.  The  an- 
swer to  this  reasoning  as  found  in  the  other  class  of  cases 
is  that  the  summary  conviction  before  a  mayor  or  police 
court  is  not  for  the  crime  committed  in  the  city  or  for  the 
offense  against  the  town  or  city  by  violating  one  of  its  or- 
dinances, that  though  the  offense  be  described  in  the  ordi- 
nance in  the  identical  words  in  which  the  offense  is  de- 
scribed in  the  statute,  yet  the  violation  of  the  ordinance  is 
to  be  regarded  only  as  an  offense  against  the  city  or  town, 
while  the  violation  of  the  statute  affects  the  punishment  to  be 
inflicted  for  the  crime  described  as  an  offense  against  the  State, 
which  is  something  entirely  different,  and  therefore  for  an 
offense  described  in  the  statute  and  in  the  ordinance  in  exactly 
the  same  words,  a  person  may  be  twice  punished,  once  by 
confinement  in  jail  under  the  summary  conviction  of  a 
mayor  or  police  court,  and  once  in  the  penitentiary  or  in 
the  county  jail  on  conviction  of  the  crime  by  jury."^  As 
has  been  said,  there  are  cases  in  Indiana  which  hold  that 
the  double  punishment  may  be  inflicted.  These  cases  occur- 
red prior  to  1881,  when,  because  of  the  abuse  of  such  hold- 
ing, it  became  necessary  for  the  Legislature  of  the  State 
to  provide  by  law  that  "Whenever  any  act  is  made  a  public 
offense  against  the  State  by  any  statute  and  the  punish- 
ment prescribed  therefor,  such  act  shall  not  be  made  pun- 
ishable by  any  ordinance  of  any  incorporated  city  or  town."  '® 

75  Moundsville    v.    Fountain,   27  76  R.  S.   1881,   §1640. 

W.  Va.   182. 


273  CONSTITUTION Al .IT Y    OF    STATUTES.  §  179 

In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  observed  that  where  an  act 
is,  in  its  nature,  one  which  constitutes  two  offenses,  one 
against  the  State  and  one  against  a  municipal  government, 
the  legislative  intention  that  a  double  punishment  may  be 
inflicted,  "ought,"  as  Judge  Dillon  says,  "  to  be  manifest 
and  unmistakable,  or  the  power  in  the  corporation  should 
be  held  not  to  exist.""  Such  power  may  not  be  inferred 
from  the  "general  welfare  clause"  usual  in  municipal  cor- 
porations. As  was  said  by  Judge  IMerriman,  of  North  Car- 
olina, ' '  It  may  be  that  the  Legislature  has  power  to  author- 
ize a  town  to  make  an  offense  against  the  State  a  separate 
offense  against  the  town ;  but  this  could  be  done  only  by  an 
express  grant  of  authority."  ^* 

Sec.  179.    Double  punishment— Conflict  of  jurisdiction. 

Can  the  same  criminal  or  penal  act  be  punished  once  un- 
der the  statute  of  a  State  and  again  under  a  statute  of  the 
United  States,  and  vice  versa?  Or,  in  other  words,  can  an 
offender,  as  it  were,  be  put  in  jeopardy  twice  for  the  same 
offense?  Article  V  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
provides,  among  other  things,  that  no  person  shall  "be  sub- 
ject for  the  same  offense  to  be  put  twice  in  jeopardy  of  life 
or  limb."  A  like  provision  is  found  in  the  Constitution  of 
each  of  the  States.'  Under  these  provisions  and  governed  by 
the  dictates  of  humanity,  the  question,  as  it  is  viewed  by 
some,  ought  to  be  answered  in  the  negative,  but  such  has  not 
been  the  case.  In  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
the  question  came  up  for  consideration  in  1847.^''  In  the 
case  then  under  consideration,  Justice  Daniels  delivered  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  and  in  it  it  was  held  that  a  person  might 
be  punished  under  the  law  of  a  State,  although  the  same 
act  was  made  punishable  under  a  statute  of  Congress,  and  con- 
sequently that  a  conviction  and  punishment  under  a  State 

77  Dillon's  Mimic.  Corp,  3d  Ed.,  78  State    v.    Brittain,    89    N.    S. 

§3i&8;   Hood  v.  Von  Glahn,  8S  Ga.  574. 

405;  Foster  v.  Brown,  55  la.  GSG;  70  Fox  v.  Tlie  State  of   Ohio,  5 

City  of  Louisville  v.  McKean,  57  How.  410. 
Ky.    (18  B.  Mon.)    9. 


§  179  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  274 

law  would  be  no  bar  lo  a  prosecution  under  a  law  of  Con- 
gress. In  so  deciding,  Justice  Daniels  said:  "It  is  almost  cer- 
tain that,  in  the  benignant  spirit  in  which  the  institutions, 
both  of  the  State  and  Federal  systems  are  administered,  an 
offender  who  should  have  suffered  the  penalties  denounced 
by  the  one  would  not  be  subjected  a  second  time  to  the  pun- 
ishment by  the  other  for  acts  essentially  the  same,  unless, 
indeed,  this  might  occur  in  instances  of  peculiar  enormity,  or 
where  the  public  safety  demands  extraordinary  vigor."  It 
occurs  to  the  A\T:"iters  that  this  statement  can  hardly  be  charac- 
terized as  an  argument  in  support  of  the  legal  proposition 
involved.  Does  it  not  beg  the  question?  In  that  case  Jus- 
tice ]\IcLean  wrote  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  he  says 
Justice  Story  concurred  when  the  case  was  being  con- 
sidered by  the  court,  and  in  which  he  also  says:  "There 
is  no  principle  better  established  by  the  conunon  law,  none 
more  fully  recognized  in  the  Federal  and  State  Constitu- 
tions than  that  an  individual  shall  not  be  put  in  jeopardy 
twice  for  the  same  offense.  *  *  *  That  the  State  should 
punish  for  that  which  an  act  of  Congress  punishes  is  con- 
tradictory and  repugnant.  This  is  clearly  the  case  whether 
with  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  power  or  infliction  of  the 
punishment.  There  can  be  no  greater  mistake  than  to  sup- 
pose that  the  Federal  Government  in  carrying  out  any  of  its 
supreme  functions  is  made  dependent  on  State  governments. 
The  Federal  is  a  limited  government  exercising  enumerated 
powers,  but  the  powers  given  are  supreme  and  independent. 
If  this  were  not  the  case,  it  could  not  be  called  a  general 
government.  Nothing  can  be  more  repugnant  or  contradic- 
tory than  two  punishments  for  the  same  act.  It  would  bring 
our  system  of  government  into  merited  contempt."  The 
question  was  considered  by  that  court  again,  and  the  decision 
from  which  this  quotation  is  taken  was  affirmed,  Justice  Mc- 
Lean again  dissenting.'"'  In  an  early  case  in  Indiana,  under 
an  indictment  for  retailing  intoxicating  liquors  without  a  li- 
cense, it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court,  acting  upon  the 
authority  of  the  two  cases  cited,  "that  the  same  act  may  be 

80  Moore    v.   People    of    Illinois,  14  How.   13. 


275  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OP   STATUTES.  §  180 

an  offense  against  two  jurisdictions  is  no  longer  an  open 
question."  ^^  And  in  Dakota  it  has  been  held  that  a  defendant 
who  violates  the  laws  of  a  State  or  Territory  and  also  a 
municipal  ordinance  in  sellinp'  intoxicating  liquors,  is  liable 
to  a  prosecution  therefor  under  eitliej  or  both,  on  the  theory 
that  they  are  separate  and  distinct  offenses — one  against 
the  State  or  Territory,  the  other  against  the  municipal  cor- 
poration.^- Notwithstanding  these  decisions  and  many  oth- 
ers of  like  character  that  might  be  cited,  there  are  some  per- 
sons of  authority  who  believe  that  the  view  of  this  question 
taken  by  Justice  McLean,  is  the  better  one  and  that  whicf 
ought  to  prevail.  In  this  view  they  are  sustained  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Connecticut,  that  court  having  held  that  if 
a  general  statute  covers  the  same  ground  with  a  municipal 
law  authorized  by  a  statute,  both  can  not  be  enforced  so  as 
to  subject  a  party  to  a  double  penalty.*^ 

Sec.  180.     Imprisonment  for  debt. 

Most,  if  not  all  the  Constitutions  of  the  States  provide 
"that  there  shall  be  no  imprisonment  for  debt,  except  in 
case  of  fraud."  Under  this  provision  it  has  been  contended 
that  a  defendant  could  not  be  imprisoned  for  a  fine  and  costs 
assessed  in  a  prosecution  by  the  State  or  by  a  municipal 
corporation  for  the  violation  of  a  statute  or  ordinance  against 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  without  having  procured  a 
license  to  do  so;  but  the  contention  has  not  been  sus- 
tained, the  courts  holding  that  the  immunity  from  imprison- 
ment contemplated  by  such  constitutional  provision  must  be 
confined  to  debts  or  liabilities  growing  out  of  contracts,  ex- 
pressed or  implied,  and  not  to  liabilities  from  crimes  or  torts. 
In  other  words,  that  the  liabilities  must  be  a  debt  within  the 

SI  State  V.  Moore,  6  Ind.  436 ;  fense  to  sell  liquors  in  an  anti- 
Howe  V.  Plainfield,  8  Vroom  (37  saloon  territory  and  another  of- 
N.  J.  L.),  145.  fense  to  sell  in  less  quantity  than 

s-  City  of  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughn,  a  gallon  or  in  any  quantity  to  he 

1   Dak.   113;  4'6  N.  W.  577.  drunk  on  the  premises.     People  v. 

83  State  V.  Welch,  36  Conn.  215.  McBride,   234   111.    146;    84   N.   K 

A  statute  may  make  it  an  of-  865. 


§  §  181,  182        TRAJ'PIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  276 

proper  and  legal  meaning  of  that  word.®*  "A  debt,"  ac- 
cording to  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey,  "is  a  sum  of 
money  due  by  certain  and  express  agreement.  It  originates 
in  and  is  founded  upon  contracts  express  or  implied;"*^  and 
a  like  definition  has  been  recognized  by  other  courts.®''  A  fine 
or  penalty,  when  assessed  becomes  a  fixed  liability  to  pay 
the  State  or  municipality  a  definite  amount  of  money  for 
the  violation  of  a  criminal  statute  or  penal  ordinance.  In 
such  cases  the  costs  are  taxed,  and  due  to  the  oflSeers  and 
witnesses,  and  are  not  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional 
provision.  The  fact  that  the  one  is  payable  to  the  State  or 
municipality,  and  the  other  to  individuals,  furnishes  no 
ground  for  a  distinction.®^  The  distinction  between  tort  and 
contract  exists  in  the  nature  of  things,  and  cannot  be  con- 
founded or  abolished  by  law.  A  Constitution  which  abol- 
ishes imprisonment  for  debt  does  not  prohibit  a  Legislature 
from  passing  a  law  to  imprison  on  judgments  founded  on 
torts.®® 

Sec.  181.    Support   of   penitentiary — Imitation   liquor. 

A  statute  requiring  a  license  of  all  persons  manufacturing, 
selling  or  distributing  any  imitation  of  or  substitute  for 
beer,  ale,  wine,  whisky,  or  other  spirituous  or  malt  liquors, 
and  devoting  the  fee  to  the  support  of  the  State  peniten- 
tiary is  valid.®^ 

Sec.  182.     Removal  of  officer  for  drunkenness. 

A  statute  may  provide  for  the  removal  of  any  officer  for 
voluntary  drunkenness  during  the  business  hours  of  his  of- 

84  Caldwell  v.  State,  55  Ala.  se  Lane  Co.  v.  Oregon,  7  Wall. 
133;  Flora  v.  Sachs,  64  Ind.  155;  (U.  S.)  71;  Perry  v.  Washburn, 
Hardenbrook  v.  Town  of  Ligonier,  20  Cal.  350;  Pierce  v.  City  of 
&5  Ind.  70;  Hibbard  v.  Clark,  56  Boston,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  520; 
N.  H.  155;  City  of  Camden  v.  Shaw  v.  Pickett,  26  Vt.  486. 
Allen,  26  X.  J.  L.  398;  Dunlap  v.  87  McCool  v.  State,  23  Ind.  127. 
Keith,  1   Leigh    (Va.),  430,  ss  Turner    v.     Wilson,     49     Ind. 

85  City   of   Camden  v.    Allen,   2  581. 

Dutch.    (N.  J.  L.)    398.  soCarroll    v.    Wright,    131    Ga. 

72S;  '63  S.  E.  260. 


277  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §§  183,184 

fice,  or  for  habitual  intoxication.  It  is  neither  repugnant 
to  nor  in  conflict  with  any  provisions  of  the  State  or  Fed- 
eral Constitutions,  when  the  State  Constitution  provides  that 
an  officer  "shall,  for  crime,  incapacity,  or  negligence,  be  lia- 
ble to  be  removed  from  office";  or  be  "removed  from  office, 
in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law. ' ' "° 

Sec.  183.    Drunkenness. 

The  Legislature  may  enact  a  law  punishing  anyone  appear- 
ing in  a  public  place  while  intoxicated,®^  and  the  statutes 
may  permit  him  to  show  that  he  has  not  been  convicted  un- 
der the  statute  within  the  past  year,  whereupon  the  court 
may  discharge  him  without  trial,  this  not  being  an  interfer- 
ence with  the  power  of  the  court.®- 

Sec.  184.    Inebriate  asylums. 

A  statute  is  valid  which  provides  for  the  care  and  cus- 
tody of  the  person  and  estate  of  habitual  drunkards;  and  it 
cannot  be  insisted  that  it  is  void  because  it  deprives  a  citizen 
of  the  right  to  enjoy,  control  and  dispose  of  his  property, 
and  to  make  contracts.  The  court  said  that  there  was  no 
question  that  the  State  could  enact  a  valid  law  for  the  cus- 
tody and  control  of  the  person  and  property  of  infants  and 
persons  born  idiots  or  who  had  become  insane ;  and  there  was 
no  difference  between  a  person  born  deficient  or  who  had  be- 
come after  birth  deficient  by  disease  or  accident.®^  And  an 
extra  license  fee  may  be  required  of  all  persons  selling  liquor, 
to  be  devoted  to  the  maintenance  of  an  inebriate  asylum,  under 
the  police  powers  of  the  State,  it  not  being  an  unequ-il  tnx.®* 

90  McComas    v.    Krug,    81    Ind.  02  Commonwealth    v.    ^Torri^sey, 

327;  42  Am.  Rep.  135.     The  court  siipi-a. 

considered    that    "incapacity"    as  'J^  Devin    v.    Scott,    34    Ind.   €7 ; 

used  in  the  constitution  was  broad  see  Ex  parte  Schwarting,  7G  Neb. 

enouj^h  to  cover  a  case  of  volun-  773;   108  N.  W.  125. 

tary  drunkenness  in  an  officer  dur-  04  State    v.    Cassidy,    22    Minn, 

ing     the    business    hours    of     his  312;    21   Am.   Rep.   765;    State  v. 

office.  Klein,  22  Minn.  328. 

81  Commonwealth    v.    Morrisey, 
157  Mass.  471;  32  N.  E.  •&(y4. 


§  185  TR.VFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  278 

But  the  Legislature  cannot  provide  for  the  treatment  of 
drunkards  in  private  asylums  at  the  public's  expense,  by  im- 
posing a  tax  on  their  counties  to  raise  the  necessary  funds; 
for  such  persons  are  not  legitimate  objects  of  public  charity.""' 
But  a  drunkard  cannot  be  confined  in  such  an  institution 
without  a  full  hearing,  of  which  due  notice  has  been  given."  "'^ 

Sec.  185.     Miscellaneous  decisions. 

In  Louisiana  it  would  seem  that  a  statute  requiring  saloomii 
for  white  and  colored  people  to  be  in  separate  buildings  is  con- 
stitutional."^ Where  local  option  has  been  adopted  a  statute 
making  it  a  misdemeanor  "to  solicit  an  order  for  the  sale" 
of  intoxicating  liquor  in  a  local  option  district,  is  unconsti- 
tutional."* But  a  statute  making  it  unlawful  to  solicit  orders 
through  the  mail  is  not  unconstitutional,  not  being  an  infringe- 
ment of  the  powers  of  Congress  to  establish  post-offices  and 
designate  what  shall  be  excluded  from  the  mails.""  A  statute 
empowering  a  city  to  exact  a  license  is  constitutional.^  A  hond 
may  be  required  of  a  licensee  as  security  against  disorder.-  A 
statute  forbidding  the  issuance  of  a  license  for  premises  where 
a  previous  license  has  been  cancelled,  on  the  ground  that  the 
premises  had  become  disorderly  or  gambling  had  been  per- 

9ij  Wisconsin  Keeley  Institute  Tlie  business  cannot  •  be  con- 
Co.  V.  Milwaukee  County,  &5  Wis.  ducted  in  one  building.  Bars  sep- 
153;  70  N.  W.  68;  36  L.  R.  A.  55.  arated    one    from    another    in   one 

96  People  V.  St.  Saviour's  Sani-  building  is  not  a  compliance  with 
tarium,  34-  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  3G3;  the  statute.  In  such  an  instance 
50  N.  Y.   Supp.   431.  the  State  cannot  compel  the  pay- 

Of   course   such   a   statute  must  ment  of  two  license  fees.     Ihid. 

be  general,  and   not   local  or  spe-  ^s  Ex    parfc    IMassey     (Tex.    €r. 

cial.     Murray  v.  Board,  81   Minn.  App.),  02   S.   W.    1086;    Ex  parte 

3.5<);    84   X.   W.   103:    51    L.    R.   A.  Hackney    (lex.    Cr.    App.),    92    S. 

828.  W.    1002. 

The    Legislature   cannot    requi' e  i'o  Zinii   v.   State    (Ark.),   114  S. 

a  judge  of  a  court  to  manage  and  W.   227. 

control       an      inebriate      asylum.  i  Kitson  v.  Ann  Arbor,  2G  Mich. 

Foreman     v.     Hennepin     Co.,     64  325;    Beasley    v.    Beckley,    28    W. 

Minn.  371;   67  N.  W.  207.  Va.  SI. 

97  State  V.  Falkenheimer  (La.)  2  Kitson  v.  Ann  Arbor,  26  ^Mic'  . 
49  So.  214.  325. 


279  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES  §  186 

mitted  therein,  is  valid.^  A  statute  is  valid  which  enables  a 
city  to  'prohibit  the  sale  of  liquor  on  Sunday.*  Where  a 
Constitution  dispenses  with  indictments  in  misdemeanor  pros- 
ecutions, the  Legislature  may  authorize  prosecutions  by  affi- 
davits for  violations  of  liquor  statutes.^  A  State  may  pro- 
vide that  one  person  shall  not  keep  or  be  interested  in  any 
saloon  at  more  than  one  place  at  the  same  time.*'  The  number 
of  saloons  in  a  block  may  be  limited,  as  two  and  a  half  in 
the  block. ^  A  city  may  be  empowered  to  prescribe  saloon 
lim,its.^ 

Sec.  186.     When    courts    will    not    consider    constitutional 
question. 

It  is  a  principle  of  constitutional  law  that  only  those  who 
are  prejudiced  by  an  unconstitutional  act  can  be  heard  to 
make  objection  to  it.  The  courts  will  not  listen  to  an  objec- 
tion made  to  the  constitutionality  of  an  act  by  a  party  whose 
rights  it  does  not  affect,  and  who,  therefore,  has  no  interest 
in  defeating  it.^  Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  a  State 
law  which  excluded  colored  persons  from  jury  service  de- 
prived them  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  law,  but  that  a 

3  People  V.  McKee,  59  N.  Y.  8  Andreas  v.  Beaumont  (Tex. 
Misc.   Rep.   369;    112  X.  Y,  Supp.       Civ.  App.),   113  S.  W.  614. 

3.85.  Constitutionality     of    ordinance 

4  State  V.  Bott,  31  La.  Ann.  'Gi63;  making  it  the  duty  of  the  collec- 
33  Am.  Rep.  224.  tor  of  revenue  of  a  city  to  enforce 

5  State  V.  Summers,  50  So.   120.       the    liquor    ordinance.      State    v. 
c  Swift   V.   Klein,    1G3    111.   269;       Rosenblatt,  9  ]\Io.  App.   587. 

45  N.  E.  219.  A    statute    requiring   saloons    to 

7  Ex  parte   Abrams    ( Tex. ) ,   120  be  located  on  the  ground  floor,  and 

S.      W.      883;      Ex     parte     Clark  so  arranged  as  to  allow  a  view  of 

(Tex.),  120  S.  W.  892.  the    interior,    is    valid    as    to    per- 

This  provision  was  not  express-  sons   in  the   liquor   business   when 

ed  in  the   title.  it  is  passed,  and  who  are  thereby 

But  a   statute  of  this  kind  ap-  compelled   to    rearrange    their   sa- 

plying     only     to     cities     of     over  loons.      Xelson   v.    State,    17    Ind. 

50,000    was    held    invalid,    because  App.   403;   46  N.  E.  941. 

it  did  not  apply  equally  to  all  the  9  Cooley      Const.      Lim.,      §164; 

cities     of     the     State.       State     v.  State  v.   Roberts,   74   N.   H.   476; 

Schraps,  <)7  Minn.  6(2;    106.  N.  W.  69  Atl.  722. 

106. 


§  186  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  280 

white  person  could  not  complain  of  the  statutory  exclusions.^* 
Also,  that  a  white  person  could  not  raise  the  question  whether 
the  exclusion  of  negroes  from  participation  in  the  benefits 
of  the  common  school  system  was  not  a  violation  of  the  State 
Constitution."  Also,  that  a  party  who  has  assented  to  his 
property  being  taken  under  a  statute  cannot  afterwards 
object  that  the  statute  is  in  violation  of  a  provision  in 
the  Constitution  designed  for  the  protection  of  private 
property.^-  Also,  that  a  party  who  seeks  to  overthrow  a 
statute  as  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract,  must  af- 
firmatively establish  that  the  same  impairs  his  contractual 
rights  and  is  prejudicial  thereto,^^  This  principle  has  been 
applied  in  cases  prosecuted  in  connection  with  the  liquor 
traffic.  In  one  instance  an  objection  was  made  to  the  validity 
of  an  ordinance  providing  for  the  issuing  of  licenses  to  retail 
intoxicating  liquors,  on  the  ground  that  it  discriminated 
against  women  and  non-residents.  The  objection  was  made 
by  a  resident  male  applicant  for  a  license.  The  court  said : 
"Since  women  and  non-residents  have  so  far  waived  any  con- 
stitutional right  they  may  have  in  respect  to  selling  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  we  content  ourselves  for  the  present  with 
holding  that  the  appellants  are  confessedly  of  those  who  en- 
joy the  monopoly  which  the  ordinance  secures,  and  they  must 
take  the  privilege  with  the  burdens  which  attend  it.  Courts 
will  not  listen  to  those  who  are  not  aggrieved  by  an  invalid 
law,"^'*  In  another  case  where  divers  constitutional  ques- 
tions as  to  the  validity  of  a  statute  upon  the  subject  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  were  attempted  to  be  raised,  and  where  it 
was  claimed  that  the  statute  was  unconstitutional  and  void 
on  the  ground  of  unjust  and  oppressive  provisions  in  it,  the 

10  Commonwealth  v.  Wright,  79  is  Currier  v.  Elliott,  141  Ind. 
Ky.  22.  394. 

11  Marshall  v.  Donavan,  10  Bush  i*  Wagner  v.  Town  of  Garrett, 
(Ky.),   &81.  118    Ind.    114;    39   X.    E.    554;    20 

12  Mobile,  etc.,  R.  €o.  v.  State,  N.  E.  706;  Daniels  v.  State,  150 
29  Ala.  58(5;  Haskell  v.  New  Bed-  Ind.  348;  50  N.  E.  74;  Linkenhelt 
ford,  108  Mass.  208;  Embury  v.  v.  Garrett,  118  Ind.  599;  20  N. 
Conner,    3    X.    Y.    511;    Baker    v.  E.  708. 

Branan,  G  Hill   (N.  Y.),  47. 


281  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF   STATUTES.  §  186 

court  said:  "It  is  firmly  settled  that  a  party  will  not  be 
heard  by  a  court  to  question  the  validity  of  a  law,  or  any 
part  thereof,  unless  he  shows  that  some  right  of  his  is  im- 
paired or  prejudiced  thereby.  This  fact  not  appearing,  the 
contentions  relative  to  these  sections  are  dismissed  without 
consideration."  ^^'  And  a  person  who  has  given  away  liquors 
in  violation  of  the  plain  provisions  of  a  statute  cannot  in- 
sist that  it  is  unconstitutional  because  it  in  effect  prohibits 
him  from  giving  liquor  to  a  member  of  his  family  or  to  his 
guest  within  his  house,  when  the  gift  made  was  not  to  a 
member  of  his  family  nor  to  his  guest.^"  So  a  person  not  hav- 
ing paid  a  tax  imposed  on  the  sale  of  liquors  to  which  he 
was  entitled  to  a  return  in  part  cannot  insist  that  the  law 
is  void  when  he  has  not  paid  the  tax.^^  Where  a  statute  cre- 
ated State  dispensaries  and  prohibited  all  private  sales,  an 
individual  indicted  for  sellinqr  liouor  cannot  assail  those  por- 
tions of  the  statute  which  are  distinct  from  those  parts  de- 
claring the  prohibition.'^  And  where,  by  local  option,  sales 
of  liquors  for  drinking  purposes  were  prohibited,  but  sales 
for  medicinal  and  religious  purnoses  were  permitted,  a  per- 
son applying  for  a  license  to  sell  for  drinking  purposes  only, 
it  was'  held  he  could  not  assail  the  act  on  the  ground  that  it 
forbade  sales  absolutely.'^  So  a  vendor  of  liquors  indicted 
for  selling  linuor  cannot  assail  the  statute  because  it  excepts 
from  its  prohibitory  provisions  the  sale  of  cider  or  wines. "'^  In 
this  same  State  it  was  held  that  one  selling  without  a  license 
could  rot  assail  the  statute  because  it  provided  for  the  ap- 
I>ointment  of  license  committees  consisting  of  three  persons 

15  State    V.    C4erliardt,    145    Intl.  tion   is   concerned.     August  Busch 

439;   44  N.  E.  469.  &  Co.  v.  Webb,  122  Fed.  655. 

iG  Parker  v.  State,  99  Md.   189 ;  is  State  v.  Potterfield,  47   S.  C. 

57  Atl.  677.  75 ;   25  S.  E.  39. 

17  State   V.    Roush,   47    Ohio   St.  lo  Ex    parte    Burnside,    86    Ky. 

478 ;  25  X.  E.  59 ;   Wert  v.  Brown,  423 ;    6  S.  W.  27<5. 

47  Ohio  St.  477 ;  25  X.  E.  59.  20  State  v.   Barr,  78  Vt.  97 ;    62 

Where  only   a   Federal   question  Atl.    43;     McLaury    v.    Watelsky, 

is   involved,   a   Federal   court   will  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.   3f^;   87   S.  W. 

not  consider  the  validity  of  a  stat-  1045. 
Ute  so  far  as  the  State  Constitu- 


§  186  TRAFP^IC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  282 

taken  from  the  two  leading  political  parties.-^  So  one  pros- 
ecuted under  a  statute  for  an  illegal  sale  cannot  object  to 
the  statute  because  those  parts  relating  to  searches  and  seiz- 
ures are  illegal,  where  such  parts  are  susceptible  of  being 
disconnected  from  the  part  under  which  he  is  prosecuted.-- 
So,  where  an  ordiance  required  a  person  desiring  to  sell  li- 
quors to  apply  to  the  City  Council  for  a  license,  and  he  has 
not  done  so,  nor  paid  the  license  fee  prescribed  by  it,  he  can- 
not raise  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  ordinance.-^  But 
where  the  offense  charged  is  a  sale  of  liquor  upon  which  no 
tax  has  been  paid,  he  may  assail  the  statute  imposing  a  li- 
cense upon  manufacture  when  the  provisions  of  the  statute 
are  so  related  as  to  avoid  it  entirely.-*  But  when  a  person 
appeared  and  contested,  as  claimant,  the  seizure  of  liquors 
under  a  statute,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  question  the 
validity  of  the  statute  on  the  ground  that  it  made  no  pro- 
vision for  notice.-''  A  licensee  may  contest  the  validity  of  a 
statute  in  a  proceeding  to  revoke  his  license,  which  requires 
him  to  file  an  answer  on  oath  denying  the  charges  set  forth 
in  the  petition  for  its  revocation,  even  when  the  court  offers 
to  receive  an  unverified  answer;  because  he  cannot  be  placed 
in  the  position  of  either  having  his  license  revoked — his  prop- 
erty lost — or  commit  perjury  to  prevent  it  before  entering 
on  the  trial.-" 

21  State  V.  Scampini,  77  Vt.  92;  Civ.  App.  324;  76  S.  W.  7&G;  77 
59  Atl.  201.  S.  W.  1135. 

22  State  V.  Paige,  78  Vt.  286;  Where  a  statute  provided  that 
62   Atl.    1017.  proof  of  the  issuance  of  an  inter- 

23  Wells  V.  Torrey,  144  Mich.  nal  revenue  special  stamp  should 
689;  108  N.  W.  423;  13  Detroit  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  sale 
Leg.  N.  378.  by  the  person  to  whom  it  was  is- 

24  State  V.  Bengsch,  170  Mo.  81;  sued,  it  was  held  that  a  person 
70  S.  W.  710;  see  State  v.  See-  indicted  for  selling  liquor  within 
bold,  192  Mo.  720;   91   S.  W^  491.  an  anti-saloon  territory  could   not 

25  Quinn  v.  State,  82  Miss.  75;  object  to  the  validity  of  such  pro- 
33  So.   839.  vision   where    the   prosecution   did 

26 /ji  re  Cullian,  82  X.   Y.   App.  not    show     that     he     possessed     a 

Div.    445;    81    N.    Y.    Supp.    507;  United      States      revenue      stamp, 

see  Kennedy  v.   Womer,  51    N.    Y.  People   v.    Mcliride,    234    111.    146; 

Misc.  Rep.  362;    100   N.  Y.  Supp.  84  N.  E.   865. 

616;    Sweeney   v,    Webb,    33    Tex.  A   person    prosecuted    under   an 


283  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  187 

Sec.  187.     Title  of  statute — Valid  statutes. 

Many  cases  have  been  decided  in  which  was  drawn  in  ques- 
tion the  sufficiency  of  the  title  of  the  act  to  sustain  the  va- 
lidity of  the  statute  involving  the  usual  constitutional  provi- 
sion requiring  the  subject  matter  of  a  statute  to  be  expressed 
in  the  title,  and  prohibiting  more  than  one  subject  in  a  stat- 
ute. It  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  the  principles  underlying 
these  provisions  nor  the  reasons  for  their  adoption ;  it  will 
be  sufficient  to  cite  the  several  instances  where  titles  to  stat- 
utes relating  to  intoxicating  liquors  and  their  regulation  have 
been  passed  upon  by  the  courts.  "Where  a  statute  provided 
that  the  question  whether  a  license  should  be  issued  should 
be  submitted  on  petition  at  the  next  municipal  election  to  the 
voters  of  the  municipality,  it  was  held  that  it  was  not  void 
because  the  title  of  the  act  recited  that  it  was  an  act  for 
licensing  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  and  not  for  prohib- 
iting, as  was  contended.  The  statute  provided  for  an  annual 
election  on  the  question,  and  if  the  vote  was  adverse  to  issu- 
ing the  license,  the  prohibition  only  lasted  a  year.-"  And 
where  the  title  of  the  act  was  "to  provide  for  the  licensing, 
restriction  and  regulation  of  the  business  of  the  *  *  * 
sale  of  *  *  *  intoxicating  liquor,"  it  was  held  sufficient- 
ly broad  to  cover  a  provision  giving  a  right  of  action  to  a 
married  woman  to  recover  damages  arising  from  a  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  to  her  husband."*  So  the  title  to  an  act 
"to  provide  for  the  creation  by  popular  vote  of  anti-saloon 
territory  in  which  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  and  the 
licensing    of    such    sale    shall    be    prohibited    and    for    the 

ordinance  for  selling  less  than  five  university.      State   v.   Turner,   210 

gallons  of  liquor  at  a  time  cannot  Mo.  77;   107  S.  W.   10G4;  see  also 

insist  the  ordinance  is  invalid  be-  State     v.     Cass    Co.     Ct.      (Mo.), 

cause    sales    of    five    gallons    and  119      S.      VV.      1010;      Swarthout 

over  are  lawful.  State  v.  Priester,  v.  State   (Mo.),  119  S.  W.  1014. 
43  Minn.  373;   45  N.  W.   712.  instate  v.  Barber    (^S.  D.),   101 

An  applicant  for  a  license  who  X.  W.  1078;  Oglesby  v.  State,  121 

has  complied  with  the  statute    so  Ga.  602 ;   49   S.  E.  706. 
as  to  entitle  him  to  a  license,  may  ^s  (Jarrigan    v.    Kennedy,    19    S. 

question    the    validity    of    an    act  D.   11;   101  N.  W.  1081;  Garrigan 

permitting  the  location  of  a  dram-  v.   Thompson    ( S.  D.),   101   N.   W. 

shop  within  five  miles  of  a  State  1135. 


§  187         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  284 

abolition  by  like  means  of  territory  so  created,"  is  broad 
enough  to  include  provisions  creating  the  offense  of  per- 
jurj^  and  forgery  arising  in  connection  with  the  filing  of 
petitions  to  secure  an  election  upon  the  subject.-'*  The  title 
is  also  broad  enough  to  cover  provisions  affecting  changes  in 
the  charter  of  municipalities  and  giving  voters  outside  such 
municipalities  the  right  to  vote  under  the  act,  as  well  as  reg- 
ulating sales  by  druggists.  And  it  was  also  further  held  that 
the  title  was  not  deceptive  nor  misleading ;  and  an  objection 
that  it  apparently  provided  for  the  abolishment  of  anti- 
saloon  territory  by  means  like  that  by  which  the  territory  was 
created,  and  at  the  same  time,  because  of  changes  in  the  pre- 
cincts, voters  could  never  again  vote  on  the  question,  was  not 
well  taken,  nor  that  no  change  in  the  boundaries  of  such 
precincts  could  be  made  so  as  to  prevent  again  the  sub- 
mission of  the  question  to  the  voters  of  a  particular  terri- 
tory; nor  was  it  open  to  the  objection  that  the  act  provided 
that  a  majority  of  the  "legal  voters"  voting  on  the  question 
should  govern,  while  the  title  used  the  Avords  "popular 
vote. ""°  Such  a  statute  is  not  void  on  the  ground  that  it 
provides  penalties  for  its  violation,  not  thereby  including 
two  subject-matters  in  the  same  aet.^^  The  title  of  a  statute 
"to  further  regulate  and  prohibit  the  sale  or  disposition  of 
spirituous,  vinous  or  malt  intoxicating  liquors,  or  the 
issuing  of  prescriptions  by  physicians  for  the  sale  or 
other  disposition  of  such  liquors,"  authorizes  the  inser- 
tion of  a  clause  prohibiting  the  issuance  of  such  pre- 
scriptions by  both  physicians  and  "other  persons,"  as  well 
as  forbidding  their  issuance  of  them  on  Sunday.^-  So  a  title 
to  "regulate  the  opening,  closing  and  operating  saloons  and 
giving  away  or  selling"  liquors  "imder  a  license"  "and  to 
punish  violators  thereof,"  covers  a  provision  in  the  statute 
fixing  the  hours  for  opening  and  closing  saloons.^^     So  a  pro- 

29  People    V.    McBride,    234    111.  Atl.     926;      Fourment     v.      State 
146;    84  N.  E.  8€5.  (Ala.),   46  So.   2&6. 

30  People    V.    McBride,    2.34    111.  32  McAllister    v.    State     (Ala.), 
146;   84  N.  E.  865.  47  So.  161. 

31  State  V.  Fountain    (Del.),   60  33  Fourment  v.  State   (Ala.),  46 

So.  266. 


285  CONSTITUTIONAIilTY    OF    STATUTES.  §  187 

hibitory  act,  so  designated  in  its  title,  is  not  invalid,  because 
it  contains  exceptions  and  the  methods  Avhereby  they  may  be 
availed  of  so  as  not  to  violate  the  major  part  of  the  statute, 
and  also  contains  the  questions  of  regulation  and  prohibition 
of  dealings  in  intoxicating  liquors  foreshadowed  in  the  title. 
In  such  a  case  the  regulation,  in  a  sense,  is  accomplished  by 
the  act,  but  it  also  sets  forth  a  method  by  which  universal 
prohibition  is  bereft  of  its  penalties  by  giving  exemption 
to  those  who  comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  statute.''*  A 
statute  of  Idaho  provided  "for  the  search  and  seizure  of 
liquors  received,  kept  or  used  contrary  to  law,  and  the  ap- 
pliances used  in  connection  therewith,  to  define  and  punish 
as  misdemeanors  all  violators  thereof,  and  vesting  all  mag- 
istrates with  authority  who  receive  complaints  and  issue  war- 
rants against  all  persons  violating  the  provisions  of"  the 
act.  This  was  held  not  to  blend  two  subjects  in  one  act,  and 
the  fact  that  the  act  declared  the  keeping  or  associating  with 
others  in  the  maintenance  of  a  place  where  liquors  w^ere  kept 
or  received  for  an  unlawful  purpose,  and  the  receiving  and 
selling  them  should  constitute  a  misdemeanor;  the  main- 
tenance of  a  place  where  liquors  were  sold  or  given  away, 
or  kept  for  that  evident  purpose,  or  where  persons  were  per- 
mitted to  resort  for  drinking  pvirposes,  should  constitute  a 
common  nuisance,  and  empowering  a  magistrate  to  issue  a 
search  w^arrant  upon  complaint  and  authorizing  the  officers 
seizing  the  liquors  and  appliances  to  hold  them  until  the  case 
was  disposed  of,  did  not  render  the  statute  of  such  a  double 
aspect  as  to  violate  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  that  a 
statute  should  only  embrace  one  subject  and  matters  prop- 
erly connected  therewith.^'^  So  in  an  act  "to  prohibit  the 
sale  of  liquors  on  Sunday"  may  be  included  a  provision 
making  it  a  penalty  to  keep  open  a  barroom  for  the  sale  of 
liquors  on  Sunday.^**  So  a  title  to  a  statute  prohibiting  the 
sale  of  liquors  in  a  certain  county  within  five  miles  of  a  cer- 

34  state    V.    Skaggs     (Ala.),    46  sg  Beauvoir  Club   v.    State,    148 

So.   a&8.  Ala.  64;   40  So.   1040. 

35 State  V.    Moran    (Idaho),   90 
Pac.  1044. 


§  187  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  286 

tain  place  and  forbidding  the  clerk  of  that  county  to  issue 
a  license,  under  the  general  law,  to  any  person  to  sell  liquors 
within  this  prohibited  territory,  does  not  contain  two  sub- 
jects.^^  So  the  title  to  an  act  "to  better  regulate  and  restrain 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  and  providing  for  remon- 
strance against  the  granting  of  licenses  for  its  sale,"  is  broad 
enough  to  cover  a  provision  for  a  ' '  blanket  remonstrance. ' '  ^^ 
A  title  fixing  an  annual  license  fee  is  broad  enough  to  provide 
for  a  license  fee  for  the  sale  of  liquor  in  any  quantity."^  And 
a  title  to  an  act  requiring  a  license  for  sale  in  a  particular 
county  is  broad  enough  to  cover  a  provision  forbidding  sales 
without  a  license  in  incorporated  towns  of  such  county.^** 
An  amendment  to  a  statute  extending  its  provisions  is  not 
necessarily  void  because  it  renders  the  act  broader  than  when 
originally  adopted.'*^  A  statute  imposing  a  property  tax 
on  distilled  liquors  made  in  the  State,  requiring  vendors  of 
liquors  to  have  a  license  and,  by  construction,  exempting  pure 
alcohol,  domestic  wines  and  liquors  made  for  export  from 
taxation,  is  covered  by  a  title  "providing  for  a  State  license 
tax  on  distilled  liquors,  including  whisky  and  distilled  spir- 
its of  all  kinds,  wines  and  all  kinds  of  vinous  liquors;  to 
create  the  office  of  special  license  commissioner,  and  to  pro- 
vide for"  his  appointment  by  the  Governor.*-  So  a  statute 
prohibiting  sales  of  liquors  in  counties  voting  against  their 
sale  and  also  prohibiting  sales  without  a  license  in  counties 
where  sales  are  permitted,  may  be  embraced  within  a  single 
statute.*^  A  statute  "in  relation  to  revenue"  providing  for 
an  annual  tax  to  be  paid  by  persons  selling  liquors  and  im- 
posing a  penalty  for  its  violation  is  valid.*"*     So  the  title  to 

37  Clark  V.  Tower,  104  Md.  175;  4i  state   v.    Courtney,   27    Mont. 
65  Atl.  3.  378;    71   Pac.   308. 

38  Cain    V.    Allen,    1&8    Ind.    8;  42  state  v.  Bengsch,  170  Mo.  SI ; 
79  N.  E.  201;    79  N.  E.  896;    Re-  70  S.   VV.  710. 

gandez   v.   Haines,    168    Ind.    140;  43  Brass  v.  State,  45  Fla.   1;   34 

79  N,  E.  352.  So.   307;    Cwsar   v.   State,   50   Fla. 

39  Glover  v.  State,  120  Ga.  594;        1;    39  So.   470. 

55  S.  E.  592.  44  Parsons    v.    Peopl«,    32    Colo. 

40  Glover  v.  State,  126  Ga.  594;       221;    76  Pac.  666, 
55  S.  E.  592. 


287  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  187 

an  act  "to  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicants"  covers  a  provi- 
sion preventing  a  "gift"  of  such  liquors  ;'=  or  of  a 
"barter.""  So  a  title  of  an  act  preventing  a  sale  of  liquors 
on  "the  Island  of  St.  Simons"  is  sufficient  to  cover  a  provision 
preventing  a  sale  "on  any  river  or  creek  within  the  boundary 
of  such  island.""^  An  act  prohibiting  sales  on  Sunday  un- 
der a  penalty  of  a  fine,  forfeiture  of  the  defendant's  license; 
to  sell  generally  on  conviction  of  a  second  offense  within  a 
year,  prescribing  certain  duties  of  the  clerk  of  the  court  and 
judge  if  a  second  conviction  is  had  and  a  penalty  for  the 
failure  of  the  judge  to  perform  such  duties,  is  covered  by  "an 
act  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquors  on  Sunday.  "*»  The  title 
to  an  act  prohibiting  ' '  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquors,  except  for  medical,  scientific  and  mechanical  pur- 
poses, and  to  regulate  the  manufacture  thereof  for  such  ex- 
cepted purposes,"  is  sufficiently  broad  to  cover  a  provision 
for  the  appointment  of  assistant  counsel  to  the  attorney-gen- 
eral of  the  State  to  prosecute  violations  of  the  statute  where 
the  local  county  attorney  fails  to  do  so ;  ^"^  and  a  statute  en- 
titled "An  act  relating  to  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors" 
may  cover  a  provision  prohibiting  unlawful  sale.=°  So  an 
act  is  valid  entitled  "An  act  to  set  apart  Sunday  as  a  day  of 
public  rest;  to  provide  for  closing  of  saloons  and  other  places 
of  business  on  Sunday;  to  prohibit  the  selling,  giving  away 
or  disposing  of  any  spirituous,  malt  or  intoxicating  liquors 
on  Sundays;  to  provide  for  the  closing  of  places  of  public 
amusements  and  prohibiting  horse  racing  on  Sundays;  and 
to  provide  for  the  punishment  of  those  guilty  of  violating  the 
provisions  of  the  act;"  and  providing  for  the  disposal  of  all 
fines  assessed  for  the  violation  of  the  act  covers  but  one  sul)- 
ject  and  matters  properly  connected  therewith."     So  an  act 

45  McLaury    v.    Watelsky     (Tex.  beyond  reasonable  construction   of 
Civ.  App.),  87  S.  VV.   104.5.  the  constitutional  provisions. 

46  James   v.   State,    124   Ga.   72;  «  state  v.  Brooks,  74  Kan.  IT."): 
52   S.   E.   295.  S3   Pac.    1013. 

47  James  v.  State,  supra.  so  state   v.    Kleinfield,    72    Kan. 
48Borck    v.    State     (Ala.),    39       674;    83   Pac.   831. 

So-  580.  51  state    v.     Dolan,     13     Idaho, 

This   case  does   not  seem  to   go       693;    92    Pac.    999;    Ex  parte  Ja 

cobs,  13  Idaho,  720;  92  Pac.  1003. 


§  187  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  288 

amending:  a  section  of  an  act  entitled  "An  act  to  regulate 
the  license  and  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  prescribing 
penalties  for  its  violation,"  the  amendment  making  any  per- 
son keeping  a  place  where  such  liquors  are  illegally  sold 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  is  germane  to  the  original  act  and 
not  void.^-  An  act  both  prohibiting  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  liquors  does  not  embrace  two  separate  subjects.^^  A 
statute  prohibiting  the  granting  in  a  certain  county,  under 
a  penalty,  of  a  license  to  sell  liquors  without  the  applicant 
first  filing  the  written  consent  of  two-thirds  of  the  city's 
freeholders,  but  providing  that  it  shall  not  be  so  construed 
as  to  prevent  the  authorities  of  an  incorporated  village  from 
putting  additional  restraints  on  the  sale  of  liquors,  does  not 
contain  two  subject-matters,  and  is  valid.^*  A  statute  de- 
fining what  shall  constitute  a  disorderly  house  so  as  to  in- 
clude any  house  in  which  liquors  are  sold  without  a  license, 
and  containing  a  section  defining  the  oifense  of  procurer  is 
valid,  the  latter  part  of  the  statute  being  separable  from  the 
former  part.^^  So  an  act  "to  establish  a  dispensary  in  F,  and 
a  branch  thereof  in  E  F,  and  to  provide  for  the  issuance  of 
liquor  license  in  such  city  and  county  until  this  act  goes 
into  effect"  clearly  enough  expresses  the  object  of  the  act. 
and  does  not  embrace  two  subjects ;  ^®  and  a  like  act  is  not 
obnoxious  because  its  effect  is  to  revoke  the  right  of  such 
city  to  grant  licenses.^^  The  title  of  "an  act  relating  to  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  and  the  suppression  of  places 
where  such  liquors  are  sold,  or  usea,  or  kept  tor  sale,  or  used 
contrary  to  law"  permits  the  insertion  of  provisions  in  the 
act  authorizing  cities  to  pass  an  ordinance  to  prohibit  unlaAv- 
ful  sales,  define  what  shall  be  a  nuisance  in  connection  with 
such   sales   and   their   suppression,   and   to    provide   for  the 

52Donavan    v.    State,    170    Ind.  ss  Joliff    v.    State,   53    Tex.    Cr. 

123;   83  N.  E.  744.  App.  61;    109  S.  W.   176;   Webber 

ssChanney    v.    State,    14^    Ala.  v.   State    (Tex.   Cr.  App.),   109   S. 

136;  41  So.  172;  State  v.  Thomas,  W.    1S2. 

74  Kan.   360;    86  Pac.   4^.  56  Mitchell    v.    State,    133    Ala. 

54  Kemp  V.  State,  120  Ga.   157;  65;  33  So.  687. 

47    S.    E.    54S;    Smith   v.    People,  57  .chamlee    v.    Davis,    115    Ga. 

32  Colo.  251;  75  Pac.  914.  266;  41  S.  E.  691. 


289  CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTES.  §  187 

search  of  all  premises  where  such  nuisances  are  alleged  to 
exist,  as  well  as  the  seizure  of  liquors,  glasses,  bars  and  bot- 
tles used  in  their  maintenance.^**  So  a  statute  requiring  the 
doors  to  be  kept  closed  on  Sunday,  prohibiting  music,  danc- 
ing and  singing  in  the  saloon  room,  and  also  prohibiting  the 
business  of  running  a  lunch  counter  and  restaurant  in  con- 
nection with  or  in  the  saloon,  and  the  payment  of  a  fixed  sum 
by  retail  dealers,  is  covered  by  a  title,  "A  statute  regulating 
and  licensing  liquor  dealers"  Mnthin  a  certain  named  terri- 
tory/'^ In  the  same  State  it  was  held  that  a  title  regulat- 
ing the  hours  when  liquor  may  be  sold,  providing  for  Sunday 
closing  and  for  a  penalty  for  sales  during  prohibited  hours, 
is  broad  enough  to  contain  provisions  requiring  saloons  to  be 
closed  between  12  o'clock  midnight  and  6  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  from  12  o'clock  Saturday  night  until  6  o'clock 
the  following  Monday  morning,  and  prohibiting  the  owner 
from  allowing  any  one,  except  his  family  and  himself,  enter- 
ing the  saloon  during  the  prohibited  hours.**"  A  similar  stat- 
ute was  held  valid,  where  the  statute  was  entitled  "Sale  of 
intoxicating  liauors."**^  So  under  a  statute  entitled  "An 
act  to  regula  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,"  a  sale  by  the 
glass  or  small  measure  may  be  prohibited,®-  or  the  duties 
of  police  officers  in  relation  to  liquors  and  to  liquor  measures 
and  repealing  local  laws  may  be  prescribed.**^  Under  a  title 
relating  to  the  "sale  of  liquors"  may  be  included  a  clause  pro- 
hibiting a  gift  to  a  minor  or  intoxicated  person.***  Under 
a  title  "to  prohibit  the  sale"  may  be  inserted  provisions 
for  a  local  option;®^  for  local  option  is  but  another  way  of 

58  Wilson    V.    Herink,    64    Kan.  C4  Parkinson    v.    State,    14    Md. 
607;  68  Pac.  72.  184;    74   Am.    Dec.   52.2;    Stickrod 

59  St.    Anthony    v.    Brandon,    10  v.  Commonwealth,  8'6   Ky.   285;   5 
Idaho,  205;    77  Pac.  322.  S.   W.   580;    Thomasson   v.   State, 

60  State  V.   Galloway,    11   Idaho,  15   Ind.    449;    State   v.   Adamson, 
719;   84  Pac.  27.  14    Ind.    296.      Contra,    Holley    v. 

61  Duluth         V.         Abrahamson  State,  14  Tex.  App.  505. 
(Minn.),  104  N.  W.  082.  65  Neighbor.s   v.     Commonwealth 

62  State  V.  Circuit  Court,  50  N.  (Ky.),  9  S.  W.  718;   McGruder  v. 
J.  L.  5S5;    15   Atl.  272.  State,  83  Ga.  616;    10  S.   E.  281; 

63  Commonwealth  v.  Sellers,  130  Hilverstine  v.  Yantes,  88  Ky.  695; 
Pa.  St.  32;   IS  Atl.  541.  21  S.  W.  811. 


§  187  TRAFP^IC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  290 

determining  whether  prohibition  shall  prevail  in  the  local 
community.  Under  the  title,  "An  act  to  provide  a  remedy 
against  persons  selling  liquors  to  husbands  and  children," 
may  be  inserted  provisions  prohibitin;;^  sales  to  minors,  in- 
toxicated persons,  hab'tual  drunkards,  and  giving  a  right 
of  action  against  the  seller  who  violates  these  provisions. '^" 
"Where  a  provision  of  a  Constitu'ion  required  everv  act 
levying  a  tax  to  distinctly  specify  the  purpose  for  wh'ch  the 
tax  is  levied,  and  another  provision  provided  thrt  the 
general  assembly  may  provide  for  the  payment  of  license 
fees  on  the  various  trades,  occupations  and  provisions,  and 
may  delegate  the  power  to  municipalities  to  impose  similar 
fees,  it  was  held  that  an  act  imposing  license  taxes  on  com- 
pound, rectified  and  distilled  spirits  was  not  unconstitu- 
tional on  the  ground  that  the  title  failed  to  specify  the 
purpose  for  which  the  tax  was  levied.''^  "Where  a  provision 
of  a  Constitution  provided  that  no  bill  should  be  so  amended 
on  its  passage  through  the  Legislature  as  to  change  its 
original  purpose,  and  a  bill  was  introduced  entitled,  "To 
further  regulate  opening,  closing,  keeping  and  selling  or 
'  giving  away  spirituous  liquors  under  a  license  operating 
saloons,  and  to  punish  the  violation  thereof,"  and  in  its 
passage  the  title  of  a  substitute  which  became  a  law  was, 
"To  further  regulate  the  opening,  closing  and  operating 
saloons  and  giving  away  or  selling  spirituous  liquors  under 
a  license,  and  to  punish  violations  thereof,"  it  was  held 
the  latter  title  was  but  an  extension  of  the  title  of  the 
original  bill,  and  it  was  not  such  a  departure  as  violated 

A   statute   entitled,   "An   act   to  66  Montgomery  v.  State,  SS  Ala. 

better   regulate,   restrict   and    con-  141;     7    So.    51;     Thomasson    v. 

trol      the      sale      of      intoxicating  State,   15  Ind.  449. 

liquors  and  providing  for  local  op-  e^  Long     continued     usage     hart 

tion  elections"  is  broad  enough  to  much   to   do   with   bringing   about 

cover  provisions   for  the  adoption  this    result.      Brown-Foreman    Co. 

of  local  option  which  will   totally  v.    Commonwealth,    126    Ky.    402; 

prohibit  the  sales  of  liquors  in  the  101    S.    W.    321;    30    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

district    adopting    it.      McPherson  793;   Mt.  Sterling  v.  King   (Ky. ), 

T.  State  (Ind.),  90  N.  E.  610.  104   S.   W.   322;    31    Ky.   L.   Rep. 

919. 


291 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATrTE'o. 


U88 


the   provision   of  the  Constitution   to  which  reference  has 
been  made."^ 


Sec.  188.     Title  of  statutes — Invalid  statutes. 

Since  "prohibition"  is  more  than  "regulation,"  therefore, 
under  a  title  to  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
their  sale  cannot  be  prohibited,  nor  provision  be  made  to 
submit  the  question  of  sale  or  no  sale  to  a  local  option  vote.'^'-' 
And  it  has  been  held  that,  "An  act  to  prohibit  the  sale  of 
spirituous,  malt  or  vinous  liquors  near  public  and  grading 
camps  of  canals  and  railroads  and  other  kindred  enter- 
prises," was  not  broad  enough  to  include  a  provision  for  the 
sale  of  liquors  and  regulating  their  sale.^*^  So  an  act  to 
"regulate"  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  liquor  cannot  con- 
tain a  provision  fixing  a  penaltv  for  being  found  drunk  in  a 
public   place,    without   any    reference   how    the   liquor   was 

Breaux,  122  La.  514;  47  So.  ST^; 
Theo.  Hamm  Brewing  Co.  v.  Foss 
(S.  D.),  91  X.  W.  584;  Ex  parte 
Abrams  (Tex.),  120  S.  W.  883; 
Ex  parte  Clark  (Tex.),  120  S. 
W.    892. 

69 /n  re  Hauck,  70  Mich.  396; 
38  N.  W.  2^9;  Sweet  v.  Wabash, 
41  Ind.  7;  People  v.  Gadway,  61 
Mich.  285;  28  N.  W.  101;  Miller 
V.  Jones,  80  Ala.  89;  Cantrill  v. 
Sainer,  59  Iowa,  2fi;  12  N.  W. 
753;  Bronson  v.  Oberlin,  41  Ohio 
St.  478;  Watson  v.  State,  140 
Ala.  134;  37  So.  225;  State  v. 
Richardson  (Ore.),  85  Pac.  225 j 
Crabb  v.  State,  88  Ga.  584;  Em- 
poria V.  Volnier,  12  Kan.  622 1 
Yahn  v.  Merritt,  117  Ala.  485; 
23  So.  71;  In  Matter  of  Hauck,  70 
Mich.  396,  404;  38  N.  W.  296; 
Heise  v.  Council,  6  Rich.  L.  415; 
State  V.  Mott,  61  Md.  297.  Contm, 
McPherson  v.  State,  90  N.  E.  610. 

70  Gurding   v.   Board,   13   Idaho, 
444;    90  Pac.  357. 


esFourment  v.  State   (Ala.),  46 
So.   266. 

Other  cases  on  the  subject  aie 
as  follows:  Smith  v.  People,  32 
Colo.  251;  75  Pac.  914;  Albrecht 
V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  216;  Ex 
parte  Burnside,  86  Ky.  423;  6  S. 
W.  276;  McArthur  v.  State,  69 
Ga.  444;  Gandy  v.  State,  86  Ala. 
20;  5  So.  420;  Gayle  v.  Owen 
Co.,  83  Ky.  61;  Ramagnano  v. 
Cook,  85  Ala.  226;  3  So.  845;  In 
re  Pollai-d,  27  Pa.  St.  507;  17 
Atl.  1087;  Hatfield  v.  Common- 
wealth, 120  Pa.  St.  395;  14  Atl. 
151;  Ck)mmonwealth  v.  Hill,  127 
Pa.  St.  540;  19  Atl.  141;  Matter 
of  DeVaucene,  31  How.  Pr.  289, 
337;  State  v.  Braun,  96  Minn. 
■521;  105  N.  W'.  975;  Schiller  v. 
State  (S.  C),  38  So.  706; 
State  V.  Hooker  (Okla.),  98  Pac. 
964;  Dinuzo  v.  State  (Neb.),  123 
Pac.  310;  Ex  parte  Ellis,  76  Kan. 
368;  91  Pac.  81;  Rose  v.  State 
(Ind.),    87    N.    E.    103;    State   v. 


§  188         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  292 

obtained.'^  Under  a  title  ''to  constitute  the  town  of  B.  and 
vicinity,  in  B.  Count.y,  a  separate  school  district,"  cannot 
be  inserted  a  provision  prohibiting  the  sale  of  li(iuor  within 
the  town.'-  So  a  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquors 
cannot  contain  a  provision  for  the  refunding  of  the  amount 
paid  on  licenses  for  the  current  year  and  appropriate  money 
for  that  purpose.'"'  Under  an  act  having  the  title,  "An  act 
to  prohibit  the  sale  of  spirituous,  vinous  and  malt  liquors  in 
Dallas  County,  outside  of  the  corporate  limits  and  police 
jurisdiction  of  Selma,"  was  inserted  the  provision  that 
''any  person  who  sells,  gives  away,  or  otherwise  disposes  of 
vinous,  spirituous  or  malt  liquors,  or  intoxicating  beverages 
or  drinks,  or  fruit  preserved  in  alcohol,  or  alcoholic  drinks 
in  Dallas  Countl.y,  outside  the  corporate  limits  and  police 
jurisdiction  of  the  city  of  Selma,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  mis- 
demeanor." It  was  held  that  the  act  was  void  so  far  as  it 
prohibited  the  giving  away  of  liquor  or  any  other  disposi- 
tion of  them  than  by  sale,  and  it  was  also  void  so  far  as  it 
tended  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquors  neither  vinous,  spiritu- 
ous nor  malt,'^*  Under  a  title  to  prevent  the  sale  or  gift  of 
liquors  to  minors  cannot  be  inserted  a  provision  prohibiting 
a  sale  or  gift  to  an  adult."'^  An  act  was  entitled,  "An  act 
to  establish  an  excise  department  in  cities  of  this  State." 
It  also  provided  that  a  board  of  excise  commissioners  should 
be  elected  at  the  next  charter  elections  on  the  general  ticket. 
A  supplementary  statute  to  this  act  provided  that  the 
governing  board  of  any  city  or  town,  except  cities  of  the 
first  class,  might  provide  for  a  board  of  excise  commis- 
sioners to  be  appointed  by  a  court  of  the  county.  It  was 
held  that  the  supplementary  act  was  not  covered  by  the 
title  to  the  original  act  .because  its  object  was  to  regulate 
the  excise  and  to  divide  municipalities  embraced  in  such 
scheme   into  two   classes.^^     So,   "An   act  to   regulate   and 

71  People    V.    Beadle,    GO    Mich.  74  state  v.  Davis,  130  Ala.  148; 
22;   26  N.  W.  800.  30  So.  344. 

72  Montgomery  v.  State,  88  Ala.  7n  Hyman    v.     State,    87    Tenn. 
141;  7  So.  51.  109;   9  S.  W.  272. 

73  State  V.  Davis,  130  Ala.  148;  76  Hann  v.  Bedell,  61  N.  J.  L. 
30  So.  344.  148;  50  Atl.  664. 


293  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    STATUTES.  §  189 

license  the  sale  of  spirituous,  vinous,  malt,  and  other  intoxi- 
cating liquors, ' '  cannot  be  so  amended  as  to  apply  to  whole- 
salers or  persons  selling  less  than  five  gallons  at  any  one 
time,  for  the  original  act  only  applies  to  retailers. '^^  Under 
a  title  concerning  the  "sale"  of  intoxicating  liquor  cannot 
be  inserted  a  provision  forbidding  a  "gift"  of  liquor  by  a 
private  person  as  a  mere  act  of  courtesy  or  hospitality,  dis- 
connected with  any  business  transaction  J*  Under  "An  act 
to  prohibit  the  sale  of  spirituous,  malt  or  vinous  liquors 
near  public  works  and  grading  camps  of  canals  and  rail- 
roads and  other  kindred  enterprises,"  a  provision  providing 
for  a  regulation  of  the  sale,  of  liquors  is  unconstitutional/'* 

Sec.  189.     Statute  or  ordinance  only  in  part  valid. 

It  is  a  well  settled  principle  of  constitutional  law  that 
when  a  part  of  a  statute  is  unconstitutional,  if  by  striking 
from  the  act  all  that  part,  which  is  void,  that  which  is  left 
is  complete  in  itself,  sensible,  capable  of  being  executed  and 
wholly  independent  of  that  which  is  rejected,  the  courts  will 
reject  that  which  is  unconstitutional  and  enforce  the  re- 
mainder. It  is  equally  well  settled  that  where  a  part  of  a 
statute  is  unconstitutional,  if  such  part  is  so  connected  with 
the  other  parts  as  that  they  mutually  depend  upon  each 
other  as  conditions,  considerations  or  compensations  for  each 
other,  so  as  to  warrant  the  belief  that  the  Legislature  in- 
tended them  as  a  whole,  and  if  they  could  not  be  carried 
into  effect  the  Legislature  would  not  have  passed  the  residue 
independently  of  that  which  is  void,  then  the  whole  act 
must  fail.  Such  constitutional  and  unconstitutional  provi- 
sions may  even  be  contained  in  the  same  section  and  yet  be 
perfectly  distinct  and  separable,  so  that  the  first  may  stand 
though  the  last  fall.  The  point  is  not  whether  they  are 
contained  in  the  same  section — for  the  distribution  into  sec- 
tions is  purely  artificial — but  whellier  they  are  essentially 

7T  state  V.  Bod:,   1C7   Ind.  559;  444;  99  Pac.  82G.     For  other  cases 

79  N.  E.   493.  see    Brumbaugh   v.    vState    (Tex.), 

78  State  V.   Fulks,   207   Mo.  26;  120       S.       W.       423;       ChriHtian 

105  S.  W.  733.  Moline   Brewing    Co.   v.    Hill,    166 

79Gerding   v.   Board,    15   Idaho,  Fed.   140. 


§189 


TKAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


294 


and  inseparably  connected  in  substance.^"  The  same  rule 
of  construction  applies  to  a  B3'-Law  or  an  ordinance  of  a 
municipal  corporation,  and  if  it  has  distinct  and  independent 
parts,  alihough  one  or  more  of  them  may  be  void,  the  rest 
are  equally  valid,  as  though  the  void  clauses  had  been 
omitted;  but  if  it  be  entire,  each  part  having  a  general  in- 
fluence over  the  rest,  and  one  part  of  it  be  void,  the  entire 
By-Law  or  ordinance  is  void.^^  This  rule  of  construction 
has  been  applied  to  statutes  and  ordinances  relating  to  in- 
toxicating liquors.^- 


soiCooley's     Const.     Lim.      (6tli 
Ed.)    211;    State   v.   Bengsch,    170 
Mo.   81;    70  S.   W.   710;    Bank  v, 
Dudley,  2   Pet.    (U.  S.)    5'26;    Mo 
bile,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  State,  29  Ala 
507;    People   v.    Hill,    7    Cal.    97 
Rood  V.    McCargar,    49   Cal.    117 
State  V.    Wheeler,    25   Conn.   290 
Robinson    v.    Bank,    etc.,    18    Ga 
65 ;   Supervisors,  etc.,  v.  Davis,  '63 
111.  405;   Myers  v.  People,  67   111. 
503;     Clark    v.     Ellis,     2    Blackf. 
(Ind.)  248;  State  v.  Blend,  121  Ind. 
514 ;    iSanto  v.  State,  1C5 ;    Town  of 
Eldora  v.  Barlingame,  62  la.  3^2 ;  17 
N.  W.  148;  Eli  V.  Thompson,  3  A.  K. 
Marsh.     (Ky.)     70;     Williams    v. 
Pagson,   14  La.   Ann.  7;    Davis  v. 
State,  7  Md.   151;   Berry  v.  Balti- 
more,   etc.,    R.   €o.,    41    Md.    446; 
Commonwealth     v.     Hitcliings,     5 
Gray     (Mass.),    482;     Wellington, 
Petitioner,    16    Pick.    (Mass.)    95; 
Commonwealth     v.      Kimball,     24 
Pick.     (Mass.)     ."-j'.);    Thomson    v. 
Grand  Gulf  R.  Co.,  3  How.  (Miss.) 
240;   'Campbell   v.   Union   Bank,   6 
How.  (Miss.)   625;  State  v.  Clark, 
54   Mo.    17;    People    v.    Lawrence, 
,S«  Barb.    (N.    V.)    190;    PZxchan^e 
Bank    v.    Hinos,    .'!    Ohio,    1  -.    State 
V.  Copeland,  3   R.   I.   33;   State  v. 
Snow,  3  R.  I.  04;  State  v.  Amery, 


12    R.    I.    64;    State   v.   Clark,    15 
R.   I.  383;    5  Atl.   635. 

81  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  3i54; 
Rex  v.  The  Company,  etc.,  8  Tcnn. 
R.  356;  Colchester  v.  Godwin, 
Carter,  121;  Elwood  v.  Bullock, 
6  Q.  B.  386;  Clark  v.  Tuckett,  2 
\'ent.  1&2;  Rex  v.  Atwood,  4  B. 
and  Ad.  481;  Shelton  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  30  Ala.  540;  Municipality  v. 
Morgan,  1  La.  Ann.  Ill;  Common- 
wealth v.  Dow,  10  Met.  (Mass.) 
506;  Amesbury  Insurance  Co.,  6 
Gray  (Mass.),  596;  State  v.  Clark, 
54  Mo.  17;  Thomas  v.  Mount,  9 
Ohio,   219. 

82  MeCreary  v.  State,  73  Ala. 
480;  Indianapolis,  138  Ind.  30; 
36  N.  E.  857;  Piqua  v.  Zimmc-lin, 
35  Ohio  Ft.  507;  State  v.  Becker, 
3  S.  D.  29;  51  N.  W.  1018;  State 
v.  Amery,  12  R.  I.  64;  State  v. 
Clark,  15  R.  I.  383;  6  Atl.  635; 
State  V.  Bengsch,  170  Mo.  81;  70 
S.  W.  710;  State  v.  Davis,  130 
Ala.   148;  30  So.  344. 

If  the  part  of  the  statute  under 
which  the  defendant  is  prosecuted 
is  separable  from  the  part  he 
claims  is  unconstitutional,  tlie 
validity  of  the  latter  pa'-t  wHl  not 
be  considered  by  the  court,  and  he 
la  not  entitled  to  raise  any  ques- 


295  CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF   STATUTES.  §  190 

Sec.  190.    Construction  of  statutes. 

In  accompjishing  the  purposes  of  their  enactment  liquor 
laws  should  be  liberally  construed.^"  This  is  true  of  all 
those  statutes,  or  parts  of  statutes,  relating  to  the  control 
of  the  sale  and  manufacture  of  intoxicating  liquors — to 
regulations  concerning  their  sale  and  manufacture — to  local 
option  laws.  But  concerning  penal  sta'^utes,  or  those  por- 
tions of  the  liquor  laws  inflicting  penalties,  they  are  strictly 
construed  under  the  well-known  rule  that  penal  statutes 
must  be  strictly  construed.  In  a  New  York  case,  however, 
it  was  said  that  "while  a  statute  of  this  character  should 
not  be  enlarged,  it  should  be  interpreted,  where  the  language 
is  clear  and  explicit,  according  to  its  true  intent  and  mean- 
ing, having  in  view  the  evil  to  be  remedied  and  the  object 
to  be  obtained.  The  evident  object  was  to  suppress  the  sale 
and  use  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  to  punish  those  who,  in 
any  form,  furnished  means  of  intoxicaHon,  by  making  them 
liable  for  damages  which  might  arise,  which  were  caused  by 
the  parties  who  furnished  such  means.^*     With  relation  to 

tion  concerning  its  validity.    State  sales  on   Sunday  is  void  where  a 

V.  Paige,  78  Vt.  2»6;  62  Atl.  1017.  statute   permits   sales   for   medici- 

See    Ferguson   v.    Josey,    70    Ark.  nal  and  mechanical  purposes.    Co- 

04;  66  S.  W.  345;   State  v.  Davis,  lumbus  v.  Schaerr,  5  Ohio  S.  &  C. 

130  Ala.  148;  30  So.  344;  Meehan  P.  100. 

v.  Board,  75  N.  J.  L.  5i57 ;  70  Atl.  In  Vermont  it  was  held  that  so 

3'63;  affirming  73  N.  J.  L.  382;  64  much   of   a   statute   as   related   to 

Atl.  689;  Ex  parte  Dupree  ( Tex. ) ,  sales  in  the  original  packages  was 

105  S.  W.  493.  void;    but   that   fact    did    not    in- 

6o   much    of    tlio    statute   as    is  validate    the    remaining    portions, 

not  covered   by   the    title   may    be  State  v.  Kibling,   63  Vt.  036;    22 

rejected  and  the  remainder  stand.  Atl.   613. 

Hancock  v.  State,  114  Ga.  439;  40  83 /«  re  Finley,  58  N.   Y.  Misc. 

So.    317.      But   an    act    depending  639;   110  X.  Y.  Supp.  71;  Roberts 

upon   another   act   that   is   invalid  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  207;  60  iS.  E. 

cannot    be    euiorced.      Mitchell    v.  1082;    see    Seattle    v.    Foster,    47 

State.    133   Ala.   65;    32    So.   e87:  Wash.    172;    91    Pac.   642;    Cox  v. 

Sweney  v.  Webb,  33  Tex.  '^'■.  Anp.  Buriiham,    120    Iowa.    43;    94    N. 

324;  76  S.  W.  766;  77  S.  W.  113o;  W.   265;    People   v.   Craio^.    112   X. 

.August  Pu9ch  ct  Co.  V.  Wobb.   192  y.    Supn.    1142. 

Fed.    655;     Brumbausrh    v.    State,  84  Mead    v.    Station,    87    N.    Y. 

(Tex.),  120  S.  W.  423.  493;  41  Am.  Rep.  386. 
An     ordinance     forbidding     ftll 


§  190  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  296 

those  provisions  giving  a  civil  remedy  to  persons  sustaining 
damages  occasioned  by  sales  to  drunkards  and  the  like,  the 
statutes  are  strictly  construed  in  so  far  as  giving  a  cause 
of  action ;  and  one  must  come  clearly  within  their  provi- 
sions,^^ for  the  cause  of  action  is  purely  a  statutory  one. 
But  if  the  person  seeking  to  recover  damages  is  clearly 
designated  by  the  statute,  and  the  wrong  of  which  he  com- 
plains is  clearly  denounced  by  the  statute  and  provision 
made  for  the  recovery  of  damages,  there  is  no  reason  for  a 
strict  construction  in  enforcing  the  remedy  given  by  the 
statute.^*' 

85  Schneider  v.  Hosier,  21   Ohio  71  111.  241;  Feese  v.  Tripp,  70  111. 
St.  98.  4fl6;     Fentz    v.    Meadows,    72    111. 

86  Tliat  such  statutes  are  strict-  540 ;     Baecher    v.    State,    19    Ind. 
ly  construed,  see  Meidel  v.  Anthis,  App.  100;  40  N.  E.  42. 


CHAPTER  III. 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE. 


SECTION. 

191.  btatutes  drawn  in  general 
terms,   how  construed. 

1&2.  What  constitutes  interstate 
commerce. 

193.  Original  packages. 

194.  What     constitutes     original 

packages — ^Size    of    pack- 
ages. 

195.  Original   packages  —   Illus- 

trations. 

196.  Discrimination   against   citi- 

zens of  other  States. 

197.  Right    of    consignee    to    sell 

imported  liquors. 

198.  Right  of  importer  to  sell  in 

original  packages. 

199.  "Wilson    Law,"    origin    and 

constitutionality. 

200.  Wilson      Law      construed — 

"Arrival"   defined. 

201.  Liquors     in     transit — When 

transit  ceases. 

202.  Wilson     Law — Effect     upon 

State  laws. 


SECTION. 

203.     Importing    liquors    for    pri- 
vate use. 
Leaving  liquor  unreasonable 
length  of  time  in  carrier's 
possession. 
License  —  Tax  —  Regulating 

sale. 
Prohibiting     solicitation     of 

orders. 
Sales   beyond   State  lines. 
Sales  to  minors  and  drunk- 
ards. 
Burden     on     'defendant     to 
show   he   is   protected    by 
the    interstate    commerce 
law. 
Liability   of   officers   serving 

warrant. 
Shipping  liquor  under   false 

brand. 
Carrier    refusing    to    accept 
liquors       for       transporta- 
tion. 


204. 

205. 

206. 

207. 
208. 

209. 


210. 


211. 


212. 


Sec.  191.     Statutes  drawn  in  general  terms,  how  construed. 

It  is  a  general  rule  of  interpretation,  as  has  been  else- 
where noted,  that  statutes  drawn  in  general  terms  and  which 
are,  therefore,  in  terms,  applicable  to  intoxicating  liquors 
imported  and  while  in  the  original  packages,  will  not  be  held 
void  for  that  reason,  but  will  simply  be  held  to  apply  to 
liquors  not  imported  or  not  in  the  oridual  packages,  and, 
therefore,  valid,  unless  the  terms  of  the  statute  are  such  that 
297 


§  192  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  298 

they  cannot  be  made  applicable  to  non-imported  liquors  or 
liquors  not  in  the  original  package.^ 


Sec.  192.     V/hat  constitutes  interstate  ccmmerce. 

"What  does  and  a' hat  d^e.s  not  constitute  interstate  com- 
merce is  often  a  delicate  question.  J-S  a  general  rule,  com- 
merce is  not  traffic  alone — it  is  interccursa.  Speak'ng  of 
the  interstate  commerce  laws  of  the  Federal  Constitution  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  said:  "It  describes 
the  commercial  intercourse  between  na'^'ons,  and  parts  of 
nations,  in  all  its  branches,  and  i^  regulated  by  prescribing 
rules  for  carrying  on  that  intercourse."-  As  distinguished 
from  domestic  or  State  commerce,  interstate  commerce  includes 
traffic  between  points  in  different  States  as  well  as  between 
points  in  the  same  State,  but  which  in  transit  is  carried 
through  another  State.'  Goods  shipped  C.  0.  D.  from  one 
State  to  another  constitutes  interstate  commerce,  and  such 
goods  cannot  be  controlled  by  State  laws.*  So  a  wholesale 
dealer  in  liquors  in  one  State,  having  no  place  of  business  in 
another  State  except  one  where  he  keeps  a  few  samples,  enter- 
ing into  a  contract  in  the  latter  to  ship  whisky  into  it  from 
the  former  State  in  the  original  package  is  engaged  in  inter- 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Gague,  153  3  Hanley  v.  Kentucky  Cent.  R. 
Mass.  205;  26  N.  E.  449;  10  L.  Co.,  187  U.  S.  617;  47  L.  Ed. 
R.  A.  44'2;  Commonwealth  v.  Gay,       333;  23  Sup.  Ct.  1214. 

153  Mass.  211;  26  N.  E.  571,  852;  4  Sedgwick  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr. 

see    Jung    Brewing    Co.    v.    Com-  App.  627;   85  JS.  W.  813;   Taggart 

monwealth    (Ky.),  98  S.  W.  307;  v.    State    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),   85   S. 

30    Ky.    L.    Rep.    267;     State    v.  W.   1155;   Hickcox  v.  State    (Tex. 

Kibling,  63  Vt.  636;   22  Atl.  613;  Cr.  App.),  85  S.  W.   ll'gS;   Amer- 

State  V.  Fitzpatrick,  16  R.  I.  54;  ican  Exp.  Co.  v.  State,   198  U.  S. 

11     Atl.    7'67;     McCord    v.    State  133;   25   Sup.  Ct.   1«2;   49   L.   Ed. 

(Okla.),  101  Pac.  2«0.  417    (reversing  118  Iowa,  447;   92 

2  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9  Wheat.  S.  W.  66);  O'Xeil  v.  Ver- 
1;  followed  in  Passenger  Cases,  mont,  144  U.  S.  323;  12  Sup.  Ct. 
7  How.  283;  12  L.  Ed.  102;  West-  693;  36  L.  Ed.  450;  Adams  Ex- 
ern  U.  T.  Co.  v.  Pendleton,  122  press  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  124 
TJ.  S.  347;  30  L.  Ed.  1187;  Lot-  Ky.  100;  98  S.  W.  593;  29  Ky. 
tery  Cases,  188  U.  S.  321;  47  L.  L.  Rep.  904;  Samuel  Westheimer, 
Ed.  492;  23  Sup.  Ct.  321.  131  Iowa,  643;   109  N.  W.  189. 


299 


INTERSTATE    COMMEuCi:..  ^  xy2 


State  commerce."  And  it  has  been  held  that  if  a  liquor  dealer 
ship  whisky  C.  0.  D.  into  a  prohibition  State,  consigned  to 
a  person  not  ordering  it,  and  then  notifies  him  of  the  ship- 
ment, and  such  consignee  then  pays  for  and  receives  the 
liquor,  it  is  not  an  interstate  transaction,  for  there  was  no 
previcm  crntract  for  'N  r^nrphase,  and  the  contract  of  sale 
took  place  in  the  prohibition  State."  Bnt  ordering  goods  by 
letter  or  telegram  sent  from  ano+her  State  to  be  shipped 
C.  0.  D.  does  not  deprive  the  goods  of  their  interstate  char- 
acter/ A  statute  impos^'ng  an  annual  tax  on  the  business  of 
selling  only  malt  linuors  and  another  tax  on  t'le  business  of 
manufacturing  such  liquors,  and  also  providing  that  the 
manufacturer  may  sell,  without  paving  anything  beyond  the 
latter  tax,  is  a  regulation  of  interstate  commerce  as  to  non- 
resident manufacturers  in  so  far  as  it  prevents  their  sending 
their  liquors  into  the  State,  and  there  selling  them  in  the 
original  packages  through  an  agent  located  there.*  So  a 
statute  imposing  a  certain  tax  on  wholesalers  selling  liquors 
to  be  shipped  into  the  State  from  wUhout,  who  do  not  have 
their  principal  place  of  business  in  such  State,  and  which 
does  not  impose  a  I'ke  tax  upon  resident  wholesalers  of  liquors 
manufactured  in  the  Sta^e.  is  voVl,  because  it  is  a  regulation 
of  commerce  between  the  States."  So  a  statute  taxing  imported 
liquors  without  taxing  liouors  manufachired  within  the  State 
is  such  a  discriminat^'on  asrainst  imported  liquors  as  renders 
it  vo:d.'°     Where  a  dealer  had  an  agent  located  in  another 

0  Sloman    v.    William   D.   Moebs  135   U.   S.   100;    10   Sup.   Ct.   681; 

Co.,    139    Mich.    334;     102    N.    W.  34  L.  Ed.  128)  ;  and  reversing  Peo- 

854;    11   Detroit  Leg.  N.  857.  pie  v.  Lyng,  74  Mich.  579;  42  N. 

6  Adams    Exp.    Co.    v.    Common-  W.  139. 

wealth,    124    Ky.    100;    92    S.    W.  9  Walling  v.   People,    IIG    U.   S. 

932;    29   Fy.   L.    Rep.    224;    92    8.  446;    6    Sup.   Ct.    454;'   29    L.    Ed. 

W.  935;  29  Fy.  L.  Rep.  230,  231;  691    (reversing  People  v.  Walling, 

92  S.  W.  936;  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  231.  53  Mich.  2€4;    18  N.   W.  807). 

7  O'Neil  V.  Vermont,  144  U.  S.  lo  Tierman  v.  Rinker,  102  U.  S. 
323;    12   Sup.   Ct.   C93;    30   L.  Ed.  123;   26  L.  Ed.   103. 

450.  A   statute   vi^ill    always   be  con- 

8  Lun<T  V.  Michigan,  1  ?.5  U.  S.  strued  as  constitutional  if  it  can 
1>61;  10  Sup.  Ct.  725;  34  L.  Ed.  be  reasonably  done.  Under  this 
128     (following   Leisy    v.    Hardin,  rule  a  statute  forbidding  the  sale 


§  193  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  300 

State  to  look  after  his  business,  and  the  agent  sold  liquor  to 
a  resident  of  the  State  in  which  he  (the  agent)  resided  and 
conducted  his  principal's  business,  and  to  fulfill  the  contract 
the  dealer  shipped  liquor  to  his  agent  who  delivered  it  to  the 
purchaser  in  the  original  packages,  it  was  held  that  the  sale 
was  legal  and  the  purchaser  liable  for  the  price  of  the  liquor, 
though  neither  the  dealer  nor  his  agent  had  a  license  to  sell 
in  the  State  to  which  the  goods  were  consigned.^^ 

Sec.  193.     Original  packages. 

Section  8,  Article  I,  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Unitea  States, 
provides,  among  other  things,  that  Congress  shall  have  the 
power,  "To  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and 
among  the  several  States,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes."  It 
has  been  said  that  this  clause  "presents  the  remarkable  in- 
stance of  a  national  power  which  was  comparatively  un- 
important for  eighty  years,  and  which  in  the  last  thirty  years 
has  been  so  developed  that  it  is  now  in  its  nationalizing 
tendency,  perhaps  the  most  important  and  conspicuous  power 
possessed  by  the  Federal  Government."  This  is  all  the  more 
evident  when  we  study  the  decisions  of  the  Federal  courts. 
It  was  thirty-seven  j-ears  after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu- 
tion before  the  first  case  was  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  placing  a  construction  upon  it.  In  1840, 
there  had  been  five  cases ;  in  1860,  twenty  cases ;  in  1870,  thirty 
cases ;  in  1880,  seventy-seven  cases ;  in  1890,  one  hundred  and 
forty-eight  cases;  while  at  the  present  time  there  are  more 
than  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  which  have  been  decided 
upon  questions  raised  under  it.  The  same  increase  of  late 
years  may  be  noted  in  the  lower  Federal  courts,  where  at 

of   intoxicating   liquors,   but   mak-  442;    Commonwealth   v.   Gay,    153 

ing  no  express  exception  in  favor  Mass.   211;   26  N.  E.  571,  852. 
of    imported    liquors    in   the   orig-  A    statute    prohibiting    the    im- 

inal    packages,    is    not    void,    be-  portation  of  liquors  under  an   as- 

cause  it  will  be  construed  to  apply  sumed    nan^e   is    not   a   regulation 

only    to    domestic    liquors.      Com-  of   interstate   commerce.     State  v. 

monwealth    v.    Cagne,    153    Mass.  Moody,  70  S.  C.  56;   45  S.  E.  8. 
205;   26  N.   E.   449;    10  L.    R.   A.  n  Carstairs    v.    O'Donnell,     154 

Mass.  3'57;  28  N.  E.  271 


301  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  193 

\ 

the  present  time  there  have  been  probably  fifteen  hundred 
cases  tried  and  determined  which  involved  its  construction. 
The  first  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
construing  it  was  decided  in  1824.^-  In  that  ease  Chief  eTus- 
tiee  ]\Iar.shall,  who  WTote  the  principal  opinion,  said:  "To 
what  commerce  does  this  power  extend  ?  The  Constitution  in- 
forms us,  to  commerce  'with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the 
several  States,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes. '  It  has,  we  believe, 
been  universally  admitted  that  the  words  comprehend  every 
species  of  commercial  intercourse  between  the  United  States 
and  foreign  nations.  No  sort  of  trade  can  be  carried  on  be- 
tween this  country  and  any  other  to  which  this  power  does 
not  extend.  It  has  been  truly  said  that  commerce,  as  the 
word  is  used  in  the  Constitution,  is  a  unit,  every  part  of 
which  is  indicated  by  the  term.  If  this  be  the  admitted  mean- 
ing of  the  word  in  its  application  to  foreign  nations,  it  must 
carry  the  same  meaning  throughout  the  sentence,  and  remain 
a  unit  unless  there  be  some  plain,  intelligible  clause  which 
alters  it.  The  subject  to  which  the  power  is  next  ap- 
plied is  to  commerce  'among  the  several  States.'  The 
word  'among'  means  intermingled  wnth.  A  thing  which 
is  among  others — intermingled  with  them.  Commerce  among 
the  States  cannot  stop  at  the  external  boundary  line 
of  each  State  but  may  be  introduced  into  the  interior. 
*  *  *  The  genus  and  character  of  the  whole  government 
seem  to  be  that  its  action  is  to  be  applied  to  all  the  external 
concerns  of  the  nation,  and  to  these  internal  concerns  which 
affect  the  State  generally,  but  not  to  those  which  are  com- 
pletely within  a  particular  State,  which  do  not  affect  other 
States,  and  with  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  interfere,  for  the 
purpose  of  executing  some  of  the  general  powers  of  the 
Government.  The  completely  internal  commerce  of  a  State, 
then,  may  be  considered  as  reserved  for  the  State  itself."  In 
1827  a  case  reached  that  court  which  depended  entirely  upon 
the  question  whether  the  Lecrislature  of  a  State  could  consti- 
tutionally^ require  the  importer  of  foreign  articles  (in  this 
case  intoxicating  liquors)  to  take  out  a  license  from  the  State 

12  See   §848;    Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9   Wheat.    (U.   S.)    1. 


§  193  TRAI'FIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  302 

before  he  could  oe  permitted  to  sell  a  bale  or  package  so 
imported.^^    This  may  be  said  to  be  the  first  "original  pack- 
age" case,  for  in  it  the  court  held  that  the  right  to  import 
necessarily  involved  the  right  to  sell  and  that  until  the  goods 
had  been  sold  or  in  some  other  way  made  a  part  of  the  prop- 
erty of  the  State  they  were  not  subject  to  its  taxing  juris- 
diction.   In  so  deciding,  Chief  Justice  ^Marshall,  said:    "Com- 
merce is  intercourse — one  of  its  most  ordinary  ingredients  is 
traffic.     It  is  inconceivable  that  the  power  to  authorize  this 
traffic,  when  given  in  the  most  comprehensive  terms,  with  in- 
tent that  its  efficacy  should  be  complete,  should  cease  at  the 
point  when  its  continuance  is  indispensable  to  its  value.     To 
what  purpose  should  the  power  to  allow  importation  be  given, 
unaccompanied  with   the  power  to   authorize  a   sale   of  the 
thing  imported?     Sale  is  the  object  of  importation,  and  is  an 
essentia]  ingredient  of  that  intercourse,  of  which  importation 
constitutes  a  part.     It  is  as  essential  an  ingredient,  as  indis- 
pensable to  the  existence  of  the  entire  thing,  then,  as  importa- 
tion itself.     It  must  be  considered  as  a  competent  part  of  the 
power  to  regulate  commerce."     In  1847,  twenty  years  after 
the    decision    was    rendered    in    Brown    v.    Maryland,    what 
is    generally    known    as    the    "license    cases"    was    decided 
by  that  court,  wherein  laws  passed  by  IMassachusetts,  Rhode 
Island  and  New  Hampshire  in  reference  to  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  came  under  review  and  were  sustained.^*     In 
the  case  from  New  Hampshire  the  defendants  had  been  fined 
for  selling  a  barrel  of  gin  which  they  had  bought  in  Boston 
and  brought  coastwise  to  Portsmouth,  and  there  sold  in  the 
.same  barrel  and  in  the  same  condition  in  which  it  was  pur- 
chased  in   Massachusetts,   but  contrary  to  the  law  of  New 
Hampshire  in  that  behalf.     In  it  Chief  Justice  Taney  said 
the  case  in  hand  "differs  from  Brown  v.  Maryland,  in  that 
the  latter  was  a  case  arising  out  of  commerce  with  foreign 
nations  which  Congress  had  regulated  by  law,  whereas  the 
case  in  hand  was  one  of  commerce  between  the  two  States,  in 
relation  to  which  Congress  had  not  exercised  its  power."    In 

13  Brown  v.  Maryland,  12  Wheat,  i*  The    License    Cases,    5    How. 

(U.   S.)    419.  (U.  S.)   504;    12  L.  Ed.  256. 


303  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  193 

other  words,  "The  question  brought  up  for  our  decision  is 
whether  a  State  is  prohibited  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  from  making  any  regulation  of  foreign  com- 
merce with  another  State,  although  such  regulation  is  confined 
to  its  own  territory,  and  made  for  its  own  convenience  or 
interest,  and  does  not  come  in  confl'ct  with  any  law  of  Con- 
gress." In  answering  this  question  he  sa:d:  "The  controlling 
and  supreme  power  over  commerce  with  fnreijrn  iTi+i';>'i-  and 
the  several  States  is  undoubtedly  conferred  upon  Conorress. 
Yet,  in  my  judgment,  the  State  may,  nevertheless,  for  the 
safety  or  convenience  of  trade,  or  for  the  protection  of  its 
citizens,  make  regulations  of  commerce  for  its  own  r»orts  and 
harbors  and  for  its  own  territory;  and  such  regulations  are 
valid  unless  they  come  in  conflict  with  the  law  of  ron^-ress. 
Such,  I  think,  was  the  construction  universallv  rpc^n^^rl  ot  the 
time  of  its  adoption,  as  appears  from  the  legislation  of  Con- 
gress and  of  the  several  States,  and  a  careful  examination  of 
the  decisions  of  th's  court  will  show  thnt  so  far  from  sanction- 
ing the  opposite  they  recognized  and  r^'^int'^i'^od  the  nowpr  of 
the  States."  His  conclusion  was  that,  "Upon  the  whole, 
therefore,  the  law  of  New  Hampshire  is,  in  my  judgment,  a 
valid  one,  for,  although  the  gin  sold  was  imported  from 
another  State  and  Consrress  has  clearlv  the  power  to  regulate 
such  importations,  under  the  grant  of  power  to  resrulate  com- 
merce among  the  several  Stages,  yet  as  Congress  has  made 
710  rrgnlafinv  on  the  snhieet  the  traffic  in  the  article  niay  be 
lawfully  regulated  by  the  State  as  soon  as  it  is  landed  in  its 
territory  and  a  tax  imnosed  unon  it.  or  license  reou'red.  or 
the  sale  altogether  prohibited,  according  to  the  policy  which 
the  State  may  suppose  to  be  its  interest  or  duty  to  pursue." 
In  that  case  the  several  justices  wrote  separate  oninions. 
Mr.  Justice  Woodbury,  in  his  opinion,  for  the  first  time 
formulated  the  modern  rule;  that  is,  that  the  commercial 
power  in  its  nature  is  not  more  exclusive  than  other  powers 
granted  to  Congress.  In  1851  the  suerorestion  made  bv  him 
was  adopted  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  the  rule  of  decision  in 
the  case  of  Cooley  v.  Port  "Wardens.' '  "nd  the  distinction  be- 

i5Cooley  V.   Port   Wardens,    12  How.   (U.  S.)   298. 


§  193  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  304 

tween  cases  in  which  Congress  has  exerted  its  power  over  com- 
merce and  those  in  which  it  has  abstained  from  its  exercise,  as 
bearing  upon  State  legislation  touching  the  subject,  was  first 
plainly  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Justice  Curtis.  For  many  years 
after  that  the  rule  as  to  exclusiveness  therein  laid  down  was 
followed  in  the  Supreme  Court  and  that  rule  may  be  thus 
stated :  The  States  may  establish  port  regulations,  regula- 
tions of  pilotage,  may  improve  their  harbors  and  erect  bridges 
and  exercise  many  other  local  powers.  In  the  exercise  of  this 
proper  authority  a  State  may  enact  laws  providing  for  the 
inspection  of  goods,  to  determine  whether  they  are  fit  for 
commerce  and  to  protect  the  citizens  and  the  market  from 
fraud.  But  in  all  instances  where  the  States  may  exercise 
powers,  which  may  be  said  to  partake  of  the  nature  of  the 
power  granted  to  the  genprfl  government,  they  are  strictly 
not  such,  but  are  merely  local  powers,  which  have  full  pro- 
tection until  circumscribed  bv  the  action  of  Congress  in  the 
general  power.  In  matters  admitting  of  uniform  regulation 
throughout  the  country  and  affecting  all  the  States,  the  action 
of  Congress  is  to  be  taken  as  a  declaration  of  its  will  that 
commerce  "shall  be  free  and  unrestricted"  so  far  only  as 
concerns  any  general  rep-idation  of  the  States.  This  phrase 
does  not  mean  mere  freedom  from  such  regulations  as  admit 
of  uniformity,  but  it  is  onlv  to  this  extent  that  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  Concress  over  interstate  commerce  is  exclusive  of 
State  regulation.  In  1887  the  question  again  came  before  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  a  case  prosecuted  for 
the  purpose  of  construing  a  statute  of  the  State  of  Iowa 
which  was  enacted  to  rcQiTlate  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors 
in  that  State  and  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  State  could 
not,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  its  people  against  the  evils 
of  intemperance,  enact  laws  which  regulate  commerce  between 
its  people  and  those  of  other  States  of  the  Union  unless  the 
consent  of  Congress,  expressed  or  imnlied,  was  first  obtained. ^^ 
Two  years  later  the  question  as  to  whether  intoxicating  liquors 
Two  years  later  arose  the  question  as  to  whether  intoxicating 
liquors  imported  into  a  State,  where  a  statute  of  the  State  r»ro- 

i«Bo\\Tnan  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  Ry.   Co.,   125  U.  S.  4G5;   8  Sup.  Ct.  689. 
1002. 


805  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  193 

hibits  their  sale  except  for  certain  purposes,  could  be  sold  by 
the  importer  in  the  "original  package,"  Congress  having  not 
made  provision  for  such  sales.^^  In  the  case  of  Pearce  v.  New 
Hampshire  the  court  held  that,  "as  Congress  has  made  no 
regulation  on  the  subject,  the  traffic  in  the  article  may  be  law- 
fully regulated  by  the  State  as  soon  as  it  is  landed  in  its 
territory."  The  rule  thus  enunciated  was  overruled  in  the 
case  now  under  consideration.  In  his  opinion,  Chief  Justice 
Fuller,  quoting  from  Bo^^^nan  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  said: 
"The  doctrine  now  firmly  established  is  that  where  the  sub- 
ject upon  which  Congress  can  act  under  its  commercial  power 
is  local  in  its  nature  or  sphere  of  operation,  such  as  harbor 
pilotage,  the  improvement  of  harbors,  the  establishment  of 
beacons  and  buoys  to  guide  vessels  in  and  out  of  port,  the 
construction  of  bridges  over  navigable  rivers,  the  erection  of 
wharves,  piers  and  docks,  and  the  like,  which  can  be  properly 
regulated  only  by  special  provisions  adapted  to  their  localities, 
the  State  can  act  until  Congress  interferes  and  supersedes  its 
authority;  but  where  the  subject  is  national  in  its  character 
and  admits  and  requires  uniformity  of  regulation,  affecting 
alike  all  the  States,  such  as  transportations  between  the  States, 
including  the  importation  of  goods  from  one  State  into  an- 
other, Congress  can  alone  act  upon  it  and  provide  the  needed 
regulations.  The  absence  of  any  law  of  Congress  upon  the 
subject  is  equivalent  to  its  declaration  that  commerce  in  that 
matter  shall  be  free.  Thus,  the  absence  of  regulations  as  to 
interstate  commerce  with  reference  to  any  particular  subject 
is  taken  as  a  declaration  that  the  importation  of  that  article 
into  the  States  shall  be  unrestricted.  It  is  only  after  the  im- 
portation is  completed  and  the  property  imported  has  mingled 
with  and  become  a  part  of  the  general  property  of  the  State  that 
its  regulations  can  act  upon  it,  except  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  insure  safety  in  the  disposition  of  the  import  until 
thus  mingled."  From  this  statement  of  the  law  the  conclu- 
sion follows  that,  as  the  grant  of  the  power  to  regulate  com- 
merce among  the  States,  so  far  as  one  system  is  required,  is 
exclusive,  the  States  cannot  exercise  that  power  without  the 

T^LcisY    V.    Hardin,    135    U.    S.   100;   10  Sup.  Ct.  681. 


§  193  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  306 

assent  of  Congress,  and,  in  the  absence  of  legislation,  it  is  left 
for  the  courts  to  determine  when  State  action  does  or  does  not 
amount  to  such  exercise ;  or,  in  other  words,  what  is  or  is  not 
a  regulation  of  such  comineree.  When  that  is  determined 
controversy  is  at  an  end.  "^hose  decisions  rest  upon  the  un- 
doubted right  of  the  States  of  the  TTnion  to  control  their 
purely  internal  affairs,  in  doing  wWh  th^^y  exercise  Bowers 
not  surrendered  to  the  national  Government;  but  whenever 
the  law  of  the  State  amounts  essentially  to  a  regulation  of 
commerce  with  foreVn  rations  or  among  the  States,  as  it  does 
when  it  inhibits,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  receipt  of  an 
imported  commodity  or  its  disposition  before  it  has  ceased  to 
become  an  article  of  trade  between  one  State  and  another,  or 
another  country  and  this,  it  comes  in  conflict  with  a  power 
which,  in  this  particular,  has  been  exclusively  vested  in  the 
general  government,  and  is,  therefore,  void.  It  may  be  added 
that  in  the  decisions  cited  and  others  that  might  be  cited,  the 
rule  prior  to  August,  1890,  the  date  of  the  enactment  of  the 
Wilson  Law,  was  that  the  right  to  sell  imported  liquor,  given 
by  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  Avas  subject  to  two  important 
limitations:  1.  That  it  remahied  in  the  hands  of  the  im- 
porter; and  2,  That  it  should  be  sold  in  the  condition  in 
which  its  importation  was  authorized,  and  that  all  sales  by  other 
persons,  or  in  any  other  quantity  or  condition  than  that  in 
which  it  was  imported,  were  subject,  like  sales  of  other  prop- 
erty, to  such  regulations  as  might  be  prescribed  by  State  laws. 
The  right  was  neither  general  as  to  persons  nor  in  its  applica- 
tion to  the  property  to  which  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
related.  The  right,  on  the  contrary,  was  limited  to  certain 
persons  and  qualified  by  the  status  of  the  property.  While  it 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  importer  and  in  the  condition  in  which 
it  was  imported,  the  laws  under  which  he  had  imported  it 
gave  him  the  right  to  sell  it  in  that  cond'tion.  This  was  the 
extent  of  that  right.  When  he  parted  wHh  the  property  and 
changed  its  condition  his  right,  and  all  right  to  sell  it,  derived 
from  these  laws,  ceased.  It  was  no  longer  the  right  to  sell 
which  was  given  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States.^' 

18  State    V.     Robinson,     49     Me.       Barb.    (N.   Y.)    567;    Bradford    v. 
286;     Wynehamer    v.    People,    20       Stevens,     10    Gray,    379;     Doorea 


307 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE 


§194 


Sec.  194.    What  constitutes  an  original  package — Size  of 
packaga 
In   another  section  we   have   seen  that  bottles  of  whisky 
may  be  original  packages.     It  would  thus  seem,  and  that  is 

V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  109 
S.  W.  302;  33  Ky.  L.  Rep.  G9; 
Yearteau  v.  Bacon,  65  Vt.  516;  27 
Atl.  1'9'8;  State  v.  Robinson,  49 
Me.    285;     State    v.    Intoxicating 


Liquors,  82  Me.  558;    19  Atl.  913 
(see    State    v.    Rlackwell,   -05    Me. 
556);    Bode  v.  State,  7  Gill,  326; 
State  V.  Amery,  12  R.  I.  64 ;  State 
V.   Pfleajor,   81    Iowa,   759;    4-6   N. 
W.  106.3;   United  States  v.  Fiscus, 
42  Fed.  395;  In  re  Beine,  42  Fed 
545;    Tuckman  v.  Welch,  42   Fed 
54S;  M.  Schandler  Bottling  Co.  v 
Welch,  42   Fed.   561;    State  v.   In 
toxicating    Liquors,    82    Me.    558; 
19  Atl.   913;    Donald  v.   Scott,   74 
Fed.    859;     State    v.    Allmond,    2 
Houst.       (Del.)       612;       Common- 
wealth V.  Clapp,  5  Gray,  97 ;  Com- 
monwealth   V.    Gagne,    153    Mass. 
205;  26  N.  E.  449;    10  L.  R.  442; 
Commonwealth   v.  Gay,  153  Mass. 
211;    26   N.   E.   571,   852;    McCul- 
lough,    41    S.    C.    220;     19    S.    E. 
458;    23    L.    R.    A.   410;    Bradford 
V.   Stevens,   76   Mass.   379;    O'Neil 
V.    Vermont,    144    U.   S.    323;    12 
Sup.  Ct.  693;   36  L.  Ed.  450;  Ex 
parte    Loeb,    72    Fed.    657;    State 
V.  Stilsing,  52   N.   J.   L.   517;    20 
Atl.    C5;    Charleston    v.    State,    4 
Strobh.   241;   State  v.  Allmond,  2 
Houst.     (Del.)    612;    Adams    Exp. 
Co.    V.    Commonwealth,    124    Ky. 
160;   92  S.  W.  932,  935,  936;    29 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  224,  230,  231;    Com- 
monwealth   V.    Illinois    Cent.    Ry. 
Co.   (Ky.),  101  S.  W.  894;  31  Ky. 
L.    Rep.   99;    Adams    Exp.    Co.   v, 


L.  Ed.  987;  27  Sup.  Ct.  606  (re- 
versing 87  S.  W.  nil;  27  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  1096);  206  U.  S.  138;  27 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  608;  51  L.  Ed.  992 
(reversing  92  S.  W.  932;  29  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  224;  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
630);  206  U.  S.  139;  51  L.  Ed. 
993;  27  Sup.  Ct.  609  (reversing 
97  S.  W.  807 ;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  207, 
and  103  S.  W.  353;  31  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  811  to  813);  Commonwealth 
V.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  103  S.  W. 
339;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  813;  State 
V.  Intoxicating  Liquors,  102  Me. 
206;  66  Atl.  393;  State  v.  Ken- 
ney,  62  W.  Va.  284;  57  S.  E.  823; 
State  V.  Moody,  70  S.  C.  52 ;  49 
S.  E.  8;  American  Exp.  Co.  v. 
State,  19-6  U.  S.  133;  25  Sup.  Ct. 
182;  49  L.  Ed.  417  (reversing 
State  V.  American  Exp.  Co.,  118 
Iowa,  447;  92  N.  W.  98)  ;  Adams 
Exp.  Co.  V.  State,  196  U.  S.  147; 
25  Sup.  Ct.  185;  49  L.  Ed.  424 
(reversing  95  iV.  W.  1129)  ;  Sedg- 
wick v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
627;  85  S.  W.  813;  Tag'jart  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  85  S.  W. 
1155;  Hickcox  v.  State  (Tex.  Or. 
App.),  85  S.  W.  1198;  Sloman  v. 
William  D.  Moebs  Co.,  139  Mich. 
334;  102  N.  W.  854;  11  Det.  Leg. 
N.  857;  Crescent  Liquor  Co.  v. 
Piatt,  148  Fed.  894;  State  v.  In- 
toxicating Liquors,  101  Me.  430; 
64  Atl.  812. 

The  fact  that  a  foreign  com- 
pany had  an  agent  in  a  prohibi- 
tion State  to  there  sell  its  liquors 
does     not     make     such     company 


Commonwealth,  206  U.  S.  129;  51      amenable  to  its  laws  nor  prohibit 


§  195  TRAI'FIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  308 

the  fact,  that  the  mere  size  of  the  package  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  question.  "It  is  not  perceived  why,"  said  a  Federal 
court  judge,  "in  the  absence  of  a  regulation  by  Congress  to 
the  contrary,  the  importer  may  not  determine  for  himself  the 
form  and  size  of  the  packages  he  puts  up  for  export.  The 
idea  that  small  packages  of  liquor  cannot  be  treated  as  original 
packages  because  they  are  small,  springs  from  the  con- 
struction back  of  it  that  liquor  in  any  form,  or  in  any  sized 
package  is  not  a  legitimate  subject  of  commerce.  That  ques- 
tion is  put  at  rest  by  the  decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  until  Congress  shall  act.  As  long  as  packages  of  liquor 
in  any  form  or  size  may  lawfully  be  sold  by  the  importer  or 
his  agent  in  a  prohibition  State,  the  size  of  the  package  is  not 
of  much  consequence."^® 

Sec.  195.     Ori^al  packages — Illustrations. 

In  this  section,  in  order  to  avoid  possible  error,  the  cases 
cited  are  those  only  in  which  the  right  to  receive  from  another 
State  liquors  and  sell  them  was  involved;  and  these  cases  do 
not  involve  a  construction  of  the  Wilson  Law  elsewhere  dis- 
cussed. Necessarily  there  arises  the  question  what  is  and 
what  is  not  an  original  package;  for  if  the  packages  sold  are 
the  "original  packages,"  then  the  State  to  which  they  are 
shipped  cannot  exact  a  license  from  the  vendor;  but  if  they 
are  not  then  the  State  may.  Thus,  where  each  bottle  of 
whisky  was  wrapped  in  paper  and  sealed  and  then  a  number 
of  them  were  closely  packed  in  uncovered  wooden  boxes  fur- 
nished by  an  express  company,  and  these  boxes  were  marked 
"to  be  returned,"  and  in  that  condition  were  shipped  from 
one  State  to  another,  it  was  held  that  the  boxes  and  not  the 
bottles  were  the  "original  packages,"  and,  therefore,  a  sale 
of  a  single  bottle  subjected  the  person  receiving  the  box  subject 
to  the  State  law ;  -°  and  it  made  no  difference  that  each  bottle 

it     shipping     liquors     into     such  -oin  re  Harmon,   43   Fed.   372; 

State.      Doores    v.    Commonwealth  Keith  v.   State,   91   Ala.   2;    8   So. 

(Ky.),  109  S.  W.  302;   33  Ky.  L.  353;    10   L.   R.   A.   430;    Harrison 

Rep.    69;    Carstairs    v.    O'Donnell,  v.   State,   91    Ala.   62;    10   So.   30; 

154  Mass.  357;  28  X.  E.  271.  Haley   v.   State,   42   Neb.  556;    60 

19 /m  re  Beine,  42  Fed.  545.  N.  W.  962;  47  Am.  St.  718;  State 


309  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  195 

was  labeled  'original  package."  -^  But  where  bottles  were  so 
labeled  and  delivered  singly  to  the  carrier,  and  the  carrier, 
without  the  shipper's  knowledge,  put  the  bottles  into  a  box  and 
then  shipped  them,  it  was  held  that  each  bottle  was  an  original 
package  and  not  the  box.--  The  vendee  of  liquors  shipped 
from  one  State  to  another  was  held  not  to  be  within  the 
interstate  clause  of  the  Constitution  where  he  imports  bottles 
of  liquor  in  boxes  with  closed  tops  which  were  broken  open.-' 
But  the  Arkansas  case  was  overturned  by  a  decision  of  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court,  which  is  the  final  arbiter  in 
questions  of  this  kind.  In  that  decision  it  was  held  that  where 
beer  and  whisky  were  put  up  in  sealed  bottles  in  one  State 
and  shipped  in  boxes  and  barrels  for  convenience  by  the 
owner  to  its  agent  in  another  State  to  sell,  and  he  removed 
the  bottles  and  sold  them  singly,  without  breaking  the  seals, 
to  customers  who  were  not  allowed  to  open  them  and  drink 
their  contents  on  the  premises,  that  neither  the  agent 
nor  principal  was  liable  to  the  license  laws  of  the  State 
where  the  liquors  were  sold.^"*  This  decision  was  distinguished 
by  a  State  court  in  a  case  where  a  saloon  keeper  thus  im- 
ported liquors  in  bottles,  sold  the  bottles  over  his  bar  to  his 
customers  who  destroyed  the  seals,  drew  the  corks,  poured  the 
contents  into  glasses  on  the  bar  furnished  by  the  saloon 
keeper,  drank  the  contents  of  the  glass  and  left -the  bottles  on 
the  bar.  In  such  an  instance  it  was  held  that  the  saloon 
keeper  must  have  a  license,  and,  of  course,  if  a  statute  forbade 

V.  Chapman,   1  S.  D.   414;    47   N.  Hills,    77    Iowa,    LSI;    41    N.    W. 

W.   411;    10   L.   R.    A.    432;    State  571;     3    L.    R.    A.    110;    State    v. 

V.    Parsons,    124    Mo.    436;    27    S.  Winters,    44    Kan.    723;    25    Pac. 

W.  1162;   42  Am.  St.  457.  235;   10  L.  R.  A.  616.     (This  case 

21  Keith    V.    State,    91    Ala.    2;  overrules  State  v.  Fulker,  43  Kan. 
8  So.  353;    10  L.  R.  A.  430.  237;    22    Pac.    1020;    7    L.    R.   A. 

22  Tinker  V.  State,  96  Ala.  115;  183);    May   v.   New    Orleans,    178 
11  So.  383.  U.S.  496;  44  L.Ed.  1165;   20  Sup. 

23  Smith  V.  State,  54  Ark.  248 ;  Ct.    976;     affirming    51    La.    Ann. 
15   S.  W.   882.  1064;     25     So.     959;     .Se\iollenber- 

24Leisy    v.    Hardin,    135    U.    S.  ger   v.  Pennsylvania,   171  XT.  S.   1; 

100;    10   Sup.    Ct.   681;    34   L.  Fd.  43  L.  Ed.  49;   18  Sup.  Ct.  1;  State 

128;     State    v.    Coonan,    82    low  i  v.  Miller,  86  Iowa  638;   53  N.  W. 

400;    48    N.    W.    921;    Collins    v.  330. 


§  195  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  310 

the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  he  had  Tiolated  its  provisions.-'' 
But  in  a  subsequent  case  in  the  same  State  it  was  held  that 
where  the  person  receiving  the  bottles  was  the  asrent  of  the 
shipper,  and  he  removed  the  bottles  frrm  the  boxes,  delivered 
them  with  a  corkscrew  a""d  plas'-es  ^'^  the  i^nrchasers.  and  al- 
lowed tl^em  to  open  the  bottles  and  d^^^^k  their  contents  on  the 
premisfs,  the  transaction  was  not  w'th^-n  the  prohibitory  law 
of  the  State. ^^  But  where  the  sale  is  cop'l'tionprl  unon  the 
right  of  the  vendee  to  o^^^n  or  nn^pa^  the  bottles  and  sample 
the  liquor  to  see  if  it  corre'snonds  wi+h  the  r'^'^»'e<?'^ntations 
made  concerning  its  cunlity.  a^^^l  to  th^'^  return  the  shipment 
if  it  does  not,  the  li-^uor  is  subiect  to  the  State  laws  because 
from  the  moment  the  bottles  are  u^'^oaled  the  sale  of  the 
liquor  became  illegal.-^  All  such  shipments  must  be  made  in 
good  faith,  in  the  usual  manner  preval^^it,  in  bona  fde  pack- 
ages, under  the  a?gis  of  the  interstate  commerce  law.^^ 
The  fact,  contrary  to  a  decision  previously  cited  that  the 
purchaser  drew  the  bungs  from  the  barrels  to  test  the  liquors, 
was  held  not  to  make  such  liquors  part  of  the  general  mass 
of  property  in  the  State  of  their  destination  and  thus  becomft 

25  Hopkins  v.  Lewis,  84  Iowa  13  R.  I.  293;  Gill  v.  Kaufman,  IG 
690;  51  N.  W.  255;  15L.  R.  A.  397.  Kan.  571;  Snider  v.  Koeller,  17 
Also     distinguishing      Collins      v.       Kan.  422. 

Hills,  77  Iowa,  181;  41  N.  W.  571;  Who   is  not  an   importpr   \inder 

3  L.  R.  A.   110.  the  Massachusets  statute  of  1855, 

26  State  V.  Miller,  86  Iowa  638;  c.  215,  §2.  See  King  v.  McEvoy, 
53  N,   W.   330;    State   v.   Coonan,  4  Allen  110. 

82  Iowa  400;    48  N.  W.   921.  Of  course,  if  liquor   is  lawfully 

27  Wasserboehr  v.  Boulier,  84  imported,  the  shipper,  though  he 
Me.  165;  24  Atl.  808;  30  Am.  St.  by  agent  sell  the  liquor  in  tho 
344.  But  the  right  to  draw  the  original  package  in  the  State  to 
bung  and  sample  the  liquors  to  which  it  is  shipped,  may  recover 
see  if  they  correspond  with  the  the  purchase  price.  Carstairs  v. 
representations,  and  to  return  O'Donnell,  154  Mass.  357;  28  N. 
them  if  they  do  not,  has  been  held  E.   271. 

not  to  make  the  place  of  sale  their  The  case  of  McGuinness  v.  Bligh, 

destination.     Wind  v.   Her  &  Co.,  11    R.    I.    94,    cannot   be    regarded 

93  Iowa,  316;    61   N.  W.   1001;  27  as   the   law. 

L.  R.  A.  219;   MoOarty  v.  Gordon,  28  Austin    v.    Tennessee,    179    U. 

16  Kan.  35;   Schlesincer  v.   Strat-  S.   343:    45   L.    Ed.   224;    21    Sup. 

ton,    9    R.    I.    578;    Mach   v.    Lee,  Ct.   132. 


311  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  196 

subject  to  its  police  re:julations.-^  A  person  vcndinf)^  single 
bottles  of  medicine  r.:r,niifaetured  in  another  State,  and  taken 
from  a  package  in  v.hicli  v;erc  several  bottles  which  had  been 
shipped  into  the  State,  cannot  claim  exemption  from  a  statute 
requiring  him  to  have  a  license.'" 

Sec.  196.    Discrimir.aticn  against  citizens  of  other  states. 

A  law  which  requires  that  an  applicant  for  a  license  to  sell 
intoxicating  liquors  shall  be  a  citizen  or  inhabitant  of  the  State 
in  which  the  liquors  are  to  be  sold  will  not  conflict  with  that 
clause  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  which  provides 
that, ' '  The  citizens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  priv- 
ileges and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  States,"  nor 
will  it  contravene  the  provision  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, that  "no  State  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which 
shall  abridge  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  "^^  The  argument  against  the  constitutional- 
ity of  such  laws  is  tliat  intoxicating  liquors  are  property,  as 
much  so  as  hogs,  horses,  grain,  or  any  other  personal  property, 
and  that  under  these  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
the  citizens  of  any  State  in  the  Union  have  the  right  to  sell 
such  property  anywhere  within  the  TJnited  States,  where  the 
sale  of  such  property  is  tolerated,  and  that  a  citizen  of  a 
sister  State  can  be  deprived  of  no  right  to  sell  which  is 
enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  the  State  where  he  offers  his  prop- 
erty to  the  public.  It  is  not  true,  as  is  sometimes  urged,  that 
the  right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  derived  from  the  State. 
It  is  a  common  law  right,  and  the  common  law  does  not  recog- 
nize any  difference  between  intoxicating  liquor  as  property 
and  any  other  property.    But  while  it  is  true  that  intoxicating 

29  Wind  V.  Her,  93  Iowa  316;  Heddrick  v.  State,  101  Ind.  564; 
61  Atl.  1001;  27  L.  R.  A.  219.  Campbell  v.  Morris,  3  Har.  &  Me- 

30  State  V.  Parson,  102  Mo.  436;  H.  (Md.)  554;  Austin  v.  State,  10 
27  S.  W.  1102;  46  Am.  St.  457.  Mo.  591;   Mette  v.  McGucking,  18 

31  License  Cases,  5  How.  (U.S.)  Neb.  323;  Coxfield  v.  Coryell,  4 
504;  12  L.  Ed.  256;  Conner  v.  El-  Wash.  €.  C.  371;  Rayman  Brew- 
liott,  18  How.  591;  Kohn  v.  ing  Co.  v.  Bristor,  92  Fed.  28 
Melcher,  29  Fed.  Rep.  433;   Doug-  (Dow   Law  of  Ohio). 

lass  V.   Douglass,   1    Del.  Ch.   465; 


§  196  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  312 

liquor  is  property,  still  its  inherent  character  is  such  that  it 
is  the  proper  subject  of  the  police  power.'^  Acting  upon  the 
just  assumption  that  the  unrestricted  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  results  in  much  evil,  and  that  it  is  detrimental  to 
society,  the  lawmaking  power  of  each  State  in  the  Union  has, 
in  the  exercise  of  such  police  power,  assumed  to  control,  regu- 
late or  prohibit  the  business,  as  seemed  to  it  best.  The  extent 
to  which  such  power  shall  be  exercised  must,  of  necessity,  be 
left  to  the  laMTuaking  power  of  the  State  exercising  such 
right.^'  The  object  of  such  legislation  is  to  provide  safe- 
guards against  evasions  and  violations  of  the  law,  by  confining 
the  privilege  of  selling,  as  a  matter  of  police  regulation,  to 
such  persons  as  it  may  be  deemed  safe  to  intrust  with  this 
right,  and  not  to  grant  greater  privileges  to  citizens  of  the 
State  than  are  accorded  to  citizens  of  other  States,  or  to  give 
the  former  an  advantage  of  the  latter.^*  In  the  State  of  New 
York  it  was  held  that,  "The  right  of  the  State  to  regulate 
the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors,  within  its  limits,  has  been 
exercised  from  the  foundation  of  the  Government,  and  it  is 
not  open  to  question.  The  State  may  prescribe  the  person  by 
w^hom,  and  the  conditions  under  which,  the  traffic  may  be 
carried  on.  It  may  impose  upon  those  who  act  under  its 
license  such  liabilities  and  penalties  as  in  its  judgment  are 
proper  to  secure  society  against  the  dan""ers  of  the  traffic  and 
individuals  against  injuries  committed  by  intoxicated  persons 
under  the  influence  resulting  from  their  intoxication."^'^  It 
is  upon  this  theory  that  it  is  held  that  it  is  not  an  unreason- 
able requirement  that  a  person  who  desires  to  avail  himself 
of  a  license  shall  become  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
State,  by  becoming  a  citizen  or  inbabitant  thereof,  to  the  end 
that  he  may  be  readily  apprehended  and  punished  for  any 
violation  of  the  law  in  connection  with  his  business,  and  that 
process  may  be  had  against  him  in  actions  for  personal  in- 
juries, and  that  laws  which  reouire  an  applicant  for  a  license 
to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  to  be  a  cHizen  or  inhabitant  of  the 

32  Welsh  V.   State,  126   Ind.   71,  34  Kohn    v.    Melcher,    29    N.    Y. 
76;   25  N.  E.  »83.                                      433. 

33  Welsh  V.   State,  126   Ind.   71,  35  Betholf  v.   O'Reilly,  74  N.  Y. 
77;    25   N.   E.   883.                                   509. 


313 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE. 


§197 


State,  are  uniformly  held  to  be  not  in  violation  of  these  con- 
stitutional provisions.^" 

Sec.  197.     Right  of  consignee  to  sell  imported  liquors. 

Whether  or  not,  before  the  passage  of  the  Wilson  Law,  an 
importer  or  consignee  of  interstate  commerce  liquors  had  the 
right  to  dispose  of  them,  was  a  ([uestion  of  dispute  among 
the  courts.  All  were  agreed  that  the  consignee  could  not 
break  the  original  packages  and  dispose  of  them  in  less  quan- 
tities than  an  original  package  contained,  for  the  instant  the 
package  was  broken  they  became  subject  to  the  State  laws.^" 
The  authorities,  however,  are  practically  unanimous  to  the 
effect  that  the  importer  may  sell  in  the  original  packages  the 
liquors  he  had  imported ;  for  to  deny  him  that  privilege  would 
be  to  overturn  the  interstate  commerce  law."'''  There  are, 
however,  some  early  cases  which  hold  that  liquors  in  the 
original  package  are  subject  to  State  laws;  but  these  are  no 
longer  authorities.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  a  State  law 
may  prohibit  the  keeping  for  sale  of  all  liquors,  which  applies 


36  Welsh  V.  State,  12'6  Ind.  71, 
78;  25  N.  E.  883;  Trageser  v. 
Gray,  73  Md.  250;  20  Atl.  905. 
It  has  been  held  that  a  statute 
imposing  a  tax  of  15  per  cent,  upon 
liquors  purchased  by  residents 
from  persons  not  residing  in  the 
State,  but  only  10  per  cent,  upon 
such  as  are  purchased  from  the 
maker  in  the  State,  is  valid,  not 
being  a  regulation  of  interstate 
commerce.  Davis  v.  Dashiel,  62 
N.  C.  114. 

3'?  Brown  v.  Maryland,  12 
Wheat.  419;  6  L.  Ed.  678;  Li- 
cense Cases,  5  How.  505;  12  L. 
Ed.  2©6;  State  v.  Allmond,  2 
Houst.  (Del.)  612;  State  v.  iStil- 
sing,  52  N.  J.  L.  517;  20  Atl. 
65;  State  v.  Winters,  44  Kan. 
723;  25  Pac.  235;  10  L.  R.  A. 
616. 

3s  State    V.     Robinson,    49    Me. 


285;  State  v.  Allmond,  2  Houst. 
(Del.)  612;  Reynolds  v.  Geary, 
26  Conn.  179;  Jones  v.  Hard,  32 
Vt.  481;  Bradford  v.  Stevens,  10 
Gray,  379;  United  States  v.  Fis- 
cus,  42  Fed.  31)5;  Carstairs  v 
O'Donnell,  154  Mass.  357;  28  N 
E.  271;  In  re  Beine,  42  Fed.  '545 
Tuclinian  v.  Welch,  42  Fed.  548 
M.  Sliandler  Bottling  Co.  v 
Welch,  42  Fed.  561;  State  v.  In 
toxicating  Liquors,  82  Me.  558 
19  Atl.  913;  Commonwealth  v 
Kimball,  24  Pick.  359;  35  Am 
Dec.  326;  Leisy  v.  Hardin,  135 
U.  S.  100;   10  Sup.  Ct.  681. 

The  License  Cases,  5  How.  504; 
12  L.  Ed.  258,  on  this  point  is 
no  longer  an  authority.  See  Bow- 
man V.  Railway  Co.,  125  U.  S. 
465;  31  L.  Ed.  700;  8  Sup.  Ct. 
10'&2;  Leisy  v.  Hardin,  135  U.  S. 
100;    34  L.  Ed.   128. 


§  197  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  314 

to  imported  liquors  in  the  original  package ;  '"*  or  may  prohibit 
actual  sales/"  A  statute,  however,  prohibiting  sales  in  larger 
quantities  than  is  contained  in  an  original  package  is  not 
necessarily  void,  for  it  does  not  exclude  sales  by  the  original 
package."  And  if  an  importer  mortgage  liquor  in  the  original 
packages  in  the  United  States  warehouse,  and  the  mortgagee 
forecloses  the  mortgage,  purchases  the  liquors  at  judicial  sale, 
pays  the  duties  and  receives  the  packages,  he  does  not  thereby 
become  an  importer  under  a  State  law  authorizing  the  im- 
porter to  sell  liquors  in  the  original  unbroken  packages.*^ 
"The  point  of  time,"  said  Chief  Justice  Fuller,  ''when  the 
prohibition  [of  a  State  to  prohibit  sale  of  imported  liquors] 
ceases,  and  the  power  of  the  State  to  tax  commences,  is  not 
the  instant  when  the  article  enters  the  country,  but  when  the 
importer  has  so  acted  upon  it  that  it  has  become  incorporated 
and  mixed  with  the  mass  of  property  in  the  country,  which 
happens  when  the  original  package  is  no  longer  such  in  his 
hands;  that  the  distinction  is  obvious  between  a  tax  which 
intercepts  the  import  as  an  import  on  its  way  to  become  in- 
corporated with  the  general  7nass  of  property,  and  a  tax  which 
finds  the  article  already  incorporated  with  that  mass  by  the 
act  of  the  importer ;  that,  as  to  the  power  to  regulate  com- 
merce, none  of  the  evils  which  proceed  from  the  feebleness  of 
the  Federal  Government  contributed  more  to  the  great  revo- 
lution which  introduced  the  present  system  than  the  deep  and 
general  conviction  that  commerce  ought  to  be  regulated  by 
Congress;  that  the  grant  ought  to  be  as  extensive  as  the 
mischief,  and  should  comprehend  all  foreign  commerce  and  all 
commerce  among  the  States;  that  that  power  was  complete  in 
itself,  acknowledged  no  limitations  other  than  those  pre- 
scribed by  the  Constitution,  was  co-extensive  with  the  subject 
on   which   it   acts,   and    not   to  be   stopped   at  the   external 

39  state  V.      Cunningham,  25  614;  43  N.  W.  458 ;  State  v.  Peck- 
Conn.    195;  State   v.    liiennan,  25  ham,  3   R.  I.  28'9;   McGuinness  v. 
Conn.   278;  State   v.   Wheeler,  25  Bligh,   11   R.  I.   1,  94. 
Conn.  290.  4i  Commonwealth     v.     Kimball, 

«o  Pierce  v.    State.     13     N.  H.  24  Pick.  359;    35  Am.  Dec.  .326, 

536;    State    v.    Moore,    14    N.  H.  42  King  v.  McEvoy,  4  Allen  110; 

451;  State  v.  Zimmerman,  78  Iowa  Bradford  v.  Stevens,  10  Gray  379. 


315 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE. 


§197 


boundary  of  a  State,  but  must  be  capable  of  entering  its  in- 
terior; that  the  right  to  sell  any  article  was  an  inseparable 
incident  to  the  right  to  import  it ;  and  that  the  principles  in 
the  case  *^  applied  equally  to  importation  from  a  sister 
State."**  The  court  quoted  from  a  recent  case,*''  and  thus 
concludes  its  opinion:  "The  plaintitTs  in  error  are  citizens  of 
Illinois,  are  not  pharmacists,  and  have  no  permit,  but  import 
into  Iowa  beer  which  they  sell  in  original  packages,  as  de- 
scribed. Under  our  decision  in  Bowman  v.  Railway  Co.,** 
they  had  the  right  to  import  this  beer  into  that  State,  and  in 
the  view  which  was  here  expressed  they  had  the  right  to  sell 
it,  by  which  act  alone  it  would  become  mingled  in  the  common 
mass  of  property  within  the  State.  Up  to  that  point  of  time 
we  hold  that,  in  the  absence  of  congressional  permission  to  do 
so,  the  State  had  no  power  to  interfere  by  seizure,  or  any 
other  action,  in  prohibition  of  importation  and  sale  by  the 
foreign  or  non-resident  importer. ' '  *^ 

43  Brown  v,  Maryland,  12  Wheat. 
419. 

*4  Chief  Justice  Fuller's  expo- 
sition of  Brown  v.  Maryland,  su- 
pra, in  Leisy  v.  Hardin,  135  U. 
S.  100;  10  Sup.  Ct.  681,  and  ex- 
plaining Bowman  v.  Railway  Co., 
125  U.  S.  465;  8  Sup.  Ct.  869, 
1062;  and  denying  the  soundness 
of  Pierce  v.  New  Hampshire  (Li- 
cense Cases),    5  How.  504, 

*5  Bowman  v.  Railway  Co., 
123  U.  S.  465;  8  Sup.  Ct. 
e€9,  1062.  Part  of  this  quo- 
tation is:  "It  is  only  after  the  im- 
portation is  completed  and  the 
property  imported  is  mingled  with 
and  becomes  a  part  of  the  general 
property  of  the  State,  that  its 
regulations  can  act  upon  it,  ex- 
cept in  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
.sary  to  insure  safety  in  the  dis- 
position of  the  import  until  thus 
mingled." 

46  125  U.  S.  465;  8  Sup.  Ct, 
mid,    1062. 


4"  The  court  cited  the  follow- 
ing cases:  Kidd  v.  Pearson,  128 
U.  S,  1;  9  Sup,  Ct,  6;  Foster  v, 
Kansas,  112  U.  S.  201;  5  Sup. 
Ct.  8;  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts, 
97  U.  S.  25;  Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa, 
18  Wall  129;  Mugler  v.  Kansas, 
123  U.  S.  623;  8  Sup.  Ct.  273; 
Webber  v.  Virginia,  103  U.  S. 
344;  Patterson  v.  Kentucky,  97 
U.  S.  501;  Walling  v.  Michigan, 
116  U.  S.  446;  0  Sup.  Ct.  454; 
Wclton  V.  Missouri,  91  U.  S, 
275;  Kinmish  v.  Ball,  129  U,  S. 
217;  9  Sup.  Ct,  277;  Railway  Co, 
V.  Alabama,  128  U,  S.  96;  9  Sup. 
Ct.  28;  Smith  v.  Alabama,  124 
U.  S.  465;  8  Sup,  Ct.  564;  Mor- 
gan's S.  S.  Co,  V,  Board,  118  U. 
S.  455;  6  Sup.  Ct.  1114;  Brown 
V.  Houston,  114  U.  S.  622;  5  S'lp. 
Ct.  1091;  Transportation  Co.  v. 
Parkersburg,  107  U.  S.  691;  2 
Sup.  Ct.  732;  Escanaba  Co.  v. 
Chicago,  107  U.  S.  678;  2  Sup. 
Ct,    185;    Mobile  v.  Kimball,   102 


§198 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


316 


Sec.  198.    Right  of  importer  to  sell  in  original  packages. 

Before  the  passage  of  the  Wilson  Law  in  1890,  the  importer 
of  liquors  from  a  foreign  country  or  other  State,  had  the 
power  not  only  to  retain  the  imported  article  in  his  possession 
if  he  kept  it  in  the  original  package  unbroken,  but  he  could 
also  sell  it  and  deliver  it  in  that  condition  to  the  purchaser;  but 
when  he  had  completed  his  sale  by  a  delivery  of  the  package 
sold,  the  liquor  passed  from  under  the  tpgis  of  the  interstate 
conunerce  law  and  at  once  became  subject  to  the  State  laws.*'^ 
And  the  fact  that  he  knew  the  purchaser  intended  to  violate 
the  State  law  by  selling  them  did  not  affect  the  validity  of  the 
sale.^-'  But  the  Wilson  Law  now  prevents  the  importer  from 
selling  his  liquors  in  those  States  where  State  laws  forbid  the 
sale  of  liquors.  "Upon  arrival  in  such  State  or  territory" 
they  are  "subject  to  the  operation  and  effect  of  the  laws  of 
such  State  or  territory  enacted  in  the  exercise  of  its  police 
powers,  to  the  same  extent  and  in  the  same  manner  as  though 
such  liquid  or  liquors  had  been  produced  in  the  State  or  terri- 


U.  S.  691;  Robbins  v.  Taxing  Dis- 
trict, 120  U.  S.  489;  7  Sup.  Ct. 
592;  Railway  Co.  v.  Illinois,  118 
U.  S.  557;  7  Sup.  Ct.  4;  Cook  v. 
Pennsylvania,  97  U.  S.  566 ;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Hasen,  95  U.  S.  465; 
Henderson  v.  Mayor,  92  U.  S. 
259;  State  Freight  Tax,  15  Wall. 
232. 

A  statute  prohibiting^  rhe  sale 
of  liquors  to  be  drunk  upon  J\e 
premises  is  not  an  interference 
with  the  interstate  commence 
law.  People  v.  Huntington,  4  N. 
Y.  Leg.  Obs.  187;  nor  is  a  pro- 
hibition law.  State  v.  Carney,  £0 
Iowa  82. 

48  Wynehamer  v.  People,  20 
Barb.  567;  State  v.  Peckham,  3 
R.  I.  289;  Low  v.  Austin,  13 
Wall.  29;  State  v.  Robinson, 
49  Me.  285;  State  v.  Intoxi- 
cating Liquors,  82  Me.  554; 
19    Atl.    913;    Hinan    v.    Lott,    8 


Wall.  148;  State  v.  Fuller,  33  N. 
H.  259;  Commonwealth  v.  Kim- 
ball, 24  Pick.  359;  35  Am.  Dee. 
326;  State  v.  Amery,  12  R.  I. 
64;  Hinson  v.  Lott,  40  4Ia.  123; 
Bode  V.  State,  7  Gill.  326;  Sears 
V.  Warren  Co.,  36  lad.  267;  State 
V.  Allmond,  2  Houst.   612. 

■19  Richards  v.  Wo^dwiud,  113 
Mass.    285. 

It  has  been  held,  however,  but 
on  doubtful  ground,  that  if  the 
importer  intended  to  break  the 
package  and  sell  the  liquor,  the 
liquor  was  not  exempt  from  the 
State  laws  while  in  his  hands  in 
unbroken  packages,  thus  making 
the  interstate  commerce  exemp- 
tion of  the  package  to  rest  upon 
the  lawful  or  unlawful  intent  of 
the  owner,  although  the  unlaw- 
ful intent  might  never  be  put  in- 
to execution.  State  v.  Blackwell, 
05  Me.  5i56. 


317  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  199 

tory,"  and  are  not  "exempt  therefrom  by  reason  of  being 
introduced  therein  in  original  packages  or  otherwise."  ^"  The 
question  now  turns  upon  point  of  "arrival"  discussed  in 
another  section;  but  we  add  that  liquors  imported  have  not 
"arrived"  when  they  reach  the  railroad  station  of  their 
destination — not  until  they  reach  the  importer's  house  or 
store,  and  in  their  passage  from  the  station  to  his  house  or 
store  they  are  still  protected  by  the  interstate  commerce 
clause.^^ 

Sec.  199.     "Wilson  Law,"  origin  and  constitutionality. 

In  the  State  of  Iowa  a  statute  was  passed  in  1886  which 
forbade  any  common  carrier  to  bring  within  that  State,  to 
any  person,  or  persons,  or  corporations,  any  intoxicating 
liquors  from  any  other  State  or  territory  of  the  United  States 
without  first  having  been  furnished  with  a  certificate  under 
the  seal  of  the  county  auditor  of  the  county  to  which  such 
liquor  was  to  be  transported  or  was  consigned  for  transporta- 
tion that  the  consignee  or  person  to  whom  the  liquor  was  to 
be  transported,  conveyed  or  delivered,  was  authorized  to  sell 
intoxicating  liquors  in  such  county.  After  the  passage  of  this 
law,  a  firm  by  the  name  of  Bowman  Brothers,  doing  business 
in  the  city  of  Marshalltown,  Iowa,  ofieered  to  the  Chicago- 
Northwestern  Railway  Company,  for  shipment  to  Marshall- 
town,  Iowa,  five  thousand  barrels  of  beer  which  they  had  pro- 
cured in  the  city  of  Chicago,  and  the  railway  company  refused 
to  receive  the  beer ;  and,  because  of  this  refusal,  the  firm  in- 
stituted a  suit  against  the  railway  company  in  the  Circuit 
Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Northern  District  of  Illinois 
to  recover  the  sum  of  ten  thousand  dollars  damages.  Judg- 
ment was  rendered  against  the  plaintiffs  on  their  demurrer 
to  an  answer  of  the  defendant  in  which  the  defendant  plead 
the  existence  of  the  statute  of  Iowa.  An  appeal  was  taken 
from  that  judgment  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
on  a  writ  of  error  to  reverse  the  decision  of  the  circuit  court, 

50  26   U.  S.   Stat,   at  L.   313,   c.  si  Scliwedes    v.    State     (Okla.), 

728;    U.  S.  Comp.   Stat.   1901,   p.       &9    Pac.    804;     Hudson    v.    State 
3177;  51  Cong.   1  Sess.  c.  728,  p.       (Okla.),  101  Pac.  275. 
313. 


§  199  TR.VFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  318 

and  the  case  was  reversed,  that  court  holding  that  a  State 
cannot,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  its  people  against  the 
evils  of  intemperance,  enact  laws  which  regulate  commerce 
between  its  people  and  those  of  other  States  of  the  Union 
unless  consent  of  Congress,  expressed  or  implied,  has  first 
been  obtained,  and  that  for  this  reason  the  Iowa  statute  was 
unconstitutional.^-  Subsequent  to  that  decision,  Leisy  &  Com- 
pany, citizens  of  Illinois,  instituted  an  action  of  replevin 
against  one  Hardin,  marshall  of  tlie  city  of  Keokuk,  Iowa,  to 
recover  a  quantity  of  beer  which  had  been  seized  by  him  in  a 
proceeding  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  Iowa  against  them,  and 
upon  issue  joined,  the  case  was  tried  by  the  court  and  judg- 
ment rendered  in  their  favor,  the  court  holding  that  the 
prohibitory  laws  of  Iowa  were  unconstitutional,  being  in  con- 
travention of  Section  8,  Article  I,  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  The  case  was  taken  by  appeal  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Iowa  where  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  was  re- 
versed, that  court  holding  that  the  law  in  controversy  was 
constitutional.'^  From  that  decision  an  appeal  was  taken  to 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  where  it  was  held 
that  a  statute  of  a  State,  prohibiting  the  sale  of  any  intoxi- 
cating liquors  except  for  pharmaceutical,  medicinal,  chemical 
or  sacramental  purposes,  and  under  licenses  from  a  county 
court  of  the  State,  as  applied  to  a  sale  by  the  importer,  made 
in  original  packages  or  kegs,  unbroken  and  unopened,  of 
the  liquors  manufactured  in  and  brought  from  another  State, 
is  repugnant  to  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  granting  to  Congress  the  power  to  regulate  commerce 
with  foreign  nations  and  the  several  States,  and,  therefore, 
imconstitutional  and  void.'*  The  effect  of  these  decisions  was 
that  a  State  could  not  enact  a  law  which  affected  or  inter- 
fered with  intoxicating  liquors  manufactured  in  and  shipped 
from  a  State  into  a  sister  State  or  territory  until  Congress 
had  made  provision  for  such  interference,  and  not  then  so 
long  as  it  remained  in  the  original  packages.     This  led  to 

52  Bowman    v.   ■Chicago,    etc.    K.  ^*  Leisy    v.    Hardin,    135    U.    S. 
Co.,   125   U.  S.   +65;   8   S.  Ct.  8H9.        100;    10    S.    Ct.   «>81. 

53  Leisy   v.  Hardin,  78   la.  286; 
43  N.   W.    188. 


319  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  199 

the  opening  up  in  the  States,  which  prohibited  the  traffic  in 
liquor,  or  imposed  a  high  license  on  the  traffic,  of  what  were 
properly  called  "original  package  houses."  Liquor  imported 
in  packages  of  all  forms  and  sizes,  but  in  original  packages, 
was  sold  in  these  houses.  In  this  way  the  retail  traffic  in 
liquor  was  practically  established,  and  in  many  cases  by  the 
most  irresponsible  and  unsuitable  persons  who  were  not  citi- 
zens of  the  State  and  were  indifferent  to  its  welfare.  Peaceful 
and  quiet  communities,  from  which  the  sale  of  liquor  had 
been  banished  for  years,  were  instantly  afflicted  with  all  the 
evils  of  the  liquor  traffic.  The  seats  of  learning  were  invaded 
by  the  "original  package"  vendor,  and  the  youth  of  the  State 
who  gathered  there  for  instruction  were  corrupted  and  de- 
moralized, and  disorder,  violence  and  crime  reigned,  where 
only  peace  and  order  had  been  known  before.  The  invaded 
communities  were  powerless  to  protect  themselves.  They  could 
neither  regulate,  tax,  restrain  nor  prohibit  the  traffic.  The 
courts  held,  and  rightly  so,  that  the  importer  and  vendor  of 
original  packages  was  not  sub.ject  to  State  laws  and  that  any 
application  of  such  laws  to  him  would  be  a  violation  of  his 
rights  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  until 
Congress,  in  the  exercise  of  its  power  to  regulate  commerce, 
should  withdraw  the  protect'ng  power  of  that  instrument 
from  original  packages  that  had  reached  the  State  where  they 
were  designed  for  consumption  or  sale.  Congress  was  applied 
to  for  relief.  Petitions  flowed  in  upon  it,  praying  for  imme- 
diate action.  It  acted  promptly  and  with  more  celerity  than 
ordinarily  characterizes  the  action  of  so  large  a  deliberative 
body  and  the  Pres'dent  approved  its  action.  This  in  brief 
is  the  origin  of  the  "Wilson  Law"  which  was  approved  August 
8,  1890,  and  which  provides,  "That  all  fermented,  distilled, 
or  other  intoxicating  liquors  or  liquids  transported  into  any 
State  or  territory  or  remaining  for  use,  consumption,  sale  or 
storage  therein,  shall  upon  arrival  in  such  State  or  territory 
be  subject  to  the  protection  and  effect  of  the  laws  of 
such  State  or  territory  enacted  in  the  exercise  of  its  police 
powers  to  the  same  extent  and  in  the  same  manner  as  that  if 
such  liouids  or  linuors  had  been  produced  in  such  State 
or  territory,  and  shall  not  be  exempt  therefrom  by  reason 


§  199  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  320 

of  being  introduced  therein  in  original  packages  or  other- 
wise.'"^^ The  first  case  under  this  law  was  on  appeal 
from  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
District  of  Kansas,  being  an  application  for  a  writ  of  haheas 
corpus  made  to  that  court,  the  petitioner  having  been 
arrested  by  the  State  authorities  for  selling  imported  liquor 
on  the  9th  day  of  August,  1890.  The  trial  court  discharged 
the  prisoner,  holding  that  the  Wilson  Law  was  unconstitu- 
tional. From  this  decision  an  appeal  was  taken  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  and  there  it  was  held  that  the  law 
was  constitutional,  and  after  it  took  effect  such  liquors  or 
liquids  introduced  into  a  State  or  territory  from  another  State 
or  territory,  whether  in  the  original  packages  or  otherwise, 
became  subject  to  such  existing  laws  of  the  State  as  had  been 
properly  enacted  by  the  State  in  the  exercise  of  its  police 
powers.^*^  In  thus  deciding  the  court  said:  "The  power  to 
regulate  commerce  is  solely  in  the  general  Government  and  it 
is  essentially  a  part  of  that  regulation  to  prescribe  the  means 
for  governing  the  introduction  and  incorporation  of  articles 
into  and  with  the  mass  of  property  in  the  country  or  State. 
No  reason  is  perceived  why,  if  Congress  chooses  to  provide 
that  certain  distinct  subjects  of  interstate  commerce  shall  be 
governed  by  the  rule  which  divests  them  of  that  character  at 
an  earlier  period  of  time  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case,  it 
is  not  within  its  competency  to  do  so."  As  to  the  effect  of 
the  Wilson  Law  the  conclusion  of  the  court  was  that,  "Con- 
gress did  not  use  terms  of  permission  to  the  State  to  act,  but 
merely  removed  an  impediment  to  the  enforcement  of  the 
State  laws  in  respect  to  imported  packages  in  their  original 
condition,  created  by  the  absence  of  a  specific  utterance  on  its 
part.  It  imparted  no  power  to  the  State  not  then  pos.sessed, 
but  allowed  imported  property  to  fall  at  once  upon  arrival 
within  the  local  jurisdiction."""  In  other  words,  the  Wilson 
Law  declares  that  intoxicating  liquors  shall,  on  arrival  in  a 
State,  be  subject  to  the  operation  of  the  police  powers  of  the 

55  Act  of  51st  Congress,  1st  Ses.,  ".o /„  re  Rahrer,  140  U.  S.  545; 

c.  728,  p.  313;   2«  U.  S.  Stat,  at  US.    Ct.    9,^;    35    L.    Ed.    572; 

L.   313,   c.   728;    U.   S.   Comp.   St.  reversing  43  Fed.  556. 
1901,  p.  3177. 


321  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  200 

State  and  merely  defines  the  time  when  imported  intoxicating 
liquors  shall  become  subject  to  State  control,  and  is,  therefore, 
not  unconstitutional  as  being  a  delegation  to  the  States  of 
the  power  to  regulate  interstate  commerce.  Tt  does  not  de- 
clare that  the  States  shall,  in  general  or  in  any  particular, 
have  the  poAver  to  regulate  interstate  commerce.  It  confers 
no  power  upon  the  States  to  legislate  upon  that  subject.  The 
States  are  not  authorized  to  declare  when  such  importations 
shall  become  subject  to  State  control.  Nor  can  the  States 
in  any  manner  change  or  affect  the  enactment  made  by  Con- 
gress on  that  subject.  Congress  can,  at  any  time,  abrogate 
or  change  the  enactment  in  question  and  it  is  clearly  a  con- 
stitutional exei-cise  of  the  power  conferred  on  Congress."^'" 

Sec.  200.     Wilson  Law  construed — "Arrival"  defined. 

The  words  ''shall  upon  arrival  in  such  State  or  territory 
be  subject  to  the  operation  and  effect  of  the  laws  of  such 
State  or  territory,"  as  used  in  the  Wilson  Law,  in  one  sense 
might  be  held  to  mean  arrival  at  the  State  line;  but  to  so 
interpret  them  would  necessitate  isolating  these  words  from 
the  entire  context  of  the  act  and  would  compel  construction 
distinctive  of  other  provisions  contained  therein.  This  would 
violate  the  fundamental  rule  requiring  the  construction  of  a 
statute  as  a  whole  and  not  by  magnifying  a  particular  word 
found  in  it.  It  is  clear  that  the  word  "arrival"  as  used  in 
this  statute  means  that  the  goods  shall  actually  come  into  the 
State,  since  it  is  further  provided  that  "all  fermented,  dis- 
tilled or  other  intoxicating  liquors  or  liquids  transported  into 
a  State  or  territory-,"  or  "remaining  therein  for  use,  consump- 
tion, sale  or  storage  therein,"  shall  "be  subject  to  the  opera- 
tion and  effect  of  the  laws  of  such  State  or  territory."    This 

"/w  re   Spicklcr.  43   Fed.   Rep.  6.    296;    15    Sup.    Ct.   367;    hi  re 

053;    10  L.  R.  A.  451;   In  re  Van  Jordon,    49    Fed.    23«;    Cantini    v. 

Vliet,    43    Fed.    Rep.    761;     State  Tillman,    54   Fed.    f)69;    Ex   parte 

V.   Fraser,    1    X.    Dak.   425;    48   N.  Edgerton,    5fl    Fed.     115;     Indian- 

W.   343.  apolis   v.   Bielor,    138    Ind.    30;    36 

See  also  Plumley  v.  Massachus-  ,N.  E.  857 ;    Commonwealth  v.  C^l- 

etts,   155   U.   S.  461;    15   Sup.   Ct.  home,    154    Mass.    115;    27    N.    E. 

154;    Emert   v.    Missouri,    156    U.  881. 


§  200  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  .  322 

language  makes  it  impossible  in  reason  to  hold  that  the  law 
intended  "arrival"  should  mean  at  the  State  line,  since  it 
prescribes  the  coming  of  the  goods  into  the  St^te  for  "use, 
consumption,  sale  or  storage."  The  fair  interence  from 
enumeration  of  these  conditions,  which  are  all  embracing,  is 
that  the  time  when  they  arrive  at  the  place  to  which  thej^ 
were  consigned  was  made  the  test  by  which  to  determine  the 
period  when  the  operation  of  the  State  law  shall  attach  to 
goods  brought  into  the  State.  To  construe  the  word  "arrival" 
to  mean  arrival  at  the  State  line  would  be  to  hold  that  each 
State  might  compel  every  interstate  commerce  train  to  stop 
before  crossing  its  borders  and  discharge  its  freight,  lest  by 
crossing  the  line  it  might  carry  within  the  State  merchandise 
of  the  character  named  covered  by  the  inhibitions  of  a  State 
statute.  In  other  words,  that  the  statute  of  a  State  might 
attach  and  operate  beyond  the  State,  and  thus  become  extra 
territorrial  in  its  operation.  Such  is  not  the  construction 
which  is  to  be  placed  upon  the  Wilson  Law.  If  it  had  been 
the  intention  of  the  law  to  provide  for  the  stoppage  at  the 
State  line  of  every  interstate  commerce  contract  relating  to 
the  merchandise  named  in  the  act,  such  purpose  would  have 
been  easy  of  expression.  The  fact  that  such  power  was  not 
conveyed,  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  language  of  the 
statute  relates  to  the  receipt  of  the  goods  "into  any  State  or 
territory  for  use,  consumption,  sale  or  storage  therein"  nega- 
tives the  correctness  of  an  interpretation  holding  that  the 
receipt  into  a  State  or  territory  for  the  purpose  named  could 
never  take  place.  In  the  language  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States:  "We  think  that  interpreting  the  statute 
by  the  light  of  all  of  its  provisions,  it  was  not  intended  to 
and  did  not  cause  the  power  of  the  State  to  attach  to  an 
interstate  commerce  shipment,  whilst  the  merchandise  was  in 
transit  under  such  shipment  and  until  its  arrival  at  the  point 
of  destination  and  delivery  there  to  the  consignee. ' '  In  other 
words,  the  statute  must  be  interpreted  and  enforced  by  the 
light  of  the  fundamental  rule  of  carrying  out  its  purpose  and 
object,  of  affording  the  remedy  which  it  was  intended  to 
create,  and  of  defeating  the  wrong  which  it  was  its  purpos'^  to 
frustrate.    Undoubtedly  the  purpose  of  the  act  was  to  enable 


323  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  200 

the  law  of  the  several  States  to  control  the  character  of  the 
merchandise  therein  enumerated  at  an  earlier  date  than  would 
have  been  otherwise  the  case,  but  it  is  equally  unquestionable 
th^t  tl  e  Wilson  Law  manifests  no  purpose  to  confer  upon  the 
States  the  power  to  give  their  statutes  extra-territorial  opera- 
tion so  as  to  subject  persons  and  property  beyond  their  borders 
to  the  restraints  of  their  laws."^  The  fundamental  right  to 
be  protected  from  the  operation  of  State  laws  by  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  is  the  continuity  of  shipment 
of  goods  coming  from  one  State  into  another  from  the  point 
of  transmission  to  the  point  of  consignment  and  the  accom- 
plishment there  of  the  delivery  covered  by  the  contract.^''  So 
where  a  State  court  held  that  the  Wilson  act  did  not  protect 
a  carrier  carrying  liquors  from  one  State  to  another,  and  that 
it  was  liable  under  a  State  law  requiring  such  a  carrier  to 
first  obtain  a  certificate  from  the  State  authorities  allowing  it 
to  carry  liquors,'=°  it  was  held  on  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  that  the  decision  was  erroneous.*''  This 
act  did  not  empower  the  State  of  South  Carolina  to  enact  a 
law  prohibiting  anyone,  except  the  designated  officers,  import- 
ing liquors  into  the  State,  in  accordance  with  the  Dispensary 
Law  of  that  State.«-  Where  the  defendant  purchased  in 
North  Carolina  liquor  for  his  own  use,  loaded  it  in  his  buggy 
and  started  home,  and  as  soon  as  he  crossed  the  State  line, 
and  before  his  arrival  at  home,  he  was  arrested,  it  was  held  that 
he  had  not  "arrived"  at  his  destination,  and  that  the  liquor 
was  not  liable  to  seizure  nor  he  amenable  to  the  State  laws.''^' 

58  Rhodes  V.  Iowa,  170  U.  S.  eo  State  v.  Rhodes,  90  Iowa  496; 
412;  18  S.  Ct.  664;  reversing  90  58  N.  W.  887;  24  L.  R.  A.  245; 
Iowa  49-6;  58  N.  W.  887;  24  L.  Ex  parte  Jervey,  m  Fed.  957; 
R    A     245.                                                  Jervey  v.  Carolina,  66   Fed.   1013. 

59  Bowman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  ai  Rhodes  v.  Iowa,  170  U.  S. 
Co.,   125  U.  S.  465:   8  S.  Ct.  869.       412;    18  Snp.  -C  t.  m4. 

The    Wilson     law     extends     no  62  Scott   v.    Donakl,    165    U.    S. 

farther    than   to   allow   the   police  58;    17   Snp.   Ct.   205;    41    L.   Ed. 

laws  of  the  State  to  be  applied  to  632. 

intoxicants  shipped  into  the  State  63  state  v.   Holleyman    (S.   C), 

after    they   have   reached   the   end  33     S.     E.     3C6;     45     L.     R.     A. 

of    the    shipment,    and   have  been  567;      High     v.     State      (Okla.), 

delivered    to    the     consignee.     In  101   Pac.    115;    Scliwedes  v.  State 

re  Berger,  115  Fed.  339.  (Okla.),  99  Pac.  804.     See  State 


§  200  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  324 

Yet  where  an  agent  of  a  brewing  company  took  an  order 
as  its  agent  in  a  foreign  State  to  deliver  a  keg  of  beer 
at  the  residence  of  the  purchaser  situated  in  the  latter  State, 
and  the  beer  was  shipped  to  and  received  by  another  agent  of 
the  company,  who  conveyed  it  to  and  delivered  at  his 
house  before  his  arrival  home,  it  was  held  that  the  trans- 
action amounted  to  a  sale  in  the  foreign  State  or  place 
of  delivery,  and  that  the  beer  had  "arrived"  when  it 
reached  the  station  and  was  there  delivered  by  the  carrier  to 
such  agent  and  that  it  was  then  subject  to  the  State  law ; 
and  so  far  as  the  question  of  interstate  commerce  was  con- 
cerned it  was  immaterial  whether  the  sale  was  made  before 
or  after  the  arrival  of  the  beer.*^*  To  constitute  an  "arrival" 
in  the  State  of  destination,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Wilson 
Law,  delivery  to  the  consignee  is  essential,  and  merely'  placing 
the  liquors  shipped  in  the  warehouse  of  the  carrier  at  the  place 
of  their  destination  is  not  such  an  "arrival"  as  Avill  subject 
them  to  the  State  laws  within  the  meaning  of  the  Wilson  act."^ 
While  the  AVilson  Law  enables  a  State  to  regulate  or  prohibit 
the  sale  of  liquors  in  the  original  packages  after  it  has  been 
actually  delivered  to  the  consignee,  yet  it  does  not  empower 
it  to  enact  a  law  prohibiting  the  carrier  delivering  the  package 
to  such  consignee.'^''     Delivery  of  the  liquors  to  the  consignee 

V.    Moody,    70    S.    C.    56;     49    S.  L.    Rep.    1090);    State    v.    Intoxi- 

E.  8.        '  eating   Liquors,    102    Me.    206;    66 

64  Stevens  v.  State,  93  Fed.  7^3.  Atl.   393;    Rliodes  v.  Iowa,   170  U. 

«5Heyman  v.  .Southern  Ry.  Co.,  S.   412;    42   L.   Ed.    1088;    18   Sup. 

203  U.   S.  270;    27    Sup.  €t.    104;  Ct.     664;     Stat<?    v.     Winters.     44 

61  L.  E<1.   178    (reversing  122  Ga.  Kan.   723;    25   Pac.   235;    State   v. 

608,  50  S.  E,  342)  ;  American  Ex-  Corrick,  82   Iowa,   451;    48   N.   W. 

press  Co.  v.  Iowa,  196  U.  S.  133;  808.      (Contra,    Southern   Ry.   Co. 

25    Sup.   Ct.    182;    49   L.   Ed.   417  t.   Heyman,    119    Ga.  -616;    45    S. 

(reversing  State  v.  American  Ex-  E.    491.)       State    v.    Intoxicating 

press    Co.    118    losva    447;    92    N.  Liquors,  90  :\Ie.  415;    52  Atl.  911. 

W.  &6)  ;   Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  eo  Crescent  Liquor   Co.  v.   Piatt. 

1<K>  U.  8.   147;    25    Sup.   Ct.    185;  148   Fed.   894.      See  Norfolk  &   W. 

49    L.   Ed.    424     (reversing   95   N.  R.   Co.   v.   Commonwealth,  93   Va. 

W.    1129);     Adams    Exp.    Co.    ^.  749;     24    S.    E.     83  i  ;      Lacey     v. 

Commonwealth.    206    U.    S.    129;  Palmer,  93  Va.  159;   24  S.  E.  930. 

27   Sup.   Ct.   006;    51   L.   Ed.   987  Liquors     imported     before     the 

(reversing  87  S.  W.  1111;  27  Ky.  Wilson  law  was  passed,  and  which. 


325  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  201 

by  the  carrier  is  necessary  to  constitute  an  "arrival,"  whether 
the  consignee  was  or  was  not  known  to  the  carrier,  and  whether 
or  not  the  name  used  for  the  consignee  was  real  or  fictitious."^ 
In  the  passage  of  the  liquor  from  the  express  office,  in  charge 
of  the  express  company's  agent,  they  still  are  in  transit  and 
have  not  yet  "arrived"  at  their  ultimate  destination,  and 
cannot  then  be  seized."^  The  more  recent  decisions  hold  that 
the  word  "arrival"  has  reference  to  the  time  when  the  liquors 
reach  their  destination,  which  is  the  home  of  the  consignee,  by 
continuous  conveyance  from  the  station  to  his  house  or  place  of 
business.*''-' 

Sec.  201.     Liquors  in  transit — When   transit  ceases. 

Where  liquors  are  subject  to  interstate  commerce  they 
cannot  be  seized  while  in  transit,  and  on  this  point  all  the 
authorities  agree ;  "^  but  when  they  have  reached  their  destina- 
tion, then  the  aiithorities  differ  concerning  whether  they  can 
be  seized  on  arrival.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  they  may  be 
seized  while  the  importer  retains  possession  of  them,  if  he  has 
the  intent  to  break  the  original  package  and  sell  them  in 
quantities  less  than  a  paekage.^^     But  an  agreement  of  the 

was    then    free    of    State    control,  to  bring  into  it  liquors   and  keep 

became    subject    to    State    control  them  for  his  own  uses.     See  Crig- 

immediately  upon  passage  of  that  Jer    v.    Commonwealth,     120    Ky. 

act.     Tinker  V.  State,  90  Ala. '638;  512;    87    S.    W.    276;    27    Ky.    L. 

8  So.  814;  State  v.  Fraser,  1  N.  D.  Eep.    918;    87  S.   W.   280;    27   Ky. 

425;   48  N.  W.  343.     In  re  Spick-  L.   Rep.   920,    927,   281;    Schwedes 

ler,    43    Fed.    653;     10    L.    R.    A.  v.  State,  supra. 
441).  '*>  State  v.  Intoxicating  Liquors, 

G7  State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors,  10'     Me.   206;    67   All.   312;    Cres- 

102  Me.  206;  '67  Atl.  312.  cent  Liquor  Co.  v.  Piatt,  US  Fed. 

68  State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors,  iS94. 
101   Me.  430;    64  Atl.  812.  To  be  in  transit  the  goods  must 

t59  Hudson  V.  State   (Okla.),   101  be   actually   delivered   to  the  car- 

Pac.      275;      Moreland      v.     State  rier.     Coe  v.  Errol,  116  U.S.  517; 

(Okla.),      101      Pac.      138;      Mc-  42  L.   Ed.   1088;    6  Sup.  Ct.  475; 

Cord      V.      State       (Okla.).      101  Adams    Express    Co.   v.   Common- 

Pac.  280;   High  v.  State    (Okla.),  wealth    (Ky.),  96  S.   W.   593;    29 

101      Pac.       115;       Schwedes      v.  Ky.  L.  Rep.  904. 
State      (Okla.),      104     Pac.      765.  7 1  State    v.    Blackwell,    65    Me. 

The   cases    hold    a    resident   of    a  656. 
prohibition    State    has    the    right 


§  201  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  326 

local  agent  of  an  express  company  carrying  liquors  into  a 
State  to  hold  them  a  few  days,  that  were  shipped  C.  0.  D.,  to 
suit  the  convenience  of  the  consignee  in  making  the  payment 
required,  does  not  so  change  the  character  of  the  interstate 
commerce  shipment  as  to  render  the  express  company  liable  to 
the  State's  laws,  for  the  liquors  are  still  in  transit."  Nor 
can  they  be  seized  in  the  hands  of  the  express  company."^ 
So  where  by  a  continuous  waybill  liquors  were  shipped  from 
Massachusetts  to  Maine  through  Canadc,  and  on  arrival  at  its 
destination  was  left  on  a  "team  track"  twenty  rods  from  the 
claimant's  freight  house,  and  on  its  arrival  the  claimant's  serv- 
ants broke  the  car  door  seals  and  removed  other  merchandise, 
leaving  the  liquors  in  the  car,  and  the  usual  practice  was,  in 
cases  of  shipments,  to  leave  goods  in  the  car  two  or  three 
days  on  the  team  track,  and  if  not  claimed  to  take  them  to  the 
freight  house,  it  was  held  that  they  could  not  be  seized  in  the 
car  under  the  State  law  making  liquors  contraband,  for  the 
transportation  had  not  ceased  and  could  not  at  least  until 
deposited  in  the  freight  house  of  the  claimant  railroad  com- 
])any.'^*  And  generally,  it  may  be  stated  that  notwithstanding 
the  Wilson  Law,  liquors  are  not  the  subject  of  State  pro- 
's This  case  was  decided  after  "3  American  Express  Co.  v. 
the  Wilson  law  went  into  force.  Iowa,  196  U.  S.  133;  4  L.  Ed. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Common-  417;  25  Sup.  Ct.  182;  reversing 
wealth,  206  U.  S.  129;  27  Sup.  State  v.  American  Express  Co., 
Ct.  -eoe;  51  L.  Ed.  987  (revers-  118  Iowa  447;  92  K  W.  66; 
ing  87  S.  W.  1111;  27  Ky.  L.  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Iowa,  196 
Hep.  1096)  ;  206  U.  S.  138;  27  U.  S.  147;  49  L.  Ed.  424;  25  Sup. 
Sup.  Ct.  «08;  51  L.  Ed.  992  (re-  Ct.  185  (reversing  95  N.  \V. 
versing  (Ky.);  92  S.  W.  932;  1129);  Crescent  Liquor  Co.  v. 
•29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  224;  5  L.  E.  A.  Piatt,  148  Fed.  894;  American 
(N.  S.)  630);  American  Express  Express  Co.  v.  Mullins,  212  U.  S. 
Co.  V.  Commonwealth,  206  U.  S.  311;  29  Sup.  Ct.  381;  53  L.  Ed. 
130;   27   Sup.   Ct.   609;   51    L.   Ed.        — . 

993      (reversing      (Ky.);      97     S.  ^i  state  v.  Intoxicating  Liquors, 

W.    807;    30    Ky.    L.    Rep.    207;        102  Me.  206;   66  Atl.  393. 
Adams    Express    Co.    v.    Common-  It  is  to  be  observed  that  under 

wealth  (Ky.),  103  S.  W.  553:  the  decisions  of  the  United  States 
31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  Sll  to  813;  Supreme  Court,  cited  above,  the 
American  Express  Co.  v.  Mul-  transportation  would  not  cease 
lins,  212  U.  S.  311;  29  Sup,  Ct.  even  if  deposited  in  the  freight 
381;  63  L.  Ed.  house. 


327 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE. 


§202 


hibition  laws  until  delivered  to  the  consignee,  and  arc  subject  to 
them  on  their  arrival.^"  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  a  resident 
of  a  prohibition  State  may  there  order  liquors  to  be  shipped 
him  from  another  State,  and  may  convey  the  same  in  the 
original  package  from  the  railroad  station  to  his  house  or 
home/*^  The  conveyance  from  the  station  to  his  house  is  a 
part  of  the  interstate  transportation,  and  is  not  a  violation 
of  the  prohibition  law  there  in  force. ^^  The  act  of  a  drayman 
in  taking  the  goods  in  the  original  package  and  placing  it 
on  his  dray  for  delivery  to  the  consignee  is  a  part  of  the  inter- 
state transportation/*  Liquors  thus  received  for  family  use 
may  be  kept  and  so  used  by  the  consignee,  notwithstanding 
prohibition  statutes/'* 


Sec.  202.    Wilson  Law's  effect  upon  State  laws. 

There  are  decisions  which  hold,  prior  to  the  enactment  of 
the  Wilson  Law,  that  a  State  statute  might  be  void  as  against 


-5  Rhodes  V.  Iowa,  170  U.  S. 
412;  42  L.  Ed.  1088;  18  Sup. 
Ct.  •&64. 

The  following  ca-s^-s  follow  this 
decision:  State  v.  Winters,  44 
Kan.  723;  25  Pac.  235;  State  v. 
Pfleagor,  81  Iowa,  759;  4^  N.  VV. 
1063;  State  v.  Coonan,  82  Iowa, 
400;  48  N.  W.  921;  Carstairs  v. 
O'Donnell,  154  Mass,  357;  28  N. 
E.  271;  State  v.  Corrick,  82  Iowa 
451;  48  N.  VV.  «08  (goods  on  de- 
pot platform)  ;  Lemp  v.  Fuller- 
ton,  S3  Iowa  192;  48  N.  VV.  1034; 
Schendler  Bottling  Co.  v.  Welch, 
42  Fed.  561;  Tuchman  v.  Welch, 
42  Fed.  548;  Woolstein  v.  Welch, 
42  Fed.  &&6 ;  United  States  v.  Fis- 
cus,  42  Fed.  3»5;  In  re  Beine,  42 
Fed.  545. 

Because  a  statute  in  general 
terms  applies  to  salas  of  liquors 
generally,  it  will  not  necessarily  be- 
held void;  because  it  may  be  in- 
valid as  to  imported  and  valid  as 


to  domestic  liquors.  State  v.  Kib- 
ling,  63  Vt.  636;  22  Atl.  613; 
Commonwealth  v.  Gagne,  153 
Mass.    205;    26    N.   E.   449. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  statute 
making  it  an  ofl'ense  to  handle 
"contraband  liquors  in  the  night 
time"  or  to  deliver  them  "in  the 
night  time"  was  valid,  not  being 
an  interference  with  interstate 
commerce.  State  v.  Ilolleyman 
(S.  C),  31  S.  E.  362. 

76  Hudson  V.  Stat«  ( Okla. ) , 
101  Pac.  275;  Moreland  v.  State 
(Okla.),  101  Pac.  138. 

77McCord  V.  State  (Okla.),  101 
Pac.  280;  High  v.  State  (Okla.), 
101  Pac.  115. 

7sMcCord  V.  State  (Okla.),  101 
Pac.  280;  Hudson  v.  State 
(Okla.),  101  Pac.  275;  More- 
land  V.  State  (Okla.),  101  Pac. 
138. 

ToSchwedes  v.  State,  1  Okla. 
Cr.  245;  9Q  Pac.  804. 


§  203  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  328 

an  importer  of  liquor  in  the  original  packages  but  still  be 
valid  as  to  domestic  liquors,  although  in  terms  it  applied  to 
both  liquors.^"  The  question,  therefore,  necessarily  arose 
whether  or  not  these  laws,  even  though  they  had  been  declared 
void,  were  or  were  not  to  apply  to  imported  liquors  in  the  orig- 
inal packages,  and  were  in  force  after  the  passage  of  the  Wilson 
Law.  At  first  there  was  some  fluctuation  in  decisions,  but  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  put  the  question  at  rest 
by  holding  that  the  laws  were  still  in  force  and  became 
effective  as  soon  as  the  Wilson  Law  was  enacted.^^ 

Sec.  203.     Importing  liquors  for  private  use. 

It  is  of  importance  whether  or  not  a  man  may  import  or 
bring  into  his  State  liquors  for  his  own  private  use  and  for 
the  use  of  his  family.  The  authorities  are  practically  one  that 
he  can  do  so,  and  that  a  State  cannot  prevent  him  doing  so. 
"A  resident  of  one  State  has  the  right  to  have  shipped  to  him 
from  another  State  alcoholic  liquors  when  ordered  by  him  for 
his  and  his  family  use,  and  to  keep  the  same  for  such  use; 
and  the  State  cannot,  under  its  police  power,  enact  laws  so  as 
to  substantially  hamper  or  burden  such  constitutional  right  to 
have  such  shipment  made  and  to  receive  and  retain  the  same 
for  personal  use."^-  The  Wilson  Law  does  not  change  the 
rule;  that  law  simply  forbids  his  selling  the  liquor  brought 
into  the  State.'*'^    And  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 

80  State    V.    Fuller,    33     X.     H.  arrival    are    subject    to    the    State 

259;     Commonwealth    v.    Kimball,  laws;    and   cannot  be   sold   if   pro- 

24   Pick.    359;    35    Am.    Dec.    32t).  hibition   is   there   in    force.      State 

8i/«.     re     Raher,      140     U.      S.  v.    Fulker,    43   Kan.    237;    22   Pac. 

545;       11      Sup.      Ct.      865       (re-  1020;    7   L.   A.    183. 
versing   43    Fed.  '556 ) .      To    same  82  Schwedes    v.    State,    1     Okla. 

eflFect.      In    re    Spickler,    43    Fed.  Cr.  245 ;  99  Pac.  804 ;  citing  Vance 

653;    In   re    Vliet,    43    Fed.    761;  v.  Vondercook    Co.,  170  U.  S.  438; 

Commonwealth    v.    Calhame,     154  18  Sup.  Ct.  674;   42  L.  Ed.   1100; 

Mass.    115;    27    N.   E.    881;   State  and  Heyman  v.   Southern  Ry.  Co. 

V.  Fraser,  1  X.  D.  425;   48  N.  W.  203   U.   S.  270;   27  Sup.   Ct.   104; 

343.  51  L.  Ed.   178. 

This   question   now,   however,    is  ss  Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Crcii- 

practically  academic.  shaw,    198  U.   S.   17;   25  Sup.   Ct. 

Liquors    imported    upon    actual  552;   49  L.  Ed.  925. 


329  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  203 

has  declared  that  every  resident  of  a  prohibition  State  "is 
free  to  receive  for  his  own  use  liquor  from  other  States,  and 
that  the  inhibitions  of  a  State  statute  do  not  operate  to  pre- 
vent liquors  from  other  States  from  being  shipped  into  such 
State  on  the  order  of  a  resident  for  his  use."  ^*  But  this  rule 
will  not  permit  a  brewery  in  one  State  to  establish  an  agency 
in  another  State  to  sell  liquors  on  orders  given  him  for  the 
purchasers'  own  private  use,  to  be  shipped  from  the  State  in 
which  the  liquor  is  manufactured,  by  a  common  carrier, 
directly  to  the  purchaser.^^  Nor  does  it  permit  the  bringing 
in  of  liquors  for  sale ;  and  if  brought  in  for  sale  they  may  be 
seized  as  soon  as  they  pass  into  the  exclusive  possession  of  the 
consignee,  even  though  that  be  upon  the  station  grounds  of 
the  carrier.*^"  And  although  a  person  may  import  liquors  for 
his  own  private  use,  yet  if  after  their  arrival  he  changes  his 
purpose  and  keeps  them  for  sale,  they  may  be  seized  as  contra- 
band goods.  "After  the  liquors  are  removed  to  one's  home  on 
the  theory  that  [the]  same  was  ordered  by  the  consignee  from 
another  State  and  received  by  him  at  the  depot  of  the  carrier, 
and  also  by  him  transported  for  the  purpose  and  intention  of 
being  for  his  personal  use,  but  afterwards  he  should  change 
his  intention  and  have  them  in  his  possession  in  his  home  for 
sale,  contrary  to  law,  the  burden  would  be  upon  the  Govern- 
ment, however,  and  the  presumption  would  be  in  favor  of  the 
claimant,  subject  to  be  rebutted  by  proof.  When  the  liquors 
are  received  at  the  depot  by  the  consignee,  if  he  then  and  there 
has  the  same  in  his  possession  with  the  intention  of  bartering 
or  selling  the  same  contrary  to  law,  the  same  would,  under 
such  circumstances,  be  subject  to  forfeiture,  the  burden  rest- 

si  Vance  v.  Vandercook   Co.,  su-  ss  Delameter    v.    South    Dakota, 

pra;    Heyman    v.     Southern     Ry.  205   U.    S.    93;    27    Sup.    Ct.    447; 

Co.,    supra;    Dehimetei-    v.    South  51    L.   Ed.   724. 

Dakota,    205    U.    S.    93;    27    Sup.  S6  State      v.      Eighteen      Casks 

Ct.  447;  '51   L.  Ed.   724;    Pligh  v.  (Okla.),    104    Pae.    1092;     Foppi- 

State    (Okla.   Cr.),   101   Pac.    115:  ano  v.   Speed,   199   U.   S.   501;    26 

McCord  V.  State    (Okla.  Cr.),   101  Sup.   Ct.   138;    50  L.  Ed.  288.     A 

Pac.  280;  State  v.  Eighteen  Casks  sale     on     the     carrier's     premises 

of   Beer    (Okla.),    104   Pac.    1093:  would  he  illegal.  State  v.  Eighteen 

Hudson  V.  State    (Okla.  Cr.),   101  Casks,  supra. 
Pac.  275. 


§§  204,  205        TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


330 


ing  upon  the  State,  with  the  presumption  likewise  in  favor  of 
the  claimant,  subject  to  be  rebutted  by  proof."  " 

Sec.  204.     Leaving  liquors  unreasonable  length  of  time  in 
carrier's  possession. 

As  is  well  known,  if  goods  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  carrier 
at  the  place  of  their  destination  after  notice  by  it  to  the  con- 
signee of  their  arrival,  and  a  sufficient  length  of  time  has 
elapsed  after  the  receipt  of  the  notice  to  enable  him  to  take 
them  from  its  possession,  the  relation  of  the  carrier  to  such 
goods  is  that  of  warehouseman  and  not  that  of  a  carrier. 
And  while  the  relationship  between  the  consignee  and  the 
carrier  is  that  of  carrier,  the  liquors  he  has  brought  into  the 
State  is  protected  by  the  interstate  commerce  clause,  and  even 
after  their  storage.  But  if  the  consignee,  after  notice  and  full 
opportunity  to  receive  them,  designedly  leaves  them  in  the 
hands  of  the  carrier  for  an  unreasonable  time,  the  conduct  of 
the  consignee,  if  affirmatively  alleged  and  proven,  will  justify 
the  court  in  holding  that  liquors  so  dealt  with  have  come  under 
the  operation  of  the  Wilson  Law,  because  constructively  de- 
li vered.^*" 

Sec.  205.     License — Tax — Regulating  sale. 

"The  business  of  interstate  commerce  cannot  be  taxed  at  all, 
and  as  the  right  to  bring  goods  from  another  State  includes 
the  right  to  sell  them  and  to  solicit  sales  therefor,  as  well  as  to 
deliver  the  property  sold,  the  State  cannot  tax  the  right  to 
sell  or  deliver,  or  to  solicit  sales,  Avhether  in  the  form  of  license 
tax  or  otherwise.  It  is  immaterial  that  the  tax  is  without 
discrimination,  as  between  domestic  and  foreign  drummers,  as 
interstate  commerce  cannot  be  taxed  at  all. ' '  ^^     But  when 

87  state  V.  Eighteen  Casks  the  leaning  of  the  court.  See  also 
(Okla.),  104  Pac.  1093;  Schwedes  State  v.  Eighteen  Casks  (Okla.), 
V.  State,  1  Okla.  Cr.  245;   99  Pac.       104   Pac.    1092. 

804.  83  Judson    on    Inter.    Com.     ( 1st 

88  This  point  is  left  undecided  in  ed.),  §  18;  citing  Robbins  v.  Shel- 
Heyman  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  203  by  County  Taxing  District,  120 
U.  S.  270;  27  Sup.  Ct.  104;  51  J.  S.  489;  7  Sup.  Ct.  592;  30  L. 
L.  Ed.   178;   but  evidently  that  is  Ed.    604;     McCullough    v.    Mary- 


331  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  205 

liquors  have  reached  their  destination  in  the  State,  they  may 
be  taxed  as  property  in  common  with  other  property  in  the 
State,  if  the  tax  be  levied  without  d'scriminution  between 
domestic  and  non-domestic  goodsj^"  whethorthey  are  in  original 
packages  or  not ;  and  this  was  true  before  the  day  of'  the 
Wilson  act.^^  But  the  Wilson  Law,  so  far  as  intoxicating 
liquors  are  concerned,  has  relaxed  the  rules  in  a  measure  on 
this  subject.  Thus,  where  the  State  of  Tennessee  exacted  a 
license  fee  from  a  person  engaged  in  selling  licjuors  within  the 
State  on  a  ferry  boat  employed  between  th-it  State  and 
Arkansas  in  interstate  commerce,  it  Avas  held  that  the  Federal 
statute  authorized  the  enactment  of  the  State  law,  and  that 
the  license  fee  could  be  exacted.^-  And  a  license  tax  imposed 
upon  those  engaged  in  selling  beer  by  the  barrel  is  valid,  even 
though  the  barrels  sold  are  original  packages,  a  statute  or  ordi- 
nance exacting  the  license  being  merely  an  exercise  of  the 
police  law,  although  the  State  or  city  derives  more  or  less 
revenue  thereby.""  So  a  law  requiring  all  liquors  received 
from  without  the  State  to  be  inspected,  and  all  sold  within  the 
State  to  be  also  inspected,  is  a  valid  exercise  of  the  police 
power  and  is  permitted  under  the  Wilson  act."^    But  a  State 

land,  4  Wheat.  310;  4  L.  Ed.  479;  So.  826;  Richard  v.  Mobile,  20S 
and  Brown  v.  Maryland,  12  U.  S.  480;  28  Sup.  Ct.  372;  52 
Wheat.  419;  6  L.  Ed.  678;  Sin-  L.  Ed.  — ;  Jones  v.  Yokum 
Clair  V.  State,  69  N.  C.  47.  (S.  D.),  123  N.  W.  272;  Corn- 
so  American  Steel  &  Wire  Co.  monwealth  v.  Newhall,  164  Mass. 
V.  Speed,  192  U.  S.  500;  24  Sup.  338;  41  N.  E.  647;  Kohn  v.  Melch- 
Ct.  365;   48  L.  Ed.   538.  er,   29   Fed.   433;    State  v.   Wheel- 

91  Woodrutr  V.  Parham,  8  Wall.  ock,  95  Iowa,  577;  64  N.  W.  (>20; 
123;     19    L.    Ed.    382;     Brown    v.  30  L.  R.  A.  429. 

Houston,  114  U.  S.  622;  29  L.  Ed.  Contra.     In   re   Lebolt,   77    Fed. 

257;    Pittsburg,    etc.    Coal    Co.    v.  587. 

Bates,   156   U.   S.   577;    30   L.   Ed.  o<  Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Cren- 

538.  shaw,   198  U.  S.   17;    25   Sup.  Ct. 

92  Foppiano  v.  Speed,  199  U.  S.  552;  49  L.  Ed.  925;  affirming 
501;  26  Sup.  Ct.  138;  50  L.  Ed.  120  Fed.  144;  State  v.  Bixman, 
—    (affirming    113    Tenn.    167;    82  162  Mo.   1;    62  S.  W.  828. 

S.  W.  222);  Harrell  v.  Speed,  113  This    statute   was    held    not    to 

Tenn.   224;    81   S.  W.  840.  app'V'   '"   'ts  construction  to  beer 

03  Phillips  V.  Mobile,  208  U.  S.  shipped   through  the  State  to  an- 

-^72;   28  Sup.   Ct.   370:    52  L.   Ed.  other   State.      Pabst   Brewing  Co. 

— ;     affirming    146    Ala.    138;    40  v.  Crenaliaw.  120  Fed.   144. 


§  205  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  332 

cannot  require  lifjiiors  temporarily  stored  in  a  State,  on  their 
transit  for  convenience  in  distributing  them  in  other  States, 
to  be  inspected  and  exact  a  fee  for  such  inspection. ^'^  A  statute 
of  Michigan  provided  for  an  annual  tax  of  five  hundred 
dollars  on  wholesalers  and  another  annual  tax  of  sixty-five 
dollars  on  the  brewing  of  liquor,  and  that  no  person  paying 
the  brewing  tax  should  pay  a  wholesaler's 'tax  on  the  liquor 
brewed  under  the  brewer's  tax.  It  defined  wholesalers  to  be 
those  who  sell  liquors  in  quantities  of  more  than  three  gallons, 
or  more  than  one  dozen  quart  bottles  at  a  time  to  any  person. 
It  was  held  that  this  statute  was  not  in  restraint  of  interstate 
commerce  on  the  ground  that  wholesalers  of  brewed  liquors 
were  required  to  pay  an  annual  tax  while  brewers  were  only 
required  to  pay  sixty-five  dollars  and  not  to  pay  the  whole- 
saler's tax,  because  in  the  sale  of  liquor  at  a  brewery  the  sale 
was  not  at  wholesale,  the  statute  forbidding  a  brewer  to 
establish  a  warehouse  or  place  of  sale  elsewhere  than  at  his 
brewery  without  the  payment  of  a  wholesaler's  tax.  The 
statute  was  held  to  apply  to  a  foreign  brewery  sending  liquors 
into  the  State  for  storage  and  sale  therein  by  its  agent.^*^ 
A  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  Louisiana  provides  that  no 
domestic  or  foreign  corporation  shall  do  any  business  within 
the  State  without  having  at  least  ono  known  place  of  business 
therein  and  an  authorized  agent  within  the  State  on  whom 
service  of  process  can  be  made.  A  foreign  corporation  sold 
liquors  within  tlie  State,  to  be  shipped  from  Kentucky  to  New 

95Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Cren-  398;    91    N.    W.    G'24;    9    Detroit 

shaw,  120  Fed.   144.     In  this  case  Leg.  N.  377;   Indianajjolis  v.  Biel- 

it    was    held    that    the    provision  er,    138    Ind.    30;    36    N.    E.    857. 

in  the  statute  that  beer  made  in  (In  this  Indiana  case  it  was  held 

the    State    and    exported    for   sale  that    a   city    could    pass    an   ordi- 

outside   of   it  should  be  inspected  nance    requiring    a    license    of    all 

free  of  charge,  was  one  of  which  wliolesalers,     but     not     merely     of 

a  foreign  manufacturer  could  not  foreign      brewers.)         Minneapolis 

complain,  and  was  not  an  illegal  Brewing    Co.    v.    McGillivray,    104 

discrimination,    since    the    inspec-  Fed.    25'8 ;    New    Iberia   v.    Erath, 

tion  fee  was  charged  alike  on  all  118  La.  305;  42  So.  945;   State  v. 

beer    sold    within    the    State,    re-  Bengsch,    170    Mo.   81;    70   S.    VV. 

gardless  of  whore  it  was  made.  710. 

90  People   V.   Voorhis,   131   Mich. 


333  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  206 

Orleans,  and  took  notes  for  the  purchase  price.  These  notes 
were  payable  in  New  Orleans.  It  was  held  that  the  trans- 
action was  valid— an  act  of  interstate  commerce — and  was, 
therefore,  not  within  the  provision  of  the  State  Constitution.^'^ 

Sec.  206.     Prohibiting  solicitation  of  orders. 

Unable  to  prohibit  the  shipment  of  intoxicating  liquors 
into  the  State,  several  States  have  enacted  laws  prohibiting 
the  soliciting  of  orders  for  liquors  by  agents  of  liquor 
dealers  of  other  States,  and  several  of  these  statutes  come 
under  the  consideration  of  the  courts.  Thus,  in  Georgia,  a 
State  statute  prohibited  the  solicitation  of  orders  for  liquors 
in  a  prohibition  county,  and  it  was  held  that  the  law  was  not 
void  on  the  ground  that  it  conflicts  with  the  power  of  Congress 
to  regulate  and  control  interstate  commerce,  even  though  the 
seller  and  liquor  sold  be  in  another  State.**^  So  a  statute 
making  it  an  offense  to  act  as  an  agent  of  either  a  vendor  or 
purchaser  of  liquor  in  any  territory  of  the  State  in  which  a 
sale  is  prohibited  is  not  in  contravention  of  the  Federal  Con- 

97  Julius  Kessler  &  Co.  v.  E.  F.  An    ordinance   requiring   dealers 

Perilloux  &  Co.,  127   Fed.   1011.  in    liquors    to    procure    a    license 

A  statute  requiring  all  persons  from  a  city  applies  to  a  non-res- 
soliciting  orders  for  liquors  in  a  ident  manufacturer  who  maintains 
State,  the  liquors  thereafter  to  be  a  depot  in  a  city  from  which  sales 
shipped  into  the  State  to  pay  a  are  made  by  an  agent,  whether 
specified  tax  is  void.  Slgman  v.  such  sales  are  made  to 'licensed 
Williams  D.  C.  Moebs  Co.,  139  dealers  or  consumers.  Duluth 
Mich.  334;  102  N.  W.  854;  11  Brewing  Co.  v.  Superior,  123  Fed. 
Detroit    Leg.    X.    857.        (Contra,  353. 

People  V.   Walling,  53  Mich.  204;  Construction     of     Georgia     Act, 

18  N.  W.  807.)  1896,  p.  26.       Smith  v.  State,  101) 

Several  cases   have  held   that  a  Ga.    227;    34    S.    E.     325;     Acme 

statute  requiring  all   dealers   sell-  Brewing  Co.  v.   Fletcher,    109   Ga. 

ing   liquors    in   the    State    to   take  463;   34  S.  E.  558. 

out  a   license   is  valid.     Keller   v.  98  Rose    v.    State,    4    Ga.    App. 

State,    11   Md.    525;    09   Am.   Dec.  588;  62  S.  E.   117. 

226;   IncrersoU  v.  Skinner,  1  Denio  This    decision    took    iiifo    consid- 

640;    Fincannon   v.    State,   93   Ga.  eration    the    Wilson    law.      State 

418;    21    S.    E.    53;    but   of    those  v.   Davis    (».  C),   66   S.   E.   875; 

cases  it  cannot  be  said  that  they  State   v.   Miller    (W.  Va.),   66   S, 

are  sound.  E.  522. 


§  206  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  334 

stitution.^*    And  in  Ohio  it  is  held  that  a  sale  of  an  original 
package  of  liquor  by  an  agent  of  a  manufacturer  located  in 
another  State  is  a  violation  of  the  local  law  ar>d  the  agent 
cannot  claim  protection  on  the  ground  of  an  interstate  trans- 
action.^    On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  decided  that  the 
Wilson  Law  providing  that  liquors  carried  into  a  State  shall 
be  subject  to  local  police  regulations  has  no  application  to  a 
sale  of  liquors  by  a  traveling  salesman  where  the  liquors  sold 
are  to  be  transported   into  the   State.-     And  where  it   was 
shown  that  a  defendant  had  solicited  orders  for  liquors,  that 
he  received  an  order  which  he  filled  out  on  a  house  in  another 
State,  that  afterwards  the  Mquor  came  C.  0.  D.  by  express 
and  the  consignee  paid  the  express  company  the  charges  but 
he  paid  the  defendant  nothing  for  the  liquor,  it  was  held  that 
the  sale  was  protected  by  the  interstate  clause,  although  the 
defendent  received   a  commission   on   all  orders  for  liquors 
taken  by  him  if  the  liquor  was  accepted  by  the  consignees, 
but   if   not    accepted    it   was    shipped    back    at    defendant's 
expense.^      So    a    Michigan    statute    was    held    void    which 
provided   that   anyone   who   comes   into   or   brings   into   the 
State    liquor    or    sells    liquor    to    citizens    of    the    State    at 
wholesale,    or    solicits    or    takes    orders    for    liquors    to    be 
shipped  into  the  Stat€  or  furnished  at  wholesale  to  any  person 
within  the  State  by  any  person  not  a  resident  of  the  State  nor 
having  his  principal  place  of  business  therein,  shall  pay  a 
tax  specified,  is  invalid.*    So  a  statute  making  it  an  offense  to 
solicit  orders  in  a  State  for  liquors  to  be  shipped  into  another 
State,  with  knowledge  or  reasonable  cause  to  believe  that  the 
liquors  were  to  be  brought  back  into  the  State  in  violation 
of  its  laws,  was  held  to  be  a  regulation  of  commerce  and  void.* 
And  a  like  decision  was  also  made  that  the  law  was  not  valid 

»9Hart  V.  state,  87   Miaa.  171;  ^Sloman    v.     William     D.     U. 

39  So.  523.  Moebs  Co.,  139  Mich.  334;    102  N. 

1  Stevens   v.   State.   Gl    Ohio  St.       W.  854;   11  Del.  Leg.  N.  857. 

h597  ;   5<5  N.  E.  478.  n  Durkee    v.    Moses,    67    N.    H. 

2Moog  V.  State    (Ala.),   41  So.       115;     23    Atl.    793.       (Overruling 

166.  Dunbar   v.   Locke,   62   N.    H.   442, 

3  Donley    v.    State,    48    Tex.  Cr.       and   Jones   v.   Surprise,   64  N.   H. 

App.  567;   89  S.  W.  553.  243;  9  AU.  384.) 


335  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE.  §  206 

by  reason  of  the  Wilson  act  having  been  enacted.^  And  a 
like  decision  has  been  rendered  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa, 
where  it  was  sought  to  punish  under  the  Iowa  statute  a  travel- 
ing salesman  soliciting  orders  for  liquors  to  be  shipped 
C.  0.  D.  by  his  principal  in  Illinois,  the  liquor  being  shipped 
from  the  latter  State.  The  order,  however,  was  subject  to  the 
acceptance  or  rejection  by  his  principal.^  And  a  like  decision 
was  rendered  by  a  United  States  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals, 
where  the  liquors  purchased  w^ere  for  the  private  use  of  the 
purchaser.*  The  salesman  had  solicited  orders  in  Kansas. 
About  the  same  time  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas  held  the 
statute  of  that  State  on  the  subject  unconstitutional.®  But 
it  has  been  held  by  a  Federal  Court  of  Appeals  that  the  laws 
of  New  Hampshire  making  it  unlawful  to  solicit  or  take  orders 
in  the  State  for  liquor  to  be  delivered  without  the  State, 
when  the  solicitor  had  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  the  in- 
tention of  the  purchaser  to  sell  the  liquor  illegally,  was 
constitutional ;  '^°  and  a  similar  statute,  without  a  clause  con- 
cerning the  evasion  of  the  law,  has  been  held  valid  recently  in 
Illinois.^ ^  It  has  been  held  in  Texas  that  a  statute  making  it 
a  misdemeanor  "to  solicit  an  order  for  the  sale"  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  in  prohibition  territory  was  void,  because  in 
violation  of  the  interstate  commerce  law.^-     And  it  has  also 

oCorbin    v.    McC'onnell,    71     N.  125   U.    S.   465;    8    Sup.   Ct.  689, 

H.  350;   52  Atl.  447.  1062;   31   L.  Ed.  700. 

7  State    V.    Hanaphy,    117    Iowa  n  People    v.    McBride,    234    III. 

15;   90  N.  W.  601;   Wind  v.   Her,  146;    84  N.   E.  «65. 

93  Iowa,  316;  61  N.  W.  1001;   27  A    statute   attempting   to    make 

L.    R.   A.    219.  the  agent  of  a  common  carrier  the 

8 /n  re  Beigen,  115  Fed.  339.  vendor   of   liquors    he   delivers    to 

9  State  V.  Hickox,  64  Kan.  persons  in  the  State,  except  to 
650;  68  Pac.  35.  Recently  such  persons  having  State  licenses  to 
a  statute  has  been  held  valid  in  sell  or  to  the  bona  f.de  consignee 
that  State.  State  v.  Wm.  J.  thereof  who  has  in  good  faith 
Lemp  Brewing  Co.  (Kan.),  102  ordered  the  liquors  for  his  own 
Pac.  504.  use,  is  unconstitutional.     Crescent 

See   Kohn   v.    Melcher,    29    Fed.  Liquors    Co.    v.    Piatt,    148     Fed. 

433.  894. 

10  Long  V.  Linch,  38  Fed.  489;  4  ^^  Ex  parte  Massey  (Tex.  Civ. 
L.  R.  831,  distinguishing  Bow-  App.);  92  S.  W.  1086;  Ex  parte 
man  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Hackney    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  92  S. 


§§  207-209         TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  336 

been  held  that  a  statute  making  it  an  offense  to  solicit  orders 
for  liquor  in  such  territory  through  agents,  circulars,  posters, 
or  newspaper  advertisements,  was  valid/^ 

Sec.  207.    Sales  beyond  State  lines. 

A  State  has  no  power  bej^ond  its  own  territorial  limits.  It, 
therefore,  cannot  make  it  an  offense  for  one  of  its  own  citizens 
where  he  goes  into  another  State  and  there  sells  liquors  he  has 
manufactured  in  his  own  State  in  violation  of  its  own  laws.^* 

Sec.  208.     Sales  to  minors  and  drunkards. 

The  interstate  laws,  however,  cannot  be  stretched  so  far  as 
to  enable  an  importer  to  sell  liquors  to  a  minor  or  drunkard 
in  violation  of  a  State  statute.^^  Yet  a  statute  making  it  an 
oft'ense  to  knowingly  furnish  liquor  to  an  inebriate  is,  as 
applied  to  the  transportation  of  liquors  by  a  common  carrier 
from  one  State  to  another,  unconstitutional,  because  a  regula- 
tion of  interstate  commerce.^® 

Sec.  209.     Burden  on  defendant  to  show  he  is  protected  by 
the  interstate  commerce  law. 

The  burden  is  upon  a  defendant  who  is  charged  with 
violating  the  State's  liquor  laws,  if  his  defense  is  that  he  is 
an  importer,  to  show:  (1)  that  he  is  either  an  importer  or 
agent  of  an  importer;  (2)  that  in  such  capacity  he  received 
the  liquor  in  question  from  a  State  or  foreign  country;  (3) 
that  in  such  capacity  he  sold  or  held  this  importation  by  the 
original  unbroken  packages;  and  (4)  that  he  was  not  making 
his  house  or  place  of  business  a  saloon  or  tippling  place  for 
the  rendezvous  of  persons,  thus  bringing  it  within  the  police 
power  of  the  State  to  declare  it  a  nuisance.^"     The  tona  fides 

W.    1092;    Carter    v.    State    (Tex.  A.   (502;    Commonwealth  v.  Silver- 
Civ.  App.),  92  S.  W.   1093.  man,     138    Pa.    St.    642;     22    Atl. 

"Zinn  V.   State    (Ark.),   114  S.  13. 

W.  227;  State  v.  J    Bass  Co.,  104  le  Adams    Express    Co.   v.    Com- 

Me.  288;    71  Atl.  '894.  monwealth,    214    U.    S.    218;     29 

i*Lindley      v.      State       (Ark.),  Sup.  Ct.  633. 

120   S.  W.  9«?.  17  State    v.    Chapman,    1    S.    D. 

15  Commonwealth    V.    Zelt,     138  414;  47  N.  W.  411. 
Pa.   St.  615;    21   All.  7;    11  L.   R. 


337  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE,  §§  210-212 

of  his  agency  is  a  question  for  the  jury.'*'  The  size  of  the 
package,  however,  is  not  a  criterion  of  the  lawfulness  of  the 
sale.^^ 

Sec.  210.    Liability  of  officer  serving  warrant. 

If  an  officer  is  directed  by  a  warrant  to  seize  liquors  that 
are  not  liable  to  seizure  because  of  the  interstate  commerce 
clause  of  the  Constitution,  he  is  justified  in  making  the  seizure, 
and  the  warrant  is  a  protection  to  him.  Whether  or  not  the 
liquor  is  a  commodity  within  the  protection  of  that  clause  is 
a  question  for  the  court  issuing  the  warrant  and  not  one  to  be 
determined  by  the  officer  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  ex- 
ecution of  his  warrant.-** 

Sec.  211.     Shipping  liquor  under  false  brand. 

A  statute  of  the  United  States-^  makes  it  an  offense  for 
any  person  to  ship  liquors  under  any  other  than  their  proper 
brand,  and  inflicts  as  a  penalty  the  forfeiture  of  the  liquors, 
and  renders  him  subject  to  a  fine  of  $500.  This  statute  is 
regarded  as  highly  penal  in  its  character  and  is  strictly  eon- 
strued.-- 

Sec.  212.     Carrier  refusing  to  accept  liquors  for  transpor- 
tation. 

"While  it  is  the  duty  of  a  common  carrier  to  accept  all  goods, 
in  a  safe  or  reasonable  condition,  for  transportation,  without 
discrimination,  yet  it  may  adopt  a  rule  by  which  it  can  decline 
to  receive  shipments  of  liquors  C.  0.  D.,  if  the  rule  applies  to 
all  shippers  and  all  locations  alike,  where  the  acceptance  of 
such  business  has  resulted  in  a  loss  to  the  company  and  detri- 
ment to  its  business  throuiih   unclaimed   packages,   and  has 

18  Commonwealth  v.  Bushman,  20  Kalloch  v.  Newbort  (Me.^  72 
138  Pa.  St.  639;  21  Atl.  12;  Com-       Atl.   736. 

monwealth  v.  Pendergast,  138  Pa.  =1  U.   S.   Rev.  St.   §3449;   U.   S. 

St.   633;    21   Atl.   12.     See  Austin  Camp.  St.  [1901]  p.  2277. 

V.   Tennessee,    179   U.    S.   343;    45  22  United      States      v.      Twenty 

L.  Ed.  224;   21  Sup.  Ct.   132.  Boxes    of   Corn   Liquor,    123    Fed. 

19  In  re  Beine,   42   Fed.   545.  135,    affirmed    133    Fed.    910;    67 

C.  €.  A.  214. 


§  212  TRAFFIC  IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  338 

had  a  tendency  to  annoy  or  drive  its  patrons  away  from  it.^' 
And  if  liquors  in  its  possession  be  seized  by  the  officers  of 
the  State  to  which  it  is  consigned  as  contraband  goods,  the 
carrier  may  notify  the  consignor  or  consignee  of  the  seizure, 
and  request  him  to  defend,  and  he  will  then  be  bound  by 
whatever  judgment  be  rendered,  even  though  the  judgment 
was  rendered  on  default.'* 

23Burk  V.  Piatt,  172  Fed.  777;  2*  American  Express  Co.  v.  Mul- 

Davis  Hotel  Co.  v.  Piatt,  172  lins,  212  U.  S.  311;  29  Sup.  Ct 
Fed.   175.  381;    53   L.   Ed.   — . 


CHAPTER   IV. 
EEGULATING  LIQUOR  TRAFFIC. 


SECTION. 

213.  Extent  of  discussion  in  this 

chapter. 

214.  Statoitory     requirements    as 

to  location  of  barroom. 

215.  Arrangement   of    room. 
21fi.     Screens  and  curtains. 

217.  Removal    of    saloon. 

218.  Keeping  more  than  one  bar 

— Barroom. 

219.  More  than  one  license. 

220.  Beneficial    interest    in    more 

than  one  license. 

221.  Lamp   burning  until  closing 
time. 

222.  Keeping  door  locked. 

223.  List  of   employes. 

224.  Music   in   saloon. 

225.  Obstruction    of    officer's    en- 

trance   on    premises. 

226.  Display  of  license. 

227.  Signs. 

228.  Salo   in   unmarked   measure. 

229.  Registration    of    sales. 

230.  Sales  on  credit. 

231.  Entering     saloon     in     viola- 

tion  of  orders   not   an   of- 
fense. 

232.  Permitting    minors    to    "en- 

ter  and   remain"   in   a   sa- 
loon. 

233.  Minor    willfully    misstating 

his  age. 

234.  Permitting    drunkenness    on 

premises    —    iSelling      to 
drunken  man. 


SECTION. 

235.  Found     drunk     on     licensed 

premises. 

236.  Power    to    exclude    drunken 

man   from    premises. 

237.  Permitting  employe  to  drink 

storage    liquors — Premises. 

238.  Women    in    saloons  —  Wine 

rooms. 

239.  Prostitutes  visiting  premises. 

240.  Permitting    premises    to    be 

a  brothel. 

241.  Knowingly    harboring    thief 

on  premises. 

242.  Gambling  on    premises. 

243.  Suflering    gambling    or    bet- 

ting on   premises — English 
statute. 

244.  iServant      permitting      gam- 

bling— Knowledge   of  Gam- 
ing. 

245.  Keeping   a  betting  house. 

246.  Public  dispensarj'. 

247.  Sales   by  public   agents. 

248.  Agent's      liability      on      hia 

bond. 

249.  Transportation     or     convey- 

ance of  liquors. 

250.  Limiting  number  of  saloons. 

251.  Saloon    for    negroes. 

252.  Liquor  sales  carried  on  with 

other  business. 

253.  Criminal    Liability    of   own- 

er  and   landlords. 

254.  Police    regulations,    enforce- 

ment by  mandamus. 


339 


§§213,214       TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  340 

Sec.  213.    Extent  of  discussion  in  this  chapter. 

In  many  of  the  other  chapters  have  heeu  discussed  ques- 
tions relating  to  the  regulation  of  the  liquor  traffic  and  the 
sales  of  intoxicating  liquors.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the 
concerning  the  constitutionality  of  statutes  and  the  powers  of 
municipalities  to  control  and  regulate  the  traffic.  Necessarily 
these  discussions  are  not  to  be  repeated.  In  this  chapter  is 
discussed  not  so  much  the  power  to  regulate  as  the  extent  to 
which  the  power  in  particular  instances  has  been  carried — a 
construction  of  statutes  upon  the  subject ;  and  in  addition 
thereto  have  been  added  some  instances  not  easy  to  classify 
under  any  head. 

Sec.  214.     Statutory  requirements   as  to  location   of  bar- 
room. 

The  opposition  to  the  retail  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  has 
at  times  taken  on  almost  fantastic  rules  and  regulations. 
Thus,  in  some  instances,  statutes  have  required  the  removal 
of  all  tables  and  chairs  from  where  liquors  are  sold  for  con- 
sumption, while  other  States  require  all  liquors  to  be 
served  at  tables  where  the  consumer  can  be  seated  thereat 
while  drinking  the  liquor  he  has  purchased.  In  the  history  of 
the  temperance  movement  statutes  have  required  all  evidence  of 
drinking  to  be  screened  from  the  public,  so  there  would  ^e  as 
little  allurement  or  enticement  held  out  to  the  youth  as  pos- 
sible, and  where  the  evidence  of  drinking  would  not  be 
flaunted  in  the  face  of  the  public.  Then  statutes  have  been 
enacted  forbidding  sales  of  liquor  to  be  consumed  on  the 
premises  where  sold.  All  these  statutes  are  simply  expressions 
of  opinions  concerning  what  measures  tend  to  suppress  intem- 
perance and  are  evidences  of  efforts  in  that  direction.  By  com- 
pelling the  sale  of  liquors  in  the  open  view  it  is  the  belief  of 
many  that,  owing  to  the  public  obloquy  cast  upon  the  use 
of  intoxicating  liquors,  men  would  refrain  from  drinking  in- 
toxicating liquors  in  view  of  the  public,  and  not  being  able  to 
procure  it  elsewhere  by  the  drink  would,  in  a  large  measure,  at 
least,  refrain  from  its  use.  AVith  this  end  in  view  statutes 
have  been  enacted  compelling  the  location  of  saloons  on  the 


341  REGULATING    LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  214 

public  streets  with  the  entrance  opening  thereon,  and  even 
forbidding,  in  a  few  States,  any  other  entrance,  And  they 
often  require  the  view  of  the  saloon  to  be  unobstructed,  at 
least  during  the  time  liquors  may  not  be  sold.  In  the  latter 
instance  the  object  is  to  prevent  violations  of  the  law,  and  if 
such  violations  do  occur,  then  to  render  them  easy  of  detection. 
Thus,  a  statute  of  Iowa  required  liquors  to  be  sold  in  "a 
single  room  having  but  one  entrance  or  exit,  and  that  opening 
upon  a  public  business  street."  While  it  was  in  force  a 
saloon  had  one  entrance  opening  into  the  street  and  another 
opening  into  an  office,  and  this  office  had  an  exit  upon  another 
street.  It  was  held  that  this  was  not  a  compliance  with  its 
provisions.^  In  that  same  State  the  "mulct"  law  required  the 
liquor  traffic  to  be  conducted  in  a  single  room  opening  into 
the  street  and  the  bar  to  be  established  ' '  in  plain  view  of  the 
street,"  unobstructed  in  any  way;  and  it  was  held  that  a 
saloon  located  in  a  basement,  with  the  bar  thirty-five  feet  from 
the  sidewalk,  having  the  tops  of  its  windows  but  four  feet 
above  such  walk,  was  a  violation  of  that  law.^  So  sales  in  a 
small  room,  cut  off  from  the  barroom  by  a  partition,  in  which  is 
kept  food  from  which  to  supply  lunches  to  customers  of  the 
barroom,  is  not  permitted  by  this  statute ; ""  and  so  is  the  use 
of  a  cellar,  though  having  an  entrance  from  the  street,  in 
which  to  store  beer,  when  used  in  connection  with  the  bar- 
room.* But  the  statute  has  no  relation  to  a  brewery  which 
operates  a  saloon  in  connection  therewith,  though  the  saloon 
be  a  nuisance  in  law.^  This  Iowa  law  forbids  all  connection 
of  the  saloon  with  other  rooms  in  the  building,  and  a  con- 
nection with  a  cellar  below  it  is  prohibited."  In  that  State, 
where  the  saloon  was  located  in  a  basement,  reached  by  a 

1  Ritchie  v.  Zalesky,  98  Iowa  *  Garrett  v.  Bishop,  supra ; 
689;  67  N.  W.  399;  Schlosser  v.  State  v.  Bussannis,  108  Iowa  11; 
Mould    (Iowa),   121   N.   W.  520.  78  N.  W.   700;   Bartel   v.  Hobson, 

2  McColl  V.  Rally,  127  Iowa  633;  107  Iowa  €44;  78  N.  W.  689. 

103  K  W.  972.  -I  Orke  v.  McManiis   (Iowa),   115 

3  Garrett    v.    Bishop,    113    Iowa       N.    \V.    580. 

23;  '84  N.   W.  923;    State  v.   Bus-  "Jones    v.    Byiujrtou,    128    Iowa 

samus,    108    Iowa    11;    78    N.    W.       397;   104  N.  W.  473. 
700;     State    v.    Kline,    107    Minn. 
1S4;    119  N.W.  656    (wine  stalls). 


§  214  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  342 

long  passage  way  from  the  street,  it  was  held  not  to  comply 
with  the  statute.'^  Even  where  beer  was  kept  in  a  cold  storage 
warehouse  several  blocks  away  and  removed  to  the  saloon  as 
needed,  it  was  held  to  be  a  violation  of  the  statute,  the  traffic 
not  being  conducted  "in  a  single  room."'*  But  where  a 
statute  made  it  unlawful  to  keep  liquor  at  one's  place  of 
business,  the  keeping  of  liquor  in  a  room  used  solely  for 
storage,  which  is  locked  and  only  opened  when,  liquors  are  to 
be  taken  out,  to  which  the  public  is  not  invited  and  where  no 
business  is  transacted,  is  not  a  violation  of  its  provisions,  for 
a  place  of  business  within  the  meaning  of  such  statute  is  a 
public  place  of  business  in  contradistinction  to  a  private  place 
of  business.  In  such  an  instance  the  w-ord  "business"  is  not 
synonymous  with  the  employment,  vocation,  or  even  occupa- 
tion, but  is  used  in  the  sense  of  trade,  commerce  or  traffic.** 
So  where  saloon  keepers  were  forbidden  to  construct  any  booth, 
stall  or  enclosure  of  any  kind  in  connection  with  their  saloons, 
enclosures  used  for  secret  lounging,  drinking  and  immoral 
practices  were  illegal,  though  others  connected  therewith  were 
innocently  maintained  and  necessary.^"  A  statute  requiring  a 
saloon  to  be  located  on  the  irround  floor,  and  front  on  a  public 
street,  provided  with  windows  or  glass  doors,  does  not  apply 
to  a  cold  storage  warehouse  from  which  liquors  are  sold  in 
wholesale  nuantities  and  not  for  consumption  there."  A 
statute  of  this  kind  applies  to  persons  who  obtained  their 
licenses  before  it  was  adopted.^-  Thoush  the  statute  requires 
the  applicant  to  distinctly  give  a  description  where  the  saloon 
is  to  be  located  for  which  he  applies  for  a  license,  and  the 
licensing  board  can  orlv  issue  a  license  for  the  place  described 

7  McColl  V.  Rally,  127  Iowa,  633;  v.  Slentz,  27  Ind.  App.  557;  61 
103  N.  W.  972.  N.    E.    793;     Slentz    v.    State,    27 

8  Bell  V.  Hamm,   127  Iowa  343;        Ind.  App.  956;   <51  N.  E.  956. 

101  N.  W.  475.  (These  last  two  cases  are  on  the 

9  Roberts  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  sufliciency  of  an  indictment  un- 
207;  CO  S.  E.   1082.  der  the  statute  referred  to.) 

10  State  V.  Barge,  82  Minn.  256;  12  Nelson  v.  State,  17  Ind.  App. 
84  N.  W.  911;  State  v.  Kline,  403;  46  N.  E.  941.  See  also  Peo- 
107  Minn.   184;    119  N.  W.  656.           pie  v.   White,   127   Mich.   428;    86 

iiTeegarden  v.  State,  39  Ind.  N.  W.  992;  8  Detroit  Leg.  N.  397. 
App.  15;  79  N.  E.  211.     See  State 


343  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  215 

in  such  application,  yet  their  action  in  granting  the  license  is 
not  an  adjudication  that  the  room  licensed  complies  with  the 
statute;  and  if  it  does  not,  and  the  licensee  conducts  a  liquor 
business  therein,  he  may  be  prosecuted. '=*  Under  such  a 
statute  a  room  situated  in  a  hotel  back  of  the  cloak  room  is  a 
violation  of  its  provisions,  though  it  had  long  been  maintained 
there.'^  Where  a  statute  required  a  retailer  of  liquors  to  pro- 
vide a  room  for  their  sale  separate  and  apart  from  any  other 
business  of  any  kind,  and  it  was  shown  that  the  accused  leased 
two  rooms,  in  one  of  which  he  had  his  bar,  the  other  one  he  sub- 
let to  his  barkeeper  for  a  card  and  pool  room,  in  which  the 
barkeeper  served  liquors  from  the  bar,  that  the  accused  paid 
the  light  and  water  bills  for  the  back  room,  owned  all  the 
furniture  in  it,  honored  checks  with  his  initials  on  them  given 
to  customers  of  the  pool  room  by  giving  liquor  in  exchange 
for  them  at  his  bar,  and  received  a  share  of  the  profits  arising 
from  the  operation  of  the  pool  room,  it  was  held  that  he  was 
interested  in  the  pool  room  and  had  violated  the  provisions  of 
the  statute  above  referred  to.^^ 

Sec.  215.    Arrangement  of  room. 

The  use  of  chairs  and  tables  in  a  barroom  or  saloon  may  be 
forbidden,  and  a  municipality  may  adopt  an  ordinance  to  this 
effect. ^°  So  the  State  may  forbid  lounging  places  or  wine 
rooms  connected  with  the  saloon  or  barroom.^"*  So  the  Legis- 
lature may  provide  that  liquor  shall  be  sold  only  in  a  single 

13  State  V.  Harrison,  162  Ind.  fill  them  from  another  room  where 
64*2;  70  N.  E.  877.  See  Gray  v.  it  is  stored  is  not  a  sale  "in  a 
'Commonwealth,  9  Dana  300;  35  single  room  having  but  one  en- 
Am.  Dec.   136.  trance   or   exit,   and   that  opening 

1*  People    V.    White,    127    Mich.  on   a   business   street,"   the   orders 

428;    816    N.    W.    992;    S    Detroit  being     delivered     in     the     saloons 

Leg.  N.   397;    Schlosser   v.   Mould  and    there    paid    for.      Battel    v. 

(Iowa),  121  N.  W.  520.  Hobson,  107  Iowa  644;   78   N.  W. 

In  Nova  Scotia  a  statute  of  this  689. 

kind   has  been   upheld.     Queen   v.  is  Brown  v.  Lutz,  36  Neb.  527; 

McDonald,  26  N.  S.  402.  54   N.  W.   860. 

15  Mason  V.  State,  170  Ind.  195;  lo* State      v.      Kline       (Iowa), 

83   N.   K.   613.  119  N.   W.  656. 

To  solicit  orders  in  saloons  and 


§  216  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  344 

room,  having  only  one  entrance  or  exit;  and  a  room  having 
a  front  entrance  and  also  a  back  door  unlocked,  three  feet 
above  the  ground,  with  no  steps  leading  up  to  it,  is  a  violation 
of  its  provisions.^^ 

Sec.  216.     Screens  or  curtains. 

A  statute  requiring  all  screens  and  blinds  to  be  removed  so 
that  there  may  be  an  unobstructed  view  of  the  bar  and  bar- 
room does  not  apply  to  wholesalers  but  only  to  retailers.^* 
Where  the  interior  of  the  room  can  only  be  seen  by  stooping 
down  and  peering  through  a  slot  blind,  the  statute  is  violated, 
for  the  statute  requires  a  clear  view  of  the  entire  interior  of 
the  room  without  making  unusual  efforts  to  obtain  it."  The 
statute  applies  to  Sundays  as  well  as  to  week  days;  -"  and  to 
common  vietualer's  licensed  to  sell  liquor.^^  But  if  a  liquor 
dealer  has  a  room  which  fronts  upon  two  streets,  and  he 
puts  a  partition  through  its  center  crosswise  so  as  to  make 
two  rooms,  one  fronting  on  each  street,  and  then  obtains  a 
license  for  each  room,  he  is  not  required  to  remove  such 
partition  on  the  theory  that  the  view  of  both  places  must  be 
from  both  streets.-"  The  entire  premises  must  be  kept  open  to 
view,  not  merely  the  place  where  sales  are  made.^^  If  screens 
be  up  the  offense  is  committed,  though  no  police  officer  has 

Instate    V.    Roney,      133     Iowa  Smith,  145  Mich.  530;   108  N.  W. 

416;    110  X.  W.  604.  1072;    13   Det.   L.   X.  651. 

isRitcliie    v.    Zalesky,   98    Iowa  21  Commonwealth      v.      Salmon, 

589;    67    X.    W.    399;     Queen    v.  136   Mass.   431. 

Power,    -28    Xov.    Sco.    373     (stat-  22  Commonwealth      v.       Barnes, 

ute   valid).  140  Mass.  447;   5  N.  E.  252;  Com- 

19  Commonwealth  v.  Costello,  monwealth  v.  Sansville,  140 
133    Mass.    192.  Mass.  450;    5   X.   E.  254. 

An  employe  does  not  violate  the  23  .Commonwealth   v.    Worcester, 

statute     where     he     has     nothing  141  Mass.  58;  6  N.  E.  700;   Com- 

whatever    to    do   with    placing   or  monwealth    v.    Kane,     143    Mass. 

maintaining    the    screens.      In    re  92;  8  X.  E.  880;   Xelson  v.  State, 

Adamek    (Xeb.),  118  X.  W.  109.  17   Ind.  App.   403;    46  X.  E.  941; 

20  Commonwealth  v.  Auberton  Componovo  v.  .State,  (Tex.  Cr. 
133  Mass.  404;  Commonwealth  v.  App.);  39  S.  W.  1114;  X^elson 
Casey,   134  Mass.    194;    People  v.  v.  State,  17  Ind.  App.  403;   46  N. 

E.  941. 


345 


REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  216 


ordered  them  taken  down  or  notified  the  saloon  keeper  they 
were  so  kept  up  as  to  violate  the  hiw.-*  Curtains  that  so 
obscure  the  room  that  it  cannot  be  seen  from  the  outside  how 
the  business  is  conducted,  is  a  violation  of  the  statute,  although 
other  parts  of  the  room  can  be  plainly  seen ;  and  it  is  im- 
material for  what  purpose  the  curtains  are  maintained.-"'  The 
maintenance  of  a  painted  glass  window  is  a  screen  if  it  ob- 
scures the  view  of  the  interior ;  -"  but  the  closing  of  one 
shutter  to  a  window,  if  another  window  affords  a  view  of  the 
entire  room,  is  not  an  offense.-^  In  Massachusetts  it  is  held 
that  the  statute  applies  to  a  druggist  selling  liquors."**  The 
running  of  a  partition  through  the  licensed  room  and  using 
the  part  cut  off  for  another  purpose,  is  not  a  violation  of  the 
law  if  the  part  in  which  liquor  is  sold  is  open  to  the  view  of 
the  public.-^  In  proving  the  offense,  where  tlie  statute  re- 
quires the  barroom  to  be  open  to  the  public  from  the  street  or 
alley,  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  the  street  or  alley  had 
been  dedicated  to  the  public ;  it  is  sufficient  to  show  that  it 
was  open  to  the  use  of  the  public.""  If  the  licensee's  servant 
place  a  screen  so  as  to  hide  the  barroom,  the  licensee  will  be 
liable  for  his  act.^^  It  is  immaterial  to  the  commission  of  the 
offense  that  the  licensee  is  not,  in  fact,  carrying  on  the  liquor 
traffic  when  the  screens  are  up ;  ^-  and  one  not  licensed  may 
commit  the  offense/''^     It  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury 

2*  Commonwealtli  V.  Roiislio,  141  tk)u<j1i,    150   [Mass.    504;    23   N.   E. 

Mass.  321;   6  X.  E.   383.  112. 

25  Commonwealth  v.   Moore,    145  2.s  Commonwoaltli     v.     Brothers, 
Mass.    244;     13    N.    E.    893;    Com-  158  Mass.  200;    33  N.  E.  38G. 
monwealth    v.     Kane,     143     Mass.  9  State  v.  Andrews,  82  Tex.  73; 
92;  8  N.  E.  880;   People  v.  Smith,  18    S.    W.    554;    Shultz     v.     Cam- 
145   Mich.   530;    108   N.   W.    1072;  bridge,   38    Ohio   St.    G59. 

13  Det.  L.   N.  561.  so  People  v.  Kennedy,  105  Mich. 

A    movable    screen    sufficient    to  75;    62   N.   W.    1020. 

obstruct    a    view    of    the    interior  3i  Commonwealtli   v.  Kellcy,   140 

through   the  door   or   window  is  a  Mass.  441;    5  X.  E.  834. 

violation   of   the    statute.      Woods  32  Commonwealth   v.   Casey,    134 

V.  Varley  (Neb.),  118  N.  W.  1114;  Mass.   194. 

Woods  V.  Kirvohlavek   (Xeb.),  118  33  Commonwcallli  v.  Salmon,  136 

N.   W.    1115.  Mass.  431. 

26  Commonwealth     v.     Sawtelle,  As   to   roar   door,   see   Commoii- 
150  Mass.  3-20;   27  N.  E.  54.  wealth   v.   Ferder,    141    Mass.   28; 

27  Commonwealth      v.      McDon-  6  N.  E.  239. 


§  216  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  346 

whether  or  not  the  screen  or  obstruction  prevents  the  proper 
view  of  the  barroom  wdthin  the  meaning  of  the  law.^*  Where 
a  statute  required  the  barroom  to  "be  so  arranged,  either 
with  a  window  or  glass  door,  as  that  the  whole  of  said  bar- 
room may  be  in  view  from  the  street  or  highway,  and  no 
blinds,  screens  or  obstructions  to  the  view"  shall  "be  ar- 
ranged, erected  or  placed  so  as  to  prevent  the  entire  view  of 
said  room  from  the  street  or  highway  upon  which  the"  bar- 
room was  situated  during  the  "days  and  hours  when  the  sales" 
of  liquor  were  prohibited  by  law,  it  was  said :  "To  obstruct 
the  view  at  certain  times  into  such  a  room  so  situated  and 
arranged  is  an  offense.  The  offense  consists  in  obstructing  the 
view  into  a  room  located  and  arranged  as  the  law  requires,  not 
in  obstruction  of  the  view  into  any  kind  of  a  room  where 
liquors  might  be  kept  and  sold.  Sales  can  be  lawfully  made 
only  in  such  a  room  as  the  law  designates.  Obstructing  the 
view  at  certain  times  into  such  a  room  constitutes  the  of- 
fense. ' '  "^  Where  a  barroom  located  back  of  the  cloak  room 
of  a  hotel  so  it  could  not  be  seen  had  been  used  ten  years 
before  the  statutes  on  screens  were  enacted,  it  was  held  that 
its  use  thereafter  was  a  violation  of  the  statute.^®  Such  a 
statute  includes  a  barroom  used  as  an  hotel  oi^ice.^^  The  use 
of  an  ell,  the  interior  of  which  is  not  visible  from  the  street,  is 
not  the  maintenance  of  a  screen  nor  a  device  for  the  obstruc- 
tion of  the  view  of  the  barroom."^     It  is  a  question  for  the 

34  People  V.  Lacy,  124  Mich.  As  to  what  constitutes  an  ob- 
180;  82  X.  W.  826;  Common-  struction  to  the  view  or  screen, 
wealth  V.  McDonnough,  150  Mass.  see  Lingelbach  v.  Hobson  (Iowa), 
504;   23   X.  E.   112.  107       X.      W.       108;       State      v. 

35  State  V.  Slentz,  27  Ind.  App.  Mathis,  18  Ind.  App.  -608;  48  X. 
659;  61  X.  E.  793;  Slentz  v.  State,  E.  645;  MeColl  v.  Rally,  127  Iowa 
27   Ind.  App.  700;    61   X.   E.  956.  633;     103    X.    W.    972,    and    what 

36  People  V.  White,  127  Mich.  not,  see  Plass  v.  Clark,  71  N.  Y. 
428;  86  X.  W.  992;  8  Detroit  App.  Div.  488;  76  X.  Y.  Supp.  2. 
Leg.  X.   397.  Charging  the  ofTense  in  the  lan- 

37  People  V.  Carroll,  118  Mich.  giiage  of  the  statute  is  usually 
79;   76  X.  W.   US.  sufficient.      People    v.   Smith,    145 

3S  State    V.    W.    J.    Langran    &       Mich.    530;    108   X.    VV.    1072;    13 
Co.    (Tex.  Civ.   App.),   87    S.   W.       Dut.  L.  N.  651. 
713. 


347  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §§  217-221 

jury  whether  the  alleged  screen  was  an  obstruction  of  the  view 
of  the  saloon  interior,^® 

Sec.  217.     Removal  of  saloon. 

Where  a  saloon  is  not  licensed  for  a  particular  location,  but 
the  license  is  a  permit  to  keep  a  saloon  in  a  particular  district, 
a  city  or  license  officials  cannot  prohibit  its  removal  fror-  one 
location  to  another,  nor  make  it  necessary  to  first  secure  per- 
rais?;ion  from  some  official  for  \l:s  removal.*" 

Sec.  218.    Keeping-  more  than  one  bar — Barroom. 

A  statute  forbidding  any  one  person  to  keep  more  than  one 
bar  is  not  violated  by  keeping  an  additional  temporary  bar  in 
a  hotel  for  one  day.  So  a  temporary  bar  so  used  in  the  hotel 
hall  adjoining  the  regular  bar  does  not  constitute  the  hall  a 
barroom.*^ 

Sec.  219.    More  than  one  license. 

It  is  a  valid  police  regulation  for  the  Legislature  to  endow 
a  local  licensing  board  with  power  to  grant  more  than  one 
license  to  the  same  person  for  separate  and  distinct  places  for 
the  sale  of  liquors.*- 

Sec.  220.    Beneficial  interest  in  more  than  one  license. 

A  statute  forbade  anyone  to  have  "a  benficial  interest  in 
more  than  one  license."  "While  it  was  in  force  A  sold  a  public 
house  to  B,  but  the  license  was  not  transferred  to  B  as  it 
might  be.  In  the  meantime  A  bought  a  public  house  from  C, 
but  in  this  case  the  license  was  also  not  transferred.  It  was 
held  that  A  did  not  have  a  "beneficial  interest  in  more  than 
one  license"  as  the  statvite  forbade.*^ 

Sec.  221.    Lamp  burning  until  closing  time. 

Where  a  statute  required  a  lamp  to  be  kept  burning  in 
a  saloon  until  closing  time,  it  was  held  that  it  meant  until  the 

39  Commonwealth  v.  Aubeiton,  42  Jn  re  Pittsburg  Brewing  Co., 
133  Mass.   404.                                           1«   Pa.   Super.   Ct.    Ap.   21.5. 

40  Jn  re  Brodie,  38  Up.  Can.  &80.  43  Regina    v.    O'Meai-e,    14   Vict. 
4iKing    V.    Lewis,    10    Can.    Cr.      L.  R.   516. 

C^.   184. 


§§  222-224         TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  348 

saloon  actually  closed  and  not  until  the  law  required  it  to  be 
closed.** 

Sec.  222.    Keeping  door  locked. 

A  statute  of  Australia  required  the  bar  door  of  a  public 
house  to  be  "locked"  during  the  time  liquors  could  not  be  sold. 
It  was  held  that  this  required  the  door  to  be  securely  fastened ; 
and  where  a  door  without  a  handle  could  be  opened  by  a  half 
turn  of  the  key  when  it  was  in  the  lock,  the  key  thus  serving 
the  purpose  of  a  handle,  the  door  was  not  locked  as  long  as  the 
key  was  in  the  loek.*^ 

Sec.  223.    List  of  employes. 

The  Iowa  Code  *^*  requires  a  person  operating  a  saloon  to 
file  with  the  county  auditor  a  list  of  the  names  of  all  persons 
he  employs  about  the  place.  In  the  construction  of  this 
statute,  however,  it  was  held  that  if  he  employed  no  person 
about  the  place,  but  conducted  the  saloon  himself,  then  he  need 
not  file  such  a  list  nor  make  any  report  concerning  the  matter 
whatever.*"  But  this  statute  requires  the  proprietor  of  a 
saloon  to  list  the  name  of  his  son,  if  he  permits  him  to  sell 
liquors  for  him.*^  This  statute  applies  to  any  persons  em- 
ployed about  the  saloon  for  any  purposes  whatsoever.** 

Sec.  224.     Music  in  saloon. 

Many  statutes  prohibit  music  in  saloons,  and  make  it  an 
offense  to  permit  it  therein.  In  an  instance  of  this  kind  the 
evidence  showed  that  the  music  was  in  a  room  in  the  rear  of 
the  barroom.  This  room  was  used  for  the  accommodation  of 
the  saloon  keeper's  customers.  It  was  separated  from  the 
barroom  by  a  thin  board  partition  with  door  openings.  It 
was  held  that  the  court  was  justified  in  saying  to  the  jury 

**  Rex.     V.     Hammerschlag.     21  46  Jones     v.     Mould,     138     Iowa 

Juta   3fl0.  mS;    116   N.   W.   73.3. 

45  Graham  v.  Gubbins,  20  Aust.  *"!  Jones  v.   Byington,   128   Iowa 

L.   T.    181;    11   Aust.   L.   R.   81.  397:   109  N.  W.  473. 

45*  §  244^,  Subd.  4.  *8  Pumphrey        v.        Aanderson 

(Iowa),  119  S.  W.  617. 


349  REGULATING    LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  225 

that  the  room  so  cut  off  by  the  partition  was  used  by  the  de- 
fendant in  connection  with  his  barroom,  and  it  constituted 
and  was  a  part  of  the  saloon/"  TUit  a  statute  which  forbids 
a  saloon  keeper  to  keep  on  exhibition  or  suffer  to  be  kept  on 
exhibition  in  bis  saloon  a  musical  instrument  for  the  purpose 
of  performing  or  having  it  performed  upon  in  his  saloon,  does 
not  apply  to  a  musical  instrument  that  is  run  l)y  machinery 
which  is  started  by  dropping  a  coin  into  it.  The  instrument 
such  a  statute  forbids  is  one  that  the  saloon  keeper  himself 
performs  upon,  or  engages  some  one  else  to  perform  upon  it.''" 

Sec.  225.     Obstructing  officer's  entrance  on  premises. 

An  English  statute  makes  it  an  offense  for  any  person,  by 
himself  or  by  any  person  in  his  employ  or  acting  by  his 
direction  or  with  his  consent,  to  refuse  or  fail  to  admit  any 
constable  in  the  execution  of  his  duty  demanding  to  enter 
at  any  time  the  saloon  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  or  de- 
tecting the  violation  of  the  liquor  licensing  act.^^  Any  person 
who,  by  himself,  or  by  any  person  in  his  employ  or  acting  by 
his  direction  or  with  his  consent,  refuses  or  fails  to  admit  any 
constable  in  the  execution  of  his  duty  demanding  to  enter  in 
pursuance  of  this  statute  is  liable  to  a  penalty.  Under  this 
statute  it  is  said  that  the  constable  is  not  bound  to 
give  special  reasons  to  the  licensed  person  before  entering 
the  licensed  premises,  yet  in  case  of  a  dispute  as  to 
the  right  of  entry  he  will  not  be  justified,  without  be- 
ing able  to  show  some  reasonable  ground  to  the  court 
for  thinking  that  the  statute  was  about  to  be  or  had  been 
violated.  To  prove  the  offense  of  refusing  admission  the  con- 
stable  must   allege    and   prove   some    reasonable    ground   for 

49  State    V.    Barnett,     110     Mo.  of  preventing  the  use  of  such   in- 

App.  •5'84;  85  S.  W.  615.     In  this  struments.      See   Bearley    v.   Mor- 

case    the    saloon    keeper    testified  ley  [I'SOO],  2  Q.  B.  121;  '63  J.  P. 

that  he   had   instructed   his    clerk  582;    68  L.   J.  Q.   B.   722;    47    VV. 

not     to     permit     musical     instru-  R.  474;    15  T.  L.  R.  39^. 

ments  to  be  kept  or   used  on  the  r>o  Febur    Sterlin<j   Music   Co.   v. 

premises;     but    it    was    held    that  Weizz,    121    Pac.    1099. 

this  was  no  defense  unless  he  did  si  37  and  38  Vict,  c.  49,  §  16. 
so  in  good  faith  for  the  purpose 


§  225  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  350 

entering.  If,  however,  the  constable  says  he  wants  to  see  if 
there  was  anything  wrong  in  the  house,  as  he  was  going  a 
round  of  visiting  all  the  licensed  houses,  this  will  be  deemed  a 
sufficient  reason  for  demanding  entry.^-  If  he  is  unable  to 
give  any  sufficient  reason  he  may  properly  be  excluded.^'' 
Accordingly,  where  a  publican  let  a  room  to  a  society  known 
as  the  Royal  Antediluvian  Order  of  Buffaloes,  and  a  con- 
stable, without  stating  any  reason,  demanded  admission  to  the 
room  whilst  a  meeting  was  taking  place,  it  was  held  that  he 
was  properly  refused.^*  There  is  no  limit  as  to  the  hour  of 
demanding  admission,  but  the  court  will  always  consider 
whether  the  time  was  reasonable.  Where  a  constable  had 
visited  C's  house  twenty  minutes  previously,  but  hearing  a 
noise  again  demanded  an  entry,  and  C's  wife  being  at  the 
door  and  saying  he  should  not  get  in  till  he  had  heard  her 
opinion  of  him,  yet  after  some  abuse  he  was  allowed  to  go  in, 
the  husband,  C,  knowing  nothing  of  what  had  taken  place 
outside,  it  was  held  that  this  was  no  evidence  that  C  had 
refused  admittance  as  he  was  not  bound  by  the  acts  of  his 
wife.^'^  Where  the  appellant  was  licensed  to  sell  beer  "by 
retail  in  order  that  it  may  be  consumed  in  the  said  dwelling 
house  of  the  said  T,  and  in  the  premises  thereunto  belonging," 
it  was  held  that  the  license  included  an  outhouse  though  only 
used  as  a  cellar.^®  A  constable  is  not  entitled  to  admission  to 
a  private  room  upon  the  ground-that  he  desires  to  prevent  or 
detect  offenses.^^  In  Nova  Scotia,  a  statute  authorized  a 
policeman  to  enter  a  house  at  any  time  where  liquors  were 
reputed  to  be  sold,  or  M^here  he  believed  liquors  were  kept 
for  sale  or  disposal  contrary  to  law.    It  was  held  that  he  could 

52  Regina   v.    Dobbins,    48    J.   P.  occupied    a    private    room    refused 
182.  admission. 

53  Duncan    v.    Dowding    [1897],  55  Caswell     v.     Hundred     House 
1   Q.  B.  575;   61  J.  P.  2S0;   66  L.  J.  J.,  54  J.  P.  87. 

J.    Q.    B.    363 ;    76   L.   T.    294 ;    45  5g  Regina  v.  Tott,  25  J.  P.  327 ; 

W.   R.   383;    13   T.   L.   R.   290;    18  30  L.  J.  M.   C.   177;    4  L.  T.  306; 

Cox  C.  C.  527.  9  W.  R.   663. 

54  Duncan  v.  Dowding,  supra.  57  Duncan  v.  Dowding,   66  L.  J. 
The  question  was  raised,  but  not  Q.  B.  369   [1893]    1  Q.  B.  675;   76 

decided,  whether  a  publican  could  Lt.  294;  45  VV.  R.  383;  18  Cox 
be  convicted  because  a  guest  who       C.   C.  527;    61   J.  P.  280, 


351  REGULATING    LIQUOR    TR<VFFIC.  §  225 

not  enter  late  at  night  on  merely  seeing  a  light  burning  and 
hearing  voices  inside  the  house,  there  being  no  evidence  of 
disorder,  when  he  had  no  reason  for  his  suspicions  except 
information  from  a  person  some  days  previously  that  liquors 
were  being  sold  there."**  An  honest  refusal  to  admit  a  con- 
stable into  a  hotel  bar  cannot  be  construed  into  a  willful  delay 
of  admittance.^''  Only  a  person  who  has  the  legal  right  to  give 
or  not  give  admission  can  be  charged  Avith  the  offense  of 
delaying  admission  to  a  saloon  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute 
making  it  an  offense  to  delay  an  officer's  admission  to  a  place 
licensed  to  sell  liquors.'''^  An  officer  had  watched  a  number  of 
persons  entering  a  hotel  on  Sunday,  and  upon  going  in  he 
found  the  door  leading  to  the  bar  locked,  and  was  told  the 
defendant  was  upstairs.  Upon  the  defendant  coming  doAvn, 
the  officer  asked  him  to  open  the  door  leading  to  the  bar  but 
the  defendant  refused,  saying  he  would  be  liable  to  a  fine  if 
he  did  so;  that  the  keys  were  upstairs,  and  the  officer,  if  he 
pleased,  might  open  it.  The  offer  was  not  accepted  by  the 
officer.  The  defendenl  bona  fide  believed  that  he  was  not 
allowed  to  open  the  door  on  Sunday.  It  was  held  that  he  was 
not  guilty  of  a  willful  delay  in  opening  the  door."^  A  person 
who  is  apparently  assisting  in  conducting  the  business  of  a 
licensed  victualer  may,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  he  does 
not  act  in  that  capacity,  be  convicted  of  willfully  delaying 
admission  to  the  licensed  premises."^ 

58  White  V.  Beckham,  26  N.  S.  a  drunken  policeman  making 
50.  an       unprovoked       attack       upon 

59  Thomas  v.  Ivey,  12  Austr.  L.  him  is  not  guilty  of  the  offense 
T.  100 ;  Buttons  v.  Justice,  16  of  resisting  an  officer.  Uniteff 
Vict.  L.  R.  <K>4;  12  Austr.  L.  T.  States  v.  Fortin,  1  Phillipine  299. 
83.  In   New    York   when    the    outer 

60  Ellis  V.  Dempster,  12  Austr.  door  of  a  hotel  is  open  a  police 
L.  T.  216.  officer  maj^  go  into  every  part  of 

61  Buttons  V.  Justices,  16  Vict.  the  hotel  to  search  for  violators 
L.   R.  604;    12  Austr.  L.  T.   83.  of  the  law,  and  forcible  exclusion 

62  Devine  v.  O.  Sullivan,  23  from  any  room  in  it  constitutes 
Vict.  L.  R.  75;  19  Austr.  L.  T.  3;  resistance  to  an  officer.  People  v. 
3    Austr.    L.    R.    (C.    N.)    33.  Miller,  79  N.  Y.  St.   1122. 

One  who  throw^s  to  the  ground 


§§  226-228         TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  352 

Sec.  226.    Display  of  license. 

If  a  statute  requires  a  dealer  to  post  up  in  a  conspicuous 
place  in  his  saloon  his  license,  a  failure  to  do  so  will  render 
him  liable;  ana  there  must  be  a  substantial  compliance  with 
its  provisions  and  not  a  posting  up  where  it  will  be  difficult 
to  see  it.  The  object  of  such  a  statute  is  twofold:  one,  that 
the  officers  of  the  law  ma3^  easily  ascertain  whether  or  not  the 
liquor  dealer  is  selling  liquor  in  violation  of  the  law;  and  the 
other,  that  his  would-be  customers  may  ascertain  if  they  are 
assisting  him  in  its  violation  by  purchasing  liquors  from  him.®^ 
"Where  a  statute  required  a  license  to  be  displayed  in  a  window 
facing  the  street  from  which  a  door  was  opened  into  a  room  in 
which  liquors  were  sold,  it  was  held  that  it  was  violated  by 
placing  it  on  a  wall  in  the  room,  though  it  could  be  plainly 
seen  thereon  through  a  portion  of  the  window  not  covered  by 
the  window  curtain.®* 

Sec.  227.    Signs. 

A  statute  forbade  the  use  of  a  sign  for  a  saloon  where  none 
was  situated,  and  a  licensed  dealer  on  the  expiration  of  his 
license  took  out  a  license  for  a  temperance  hotel,  but  left  his 
saloon  sign  up,  reading,  "North  California  Hotel,  Joseph 
Loiseau, "  taking  away  that  part  of  the  sign  indicating  that 
he  had  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors.  It  was  held  that 
he  had  not  violated  the  statute  by  maintaining  an  improper 
sign.**^ 

Sec.  228.     Sale  in  unmarked  measure. 

In  England  liquor  sold  at  retail  and  not  in  a  cask  or 
bottle  in  a  quantity  of  a  half  pint  or  over  must  be  sold  "in 
measures  marked  according  to  the  imperial  standards,"  and  if 
the  sale  be  made  in  an  unmarked  measure  a  penalty  is  in- 
curred and  the  measure  liable  to  forfeiture. "*'•  In  construing 
this  statute  it  is  said  by  an  acknowledged  authority :  ®^  "  The 
penalty  in  this  section  is  incurred  only  by  the  person  who  sells 

es  Schwartz  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  Leg.   139.     See  King  v.  Orland,  8 

Rep.  387;  24  S.  W.  28.  Cr.  Can.  Cas.  208. 

84 /n     re     Chapman      (N.     Y.),  0035  and   36  Vict.  c.   94,   §8. 

119  N.  Y.  Snpp.  352.  C7  Patterson's      Licensing      Acts 

esCarpeau   v.   Loiseau,    12   Rev.  (19  ed.),  p.   355. 


353  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  228 

or  suffers  his  servants  to  sell  and  act  in  contravention  of  the 
section.  There  may  be  cases  where  the  keeper  of  the  house 
shows  successfully  that  he  did  not  suffer  his  servants  to  sell 
in  measures  not  marked,  as  where  the  servant  has,  in  disregard 
of  his  order,  so  sold.  This  penalty  will  apply  to  unlicensed 
as  well  as  licensed  persons  selling,  and  is  a  cumulative  pen- 
alty. A  publican  who  uses  earthen  mugs,  and  serves  cus- 
tomers with  them,  impliedly  represents  them  to  be  of  imperial 
measure,  and  if  they  are  unstamped  they  will  be  liable  to 
seizure.*"*  It  has  been  held  that  if  a  customer  asks  for  a  quan- 
tity of  liquor,  not  under  any  usual  denomination  of  imperial 
capacity,  but  by  some  local  name,  and  the  quantity  supplied 
equals  or  exceeds  half  a  pint,  as,  for  example,  a  'blue  of  beer,' 
which  is  about  one-third  of  a  quart,  the  seller  is  liable  under 
this  section."  "^  "A  man  asked  for  a  'schooner'  of  beer  at  a 
public  house,  a  schooner  being  a  glass  tumbler  capable  of  hold- 
ing about  a  third  of  a  quart.  He  was  supplied  with  one  filled 
from  the  counter  pump,  and  paid  2  d.  It  was  held  by  the 
Court  of  Justiciary  in  Scotland  that  he  [the  seller]  had 
contravened  an  enactment  corresponding  to  Section  8.  ™  But 
where  the  customer  asks  for  a  glass  of  beer  or  other  quantity 
which  is  not  a  known  legal  measure  of  capacity,  and  which 
does  not  exceed  or  equal  half  a  pint,  then  no  offense  will  be 
committed  by  the  seller,  whatever  may  be  the  capacity  of  the 
glass."''      "In   Addy   v.    Blake,"    B    went   into    a   licensed 

68  Citing  Regina  v.  Aulton,  30  than  half  a  pint,  in  measures 
L.  J.  M.  C.  129;  25  J.  P.  69;  3  marked  according  to  imperial 
E.  &  E.  508;  3  L.  T.  699;  9  standards.  That  is  general  and 
W.  R.  278;  16  Cox  C.  C.  259;  imperative."  /6jd.,  per  Hawkins,  J. 
Washington  v.  Young,  19  L.  J.  ^o  Set  forth  at  the  beginning  of 
Exch.  348;   5  Exch.  403.  this    section.      Citing    Riddell    v. 

69  "Notwithstanding  the  Weights  Neilson,  5  F.    (J.  C.)    57. 

and  Measures  Act  [1878]    (41  and  7i  Citing    Craig    v.    MePhee,    10 

42    Vict.    c.     49),    §22."      Citing  €t.  Sess.  Cas.   (4th  series)    51;  48 

Payne  v.  Thomas,  60  L.  J.  M.  C.  J.  P.   115.     "It  is  under  this  sec- 

3;    '53   J.    P.   824;    63   L.    T.    456;  tion    a    person    may    be    convicted 

17  Cox  €.  C.  212;   39  W.  R.  240.  for    selling    by    the    'long    pull.'* 

"The     language     of      §8      [above  Patterson's    Licensing    Act     (19th 

quoted  in  part]  is  that  every  per-  Ed.),  p.  356. 

son   shall    sell   all   liquors,   if   not  "19  Q.   B.   Div.  478;   51   J.  P. 

in   cask   or   bottle,   or   if   not   less  599;  56  L.  T.  711;  35  W.  R.  710. 


§  229  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  354 

house  of  A  and  asked  for  a  pint  of  beer.  A  went  into  the 
back  parlors,  poured  the  liquor  into  a  stamped  measure  not 
seen  by  B,  and  then  into  a  jug,  and  delivered  the  jug  to  B, 
and  the  court  held  that  this  was  not  a  selling  by  imperial 
measure,  as  the  measure  was  not  seen  by  B,  and,  therefore, 
A  had  committed  the  offense  under  this  section.  Smith,  J., 
said :  '  What  was  done  did  not  amount  to  a  sale  in  a  stamped 
measure,  which  is  the  obvious  requirement  of  Section  8.' 
Wills,  J.,  said:  'The  beer  was  sold  when  it  was  placed  before 
the  customer  and  not  till  then.'  "  ^^  Where  a  pint  was  asked 
for,  and  a  marked  vessel  filled  with  beer  and  then  poured  into 
the  customer's  jug,  and  then  one  gill  more  was  pumped  into 
it  as  a  "long  pull,"  and  then  the  jug  handed  to  the  purchaser, 
it  was  held  that  the  seller  was  not  guilty  of  selling  in  an  un- 
marked measure."^ 

Sec.  229.    Registration  of  sales. 

In  a  very  few  States  statutes  have  been  enacted  requiring 
the  registration  of  sales  and  also  requiring  reports  to  be  made 
at  certain  times  to  designated  officers.  In  Iowa,  the  statute 
required  those  reports  to  be  made  "on  the  last  Saturday  of 
every  month"  to  the  auditor  of  the  county,  "showing  the 
kind  and  quantity  of  liquors  sold  and  purchased;"  but  the 
court  held  that  the  statute  was  not  mandatory  concerning  the 
exact  time  of  making  the  report  and  that  it  was  sufficient  to 
make  it  at  any  time  before  a  suit  was  begun  to  recover  the 
penalty  inflicted  for  a  neglect  to  report ;  "^  but  afterwards  the 
statute  was  amended  so  as  to  make  it  mandatory  to  report  at 

73  For  a  decision  under  the  livered,  and  not  such  as  are  com- 
Weights  and  Measures  Act,  see  monly  so  sold  or  delivered."  Fern- 
Bellamy  V.  Pow.  CO  J.  P.  712;  1  ,  dale  v.  Dillon  [1907],  2  K.  B. 
T.  L.  R.  527.  513;   76  L.  J.  K.  B.  922;  97  L.  T. 

74  Pennington  V.  Pincock  [1908],  284;  71  J.  P.  374;  21  €ox  C.  C. 
2  K.  B.  244;  77  L.  J.  K.  B.  537;  500;  but  this  decision  has  been 
98  L.  T.  804;  72  J.  P.  199;  6  L.  disapproved  in  Jones  v.  Sherving- 
G.  R.  830;   24  T.  L.  R.  509.  ton  [1908],  2  K.  B.  539;  77  L.  R. 

The    plirase    "such    intoxicating  K.  B.  771;   99  L.  T.  57;   72  J.  P. 

liquors    as    are    sold   or    delivered  381;   24  T.  L.   R.   693. 
in  corked  or  sealed  vessels"  means  75  Abbott   v.    Sartori,   i57    Iowa, 

such  as  are  in  fact  so  sold  or  de-  &5^;   11  N.  W.  626. 


355  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  230 

the  time  fixed  by  it ;  '"  and  it  was  held  also  that  all  sales  or 
prescriptions  must  be  reported."  In  Vermont,  the  statute 
gave  a  form  to  be  used,  and  in  it  was  a  requirement  not 
required  by  the  statute  itself;  and  it  was  held  that  the  form 
in  this  respect  need  not  be  complied  with.'''^  In  this  instance 
the  statute  prescribed  the  form  in  which  the  liquor  seller 
should  keep  an  account  of  his  sales,  but  it  was  held  that  if  he 
kept  the  form  in  a  different  manner,  yet  had  the  same  entries 
as  the  statute  required,  there  was  a  sufficient  compliance  with 
its  provisions.'^"  A  failure  to  keep  the  record  as  the  statute 
requires  renders  a  town  agent  for  the  sale  of  liquors  liable;  '^'* 
but  a  statute  requiring  him  to  keep  a  "book  and  enter  therein 
the  date  of  every  sale  made  by  him,  the  person  to  whom  sold, 
the  kind,  quantity,  and  price  thereof,  and  the  purpose  for 
which  sold,  substantially  in  the  following  form  [setting  out  a 
tabulated  form],"  does  not  require  the  book  to  be  in  tabular 
form.*^ 

Sec.  230.     Sales  on  credit. 

Sales  on  credit  may  be  forbidden ;  *-  but  such  a  statute  is 
construed  strictly  and  not  extended  to  persons  not  clearly 
within  its  provisions,  as  one  prohibiting  an  innkeeper  giving 
credit  will  not  be  extended  to  a  retail  grocer  selling  liquor. "^-^ 

78  state    V.    McEntee,    m    Iowa,  Campbell,  71  Ind.  512;   Evansville 

381;  27  N.  W.  265.  Bank  v.  Button,  105  U.  S.  322. 

77  State  V.  Chamberlin,  74  Iowa  79  Barnard     v.     Houghton's     Es- 

266;  37  N.  W.  326.  tate,  34  Vt.  264. 

7s  Barnard     v.    Houghton's     Es-  As  to  druggicts'  report  of  sales, 

tate,  34  Vt.  2<64.  see  index. 

It  may  be  added  that  in   Indi-  so  Wenham   v.    Dodge,   9i8   Mass. 

ana,     where     the     statutory     tax  474. 

schedules,  that  the  owner  of  prop-  siWenham   v.    Dodge,   9S    Mass. 

erty  was  required  to  use,  differed  474. 

from   the   pixivisions   of   the    stat-  ^-  Kizer  v.  Randleman,  50  N.  €. 

ute,  the  schedule  controlled.    Was-  428. 

son  V.    First   National    Bank,    107  83  Brittain  v.  Bethany,  31  Miss. 

Ind.   212;    8   N.    E.   97;    Clark   v.  331. 
Carter;  40  Ind.  190;  In  Matter  of 


§  231  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  356 

Sec.  231,     Entering  saloon  in  violation  of  orders  not   an 
offense. 

A  conviction  of  a  violation  of  a  statute  declaring  it  un- 
lawful for  the  proprietor  of  a  saloon  to  permit  any  person 
to  go  into  the  saloon  room  at  times  when  the  sale  of  liquor  is 
prohibited  by  law,  cannot  be  sustained  where  a  person  who 
entered  the  saloon  at  the  prohibited  time  did  so  in  violation 
of  orders  of  the  saloon  keeper,  given  in  good  faith,  with  the 
intention  and  expectation  that  they  should  be  obeyed ;  but 
whether  such  orders  were  given  in  good  faith  or  not  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact  for  the  jury.**  It  cannot  be  said  that  putting  it 
within  the  power  of  another  to  do  an  act  means  a  permission 
to  do  such  a«t.  The  defendant,  to  be  guilty  under  such  a 
statute,  must  have  known  of  the  illegal  use  to  which  his  prem- 
ises were  being  put.  Justice  Blatchford,  in  construing  the 
words  ' '  suffer ' '  and  ' '  permit ' '  has  said :  ' '  Every  definition  of 
'suffer'  and  'permit'  includes  knowledge  of  what  is  to  be  done 
under  the  sufferance  and  permission  and  intention,  that  what  is 
done  is  what  is  to  be  done."  ^■'  The  word  "permit"  is  derived 
from  the  Latin  "  per  mitt  ere,"  which  means  "to  concede,  to 
give  leave,  to  grant."  **'  It  is  one  of  the  underlying  principles 
of  our  criminal  law  that  a  man  shall  not  be  deemed  guilty  of 
a  crime  in  the  absence  of  a  wrongful  intent.  Nowhere  have 
we  been  able  to  find  where  the  courts  compelled  a  man  invol- 
untarily and  against  his  will  to  be  guilty  of  a  crime,  against 
the  commission  of  which  he  protested,  was  not  present  when  it 
was  committed,  and  the  evidence  shoM^ed  he  tried  to  prevent 
it."  ^^  Where  a  defendant  went  upon  the  premises  and  in  three 
minutes  came  off  with  a  bottle  of  gin,  it  was  held  that  he  had 
violated  the  statute.^* 

s^Botkins     v.     State.     36     Ind.  87  Lauer  v.  State,  24  Ind.    131 

App.  179;  75  N.  E.  208.  Hanson    v.    State,    43    Ind.    550 

85  Gregory  v.  United  States,   17  O'Leary    v.     State,    44    Ind.     91 

Rlatchf.  325.  Thompson  v.  State,  45  Ind.  495. 

80  Welsch  V.  State.  19  Ind.  App.  **«  Thomas    v.   Powell,    57    J.    P. 

389;   46  N.  E.  1050.  329. 


357  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  232 

Sec.  232.     Permitting  minors  to  "enter  and  remain"  in  a 
saloon. 

A  statute  in  Texas  requires  a  licensed  dealer's  bond  to  be 
conditioned  that  he  will  not  jjermit  a  minor  to  "enter  and 
remain"  in  his  saloon.^''  Under  this  statute  it  is  held  that  it 
is  no  defense  that  the  saloon  keeper  in  good  faith  believed 
that  the  minor  entering  and  remaining  was  an  adult.'"'  To 
constitute  a  violation  of  the  bond  these  must  be  both  an  entry 
and  remaining,  or,  in  other  words,  the  entry  must  be  followed 
by  a  remaining,  and  if  there  be  a  mere  entry  and  no  remain- 
ing, no  offense  is  committed.^''*  And  where  it  was  shown  that 
the  minor  entered  on  three  occasions  and  remained  in  the  sa- 
loon only  long  enough  to  purchase,  drink  and  pay  for  beer, 
it  was  held  that  there  was  no  breach  of  his  bond.**^  The  com- 
plaint in  a  civil  action  is  sufficient  if  it  charges  that  the  minor 
was  permitted  to  enter  and  remain  "on  or  about"  specified 
dates;  and  the  court  may  instruct  the  jury  that  the  plaintiff 
may  recover  if  the  minor  was  permitted  to  enter  at  any  time 
on  or  about  the  date  given.  It  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  con- 
fine the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover  to  violations  on  the  exact 
date  alleged.^-  Where  an  ordinance  forbids  a  saloon  keeper 
to  suffer  a  minor  or  female  to  drink  in  his  saloon  or  remain 
in  it  over  five  minutes,  and  declaring  that  it  shall  be  a  defense 
to  show  that  the  minor  or  female  was  in  good  repute,  proof 
that  the  accused  suffered  a  minor  or  female  to  drink  in  his 
saloon  or  to  remain  in  it  over  five  minutes  is  sufficient  to  jus- 
tify a  conviction;  for  if  he  wishes  to  escape  a  conviction  he 
must  show  that  the  persons  so  obtaining  the  liquor  or  remain- 
ing  therein   was    in    good   repute."^'     A   statute    prohibiting 

89  Rev.  Stat.  [1895],  Art.  5060.^7,  Stephens    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  78  S. 

as  amended  by  Act  April  27,  1901  W.  1084. 

(Laws,   1901,  p.   314,  c.  136).  9^  Mimoz  v.   Brassel    (Tex.   Civ. 

soMinter    v.    State     (Tex.    Civ.  App.),  108  S.  W.  417.     As  to  suf- 

App),     76     S.     W.      312;      State  fieiency  of  a  complaint  under  this 

V.  Dittforth    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  79  statute,   see  Markus  v.   Thompson 

S.   W.  '52.      See    State  v.  Johnson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  Ill  S.  W.  1074. 

(S.  D.),   121   N.   W.   7'85.  93  Commonwealth         v.         Price 

9o*Minter  v.  State,  supra.  (Ky.),   94   S.    W.    32;    29   Ky.   L. 

91  Tinkle  v.   Sweeney    (Tex.  Civ.  Rep.  593. 

App.),    78    S.    W.    248;    Ghio    v.  An    instruction    that    the    (jues- 


§233 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


358 


a  minor  visiting  a  saloon  is  constitutional.^*  Where  it  was 
made  an  offense  for  the  owner  of  public  billiard  tables  to 
permit  minors  to  congregate  at  a  place  where  billiards  were 
played,  it  was  held  that  a  congregation  or  assemblage  of  min- 
ors must  be  shown  to  sustain  a  conviction,  the  statute  implying 
the  joint  action  or  co-operation  of  two  or  more  persons,  it  be- 
ing applicable  to  the  coming  together  of  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  persons.^^* 


Sec.  233.    Minor  willfully  misstating  his  age. 

AVhere  a  statute  made  it  an  offense  in  a  minor,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  inducing  any  person  to  give  or  sell  him  intoxicating 
liquor,  to  represent  that  he  is  twenty-one  years  of  age  or  over, 
it  was  held  that  the  seller  could  not  escape  punishment  on  a 


tion  for  the  jury  to  determine 
whether  the  accused  was  the  owner 
of  a  saloon,  and  whether  he  per- 
mitted the  person,  who  was,  in 
fact,  under  the  age  of  twenty-one 
years,  to  remain  in  his  saloon, 
does  not  assume  that  the  person 
was  under  such  age.  State  v. 
Baker  (Ore.),  92  Pac.  1076;  13  L. 
R.   A.    (N.  S.)    1040. 

Where  a  statute  made  it  an 
offense  to  permit  a  minor  to 
gamble  in  a  saloon,  it  is  no  de- 
fense that  the  proprietor  in- 
structed his  servants  not  to  per- 
mit it,  where  they  permitted  it. 
Church  V.  Territory  (N.  M.),  91 
Pac.  720. 

9*  Territory  v.  Crunka,  15 
Hawaii,  607. 

04*  Powell  V.  State,  62  Ind.  531 ; 
"Manheim  v.  State,  GO  Ind.  65; 
Hanralian  v.  State,  57  Ind.  527; 
Walbert  v.  State,  17  Ind.  App. 
350;  4G  X.  E.  827. 

In  a  trial  for  a  violation  of  a 
statute  forbidding  a  minor  to  be 
on  the  premises,  it  is  not  a  ques- 


tion of  fact  for  the  jury  to  de- 
termine as  to  the  peculiar  evils 
tliat  might  surround  a  particular 
visit.  State  v.  Johnson  (S.  D. ), 
121  S.  W.  7S'5. 

Where  a  saloon  keeper  employed 
an  adult  to  furnish  music  for  his 
saloon,  and  the  adult  brought  a 
minor  who  played  in  the  com- 
pany of  other  musicians,  and  the 
saloon  keeper,  as  soon  as  he  dis- 
covered he  was  a  minor,  ordered 
him  to  leave,  it  was  held  that  he 
was  not  guilty  of  employing  a 
minor  in  a  saloon.  State  v. 
Haugh,  123  N.  W.  251. 

An  ordinance  providing  that 
minors  shall  not  be  permitted  to 
enter  a  place  where  "near  beer" 
is  sold  is  valid.  Campbell  v. 
Thomasville    (Ga.),   64   S.   E.   815. 

A  statute  forbidding  the  em- 
ployment of  a  minor  in  a  place 
where  intoxicating  liquors  are 
sold  applies  to  a  beer  garden. 
State  V.  Hough  ( Wis. ) ,  123  N.  W. 
251. 


359  REGULATING    LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  234 

charge  of  selling  to  a  minor,  on  the  ground  that  the  minor 
stated  he  was  of  age,  where  such  seller  knew  the  statement  was 
false.^^ 

Sec.  234.    Permitting  dmnkeimess  on  premises — Selling  to 
drunken  man. 

Statutes  sometimes  forbid  a  licensee  to  permit  drunkenness 
or  a  drunkard  to  come  on  the  licensed  premises.  To  violate 
such  a  statute  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  licensee  to  sell  the 
liquor  that  creates  the  drunkenness,  nor  any  part  of  it.®^ 
A  licensee  cannot  be  convicted  of  permitting  drunkenness 
in  the  absence  of  knowledge,  or  connivance,  or  carelessness  on 
his  part.  Thus  Avhere  the  evidence  showed  that  a  person  who 
was  on  the  premises  was  in  fact  drunk,  and  it  also  showed  that 
the  licensed  person  did  not  know  that  such  person  was  drunk, 
it  was  held  that  the  licensed  person  could  not  be  convicted."^ 
Where  the  only  evidence  was  that  a  person  had  been  drinking 
in  a  licensed  house,  and  three-quarters  of  an  hour  later  was 
found  drunk  in  a  d'tch  about  one  hundred  yards  distant,  and 
the  court  convicted  the  keeper  of  the  licensed  house,  its  judg- 
ment was  sustained.^^*  So  to  supply  liquor  to  one  already 
drunk  is  to  permit  drunkenness  on  the  licensed  premises.^^  And 
where  a  person  is  found  on  licensed  premises,  and  is  known  to 
be  so  by  the  licensee,  the  latter  is  liable,  though  no  drink  may 
have  been  given  him  by  the  licensee.""  At  the  same  time  it 
must  be  recollected,  to  permit  drunkenness  on  the  licensed 
premises  implies  that  there  was  power  to  prevent  it;  and  if  a 
customer  becomes  drunk,  but  is  not  allowed  to  remain  on  such 
premises,  the  licensee  cannot  be  deemed  to  permit  it.^°^    A  sim- 

95  state  V.  GuUey,  41  Ore.  318;  as  Edmunds  v.  James  [1892],  1 
70  Pac.  385.  Q.   B.    18;    56  J.   P.   40;   61    L.   J. 

96  Edmunds  v.  James  [1892],  1  M.  C.  56;  40  W.  R.  140;  65  L.  T. 
Q.   B.    18;    56   J.   P.   40;   61    L.   J.  675. 

M.  C.  56;  40  W.  Pv.   140;  65  L.  T.  09  Hope  v.  Warburton    [18921,  2 

C75.  Q.  B.  1.34;   56  J.  P.  3-28;  61  L.  J. 

97  Somerset  v.  Wade  [1894L  1  M.  C.  147;  66  L.  T.  589;  40  W. 
Q.  B.  574;   58  J.  P.  231;   63  L.  J.  E.   510. 

M.  C.  126;  70  L.  T.  452;  42  \V.  Pv.  n-i  Where    a     shihifc     (Scottivli 

399.  Licensing   Act,    1903,    §    9S)    pro- 

97*  Ex  parte  Ethelstane,  40  J.  P.  vided    that   when    a    licensed    per- 

39;  33  L.  T.  339.  son  was  charged  with  permitting 


§234 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


360 


ilar  statute  lias  been  adopted  in  certain  English  colonies.  Thus, 
in  Australia,  under  a  statute  where  it  was  proved  that  there 
was  a  drunken  person  upon  the  premises,  but  it  was  also  shown 
that  both  the  licensee,  who  was  absent,  and  the  person  left  by 
him  in  charge  of  the  premises,  had  in  fact  no  knowledge  of 
the  presence  of  the  drunken  man,  it  was  held  that  the  prima 
facie  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  presence  of  such  drunk- 
en man,  to  the  effect  that  the  licensee  permitted  a  drunken 
person  to  be  on  his  premises,  was  rebutted,  and  the  accused 
was  discharged."-  This  English  statute  also  prohibits  sales  to 
a  drunken  person ;  and  the  prohibition  is  absolute.  Where, 
therefore,  the  customer  is  really  drunk,  the  licensee  cannot  set 
up  the  defense  that  he  and  his  partner  considered  the  custo- 
mer not  to  be  drunk,  for  the  risk  of  discovering  the  facts  rests 


drunkenness  on  his  premises,  and 
it  was  proved  that  any  person 
was  drunk  on  his  premises,  it 
should  "be  on  the  licensed  person 
to  prove  that  he  and  those  era- 
ployed  by  him  took  all  reasonable 
steps  for  preventing  drunkenness 
on  the  premises,"  it  was  held  that 
on  a  showing  that  the  li- 
censed defendant  and  one  X  were 
friends  and  were  both  found  in 
the  licensed  premises  at  3  a.  ji. 
asleep  and  intoxicated,  the  de- 
fendant must  be  convicted  of  hav- 
ing permitted  X  to  remain  on  the 
premises  while  in  a  state  of  in- 
toxication, he  not  having  dis- 
charged the  onus  imposed  on  him 
by  the  statute.  Kessack  v.  Smith, 
7  F.  (Just.  Cas.)  75.  There  is  a 
similar  English  statute  (2  Edw. 
VII,  c.  28,  §  4;  and  Patterson 
(Licensing  Acts  [19th  Ed.],  p. 
583)  construes  it  in  this  wise: 
"The  effect  of  this  section  appears 
to  be  that,  where  any  person  is 
drunk  on  licensed  premises,  this 
will  he  prima  facie  evidence  of 
permitting    drunkenness,    and,    to 


rebut  this,  the  licensed  person 
must  prove  that  he  and  his  serv- 
ants took  all  reasonable  steps  for 
preventing  drunkenness  on  the 
I^remises.  If  a  licensed  person,  or 
his  servant,  as  soon  as  he  found 
that  the  person  was  drunk,  turned 
him  oif  the  premises,  he  would 
rebvit  tlie  prima  facie  presump- 
tion. If,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
supplied  tlie  person  with  drink,  so 
that  the  latter  became  drunk  on 
the  premises,  the  licensee  would 
be  liable  to  be  convicted,  for,  by 
supplying  the  drink  which  caused 
the  drunkenness,  he  has  not  taken 
all  reasonable  steps  to  prevent 
drunkenness  on  the  premises.  A 
lisensee  would  be  similarly  liable 
if  he  neglected  to  notice  the  con- 
dition of  the  drunken  person  en- 
tering or  being  on  the  premises." 
io2Hillard  v.  Fitzpatrick,  27 
Vict.  L.  R.  380;  23  Austr.  L.  T. 
1;  7  Austr.  L.  E.  223.  See  Con- 
nolly V.  Stenniker,  22  Vict.  L,  R. 
2'57;  18  Austr.  L.  T.  GO;  2  Austr. 
L.  R.    (C.  N.)    322. 


361  REGULATING    LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  235 

with  the  licensee.^°-''  The  licensee  is  also  liable  where  his  man- 
ager, contrary  to  express  general  instructions,  supplies  liquor 
to  a  drunken  person.^"'*  Moreover,  if  a  drunken  man  and  a 
sober  man  enter  together,  and  the  latter  orders  liquor  for  both, 
this  will  be  deemed  a  selling  to  a  drunken  man/  A  licensee 
cannot  be  convicted  under  this  statute  for  being  drunk  on  his 
own  premises.^ 

Sec.  235.     Found  drunk  on  licensed  premises. 

Where  a  statute  provides  that  it  shall  be  an  offense  "to  be 
found  drunk  on  licensed  premises,"  if  found  drunk  on  un- 
licensed premises,  no  offense  is  committed.  If  he  is  drunk  in 
licensed  premises,  but  is  not  "found"  in  the  state  of  drunken- 
ness, he  escapes  the  penalty  of  the  statute.  But  to  incur  the 
penalty  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  police  officer  find  him  on 
the  premises  in  a  state  of  intoxication.  If  the  drunken  per- 
son, before  beinu'  found  has  staggered  out  of  the  licensed  prem- 
ises into  an  adjoining  field  he  escapes  the  penalty.  And  if 
the  licensed  premises  are  his  own  house,  the  drunken  person 
would  obviouslj'  not  be  liable,  except  to  be  found  drunk  during 
open  hours  and  in  the  public  part  of  the  premises.^  But  a 
person  who  enters  a  house  to  use  it  as  licensed  premises,  and 
not  as  a  lodger  or  inmate,  and  is  found  drunk  in  the  house 
after  the  closing  hours,  may  be  convicted.* 

losiCundy   v.   LeCocq,    13    Q.    B.  think,  looking  at  the  collection  of 

Div.  207;   48  J.  P.  .599;   53   L.  J.  words,     that     'licensed     premises,' 

M.   €.       125;    51    L.    T.    2G5;    32  for    the    purpose    of    the    section 

W.  R.  760.  ['Every    person    found    drunk    in 

104  Commissioners    of    Police    v.  any     highway,     or     other     public 

Cartman   [189G],   1   Q.   B.  655;   00  place,  whether  a  building  or  not, 

J.  P.  357;   65  L.  J.  M.  C.   113;   74  on  any  licensed  premises,  shall  be 

L.   T.   726;    44  W.   R.  '637;    12  T.  liable,'  etc.],   must   mean  open   to 

L.    R.    334;    Worth    v.    Brown,    40  the   public    during   licensed    hours, 

Sol.  J.  515;   62  J.  P.  658.  or  during  the  time  when  the  prem- 

1  Scatchard  v.  Johnson,  52  J.  P.  ises  are  a  quasi   public  place." 
380;  57  L.  J.  M.  C.  41.  4  Eegina  v.   Relly    [1897],   2   Q. 

2  Warden  v.  Tye,  2  C.  P.  Div.  B.  33;  fil  J.  P.  373;  66  L.  J.  Q. 
74;  41  J.  P.  120;  40  L.  J.  M.  C.  B.  519;  45  W.  R.  504;  Warden 
111;   35  L.  T.  852.  v.  Tye,  2  C.  P.  Div.  74;  41  J.  P. 

3  Lester  v.  Torrens,  2  Q.  B.  Div.  120;  46  L.  J.  M.  C.  Ill;  35  L.  T. 
404;  41  J.  P.  821;   25  W.  R.  691;  852. 

46  L.  J.  M.  C.  280.     Lush,  J.:   "i 


§  236  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  362 

Sec.  236.  Power  to  exclude  drunken  man  from  licensed 
premises. 
An  English  statute  expressly  authorizes  any  licensed  person 
to  "refuse  to  admit  to  and  may  turn  out  of  the  premises  in 
respect  of  which  his  license  is  granted  any  person  who  is 
drunken,  violent,  quari-elsome,  or  disorderly,  and  any  person 
who  would  subject  him  to  a  penalty"  under  the  law.^  This  sec- 
tion also  authorizes  all  constables®  on  demand  of  any  licensed 
person,  agent,  or  servant  to  expel  or  assist  in  expelling  a 
drunken,  violent,  quarrelsome  or  disorderly  person  from  the 
licensed  premises, ' '  and  may  use  such  force  as  may  be  required 
for  that  purpose. ' '  In  turning  out  a  drunken,  violent,  quarrel- 
some or  disorderly  person,  no  more  force  can  be  lawfully  used 
than  is  necessary  to  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  person  to  be 
turned  out.  Of  this  statute  it  is  said  that  "a  request  to  leave 
peaceably  should  always  be  first  made  to  such  person  and 
proved  on  the  hearing  of  the  charge.  The  constable  acts  usually 
as  the  agent  of  the  licensed  person,  unless  he  has  witnessed  some 
violation  of  the  act. "  "If  the  licensed  person  turns  out  a  per- 
son who  is  not  drunken,  violent,  quarrelsome  or  disorderly,  or 
whose  presence  would  not  subject  him  to  a  penalty,  then  such 
person  when  turned  out  cannot  be  convicted  under  this  sec- 
tion. Where  a  chimney  sweep  in  his  working  dress  came  to 
the  public  house  bar  amongst  the  company  and  refused  to 
leave,  it  was  held  that  he  could  be  excluded  by  force,  even 
though  the  premises  were  an  inn.^  And  the  same  where  a  per- 
son had  a  large  dog  accompanying  him,  which  caused  reason- 
able alarm.^  The  respondent,  who  was  not  a  traveler,  en- 
tered the  appellant's  licensed  premises — not  being  an  inn — he 
having  been  on  several  previous  occasions  ejected  by  the  appel- 
lant from  the  premises  for  using  offensive  language  and  be- 
having in  a  disorderly  manner,  and  he  was  known  to  be  one 
of  a  disorderly  gang.  The  respondent  was  half  drunk  when  he 
entered,  and  threatened  to  fight  the  appellant,  but  the  magis- 

5  35  and  36  Vict.  e.  94,  §  18.  «  Citing  Regina  v.  Rymer,  2  Q. 

«The    English   term    for    police-  B.  Div.   13G;   46  L.  J.  M.  C.  108; 

men.  41   J.  P.   199;   25  W.  R.  415;   see 

7  Citing  Pidgeon  v.  Legge,  21  J.  also  Howell  v.  Jackson,  6  C.  &  P. 

P.   743.  725. 


363  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  237 

trate  found  as  a  fact  that  he  was  neither  drunken  nor  quarrel- 
some nor  disorderly.  The  appellant  requested  the  respondent 
to  leave,  but  he  refused.  The  appellant  went  to  eject  him,  and 
the  respondent  kicked  him  in  the  face.  The  magistrate  refused 
to  convict  the  respondent  of  an  assault  on  the  ground  that  the 
appellant  had  no  right  to  eject  the  respondent  for  refusing  to 
leave  when  requested.  The  court  held  that  the  appellant  had 
the  right  to  request  the  respondent  to  leave  if  he  did  not 
wish  him  to  remain  on  the  premises,  and  remitted  the  case 
to  the  magistrate  to  hear  the  charge  of  assault."  °  A  landlord 
of  a  saloon  may  eject  customers  from  his  premises,  though 
they  are  not  drunken,  violent,  quarrelsome,  or  disorderly ;  ^'^ 
but  a  person  not  drunken,  nor  violent,  nor  quarrelsome,  nor 
disorderly  cannot  be  convicted  for  not  leaving  the  premises 
when  requested  to  leave  by  the  landlord  or  licensee.^^ 

Sec.  237.     Permitting  employes  to  drink  storage  liquors — 
Premises. 

A  statute  of  Texas'-  makes  it  an  offense  for  anyone  engaged 
in  the  "business  or  occupation"  of  keeping  or  storing  intox- 
icating liquors  in  a  county  which  has  adopted  locai  option,  to 

9  Patterson's  Licensing  Acts  hibited  person  may  demand  en- 
(ISth  Ed.),  p.  387;  citing  Sealy  trance.  Waters  v.  Fitzgerald,  25 
V.  Tandy  [1902],  1  K.  B.  296;  66  Vict.  L.  R.  86;  21  Austr.  L.  T. 
J.   P.    19;    71   L.  J.   K.  B.  41;    50  17;   5  Austr.  L.  R.   149. 

W.   R.   347;    85  L.  T.   459;    18   T.  In    Canada,   a   railway   employe 

L.  R.  38;   20  Cox  C.  C.  57.  may  be  discharged  summarily  for 

10  Sealy  v.  Tandy,  supra.  being  drunk    while   on   duty   witn 

11  Dallimore  v.  Tulton,  78  L.  T.  other  employes;  and  although 
409;  G2  J.  P.  423;  19  Cox.  C.  C.  only  a  recipient  of  the  intoxicat- 
31.  ing    liquor,    such    conduct    consti- 

In    New    Zealand    it    is    an    of-  tutes   a   participation    in   a   crim- 

fense  for  an  habitual  drunkard  to  inal    offense    under    §  259    of    the 

enter  on   licensed  premises  during  Railway  Act,  51  Vict.  c.  29  C.  D. 

the  time  an  order  is  in  force  pro-  which     prohibits     anyone     selling, 

hibiting  him  entering  thereon.  To  giving  or  bartering  spirits  or   in- 

commit   the   offense,    he   need    not  toxicating  liquors   while   on   duty, 

buy   liquor.     Rex   v.  Ward,  21   N.  Marshall    v.    Central    Ontario    Ry. 

Z.  506.     In  Australia  the  prohib-  Co.,  28  Ont.  Rep.  241. 
iting  order  must  name  the  house  12  Gen.   Laws    [1906],    p.   91,   c. 

and  give  the  time  at  which  a  pro-  64. 


§  238  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  364 

permit  another  to  drink  any  of  such  liquor  within  such  place 
of  business.  It  was  held  that  the  terms  "business"  or  "occu- 
pation," so  used  in  a  statute,  means  the  trade,  the  calling,  or 
the  vocation  in  which  one  engages  to  make  a  living  or  obtain 
wealth.  Consequently,  it  was  held  error  to  define  "business 
or  occupation"  in  an  instruction  to  a  jury  to  be  that  which 
engages  one 's  time  and  labor  or  attention,  or  that  about  which 
one  is  engaged  or  employed,  where  it  was  shown  that  the  in- 
toxicants drank  on  the  premises  were  not  kept  for  profit, 
nor  as  a  business,  or  calling;  but  they  were  kept  casually 
or  incidentally  to  another  business.^^  So  an  Iowa  statute^* 
provides  that  any  person  operating  a  brewery  who  permits  its 
products  to  be  drunk  or  sells  them  at  retail  ' '  upon  the  prem- 
ises of  any  such  manufacturing  establishment"  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  a  forfeiture.  It  was  held  that  the  word  "premises" 
was  limited  to  the  buildings  occupied  by  and  the  grounds  used 
in  connection  with  the  brewery.  Consequently  it  was  held 
where  a  brewery  had  an  entrance  into  the  general  manager's 
office  and  an  entrance  from  that  office  to  a  saloon  in  the  same 
building,  upon  which  saloon  the  liquor  taxes  were  paid,  the 
operation  of  the  saloon  was  not  a  violation  of  the  statute,  the 
entrance  from  the  brewery  being  used  by  no  one  to  obtain 
liquor,  and  the  employes,  when  they  desired  liquor,  entering 
only  from  the  outside. ^^ 

Sec.  238.     Women  in  saloons — Wine  rooms. 

Statutes  are  common  forbidding  the  furnishing  of  liquor  to 
women  in  saloons  or  the  keeping  of  wine  rooms  in  connection 
with  saloons  into  which  women  are  permitted  to  enter  and 
he  supplied  with  liquor.     Where  wine  rooms  are  forbidden,  a 
room   to    come   within    the   prohibition    of   the    statute   must 
be  kept  as  a  part  of  the  saloon.     The  statute  refers  to  a  place 
where  patrons  of  the  saloon  are  supplied  with  liquor  privately 
instead  of  drinking  at  the  bar.^"     Where  such  rooms  are  f or- 
is Cohen   V.   State,   53   Tex.    Cr.  ic  Ellis  v.  People,  38  Colo.  516; 
App.  422;   110  S.  W.  66.                          88  Pae.  401;   Denver  v.  Domedian, 
!■»  Iowa  Code,  §  2460.                            15  Colo.  App.  3(3;   00  Pac,  1107. 
15  Orke     V.     .McMamis      (Iowa), 
115  N.  W.  580. 


365  REGULATING    LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  '  ^  239 

bicfden  balls  or  like  entertainments  cannot  be  given  in  them.^^ 
But  to  supply  liquor  to  a  female  in  a  restaurant  with  her 
meal,  the  restaurant  being  located  in  the  same  building,  owned 
by  the  saloon  keeper,  but  separated  by  a  hall,  is  not  a  serving 
of  liquor  in  the  saloon,  and  the  act  is  not  a  violation  of  the 
statute.^^  A  statute  which  forbids  the  employment  of  females 
in  a  saloon  cannot  be  evaded  under  the  subterfuge  of  tak- 
ing them  in  as  partners  in  the  business.-®  Where  a  female 
servant  went  into  a  bar  and  obtained  liquor  which  she  took 
out  of  the  bar  and  went  to  a  customer  in  a  parlor  of  the  hotel 
in  which  the  bar  was  kept,  it  was  held  that  she  had  not  served 
liquors  in  a  bar  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  forbidding  a 
female  to  serve  liquor  in  a  bar.-^ 

Sec.  239.     Prostitutes  visiting  premises. 

An  English  statute  forbids  any  licensed  person  to  knowingly 
permit  his  premises  "to  be  the  habitual  resort  of  or  a  place 
of  meeting  of  reputed  prostitutes,  whether  the  object  of  their 
so  resorting  or  meeting  is  or  is  not  prostitution"  "longer  than 
is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  reasonable  refresh- 
ment." '^  The  word  "knowingly,"  as  used  in  this  statute,  ap- 
plies to  the  character  of  the  persons  who  are  permitted  to  re- 
sort to  the  premises;  and  it  is  said  that  "this  expression  is 
necessary,  because  if  that  or  some  similar  word  were  not  used 
it  might  be  contended  that  if  women  were  knowingly  permit- 
ted to  resort  to  the  premises  it  would  be  no  defense  that  it 
was  not  known  that  they  were  reputed  prostitutes."  "^    "In  or- 

1-  Cunningham  v.  Porchet,  23  A  "dancing  saloon"  means  a 
Tex.  Civ.  App.   80;   56  S.  W.  574.       place    to    which    persons    are    ad- 

18  Denver  v.  Domedian,  15  Colo.  mitted  on  payment   of   money,   or 

App.  36;  GO  Pac.  1107.  on    the    understanding    that    they 

Such   a   statute   is  considered   a  will  purchase  liquor.     But  a  stat- 

fair    one.       Greiner    v.    Hoboken,  ute    prohibiting    the    keeping,. of 

(N.  J.  L.)  ;    53   Atl.   693;    People  such  a  place  does  not  prohibit  the 

V.  Case,  153  Mich.  98;   116  N.  W.  licensee   admitting   his    friends    to 

558;   Hoboken  v.  Goodman,  68  N.  dance    as    his    guests.      Walsh    v. 

J.  L.  217;   51  Atl.   1092.  Bedfell,   16  Aust.  L.  .T,_.35. 

26  Walter  v.   Commonwealth,  &8  2835  and  36  Vict.  c.  94,  •§  14. 

Pa.  St.   137  -^  Patterson's      Licensing      Acts 

2-  Ex  parte  Cameron,  23  N.  S.  (19th  Ed.),  p.  368,  citing  Mathew, 
W.  24-   6  S.  R.  132.  J-j  and  Collins,  J.,  in  Somerset  v. 


§  239  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  366 

der  to  prove  the  offense,"  says  the  author  just  cited,  "it  must 
be  shown:  (1)  That  the  licensed  porson,  or  at  least  Lis  man- 
ager, knew  the  women  were  reputed  prostitutes,  and  the  jus- 
tices will  inquire  into  the  grounds  of  belief  of  witnesses  as  to 
this  evil  reputation;  (2)  That  he  allowed  them  to  remain 
longer  than  necessary  for  reasonable  refreshment,  which  is 
partly  a  matter  of  arithmetic,  the  nature  of  the  meal  or  re- 
freshment being  generally  the  best  materials  for  showing 
whether  they  remained  longer  than  was  necessary  for  its  con- 
sumption. Accordingly,  where  a  woman  of  the  unfortunate 
class  was  found  on  licensed  premises  by  a  police  constable, 
and  the  woman  immediately  left  upon  being  spoken  to  by  the 
publican  as  soon  as  the  constable  entered,  it  was  held  that  this 
was  not  enough  to  sustain  a  conviction  under  this  section. ^'^ 
In  this  case  there  was  no  evidence  as  to  whether  the  woman  had 
gone  to  the  house  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  refreshment 
or  not,  nor  how  long  she  had  been  upon  the  premises,  but  the 
constable  stated  that  at  the  time  when  he  saw  the  woman  she 
was  not  partaking  of  any  refreshment.  The  evidence  was  thus 
consistent  with  the  Avoman  having  finished  her  refreshment 
and  being  on  the  point  of  leaving  when  the  constable  entered, 
and  was  therefore  insufficient  to  sustain  a  conviction. "  "  Un- 
less the  woman,"  continues  the  same  writer,  "remains  longer 
on  the  premises  than  is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  refresh- 
ment, it  seems  that,  though  her  object  may  be  prostitution, 
yet  the  penalty  will  not  be  incurred  by  the  licensed  person  till 
the  time  for  her  refreshment  has  ceased.  It  is  only  after  that 
time  that  her  remaining  on  the  premises  can  be  in- 
quired into;  but  for  whatever  purpose  she  is  there  after  that 
time  is  immaterial.  And  if  she  do  not  resort  for  refreshment 
at  all,  then  if  the  landlord  allow  her  to  remain  for  any  length 
of  time,  however  short,  he  will  be  liable  for  the  penalty.  The 
licensed  person  has  the  powder  to  turn  her  out,^^  and  if  he  fails 
to  do  60  he  will  run  the  risk  of  the  penalty.  An  objection, 
founded  on  the  conduct  of  licensed  houses  as  to  serving  pros- 

Wadc    [18941,    1    Q.    B.    674;    68  3o  Citing    Miller    v.    Dudley,    J. 

J.  P.  231;  •SS  L.  J.  M.  C.  126;   70       J.,  46  W.  R.  606. 
L.  T.  452;   42  W.   R.  399.  3 1  Section    18    of    the    same    act 

gives  the  power. 


367 


REGULATING  LIQUOR  TRAFFIC. 


§240 


titutes,  being  often  raised  to  the  renewal  of  a  license,  in  one 
case  there  was  evidence  given  that  several  times  seventeen 
prostitutes  were  found  in  the  house  at  one  time,  and  this  was 
known  to  the  license  holder,  and  he  produced  no  evidence  that 
they  were  there  for  the  purpose  of  refreshment,  the  licensing 
justices  were  held  justified,  after  due  notice  of  opposition,  in 
refusing  to  renew  the  license.^-  It  is  not  essential  that  the 
prostitutes  who  'meet'  should  be  the  same  persons;  it  is 
enough  that  persons  of  their  class  frequently  come  to  the 
house,  and  that  one  is  there,  though  for  the  first  time,  if  known 
as  to  character.  And  in  any  summons  or  conviction  it  is 
not  necessary  to  name  the  disorderly  persons  or  allege  that 
they  are  unknown."  "^ 


Sec.  240.    Permitting  premises  to  be  a  brothel. 

An  English  statute  provides  that  "if  any  licensed  person 
is  convicted  of  permitting  his  premises  to  be  a  brothel  he  shall 


32  Citing  Sharpe  v.  Hughes,  57 
J.  P.   104. 

sselting  Wray  v.  Take,  12  Q. 
B.  492;  17  L.  J.  M.  C.  183;  12 
J.  P.  804. 

Cases  under  previous  English 
statutes  are  Greig  v.  Bendeno,  E. 
B.  &  E.,  133;  27  L.  J.  M.  C.  294; 
Purkis  V.  Huxtable,  1  E.  &  E., 
780;  28  L.  J.  M.  C.  221;  5  Jur. 
790;  23  J.  P.  197,  and  Whitfield 
V.  Bainbridge,  30  J.  P.   644. 

"The  constable  having  seen 
prostitutes  previously  in  the 
house  is  some  evidence  of  the 
keeper's  knowledge  of  their  char- 
acter." Patterson's  Licensing 
Acts  (19th  Ed.),  p.  3e'9,  citing 
Belasco  v.  Hannant,  3  B.  &  S.  13; 
26  J.  P.  823;  31  L.  J.  M.  C.  225; 
6  L.  T.  577;  10  W.  R.  8<57;  Parker 
v.  Green,  2  B.  &  S.  299;  26  J.  P. 
247;  31  L.  J.  M.  C.  133;  10  \V. 
R.  316;  Cole  v.  Coulton,  24  J.  P. 
596;   2  E.  &  E.  695;   29  L.  J.  M. 


C.  125;  2  L.  T.  216;  8  VV.  R.  412. 
"The  cases  decided,"  says  Patter- 
son, "under  the  previous  statutes, 
show  that  prostitutes  are  entitled, 
like  other  people,  to  refreshment, 
and  that  it  cannot  be  reasonably 
implied  from  the  fact  of  the  li- 
censed person  supplying  them  with 
refreshment  that  he  permits  them 
to  assemble  in  an  unlawful  man- 
ner." 

In  Australia  it  is  held  that,  al- 
though the  presence  of  reputed 
prostitutes  on  licensed  premises 
is  made  by  statute  prima  facie 
evidence  that  the  licensee  know- 
ingly permitted  them  to  be  pres- 
ent with  the  knowledge  they  were 
prostitutes,  the  presumption  may 
be  rebutted.  Cullen  v.  Ware,  3 
Austr.  L.  R.   (C.  N.)   65. 

Using  a  room  at  a  hotel  for  the 
purpose  of  illicit  sexual  inter- 
course is  using  it  "for  the  pur- 
pose of  prostitution. 


§  241  TRAFFIC   IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  368 

be  liable  to  a  penalty  not  exceeding  twenty  pounds,  and  shall 
forfeit  his  license,  and  he  shall  be  disqualified  forever  from 
holding  any  license  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors."^* 
In  order  to  prove  the  offense  it  is  not  material  that  there  was 
no  outward  sign  of  indecency,^^  or  that  there  was  no  actual  dis- 
orderly conduct. ^"^  A  brothel  is  the  same  thing  as  a  "bawdy 
house, ' '  and  the  term  applies  to  a  place  resorted  to  by  persons 
of  both  sexes  for  the  purpose  of  prostitution."'^  If  a  licensee 
or  his  manager  permits  people  to  use  the  premises  for  purposes 
of  prostitution  once,  this  is  some  evidence  to  support  the 
charge  of  permitting  the  premises  to  be  used  as  a  brothel.-''^  A 
charge  under  the  statute  that  the  licensee  permitted  his  prem- 
ises to  be  used  as  a  brothel  on  the  26th,  28th,  29th  and  31st  of 
January,  and  1st,  4th,  5th  and  6th  of  February,  was  held  to 
charge  him  with  but  one  offense,  the  charge  being  a  continuing 
offense,  notwithstanding  the  days  were  not  consecutive.^'' 

Sec.  241.    Knowingly  harboring  thief  on  premises. 

An  English  statute  makes  it  an  offense  for  the  keeper  of  a 
saloon  to  knowingly  lodge  or  knowingly  harbor  thieves  or  re- 
puted thieves,  or  "knowingly  suffer  them  to  meet  or  assem- 
ble therein.  "^*'  Under  this  statute  where  a  meeting  was  held 
in  a  saloon,  pursuant  to  a  circular,  to  get  up  a  subscription  for 
the  wife  and  children  of  a  convicted  thief,  several  thieves 
being  in  the  company,  it  was  held  that  there  was  such  an  as- 
sembly of  thieves  as  the  statute  forbade,  notwithstanding  their. 

34  35  and  36  Vict.  e.  94,  §  15.  officer    refused    to    say    where    he 

35  Regina  v.  Rice,  L.  R.  1 ;  C.  was  standing  wlien  he  discovered 
C.  E.  21;  35  L.  J.  M.  C.  93;  13  that  the  place  was  used  as  a 
L.  T.  382;    14  W.  R.  56.  brothel,    and   the   court    held   that 

36  Greig  v.  Bendeno,  E.  B.  &  E.  he  was  bound  to  answer  on  cvosp- 
133;  27  L.  J.  M.  C.  294.  examination  as  to  this,  as  it  had 

37 Singleton    v.    Ellison     [1895],  an  important  bearing  on  his  credi- 

1  Q.  B.  607;   64  L.  J.  M.  C.   123;  bility. 

«59    J.    P.    119;    72   L.   T.    236;    43  ^^  Ex    parte    Burnby    [1901],    2 

W.  R.  426;   18  Cox,   79.  K.   B.   458;    70  L.   J.K.   B.    739; 

38  Regina   v.   Justices,   46    J.    P.  85   L.   T.    1&8. 

312;   Webb  v.  Catchlove,  50  J.  P.  *o  34  and  35,  c.  112,  §  10. 
705.      In  this  last  case   the   police 


369 


REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC. 


§242 


good  intentions."  But  permittin<j:  a  person  who  has  received 
stolen  goods  to  be  on  the  premises  is  not  permitting  a  thief 
to  be  on  the  premises/- 


Sec.  242.     Gambling  on  premises. 

In  all  States  gambling  is  an  offense,  and  in  many  of  them 
statutes  especially  prohibit  gambling  in  saloons  or  on  prem- 
ises where  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold.  When  such  a  statute 
is  in  force  it  is  an  offense  to  play  for  the  drinks  on  a  pool  table, 
even  though  there  be  no  prior  agreement  that  the  loser  should 
pay  for  them,  if  he  in  fact  did  so  pay.*^  And  the  same  is  true 
of  a  game  of  cards,'*  or  where  the  loser  pays  for  the  use  of  the 
pool  or  billiard  table.*^  Throwing  dice  to  determine  who  shall 
pay  for  the  drinks,  or  whether  the  saloon  keeper  shall  furnish 
them  free  is  gaming.**^    Where  a  statute  forbids  gambling  in  or 


41  Marshall  v.  Fox,  L.  R.  6 ;    Q. 

B.  370;  24  L.  T.  751;  40  L.  J.  M. 

C.  142;    19  W.  R.   1108;    35  J.   P. 
'631. 

42McGan  v.  Pratley,  24  Vict. 
L.  R.  840 ;  5  Austr.  L.  R.  ( C.  N. ) 
80. 

43  Dunbar  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr. 
Rep.  596;  31  S.  W.  401;  Humph- 
reys V.  Statu,  34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 
434;  30  S.  W.  1066;  Stone  v. 
State,  3  Tex.  App.  675;  Hall  v. 
State,  (Tex.  Cr.  App.);  34 
S.  W.  122;  Hitchens  v.  People,  39 
■N.  Y.  454;  Robinson  v.  State,  24 
Tex.  App.  4;  5  S.  W.  509;  Ballen 
V.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  483;  9  S. 
W.  7'65 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Ar- 
nold, 4  Pick.  251 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Bolkom,  3  Pick.  251;  Buford  v. 
Commonwealth,  14  B.  Mon.  24; 
State  V.  Kennedy,  1  Ala.  31;  Ray 
V.  State,  50  Ala.  172;  Shihagan 
V.  State,  9  Tex.  430;  Smith  v. 
State,  23  Ala.  39;  Cole  v.  State, 
9   Tex.  42. 

44Bachellor    v.    State,    10    Tex. 


260;  Brown  v.  State,  49  N.  J.  L. 
61;  7  Atl.  340;  Commonwealth  v. 
Taylor,  14  Gray,  26;  Common- 
wealth V.  Gourdier,  14  Gray,  390; 
Stahel  V.  Commonwealth,  7  Bush, 
387;  Marston  v.  Commonwealth, 
18   B.   Mon.   485;   State  v.  Leicht, 

17  Iowa,  28;  State  v.  Cooster,  10 
Iowa,  453;  State  v.  Maurer,  7 
Clarke  (la.),  406;  Montford  v. 
Christian,  13  Vict.  L.  R.  893;  Ex 
parte  Little,  19  W.  X.  (X.  S. 
W.)  268;  Fuller  v.  Fouhy,  24  N. 
Z.  753;  McCalman  v.  State,  96 
Ala.  98;  11  So.  408;  King  v. 
Laird,  7  Can.  Cr.  Cas.  318;  Jenks 
V.  Turpin,  13  Q.  B.  Div.  505,  524; 
48  J.  P.  489;  49  J.  P.  20;  53  L. 
J.  M.  C.  161;  50  L.  T.  808;  Craig 
V.  Boy  an  [1901],  2  Irish  Rep.  429. 

45  Hall  V.  State,  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.);  34  S.  W.  122;  People  v. 
Cutler,  28  Hun,  465;  INIarshall  v. 
Creen,   26    N.   Z.    161. 

46  McDaniel    v.    Commonwealth, 

18  B.  Mon.  485;  Marston  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 18  B.  Mon.  485. 


§  242  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  370 

at  a  place  where  liquors  are  sold,  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
place  is  licensed  or  not.*^  A  statute  preventing  gambling 
"at"  any  tavern,  storehouse  for  retailing  liquor,  or  the  like, 
means  in  or  near  such  place,**  and  one  which  forbids  it  in 
the  house  means  any  part  of  the  house ;  *"  but  if  the  place 
where  gaming  is  forbidden  is  "the  premises,"  then  only  such 
places  as  are  occupied  by  the  dealer  with  the  house  in  which  he 
retails,  is  the  place.^^  If  there  be  no  connection  between  the 
saloon  and  the  room  where  the  gambling  takes  place,  though 
in  fact  connected  by  a  stairway,  but  not  used  by  the  family  in 
reaching  it,  the  offense  against  gambling  in  a  house  where 
liquor  is  sold  is  not  committed.^'  But  a  mere  partition  be- 
tween the  saloon  and  the  gambling  room  having  a  window  in 
it  through  which  liquor  is  supplied  when  called  for  (by  rap- 
ping) is  not  sufficient  to  prevent  the  commission  of  the  of- 
fense.^- Playing  in  a  private  or  upper  bedroom  in  the  building, 
the  bedroom  not  being  connected  with  the  saloon,  is  not  an 
offense."  But  where  the  proprietor  used  the  story  over  his 
saloon  for  a  bedroom  and  reached  it  by  an  outside  stairway,  it 
was  held  that  he  violated  the  statute.^*  If  it  had  been  his  ten- 
ant who  occupied  the  bedroom,  the  proprietor  would  not  have 
been  guilty.^"'  Where  the  gambling  took  place  in  the  yard  im- 
mediately back  of  the  licensed  hotel,  but  the  yard  was  not  in- 
cluded in  the  lease  of  the  hotel,  and  the  frequenters  of  the 
hotel  had  no  right  to  occupy  the  yard,  it  not  being  open  to  the 

47  state  V.  Hawkins,  91  N.  C.  ss  Phillips  v.  State,  51  Ala.  20 
626;  State  v.  'lerry,  4  Dev.  &  B.  Watson  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App 
185.  See  State  v.  Hix,  3  Dev.  160;  Dale  v.  State,  27  Ala.  31 
(N.  C.)    116.  Miller  v.   State,   35  Tex.   Cr.   Rep 

48  Ray  V.  State,   50  Ala.   172.  650;    34    S.    W.    959;    Winters    v 

49  Cole    V.    State,    9     Tex.    42;  State,   33    Tex.    Cr.    Rep.   395;    26 
State   V.    Terry,    9    Ired.    (N.    C.)  S.  W.  S39. 

378 ;   State  v.  Terry,  4  Dev.  &  B.  54  Johnson  v.  State,  19  Ala.  527 ; 

185.  ^  Kicker  v.  State,  133  Ala.  193;    32 

50  State   V.    Black,    9    Ired.    (N.       So.  253. 

C),  378.  ssGalbreath    v.    State,    36    Tex. 

61  Winters  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  200;     Hercrow    v.    State,    2    Tex. 

Rep.  395;   26  S.  W.   839;   Watson  App.   511;   In  re  Clement,   190  N. 

V.  State,   13  Tex.  App.  160.  Y.   523;   83  N.  E.   1123;   affirming 

62Stebbin8    v.     State,    22    Tex.  119  N.  Y.  App.  Div,  622;    104  N. 

App.  32;  2  S.  W.  617.  Y.  Supp.  25. 


371  REGULATING   LIQUOE   TRAFFIC.  §  242 

street  for  the  use  of  the  public,  and  access  to  it  being  gained 
from  the  hotel,  it  was  held  that  the  yard  might  properly  be 
regarded  as  a  part  of  the  hotel,  and  evidence  of  gambling  there 
was  properly  admitted.^"  Where  a  statute  forbade  gam- 
bling on  a  steamboat  while  "navigating  any  of  the  rivers  of 
the  State,"  it  was  held  no  oflFeuse  to  gamble  on  a  steamboat 
while  on  a  salt  water  bay  within  the  State."  Permitting  gam- 
bling in  the  back  yard  of  a  saloon,  from  which  entrance  to  the 
saloon  is  provided,  is  the  permitting  of  gambling  "at"  a 
store  where  liquor  is  sold.^^  Where  the  prohibition  is  against 
gambling  in  a  "public  place,"  then  a  place  which  becomes  a 
public  place  by  force  of  circumstances  is  included;  and  a 
"public  house"  is  such  a  place.^^  A  court  house,  or  tavern, 
or  store,  or  saloon  is  a  public  place.*=°  But  a  bedroom  adjoin- 
ing a  law  office  is  not  when  all  doors  are  locked  and  the  win- 
dows closed,  and  the  persons  playing  are  privately  invited  by 
the  occupant  to  it.'-'  Nor  is  a  place  one  hundred  yards  from 
the  saloon,  in  the  woods  and  that  distance  from  the  public 
highway,  which  cannot  be  seen  from  either  the  saloon  or  high- 
way.*^^  When  the  gambling  took  place  in  a  room  behind  the 
bar,  without  the  saloon  keeper's  knowledge,  and  one  of  the  par- 
ticipants in  the  game  was  a  boarder  on  the  premises,  and  the 
cards  nsed  were  his,  it  was  held  that  the  saloon  keeper  was 
liable.*^^  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  keeper  of  a  hotel  closed 
up  and  locked  his  premises  at  11  p.  m.  and  went  to  bed,  leaving 
no  one  in  charge,  and  ul  12:30  a.  m.  the  police  entered  and 
found  several  persons,  some  of  whom  were  boarders,  gambling, 
it  was  held  that  he  Vv  as  not  guilty."  Where  a  statute  provided 
that  betting  at  a  private  residence  should  be  exempt  from  its 

ssBritrgs    v.    Noonan,    27    Vict.       v.  State,  50  Ala.  172;  Shihagan  v. 
L.  R.   580;    23   Austr.  L.   T.   138;       State,  9  Tex.  430. 
7  Austr.  L.  R.  274.  ^'^  Shihagan  v.  State,  9  Tex.  430. 

67  Johnson  v.  State,  74  Ala.  537.  «i  Roquemore   v.   State,    19    Ala. 

s8  James  v.  State,  133  Ala.  208;       528. 
32    So.   237.      As   within   an   open  6=  Smith  v.  State,  23  Ala.  39. 

place  within  ten  feet  of  the  house.  63  Rex.  v.  Laird   [1903],  6  Ont. 

Napier  v.  State,  50  Ala.  168;  Ray       L.   R.   180. 
V.  State,  50  Ala.  172.  «*    ^^  P<^rte  Lambert,  22  W.  N. 

B9  Windham  v.  State,  26  Ala.  69;        (N.  S.  W.)    130. 
Napier  v.  State,  50  Ala.  168 ;  Ray 


§242 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


372 


provisions,  and  the  bet  was  made  in  a  room  over  a  saloon, 
reached  by  a  stairway  from  the  sidewalk  to  a  hall,  into  which 
the  room  door  opened,  and  the  room  was  furnished  with  a 
bed,  table,  washstand,  trunk,  and  clothing,  and  was  used  by  a 
single  man  for  a  bedroom,  it  was  held  that  no  offense  had  been 
conmiitted.^^  Games  of  skill  and  chance  are  not,  usually,  for- 
bidden ;  and  a  statute  forbidding  unlawful  games  in  a  saloon 
does  not  reach  such  games  when  not  played  for  stakes.*'*'  If 
the  charge  be  that  the  accused  played  "  in  a  house  for  retailing 
spirituous  liquors,"  proof  of  playing  in  a  "saloon"  will  not 
support  the  charge,  unless  it  be  shown  spirituous  liquors  were 
there  sold.*'^  The  evidence  must  show  that  the  gambling  took 
place  before  the  indictment  was  found,  and  proving  that  it 
took  place  at  the  time  of  the  trial  is  not  sufficient.*'^  If  liquor 
had  been  sold  in  the  past,  but  the  selling  had  ceased  when  the 
gaming  took  place,  then  there  can  be  no  conviction.*'^  A  stat- 
ute forbidding  the  use  of  pool  tables  in  a  saloon  makes  it  an 
offense  to  maintain  a  table  irrespective  of  the  question  of 
gambling.''** 


65  Stewart  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr. 
Rep.  33;   28  S.  W.  806. 

6«  Lockwood  V.  Cooper  [1903], 
2  K.  B.  428;  72  L.  J.  K.  B.  690; 
iS9  L.  T.  306;  52  VV.  R.  48;  67 
J,  P.  307;   20  Cox  C.  C.  509. 

Euchre  has  been  held  not  to 
be  an  "unlawful  game"  even  when 
played  for  money,  the  statute  not 
making  it  an  unlawful  game. 
Glasson  v.  Whitly,  2  N.  Z.  L.  R. 
118;  Leight  v.  Milton,  2  N,  Z. 
L.  R.  214.  But  it  has  been  held 
to  be  a  game  of  chance.  King  v. 
Laird,  7   Can.   Cr.  Cas.   318. 

Poker  played  for  stakes  is  an 
"unlawful  game."  Ex  parte  Lit- 
tle, 19  W.  N.   (N.  S.  W.)    268. 

A  witness  may  be  asked  to  de- 
scribe what  he  saw  in  a  room  in 
the  way  of  furniture  for  the  pur- 
pose of  eliciting  from  him  whether 
or  not  any  gambling  devices  were 


in  the  room.  Utsler  v.  Territory, 
10  Okla.  463;   62  Pac.  287. 

If  a  saloon  keeper  receives  part 
of  the  money  won  in  his  place,  he 
is  liable  for  the  whole  of  the 
amount  lost.  Cartright  v.  Mc. 
Elden    (Ky.),    116   S.   W.   297. 

6T  Springfield  v.  State,  (Tex.); 
13  S.  W.  752. 

es  Mitchell  v.  State,  55  Ala.  160. 

09  Logan   v.   State,  24  Ala.   182. 

70  State  V.  Ranelle,  (Mo.);  119 
'S.  W.  55. 

A  special  verdict  finding  these 
facts  was  held  to  show  the  de- 
fendant guilty  of  the  offense  of 
gaming:  "We  find  that  the  de- 
fendant, with  some  six  or  more 
other  gentlemen,  played  at  a  game 
called  'tenpins,'  or  'handicap.'  In 
this  game  no  one  played  to  beat 
any  other  gentleman,  but  each  one 
had    assigned    to    him    a    certain 


373 


REGULATING    LIQUOR    TRAFFIC. 


§243 


Sec.  243.     Suffering,    gambling   or   betting   on    premises — 
English  statute. 

An  English  statute  provides  that  "if  any  licensed  person 
suffers  any  gaming  or  unlawful  game  to  be  carried  on  on  his 
premises  it  shall  be  an  offense.'^  What  is  "gaming  or 
an  unlawful  game,"  has  been  the  subject  of  a  number 
of  decisions  in  that  country.  Thus,  nine-pins  or  skittles 
played  for  beer  on  licensed  premises  are  unlawful,'-  and 
it  is  immaterial  whether  the  beer  is  drunk  on  the  prem- 
ises or  not.^'  So  this  is  true  if  cards  are  played  for 
money.'*  It  is  no  defense  that  the  game,  such  as  skittle  pool, 
is  said  to  be  mostly  a  game  of  skill,  if  it  is  played  for  money.'^'* 
But  playing  a  game  of  skill  and  chance,  not  being  of  itself  an 
unlawful  game,  and  not  being  played  for  stakes,  but  for  prizes 
given  by  third  persons,  is  not  unlawful  within  this  statute.^'' 
Where  a  licensed  person  suffered  the  game  of  "pool"  to  be 
played  for  small  stakes  on  a  table  in  his  licensed  premises,  it 
was  held  by  the  Irish  courts  that  he  had  committed  the  offense 


number  of  pins  to  get,  with  a  cer- 
tain number  of  balls,  some  more 
and  s<jme  less,  according  as  they 
were  considered  good  or  bad  play- 
ers. If  the  player  did  not  get  the 
number  of  pins  assigned  him,  he 
was  to  treat  to  a  bottle  of  cham- 
pagne. Tlie  defendant  did  play 
in  this  game,  in  Maury  county,  in 
less  than  six  months  preceding 
this  presentment,  and  did  some- 
times, on  failing  to  get  the  num- 
ber of  pins  allotted  to  him,  treat 
to  a  Lottie  of  champagne,  and 
sometimes  he  did  not.  It  was 
agreed  by  the  parties,  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  playing,  that 
the  treat  was  a  voluntary  thing, 
and  no  one  need  do  so,  unless  he 
was  perfectly  willing.  The  jury 
further  find  that  the  defendant 
and  the  other  gentlemen  engaged 
in  this  play  did  not  believe  it  to 


be  gaming."  Walker  v.  State,  32 
Tenn.    (2   Swan)    287. 

Rooms  of  a  commercial  club,  to 
which  only  the  club  members  and 
invited  visitors  are  admitted,  is 
not  a  public  place  where  card 
playing  is  forbidden.  Grant  v. 
State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  .527;  27 
S.  W.  127;  Winters  v.  State,  33 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  39<5;   26  S.  W.  839. 

71  35  and  36  Vict.  c.  94,  §  17. 

"Danford  v.  Taylor,  20  L.  T. 
483;  33  J.  P.  012. 

73  Luff  V.  Leaper,  30  J.  P.   773. 

74  Patten  v.  Rhymer,  3  El.  &  El. 
1;  29  L.  J.  M.  C.  189;  24  J.  P- 
342;   2  L.  T.  352;  8  W.  R.  496. 

'■•  Dyson  v.  Mason,  22  Q.  B. 
Div.  351;  53  J.  P.  202;  58  L.  J. 
M.  C.  55 ;   60  L.  T.  285. 

'6  Lockwood  v.  Cooper,  72  L.  J. 
K.  P..  090;  07  J.  P.  307;  52  W. 
R.  4S;  89  L.  T.  306;  19  T.  L.  R. 
610. 


§243 


TR.iJ'PIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


374 


of  gaming  under  this  statute.^^  If  the  licensee  lend  money 
to  a  guest  to  play  for  money,  such  licensee  cannot  recover  it: '" 
nor  can  he  recover  money  lost,  e.  g.,  at  the  game  of  billiards/* 
There  are  some  games  unlawful  in  themselves,  and  others  are 
illegal  only  when  played  for  money. *'^  Thus  cirds  and  dice 
are  not  in  themselves  unlawful."^  nor  dominoes. ^^*  The  games 
may  be  lawful,  as  being  mostly  games  of  skni,^^  vet  if  played 
for  money  they  are  generallv  (Tamine.^^  The  licensee  cannot 
set  up  an  exemption  from  liability  under  the  statute  on  the 
ground  that  the  persons  playing  at  the  game  were  his  own  pri- 
vate fr^"ends  and  not  customers. "*  And  although  another  stat- 
ute *■"'  allows  him  to  keep  private  friends  in  his  house  after  clos- 
ing hours,  he  is  still  liable  under  the  statute  if  he  allows  them 
to  gamble  ^'^  or  play  at  billiards.^^  The  game  of  baccarat  is  more 
of  a  game  of  chance  than  skill,  and  is  illegal.^^  Gaming  in- 
tended to  injure  public  morals  is  illegal  at  common  law.®' 
But  mere  excessive  gaming  not  in  a  common  gambling  hou^e 
is  not  unlawful.^**    In  England  ace  of  hearts,  pharaoh  (faro), 


77  Craig  V.  Boyan  [1901],  2 
Irish  Rep.  429. 

78  Foot  V.  Baker,  6  Scott  N. 
R.  301;  5  Man.  &  Gr.  335. 

70  Parsons  v.  Alexander,  24  L. 
J.  Q.  B.  277;   5  E.  &  B.  263. 

80  For  an  enumeration  of  illegal 
games,  see  Jenks  v.  Turpin,  12  Q. 
B.  Div.  505;  48  J.  P.  489;  49  J. 
P.  20;  53  L.  J.  M.  C.  161;  50  L. 
T.  808;  Fairclough  v.  Whitmore, 
64  L.  J.  Ch.  386;  72  L.  T.  354; 
43  W.  R.  421;   13  Rep.  402. 

81  Allport  V.  Nutt,  1  C.  B.  075 ; 
14  L.  J.  C.  P.  272. 

81*  Regina  v.  Ashton,  1  E.  L.  & 
B.  L.  286;  16  J.  P.  790;  22  L.  J. 
M.  C.  61;   17  Jur.  501. 

82  Bew  V.  Harston,  3  Q.  B.  Div. 
454 ;  42  J.  P.  808 ;  47  L.  J.  M.  C. 
121;  26  W.  R.  915. 

83  Dyson  V.  Mason,  22  (?.  B. 
Div.  351;  53  J.  P.  262;  58  L.  J. 
M.  C.  55;  60  L.  T.  2G5;  Parsons 
V.  Alexander,  24  L.  J.  Q.  B.  277; 


5  E.  &  B.  263;  Lockwood  V. 
Cooper,  72  L.  J.  K.  B.  690;  67  J. 
P.  307;  52  W.  R.  4?;  »9  L.  T, 
306;   19  T.  L.  R.  610. 

8*  Patten  v.  Rhymer,  3  El.  & 
El.  1;  29  L.  J.  M.  C.  189;  24  J. 
P.  342;  2  L.  T.  352;  8  W.   11.  496. 

85  37  and  38  Vict.  c.  49,  §  30. 

ssHare  v.  Osborne,  34  L.  T. 
294;  Osborne  v.  Hare,  40  J.  P. 
759 ;  Cooper  v.  Osbornv^,  34  L.  T. 
(X.  S.)   347;  40  J.  P.  759. 

87  Ovenden  v.  Raymond,  40  J. 
P.  727;   34  L.  T.  698. 

88  Jenks  V.  Turpin,  13  Q.  B. 
Div.  505;  53  L.  J.  M.  C.  161;  50 
L.  T.  808;  48  J.  P.  420n;  49  J. 
P.   20. 

89  Rex  V.  Rogiers,  1  B.  &  C. 
272;  2  D.  &  Ry.  431;  Regina  v. 
Rice,  L.  R.  1;  C.  C.  R.  21;  35 
L.  J.  M.  C.  93;  14  W.  R.  56;  13 
L.   T.    382. 

90  Jenks  v.  Turpin,  supra. 


375  REGULATING    LIQUOR   TR.VFFIC,  §  244 

bassett  and  hazard,**^  panago,  and  every  other  game  with  dice 
or  dice  (except  backgammon)  and  roulette  (or  roly-poly),  and 
any  other  mere  game  of  chance  are  illegal  games  by  statutes. 
Other  games  are  unlawful  only  when  played  in  common  gam- 
ing houses.  Thus,  bowling,  coyting,  half-bowl,  tennis,  dicing 
table,  or  carding  were  unlawful  until  1845,  after  which  games 
of  mere  skill  were  said  not  to  be  illegal."- 

Sec.  244.     Servant  permitting  gambling — Knowledge  of  gam- 
bling. 

If  the  barkeeper  or  servant  of  the  saloon  keeper  permit  gam- 
bling on  the  premises  without  such  keeper's  knowledge  and 
contrary  to  his  orders,  such  keeper  is  not  liable."^  In  all  such 
cases  it  must  appear  that  the  saloon  keeper  had  either  actual 
or  constructive  knowledge  that  gambling  was  going  on,  to 
make  it  a  violation  of  the  statute.^*  The  fact  that  the  servant 
knew  of  the  gambling  when  he  was  not  in  charge  of  the  prem- 
ises, will  not  render  the  keeper  liable.^^  But  if  the  servant 
was  in  charge  of  the  premises  when  the  gambling  took  place, 
then  the  keeper  is  liable.^"  If  the  game  is  played  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  licensed  person  or  the  manager,  and  is  a 
mere  casual  frolic,  no  penalty  is  incurred  by  him.^^  But  if  the 
conduct  of  the  landlord  is  such  that  he  leaves  the  management 
of  the  house  to  a  servant,  and  either  he  or  such  servant  closes 
his  eyes  to  what  is  going  on,  the  landlord  will  be  guilty  of  the 
■offense,  his  gross  negligence  or  willful  shutting  of  h'.s  own 
eyes  or  his  manager's  eyes  being  equivalent  to  "suffering  the 

siMackinnell  v.  Robinson,  3  M.  95  iSomerset    v.    Hart,    53    L.    J. 

&  W.  434.  M.   C.   77;    12   Q.   B.  Div.   360;    48 

92Jenks    V.    Turpin,   per   Hawk-  J.  P.  327. 
ins,  J.  9«  Bond  v.  Evans,  57  L.  J.  M.  C. 

93  Wilson  V.  State,  64  Ark.  586;  105;  21   Q.   B.  Div.  249;   59  L.  T. 

43   S.    W.    972;    Ex   parte    Little,  411;   36  W.  R.  7i)7;  52  J.  P.  612; 

19  W.   N.    (N.   S.   W.)    266    (wife  Tippett  v.  Heyman,  19  W.  N.   (^'. 

in  charge)  ;    Avards  v.   Dance,   26  S.   \V.)   6;   King  v.  Laird,  7  ■Can. 

J.  P.  437.  Cr.  Cas.  318. 

9*  Francis  v.  Smith,  2  W.  N.  i2.  ^i  Avards    v.    Dance,    26    J.    P. 

(N.  S.   W.)   82;    Maloney  v.   Clif-  437. 
ford,  6  W.  N.    (N.  S.  W.)    124. 


§  245  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  376 

game  to  be  carried  on. ' '  ^^  Thus,  where  the  manager  goes  to 
bed  and  leaves  the  house  under  the  management  of  the 
"boots,"  in  England,  during  late  hours,  and  gaming  goes  on, 
the  licensed  person  may  be  rightly  convicted.^'-*  And  where 
the  skittle  alley  was  in  charge  of  a  separate  attendant,  who  al- 
lowed gambling,  though  directed  generally  by  the  licensed 
holder  never  to  do  so,  the  latter  was  held  rightly  convicted.^ 
But  where  all  that  was  shown  was  that  the  potman,  who  was 
not  proved  to  be  in  charge,  saw  some  gambling,  and  did  noth- 
ing to  prevent  it,  and  the  master  was  in  another  part  of  the 
public  building  and  knew  nothing  whatever  about  the  matter, 
the  defendant  master  was  acquitted.-  From  these  cases  it 
would  seem  that  a  licensee  is  liable  if  the  offense  be  commit- 
ted by  a  person  who  has  been  left  to  act  in  the  management  of 
the  business,  although  the  licensee  did  not  know  or  connive 
at  the  offense.''  If  a  licensed  person  allows  a  man  to  visit  his 
house  and  to  make  bets  with  persons  resorting  thereto,  he  (the 
licensed  person)  may  be  convicted  for  suffering  his  house  to 
be  used  for  the  purpose  of  betting  with  persons  resorting 
thereto.* 

Sec.  245.     Keeping  a  betting  house. 

An  English  statute  provides  that  "no  house,  office,  room 
or  other  place  shall  be  opened,  kept,  or  used  for  the  purpose 

98  Bosley  v.  Davies,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  "with   an   intimation  of   the  opin- 

84;    45  L.  J.  M.   C.   27;    33  L.  T.  ion  of  the  court  that  actual  knowl- 

628;  24  W.  R.  140;  40  J.  P.  550;  edge    in    the    sense    of    seeing    or 

Redgate  v.   Haynes,    1    Q.   B.   Div.  hearing   by    the    party   charged   is 

SQ;    41   J.   P.   86 ;    33   L.    T.   779 ;  not  necessary,  but  that  there  must 

45  L.  J.  M.  C  '65.  be  some   circumstance  from  which 

"O'Crabtree    v.    Hale,    43    J.    P.  it  may  be  inferred  that  he  or  his 

499.  servants  had  connived  at  what  was 

1  Bond  V.  Evans,   21   Q.  B.  Div.  going     on.       Constructive     knowl- 

249;  52  J.  P.  513;  57  L.  J.  M.  C.  edge  will   supply  the  place  of  ac- 

105;  '59  L.  T.  411;   3-6  W.  R.  767.  tual   knowledge."     Quoted  in  Pat- 

-  Somerset    v.    Hart,    12    Q.    B.  terson's      Licensing      Acts      ( l'9th 

Div.  360;   48  J.   P.   327;   53  L.  J.  Ed.),  p.  377. 
M.  C.  77.  4Peddie    v.    Bennett,    61    J.    P. 

3  The  case   of  Bosley  v.   Davies,  680.     But  see  Ex  parte  Marshall, 

supra,    was    sent    back    for    trial,  71  J.  P.  501, 


377  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  245 

of  tlie  ouiier,  occupier  or  keeper  thereof,  or  any  person  using 
the  same,  or  any  person  procured  or  employed  by  or  acting  for 
or  on  behalf  of  such  owner,  occupier,  or  keeper,  or  person  us- 
ing the  same,  or  of  any  pei-son  having  the  care  or  manage- 
ment or  in  any  manner  conducting  the  business  thereof,  bet- 
ting with  persons  resorting  thereto,  or  for  the  purpose  of  any 
money  or  valuable  thing  being  received  by  or  on  behalf  of 
such  owner,  occupier,  keeper  or  person  aforesaid,  as  or  for 
the  consideration  for  any  assurance,  undertaking,  promise  or 
agreement,  express  or  implied,  to  pay  or  give  thereafter  any 
money  or  valuable  thing  on  any  event  or  contingency  of  or 
relating  to  any  horse  race  or  other  race,  fight,  game,  sport,  or 
exercise,  or  as  or  for  the  consideration  for  securing,  the  pay- 
ing or  giving  by  some  other  person  of  any  money  or  valuable 
thing  on  any  such  event  or  contingency  aforesaid ;  and  every 
house,  office,  room  or  other  place  opened,  kept  or  used  for 
the  purposes  aforesaid,  or  any  of  them,  is  hereby  declared  to  be 
a  common  nuisance  and  contrary  to  law. ' '  ^  The  second  section 
of  this  same  act  makes  all  such  places  in  law  a  common  gaming 
house.  Inasmuch  as  saloons  are  frequently  used  as  places 
for  gambling,  it  is  believed  that  the  construction  of  this  act 
as  made  by  the  courts  will  l)e  of  use  sufficient  to  justify  their 
citation  and  consideration  here.  Tender  its  provisions  a  book- 
maker using  the  bar  of  a  public  house  for  the  purpose  of  pay- 
ing debts  made  and  lost  els(nvhere  is  not  using  the  house  for 
the  purpose  of  ' '  betting  with  persons  resorting  thereto. ' '  *>  This 
statute  creates  two  separate  and  distinct  offenses,  the  one  keep- 
ing the  places  referred  to,  first,  for  the  purpose  of  betting 
with  persons  resorting  thereto ;  and,  secondly,  for  the  purpose 
of  receiving  deposits  on  bets.  A  person  may  be  rightly  con- 
victed for  one  or  the  other  of  these  offenses.^  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  a  conviction  for  keeping  a  house  for  the  purpose  of 
betting  with  persons  resorting  thereto  to  prove  an  actual  resort- 
ing, and  it  is  enough  to  show  that  the  house  was  opened  and 

•'■•  m  and  17  Vict.  c.  119,  §  1.  Stoddart  v.  Hawko,  .50  W.  R.  93; 

«  Bradford  v.  Dawson   [1897],   1  18  T.   L.   R.  22. 

Q.  B.  307;    61  J.  P.  134;   66  L.  J.  ^  Bond    v.    Plumb    [1894],    1    y. 

Q.  B.  191;   76  L.  T.  54;  4.5  W.  R.  B.  169;  58  J.  P.  168. 
347;    18  €ox  C.  C.  473.     See  also 


§  245  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  378 

advertised  as  a  betting  house.  But  if  evidence  of  resorting  is 
relied  upon  it  must  be  physical  "resorting"  as  that  term  is 
used  in  its  ordinary  sense.*  If  two  separate  acts  of  betting 
with  strangers  are  proved  and  betting  books  kept,  this  is  some 
evidence  of  keeping  a  betting  house.^  But  if  the  betting  takes 
place  between  members  of  a  bona  fide  club  this  is  not  an  of- 
fense within  this  statute.'**  A  person  who  goes  into  a  bar 
of  a  public  house,  and  not  casually,  but  for  several  days,  habi- 
tually bets  with  people  he  meets  there  on  horse-racing,  though 
he  has  no  interest  in  the  room  or  house,  may  be  convicted  of 
using  the  house  for  betting."  "Where  it  was  proved  that  on 
each  of  three  different  days  the  defendant  was  in  the  bar  of 
a  beer  house  and  a  number  of  persons  came  in,  took  slips  of 
paper  which  were  hanging  on  the  wall,  wrote  on  the  slips 
the  names  of  the  horses  they  wished  to  back  for  the  races, 
.wrapped  up  in  the  slips  the  money  they  staked  and  handed 
the  slips  with  the  money  enclosed  to  the  defendant;  and  it 
was  also  proved  that  usually  the  defendant  went  outside  and 
received  the  slips  and  the  money  on  the  doorstep  of  the  house, 
but  on  one  of  the  three  days  he  received  two  slips  with  money 
enclosed  in  the  bar,  it  was  held  that  there  was  evidence  to  go 
to  the  jury  that  the  defendant  had  used  the  bar  for  the  pur- 
pose of  betting  with  persons  resorting  thereto  on  each  of  the 
three  days,  and  that  he  was  rightly  convicted.'-  The  license 
holder  Avho  knows  of  a  bookmaker  using  the  bar  of  his  house 
for  the  purpose  of  betting  with  the  customers  may  also  be  con- 
victed of  suffering  betting  upon  his  premises.'^  "Where  a  stran- 
ger stood  on  a  piece  of  waste  ground  near  but  not  belonging 
to  a  public  house  and  received  bets  in  sealed  packets,  and  these 

sRegina  v.  Brown,  1  Q.  B.  119;  n  MacWilliam  v.  Dawson,  58  J. 

64  L.  J.  M.  C.  1;   72  L.  T.  22;  43  P.     182;     Whitehurst    v.     Fincher, 

W.  R.  222 ;  59  J.  P.  485 ;   15  Rep.  62  L.  T.  433 ;    5*  J.  P.  565. 

59.  i2Regina   v.    Warton    [1895],    1 

9Foote  V.  Butler,  41   J.  P.  7&2.  Q.  B.  227;  64  L.  J.  M.  C.  74;   72 

10  Downs    V.   Jackson    [1895],   2  L.   T.   29;    15    Rep.    102;    18   Cox 

Q.  B.  203;   59  J.  P.  487;  64  L.  J.  C.  C.  70. 

M.  C.  238;    72  L.  T.   728;    43   \V.  is  Hornsby  v.  Raggett  [1892],  1 

R.   5G6;    15   Rep.   466;    Oldham  v.  Q.   B.  20;  66  L.  T.  21;   40  W.  R. 

Ramsden,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  309;   22  111;  55  J.  P.  508. 

L.  T.  825 ;  39  J.  P.  583. 


379  REGin.ATING   LIQUOR    TRAFFIC.  §  245 

packets  were  fetched  at  intervals  by  a  servant  of  the  house, 
who  kept  them  in  the  house  till  the  stranger  entered  and 
opened  them,  but  the  stranger  had  no  interest  in  the  house,  it 
was  held  that  the  license  holder  could  not  be  convicted  of  suf- 
fering the  stranger  to  use  the  house  as  a  betting  house.^* 
Where  a  professional  betting  man  went  for  three  hours  every- 
day to  a  beer  house  and  conducted  the  business  of  ready- 
money  betting  in  the  saloon  to  the  knowledge  of  the  license 
holder,  it  was  held  that  the  betting  man  was  guilty  of  the 
offense  of  using  a  place  for  betting  and  the  license  holder 
of  permitting  his  licensed  premises  to  be  used  as  a  place  of 
betting.^^  If  a  betting  man  carries  on  his  betting  without  the 
knowledge  or  consent  of  the  license  holder,  he  [the  licensee] 
cannot  be  convicted.^*'  The  sale  and  receipt  of  the  pur- 
chase money  for  tickets  in  an  ordinary  Derby  sweepstakes  by  a 
licensed  victualler  in  England  in  the  bar  of  his  house  is  not 
an  offense  against  the  betting  act  of  that  country,  although 
it  may  be  a  lottery."  Where  the  grounds  of  a  public  house 
are  used  for  races  or  matches  much  depends  on  the  kind 
of  uses  and  the  relation  between  the  owner  of  the  place  and 
those  who  bet  there  to  constitute  the  user  an  offense. 
Thus,  where  the  owner  of  the  ground  allowed  a  betting 
man  to  receive  bets  in  a  palisade  forty-four  yards  long 
and  two  yards  wide,  the  latter  was  held  to  keep  a  "place."  ^* 
So  where  a  betting  man  stood  on  a  stool  on  which  there 
was   a   large   umbrella,   on    a   race   ground,   it   was   held  he 

14  Davis  V.  Stephenson,  24  Q.  B.  8^;   51   W.   R.   604;   88   L.  T.   32; 

Div.  529;   54  J.   P.  565;  59  L.   J.  19  T.  L.  R.  223. 
M.  C.  73;  62  L.  T.  436;  38  W.  H.  is  Rex    v.    A.    Deavillc,    Rex  v. 

492.  Simpson   [1903],   1   K.  IJ.  468;   72 

i&Belton  V.  Busby   [1899],  2  Q.  L.  J.  K.  B.  272;   67  J.  P.  82;   51 

B.    3«0;    '68   L.   J.    Q.    B.    859;    63  W.   R.  -604;    88    L.   T.    32;    19    T. 

J.  P.  709;  47  W.  R.  636;  81  L.  T.  L.    R.   223. 

196;    15    T.   L.    R.    45i8.      Consult  i^  Regina  v.  Hobbs  [1898],  2  Q. 

also  Tromans  V.  Hodkinson  [1903],  B.  647;  62  J.  P.  474,  561;   67  L. 

1    K.   B.   30;    72   L.   J.   K.   B.   21;  J.   Q.    B.   928;    79   L.   T.    160;    14 

67   J.   P.    30;    51    W.    R.   286;    87  T.  L.  R.  573;  47  W.  R.  79. 
L.   T.    549;    19   T.   L.    R.    19;    Rex  is  Shaw     v.     Morley,     L.     R.     3 

V,    J.    Dea'ville     [1903],    1    K.    B.  Exch.  137;   S2  J.  P.  391. 
468 ;  72  L.  J.  K.  B.  272 ;  67  J.  P. 


§245 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


380 


kept  a  "place."  ^'^  Likewise,  where  the  place  was  a  field 
of  three  acres,  in  which  was  a  pigeon-shooting  match  for  ten 
pounds  a  side,  and  afterwards  a  foot  race  took  place,  to  which 
persons  were  admitted  who  betted  with  each  other,  it  was 
held  he  kept  a  "place."-"  The  same  ruling  was  made  where 
an  occupier  of  enclosed  land  permitted  bookmakers  to  bet 
on  a  foot  race  in  the  enclosed  land,-^  and  also  where  the  book- 
maker stood  in  the  ring  at  a  grand  stand  during  the  race.-^ 
But  where  one  S  went  into  a  field  where  dog  races  were  held, 
but  only  walked  up  and  down,  and  stood  in  no  one  spot  mak- 
ing bets,  it  was  held  that  he  did  not  keep  a  ' '  place ' '  for  bet- 
tinsr.--* 


10  Bows  V.  Fenwick,  L.  R.  9 ; 
C.  P.  339;  43  L.  J.  M.  C.  107;  30 
L.  T.  524;  22  W.  R.  804;  38  J.  P. 
440. 

20  Eastwood  v.  Miller,  L.  R.  9; 
Q.  B.  440;  43  L.  J.  M.  C.  139; 
30  L.  T.  71G;  22  W.  R.  7C0;  38 
J.  P.  <347. 

2iHaigli  V.  Sheffield,  L.  R.,  10 
Q.  B.  102;  44  L.  J.  M.  C.  17;  31 
L.  T.  536;  23  W.  R.  547;  .0  J.  P. 
230. 

22  Galloway  v.  Morris,  8  Q.  B. 
Div.  275;   46  J.  P.  326. 

23  Snow  V.  Hill,  14  Q.  B.  Div. 
588;  54  L.  J.  M.  C.  95;  52  L.  T. 
839;  33  W.  R.  475;   a  J.  P.  440. 

Under  this  English  statute 
there  must  be  evidence  of  rnore 
than  one  act  of  betting.  Jayes  v. 
Harris,  99  L.  T.  56;   72  J.  P.  ZM. 

Further   illustrations   as   to   tho 
meaning    of     a    "place"     will     bo 
found     in     Liddell     v.     Loftliouse 
[1896],    1     Q.    B.    498;     CO    J.    P. 
264;    12   T.    L.    R.   204;    Mclnaney 
V.  llildreth    [1897],   1   Q.   B.   600 
61  J.  P.  325;   GO  L.  J.  Q.  B.  376 
76   L.   T.  463;    13   T.    L.  R.   284 
Regina    v.    Humphrey     [1897],    2 
Q.  3.  242;   Gl  J.  P.  548;   66  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  601;    77  L.  T.  2;   46  W.  R. 


0;  affirmed  H.  L.  [18<)9]  A.  C. 
143;  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  392;  G3  J.  P. 
260;  47  W.  R.  580;  SO  L.  T.  538; 
15  T.  L.  R.  2GG ;  overruling 
Hawke  v.  Dunn  [1897],  1  Q.  B. 
379;  61  J.  P.  2D2;  66  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
364;  76  L.  T.  355;  45  W.  R.  359; 
13  T.  L.  R.  281;  and  Bro\\Ti  v. 
Patch  [ICDO],  I  Q.  B.  892;  68 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  588;  63  J.  P.  421;   47 

w.  v..  c.::;  80  l.  t.  716. 

An  ordinance  prohibiting  per- 
sons from  frequenting  and  using 
any  street  or  public  place  for  the 
purposes  of  bookmaking  or  betting 
is  valid.  Burnett  w  Berry  [1896], 
1  Q.  \l.  641;  60  J.  P.  375;  G5 
L.  J.  M.  C.  US;  44  W.  R.  512;  74 
L.  T.  494;  12  T.  L,.  R.  362;  Jones 
V.  Walters,  62  J.  P.  374;  78  L.  T. 
167;  14  T.  L.  R.  265;  White  v. 
Morley  [1899],  2  Q.  B.  34;  63 
J.  P.  ::0;  C6  L.  J.  Q.  B.  702;  47 
W.  R.  883;  80  L.  T.  761;  15  T. 
L.  R.  360;  Thomas  v.  Suffers 
[1900],  1  Ch.  10;  69  L.  J.  Ch. 
27;  63  J.  P.  724;  48  W.  R.  133; 
81  L.  T.  469;  16  T.  L.  R.  7; 
Hickey  v.  Hay,  65  J.  P.  232;  17 
T.  L.  R.  '52. 

For  a  casp  of  a  penny-in-a-slot 
machine   held   to   be   kept   in   vio- 


381  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  246 

Sec,  246.     Public  dispensary. 

In  several  States  liquor  is  only  sold  at  public  dispensaries 
owned  and  managed  by  the  State  or  by  one  of  its  subdivi- 
r;ions.  This  Avas  particularly  true  of  South  Carolina.  Usually 
the  person  or  officer  in  charge  of  the  dispensary  was  selected 
by  the  county  wherein  it  was  located,  but  he  was  a  State  offi- 
cer, and  all  books,  documents  and  letters  therein  prima  facie 
related  to  the  public  business,  subject  to  examination  by  the 
Legislature.-*  The  County  Board  of  Control  in  that  State  des- 
ignated the  location  of  a  dispensary,  notice  thereof  being'duly 
given,  and  thereupon  the  voters  of  the  township  wherein  it 
was  to  be  located  could  remonstrate  by  petition  against  its 
location  in  the  township,  and  it  was  not  necessary  for  this 
remonstrance  to  specifically  specify  the  exact  place  where  the 
dispensary  was  to  be  located."'  The  officer  in  charge  of  a  dis- 
pensary was  required  to  deposit  all  monies  received  for  sales 
of  liquors  with  the  County  Treasurer,  and  to  give  bond  for  a 
faithful  accounting.^^  Any  one  purchasing  liquors  outside  the 
State  and  bringing  them  within  it  was  required  to  comply 
with  the  regulations  of  the  dispensary  law  on  their  arrival  or 
the  liquor  would  become  "contraband."-''  This  dispensary 
law  did  not  repeal  by  implication  prior  statutes  forbidding  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  in  various  counties  of  the  State,  and 
in  such  counties  dispensaries  could  not  be  established.-^^  This 
is  also  true  in  Alabama,  w^here  a  dispensary  law  had  been 
enacted;-^  nor  could  one  be  located  within  the  distance  of  a 

lation  of  the  law,  see  Fielding  v  the  State  Dispensary,  all  its  funds 

Turner    [1903],    1    K.    B.    867;    67  was   held   to  be   a   trust   fund   for 

J.  P.  252;  72  L.  J.  K.  B.  542;   51  the  payment  of  claims  of  dispen- 

W.  R.  543;    89   L.   T.   273;    19   T.  sary    creditors.       Fleischman     Co. 

L.  R.  404.  V.  Murray,   161   Fed.   152    (officers 

24  State    V.    Farnum,    73    S.    C.  not  officers  of  State ) . 

165 ;   53  S.  E.  83.  27  Dispensary     Act,     March     6, 

25  Severance  v.  Murphy,  67  S.  1896,  §  37 ;  State  v.  Holleyman 
€.    409;    46    S.    E.    35.      See    also        (S.  C),  31  S.  E;  362. 

Little    V.    Barksdale     (S.    C),    63  28  Bailey  Liquor   Co.   v.   Austin, 

S.   E.   308.  S2    Fed.    785;    See    also    State    v. 

26  Guy  V.  McDaniel,  51  &.  C.  Loftis,  49  S.  €.  443;  27  S.  E.  451. 
436;  29  S.  K.  196  (sufficiency  of  29  Rose  v.  Lampley,  146  Ala. 
complaint   to   recover   funds).  445;     41     So.     521;     Gilmore     v. 

On    winding   up    the    afTairs    of      State,    126  Ala.  20;    28  So.   382; 


§247 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


382 


church  or  schoolhouse  wherein  the  Legislature  had  provided  by 
a  prior  act  that  liquors  should  not  be  sold.^°  A  like  rule  pre- 
vails in  Georgia.^^  The  right  to  operate  a  dispensary  is  the 
exercise  of  a  franchise  which  must  be  given  by  the  State.^- 
In  North  Carolina  the  dispensary  law  does  not  repeal  the 
general  statute  forbidding  the  retail  of  liquors  without  a  li- 
cense, although  the  County  Commissioners  are  forbidden  to 
issue  a  license,  and  if  issued  it  would  be  no  protection  to  the 
holder  of  it.^^  The  Georgia  statute  authorizing  the  city  of 
Rome  to  maintain  a  dispensary  and  to  borrow  money  and 
make  purchases  of  liquors  on  credit  is  constitutional.^* 

Sec.  247.     Sales  by  public  agents. 

In  some  of  the  New  England  States  for  more  than  half  a 
century  sales  of  liquors  have  been  in  the  hands  of  public  agents. 


see  iSheppard  v.  Dowling,  127  Ala. 
1;  28  So.  791;  Hubbard  v.  Lan- 
caster, 127  Ala.  157;  '28  So.  79'6; 
Davis  V.  State,  145  Ala.  247;  40 
So.  663. 

30  Tallassee  v.  Toombs  (Ala.), 
47  So.  308. 

31  Rose  V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  588 ; 
62  S.  E.  117;  see  also  Ex  parte 
Hall  (Ala.),  47  So.  199;  Fowler 
V.  Rome  Dispensary  (Ga.  App.), 
62  S.  E.  660. 

32  Union  Town  v.  State  ( Ala. ) , 
39  So.  814;  State  v.  Wilburn 
(Ala.),  39  So.  816.  The  Alabama 
act  is  constitutional.  Sheppard 
V.  Dowling,   127  Ala.  1 ;   28  So.  791. 

33  State  V.  Smith,  126  N.  C. 
1057;  35  S.  E.  615.  Citing  Hills- 
boro  V.  Smith,  110  X.  C.  417;  14 
S.  E.  972;  State  v.  Smiley,  101 
N.  C.  709;  7  S.  E.  904;  State  v. 
Stevens,  114  N.  C.  873;  19  S.  E. 
861;  State  v.  Reid,  115  N.  €.  741; 

20  S.  E.  4&8;  State  v.  Robinson, 
116  N.  €.  1046;  21  S.  E.  701; 
State  v.  Downs,   IIG  N.  C.   1064; 

21  S.  E.  G89;  State  v.  Weathers, 
9«  N.  C.  685;   4  S.  E.  512;   State 


v.  Haynie,  118  N.  C.  1270;  24  S. 
E.  536;  State  v.  Hicks,  101  N.  C. 
747 ;  7  S.  E.  707 ;  State  v.  Hamby 
(N.  C),  35  S.  E.  614. 

As  to  disposal  of  profits  of  sale 
of  liquors  in  North  Carolina,  see 
Crocker  v.  Moore,  140  N.  C.  429; 

53  S.  E.  229. 

34  Chamlee  v.  Davis,  115  Ga. 
266;   41   S.   E.  691. 

As  to  what  officers  shall  have 
control  of  these  dispensaries,  see 
Dallis  V.  Griffin,  117  Ga.  408;  43 
S.  E.  758;  and  as  to  what  towns 
and  cities  under  the  Lee  County 
Act  (Acts  1902,  p.  222)  may  es- 
tablish a  dispensary,  see  Smith- 
ville  V.  Lee  County,  125  Ga.  559; 

54  S.  E.  539;  Waters  v.  McDow- 
ell, 126  Ga.  807 ;  56  S.  E.  95. 

As  to  the  funds  coming  into 
the  hands  of  the  public  town 
liquor  agent  in  Vermont,  see 
State  V.  Brattleboro,  68  Vt.  520; 
35   Atl.   472. 

After  a  dispensary  has  been 
abolished,  sales  by  its  officers  are 
illetral.  Dispensary  Commissioners 
V.  Hooper,  128  Ga.  99;    56  S.  E.  997. 


383  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAP^FIC.  §  247 

These  were  the  forerunners  of  the  dispensaries  of  the  South — 
of  South  Carolina,  of  Ahibama,  of  Georgia.  These  agents  are 
not  officers  of  the  political  division  of  the  State  selecting  them, 
their  positions  are  not  offices,  and  they  do  not  hold  over  until 
their  successors  have  been  selected  and  qualified,  as  is  the 
case  of  officers  generall3^•^^  Where  selectraen  were  liable  to 
a  penalty  for  failure  to  select  an  agent,  and  the  selectmen  of 
a  town  appointed  one  of  their  own  number,  making  the  ap- 
pointment a  matter  of  record,  and  he  accepted,  it  was  held  that 
they  were  not  guilty  under  the  statute  on  the  ground  that 
they  fixed  no  salary  for  him,  made  no  regulations  concerning 
sales,  the  town  clerk  made  no  entry  on  the  town  records  of  the 
appointment,  and  the  agent  gave  no  bond,  as  required  by 
statute,  nor  entered  upon  his  duties.^'^  But  as  a  rule  the  select- 
men of  a  New  England  State  cannot  appoint  one  of  their  own 
number  as  agent,  nor  can  they  purchase  liquors  and  bind  their 
town  by  the  purchase. ^^  If  a  duly  appointed  agent  sell  liquors 
in  violation  of  law  he  becomes  liable  to  its  penalty  the  same 
as  any  other  person  so  selling  liquors.^®  As,  for  instance,  if 
he  sells  to  a  minor.^"  A  statute  authorizing  a  town  to  sell 
liquor  for  a  specific  purpose  is  sufficient  to  authorize  them 
to  make  a  purchase  of  the  liquor  in  order  to  sell  it.*°  Irregu- 
larity in  making  the  appointment  of  the  agent  will  not  render 
him  liable  if  he  make  a  sale  thereunder,  on  the  theory  that  the 
sale  is  illeg-al ;  *^  but  if  he  must  give  a  bond,  then  a  sale  before 

35  state   V.    Weeks,   67    Me.   -60;  Dispensary  Board  was  inefTectual, 

S  Atl.  754.  the  act  in  that  respect  being  un- 

3G  Rowe    V.    Edmunds,    3    Allen,  constitutional.      State    v.    Porter- 

334 ;    see   State   v.    Woodbury,    35  field,  47  S.  C.  75 ;   25  S.  E.  39. 

N,  H.  230.  38  Sate    v.    Keen,    34    Me.    500; 

Where    the    statute    was    in    its  State    v.    Putnam,    38    Me.    296; 

main     purpose     ineffectual,     man-  State  v.   Parks,  29  Vt.  70;   State 

damns  was   refused  to  compel   an  v.  Fisher,  35  Vt.  584. 

appointment.      People   v.    Lawton,  39  State  v.  Fairfield,  37  Me.  517. 

30  Mich.   386.  4o  Kidder  v.  Knox,  48  Me.  551; 

37  Richards  v.    Columbia,   55   N.  Great  Falls  Bank  v.   Farmington, 

H.  96.  41   N.  H.   32. 

In  South   Carolina   it  was   held  <i  State    v.    Weeks,   67   Me.    60; 

that    the    attempt    to    make    the  8  Atl.  754. 
governor    a   member   of   the   State 


§  247  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  384 

he  has  given  his  bond  will  be  illegal/-  If  a  town  agent  refuse 
to  sell  to  any  particular  person,  his  refusal  does  not  render 
him  liable  to  such  person  in  damages.*^  A  statute  requiring 
him  to  keep  an  account  of  all  liquors  he  purchases,  the  several 
kinds  purchased,  and  the  prices  paid  with  the  dates,  is  com- 
plied with  by  keeping  the  receipted  bills,  rendered  by  the 
seller,  showing  the  date,  price  and  kind  of  liquors  sold  him.** 
Anyone  selling  to  a  person  claiming  to  act  as  town  agent  must 
take  notice  of  his  authority  or  power  to  bind  his  town,  and  for 
that  purpose  is  chargeable  with  notice  of  the  record  of  his 
appointment  as  entered  in  the  town  records,  even  though  such 
agent  has  a  certificate  of  his  appointment.*^  Where  there  is  a 
State  agent  authorized  to  make  sales  to  town  agents,  if  a 
person  falsely  represent  himself  as  such  State  agent,  and 
thereby  induces  a  town  to  purchase  liquors,  on  discovering  the 
fraud  the  town  may  rescind  the  purchase  and  tender  back  the 
liquors,  if  done  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  discovery 
is  made.**'  Under  the  town  agency  law  in  Vermont,  in  1863, 
an  agent  could  only  sell  liquor  upon  application  for  it  for  a 
lawful  purpose,  and  such  application  hiust  have  been  accom- 
panied by  representations  reasonably  inducing  the  belief  that 
it  was  desired  for  that  purpose  only ;  and  a  sale  without  such 
application  and  representations,  and  upon  a  belief  that  they 
were  truthfully  made,  rendered  the  agent  liable.*^  The  liquor 
in  the  hands  of  the  agent  is  the  liquor  of  the  town  and  not 
his  property;  and  liquor  shown  to  be  in  his  hands  wall  be  so 
regarded  until  the  contrary  is  shown.**  So  the  fact  of  money 
advanced  to  a  town  by  the  agent  will  not  make  the  money  he 
receives  on  sales  his  money  to  reimburse  himself ;  and  the  fact 
that  the  selectmen  give  their  personal  obligation  in  payment 

*-  Commonwealth     v.     Pillsbury,  46  Butler  v.  Northumberland,  50 

12  Gray,   127.  N.  H.  33. 

43  Dwinnels      v.      Parsons,      98  In    New    Hampshire,     in     187S, 

Mass.    470.  towns  were  liable  only  for  liquors 

4*  Wenham    v.   Dodge,   98   Mass.  purchased  of  s   State  agent.    Law- 

474.  ten  v.  AUentown,  58  N.  H.  289. 

45  Backman    v.   Charlestown,    42  *^  State  v.  Fisher,  35  Vt.  584. 

N.  H.  125.  48  Lemington     v,     Blodgett,     37 

Vt.  210. 


385  REGULATING   LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §§248,249 

of  the  liquors  will  not  make  the  liquor  theirs  when  they  pur- 
chase on  behalf  of  their  town.*^ 

Sec.  248.     Agent's  liability  on  his  bond. 

Usually  a  public  agent  for  the  sale  of  liquor  is  not  liable 
on  his  bond  until  a  demand  on  him  has  been  made ;  but  if  his 
term  expire  and  he  fails  to  turn  over  the  monies  in  his  hands, 
a  demand  is  not  necessary.^*'  Usually  the  bondmen's  liability 
is  limited  to  sales  made  during  the  term  for  which  he  is 
appointed  and  not  for  sales  made  thereafter,  even  though  ho 
holds  over.-'^  In  a  suit  on  his  bond  to  recover  monies  due  the 
town  his  records  as  kept  by  him  in  his  official  capacity  are 
admissible  in  evidence;  and  if  they  show  he  paid  more  for 
liquors  than  he  reports  he  received  for  them  on  sales  thereof 
made,  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  he  made  sales 
which  he  has  not  recorded.^- 

Sec.  249.    Transportation  or  conveyance  of  liquors. 

In  a  number  of  States,  in  order  to  restrict  the  liquor  traffic, 
statutes  forbid  the  transportation  of  liquors  in  or  into  pro- 
hibition districts.  A  statute  forbidding  the  conveyance  of 
liquors  has  no  reference  to  a  removal  of  liquors  from  one 
room  in  a  house  to  another  room  in  the  same  house.^^  A 
statute  making  it  unlawful  to  manufacture,  sell,  or  keep  for 
sale,  give  away,  or  furnish  liquors,  or  to  ''keep  a  saloon  at 
any  other  place  Avhere  such  liquors  are  manufactured,  sold  or 
stored  for  sale,  given  away,  or  furnished,"  does  not  forbid 
anyone  conveying  or  delivering  liquors  within  local  option 
districts.^*     The  conveyance  of  liquors  from  one  place  in  a 

•*9  Lemington     v.     Blodgett,     37  erence  to  the  conveyance  of  liquors 

Vt.  215.  from  one  place  within  a  State  to 

50  Powesheik  County  v.  Ross,  9  another  place  therein.  High  v. 
Iowa,  511.  State    (Okla.),   101   Pac.   115. 

51  Dover  v.  Twombly,  42  N.  H.  i>4  People  v.  Converse,  (Mich); 
59.  121  N.  W.  475. 

52  Wenham  v.  Dodge,  98  Mass.  As  to  what  does  not  sliow  the 
474.  agent  of  an  express  company  was 

53  State  V.  Kaplicsky,  73  Atl.  guilty  of  delivering  liquors  in  a 
830.  local  option  district,  see  this  case. 

Incidentally    it    may    be    stated  See   also    Mason   v.   Lathrop,    7 

that  the  interstate  law  has  no  ref-       Gray,  384. 


§  249  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  386 

town  to  another  plact-  in  the  same  town  is  a  violation  of  a 
statute  forbidding  the  conveyance  or  transportation  of 
liquors.^^  This  covers  an  instance  of  a  wholesaler  delivering 
goods  sold  to  his  customers.'"'"  A  common  carrier  cannot 
screen  itself  from  prosecution  under  its  common  law  duty  to 
accept  and  convey  goods  tendered  it  for  carriage.^^  A  statute 
which  forbids  express  companies,  common  carriers,  or  their 
employes,  "or  any  other  person,"  to  convey  liquors  applies 
to  the  driver  of  a  team  who  undertakes  with  his  team  to  de- 
liver liquors  in  his  own  wagon. ''^  "Where  a  statute  makes  it 
an  offense  to  "receive  for  conveyance  liquors  unlawfully  sold 
or  intended  for  unlawful  sale, "  it  is  the  receipt  of  the  liquors 
for  the  purpose  of  conveyance  that  creates  the  offense,  for 
that  act  completes  their  sale.  In  such  an  instance  the  pur- 
chaser's intention  with  regard  to  the  sale  is  immaterial;  and 
he  need  not  be  named  in  the  indictment,  nor  need  it  be  shown 
he  had  no  authority  to  sell."°  In  order  to  show  that  the  carrier 
had  reasonable  cause  to  believe  the  liquors  conveyed  were  in- 
tended to  be  unlawfully  sold,  the  general  reputation  of  the 
consignee  as  a  liquor  dealer,  and  of  discoveries  made  on  a 
search  warrant  of  his  premises,  may  be  shoAMi.'''*'  In  a  statute 
forbidding  any  person  or  corporation  not  "regularly"  con- 
ducting a  "general"  express  business,  except  a  railroad  or 
street  railway  company  authorized  to  carry  freight  or  express, 
to  receive  for  transportation,  for  hire,  for  delivery  of  liquor 
in  a  place  where  licenses  are  not  granted,  the  word  general 
imports  something  more  than  a  casual,  infrequent  and  in- 
cidental carriage  of  goods  other  than  liquors,  and  means  that 
the  major  part  of  its  business  is  the  carriage  of  a  variety  of 
goods  commonly  carried  by  express  companies.     The  word 

55  Commonwealth  v.   Waters,   11  so  Commonwealth      v.      Harper, 

Gray,  81.  145  Mass.   100;    13  N.  E.  459;   see 

5«  State   V.    Campbell,    7G    Iowa,  Commonwealth      v.      Fisher,      138 

122;   40  N.  W.   100.  Mass.  504. 

57  State  V.  Goss,  59  Vt.  2&6 ;   9  Evidence   which   showed   defend- 
Atl.  829.  ant  was  conducting  a  general  ex- 

58  State   V.    Campbell,    76    Iowa,  press  business.     Commonwealth  v. 
122;   40  N.  W.  100.  People's  Express  Bureau    (Mass.), 

59  Commonwealth   v.   Tx)cke,    114  88  N.  E.  420. 
Mass.  2S8. 


387  REGULATING  LIQUOR   TRAPPIC.  §  250 

regularly  means  fixedness  and  permanency  in  the  character  of 
the  business,  and  indicates  stated  times  and  established  routes 
of  conveyance."  Upon  a  charge  of  a  violation  of  such  a 
statute  brought  against  an  express  company,  no  presumption 
arises  from  its  name  thaj;  it  is  engaged  in  carrying  on  a 
general  express  business.  That  fact  must  be  proven.*^-  It  was 
held  that  the  statute  just  alluded  to  included  those  who 
carried  liquors  in  their  own  vehicles  as  well  as  those  who 
go  on  trains  or  steamers,  but  it  involves  the  idea  of  route  and 
time,  or  both.^"  Such  a  statute  is  constitutional.*'*  Where  a 
statute  requires  expressmen  to  keep  open  for  inspection  of 
police  officers  a  book,  in  which  must  be  plainly  entered  the 
date  of  reception  of  each  package  of  liquor  received  for 
carriage  into  a  no-licensing  towTi,  with  a  correct  transcript  of 
the  marks  as  well  as  date  of  delivery,  it  is  violated  if  the  ex- 
pressman carries  the  liquor  into  such  town  before  he  makes  the 
entries,  although  he  may  have  made  them  correctly  afte^'  their 
arrival.""'  In  South  Carolina,  a  statute  forbidding  the  ''trans- 
port" of  liquors  "from  place  to  place"  within  the  State, 
applies  to  the  carriage  or  conveyance  of  liquor  on  the  person.*^"' 

Sec.  250.    Limiting  number  of  saloons. 

The  Legislature  may  limit  the  number  of  saloons  within  a 
city  or  within  a  block  of  a  city,  and  such  limitation  is  not  a 
prohibitory  law  but  a  mere  regulation  of  the  sale  of  liquor.*"' 
And  where  a  city  council  or  town  board  has  a  discretion  to 
issue  a  license  or  refuse  the  application  without  assigning  any 

61  Commonwealth  v.  Peoples  A  city  may  require  a  common 
Express  Co.  (Mass.),  88  N.  E.  carrier  to  deliver  all  liquor 
820.  brought    within    such    city    by    it 

62  Commonwealth  v.  Peoples  Ex-  from  without  the  State  at  a 
press  'Co.    (Mass.),  88  N.   E.   420.  particular      depot      and      nowhere 

63 Commonwealth      v.      Peoples  else.     Barrett  v.   Richard    (Neb.), 

Express  Co.,  supra.  124  N.  W.  153. 

64  Commonwealth      v.       Peoples  <^'' Ex    parte   Abrams    (Tex.    €r. 

Express  Co.,  supra.  App.),   120   S.   W.   883;    Ex  parte 

65 Commonwealth    v.    Shea,    185  Clark     (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    120    S. 

Mass.  89 ;  m  N.  E.  1060.  W,   892. 

60  State    V.    Pope,   79   S.   C.  87; 
€0  S.  E.  234. 


§§  251-253        TR.VFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.^  388 

cause,  or  without  any  cause  for  its  refusal  to  its  issuance,  a 
refusal  of  a  license  for  a  town  where  others  are  in  force  will 
not  be  reviewed,  and  the  licensing  authorities  are  justified  in 
doing  so."*  But  an  ordinance  limiting  the  number  of  licenses  ®* 
to  one  in  a  space  of  nine  hundred  yards  on  a  single  street, 
including  the  parks  on  intersecting  streets,  is  unreasonable, 
amounting  to  substantial  prohibition,  especially  when  taken  in 
connection  with  a  clause  in  it  requiring  the  consent  of  all 
owners  and  occupants  of  stores,  residences  and  other  buildings 
within  a  radius  of  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place  where 
the  business  is  to  be  conducted.'^" 

Sec.  251.     Saloon  for  negroes. 

In  Louisiana  separate  saloons  are  provided  for  negroes  and 
whites ;  and  the  requirements  of  the  statute  that  they  can  be 
used  only  by  the  race  for  which  they  are  provided  seems  to  be 
regarded  as  valid. ^^ 

Sec.  252.     Liquor  sales  carried  on  with  other  business. 

An  ordinance  providing  that  the  sale  of  "near"  beer  shall 
not  be  carried  on  in  connection  with  any  other  business  is  a 
reasonable  regulation.'^- 

Sec.  253.     Criminal  liability  of  owner  and  landlord. 

In  some  States,  by  statute,  it  is  made  a  misdemeanor  for 
the  owner  of  real  estate  to  lease  it  for  the  illegal  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors,  or  to  suffer  premises  under  his  control  to 

68  Schweirman  v.  Highland  Park  In  Rhode  Island  one  license 
(Ky. ),   113  S.  W.  507.  only   can   be   issued   for    each   500 

69  In  this  case  limiting  the  sale  inhabitants  according  to  the  last 
of   "near   beer."  United  States  or  the  State  census 

"0  Campbell        v.        Thomasville  (Acts     1908,     p.     206,     c.     1783). 

(Ga.),  '64  S.  E.   15.  Greenougli     v.     Xarragansett     (R. 

A  licensee  who  opens   two  bars  I.),   71    Atl.   594. 

in    different   buildings   cannot    in-  7 1  State  v.   Falkenheimer    (La.), 

sist   that    he    cannot   be    punished  49   So.   214. 

for  maintaining  either,  as  one  or  72. Campbell        v.        Thomasville 

the    other    is    lawful.      Huber    v.  (Ga.),  04  S.  E.   15. 
Commonwealth    (Ky.),   112  S.   W. 
583;  33  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1031. 


389  REGULATING   LIQUOK   TRAFFIC.  §  253 

be  used  for  that  purpose.  Under  such  a  statute,  if  a  building 
is  leased  to  a  tenant  for  a  lawful  purpose,  and  the  tenant 
enters  into  possession  under  the  lease,  the  building  is  under 
the  control  of  the  tenant  while  he  continues  in  possession 
under  the  lease,  unless  there  are  special  provisions  in  the  lease 
which  give  the  control  to  the  landlord."  The  gist  of  the 
offense  is  in  the  landlord  allowing  his  premises  lo  be  used  for 
purposes  violative  of  the  liquor  law,  when  he  might  have  pre- 
vented it.  xVccordingly,  it  is  held  that  the  owner  of  premises 
upon  which  intoxicating  liquors  are  kept  for  sale  contrary  to 
law,  is  not  guilty  of  an  offense  if  he  leased  them  for  a  lawful 
purpose,  and  does  not  affirmatively  assent  to  such  unlawful 
use;  the  mere  failure  to  prevent  or  attempt  to  prevent  the 
illegal  use  or  sale  of  the  liquors  will  not  subject  him  to  the 
penalties  of  the  statute.^*  Under  such  a  statute,  a  landlord 
who  lets  a  house,  knowing  at  the  time  of  letting  it  that  it  is 
to  be  used  for  the  clandestine  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  or 
who  afterwards  advises,  encourages,  or  aids  oUch  sales,  is 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor;  but  when  he  leases  the  house  for  a 
lawful  purpose,  his  mere  non-interference  with  the  subsequent 
illegal  traffic  of  his  tenant,  after  he  becomes  aware  of  it,  does 
not  involve  him  in  his  tenant's  guilt.  The  enforcement  of  a 
law  is  a  duty  which  rests  primarily  upon  the  officers  and  the 
courts.  The  law  is  not  so  unreasonable  as  to  require  a  private 
citizen  to  embroil  himself  in  personal  difaculties,  contentions 
and  law  suits  for  the  public  good.^^  And  in  a  prosecution  for 
a  violation  of  the  statute  the  State  must  show  such  acts  or 
circumstances  as  will  satisfy  the  jury  that  the  landlord, 
having  knowledge  that  the  house  was  being  used  for  such 
illegal  purpose  not  only  remained  inactive,  but  he  assented  or 

73  state  V.  Pearsell,  43  la.  630;  74  state  v.  Ballingall,  42  Ta.  87; 

Commonwealth  v.  VVentwortli,  14G  State  v.  Bates,  (i'2  Vt.  184;  19  Atl. 

Mass.  36;    13  N.  E.   138;   Koester  Rep.   229. 

V.  State,  36  Kan.  27;   12  Pac.  Rep.  75  Crocker  v.  State,  49  Ark.  60; 

339;   State  v.  Shanahan,  54  N.  H.  4   S.   W.   Rep.   197;   State  v.   Pot- 

497 ;   Crofton  v.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  ter,  30  la.  587 ;   Koester  v.  State, 

249;    Robinson    v.    State,   24   Tex.  36   Kan.   27;    12    Pac.   Rep.    339; 

152;     Commonwealth    v.    Conway,  State    v.    Williams,    30   N.   J.   L« 

112   S.    W.    575;    33    Ky.   L.   Rep.  102. 
996. 


§  254  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS,  390 

consented  to  such  use,  the  burden  of  proof  being  upon  the 
State.'"  In  such  case,  as  we  have  already  said,  an  affirmative 
assent  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  is  necessary,  but  in  establish- 
ing such  affirmative  assent  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  the 
defendant  told  the  lessee  that  he  assented  to  the  building  being 
used  for  an  illegal  purpose.  Such  assent  is  the  result  of  the 
landlord's  mind  and  need  not  be  coupled  with  any  other  pur- 
pose. In  order,  however,  to  ascertain  such  assent,  the  jury 
must  find  that  the  defendant  did  some  affirmative  act,  or 
made  some  declaration  in  connection  therewith,  or  in  relation 
thereto,  from  which  they  can  find  that  the  defendant  did  so 
assent.'^^ 

Sec.  254.    Police  regulations — Enforcement  by  mandamus. 

The  remedy  by  mandamus  is  one  which  is  allowed  to  compel 
the  performance  of  some  duty  owing  to  an  individual  or  to 
the  public.  The  duty  must  be  specific  in  its  nature  and  of 
such  character  that  the  court  can  prescribe  a  definite  act  or 
series  of  acts  w^hich  will  constitute  a  performance  of  the  duty, 
so  that  the  respondent  may  know  what  he  is  obliged  to  do 
and  may  do  the  act  required,  and  the  court  may  know  that  the 
act  has  been  performed  and  may  enforce  its  performance. 
It  is  not  necessary,  in  all  cases,  that  the  performance  of  the 
duty  should  consist  of  a  single  act.  It  may  be  a  succession 
of  acts  if  this  duty  is  specific  and  the  acts  are  of  such  a 
nature  that  the  court  can  supervise  the  performance  of  the 
duty  and  the  execution  of  the  mandate.  But  the  \^Tit  has 
never  been  made  use  of  and  does  not  lie  for  the  purpose  of 
enforcing  the  performance  of  duties  generally.  It  will  not  lie 
where  the  court  would  have  to  control  and  regulate  a  general 
course  of  official  conduct  and  enforce  the  performance  of 
official  duties  generally.  In  such  a  case  the  court  could  not 
prescribe  the  particular  act  to  be  performed  and  enforce  its 
performance.  Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  that  mandamus 
will  not  lie  to  compel  the  mayor  of  a  city  to  enforce  Sunday 

restate  V.  Ahraliains,  4  la.  541.       Cordes  v.   State,   37   Kan.   48;    14- 
TTiSUitc     V.     Abrahams,     6     la.       Pac.   Rep,   493. 
11-6;  State  v.  PuarscU,  43  la.  630; 


391  REGULATING    LIQUOR   TRAFFIC.  §  254 

closing  laws  and  ordinances  against  the  saloons  of  such  city. 
In  such  a  case  the  court  could  not  prescribe  the  particular 
act  to  be  performed  and  enforce  its  performance.  To  do  so 
it  would  be  necessary  for  the  court  to  supervise  generally  the 
official  conduct  of  the  mayor  and  to  determine  in  numerous 
instances  whether  he  had  persistently,  and  to  the  extent  of 
his  power  and  the  force  in  his  hands,  carried  out  the  mandate 
of  the  court  and  performed  his  official  duty.  For  a  court  to 
assume  the  management  of  municipal  affairs  of  a  city  w'ould 
be  to  depart  from  its  proper  sphere  and  assume  governmental 
functions,  which  are  outside  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts 
and  not  within  the  remedy  by  writ  of  mandamus.'^  And  in 
Massachusetts,  it  has  been  held  that  mandamus  will  not  lie 
to  compel  the  marshal  of  a  city  to  station  a  police  officer  at  a 
certain  place  in  accordance  with  an  order  of  the  board  of 
aldermen  of  the  city.'^ 

78  People  V.  Dunne,  21S  111.  346;  79  Alger    v.    Seaver,    138    Mass. 

76  N.  E.  570;  People  v.  Buss,  238       331. 
111.  593;    77  N.  E.   840;   affirming 
111   111.  App.  218. 


CHAPTER  V. 
MUNICIPAL  REGULATION. 


SECTION. 

255.  Creation  of  public  corpora- 
tions— Ordinances. 

25'6.  Municipal  power,  how  con- 
ferred  and   construed. 

257.  Municipal  control  —  Legis- 

lative       power  —  Police 
power. 

258.  Discretionary  powers  of  mu- 

nicipal   corporations. 

259.  Exclusive    municipal    power, 

efl'ect. 

260.  Powers  delegated  to  and   by 

municipal    corporations. 

261.  Municipal      regulations     be- 

yond corporate  limits. 

262.  Reasonableness  of  ordinance. 

263.  Extent   of   power   of   munic- 

ipality to  grant  licenses. 

264.  Power    to   license — Use    and 

grant. 

265.  Power  to  require  a  license — 

Instances. 

266.  Power    to    grant    a    license, 

what  includes. 

267.  Ordinances   necessary  to  ex- 

action of  a  license. 

268.  Delegation  by  city  of  power 

to  require  a  license. 

269.  Number  of  licenses. 

270.  Restricting   saloons   to   spec- 

ified parts  of  a  city. 

271.  License  ordinance,  when  not 

invalid. 

272.  Discriminating        ordinance, 

when  not  unconstitutional. 


SECTION. 

273.  Exacting      license,      require- 

mient    when    not    discrim- 
inating. 

274.  Bond  of  licensee. 

275.  Municipal  power  to  prohibit. 

276.  Power    to    prohibit   includes 

power  to  license. 

277.  Prohibitory     ordinance,     not 

in     violation     of     common 
law  rights. 

278.  Regulation    and    prohibition 

distinguished. 

279.  Limitation  on  power  of  city 

to   enact   ordinance. 

280.  Power    to    regulate    sale    of 

liquor — Valid   ordinance. 

281.  Power    to    regulate    sale    of 

liquors   —    Invalid      ordi- 
nance. 

282.  Amount    of    license    fees    or 

taxes. 

283.  License    fees,    limitation. 

284.  Right    of    different   jurisdic- 

tions to  exact  license. 

285.  License,     different     jurisdic- 

tions may   require. 

286.  United  States  license,  effect. 
2'87.     Keeping  liquors  for  sale  or 

saloon  open. 

288.  Ordinance,  when  not  con- 
flicting with  statute  — 
Keeping  liquor  for  un- 
lawful   sale. 

280.  Prohibiting  owner  to  enter 
saloon  on  Sunday. 


393 


MUNICIPAL    REGULATION. 


§255 


SECTION. 

2)90.     Declaring  sale  of   liquors   a 
nuisance. 

Regulating  days  and 

hours. 

Sales  on  Sundays,  election 
days  or   holidays. 

Sales  at  prohibited  hours. 

Picnic  and  social  gatherings. 

Physician's    prescriptions. 

Sales  to  minors  and  drunk- 
ards. 

Prohibiting  sales  in  State 
having   local    option   laws. 

Women  not  licensing — Con- 
stitutional  law. 

Women  in  saloons. 

Wine  rooms. 

Requiring   a   county   license. 

Repeal  of  statute  bj  impli- 
cation, when  not  accom- 
plished. 

Regulation    of    saloon    room 
— Location  of  saloon. 
304.     Lights   burning  in   saloon. 


291. 

2D2. 

293. 
294. 
295. 
296. 

297. 

29S. 

299. 
300. 
301. 
•302. 


303. 


SECTIOX. 

305.  Screens — Exposure   of    room 

to  view. 

306.  Prohibiting   the   carriage   of 

liquors. 

307.  Police   visiting   saloon. 

308.  Penalties  essential — Heavier 

for   subsequent  offense. 

309.  Penalties,    greater    and    ad- 

ditional— Infliction. 

310.  Revocation   of   license — Con- 

ditional ordinance. 

311.  Ordinance   annulled  by  sub- 

sequent statute, 

312.  Exceptions     to     prohibitory 

ordinances. 

313.  Ordinance  in  part  void. 

314.  Ordinance    in    conflict    with 

Constitution. 

315.  City    conducting    a    dispen- 

sary. 

316.  Appointment     of      liquor 

agents. 

317.  Duties  and  powers  of  liquor 

agents. 


Sec.  255.     Creation  of  public  corporations — Ordinances. 

Public  or  municipal  corporations  are  established  for  the 
local  government  of  towns,  cities  or  particular  districts.  The 
special  powers  conferred  upon  them  are  not  vested  rights  a.s 
against  the  State,  being  wholly  political  rights  existing  only 
during  the  will  of  the  Legislature  of  the  State ;  for  otherwise 
there  would  be  numberless  petty  governments  existing  within 
the  State  forming  a  part  of  it,  yet  independent  of  the  control 
of  the  sovereign  power.  Such  powers  may  at  any  time  be  re- 
pealed or  abrogated  by  the  Legislature,  either  by  a  general 
law  operating  upon  the  whole  State,  or  by  a  special  act  alter- 
ing the  powers  of  the  corporation.^     If  the  legislative  action 


1  Barnes  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 91  U.  S.  510;  Laranne  Co.  v. 
^^ew  Albany  Co.,  92  U.  S.  307; 
iState  V.  Jennings.  27  Ark.  419; 
San  Francisco  v.  Canaran,  42  Cal. 


541 ;  Granbury  v.  Tliurston,  23 
Conn.  416;  People  v.  Power,  24 
111.  187;  Sloan  v.  State,  8  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  35L;  Langsworthy  v.  Du- 
buque,   16    la.   271;    Atchinson   v. 


§  255  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  394 

in  such  cases  operates  injuriously  to  the  municipalities  or  to 
individuals,  the  remedy  is  not  with  the  courts.  The  courts 
have  no  power  to  interfere  and  the  people  must  be  looked  to, 
to  right  through  the  ballot  box  all  such  wrongs.^  Being 
created  by  the  Legislature,  ordinances  of  such  corporations 
must  not  conflict  with  the  general  laws  of  the  State,  and 
powers  conferred  upon  them  in  reference  to  the  traffic  in 
intoxicating  liquors  must  be  exercised  in  conformity  to  such 
laws  unless  exclusive  control  over  the  subject  is  granted  to 
them.  The  granting  authority  of  such  a  corporation  to  pass 
ordinances  in  relation  to  such  traffic,  in  and  of  itself,  will  not 
by  implication  repeal  the  general  laws  of  the  State  upon  the 
same  subject ;  ^  nor  will  a  clause  in  the  charter  of  such  a 
corporation  in  general  terms  to  pass  By-Laws  not  consistent 
with  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  State  confer  power 
upon  the  municipal  authorities  to  pass  an  ordinance  making 
it  a  penal  offense  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  in  quantities  of 
a  quart  or  more  to  be  drank  on  the  premises,  where  there  is  a 
statute  of  the  State  w'hich,  in  effect,  declares  that  every  citizen 
may  sell  such  liquors  in  quantities  of  a  quart  or  more ;  *  nor 
to  punish  a  person  for  selling  such  liquors,  the  sale  of  which 
is  already  prohibited  by  the  statute  of  the  State,  unless 
specially  authorized  to  do  so.^  In  other  words,  where  author- 
ity is  conferred  upon  a  municipal  corporation  to  regulate  the 
traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  such  power  does  not  enable  the 
corporation  to  nullify  or  abrogate  the  general  laws  of  the 

Bartholow,    4    Kan.    124 ;    Goff    v.  v.  Haines,  35     Ore.  379 ;  ^S  Pac.  39. 

Frederick,  44   Md.   67;    Martin   v.  2  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Allen,   13 

Dix,  52  Miss.  53;  State  v.  Cowan,  Mo.   414;    Bronson  v.   Oberlin,   41 

29  Mo.  330;  Bradshaw  v.  Omaha,  Ohio   St.    476;    52    Am.    Rep.   90; 

1   Neb.    16;   Hess  v.  Pegg,  7   Nev.  State  v.  Columbia,  17  S.  C.  80. 

23 ;   Patterson  v.   Society,  etc.,  24  3  Gardner     v.     Morris,     20     111. 

N.  J.  L.  385;  People  v.  Tweed,  63  431;      Harrington      v.      State,      9 

K  Y.  202;   Mills  v.   Williams,   11  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    525;   Rochester  v. 

Ired.    (N.   C.)       55>8;    Hawkins   v.  Harrington,     10    Wend.     (N.    Y.) 

Commonwealth,    76    Pa.    St.    151;  547;    People   v.   Morris,    13   Wend. 

Blessing     v.     Galveston,     42     Tex.  (N.  Y.)   325;  State  v.  Witter,  107 

641;    Kuhn   V.   Board,   etc.,   4    W.  N.  C.  792. 

Va.  499;   Weeks  v.  Milwaukee,   10  <  Adams  v.   Albany,  29   Ga.  66. 

Wis.  242 ;    Harrison,   etc.,   v.   Hnl-  5  Loeb  v.  City  of  Attica,  82  Ind. 

Ifind,    3    Grat.    (Va.)    247;    State  175. 


395  MUNICIPAL    REGULATION.  §  256 

State.®  Where,  however,  the  exclusive  power  to  license,  pro- 
hibit, or  to  regulate  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  is  given 
to  a  municipal  corporation  by  the  Legislature,  such  corpora- 
tion may  license,  regulate  or  partially  or  entirely  prohibit  the 
traffic  as  it  may  see  proper  to  do  without  regard  to  the  general 
laws  of  the  State.'^  A  city  may  be  given  the  exclusive  power 
to  grant  licenses  to  sell  liquors  within  its  boundaries;  ^  and  it 
may  be  authorized  to  require  licenses  from  all  who  eugage 
in  the  sale  of  liquors  within  its  boundaries.''  A  city  may  be 
empowered  to  inflict  a  greater  penalty  for  the  same  act  than 
the  State  inflicts.^'' 

Sec.  256.    Municipal  power,  how  conferred  and  construed. 

Municipal  corporations  have  such  powers  only  as  are  con- 
ferred upon  them  by  the  act  of  Legislature  creating  them,  and 
such  incidental  powers  as  are  implied  by  their  creation  and 
for  their  continued  existence.^^  "It  is  a  general  and  undis- 
puted proposition  of  law,"  says  Judge  Dillon,  "that  a  munic- 
ipal corporation  possesses  and  can  exercise  the  following 
powers  and  no  others:    First,  those  granted  in  express  words; 

6  Harris  v.  Town  of  Livingston,  fied,  and  a  city  of  one  class  be 
28  Ala.  577;  Huffsmith  v.  People,  given  greater  powers  than  those 
8  Colo.  175;  Foster  v.  Brown,  55  given  to  another  class.  Bronson 
la.  ■686;  Commonwealth  v.  Luck,  v.  Oberlin,  41  Ohio  St.  476;  52 
2  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  296;  State  v.  Am.  Rep.  90;  Burckholter  v.  Mc- 
Langdon,  31  Minn.  316;  State  v.  Connellsville,  20  Ohio  St.  308. 
Nolan,  37  Minn.  16;  Thompson  v.  s  state  v.  Dwyer,  21  Minn.  512; 
City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  11  Ohio  St.  Wilson  v.  Whelan,  91  Ga.  461;  17 
688;  Aug-erhoff  v.  State,  15  Tex.  S.  E.  906;  Coulterville  v.  Gillam, 
App.  .613;    Craddock   v.   State,    18  72  111.  599. 

Tex.   App.   567;    Corbett  v.   Terri-  » Bronson    v.    Oberlin,    41    Ohio 

tory,  1  Wash.  Tr.  431;  St.  476;  52  Am.  Rep.  90;  State  v. 

7  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  18  Ga.  586;  Columbus,  17  S.  C.  80;  Mounds- 
Schwuchow  V.  Chicago,  68  111.  444;  ville  v.  Fountain,  27  W.  Va.  182; 
Harbaugli  v.  Munough,  74  111.  Jelly  v.  Dils,  27  W.  Va.  267; 
371;    Gunnarsson    v.    Sterling,    92  Glantz  v.  State,  38  Wis.  649. 

111.    5P9;    Phillip    V.    Tecumseh,   5  lo  Pekin  v.  Smelzel,  21  III.  464; 

Neb.   30'5;    Trustees  v.   Keating,   4  74  Am.  Dec.   105. 

Den.    (N.    Y.)    341;    St.    Paul    v.  n  Chambers  v.  Greeneastle,  138 

Troyer,  3  Minn.  291    (Gil.  200).  Ind.  330;  35  N.  K  14. 
Cities  and  towns  may  be  classi- 


§  256  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  396 

second,  those  necessarily  or  fairly  implied  in  or  incident  to 
the  powers  expressly  granted;  third,  those  essentially  to  the 
declared  purpose  of  the  corporation — not  simply  convenient, 
but  indispensable.  Any  fair,  reasonable  doubt  concerning 
the  existence  of  the  power  is  resolved  by  the  courts  against 
the  corporation,  and  the  power  is  denied.  Of  everj^  municipal 
corporation  the  charter  or  statute  hy  which  it  is  created  is 
its  organic  act.  "^-  It  has  been  held  that  the  ordinances  of 
the  corporation  of  the  city  of  Washington  cannot  increase  or 
vary  the  power  given  by  the  acts  of  Congress,  or  impose  any 
terms  or  conditions  not  authorized  by  the  act  of  Congress ;  ^^ 
also,  that  the  corporation  of  Washington  cannot  grant  a  license 
to  retail  intoxicating  liquors  where  the  general  law  is  that 
such  licenses  are  granted  by  the  county  courts  exclusively.^* 
In  other  words,  the  actions  of  such  corporations  are  to  be  held 
strictly  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  their  charters,  these 
being  their  Constitutions.  The  courts  will  not  infer  that  a 
Legislature  intends  to  authorize  a  local  departure  from  a 
general  policy  of  the  State  unless  the  local  exception  is  ex- 
pressed in  specific  terms ;  and  a  general  law  of  the  State  regu- 
lating its  municipal  corporations  will  give  no  authority  to 
them  to  pass  ordinances  to  license  and  regulate  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors  within  their  corporate  limits.  Within 
such  limits  such  corporations  are  favored  by  the  courts,  and 
powers  expressly  granted  to  them  or  necessarily  implied  from 
their  charters  cannot  be  defeated  by  a  strict  construction ;  but 
acts  authorized  by  them  must  be  done  in  a  manner  provided 
by  such  statutes.^^ 

12  Dillon's     Munic.     Cor.,     §S0;  City  of  Madison,  7  Ind.  S6;  Town 

Cook   County    v.    McCrea,    93    111.  of  Martinsville,  33  Ind.  507 ;  Com- 

2.3'6;    Hencke    v.    McCord,    55    la.  monwealth  v.  Voories,  51  Ky.    (12 

378;  Smith  v.  Xewburn,  70  N.  C.  B.  Mon.)    3C1;    State  v.   Brittuin, 

14.  89  N.  C.  574. 

i-'^  Thompson    v.    Lessee    of    Car-  A  statute  specifically  naming  in 

roll,  22  How.  422.  what  instances  and  for  what  pur- 

1*  United  States   v.   Kladenbach,  poses   a   city  may  exact   a  license 

1   C.  C.  132.  and   regulate   the   sale    of    liquors 

!•"'  Sanders  v.  Town  Commission-  followed  by  a  general  clause  that 

ers,  30  Ga.  679;   Sullivan  v.  City  it    "may  make  any  other  by-laws 

of   Oneida,   Gl   111.   242;    Smith   v.  and    regulations  which   may   seem 


397  MUNICIPAL    REGULATION,  §  257 

Sec.  257.     Municipal     control — Legislative     power — Police 
power. 

The  municipal  authorities  of  incorporated  towns  and  cities 
may,  in  the  absence  of  constitutional  restrictions,  be  invested 
by  the  Legislature  of  the  State  with  the  power  to  license, 
regulate,  prohibit  or  suppress  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors 
subject  to  the  general  laws  of  the  State,  and  such  traffic  may 
be  prohibited  in  one  part  of  a  town  or  city,  and  licensed  in 
another  part,  as  the  public  welfare  may  require.  This  is  so 
because  the  to^vns  and  cities  of  a  State  are  a  part  of  the 
governmental  frame  work  of  the  State,  and  such  power  may 
be  delegated  to  them  as  a  rightful  legislative  power,  to  be 
carried  out  by  the  enactment  of  proper  By-Laws  or  ordi- 
nances.^*' And  without  the  grant  of  such  power,  a  municipal 
corporation  may  not  legislate  upon  the  subject,  and  it 
will  not  of  itself  authorize  its  authorities  to  issue  a  license. 
Such  power  in  a  municipal  corporation  is  a  dormant  one  and 
affords  no  authority  to  issue  a  license  until  called  into  life 
and  put  into  operation  by  appropriate  legislation  by  the 
proper  municipal  authorities.^^  When  such  power  has  been 
conferred  upon  a  municipality,  it  is  wholly  discretionary  with 

for  the  well-being  of  the  city,  pro-  Mich.  367;   19  N.  W.  38;  Sherlock 

vided    they    be    not    repugnant    to  v.  .Stuart,  96  Mich.  193;  55  N.  VV. 

the    Constitution    or    laws    of    the  845;    St.  Paul  v.  Troyer,   3  Minn. 

State"  only   empowers   it   to  pass  291 ;  State  v.  Dwyer,  21  Minn.    512; 

an   ordinance   upon    the   cases   de-  State    v.    Andrews,    11    Neb.    523; 

scribed   in   the  specific   provisions.  State    v.    Fay,    44    N.    J.    L.     ( 15 

State  V.  Ferguson,  33  N.  H.  424.  Vroom)    474;    Paul   v.   Gloucester, 

16  Mayor   v.    Shattuck,    19   Colo.  21    Vroom     (N.    J.    L.),    585;     15 

104;   Morris  v.  Rome,  10  Ga.  532;  Atl.  272;   Riley  v.  Trenton,  51  N. 

Denehy    v.  Chicago,    120    111.    627;  J.  L.  (22  Vroom)  49'8;18  Atl.  116; 

City   of   Lawrenceburg   v.    Wuest,  Burkhalter   v.   McConnellsville,   20 

1'6   Ind.  337;   Wiley  v.   Owens,   .39  Ohio  St.  309;    Bronson  v.  Oberlin, 

Ind.  429;    Crawfordsville  v.   Lutz,  41    Ohio  St.   47<);    Davis   v.   State, 

109  Ind.  466;    10  N.   E.  411;   Ma-  2   Tex.   App.    425;    Moundsville   v. 

son    V.    Trustees,    4    Bush     (Ky.),  Fountain,  27   W.  Va.   1S2;   Glentz 

40'6 ;  State  v.  Harper,  42  La.  Ann.  v.  State,  28  Wis.  549. 

312;    7  So.  446;   New  Hampton  v.  i7  People  v.  Crothy,  93  111.  180; 

Conroy,  56  la.  498;  9  N.  W.  417;  Conley  v.   Rushville.  60  Ind.  327; 

Commonwealth  v.   Fredericks,    119  Carr  v.  Fowler,  74  Ind.  590. 
Mass.    199;    Wolf   v.    Lansing,    53 


§  258  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  398 

its  authorities  to  license  and  regulate  or  partially  or  wholly 
prohibit  the  liquor  traffic,  provided  such  municipal  legislation 
is  not  in  contravention  of  the  Constitution,  statutes  and  police 
power  of  the  State.'^  Under  the  police  power  of  the  State, 
such  municipal  authorities  may  enact  ordinances  of  wider 
scope  and  affixing  greater  penalties  than  are  provided  by  the 
laws  of  the  State  for  the  violation  of  the  laws,  provided  they 
are  not  prohibited  from  doing  so  by  a  statute  of  the  State ; 
and  the  enactment  of  laws  by  the  State  regulating  the  liquor 
traffic  will  not  have  that  effect,  nor  prevent  such  municipal 
authorities  from  acting/^  The  acknowledged  police  power  of 
the  State  extends  even  to  the  destruction  of  property.  For 
this  reason,  even  though  the  enforcement  of  an  ordinance  may 
operate  to  destroy  a  business  theretofore  lawful,  and  to  seri- 
ously impair  the  value  of  property  acquired  under  the  sanction 
of  a  special  law  or  charter,  these  considerations  will  not  render 
the  ordinance  invalid  or  prevent  its  enforcement  when  the  pro- 
tection of  the  public  health  or  promotion  of  the  general  wel- 
fare requires  it."° 

Sec.  258.  Discretionary  powers  of  municipal  corporations. 
"Where  there  is  no  constitutional  inhibition,  a  Legislature 
has  the  right  to  confer  upon  the  municipalities  of  the  State 
the  power  of  regulating  any  business  which  may  act  preju- 
dicially upon  the  health,  morals,  and  peace  of  the  inhabitants. 
This  regulation  may  be  extended  to  the  exercise  of  the  dis- 

18  Schwiichow  V,  'Chicago,  68  111.  Where  a  Constitution  prohibits 
444 ;  Yunnarsaohn  v.  Sterling,  92  the  Legislatm-e  delegating  the 
111.  5-69;  State  v.  Columbia,  17  power  to  suspend  the  laws,  it  can- 
6.  C.  80.  not  delegate  such  power  to  a  mu- 

19  Pekin  v.  Smclzel,  21  111,  464;  nicipality  to  suspend  a  law;  and 
74  Am.  Dec.  105.  a   city  charter  providing  that   its 

20  License  Case,  5  How.  504;  provisions  nd  an  ordinance  en- 
Brewing  Co.  V.  Mass,  97  U.  S.  26;  acted  in  oursuance  thereof  shall 
Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  97  supersede  a  State  statute  when- 
U.  S.  659;  Muglcr  v.  Kan.  123  U.  ever  there  is  conflict  between 
6.   623;    8  Sup.   C't.   273;— L.   Ed.  them    is    void.      Arroyo    v.    State 

An  ordinance  in  conflict  with  a        (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  69  S.  W.  503. 
State  law  is  void.     State  v.  Lang- 
ston,  S8  N.  €.  682. 


399  MUNICIPAL   liEGULATION.  §  258 

cretionary  power  by  the  municipal  authorities,  as  to  the  person 
who  is  to  be  licensed  and  the  place  where  the  business  is  to  be 
transacted;   and  a  reasonable  tax  may  be  imposed  for  the 
privilege  of  embarking  in,  and  carrying  on,  any  such  business. 
The  right  to  regulate  such  matters  is  found  in  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  good  government  and  self-protection  and  the  compre- 
hensive police  power  of  the  State.    The  right  to  impose  a  tax 
upon  a  licensed  business  is  largely  supported  by  legislative 
and  judicial  sanction  and  recognition.    That  a  very  large  dis- 
cretion must  be  vested  in  the  officers  who  are  to  grant  or  refuse 
the  licenses  in  such  cases  is  manifest  from  the  nature  of  the 
subject  to  be  regulated.     In  the  matter  of  licensing  tippling 
shops  and  saloons  they  must  of  necessity  be  the  best,  and 
generally  the  only,  judges  whether  the  establishment  of  such  a 
place  in  any  particular  locality  will  affect  or  disturb  the  peace 
of  the  community,  as  each  particular  ease  must  depend  in  a 
great  measure  upon  its  own  circumstances  and  bearings.     In 
such  case  there  is  no  presumption  that  the  persons  charged 
with  the  duty  of  granting  such  licenses  will  not  perform  it  or 
that  they  will  abuse  the  discretion  given  them.     Other  con- 
siderations than  the  mere  locality  must  often  enter  into  the 
determination  of  the  suitableness  of  the  place  for  the  saloon. 
If  the  building  be  so  arranged  as  to  render  violations  of  the 
law  easy,  or  if  it  is  to  be  kept  in  connection  with  a  house  of 
prostitution,  or  if  it  be  not  situated  upon  a  street  or  an  alley, 
or  if  it  be  one  of  the  upper  stories  of  a  building,  or  in  a  part 
of  the  city  kept  for  residence  only,  or  near  a  school,  these 
would  certainly  afford  good  reasons  for  rejecting  an  applica- 
tion for  such  a  license.    The  power  to  regulate  and  grant  such 
a  license  necessarily  involves  the  power  to  refuse  to  grant 
one,   when,   in   the  judgment   of  the   municipal   authorities, 
there  are  features  connected  with  any  particular  application 
which   would   render   the    compliance    unsafe    or    improper. 
Unless  this  poAver  to  refuse  is  admitted  there  could  be  no 
regulation,  because  if  the  authorities  were  obliged  to  license 
every  applicant  who  has  complied  with  a  prescribed  set  of 
conditions,   or  who  will  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money,  the 
power  would  be  changed  from  one  of  regulation  into  one  of 
simple  taxation,  from  a  power,  the  judicious  exercise  of  which 


§  259  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  400 

is  essential  to  the  very  life  of  a  municipal  corporation,  into 
one  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  individual  citizens,  and  of  no 
possible  value  to  the  municipal  corporation,  save  in  the  paltry 
sums  it  might  put  into  the  treasury.  When  we  speak  of  the 
discretion  in  municipal  authorities,  in  the  exercise  of  the 
power,  we  mean,  of  course,  a  legal  discretion  and  not  an  arbi- 
trary and  uncontrollable  sway.  From  the  peculiarly  demo- 
cratic character  of  our  municipal  institutions  such  powers 
cannot  become  dangerous  in  the  hands  of  our  rulers  except, 
perhaps,  in  the  granting  of  such  licenses  with  too  much 
liberality.-^ 

Sec.   259.    Exclusive  municipal  power — Effect. 

If  the  Legislature  of  a  State,  having  the  power  to  do  so, 
provides  that  the  incorporated  towns  and  cities  of  the  State 
shall  have  the  exclusive  privilege  of  granting  licenses  to  retail 
intoxicating  liquors  within  their  corporate  limits,  this  will 
deprive  the  State  and  county  officials  of  all  authority  to  inter- 
fere in  any  manner  whatever  with  the  granting  of  such 
licenses.--    A  grant  of  such  exclusive  power  and  authority  to 

2i7ji    re    Hoover,    30    Fed.    ol;  389;    Baton   Rouge  v.   Butler,   IIS 

United   States   v.   Ronan,   33   Fed.  La.  73 ;  42  So.  650 ;  State  v.  Lind- 

117;  Batters  V.  Dunning,  49  Conn.  quist,    77    Minn.    540;     80    N.    W. 

479;  Sherlock  v.  Stuart,  96  Mich.  701;     Coulterville     v.     Gillen,     72 

193;   55   N.   W.   845;   St.   Paul   v.  111.  599;  State  v.  Binswanger,  122 

Froyer,    3    Minn.    200;     State    v.  Mo.  App.  78;   98   S.  W.    103;   Ed- 

Ludwig,    21    Minn.    202;     Perkins  monson     v.     Commonwealth,     110 

V.  Ledvetter,  68  Miss.  327;    8  So.  Ky.  510;   62  S.  W.   1018;    22  Ky. 

507;       Sparrow's      Petition,      138  L.    Rep.    1902;    Commonwealth    v. 

Penn.   St.    116;    20    A.    711;    Ail-  Luck, '2  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)   296;  State 

stock  V.  Page,   77   Va.  386;    State  v.    Wheeler,    27    Minn.    76;    Berg- 

V.  Columbus,   17   S.   C.  80.  meyer     v.     Greenup     Co.      (Ky. ), 

Under  a  power  to  regulate  the  44  S.  W.  82;  Sharon  Borough  v. 
sale,  an  ordinance  may  vest  dis-  Mercer  Co.,  20  Pa.  Ct.  Rep.  507; 
cretionary  power  in  the  city  as  to  State  v.  Nolan,  37  Minn.  16;  Alex- 
the  place  or  places  where  sales  ander  v.  State,  42  Miss.  316;  Phil- 
may  be  made.  State  v.  Cheyenne,  lips  v.  Tecumseh,  5  Nob.  312; 
7  Wyo.  417;   52  Pac.  975.  Cook  v.   Mercer   Co.,   51    N.  J.  L. 

22  Camp  V.  State,  27  Ala.  53;  85;  16  Atl.  176;  Raubold  v.  Corn- 
State  V.  Cochran  (Ore.),  104  Pac.  monwealth  (Ky.),  54  S.  W. 
419;    Bennett    v.    People,    30    111.  17;  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1125;  Feather- 


401  MUNICIPAL    REGULATION.  §  259 

one  jurisdiction,  for  instance,  to  a  municipal  corporation,  to 
restrain  or  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  upon  every 
day  in  the  week,  is  irreconcilable  with  the  existence  of  an 
antecedent  power,  for  instance,  in  the  State,  to  prohibit  the 
exercise  of  the  same  upon  a  special  day  of  the  week ;  -^  and  a 
general  statute  which  empowers  the  county  authorities  of  a 
State  to  grant  licenses  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  at 
retail,  but  provides  that  it  shall  not  apply  to  any  toA\'n  or  city, 
which,  by  its  charter  has  power  to  grant  licenses  for  the  sale 
of  such  liquors,  provided  the  fees  charged  therefor  are  at  least 
as  much  as  those  required  by  the  county,  will  deprive  the 
county  authorities  of  jurisdiction  to  act  in  the  premises  and 
grant  a  license  under  the  provisions  of  such  general  statute.^* 
The    fact    that    an    incorporated    town    or    city    which    has 
been    granted    the    exclusive    power    to    regulate    the    sale 
of    intoxicating    liquors    within    its    corporate    limits,    sees 
proper  not  to  grant  an  applicant  a  license  for  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  within  its  limits,  will  not  confer  upon  the 
State  and  county  authorities  power  to  act  in  the  premises,  and 
if  they  do  and  issue  a  license  to  such  applicant  it  will  be  void 
and  afford  him  no  protection.     The  effect  of  the  granting  of 
such  exclusive  power  to  a  municipal  corporation  is  to  super- 
sede or  suspend  the  general  law  of  the  State  upon  the  subject; 
and  if  a  person  in  such  case  brings  himself  within  the  rules 
and  regulations  adopted  by  a  municipal  corporation  to  whom 
such  exclusive  privilege  has  been  granted,  he  is  not  amenable 
to  the  general  law,  nor  punishable  for  acts  which,  without  the 
protection  afforded  by  the  license  of  such  corporation,  would 
be  violations  of  the  general  laws  of  the  State.    But  a  statute 
which  confers  upon  the  municipal  corporations  within  a  State 

stone  V.  Lambertville,  50  N.  J.  L.  Moskow  v.  Highlands    (Colo.),  47 

(21    Vroom)     507;     14    Atl.    599;  Pac.    846;  Schwerman  v.  Common- 

Clintonville   v.    Keating,    4    Denio  wealth,  99  Ky.  296 ;  38  S.  W.  146 ; 

(N.  Y.),  341;   State  V.  Baker,  381  I'ommonwealth     v.     Helbeck,     101 

Ore.   50;    92   Pac.    1076;    13  L.   R.  Ky.    16G;    40  S.  W.  245. 

A.   (N.  S.)    1040;  Ward  V.  County  -'s  Hetzer    v.    Wheelan,    21    Ga. 

Court,   51    W.   Va.    102;    41    S.    K.  461. 

154;    Seattle    v.    Clark,    28    Wash.  24  State    v.    Andrews,     11    Neb. 

717;     69     Pac.     407;     Ex     parte  6'23;    Clintonville    v.    Keating,    4 

Simms,  41   Fla.   31'6;   25  So.  280;  Denio,   341. 


§259 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


402 


the  power  to  license  or  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
within  their  corporate  limits  does  not  thereby  confer  the  ex- 
elusive  right  to  do  so,  but  a  right  concurrent  with  that  of  the 
State  and  county  authorities  in  regard  to  the  same  matter  or 
subject.  The  exclusive  right  of  municipal  corporations  to 
license  and  control  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  within  their 
corporate  limits  is  unusual  and  not  in  harmony  with  the  system 
of  State  legislation.  Hence,  the  legislative  intention  of  con- 
ferring such  a  power  must  be  clear  to  that  effect  and  sus- 
ceptible of  no  other  reasonable  construction.  The  usual  power 
conferred  upon  such  a  corporation  to  collect  a  license  for  the 
sale  of  such  liquors  within  its  limits  will  not  be  sufficient  to 
confer  the  right  of  such  exclusive  control.-^  When  a  municipal 
corporation  has  the  exclusive  privilege  of  granting  licenses  to 
sell  intoxicating  liquors,  and  to  prescribe  the  terms  on  which 
they  may  be  sold  within  the  limits  of  incorporation,  it  has  the 
power  to  declare  the  sale  of  such  liquors  within  its  limits  a 
nuisance  and  to  punish  it  as  such.-" 


25  Territory  v.  Webster,  5  Dak. 
3-51;  40  N.  W.  535;  Corbett  v. 
Territory,  1  Wash.  T.  431;  Lutz 
V.  Crawfordsville,  109  Ind.  466; 
10  N.  E.  411;  State  v.  Gurlock, 
14  Iowa,  444;  Keokuk  v.  Dressell, 
47  Iowa,  597;  Ginnochio  v.  State, 
30   Tex.    App.   584;    18    S.    W.   82. 

26  Bennett  v.  The  People,  30  111. 
394;  Village  of  Coulterville  v. 
Gillen,  72  III.  599. 

There  is  no  constitutional  ob- 
jection to  a  statute  which  turns 
over  to  cities  the  complete  con- 
trol over  the  liquor  trallic  within 
them.  Davis  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App. 
425;  ^loundsville  v.  Fountain,  27 
W.  Va.  182;  Taul  v.  Troyer,  3 
Minn.  291;  Commonwealth  v. 
Fredericks,  119  Mass.  119;  Mason 
V.  Trustees,  4  Bush,  40i6 ;  State  v. 
Harper,  42  La.  Ann.  312;  7  So. 
446 ;  Ex  parte  Cowert,  92  Ala.  94 ; 
0  So.  225;  State  v.  King,  37  Ala. 
462. 


Power  once  given  to  license  may 
be  taken  away,  even  though  the 
license  fees  had  been  used  and  the 
city  would  not  return  them  to  the 
licensees.  Gutzweller  v.  People, 
14  111.   142. 

A  general  statute  prohibiting 
the  opening  of  a  saloon  on  Sunday 
does  not  prevent  the  Legislature 
authorizing  a  city  "to  pass  all  or- 
dinances in  relation  to  keeping 
open  saloons  on  the  Sabbath  day 
in"  the  city.  Hood  v.  Van  Glahn, 
S8  Ga.  405;    14  S.   E.  564. 

Power  given  a  city  to  enact 
ordinances  regulating  the  liquor 
traffic  within  its  boundaries  does 
not  repeal  the  general  State 
liquor  law  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
such  city.  Gardner  v.  People,  20 
111.  430;  State  v.  Langdon,  29 
Minn.  393;  13  N.  W.  187;  and 
vice  versa.  Salina  v.  Seitz,  16 
Kan.  143;  Drysdale  v.  Pradot,  45 
Miss.  44'5. 


403 


MUNICIPAL    REGULATION. 


§260 


Sec.  260.    Powers  delegated  to  and  by  municipal  corpora- 
tions. 

A  license  is  a  privilege  granted  by  the  State  usually  on  the 
payment  of  a  valuable  consideration,  though  this  is  not  essen- 


A  statute  prohibiting  a  city 
from  punishing  by  ordinance  an 
act  for  wliich  a  State  law  prose- 
cutes a  penalty  does  not  prohibit 
a  city  passing  an  ordinance  re- 
quiring a  license  to  sell  liquor 
and  prescribing  a  penalty  for  a 
sale  without  it,  although  the  same 
act  of  sale  is  a  violation  of  a 
statute  prohibiting  such  sale  with- 
out a  State  license,  and  the  ac- 
cused has  no  such  State  license. 
■Clevenger  v.  Rushvillc,  90  Ind. 
258;  Zeller  v.  Crawfordsville,  90 
Ind.  2<52;  Lutz  v.  Crawfordsville, 
109  Ind.  4G6;  10  N.  E.  411;  Ex 
parte  Stephen,  114  Cal.  27'8;  41) 
Pac.  86;  Von  Der  Leith  v.  State, 
•60  N.  J.  L.  46;  37  Atl.  436;  60 
N.  J.  L.  590;  40  Atl.  590;  Mor- 
ganstern  v.  Commonwealth,  94 
Va.  787;  26  S.  E.  402.  Contra, 
Foster  v.  Brown,  55  Iowa,  686;  8 
N.   VV.  «54. 

The  fact  that  the  State  at  large 
has  adopted  prohibition  does  not 
prevent  a  city  adopting  an  ordi- 
nance regulating  the  liquor  traffic 
within  its  boundaries.  In  re 
Thomas,  53  Kan.  C59;  37  Pac. 
171. 

Although  a  State  levies  a  tax 
upon  the  liquor  traffic,  it  may  au- 
thorize a  city  to  levy  an  addi- 
tional tax.  Wolf  v.  Lansing,  53 
Mich.  367;  19  N.  W.  38;  Louis- 
ville V.  Kean,  18  B.  Mon.  9. 

In  West  Virginia  a  city  has  the 
exclusive  power  to  determine 
whether  a  license  shall  be  grant- 
ed;  and  if  it  grant  one,  then  the 


county  must  and  may  be  com- 
pelled to  grant  one.  Ward  v. 
■County  Court,  51  W.  Va.  102;  41 
S.  E.   154. 

In  Kansas,  cities  of  the  second 
class  have  been  held  authorized  to 
regulate  the  sale  of  liquors  not 
intoxicating  but  which  contain  al- 
cohol. Eureka  v.  Jackson,  8  Kan. 
A  pp.  49;  54  Pac.  5. 

A  prohibitory  statute  may  be 
repealed  by  the  enactment  of  a 
city  charter.  PursifuU  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  47  S.  W.  772; 
20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  863;  Douglass  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky. ),  4*7  S.  W. 
329;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  653. 

A  statute  of  Georgia  incorpo- 
rating the  city  of  Swainsboro, 
empowering  it  to  grant  licenses 
to  sell  liquors,  has  been  held  not 
to  repeal  a  special  act  proliibit- 
ing  the  sale  of  liquors  within 
three  miles  of  a  particularly  spe- 
cified place  in  the  city.  Pughsley 
V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  494;  61  S. 
E.  886;  see  also  Pacific  Univer- 
sity V.  Johnson,  47  Ore.  448;  84 
Pac.   704. 

As  to  power  of  Atlantic  City, 
N.  J.,  see  Conover  v.  Atlantic 
City,  73  N.  J.  L.  596;  64  Atl. 
146;  reversing  (N.  J.  L.)  60  Atl. 
31.  As  to  the  town  of  Houma 
( La. ) ,  see  Houma  v.  Houma,  etc., 
Co.,  121  La.  21;  46  So.  42.  See 
generally.  State  v.  Kesells,  120 
Mo.  App.  233;  98  S.  W.  494;  Peo- 
ple v.  Thornton,  186  111.  162;  57 
X.  E.  <841. 

As  to  effect  of  granting  a  new 


§  260  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  404 

tial.-^  The  grant  of  a  license  may  be  made  by  the  State 
directly  or  it  may  be  made  indirectly  through  one  of  the 
municipal  corporations  of  the  State.  Of  the  direct  grant  it  is 
to  be  observed  that  a  municipal  corporation  as  such  has  no 
inherent  power  to  grant  licenses  or  exact  license  fees ;  it  must 
derive  all  its  authority  in  this  regard  from  the  State,  and  the 
power  must  come  by  direct  grant  and  cannot  be  taken  by 
implication.-^  A  municipal  corporation  can  no  more  exercise 
powers  not  conferred  upon  it  than  any  other  corporation. 
They  are  all  creatures  of  the  law  and  can  exercise  such  powers 
only  as  are  conferred  upon  them  by  it.-^  Where,  how- 
ever, such  power  has  been  conferred  upon  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, it  may  provide  by  ordinance  duly  passed,  for  a  license 
system  of  its  own,  and  enact  penalties  for  its  violation,  and 
this  it  may  do  notwithstanding  that  the  State  has  provided  for 
a  license  system  of  its  own  and  enacted  penalties  for  its  viola- 
tion. The  powers  exercised  by  a  municipal  corporation  in 
such  case  are  superadded  to  those  exercised  by  the  State.^^ 
And  likewise  it  may  do  so  even  though  the  State  has  not 
enacted  any  laws  upon  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.  This 
is  so  because  the  authority  to  pass  By-Laws  and  to  regulate 
the  internal  affairs  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  incident  to 
its  existence.^^  An  ordinance  hy  a  municipal  corporation  for 
such  purpose,  although  to  some  extent  in  restraint  of  trade,  is 
not  arbitrary,  is  incident  to  the  exercise  of  a  police  power,  and 
if  authorized  by  a  valid  law  of  the  State  will  not  be  unlawful 
or  void.^^    Where  power  has  been  conferred  upon  a  municifjal 

charter  to  a  city,  see  Brinkley  v.  so  City  of  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughn, 

State,    108    Tenn.    475;    67    S.    W.  1  Dak.   11.3. 

796.  31  Burlington   v.    Kellar,    18    la. 

Local    option    and   general    local  59. 
option  and  city  charter  construed.  32  License    Cases,    5    How.     (U, 

Mullins    V.    Lancaster     (Ky.),    63  S.)    504;   City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Up 

S.  W.  475;   23  Ky.  L.  Hep.  436.  ham,    12    Minn.    49;    City    of   Ko 

27  Cooley   on    Taxation,    p.   40'6 ;  Chester   v.    Upham,    19    Minn.    78 
Heise  v.  Columbia,  6  Rich.   (S.  C.  Presbyterian    Church    v.    City    of 
Law)    404.  Xew   York,  5   Cow.    (N.  Y.)    540 

28  Cooley   on   Taxation,   p.    408 ;  Stuyvesant  v.  Mayer,  etc.,  7  Cow 
1   Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §89.  (X.      Y.)       604;      McDermott      v 

29  Martinsville     v.      Frieze,      33  Board,    etc.,    5    Abb.   Pr,    (N.   Y. 
Ind.  507.  434. 


405  MUNICIPAL,   REGULATION.  §  261 

corporation  to  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  it  is  so 
done  with  the  intention  that  such  power  shall  be  exercised  by 
such  corporation,  and  in  the  mode  prescribed,  and  it  cannot 
delegate  it  to  others  or  to  an  individual. ^^  Until  it  by  proper 
ordinance  has  either  prohibited  the  sale  of  such  liquors  or 
provided  for  the  regulation  of  their  sale,  and  fixed  a  penalty 
for  its  violation,  no  prosecution  can  be  maintained  by 
the  corporation  against  a  person  for  selling  such  liquors.  The 
power  delegated  to  the  corporation  remains  dormant  until 
called  into  exercise  in  the  mode  provided  for  in  its  charters 
and  by  the  laws  of  the  State.^* 


Sec.  261.    Municipal  regulation  beyond  corporate  limits. 

If  there  be  no  constitutional  provision  to  the  con- 
trary, the  power  of  the  Legislature  over  the  municipal 
corporations  of  the  State  is  supreme  and  transcendent;  it 
may  direct,  change,  divide  and  abolish  them  at  pleasure, 
as  it  deems  the  public  good  to  require.''^  Having  this 
power,  it  can  designate  the  limits  over  which  the  jurisdiction 
of  such  corporations  shall  extend,  and  its  judgment  upon  the 
question  will  be  conclusive.  It  may  declare  that  they 
may  provide  by  ordinance  that  no  unlicensed  dramshop  shall 
be  kept  within  a  designated  distance  of  their  corporate 
limits;  for  otherwise  all  that  need  be  done  to  evade  the 
law  would  be  to  keep  a  foot  or  two  beyond  the  cor- 
porate boundaries.^''  AVhere  a  Legislature  has  done  this, 
an  ordinance  passed  by  such  a  corporation  with  proper 
penalties  affixed  providing  that  the  retail  dealers  in  intoxi- 
cating liquors  outside  of  and  within  the  designated  limits, 
shall  obtain  a  license  from  the  corporate  authorities  is  a  valid 

33  East    St.    Louis    v.    Wehring,  34  City    of    East     St.    Louis    v. 

60   111.    28;    Kinmundy  v.   Mahan,  Wehring,    50    111.    28;     People    v. 

72    111.  462;    Darling  v.  .St.   Paul,  Village  of   Crotty,  93   III.    180. 

19   Minn.    389 ;    lyi  re   Wilson,    32  33  Dillon    Munic.    Corp.,    §  -54. 

Minn.   145;    19   X.  W.   723;    State  3o  Lutz    v.    City    of    Crawfords- 

V.    Kantler,    33    Minn.    69;    21    N.  ville,   109  Ind.  446;   10  N.  E.  411; 

W.  '856 ;   Wynants  v.  Bayonne,  44  Falmouth  v.  Watson,  5  Bush,  060. 
N.  J.  L.   (15  Vroom)    114. 


§  261  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  406 

exercise  of  the  power  granted  to  it,  and  may  bo  enforced.'^ 
The  object  of  this  clause  of  legislation  is  to  restrict  the  busi- 
ness of  selling,  and  not  to  secure  to  the  vendor  the  protection 
of  the  municipal  government.  The  liquor  seller  is  compelled 
to  pay  a  special  tax  in  the  form  of  a  license  fee  in  order  that 
the  business  may  be  restricted  to  fewer  persons,  and  not  be 
open,  like  other  pursuits,  to  every  one  without  the  payment 
of  any  special  tax.  The  theory  of  such  legislation  is  that  the 
business  requires  restrictions  because  it  is  harmful  to  society. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  just  reason  for  affirming  that  a 
person  who  could  secure  no  benefit  from  the  municipal 
government,  because  his  place  of  business  is  outside  of  corpo- 
rate limits,  should  be  exempt  from  the  special  tax  imposed  up- 
on those  engaged  in  the  business  of  selling  liquor  within  the 
corporate  limits.^*  In  the  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska  it  was 
contended  that  such  a  statute  was  within  the  interdiction  of  a 
clause  of  the  State  Constitution  which  provided  that  no  man's 
property  should  "be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use  without  the 
consent  of  his  representatives,  and  without  just  compensation 
being  previously  made  to  him. ' '  In  answering  this  contention 
the  court  said :  ' '  Had  the  exercise  of  the  power  complained  of 
been  the  imposition  of  an  ordinary  tax  merely  on  the  property 
of  the  appellee,  situated  without  the  limits  of  the  town,  for 
municipal  purpose,  we  should  not  doubt  the  correctness  of  the 
objection ;  or  even  if  the  exclusion  of  the  same  in  controversy 
in  consideration  of  the  trade  license,  had  been  made  for  local 
revenue  purposes  alone,  though  not  in  the  usual  form  of  tax- 
ation, we  should  regard  it  as  within  the  constitutional  prohi- 
bition ;  for  the  Legislature  could  not  delegate  to  the  corpora- 
tion the  right  to  either  license  for  a  compensation  or  tax,  a 
privilege  to  be  enjoyed  beyond  its  limits,  except  as  a  police 
regulation,  having  reference  to  the  comfort,  safety  and  wel- 
fare of  society  within  its  local  jurisdiction.  But  in  our  opin- 
ion the  exaction  of  a  fee  of  one  hundred  dollars  for  the  priv- 

37  Strauss    v.    Pontiac,    40     111.       N.    E.    729;    Board    v.    Watson",    5 
301;    Lutz   V.   Crawfordsville,    109       Bush    (Ky.),    GGO. 
Mo.   466;    10  N.   E.  411;    Emerich  :^s  Emerich    v.    City    of    Indian- 

V.  Indianaiwlis,   118   Mo.   279;    20       apolis,    118    Mo.    279;    20    N.    E. 

729. 


407  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  261 

ilege  of  vending  ardent  spirits,  in  such  proximity  to  the  towTi 
as  to  render  its  exercise  liable  to  effect  the  good  order  or  peace 
of  the  local  community  did  not  infringe  any  constitutional 
right  of  the  appellee."  ^9  Subsequently  in  approving  this  state- 
ment of  the  bnv.  the  court  said:  "This  provision  violates  no 
command  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  general  in  its  application 
to  all  territory  of  the  State  falling  within  such  description, 
and  it  is  but  an  exercise  of  the  police  power  intrusted  to  the 
Legislature.  It  is  referrable  to  that  principle  which  enables 
the  Legislature  to  prohibit  liquor  selling  on  Sundays  and  on 
days  of  election,  or  within  the  vicinity  of  fairs,  camp-meet- 
ings, and  other  gatherings  of  the  people."^"  Likewise  it  has 
been  held  that  a  law  prohibiting  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
within  two  miles  of  the  corporate  limits  of  any  municipality 
is  not  obnoxious  to  the  constitutional  provision  requiring  all 
laws  to  be  uniform  in  their  operation ;  nor  does  it  violate  the 
constitutional  requirement  that  every  act  shall  embrace  but 
one  subject  and  matters  properly  connected  therewith,*^  While 
it  is  true  that  the  enacting  of  necessary  by-laws  for  the  regu- 
lation of  municipal  corporations  is  an  incidental  power  essen- 
tial to  their  continued  existence,  it  is  also  true  that  such  by- 
laws must  not  be  inconsistent  with  their  charters.  These  are 
the  fundamental  laws  of  their  creation;  and,  in  effect,  are 
the  Constitutions  to  such  petty  legislative  bodies  to  whom  the 
power  to  enact  by-laws  is  delegated.  Such  corporations  there- 
fore cannot  give  to  their  ordinances  extra  territorial  effect  ex- 
cept so  far  as  they  may  be  clearly  authorized  so  to  do  by  their 
charters,  and  an  ordinance  passed  without  such  authority  is 
void." 

39Pleuler  v.  State,  11  Neb.  547;  its  limits.     Ex  parte  Stephen,  114 

10  N.  W.  481.  Cal.  278;    46  Pac.  86. 

40  Hunzinger   v.    State,    39    Neb.  In  Colorado   it  is  held  that  a  per- 
653;  58  N.  W.  194.  son    selling   liquor   within    a   mile 

41  State  V.  Shroeder,  51  la.  197;  of     a     town     may     be     punished, 
1  N.  W.  431.  though   the   place   where   he  made 

42  Gabel  v.  Houston,  29  Tex.  335.       the  sale    is   within  a  mile  of  an- 
It  would  seem  that  one  amount       other  town  or  towns.     Meckew  v. 

may  be  chai-ged  for  a  license  Highland,s,  9  Colo.  App.  255;  47 
within  a  city  and  another  beyond       Pac.  846. 

If  the  limitation  distance  runs 


;§262 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


408 


Sec.  262.    Reasonableness  of  ordinances. 

In  the  United  States  the  courts  have  often  affirmed  general 
incidental  power  of  municipal  corporations  to  make  ordi- 
nances, but  have  always  declared  that  ordinances  passed  by 
virtue  of  an  implied  power  must  be  reasonable,  consonant  with 
the  general  powers  and  purposes  of  the  corporation,  and  not 
inconsistent  with  the  laws  or  policy  of  the  State. *^  It  has  al- 
ways been  held  that  the  courts  will  review  the  question  as  to 
reasonableness  of  ordinances  passed  under  a  grant  of  power, 
general  in  its  nature  or  under  incidental  or  implied  municipal 
powers,  and  if  any  given  ordinance  is  found  unreasonable  will 
declare  it  void  as  a  matter  of  law.**  The  grounds  on  which 
an  ordinance  may  be  declared  void  for  unreasonableness  have 
been  said  to  be  two:  First,  where  it  is  oppressive,  unequal 
and  unjiLst ;  and  second,  where  it  is  altogether  unreason- 
able.*'' But  the  question  whether  an  ordinance  is  rea- 
sonable cannot  be  raised  to  affect  its  validity,  where  the  power 


into  another  county  in  which  the 
city  is  not  located,  the  city  may 
as  to  such  of  its  territory  as  lies 
in  such  other  county  exact  a  li- 
cense. Gower  v.  Agee  (Mo. 
App.),  107  S.  W.  '999.  See  also 
Mason  v.  State,  1  Ga.  App.  534; 
68  S.  E.   139. 

The  question  of  the  jurisdiction 
of  a  city  over  the  place  where  the 
illegal  sale  took  place  cannot  be 
raised  in  a  prosecution  because  of 
such  sale,  where  it  is  admitted 
that  the  city  had  assumed  to  ex- 
ercise jurisdiction  with  respect  to 
the  place.  Allode  v.  Nylin,  139 
111.  App.  527. 

43  Dillon's  Munic.  Corp.,  §  253 ; 
Waters  v.  Leech,  3  Ark.  110;  In 
re  Frank,  52  Cal.  606;  Tugman  v. 
iCity  of  Chicago,  T8  111.  405; 
Chaniper  v.  City  of  Greencastle, 
138  Ind.  339;  Commonwealth  v. 
Steffee,  7  Bush    (Ky.),  L61;   Com- 


monwealth V.  Robertson,  5  Cush. 
(Mass.)  438;  Paris  v.  Graham, 
33  Mo.  94;  Kipp  v.  Patterson,  2 
Dutch.  {N.  J.)  298;  Dayton  v, 
Quigley,  29  N.  J.  Eg.  77;  State  v. 
Freeman,  38  N.  H.  426;  People 
V.  Throop,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  183; 
Commissioner  v.  Gas  Co.,  2  Grant 
(Pa.),  291;  Mayor,  etc.,  v.  Beas- 
ley,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  232; 
White  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  2  Swan 
(Tenn.),  364;  Chason  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  31'6;  State  v. 
McCannon,  111  Mo,  App.  626;  86 
S.  W.   510. 

«  McQuillin  Munic.  Corp.,  §  182; 
Yates  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  1 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  497;  Lanar  v. 
Weidman,  57  Mo.  App.  507; 
Springfield  v.  Starke,  93  Mo.  App. 
70;  Livingston  v.  Wolf,  136  Pa. 
Ft.  519;  20  Atl.  551;  State  v.  Cal- 
"   "-iv,  11   Idaho,  719;   84  Pac.  27. 

"Mcyuillin  Munic.  Corp.,  §  182; 


409  MUNICIPAL  REGULATION.  §  262 

to  enact  the  particular  ordinance  is  specifically  conferred  upon 
the  municipal  corporation.  When  the  legislative  power  has 
been  thus  extended,  its  exercise  necessarily  involves  the  author- 
ity to  determine  whether  the  results  are  reasonable  or  unrea- 
sonable, and,  if  the  judiciary  assumes  to  pass  upon  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  results  which  follow  from  the  exercise  of  that 
power,  it  departs  from  its  function  as  one  of  the  independent, 
co-ordinate  branches  of  the  government.  It  would  result  in 
the  greatest  confusion  of  decisions  to  permit,  in  any  case,  the 
introduction  of  evidence  as  to  the  effect  of  an  ordinance  upon 
a  business,  trade  or  occupation.  The  jury  would,  in  the  one 
case,  hold  that  under  the  facts  proven,  the  ordinance  was  in- 
valid, while  in  another  ease,  with  more  or  less  evidence  of  its 
hurtful  consequences,  the  ordinance  would  be  held  valid;  nor 
would  it  be  more  just  to  permit  the  reasonableness  of  an  or- 
dinance to  be  determined  by  the  court  as  a  question  of  law 
arising  upon  the  face  of  the  ordinance  and  from  the  general 
knowledge  of  its  harmful  effects.  To  do  so  would  be  to  deny 
the  right  of  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government,  whether 
local  or  general,  to  judge  of  the  wisdom  and  prudence  of  its 
own  enactments,  or  it  would  result  in  the  coexis.tence  of  power 
in  the  legislative  and  judicial  departments  to  judge  of  that 
wisdom  or  prudence  which  would  invite  endless  conflict  of 
decision  between  the  departments.'*'''  Where  the  authority 
has  ijeen  conferred  upon  a  municipal  corporation  to  suppress 
and  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  as  well  as  to  license 
the  sale,  an  ordinance  which  imposes  a  penalty  for  selling  such 
drinks  without  a  license,  where  the  penalty  exceeds  that  im- 
posed by  general  lav/  of  the  State,  is  reasonable. ■*" 

State  V.  Beattie,  IG  Mo.  App.  131 ;  *'  Deitz     v.      Central,      1     Colo. 

Kansas  City  v.  Cork,  38  Mo.  App.  323. 

6'6'6;    Plattsburg  v.   Kiley,   42   Mo.  In    determining   whether   an   or- 

App.  18;  Cape  Girardeau  v.  Riley,  dinance    is    reasonable,    the    court 

72   Mo.  220.  may     consider    its    provisions     in 

40  Steffy    V.    Monroe    City,    135  connection     Avith     the     legislative 

Ind.   4GG;    35    N.    E.    121;    Shelby-  policy    as    disclosed    in    its    enact- 

ville    V.    Cleveland,    etc.,    R.    Co.,  ments    on    the    subject-matter    of 

146   Ind.   G'6;   44  N.   E.  929;   Shea  the  ordinance.     Chicago  v.   Slack, 

V.  Muncie,   148  Ind.  14;   46  N.  E.  121  III.  App.  131. 
138. 


§  263  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  410 

Sec.    263.     Extent    of    power    of    mitnicipality    to    grant 
licenses. 

The  power  to  license  places  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  li- 
quors granted  to  a  municipal  corporation  where  such  places 
are  unrestrained  by  the  general  law  of  the  State,  coupled  with 
the  general  power  to  pass  ordinances  for  promoting  the  peace 
and  good  order  of  such  corporation,  will  justify  an  ordinance 
which  forbids  sale  of  such  liquors  in  unlicensed  places.**  In 
such  case  the  power  to  license  implies  the  power  of  such  a  cor- 
poration to  determine  the  amount  to  be  exacted  as  a  license 
fee,  subject  only  to  a  restriction  that  it  shall  not  be  so  large 
as  to  show  an  evident  intention  to  prohibit  altogether  acts  to 
be  licensed,  the  rule  being  that  the  power  to  regulate,  license 
and  tax  the  traffic  does  not  include  the  power  to  pass  ordi- 
nances prohibiting  it.*®  Authority  given  to  such  a  corporation 
"to  license  saloons,  taverns  and  eating  houses"  will  not  au- 
thorize the  granting  of  the  right  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors.^" 
The  words  used  in  conferring  such  authority  will  not  war- 
rant such  construction.  It  is  not  possible  to  contend  that  "sa- 
loons, taverns  and  eating  houses"  are,  in  contemplation  of 
law,  inseparable  from  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.  The 
power,  however,  ' '  to  license,  tax,  regulate  and  restrain  bar- 
rooms and  drinking  shops"  does  confer  the  power  to  license 
the  business  of  keeping  or  conducting  a  place  in  which  to  sell 
intoxicating  liquors.  In  so  deciding  it  was  said  that  a  "bar- 
room and  a  dramshop"  signify  a  place  where  intoxicating  li- 
quors can  be  had.^*     In  a  measure  a  general  State  law  may 

48  Vinson    v.    Town    of    Monti-  43   Mich.   361;   5   N.  W.   378;    38 

cello,    118    Ind.    103;    Clintonville  Are.  Rep.  193. 

V.  Keating,  4  Denio   (N.  Y.),  341;  si  Beiser   v.   State,   79   Ga.   326; 

HershofT   v.    Beverly,   43   N.   J.   L.  43  S.  E.  257;  In  re  Schneider,  11 

(16    Vroom)     288;     Schlachter    v.  Ore.   288;    8  Pac.  289. 

Stokes,   6.;   X.   J.   L.   138;    43  Atl.  Power  to  pass  an  ordinance  re- 

."571;  State  v.  Kaines,  35  Ore.  379;  quiring    a    dealer    to    take    out    a 

58  Pac.  39.  license    cannot  be   delegated   by  a 

49 /n  re  Stuart,  Gl  Cal.  374;  Ex  city.       State    v.    Milwaukee,     129 

parte  Wolters,  65   Cal.  269;    City  Wis.  562;    109  N.  W.  421;   but  it 

of   Portland    v.    Schmidt.    13    Ore.  mny    be    if    the    statute    expressly 

17;    Provo,    City    of    SchurtlefT.    4  authorizes    it.      In    re    Bight,    12 

Utah,    15.  Can.  Prac.  433. 

80  Mount    Pleasant    v.    Vansice, 


411  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  264 

come  to  the  aid  of  powers  illy  conferred  upon  a  town,  or  in- 
distinctly given.  Thus,  where  a  general  statute  prohibited  the 
sale  of  liqaors  throughout  a  county  except  in  a  certain  to\\Ti 
therein,  and  that  town  had  the  power  to  pass  an  ordinance 
"for  the  preservation  of  good  order,  decency  and  decorum 
within  its  limits,"  it  was  held  that  this  special  charter  should  be 
construed  in  the  light  of  the  passage  of  the  general  law  in  order 
to  ascertain  the  intent  of  the  Lecislature  in  the  use  of  the 
words  quoted ;  and  as  thus  considered  the  town  could  prohibit 
the  sales  of  liquors  within  her  boundaries.^^  And  where  a 
general  city  law  authorized  the  city  to  enact  an  ordinance  re- 
quiring all  persons  selling  liquors  within  its  boundaries  under 
a  county  license  to  take  out  a  city  license,  it  was  held  that  a 
defendant  who  had  sold  liquor  in  the  city  without  having  a 
city  license  could  not  escape  the  penalty  of  the  ordinance  by 
showing  that  he  had  no  county  license,  admitting  at  the  same 
time  that  iP  he  had  a  county  license  he  would  be  amenable  to 
the  city  ordinance.^^ 

Sec.  264.    Power  to  license,  use  and  grant. 

When  an  express  authority  to  license  is  given,  it  may  be  a 
question  whether  it  is  intended  for  the  purpose  of  revenue  or 
regulation,  ^mce  a  municipal  corporation  has  no  authority 
to  impose  a  tax  otherwise  than  in  pursuance  of  an  express 
grant  of  power  to  that  effect,  or  a  clear  and  necessary  impli- 
cation from  an  express  grant,  a  power  to  license  should  be  used 
only  for  regulation,  unless  there  is  something  in  the  language 
of  the  grant,  or  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  clearly  indi- 
cating that  it  was  also  intended  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of 
revenue.  When  the  power  to  license  is  not  especially  given, 
but  only  implied  as  a  means  of  regulating  the  subject,  it  can- 
not be  used  for  anything  else ;  in  other  words,  while  the  power 
to  license  may  be  inferred  from  the  power  to  regulate,  the 
power  to  tax  cannot.^*    As  a  means  of  regulating  the  business 

52Fortner    v.    Duncan,    91    Ky.  Fed.  Rep.  701 ;  State  v.  Herod,  29 

171;    15  S.  W.  55.  la.    123;     City    of    Burlinjrton    v. 

33Lutz    V.    €rawfordsville,     109  Putnam,  31    la.   102;   Copeland  v. 

Ind.  466;   10  N.  E.  411.  Sheridan,   152  Ind.   107;   51  N.  E. 

»4  Laxindry     License     Case,     22  474. 


§  264  TRAl^PIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  412 

it  implies  the  power  to  charge  a  fee  therefor  sufficient  to  de- 
fray the  expense  of  issuing  the  license ;  and  to  compensate  the 
corporation  for  any  expense  incurred  in  maintaining  such 
regulation. °^  The  terms  in  which  a  municipality  is  empowered 
to  grant  licenses  will  be  expected  to  indicate  with  sufficient 
precision  whether  the  grant  is  conferred  for  the  purpose  of 
revenue,  or  whether  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  given  for  regu- 
lation merely.  It  is  perhaps  impossible  to  lay  down  any  rule 
for  the  construction  of  such  grants  that  shall  be  general  and 
at  the  same  time  safe.^'^  The  appropriate  word  to  confer  the 
power  to  regulate  a  vocation  is  "license,"  but  the  use  of  it 
is  not  absolutely  essential.  For  instance,  in  California  it  was 
held  that  the  provision,  "Any  county,  city,  town  or  township 
may  nriake  and  enforce  within  its  limits  all  such  local  police, 
sanitary  and  other  regulations  as  are  not  in  conflict  with  the 
general  laws, ' '  conferred  the  power  to  regulate  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  within  either  of  such  corporations,  by  impos- 
ing a  license  tax.^^  In  other  States  it  has  been  held  that  the 
power  to  "restrain  and  prohibit,"  "regulate  and  prohibit" 
and  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  such  liquor  included  the  power  to 
license  the  traffic  and  to  fix  a  penalty  for  pursuing  the  business 
without  such  license.^*  And  in  others  it  has  been  held  that 
the  power  to  "tax"  or  to  "restrain"  carries  with  it  the  power 
to  license  the  traffic.^®  On  the  other  hand  it  has  been  held  that 
the  power  to  tax  does  not  confer  the  authority  to  license,®" 
and  that  the  right  granted  to  a  city  "to  tax  or  entirely  sup- 
press all  petty  groceries"  does  not  confer  upon  the  corpora- 
tion the  power  to  grant  licenses  for  retailing."^ 

55  Laundry  Case,  22  Fed.  Rep.  bash  Co.,  50  111.  09 ;  In  re  Schnei- 
701;      Colusa     County     v.     Seube       der,  11   Ore.  288. 

(Cal.),    53    Pac.    1128;    affirming  so  City    of    Burlington    v.    Bum- 

(Cal.)    53  Pac.  654.  gardner,  42  la.  102. 

56  Cooley  on  Taxation,  p.  408.  si  Leonard  v.  City  of  Canton,  35 

57  Ex  parte  Wolters,  65  Cal.  269.  Miss.   189. 

58  Wiley  V.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429 ;  If  there  be  neither  express  nor 
City  of  Keokuk  v.  Dressell,  47  la.  implied  power  given  to  a  city  to 
697;  City  of  Emporia  v.  Volmer,  require  a  license,  it  cannot  exact 
12  Kan.  623;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  one.  Deutschman  v.  Charlestown, 
Smith,  2  Uo.    113.  40    Ind.    449;    Steinmetz    v.    Ver- 

■'•»  Town  of  Mt.  Carmel  v.   Wa-       sallies,  40   Ind.   249 ;   Martinsville 


413 


MUNICIPAL   REGULATION. 


§265 


Sec.  265.    Power  to  require  a  license — Instances. 

Unless  expressly  or  impliedly  empowered  by  the  Legislature 
a  city  has  no  power  to  require  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  li- 
quors."^ A  provision  of  a  Constitution  that  a  city  "may  make 
and  enforce  within  its  limits  all  such  local,  police,  sanitary  and 
other  regulations  as  are  not  in  conflict  with  the  general  laws," 
empowers  it  to  adopt  an  ordinance  requiring  a  license ; '" '  and 


V.  Frieze,  33  Ind.  507;  Walker  v. 
McNelly,  121  Ga.  114;  48  S.  E. 
718. 

Where  a  statute  empowers  a 
city  to  issue  a  liquor  license  and 
exact  a  fee  therefor,  and  a  subse- 
quent statute  gives  it  a  part  of 
the  county  license  fee,  the  prior 
statute  will  be  held  repealed.  Al- 
toona  V.  Stehle,  21  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 
395;   8  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  25. 

An  ordinance  is  not  void  be- 
cause it  discriminates  in  favor  of 
spirituous  and  vinous  and  against 
malt  liquors.  Grabbs  v.  Danville, 
63  111.  App.  590. 

A  statute  authorizing  a  "town" 
to  issue  a  license  means  an  incor- 
porated town  and  not  a  township 
organization,  although  townships 
are  called  "towns."  People  v. 
Thornton,  186  111.  162;  57  N.  E. 
•841. 

A  city  may  exact  a  license  of 
one  who  has  a  county  license  to 
sell  in  its  limits.  Ex  parte  Hin- 
kle,  104  Mo.  App.  104;  78  S.  W. 
317. 

So  a  city  may  classify  licenses 
and  fix  one  rate  for  one  kind  and 
another  rate  for  another;  and  a 
dealer  falling  in  the  class  of  the 
lower  rate  cannot  complain  of  it 
because  there  is  a  class  of  a  higher 
rate  provided  for  in  it.  Petitfils 
V.  Jcanerette,  52  La.  Ann.  1005; 
27  So.  35S. 

A  city  may  require  a  common 


carrier  to  deliver  liquor  at  a  par- 
ticular depot  and  nowhere  else. 
Barrett  v.  Kickard  (Neb.),  124 
N.  W.   153. 

Under  a  power  to  regulate  or 
prohibit,  a  city  may  prohibit  so- 
liciting of  orders.  Bravmstein  v. 
People    (Colo.),    105   Pae.   857. 

62  United  States  v.  Kaldenbach, 
1  Cranch  C.  C.  132;  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
15504;  Cowley  v.  Rushville,  60 
Ind.  327;  Walter  v.  Columbia,  61 
Ind.  24;  McFee  v.  Greenfield,  62 
Ind.  21;  Carr  v.  Fowler,  74  Ind. 
590;  Burlington  v.  Kellar,  18 
Iowa,  59;  Commonwealth  v.  Voor- 
hies,  12  B.  Mon.  361 ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Locke,  114  Mass.  288; 
Hamel  v.  St.  Jean  Deschaillons, 
Rap.  Jud.  Que.  20  Can.  Sup.  301; 
Houma  v.  Houma,  etc.,  Co.,  121 
La.  21;  46  So.  42;  Mernaugh  v. 
State,  41  Fia.  433;   27  So.  34. 

63  Ex  parte  Wolters,  65  Cal. 
200 ;  3  Pac.  894 ;  People  v.  Dwyer, 
4  Pac.  451;  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  IS 
Ga.  586;  Douglassville  v.  Johns, 
62  Ga.  423;  Lawrenceburg  v. 
Wuest,  16  Ind.  337;  Meyer  v. 
Bridgeton,  37  N.  J.  L.  160;  Her- 
shoff  V.  Beverly,  45  N.  J.  L.  288; 
Heisembrittle  v.  Charleston,  2 
McMul.  233 ;  Portland  v.  Schmidt, 
13  Ore.  17;  6  Pac.  221;  Stokes  v. 
Schlachter,  66  N.  J.  L.  247;  49 
Atl.  556;  Hoboken  v.  Goodman, 
68  N.  J.  L.  217;  51  Atl.  1092. 


§  265  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  414 

such  ordinance  may  provide  for  certain  reqiiisities  before  the 
license  i^;  granted."*  Power  to  license,  regulate  and  prohibit 
sales  or  gifts  of  liquors  authorizes  the  adoption  of  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  a  license  for  sales  in  quantities  of  one  gallon 
or  over."^  Under  such  a  power  a  city  may  prohibit  sales  in 
one  part  of  a  city  and  require  a  license  in  the  other  part.*^" 
Under  a  power  to  exact  a  license  from  persons  licensed  by  State 
or  county  authority,  it  may  punish  those  selling  liquor  with- 
out a  city  license,  even  though  he  has  no  State  or  county  li- 
cense.®^ As  a  prerequisite  to  obtaining  a  license  a  city  may 
require  an  applicant  to  first  obtain  a  county  license."®  Under 
a  power  to  "regulate  or  prohibit"  the  sale  of  liquors  a  city 
may  require  a  license  for  their  sale ;  "^  but  it  has  been  held 
that  under  a  power  to  license  "saloons,  taverns  and  eating 
houses,"  a  license  could  not  be  imposed  for  the  sale  of  liquor; "° 
and  one  "to  tax  or  entirely  suppress  all  petty  groceries"  not 
to  license  retail  liquor  dealers. '^^  A  resolution  of  Congress 
authorizing  the  Commissioners  of  the  District  of  Columbia  to 
enforce  police  regulations  for  the  safety  of  the  "lives,  health,- 
comfort  and  quiet"  of  the  inhabitants  of  such  District,  was 
held  not  to  authorize  them  to  punish  a  person  for  selling  li- 
quor without  a  license.'^     And  power  authorizing  a  city  to 

64  Foster  v.  San  Francisco,  102  cs  Wagner  v.  Garrett,  118  Ind. 
Cal.  483;  37  Pac.  763;  41  Am.  St.  114;  20  N.  E.  706;  Linkenhelt  v. 
194;  Wells  v.  Torrey,  144  Mich.  Garrett,  118  Ind.  599;  20  N.  E. 
689;  108  N.  W.  423;  13  Detroit  708;  see  also  Territory  v.  Robert- 
Leg.  N.  378.  son,    19    Okla.    149;    92    Pac.    144; 

esDennehy   v.   Chicago,    120   111.  Gale  v.  Moscow,  15  Idaho,  332;  97 

627;    12    N.    E.    227;    Ammon    v.  Pac.  828. 

Chicago,   26  111.  App.  641 ;   Miller  so  Keokuk   v.   Dressell,  47   Iowa, 

V.  Ammon,  145  U.  S.  421;  12  Sup.  597;    State  v.   Stevens,   114  N.   C. 

Ct.  S84;   36  L.  Ed.  759;   Common-  873;    19   S.  E.  861;   In  re  Schnei- 

wealth    V.    Turner,    1    €ush.    493;  der,  11   Ore.  288;   8  Pac.  2S9. 

Clintonville    v.    Keating,   4   Denio,  "o  Mt.    Pleasant    v.    Vanice,    43 

341.  Mich.  361;    5  N.  W.  37'8;   38   Am. 

60  People     V.     Cregier,     13S     111.  Rep.   193. 

401;   28  N.  E.  812.  ■?!  Leonard   v.  Canton,   35   Miss. 

STLutz    V.    Crawfordsville,    109  189. 

Ind.  46<5;  10  N.  E.  411;  Frankfort  72 /„     re    Sullivan,     21     D.     C. 

V.  Aughe,  114  Ind.  77,  600;   15  N.  139. 
E.  S02,  804. 


415 


MUNICIPAL   REGULATION. 


§265 


license,  regulate  and  restrain  the  sale  of  liquor  is  broad  enough 
to  authorize  the  adoption  of  an  ordinance  requiring  a  license 
for  selling,  bartering  or  giving  it  away."  Under  its  general 
power  to  exact  a  license  a  city  may  provide  that  no  one  shall 
receive  a  license  except  his  application  be  accompanied  by  a 
recommendation  signed  by  a  specified  number  of  respectable 
citizens  who  state  that  the  applicant  has  a  good  reputation ;  '* 
and  it  may  require  a  grocer  selling  liquor  to  take  out  a  li- 
license,"  and,  under  a  proper  power  conferred,  may  require  a 
wholesaler  to  take  out  a  license.'^^  An  ordinance  which  pro- 
vides that  "no  person"  shall  sell  or  give  away  any  intox- 
icating or  malt  liquors  to  be  drunk  on  the  premises  applies 
to  the  keeper  of  a  restaurant ;  ^^  but  power  to  exact  a  license 
from  houses  of  public  entertainment  only  will  not  authorize 
the  enactment  of  a  license  from  the  keeper  of  an  inn.^^     An 


73  Vinson  v.  Monticello,  118 
Ind.  103;  19  N.  E.  734;  Gertz  v. 
Monticello,  US  Ind.  600;  It)  N. 
E.   735. 

74  Wells  V,  Torrey,  144  Mich. 
6&9;  108  N.  VV.  423;  13  Detroit 
Leg.  N.  378;  People  v.  Mount,  186 
111.  560;  58  N.  E.  360;  affirming 
87  111.  App.  194;  State  v.  Kes- 
sells,  120  Mo.  App.  233;  96  S.  W. 
494.  Held  otherwise  under  a  con- 
stitutional provision.  State  v. 
McCammon,  111  Mo.  App.  626; 
86  S.  W.  510. 

An  ordinance  requiring  two- 
thirds  of  a  majority  of  the  voters 
to  annually  sign  the  petition  for 
a  license  is  void,  because  unrea- 
sonable. State  V.  McCammon,  HI 
Mo.  App.  626;  86  S.  W.  510;  but 
not  one  requiring  two-thirds  of 
the  voters  in  the  block  where  the 
saloon  is  to  be  located.  Martens 
V.  People,  186  111.  314;  37  N.  E. 
871;  affirming  85  111.  App.  66. 

75  Chicago  V.  Slack,  121  111. 
App.    131. 

70  Confer  v.  Elizabcthtown 
<Ky.),  99  S.  W.  608;    30  Ky.  L. 


Pvep.  706;  Spira  v.  State,  146  Ala. 
177;  41  So.  4-65  (a  brewery); 
State  V.  Calloway,  11  Idaho,  719; 
84  Pae.  27  (by  statute);  Joseph 
Schlitz  Brewing  Co.  v.  Superior, 
117  Wis.  297;  93  N.  W.  1120; 
Cofer  V.  Commonwealth  ( Ky. ) ,  87 
S.  W.  264;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  934; 
Cooper  V.  Hot  Springs,  87  Ark. 
12;    111   S.   W.   997. 

A  license  to  retail  and  one  to 
wholesale  may  be  combined. 
Strauss  v.  Galesburg,  203  111. 
234;  67  N.  E.  836;  affirming  89 
111.   App.   504. 

77Scanlon  v.  Denver,  38  Colo. 
401;  88  Pac.  156;  Conover  v.  Greg- 
son,  72  N.  J.  L.  103;  60  Atl.  31. 

78 /n  re  Barclay,  11  Up.  Can. 
470. 

Tlie  grant  of  the  license  and 
payment  of  the  fee  is  no  defense 
where  no  license  was  actually  is- 
sued ;  for  the  license  is  the  only 
defense  allowed  on  the  charge  of 
a  sale  without  a  license.  Jordan 
V.  Bespole,  c.  8  Minn.  441;  90  N. 
W.   1052. 


§  265  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  416 

ordinance  may  forbid  a  person  having  an  interest  in  more  than 
one  license  or  in  more  than  one  place  for  the  sale  of  liquors 
at  the  same  time/°  An  ordinance  providing  that  "every  per- 
son who  sells  intoxicating  liquors  must  have  a  license  does  not 
impose  a  license  tax  on  each  sale  instead  of  on  the  business  of 
selling  such  liquors,  where  the  entire  ordinance  shows  it  was 
the  intention  not  to  impose  a  tax  on  each  sale,  but  on  the  en- 
tire business  of  selling.*^  Under  a  power  to  grant  licenses  with- 
out restriction,  except  as  the  Constitution  of  the  State  forbids, 
the  city  may  provide  for  the  issuance  of  licenses  generally, 
although  State  licenses  are  graduated. ^^  So  under  a  power  to 
exact  a  license  a  city  may  provide  a  penalty  if  a  sale  be  made 
without  it.^^  An  ordinance  which  requires  an  applicant  for  a 
license  in  a  block  where  no  saloon  has  been  established  to  pre- 
sent the  written  consent  of  two-thirds  of  the  property  owners 
in  the  block,  is  reasonable,  and  does  not  so  discriminate  be- 
tween the  blocks  and  the  several  parts  of  the  city,  nor  be- 
tween persons  owning  the  same  property  interests  so  as  to  be 
void.    The  ordinance  is  uniform  in  its  operation.*^ 

79  Swift  V.   Klein,    163   III.   269;  and  the  city  is  not  liable  for  their 

45  N.  E.  219.  acts,    if    there    be    no    statute    ex- 

so  Ex  parte  Seuhe,  Wo  Ca.1.  629 ;  pressly    making     it    liable.       Mc- 

47    Pac.   59'6.  Ginnis  v.  Medway,   176  Mass.   67; 

81  New  Iberia  v.  Moss  Hotel  Co.,  57  X.  E.  210. 

112  La.  525;    36  So.  552;  but  see  A    citizen    and    taxpayer    of    a 

Houma   v.    Houma,   etc.,   Co.,    121  town    cannot   enjoin    the    issuance 

La.  21;  46  So.  42.  of    a   license   on   the   ground   that 

82  Hoboken  v.  Goodman,  68  N.  the  ordinance  permitting  its  is- 
J.  L.  217;  51  Atl.  1092;  Warrens-  suance  is  void.  Marshall  V. 
burgh  V.  McHugh,  122  Mo.  649;  Marksville,  116  La.  746;  41  So.  57. 
27  S.  W.  523;  Emporia  V.  Volmer,  83  Martens  v.  People,  186  III. 
12  Kan.  622.  314;    57   N.   E.   871;    affirming  85 

As  to  rule  concerning  the  repeal  111.  App.  66. 

of    conflicting    ordinances,    see    In  Mandamus     lies     to     compel     a 

re  Bailey,   64    Kan.   887;    68   Pac.  chief   of   police    to   prosecute   per- 

•53;  People  v.  Mount,  186  111.  560;  sons    who    sell    liquor    without    a 

68    N.    E.    360;    affirming    87    111.  license,    where    a    city    ordinance 

App.   194.  requires   him  to  carry  its  provis- 

In  the  granting  of  licenses  by  a  ions  into  effect.  Goodell  v.  Wood- 
city,  the  members  of  a  licensing  bury,  71  X.  H.  37'8;  52  Atl.  855. 
board  do  not  act  as  the  agents  of  A  city  may  be  empowered  to 
the  city,  but  as  its  public  officers;  exact   a   license  for  each  pool   or 


417  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  266 

Sec.  266.    Power  to  grant  a  license— What  includes. 

The  power  to  license,  tax,  regulate  and  restrain  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors  at  retail  carries  with  it,  without  any  ex- 
press provision,  authority  to  provide  by  ordinance  the  terms 
and  conditions  upon  which  such  license  shall  be  issued,  the 
amount  of  tax  to  be  imposed  and  the  mode  of  collecting  it, 
and  to  establish  reasonable  rules  to  be  observed  in  conducting 
the  business,  provided  the  ordinance  does  not  contravene  any 
of  the  statutory  provisions  of  the  State  upon  the  subject,  and 
the  license  fee  required  is  not  an  unreasonable  one,  and  such 
an  ordinance  may  be  amended  so  as  to  increase  the  tax  or  fee 
required  to  be  paid  for  it,  and  made  to  apply  to  licenses  al- 
ready granted  as  well  as  to  those  to  be  granted  thereafter,  and 
will  not  be  subject  to  the  objection  that  it  is  an  ex  post  facta 
ordinance.^*  It  is  abundantly  settled  that  a  license,  or  per- 
mit, issued  in  pursuance  of  a  mere  police  regulation,  has  none 
of  the  elements  of  a  contract,  and  that  it  may  be  changed  or 
entirely  revoked,  even  though  based  upon  a  valuable  consid- 
eration, and  that  in  accepting  such  a  license  the  licensee  takes 
it  with  the  knowledge  that  if  the  public  good  requires  that  the 
ordinance  authorizing  the  issuance  shall  be  changed,  modified 

billiard  table  kept  and  used  in  a  a  fee  for  it,  and  forbidding  any 
saloon.  Bailey  v.  Opelika,  14tj  one  to  conduct  a  saloon  without 
Ala.  171;  40  So.  968.  a  license,  is  not  repealed  by  a  sub- 
Under  a  power  to  license  and  sequent  ordinance  providing  regu- 
regulate  and  control  places  where  lations  that  must  be  complied 
liquors  are  kept  and  sold,  and  de-  with  by  anyone  desiring  a  license, 
daring  that  "no  license  for  the  Ex  parte  Hinkle,  104  Mo.  App. 
sale  or  disposal  of  spirituous  or  104;  78  S.  W.  317. 
intoxicating  liquors  as  a  beverage  It  has  been  held  that  a  city 
shall  be  granted  for  a  longer  pe-  cannot  exact  any  requirements  be- 
riod  than  a  municipal  year,"  a  yond  those  required  by  the  State, 
city  may  regulate  the  sale  of  Evans  v.  Redwood  Falls,  103 
liquors  and  require  a  license,  and  Minn.  314;  115  N.  W.  200;  Ter- 
is  not  confined  to  licensing  and  ritory  v.  Robertson,  19  Okla.  149; 
regulating    barrooms     and    drink-  92  Pac.   144. 

ing     houses      and     places     where  «*  In   re    Stuart,    61    Cal.    374; 

liquors  are   sold.     Houck  v.   Ash-  Ex   parte    Wolters,   65   Cal.    269; 

land,   40    Ore.    117;    66    Pac.  ■697.  3   Pac.   894;    Moore  v,   Indianapo- 

An  ordinance  requiring  a  saloon  lis,   120  Ind.  483;   22  N.   E.   424; 

keeper  to  have  a  license  and  pay  Portland  v.  Schmidt,  13  Ore.  17. 


§266 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


418 


or  repealed,  no  incidental  inconvenience  which  he  may  suffer 
can  stay  the  hand  of  the  municipal  corporation  in  changing, 
modifying  or  repealing  the  ordinance.^^  Even  if  it  were  con- 
ceded that  a  permit  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  was  possessed 
of  some  of  the  characteristics  of  property,  or  that  it  was  a 
thing  of  value,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  it  would  still  offer  no 
impediment  against  the  exertion  of  the  police  power  of  the 
State.  "The  acknowledged  police  power  of  the  State  extends 
often  to  the  destruction  of  property. ' '  ^^ 

Falkenheine 


85  Moore  v.  City  of  Indianapo- 
lis, 120  Ind.  483;  22  X.  E. 
424. 

8G  License  Cases,  5  How.  (U. 
S.)  504,  577;  Mugler  v.  Kansas, 
123  U.  S.  623,  658;  8  Sup.  Ct. 
273. 

Under  a  power  to  exact  a  li- 
cense, a  city  may  prescribe  what 
kind  of  a  person  is  entitled  to 
take  out  a  license.  Rochester  v. 
Upman,  19  Minn.  108;  Cheny  v 
Shelbyville,  18  Ind.  84;  Lawrence- 
burg  V.  Wuest,  16  Ind.  337;  Ex 
parte  Schneider,  11  Ore.  288;  8 
Pac.  289;  Whitten  v.  Covington, 
43  Ga.  421. 

We  append  a  digest  of  a  number 
of  decisions.  A  charter  empower- 
ing a  city  to  levy  taxes,  to  pro- 
vide for  licensing  retailers,  tav- 
erns and  billiai-d  tables,  author- 
izes a  city  to  impose  a  fine  for 
keeping  a  tippling  house  with- 
out a  license.  St.  Louis  v.  Smith, 
2  Mo.    113. 

An  ordinance  requiring  saloon 
keepers  to  take  out  a  license  is 
not  void  because  in  restraint  of 
trade.  Kitson  v.  Ann  Arbor,  26 
Mich.   325. 

An  ordinance  regulating  the 
sale  of  liquors  will  be  construed, 
if  reasonably  possible,  in  confor- 
mity   with    the    statutes    of    the 


State.       Vidalia     v. 
(La.),  49  So.  217. 

Under  a  statute  restricting 
towns  in  the  imposition  of  licenses 
to  a  sum  not  exceeding  the  amount 
levied  for  State  purposes,  and  pro- 
viding that  the  license  fee  shall 
not  be  less  than  $15  nor  more  than 
$100  for  every  period  of  s'x 
months,  the  amount  of  the  tax  to 
be  determined  by  the  court  or 
clerk  granting  the  license,  a  town 
cannot  fix  the  tax  at  $00  for 
every  saloon,  although  the  town's 
charter  grants  it  authority  to 
tax,  license,  and  regulate  saloons 
without  limitation  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  tax.  Paris  v.  Gra- 
ham, 33  Mo.  94. 

Where  constitutional  prohibi- 
tion exists,  but  a  city,  in  consid- 
eration of  sums  of  money  paid  it 
from  time  to  time  in  the  form  of 
simulated  fines,  permits  persons 
to  carry  on  the  liquor  traffic  and 
have  immunity  from  prosecutions, 
quo  warranto  lies  to  oust  it  from 
the  exercise  of  such  unwarranted 
corporate  powers.  State  v.  Cof- 
feyville,  78  Kan.  599;  97  Pac. 
372.  Officers  who  fail  to  carry 
out  the  laws  enforcing  prohibition 
may  be  removed  from  office.  State 
V.  Wilcox,  78  Kan.  597;  97  Pac. 
372. 


419 


MUNICIPAL    REGULATION. 


§267 


Sec.  267.    Ordinance  necessary  to  exaction  of  a  license. 

A  power  oiveu  a  city  to  regulate  the  sale  of  liquors  can  only 
be  exercised  through  the  medium  of  a  duly  enacted  ordinance, 
and  the  officers  of  a  city,,  in  the  absence  of  such  an  ordinance, 
cannot  require  dealers  to  take  out  a  license  or  pay  a  license 
fee."  This  is  accomplished  by  a  general  ordinance,  which  re- 
mains in  force  until  repealed,  even  though  it  be  a  revenue 
measure.*^  Tf  a  city  annex  territory,  and  in  this  territory  an 
ordinance  regulating  the  liquor  traffic  is  in  force,  as  a  general 
rule  it  remains  in  force  until  repealed  by  the  city  making 
the  annexation.^''  Where  a  statute  provided  that  no  license 
should  extend  beyond  the  first  Monday  in  the  June  next  after 
it  was  granted,  it  was  held  that  a  newly  incorporated  town 
could  not  adopt  an  ordinance  providing  for  the  payment  of 
an  annual  license  fee  on  or  before  the  first  day  of  the  next 
May  of  the  yeav  for  which  the  license  was  granted.'"' 


87  People  V.  Crotty,  93  111.  180; 
affirming  3  Bradw.  (111.)  465; 
Hurdland  v.  Hardy,  74  Mo.  App. 
614;  Malken  v.  Chicago,  217  111. 
471;  75  N.  E.  548;  affirming  119 
111.  App.  542;  People  v.  Mount 
(111.),  58  X.  E.  300;  affirming 
87  111.  App.  194;  Backus  v.  Peo- 
ple, 87  111.  App.  173.  A  mere  vio- 
lation is  not  sufficient.  In  re  Wil- 
son, 32  Minn.  145;  19  N.  W.  723; 
State  V.  Andrews,  11  Neb.  523; 
10  N.   W.  410. 

ssC'anova  v.  Williams,  41  Fla. 
50<);   27  So.  30. 

89  People  V.  Harrison,  191  111. 
257;  61  N.  E.  99;  affirming  92 
111.   App.    643. 

Occasionally  statutes  provide 
for  fixing  the  amount  of  liquor 
license  fees  by  popular  vote.  Se- 
attle V.  Clark,  28  Wash.  717;  69 
Pac.  407. 

90  Albion  v.  Boldt,  145  Mich. 
285;  108  N.  W.  703;  '3  Detroit 
Leg.  N.  430. 

If    an    ordinance    requires    tha 


chief  of  police  to  enforce  its  pro- 
visions, mandamxis  lies  to  compel 
him  to  do  so.  Goodell  v.  Wood- 
bury, 71  N.  H.   378;   52  Atl.  855. 

A  city's  new  charter  providing 
that  all  existing  ordinances  in 
effect  at  the  date  of  its  adoption 
shall  continue  in  force,  continues 
in  force  a  liquor  tax  levied  under 
an  ordinance  in  force  at  the  time 
such  new  charter  was  adopted. 
Ex  parte  Abrams  (Tex.),  120  S. 
W.  8'S3;  Ex  parte  Clark  (Tex.), 
120   S.   W.  892. 

The  removal  of  constitutional 
prohibition  against  licensing  tiie 
sale  of  liquor  does  not  authorize 
a  town  to  license  saloons  under  a 
statute  adopted  before  the  adop- 
tion of  constitutional  prohibition. 
Dewar  v.  People,  40  Mich.  401; 
29  Am.  Rep.  545. 

Occasionally  the  statute  is  so 
broad  that  no  ordinance  provid- 
ing for  a  license  is  necessary. 
Ashton  V.   Ellsworth.   48   111.  299.. 


§§268,269        TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  420 

Sec.  268.    Deleg-ation  by  city  of  power  to  require  a  license. 

In  keeping  with  the  rule  that  a  city  cansiot  exact  a  license 
except  in  pursuance  of  a  duly  adopted  ordinance  is  the  further 
rule  that  the  city  itself  through  its  council  must  fix  and  de- 
termine the  right  to  exact  a  license  and  the  amount  to  be  paid 
therefor,  and  incidentally  to  whom  it  may  be  issued;  and  it 
cannot  delegate  this  power  to  any  of  its  officers  or  to  any 
official  body  of  its  organization ;  "^  and  the  council  must  enact 
the  ordinance  and  not  some  other  integral  part  of  the  city 
government.-''  A  city  endowed  with  power  to  exact  or  require 
a  license  is  not  bound  to  do  so;  '^^  and  if  it  refuse  to  do  so,  al- 
though prohibition  within  its  borders  will  exist  if  it  do  not, 
yet  the  county  or  State  authorities  cannot  for  that  reason 
authorize  sales  within  such  boundaries  by  issuing  a  county  or 
State  license."*  A  statute  may,  however,  authorize  a  city  to 
appoint  a  committee  for  the  purpose  of  granting  licenses.^^ 

Sec.  269.    Number  of  licenses. 

A  city,  unless  especially  empowered  to  do  so,  cannot  limit 
the  number  of  licenses  to  be  granted  by  it.""  But  the  Legis- 
lature may  empower  it  to  so  limit  the  number,"^  usually  ac- 
cording to  the  population ;  and  in  that  event  the  ordinance 
need  not  state  the  number  of  inhabitants  in  the  city  so  as  to 
show  upon  its  face  that  the  number  of  licenses  fixed  is  within 
the  statute ;  nor  need  it  be  stated  in  the  ordinance  under  what 
statute  it  is  passed."^    And  a  city  may  be  empowered  to  grant 

91  Riley  v.  Trenton,  51  N.  J.  L.  o*  Coulterville  v.  Gillan,  72  111. 
498;  28  Atl.  116;  5  L.  R.  A.  352;        599. 

East  St.  Louis  v.  Wehring,  50  111.  os  In    re    Bight,    12    Can.    Prac. 

28;  Darling  v.  St.  Paul,   19  Minn.  433;    see   also   Williams   v.   State, 

389;   In  re  Wilson,  32  Minn.  145;  52  Tex.  €t.  App.  371;    107  S.  W. 

19  N.  W.   723;    Kinmundy  v.  Ma-  1121. 

han,  72  111.  462 ;  State  v.  Kantler,  oe  in    re    Gifford,    35    Up.    Can. 

32  Minn.  69;  21  N.  W.  856.  285;  In  re  Greystock,  12  Up.  Can. 

92  Featlierstone  v.  Lambertville,  458 ;  Regina  v.  Gamble,  8  Up.  Can. 
50    N.    J.    L.    507;    14    Atl.    599;  263. 

Glantz    V.    State,     38     Wis.    549;  ^- In  re  Boylan,   15   Ont.   13. 

Winants  v.  Bayonne,  44  N.  J.  L.  os  In  re  Groome,  6  Ont.  188 ;  In 

114.  "  re  Goulden,  28  Ont.  387. 

83  Schwuchow  V.  Chicago,  68  111. 
444. 


421  MUNICIPAL    REGULATION.  §  270 

more  than  one  license  to  the  same  person  or  to  the  same  brew- 
ery ;  "^  so  it  may  provide  that  a  licensee  shall  not  keep  or  be 
interested  in  a  saloon  at  more  than  one  place  at  the  same 
time.^ 

Sec.  270.    Restricting  saloons  to  specified  parts  of  the  city. 

Statutes  occasionally  provide  that  municipalities  may  pre- 
scribe the  territory  in  them  within  which  saloons  shall  not  be 
located,  and  also  where  they  must  be  located.  A  statute  of 
Indiana  declared  that  cities  might  "exclude  such  sales  [of  in- 
toxicating liquors]  from  the  suburban  or  residence  portion" 
of  the  city,  "and  confine  the  places  where  such  sales  may  be 
made  to  the  business  portion  of  such  city."  -  Of  this  statute 
the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  said:  "The  statute  did  not 
require  the  common  council  to  fix  the  boundaries  of  the  busi- 
ness portions  of  the  city;  neither  did  it  prohibit  them  from 
doing  so.  It  may  have  been  thought  by  the  Legislature  that, 
HI  some  cases,  it  would  be  practicable  to  define  such  boun- 
daries, and  that  in  others  it  would  not.  Very  good  reasons 
may  be  given  in  support  of  each  of  these  methods.  It  may  be 
said  that  the  question  of  the  boundaries  of  the  business  dis- 
trict should  be  left  to  the  determination  of  the  courts  as  a 
question  of  fact.  Or,  with  equal  force,  it  may  be  contended 
that  greater  certainty  and  uniformity  in  the  enforcement  of 
the  ordinance  can  be  secured  Avhere  such  boundaries  are  pre- 
viously established  and  made  known.  Neither  of  these 
methods  seems  to  be  objectionable  upon  any  legal  ground,  and 
the  common  council  of  Greencastle,  in  the  exercise  of  its  dis- 
cretion, had  the  right  to  adopt  either.  It  saw  fit  to  fix  and  de- 
clare the  boundaries  of  the  business  portion  of  Greencastle, 
and  confine  the  places  where  intoxicating  liquors  might  be 
kept  for  sale,  to  be  used  upon  the  premises,  within  such  boun- 
daries, excluding  them  from  both  the  suburban  and  the  resi- 
dence parts  of  the  city.  But  while  the  ordinance  adopted 
by  the  common  council  of  the  city  of  G-reencastle  was  valid, 

99  7h  re  Pittsburg  Brewing  Co.,  i  Swift    v.    Klein,    103    111.   2G9; 

16  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  215.  45  N.  E.  219. 

2  Acts  1895,  p.  180,  sec.  13. 


§  270  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  422 

and,  prima  facie,  rendered  unlawful  the  maintenance  of  all 
shops,  etc.,  kept  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  be  used 
upon  the  premises,  outside  of  the  business  portion  of  the  city, 
as  defined  by  the  ordinance,  yet,  Ave  think,  that  such  declara- 
tion of  the  boundaries  oE  the  business  portion  of  the  city  was 
not  conclusive.  The  statute  authorized  the  common  council 
to  confine  such  places  to  the  business  portion  of  the  city  and 
to  exclude  them  from  the  suburban  and  residence  portions. 
But  that  body  could  not,  without  exceeding  its  statutory  au- 
thority, exclude  such  places  from  those  portions  of  the  city 
which  were,  in  fact,  neither  suburban  nor  residence  districts. 
Declaring  them  to  be  subnrban  or  residence  portions  would 
not  make  them  such.  Proof  of  the  passage  of  the  ordinance 
and  that  the  appellant's  room  or  saloon  Avas  within  the  pro- 
hibited district  was  sufficient  to  make  a  prima  facie  case 
against  him,  but  he  had  the  right  to  show  that  his  room  or 
saloon  was,  in  fact,  in  the  business  part  of  the  city,  and  not 
in  either  the  suburban  portion  or  the  residence  portion.  It 
is  proper  to  suggest,''  continued  the  court,  "in  this  connec- 
tion, that  the  words  'residence'  and  'suburban,'  as  used  in  the 
statute  and  ordinance,  do  not  mean  the  same  thing.  The  sub- 
urban portion  of  the  city  is  the  outlying  part,  that  portion 
Avhich  is  remote  from  the  center  of  trade  and  population,  where 
the  houses  are  generally  more  or  less  scattered,  and  where 
many  of  the  improvements  and  advantages  enjoyed  by  the 
central  and  more  densely  populated  parts  of  the  city  are  want- 
ing. The  suburban  part  of  a  city  may  be  used  for  business, 
or  it  may  be  occupied  by  residences,  or  it  may  be  used  both 
for  residence  and  business  purposes.  But  in  either  case  police 
surveillance  and  protection  are  usually  less  thorouch  and  effi- 
cient than  in  tlic  central  parts  of  the  cHy,  and,  hoAvever  occu- 
pied, the  same  reasons  exist  for  excluding  from  such  portion 
of  the  city  places  of  resort  and  offensive  occupations  AA-h'"ch 
may  breed  disorder  and  threaten  the  quiet  and  safety  of  the 
neighborhood"  Another  statute  inA^olved  in  th^'s  s^me  case 
was  one  providing  that  a  city  "in  recrulating,  restrain^'ncr,  and 
licensing  such  inns,  taverns,  shops,  or  places  aforesaid,  they 
shall  have  the  poAver  to  desisrnate  the  room,  building  or  struc- 
ture Avhere  such  liquors  may  be  sold;"  and  it  AA'as  claimed 


423  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  270 

that  this  statute  enabled  a  city  "to  fix,  conclusively,  the  loca- 
tion in  which  intoxicating-  lit^uors  may  be  kept  for  sale,  to  be 
used  on  the  premises."  But  this  claim  the  court  denied,  the 
court  saying  that  tliis  statute,  following  the  course  of  legisla- 
tion for  more  than  fifty  years,  was  intended  "to  restrict  the 
business  of  the  person  to  whom  the  license  was  issued  to  a 
single  room,  in  a  particular  structure  or  building. "  "The  con- 
struction contended  for  by  the  appellee,"  ^aid  '.he  court, 
"would  authorize  the  adoption  of  an  ordinance  requiring  all 
intoxicating  liquors  kept  and  sold  for  use  on  the  premises 
by  all  persons  engaged  in  the  business  to  be  so  kept  and  sold 
in  one  or  more  desigiiated  rooms,  buildings,  or  structures  in 
the  city,  not  owned  by,  or  accessible  to,  such  persons.  An 
ordinance  of  this  character  would  operate,  not  to  regulate  or 
restrain  the  traffic,  but  to  prohibit  it,  and  this  the  common 
council,  in  this  manner,  cannot  do. "  "  In  a  Minnesota  case  pow- 
er to  confine  the  sale  of  liquors  to  a  certain  portion  of  the  city 
was  held  to  be  given  under  the  power  to  i-egulate.  "We  have 
no  doubt  whatever  of  the  power  of  the  city  council  to  deter- 
mine where,  and  within  what  portions  of  the  city,  the  business 
of  selling  and  dealing  in  intoxicating  liquors  may  be  carried 
on.  This  right  is  implied  and  included  in  the  power  to  regu- 
late. And  if  they  deem  that  the  good  order  of  the  city  re- 
quires that  this  traffic  shall  be  excluded  from  the  suburbs  and 
residence  portions  of  the  city,  and  confined  to  the  more  central 
and  business  portions,  where  it  can  be  kept  under  more  ef- 
fectual police  surveillance,  their  power  to  do  so  is,  in  our 
judgment,  undoubted.  Under  a  grant  of  police  power  to  reg- 
ulate, the  right  of  municipal  authorities  to  determine  where 
and  within  what  limits  a  certain  kind  of  business  may  be  con- 
ducted, has  often  been  sustained.  For  example,  the  place 
where  markets  might  be  held;  where  butchers'  stalls  or  meat 
shops  may  be  kept;  where  hay  or  other  produce  shall  be 
weighed;  where  auctions  may  be  held;  the  limits  within  which 
certain  kinds  of  animals  shall  not  be  kept;  within  which  the 

•t  "Rowland     v.     Crppnoastlp,     157  14;  46  N.  K.  ISS;  .Tolinsnn  v.  Bes- 

Ind.  591;   62  N.  E.  474;    Rowland  seniere,  143  Mich.  liVS;    lOti  X.  VV. 

V.  Greencastle,  157  Ind.  707;  62  N.  852;    12  Detroit  Leg.  N.  &81. 
E.  1103;   Shea  v.  Muncie,  148  Ind. 


§  270  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  424 

business  of  tallow  chandler  shall  not  be  carried  on;  within 
which  gunpowder  shall  not  be  stored ;  within  which  slaughter 
houses  shall  not  be  kept;  the  distance  from  a  church  within 
which  liquor  shall  not  be  sold.  Such  cases  might  be  multi- 
plied almost  indefinitely.  If  under  the  general  police  power 
to  regulate,  this  can  be  done  as  to  such  kinds  of  business,  on 
what  principle  can  it  be  claimed  that  similar  regulations  may 
not  be  adopted  as  to  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors — a  traf- 
fic which  all  civili/ed  communities  deem  necessary  to  place  im- 
der  special  police  regulations  and  restraints. ' '  *  An  ordinance 
prohibiting  sales  in  a  residence  portion  of  the  city  may  also 
provide  that  the  license  shall  be  no  defense,  and  that  the  pay- 
ment of  the  license  fee  and  its  retention  shall  not  estop  the 
city  to  enforce  its  provisions.^  Where  an  ordinance  permits 
the  granting  of  a  license  for  the  business  portion  of  a  city,  and 
a  portion  of  a  city  is  used  both  for  residence  and  business,  such 
portion  is  not  in  the  business  portion  of  the  city;  and  the 
use  of  a  dwelling  house  in  part  by  boarders,  using  it  with  the 
family,  does  not  render  it  a  "  business  house. "  "  A  city  may 
also  limit  sales  of  liquor  to  houses  of  public  entertainment.^ 

4 /n  re  Wilson,  32  Minn.  145;  19  55   X.   W.  845;    21    L.   R.   A.   580; 

N.  W.   723;   Portland  v.   Schmidt,  Minden  v.  Silverstein,  36  La.  Ann. 

13  Ore.   17;    6  Pac.  221;    State  v.  912;    People   v.   Bloom,   120   Mich. 

Schroeder,  51  Iowa,  197;   1  N.  W.  45;     78    N.    VV.     1015;     State    v. 

431;     DeBois    v.    State,    34    Ark.  Franklin   Co.,   49    Wash.    208;    94 

381;     State    v.    Raiischer,    1    Lea  Pac.    1086;    State    v.    Cain,    78    S. 

(Tenn.),    96;     Commonwealth    v.  C.   348;    58   N.   E.   937;    Cohen   v. 

Jones,    142    Mass.   573;    Mayor   v.  Rice    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  101   S.  W. 

Shattuck,    19    Colo.    104;    34   Pac.  1052;     Endsley    v.    State     (Ind.), 

947;    41    Am.    St.    208;    People   v.  88   N.    E.    62;    Mills  v.   Ludington 

Cregier,  138  111.  401 ;     2&N.  E.812;  (Mich.),  122  N.  W.  1082;  Ritz  v. 

Martens    v.    People,    85    111.    App.  Lightson     (Cal.),    103    Pac.    303; 

66;    affirmed    186   111.   314;    57   N.  Andreas   v.    Beaumont    (Tex.    Civ. 

E.  871;    Churchill   v.  Detroit,   153  App.),    113    S.   W.    614;    Swift    v. 

Mich.  93;    116  N.  W.  558;    Straus  People.  63   111.   App.   453k 

V.  Galesburg,  203   111.  234;   67  N.  c  Shea   v.   Muncie,   148  Ind.    14; 

E.    836;     affirming    89    111.    App.  46  N.  E.  138. 

504;    State   v.   Cheyenne,    7    Wyo.  6  Shea  v.   Muncie,   14jS  Ind.    14; 

417;    52   Pac.   975;    Swift  v.   Peo-  46  N.  E.   138. 

pie,    63   111.   App.   4'53;    Gorrell   v.  r  In  re  Slavin,  36  Up.  Can.  159. 

Newport,    1   Tenn.  Ch.   App.    120;  An  ordinance  providing  that  no 

Sherlock  v.  Stuart,  96  Mich.  123;  license    shall     be    granted    for    a 


425  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  271 

Sec.  271.    License  ordinance,  when  not  invalid. 

An  ordinance  which  provides  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for 
any  person,  firm,  association,  company  or  corporation  to  estab- 
lish, conduct  or  maintain  within  a  city  any  brewery,  distillery 
or  depot  or  agency  of  any  brewery  or  distillery  without  com- 
plying with  the  provisions  of  the  ordinances,  and  that  an  an- 
nual license  fee  of  $1,000  shall  be  charged  and  paid  for  each 
brewery,  distillery,  depot  or  agency  so  established,  conducted 
or  maintained,  is  not  subject  to  the  objection  that  it  is  a  tax- 
ing ordinance,  and  that  police  regulations  embodied  in  it  are  a 
mere  cloak  to  conceal  its  true  character  and  object.*  Ordi- 
nances enacted  in  relation  to  the  comfort,  health,  convenience, 
good  order,  morality,  security  and  general  welfare  of  the  in- 
habitants are  comprehensively  known  as  police  regulations. 
Where  a  fee  is  imposed  for  the  purpose  of  such  regulation  and 
the  ordinance  requires  compliance  with  prescribed  conditions 
in  addition  to  the  payment  of  the  fee,  such  sum  is  a  license 
proper  imposed  by  virtue  of  the  police  power ;  but,  where  the 
fee  is  imposed  solely  for  revenue  purposes,  and  payment  there- 
of gives  the  right  to  carry  on  the  business  without  the  per- 
formance of  any  further  conditions,  it  is  a  tax.  In  general 
it  may  be  said  that  license  fees  imposed  upon  useful  occupa- 
tions, not  hurtful  or  pernicious  to  society,  and  not  calling 
for  regulation  by  the  sovereign  power,  are  in  fact  taxes  en- 
acted under  the  revenue  power;  while  licenses  imposed  on  the 
liquor  traffic  and  such  other  occupations  as  call  for  regulation 
by  the  State,  are  none  the  less  licenses  proper,  because  thej' 

place  within  certain  limits  is  self-  in  the  district  owned  by  the  city, 

executing,   so   as  to   authorize  the  is  valid.     Garzonzik  v.    State,   50 

council   to   refuse   to    approve   the  Tex.    Cr.    App.    533;     100    S.    W. 

bond   of    a    liquor    dealer   who    in-  374. 

tends  to  open  a  saloon  at  a  place  The  business  of  selling  "near 
within  such  limits.  Johnson  v.  beer"  may  be  limited  to  certain 
Bessemer,  143  Mich.  313;  106  N.  territory  of  a  city;  but  such  lim- 
W.  852;  12  Detroit  Leg.  N.  981.  its  must  be  fairly  extensive  and 
A  statute  authorizing  a  city  to  not  arbitrarily  narrow.  Camp- 
adopt  an  ordinance  restricting  bell  v.  Thomasville  (Ga.),  64  S. 
saloons   to   a  certain  district,  but  E.  815. 

preventing     it     passing    an     ordi-  s. Schmidt    v.    Indianapolis,    168 

nance    prohibiting   sales   on   lands  Ind.  631;  80  N.  E.  632. 


§  271  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  426 

yield  a  revenue  in  excess  of  that  required  for  the  purpose  of 
regulation.**  Where  a  municipal  regulation  is  adopted,  which 
would  be  lawCul  if  intended  for  one  purpose,  and  unlawful  for 
another,  the  presumption  is  that  the  purpose  was  lawful,  un- 
less the  contrary  clearly  appears."  The  theory  of  legislation 
upon  this  subject  is  that  the  business  of  handling  and  selling 
intoxicating  liquors  is  one  which  requires  restraint,  because 
it  is  harmful  to  society  and  the  license  fee  is  exacted  for  the 
purpose  of  restraining  the  business.  This  necessity  for  regula- 
tion and  restriction  in  the  interests  of  peace  and  good  order 
and  for  the  promotion  of  public  morals  distinguishes  the  li- 
quor business  from  useful  and  harmless  occupations.  It  is  well 
settled  that  the  legislative  power  to  deal  with  this  subject, 
whether  it  be  to  license,  regulate,  restrain  or  prohibit  the  sale 
of  such  liquors,  is  unlimited.  All  such  restrictive  measures, 
taken  either  by  the  State  or  by  virtue  of  authority  delegated 
to  municipalities,  are  upheld  as  a  proper  exercise  of  the  po- 
lice power.  Because  of  this  fact  such  an  ordinance  is  not  an 
unlawful  interference  with  interstate  commerce,  in  violation 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  By  an  act  approved 
August  8,  1890,  Congress  expressly  subjected  intoxicating  li- 
quors, when  transported  as  articles  of  interstate  commerce  and 

sRoyall   v.   Virginia,    116   U.   S.  51   Neb.   870;    State   v.    O'Connor, 

572;   In  re  Nicliols,   48    Fed.    Rep.  5    N.    Dak.   (J29;    Mays    v.    Cinein- 

164;   Long  v.   State,  27   Ala.   164;  nati,   1   Ohio  St.  269;    Oil   City  v. 

Long   V.   State,   27    Ala.   32;    Ark-  Oil    City   Trust    Co.,    151    Pa.   St. 

adelphia   v.   Lumber    Co.,   56   Ark.  454;    31   Am.  St.  Rep.   770;   Com- 

370;    People    v.    Martin,    60    Cal.  monwealth    v.    Muir,    180    Pa.    St. 

153;    Matter   of    Guerro,    69    Cal.  47;   State  v.  Foster,  22  R.  I.  163; 

»88;   Merced   County  v.   Helm,    102  Baker  v.   Panola   County.  30  Tex. 

Cal.  159;   Kiowa  County  v.  Dunn,  87;    Fire    Department    v.    Helfen- 

21  Colo.  185;   Burch  v.  Savannah,  stein,   16  Wis.  136. 

42    Ga.    576;    Schmidt    v.    Indian-  lo  Ivey   v.    State,    112   Ga.    17'5; 

apolis,    168    Ind.    .631;     80    N.    E.  37  S.  E.  398;   Hannon  v.  Chicago, 

'632;    State  v.  Wagener,  77  Minn.  140   111.  398;   29  X.  E.  732;   Rob- 

488;   77  Am.   St.  Rep.  681;   State  son  v.  Doyle,   191   111.   566;   61  N. 

V.  Adler,   68   Miss.   487;    Rinehart  E.  435;  Schmidt  v.  City  of  Indian- 

V.  Long,  95  Mo.  396;  Kansas  €ity  apolis,  168  Ind.  631;  80  N.  E.  632; 

V.  Crash,   151   Mo.   128;    St.  Louis  State  v.  Capdeville,   104  La.  561; 

V.  Knox,  6  Mo.  App.  247;  German  29   So.   515;   Johnson  v.  Philadel- 

American   F.    Ins.  Co.   v.   Minden,  phia,  CO  Pa.  445. 


427  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  271 

delivered  to  the  consijxnee,  to  the  police  n.-gulations  of  the  sev- 
eral States  and  Territories."  Nor  is  such  ordinance  subject 
to  the  objection  that  the  license  fee  is  excessive.  It  is  true 
that  as  a  general  jjrinciple  the  amount  which  may  be  exacted 
for  a  license  proper  under  the  police  power  must  be  limited 
and  reasonably  measured  by  the  cost  of  the  issuance  of  the 
license,  and  the  reoiilation  and  insnection  for  which  provision 
is  made,  while  a  wider  latitude  is  allowed  in  imposing  a  special 
tax  upon  a  particular  occupation  or  business  as  a  source  of 
revenue.  This  general  doctrine,  however,  properly  applies 
only  to  useful  occupations  which,  being  not  d<^+'''^ental  to  the 
public,  cannot  be  unduly  restricted  or  substantially  prohibited 
under  the  guise  of  a  police  regulation.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  courts  now  quite  genernllv  reco^^nize  that  as  to  those  lines 
of  business  which  are  hurtful  to  public  morals,  productive  of 
disorder  or  injurious  to  the  publ^'c.  but  nevertheless  tolerated, 
the  police  power  may  be  riehtfully  exercised  in  the  levy  of 
such  a  license  tax  as  will  limit  and  discourage  the  business." 
The  power  and  authority  to  license  necessarily  implies  the 
right  to  fix  the  amount  of  the  license  fee.^^  The  power  to  li- 
cense and  to  fix  the  fee  charged  being  lodged  in  the  munici- 
pality, the  amount  to  be  exacted  is  not  strictly  a  judicial  ques- 
tion, and  the  action  of  the  municipal  body  in  fixing  the  license 
fee  will  be  disturbed  only  in  case  of  manifest  abuse  of  its 
power.^* 

11 7n  re  Raher,   140   U.   S.   545;  Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall.   (U. 

11    Sup.    Ct.    8i&5;    Pabst    Brewing  S.)    133;   Beer  Company  v.  Massa- 

Co.    V.    Crenshaw,    198    U.    S.    17;  chusetts,    97    U.    S.    33;     Dulutli 

25    Sup.     Ct.     552;     Foppiano    v.  Brewing  Co.   v.   City   of  Superior, 

Speed,   199  U.  S.  501;   2G  Sup.  It.  123  Fed.  350;   Meyer,  Josen  &  Co. 

138;    Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    City  v.  City   of  Mobile,   147   Fed.   843; 

of  Terre  Haute,  98  Fed.   330;    In-  Schmidt  v.   Indianapolis,   1(>8  Ind. 

dianapolis  v.  Bieler,   138   Ind.  30;  031;   60  N.  E.   632;    State  ex  rel. 

36  N.  E.  587;   Schmidt  v.  Indian-  v.  Hudson,  78  Mo.  302. 

apolis,    168    Ind.    631;    80    N.    E.  is  Schmidt   v.    Indianapolis,    168 

g32  Ind.  631;   80  N.  E.  632;   Portland 

12  Gray  on   Limitations   of   Tax-  v.    Schmidt,    13    Ore.    18;    6    Pac. 

ing    Power,    §  1452;    Tiedeman    on  221. 

Limitations   of   Police   Power,   pp.  lOIatter    of   Guerrero,    69   €al. 

273,    277.    278;    Cooley    on    Taxa-  95;    10   Pac.   261;   Schmidt  v.   In- 

tion     (3d    Ed.),    pp.    1142,    1143;  dianapolis,    168    Ind.   tiSl;    80   N. 


§  272  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  428 

Sec.  272.    Discriminating  ordinance,  when  not  unconstitu- 
tional. 

The  power  granted  to  the  common  council  of  a  municipal 
corporation  to  fix  the  rates  for  the  privilege  of  transacting 
business  is  a  branch  of  the  taxing  power  which  is  not  affected 
by  a  constitutional  requirement  that  taxes  shall  be  uniform. 
The  council,  therefore,  in  fixing  such  rates,  may  discrimi- 
nate and  impose  a  larger  license  tax  upon  one  class  of  busi- 
ness, such  as  retailing  intoxicating  liquors,  than  on  another. ^^ 
Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  that  a  county  ordinance  fixing 
a  less  rate  for  selling  intoxicating  liquors  at  a  wayside  tavern 
than  in  a  village  or  city  was  not  invalid ;  ^^  that  a  city  ordi- 
nance dividing  liquor  dealers  into  different  classes,  according 
to  the  amount  of  their  sales  and  imposing  a  license  tax  vary- 
ing in  amount  according  to  the  class  was  constitutional ;  ^'' 
that  the  fact  that  the  same  license  fee,  as  a  tax,  is  not  required 
by  all  cities  in  the  State,  is  no  valid  objection  to  a  law  confer- 
ring power  on  the  common  council  to  pass  such  an  ordinance 
or  to  the  ordinance  itself ;  ^^  and  that  within  the  same  city  an 
ordinance  may  properly  impose  different  rates  according  to 
the  locality  in  which  such  liquors  are  to  be  sold,  provided  it 
does  not  discriminate  between  persons. ^^  In  other  words,  such 
an  ordinance  may  be  differential  in  its  character  if  it  does  not 
discriminate  between  persons  having  equal  facilities  for 
profit.^"    "Where  the  law  of  the  State  or  the  charter  of  the  mu- 

E.  632;    Dennehy   v.   Chicago,   120  le  Amador    Co.    v.    Kennedy,    70 

111.   G27;    13   N.   E.    227;    Spiegler  Cal.  458;    11  i'ac.  757. 

V.   City   of   Chicago,   216   III.    114;  it  Gross    v.    Allentown,    132    Pa. 

74   N.   E.   71'8.  St.   319;    19  Atl.  269. 

If   an   ordinance    be   regular   on  is  Wiley  -/.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429. 

its  face,   purporting  to  have  been  lo  East    St.    Louis    v.    Wehrung, 

adopted    by    the    common    council  46    111.    392. 

and   duly   published,   a   license   is-  20  People     v.     Thurber,     13     111. 

sued  thereunder  and  paid  for  is  a  554;    Tulloss    v.    Sedan,    31    Kan. 

defense   to   a  prosecution  for  sell-  165;    1   Pac.   2'8'5;    State   v.   Rolle, 

ing  without  a  license,  although  it  30   La.   Ann.   991;    Mayor,   etc.,  v. 

was    not    legally    passed.      Hanks  Beasley,    I    Humph.   232;    34   Am. 

V.  People,  39  111.  App.  223.  Dec.  646;   Texas  B.   and  Ins.  €0., 

i^Ex  parte   Hurl,  49   Cal.  &57.  42    Tex.    636;    Slaughter  v.    Com- 
monwealth,  13  Gratt.    (Va.)    767. 


429  Ml]NICIPAl>    REGULATION.  ■  .   §  273 

nicipal  corporation  does  not  limit  the  amount  that  may  be 
charged  for  a  license  to  carry  on  such  business,  the  amount 
to  be  charged  must  be  determined  by  the  circumstances,  and 
can  be  changed  bj^  the  common  council  of  the  corporation 
where  the  business  is  to  be  carried  on  much  better  than  author- 
ity remote  therefrom,  and  if  the  ordinance  is  not  prohibitory  in 
its  character  it  will  be  sustained  by  the  courts.-'  But  an  ordi- 
nance which  makes  the  granting  of  a  license  to  rest  upon  the 
arbitrary  will  of  the  council  or  city  officer,  is  void.^^  And  so 
is  an  ordinance  which  discriminates  in  favor  of  two  classes  of 
persons,  each  of  whom  are  exempted  from  its  operation.-^ 
Under  the  usual  powers  given  a  city  it  may  charge  one  amount 
for  a  license  for  a  saloon  and  another  amount  for  a  tavern 
license ;  -*  but  it  cannot  charge  one  amount  for  one  locality 
and  another  amount  for  another.-^  An  ordinance  providing 
that  liquor  in  certain  parts  of  a  city  can  be  sold  only  at  a  bar 
in  a  hotel  is  valid,  being  based  upon  a  proper  classification.-" 
So  an  ordinance  limiting  saloons  to  certain  portions  of  a  city, 
but  providing  that  those  outside  the  limits  may  continue  in 
business  until  their  licenses  expire,  is  likewise  valid.-'^ 

Sec.  273.     Existing  license  requirement,  when  not  discrim- 
inating. 

As  it  is  competent  for  a  State  to  confer  upon  its  municipal 
corporations  the  power  to  regulate  and  restrain  the  traffic  in 
intoxicating  liquors,  then  when  this  has  been  done  such  corpo- 
rations may  by  duly  enacted  ordinances  determine  what  shall 
be  required  of  an  applicant  for  a  license  to  sell  such  liquors 
within  the  corporate  limits.  Under  such  authority  such  a 
corporation  may  require  an  applicant  to  hold  an  unexpired 
license  issued  by  the  Board  of  Commissioners  of  the  county 

21  Wiley  V.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429.  2^-  In  re  Donnelly,   38   Up.   Can. 

22  Ex    parte    Theisen,     30    Fla.       599. 

529;    11   So.  901;    32  Am.   St.  36;  2g  Ritz      v.      Liorhtson       (Cal.), 

iState     V.     D'Alemberte,     30     Fla.  103  Pac.  303.             . 

'545;    11    So.   905.  27  Andreas    v.    Beaumont     (Tex. 

23Popel    V.    Monmouth,    81    III.  Civ.  App.),   113  S.  W.  614;    Mills 

App.  512.  V.  Ludington    (Mich.),  122  N.  W. 

24  In  re  Grand,  27  Up.  Can.  46.  1082. 


§§  274,  275        TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  430 

in  which  the  municipality  is  located.  Such  a  requirement  is 
not  an  arbitrary  one  nor  is  it  subject  to  the  objection  that  it 
discriminates  against  women  and  non-residents  where,  under 
the  laws  of  the  State,  male  inhabitants  only  can  obtain  a  license 
from  the  Board  of  County  Commissioners  of  the  State.  Per- 
sons who  have  obtained  licenses  from  such  county  boards  will 
be  presumed  to  have  shown  their  fitness  to  be  trusted  with  the 
sale  of  such  liquors  before  a  tribunal  where  the  right  of  remon- 
strance is  secured.  As  a  rule  such  corporations  are  not  pro- 
vided with  the  machinery  for  prosecuting  inquiries  into  the 
character  and  fitness  of  such  applicants.  Hence,  such  a  re- 
quirement is  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  power  to  regulate  and 
restrain  the  traffic.-* 

Sec.  274.    Bond  of  licensee. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  a  city  be  expressly  empowered  to 
require  a  bond  from  a  licensee  to  retail  intoxicating  liquors  in 
order  to  enable  it  to  require  the  giving  of  a  bond  as  a  prerequi- 
site to  the  issuance  of  a  license.  Thus,  under  a  power  to  license, 
tax  and  regulate  the  liquor  traffic  within  the  limits,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  city  may  require  a  bond  in  a  specified  sum,  with 
good  and  approved  sureties,  conditioned  that  the  licensee  will 
conduct  his  liquor  business  according  to  law.  Such  a  require- 
ment has  a  tendency  to  compel  an  observation  of  the  law,  and 
is  reasonable  and  proper.^'' 

Sec.  275.    Power  to  prohibit. 

In  the  absence  of  constitutional  provisions  to  the  contrary, 
it  is  competent  for  a  Legislature  to  delegate  to  the  munici- 
palities of  a  State  the  power  to  prohibit  the  traffic  in  intoxi- 
cating liquors.^"  Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  a  general 
power  in  a  city  or  town  charter  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  such 

28  Wagner   v.   Garrett,    118   Ind.  so  Harris  v.  Livingston.  28  Ala. 

114;  20  N.  E.  706;   Likenhelt,  118  — ;  Ex  parte  Sikes,  102  Ala.  173; 

Ind.  699;    20   N.   E.   145.  15   So.   522;    Paul  v.   Washington, 

29Paducah  v.  James   (Ky.),  104  134  N.  C.   363;   47  S.  E.   793;   65 

S.  W.  971;   31   Ky.  L.  Rep.   1203;  L.  R.  A.  902;   Perdue  v.  Ellis,   18 

Campbell     v.     Thomasville      (Ga.  Ga.  586. 
App.),  64  S.  E.  815. 


431  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  275 

liquors  is  sufficient  to  authorize  the  adoption  of  an  ordinance 
for  a  total  or  partial  prohibition  of  their  sale;  and  that 
where  such  power  is  conferred  it  is  wholly  discretionary  with 
the  municipality  to  license,  regulate,  partially  or  entirely 
prohibit  the  traffic,  and  that  if  a  municipality  adopts  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  the  sale  of  any  such  liquors  within  its 
limits,  if  sales  are  made  within  the  corporate  limits  of  the 
municipality  for  a  lawful  purpose,  the  burden  is  upon  the 
seller  to  prove  such  fact.-''^  And  the  same  is  true  where  the 
power  conferred  upon  the  corporation  is  "to  license  and  regu- 
late the  retailing  of  intoxicating  liquors  within  their  corporate 
limits,  to  revoke  licenses  by  them  issued  for  good  cause  shown, 
to  close  up  retail  establishments  for  such  time  as  they  may 
deem  necessary,  and  to  prevent  the  selling  of  such  liquors 
within  their  corporate  limits  whenever  they  may  deem  it 
expedient;"  and  the  same  will  be  true  if  such  a  corporation 
is  authorized  "to  license,  regulate  and  prohibit"  the  sale  of 
such  liquors,  or  if  a  like  prohibitory  clause  be  included  in  the 
grant  of  authority.^-  But  power  to  entirely  prohibit  such  sales 
is  not  conferred  if  the  grant  is  to  "license,  regulate  and  re- 
strain" the  traffic.  The  intention  to  prohibit  the  traffic  must 
be  expressly  granted  to  it,  or  the  terms  used  in  the  charter 
must  be  such  as  plainly  to  indicate  that  the  Legislature  intend- 
ed to  confer  the  power.  Such  an  intention  cannot  be  inferred 
when  the  controlling  words  used  in  the  grant  are  "license," 
"regulate"  and  "restrain."  These  words  are  not  synonymous 
with  the  word  "prohibit."  In  such  a  connection,  to  license 
a  business  is  to  grant  a  formal  permission  from  the  proper  au- 
thorit'es  to  perform  or  carry  it  on  when,  without  such  permis- 
sion, it  would  be  illegal ;  to  regulate  it  is  to  adjust  it  by  rules 
or  method ;  to  direct  it,  to  put  it  into  good  order,  to  govern  it ; 
and  to  restrain  it  is  to  hold  it  back  or  keep  it  in  check.^^    Such 

31  Giinnarsohn   v.   City  of   Sterl-  see    State  v.    Gill,   89   Minn.   502; 

ing,  92  111.  569;  Ex  parte  Russell-  95  N.  W.  449. 

ville,  95  Ala.  19;   11  So.  18;  State  33  Miller   v.   Jones,  SO   Ala.   S9; 

V.  Bolt,  31  La.  Ann.  663;   33  Am.  Ex      parte      Reynolds,      87      Ala. 

Rep.    224;     Litch    v.    People,     19  138;      6      So,      335;      Ex      parte 

Colo.  App.  435;   75   Pac.   1079.  Anniston,     90     Ala.     516;     7     So. 

2-/n.-e  Jones,  78  Ala.  419;  and  779;      Ex     parte      Florence,      78 


§275 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


432 


terms,  however,  -will  warrant  the  adoption  of  an  ordinance  pro- 
viding for  a  partial  prohibition;  that  is,  to  encumber  such 
sales  wath  such  conditions  and  limitations  as  will  hinder  and 
prevent  in  some  degree  the  sale  of  such  liquors.^*  The  power 
to  prohibit  is  not  included  in  the  power  to  license.'"'  It  may 
prohibit  the  keeping  of  liquor  in  a  restaurant. ^"^  But  a  stat- 
ute authorizing  a  town  to  prohibit  saloons  does  not  empower 
it  to  prohibit  sales  in  any  quantity  or  for  any  purpose.^^    Un- 


Ala.  419;  Ex  parte  Sikes,  102  Ala. 
173;  Harris  v.  Livingston,  28  Ala. 
577;  Tuck  v.  Waldron,  31  Ark. 
462;  Hill  V.  Commissioners,  22  Ga. 
203;  Pekin  v.  Smelzel,  21  111.  464; 
74  Am.  Dec.  105;  Sweet  v.  City 
of  Wabash,  41  Ind.  7;  Loeb  v. 
City  of  Attica,  82  Ind.  175;  Em- 
poria V.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622; 
State  V.  Harper,  42  La.  Ann.  312; 
7  So.  446;  Lincoln  Parish  v.  Har- 
per, 42  La.  Ann.  776;  7  So.  716; 
Portland  v.  Schmidt,  13  Ore.  17; 
Woods  V.  Town,  etc.,  19  Ore.  108; 
Logan  City  v.  Buck,  3  Utah,  307 ; 
5  Pac.  564;  Hayes  v.  Thompson, 
9  B.  C.  Rep.  249;  In  re- Frawley 
[1907],  14  Ont.  App.  L.  R.  99; 
Marnaugh  v.  Orlando,  41  Fla. 
433;  27  So.  34;  Moran  v.  Atlanta 
(Ga.),  30  S.  E.  298;  Duran  v. 
Stephens,  12C  Ga.  496;  54  S.  E. 
1045;  State  v.  McCammon,  111 
Mo.  App.  626;  86  S.  W.  510; 
Shreveport  v.  P.  Draiss  &  Co., 
Ill  La.  511;  35  So.  727;  Bennett 
V.  Pulaski  (Tenn.  Ch.),  52  S.  W. 
913;  47  L.  R.  A.  278;  .State  v. 
Franklin  Co.,  49  Wash.  268;  94 
Pac.  1086;  Concord  v.  Patterson, 
53  X.  C.  182;  State  v.  Hudson,  11 
Mo.  App.  590;  Campbell  v.  Thom- 
asville    (Ga.),  «4  S.   E.   815. 

34  Provo    City    v.     Shurtlilf,     4 
Utah,    15;    4  Pac.   302. 

30  Miller   v.   Jones,   80   Ala.   89; 


Ex  parte  Reynolds,  87  Ala.  138; 
6  So.  335;  Ex  parte  Anniston,  90 
Ala.  516;  77  So.  779;  Hood  v. 
Von  Glahn,  88  Ala.  405 ;  14  S.  E. 
564;  Tuck  V.  Waldron,  51  Ark. 
462;  Hill  v.  Decatur,  22  Ga.  203; 
Sweet  V.  City  of  Wabash,  41  Ind. 
>8;  Rossell  v.  Garm,  50  N.  J.  L. 
358;  13  X.  E.  26;  Portland  v. 
Schmidt,  13  Ore.  17.  But  it  is 
under  the  power  to  "restrain." 
Smith  V.  Warrior,  99  Ala.  481; 
12  So.  418.  Contra,  Portland  v. 
Schmidt,  13  Ore.  17;  6  Pac.  221. 
Under  a  power  to  make  all  local 
police,  sanitary  and  other  regu- 
lations, not  inconsistent  with  the 
State  laws,  a  city  may  prevent 
sales  of  liquor  without  a  license, 
prohibit  sales  in  dance  houses, 
places  where  musical  and  theat- 
rical entertainments  are  given, 
and  where  females  attend  as 
waitresses.  Ex  parte  Hayes,  98 
Cal.  555;  33  Pac.  337;  20  L.  R. 
A.  701;  Ex  parte  Smithy,  33  Pac. 
338. 

38  State  V.  Clark,  28  X.  H.  176; 
61  Am.  Dec.  611;  Xashville  v. 
Linck,  12  Lea,  499;  Gabel  v. 
Houston,   29   Tex.   335. 

37  Straus  v.  Pontiac,  40  111. 
301 ;  State  v.  Harper,  42  La.  Ann. 
312;  7  So.  446;  Lincoln  Parish 
V.  Harper,  42  La.  Ann.  776;  7  So. 
716;  Rossell  v.  Garon,  50  N.  J.  L. 


433  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  275 

der  a  statute  empowering  a  city  to  regulate,  restrain  and  pro- 
hibit ale,  beer  and  porter  houses  or  shops  and  places  of  resort 
for  intemperance,  it  may  adopt  an  ordinance  making  it  unlaw- 
ful to  keep  in  the  city  a  house,  shop,  booth  or  place  where 
ale  or  beer  is  habitually  sold.'*  Power  "to  provide  by  ordi- 
nance against  the  evils  resulting  from  the  sales  of  intoxicating 
liquors"  does  not  authorize  an  ordinance  prohibiting  all  sales 
except  for  medicinal  and  mechanical  purposes. ^^  One  em- 
powered to  prohibit  saloons  and  dramshops  and  abate  nui- 
sances does  not  authorize  it  to  adopt  an  ordinance  prohibiting 
persons  from  soliciting,  receiving  or  transmitting  orders  for 
liquors.*"  Under  a  power  to  suppress  saloons  for  the  sale  of 
liquors,  a  city  may  suppress  a  room  at  a  hotel  set  apart  for 
their  sale  at  retail ;  *^  and  so  under  a  power  to  prevent  and  re- 
move nuisances,  to  suppress  and  prohibit  saloons,  a.  city  may 
declare  any  place  to  which  people  are  permitted  to  resort  to 
drink  liquors  shall  be  deemed  a  nuisance.*-  If  a  city  be  em- 
powered to  pass  all  by-laws  respecting  its  police  as  it  shall 
deem  necessary  for  its  security,  welfare,  good  government  and 
for  the  preservation  of  its  health,  peace  and  good  order,  it  may 
prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.*^  An  ordinance  in- 
flicting a  penalty  on  anyone  selling  liquor  is  not  invalid  on 
the  ground  that  it  does  not  expressly  prohibit  the  sale  of  li- 
quor.** A  city  cannot,  however,  prevent  the  sale  of  liquor 
which  is  not  intoxicating,  or  which  contains  so  little  alcohol 
that  if  drunk  in  ordinary  quantities  it  will  not  intoxicate.*'^    If 

35'8;    13    Atl.    26;    State    v.    Brit-  4i  Rattenbury  v.  Xorthville,  122 

tain,    S^    N.    C.    574;    iStaats    v.  Mich.   158;   80  N.  W.   1012. 

Washington,  44  N.  J.  L.   605;   43  42  Topeka    v.     Raynor,     8     Kan. 

Am.   Rep.   402;    Piqua  v.   Zimmer-  App.   279;   55  Pac.  509. 

lin,   35    Ohio   St.   507.  « Bailey   Liquor   Co.   v.   Austin, 

38  Burkholter      v.      McConnells-  82  Fed.  785. 

ville,  20  Ohio  St.  308.  44  Areola  v.   Wilkinson,   233   III. 

39Bronson    v.    Oberlin,    41    Ohio  250;   84  N.  E.  264. 

St.  476 ;   52  Am.  St.  90 ;  Piqua  v.  45  Fontana    v.    Grant,     6     Kan. 

Zimmerlin,  35  Ohio  St.  507;  State  App.   462;    50  Pac.    104;    State   v. 

V.  Roush,  47  Ohio   St.  478;   25  N.  Dannanburer    (N.   €.),    63    S.    E. 

E.  59.  '946.     But  see  Eureka  v.  Jackson, 

40  Homer  V.  Brown,  117  La.  Ann.  8  Kan.  App.  49;   54  Pac.  5. 

425;  41  iSo.  711,  See    Lincoln    Center    v.    Linker, 


§276 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


434 


the  general  statutes  permit  sales  for  medicinal  and  mechanical 
purposes  a  town  cannot  restrict  the  sales  to  medicinal  pur- 
poses only/"  But  a  city  may  prohibit  sales  of  liquors  "in 
connection  with  drugs  or  in  drug  stores"  under  an  authority 
to  regulate  the  sale  of  them.'^  If  a  statute  forbid  the  sale  of 
liquors,  an  ordinance  cannot  authorize  their  sale.''^  But  if  it 
is  the  policy  of  a  general  State  laAV  that  liquors  may  be  sold 
under  a  license,  a  municipality  cannot  prohibit  their  sale 
within  its  limits.*' 


Sec.  276.    Power  to  prohibit  includes  power  to  license. 

It  has  been  said  that  under  the  police  power,  license  fees 
may  be  imposed :  1.  For  regulation.  2.  For  revenue.  3.  To 
give  monopolies.  4.  For  prohibition.  The  fourth  pur- 
pose is  entirely  admissible  in  the  case  of  pursuits  or  indul- 


7  Kan.  App.  282;  51  Pac.  807, 
holding  that  a  city  could  require 
the  removal  of  obstructions  to 
the  view  of  a  room  where  non- 
intoxicating  liquors  were  sold. 

An  ordinance  "to  prohibit  the 
keeping  and  selling  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquors,  except  for  medicinal, 
scientific  and  mechanical  pur- 
poses," applies  to  saloons.  Hol- 
ton  V.  Bimrod,  8  Kan.  App.  2G5; 
55  Pac.  505. 

Where  a  statute  defines  sales 
at  retail,  an  ordinance  prohibit- 
ing sales  at  retail  need  not  de- 
fine a  retail  sale.  Brunker  v.  Tp. 
of  Mariposa,  22  Ont.  Rep.  120. 

A  city  which  attempts  to  li- 
cense the  sale  of  liquors  in  viola- 
tion of  a  prohibitory  clause  in 
the  State  Constitution,  may  be 
ousted  of  its  powers  by  an  action 
in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto. 
State  V.  Topeka,  31  Kan.  586;  3 
Pac.  320;  State  v.  Topeka,  31 
Kan.  452;  2  Pac.  593;  State  v. 
Leavenworth,  36  Kan.  314;  13 
Pac.   591. 


Under  a  power  to  prohibit  the 
sales  of  liquor,  a  city  may  ex- 
empt from  the  provisions  of  an 
ordinance  forbidding  sales  phy- 
sicians who  use  liquors  in  good 
faith  in  their  practice  as  medi- 
cine. Carthage  v.  Carlton,  99 
111.  App.  338. 

46  Hundland  v.  Hardy,  74  Mo. 
App.    614. 

*7  Jacobs  Pharmacy  Co.  v.  At- 
lanta, 89  Fed.  244. 

As  to  power  in  the  Province  of 
Quebec  to  authorize  a  city  to  pro- 
hibit the  sales  of  liquor,  see  St. 
Aubin  V.  Lafrance,  8  Quebec  L.  R. 
(Can.)  190.  Contra,  Huntingdon 
V.  Moir,  20  Rev.  Leg.  6'84,  and 
Compton  V.  Simoneau,  21  Rev. 
Leg.   265. 

48  Shelton  v.  State.  89  N.  E.  860. 

49  Parker  v.  Griffith  (N.  C), 
66  S.  E.  565. 

Under  a  power  to  regulate  and 
prohibit,  a  city  may  prohibit  the 
solicitation  or  receiving  of  orders 
for  liquors.  Braunstein  v.  People 
(Colo.),  105  Pac.  857. 


435  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  277 

gences  which  in  their  general  effect  are  believed  to  be  more 
harmful  than  beneficial  to  society,  and  that  it  is  often  found 
that  prohibition  of  an  occupation  which  excites  or  gratifies 
the  vices  or  passions  of  large  numbers  of  people,  is  met  by  a 
resistance  so  steady  and  powerful  as  to  render  the  law  wholly 
ineffectual,  when  a  heavy  tax  might  lessen  the  evils  and  pos- 
sibly in  the  end  make  the  occupation  unprofitable.^"  Accord- 
ingly it  has  been  held  that  under  a  power  given  to  a  munici- 
pal corporation  to  "regulate  or  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquors,"  the  corporation  may,  by  a  duly  enacted  ordi- 
nance, authorize  the  granting  of  licenses  to  dealers  in  such 
liquors.  Authority  to  prohibit,  as  we  have  seen,  implies  the 
power  to  interdict,  hinder  and  prevent.  Whatever  will  h'nder 
or  prevent  the  full  exercise  of  a  pursuit  has  the  effect  of  pro- 
hibition in  a  degree.  There  may  be  the  exercises  of  power  un- 
der authority  to  probibit  which  results  only  in  partial  prohi- 
bition ;  or  it  may  be  more  wisely  and  effectively  exerted  in  a 
manner  that  will  result  in  total  prohibition.  Whether  the 
prohibition  be  partial  or  total,  it  is  exercised  under  the  same 
authority.  The  licensing  of  intoxicating  liquors  hinders  and 
prevents  in  a  degree  the  traffic  in  those  liquors.  So  far  as  a 
license  restricts  the  free  sale  of  such  liquors,  it  that  far  oper- 
ates to  hinder  and  prevent  the  traffic.  Therefore,  as  we  have 
already  said,  a  license  may  be  imposed  under  the  authority 
to  prohibit.^^ 

Sec.  277.     Prohibitory  ordinance,  not  in  violation  of  com- 
mon law  rights. 

The  Legislature  of  a  State  where  there  is  no  constitutional 
provision  inhibiting  it  from  doing  so  may  prohibit  the  traffic 
in  intoxicating  liquors,  and  having  such  power  the  Legislature 
may,  by  proper  legislation,  empower  the  municipal  corpora- 
tions within  the  State  with  a  like  power.     In  a  case  where  the 

50  Cooley  on  Taxation,  p.  403.  however,   under   a   power   to  "pro- 
si  Keokuk    v.    Dressell,     47     la.  hibit"    the    sale    of    liquors,    it    is 
595;    Mt.   Carmel    v.   Wabash   Co.,  held   that   a  power   to  regulate  is 
50  111.  69;  see  Burlington  v.  Bum-  not  given.     State  v.  Fay,  44  N.  J. 
gardner,   12   Iowa,  673.  L-  474. 
In    the    State    of    New    Jersey, 


§  278  TRAiPIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  436 

power  has  been  conferred  upon  such  corporation  to  license, 
regulate,  or  prohibit  the  traffic  in  such  liquors,  it  is  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  corporation  to  do  either  of  such  things;  and 
therefore  an  ordinance  which  provides  for  the  prohibition  of 
the  sale  by  retail  of  such  liquors  within  the  corporate  limits 
will  be  valid  and  not  subject  to  the  objection  that  it  is  con- 
trary to  the  common  law.  The  right  to  engage  in  such  a  busi- 
ness and  to  be  protected  by  law  in  its  prosecution  can  no  longer 
be  claimed  as  a  common  law  right,  but  is  a  right  which  can  be 
exercised  only  in  the  manner  and  on  the  terms  which  the  stat- 
ute prescribes.  The  refusal  to  license  a  man  to  conduct  the 
business  does  not  deprive  him  of  any  personal  or  property 
right,  but  merely  deprives  him  of  a  privilege  Avhich  it  is  in 
the  discretion  of  the  municipal  authorities  to  grant  or  with- 
hold." 

Sec.  278,     Regulation  and  prohibition  distinguished. 

"To  regulate"  is  the  expression  most  frequently  used  to 
define  the  power  delegated  to  municipal  corporations  in  refer- 
ence to  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors,  and  the  meaning  of 
the  phrase  has  been  fully  determined  by  many  well-adjudicat- 
ed cases.  In  these  cases,  the  phrase,  "to  regulate,"  is  distin- 
guished from  "to  prohibit,"  it  being  held  that  they  have  dif- 
ferent and  distinct  meanings,  whether  understood  in  their  or- 
dinary and  common  signification  or  as  defined  by  the  courts  in 
construing  them.  Power  granted  to  a  municipal  corporation 
to  grant  licenses  to  retailers  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  to 
regulate  them,  does  not  confer  power  to  prohibit,  either  di- 
rectly or  by  a  prohibitory  charge  for  a  license  fee.  Regulate 
and  prohibit  are  not  synonymous.^^     To  regulate  the  sale  of 

52  People  V.  €regier,  138  111.  CI  Md.  297;  Austin  v.  Murray,  33 
401;   28  N.  E.   812.  Mass.    (16   Pick.)    121;    People   v. 

53  Marion  v.  Chandler,  6  Ala.  Gadway,  61  Mich.  2So;  28  N.  W. 
695;  Ex  parte  Burnett,  30  Ala.  101;  In  re  Hauck,  70  Mich.  396; 
461;  Miller  v.  Jones,  80  Ala.  89;  McConville  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  39  N. 
Tuck  V.  Waldron,  31  Ark.  462;  J.  L.  38;  State  v.  Fay,  44  N.  J. 
Duckwall  V.  New  Albany,  25  Ind.  L.  474;  State  v.  Garm,  50  N.  J. 
283;  Sweet  V.  City  of  Wabash,  41  L.  358;  13  Atl.  26;  Bronson  v. 
Tnd.  7;   Cantrill  v.  Sainer,  59  la.  Oberlin,  41  Ohio  St.  478. 

26;   12  X.  W.  753;   State  v.  Mott, 


437  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  279 

liquor  implies  ex  vi  termini,  that  the  business  may  be  engaged 
in  or  carried  on,  subject  to  established  rules  or  methods.  Pro- 
hibition is  to  prevent  the  business  being  engaged  in,  or  car- 
ried on,  entirely  or  partially.  The  two  purposes  are  incon- 
gruous.'''* To  regulate  does  not  mean  to  annihilate  or  suppress, 
or  to  prohibit  under  all  circumstances.  No  regulation  or  rules 
are  necessary  concerning  an  evil  absolutely  prohibited.'^'''  The 
power  to  license,  tax,  regulate  and  restrain  barrooms  and 
drinking  shops  carries  with  it,  without  any  express  provision, 
authority  to  provide  by  ordinance  the  terms  and  conditions 
upon  which  such  license  shall  be  issued,  the  amount  of  tax 
to  be  imposed  (if  it  be  reasonable  and  not  prohibitovv).  and 
the  mode  of  conducting  the  business,  and  implies  the  power  to 
inhibit  the  carrying  on  that  kind  of  business  without  such  li- 
cense.""' While  the  power  "to  rearulate"  does  not  authorize 
prohibition  in  a  general  sense,  because  the  very  essence  of  reg- 
ulation is  the  existence  of  something  to  be  regulated,  yet  the 
Aveight  of  authority,  is  to  the  effect  that  this  power  does  con- 
fer the  authority  to  confine  the  business  hours  of  the  day,  to 
certain  localities  or  buildings  in  a  city,  and  to  the  manner  of 
its  prosecution  within  those  hours,  localities  and  buildings,  pro- 
viding such  regulations  do  not  conflict  with  the  statutes  of  the 
State." 

Sec.  279.     Limitation  of  power  of  city  to  enact  ordinance. 

If,  by  the  provisions  of  a  city  charter,  power  is  conferred 
upon  a  city  council  to  make  and  establish  ordinances  and  by- 
laws for  numerous  purposes,  specifically  set  forth  in  the  char- 
ter, among  which  are  ordinances  and  by-laws  "to  prohibit 
the  selling  or  giving  away  any  ardent  spirits  by  any  store- 
keeper, trader  or  grocer,  to  be  drunk,  except  by  innkeepers 
duly  licensed,"  and  "to  forbid  the  selling  or  giving  away  of 

54  Miller  v.  Jones,  80  Ala.  89;  " /n  re  Wilson,  32  Minn.  145; 
Schwuchow  V.  City  of  Chicago,  08  Livery  Stables  v.  State,  10  Mo. 
111.  444.  App.  131;  Cronin  v.  People,  82  N. 

55  State  V.  Clark,  54  Mo.  1,  34;  Y.  318;  Piqua  v,  Zimmerlin,  35 
State  V.  Vic.  De  Bar,  18  Mo.  395.  Ohio  St.  17. 

06  Portland,    13    Ore.    1;    Provo 
City  V.    Shurtlifl",   4  Utah,    15. 


§  280  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  438 

ardent  spirits  or  other  intoxicating  liquors  to  any  child,  ap- 
prentice or  servant  without  the  consent  of  his  parent,  master 
or  guardian;"  and  such  specific  enumerations  are  followed  by 
a  provision  in  the  charter  that  the  city  council  "may  make 
any  other  by-laws  and  regulations  which  may  seem  for  the 
well-being  of  the  city,  provided  they  be  not  repugnant  to  the 
Constitution  or  laws  of  the  State,"  the  power  of  such  city 
council  to  pass  ordinances  on  the  subject  of  the  sale  of  ardent 
spirits  or  other  intoxicating  liquors  is  limited  to  the  cases 
described  in  the  specific  provisions.  In  such  cases  the  general 
provision  is  to  be  construed  as  referring  to  other  matters,  more 
properly  the  subjects  of  police  reorulation  than  those  specifically 
enumerated.  Consenuently  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  intoxicatinsi:  liouors  to  any  person  without  a  license  from 
the  mayor  and  aldermen  will  be  unauthorized  by  such  char- 
ter and  void.^^  The  rule  in  pueh  cases  is  that  the  nower  to 
make  by-laws,  when  not  expressly  given,  is  imnlied  as  inci- 
dent to  the  very  existence  of  a  cornoration  ;  but  mi  the  case  of 
the  express  grant  of  the  power  to  enact  by-laws  limited  to 
certain  specified  cases  and  for  certain  purposes,  t^e  cnrnorate 
power  of  the  legislation  is  confinpd  to  the  objects  specified,  all 
others  being  excluded  by  impr'catinn.  To  hold  in  such  case 
that  such  a  general  clause  confers  the  power  to  pass  an  ordi- 
nance prohibiting  the  sale  of  intoxicating  linuoT"s  to  any  per- 
son without  a  license  would  in  effect  be  to  expuTi""e  t^e  special 
provisions  from  the  charter;  and  not  these  onlv  but  nil  the 
numerous  clauses  which  go  to  limit  and  define  thp  pre^^i^e  boun- 
daries of  a  power  to  be  exercised  by  the  city  in  the  various 
cases  specified  for  the  enacting  of  by-laws  and  ordinances.^'' 

Sec.  280,     Power  to  regulate  sale  of  liquors — Valid  ordi- 
nance. 

Under  a  power  to  require  a  license  for  the  sale  of  liquors,  a 
municipality  has  the  right  to  provide  that  no  license  shall  be 
granted  an  applicant  unless  he  "produce  the  written  recom- 

58  state  V.  Ferguson,  33  X.  H.  and  Ames  on  Corp.,  177;  Child  v. 
424.  Hudson's  Bay  Co.,  2  P.  Willliams, 

68Kyd    on    Corp.,     102;     Angel       207. 


439  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  280 

mendation  of  four  of  his  nearest  neighbors."  ^^  And  although 
the  statute  conferring  the  power  to  require  a  license  says  noth- 
ing about  the  right  to  require  the  licensee  to  furnish  a  bond 
conditioned  that  he  will  obey  the  ordinance  of  the  municipal- 
ity, yet  as  incident  to  the  licensing  power  it  may  require  him 
to  furnish  such  a  bond  with  surety  to  be  approved  by  it." 
Under  such  a  power  it  may  provide  thnt  a  sale  of  liquor  with- 
out a  license  shall  render  the  seller  liable  to  a  prescribed  pen- 
alty.«2  XTnder  its  power  to  licence,  reo-ulate  and  restrain  the 
traffic  it  may  prohibit  the  criving  av^^ay  or  bartering  of  li- 
quors.*'^ A  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  unfermented  cider 
in  less  quantities  than  a  gallon,  or  forbidding  its  being  drunk 
on  the  premises  where  sold,  is  not  so  unreasonable  as  to  be 
void.*'*  Under  a  power  to  license  a  particular  place  a  city 
may  impose  a  penaltv  for  a  sale  made  at  an  unlicensed  place."'' 
A  city  may  declare  that  linuors  shall  not  be  kept  in  restaurants 
or  like  places ;  *"*  or  that  druggists  shall  only  sell  for  medicinal 
purposes.^^  But  under  such  a  power  it  may  not  prohibit  sales  at 
saloons  in  any  quantities  or  for  any  purpose  unless  they  be  for 
medicinal  purposes.*'®  Punishment  for  a  sale  of  liquors  without 

60  Whitten  v.  Covington,  43  Ga.  tion  all  that  is  necessary  to  make 

421;    In    re    Indiana    County    Li-  the  power  granted  effectual.     The 

censes,  2  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  358.  ordinance  is,  therefore,  valid  as  a 

^^  Ex   parte    Schneider,    11    Ore.  whole."      Citing    State    v.    Adam- 

288;   8  Pac.  289.  son,     14    Ind.    296;     Williams    v. 

62  Schweitzer  v.  Liberty,  82  Mo.  State,  48  Ind.  306. 

309;    Mayson   v.    Atlanta,    77    Ga.  C4  Lawrence  v.  Monroe,  44  Kan. 

662.  C07;  24  Pac.   1113. 

G3  Vinson      v.      Monticello,      118  es  State  v.   Beverly,  45   X.  J.  L. 

Ind.    103;     19    N.    E.    734.      "The  288. 

substantive  grant  contained  in  the  C6  State  v.  Clark,  28  N.  H.  176. 

statute    is    the    power    to    license,  e-  Provo     City    v.     Shurtliff,    4 

regulate   and  restrain   the  sale  of  Utah,    15;    5   Pac.   302;    Selnia   v. 

intoxicating  liquor,  but  as  a  nee-  Brewer,   9   Cal.   App.   70;    98   Pac- 

essary    incident    to    the    power    to  61. 

restrain  and  regulate  the  sale,  and  68  Strauss  v.  Pontiac,  40  111.  301. 

to  prevent  the  evasion  of  any  or-  Municipalities    have    some    lati- 

dinance    against     selling    without  tude  in  cases  of  violations  of  its 

license,   is   included    the   power   to  ordinances,  so  long  as  they  do  not 

prohibit    the    bartering   or    giving  run  counter  to   State  statutes  on 

away   of   any   intoxicating   liquor.  the     came     subject.       Jackson     v. 

This  is  upon  the  principle  that  a  Boyd,  53  Iowa,  536;  o  N.  W.  734. 
grant  carries  with  it  by  implica- 


§  280  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  440 

a  license  may  be  had,  although  the  State  inflicts  a  punishment 
for  the  same  sale.*^''  After  issuing  a  license  a  city  may  adopt 
an  ordinance  regulating  the  sale  under  it,  not  essentially  im- 
pairing the  right  to  retail  liquors  authorized  by  it  to  be  sold.'''* 
So  a  city  may  regulate  the  sale  of  liquors  in  greater  quantities 
than  the  State  regulates  it.'^  Under  its  general  power  to 
enact  ordinances  for  the  i-egulation  of  the  sale  of  liquors,  such 
as  it  deems  desirable,  a  city  may  require  an  applicant  for  a 
license  to  state  in  his  application  such  facts  as  will  show  the 
suitableness  of  the  place  for  the  saloon  as  where  it  is  to  be  lo- 
cated.'^ The  selling  of  "near  beer"  is  a  business  which  from 
its  nature  admits  of  strict  regulations.  It  stands  in  a  different 
class  from  selling  drugs,  soda  water  and  similar  liquids. 
Therefore  regulations  may  be  upheld  which  w^ould  be  arbitrary 
and  unreasonable  if  applied  to  other  business.''^  So  that  an 
ordinance  forbidding  the  sale  of  it  in  a  less  quantity  than  a 
pint  at  a  time  is  valid ;  but  one  forbidding  a  sale  of  more  than 
one  quart  to  one  person  in  a  day  is  unreasonable.  But  an  or- 
dinance requiring  a  dealer  to  furnish  samples  to  be  tested  to- 
ascertain  the  amount  of  alcohol  in  the  liquor  he  is  selling  or 
offering  for  sale  is  valid.  So  an  ordinance  requiring  bottles 
and  barrels  containing  it  to  be  plainly  stamped,  so  as  to  show 
their  contents  with  the  names  of  the  manufacturers  is  reason- 
able. But  in  the  absence  of  an  express  provision  in  its  charter 
a  city  may  not  prohibit  its  sale.''-  It  has  been  held  that  a  city 
under  its  general  power  to  regulate  the  sale  of  liquors  may 
prohibit  screens,  blinds  and  stained  windows,  or  any  other  de- 
vice to  obscure  the  view  of  the  interior  of  the  room  where  li- 
quors are  sold,  even  though  non-intoxicating,  in  ordei*  to  pre- 

60  State  V.  Harris,  50  Minn.  128 ;  State  v.  Dannenberg    (N.   C),  && 

52   N.   W.   387.  S.  E.  301. 

TO  Morris  v.  Rome,  10  Ga.  532.  This    is    a    malt    liquor    which 

71  Dennehy  v.  Chicago,  120  111.  contains  so  little  alcohol  that  it 
627;    12  N.  E.  227.  will      not      produce      intoxication, 

72  Sherlock  v.  Stuart,  96  Mich.  though  drunk  to  excess.  In  Geor- 
193;  55  N.  W.  485;  21  L.  R.  A.  gia  it  includes  all  malt  liquors 
580.  not  within  the  purview  of  the  gen- 

73  Campbell        v.        Thomasville  eral  prohibition  law. 

(Ga.),    64    S.    E.    815;     Baker    v.  74  Campbell        v.        Thomasville 

Griffith    (N.    C),   '66   S.    E.    565;        (Ga.),  64  S.   E.  815. 


441  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  281 

vent  a  surreptitious  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors."  Under  a 
power  to  exact  a  license  of  retailers  a  city  may  impose  a  fine 
upon  all  persons  keeping  tippling  houses  without  a  license.^® 
So  under  a  power  given  a  city  to  declare  by  ordinance  what 
shall  constitute  a  nuisance,  a  city  may  declare  the  maintenance 
of  a  house  for  unlawful  sale  of  liquors  or  the  carrying  on  of 
such  business  shall  be  a  nuisance."  If  especially  authorized 
by  statute,  a  city  may  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicating  li- 
quors.^"^  Under  the  general  welfare  clause  a  city  may  provide 
that  it  shall  be  unlawful  to  keep  a  "blind  tiger"  or  keep  for 
illegal  sale  intoxicating  liquors.''^  The  exemption  of  Weiss 
beer  from  a  prohibitory  ordinance  does  not  render  the  ordi- 
nance void.'*" 

Sec.  281.     Power  to  regulate  sale  of  liquor — Invalid  ordi- 
nance. 

An  ordinance  which  makes  the  granting  of  a  license  to  rest 
upon  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  common  council  or  municipal 
officers  is  void.^'  So  is  an  ordinance  authorizing  any  person 
to  bring  an  action  in  the  name  of  a  city  to  recover  damages  for 
its  violation  and  giving  him  a  reward  if  he  be  suceessfui.^- 
And  an  ordinance  prohibiting  sales  to  a  certain  class  of  per- 
sons on  Sunday  is  void  when  the  State  law  permits  them;  «=^  or 
prohibiting  sales  in  certain  quantities  when  a  State  law  per- 
mits   such    sales.^*     An     ordinance     if    not     authorized    by 

75  Campbell  v.  Thomasville  so  Kiel  v.  Cliica/io,  176  111.  137; 
(Ga.),  '64  S.  E.   815.                                52    N.    E.    29;     reversing   «9    111. 

76  St.  Louis  V.  Smith,  2  Mo.  113.       App.  685. 

TTMayhew     v.     Eugene      (Ore.),  si  fia?    parte    Theisen,     30     Fla. 

104  Pac.  727;  Ruston  v.  Fountain,  529;    11   So.  901;    32  Am.  St.  36; 

118  La.  53;  42  So.  644.  State  v.  D'Alemberte,  30  Fla.  545; 

78  Ruston   V.   Fountain,    118   La.  11   So.  905;    Chute  v.   Van  Camp 

53;    42  So.   644;   Gale  v.  Moscow,  (Wis.),  117  N.  W.  1012. 

15  Idaho,  332 ;  97  Pac.  828 ;  Searcy  s^  Oechslein  v.  Passaic,   2  N.  J. 

V.  Turner   (Ark.),  114  S.  W.  472;  Law  J.   85. 

Selma  v.  Brewer,  9  Cal.  App.  70;  83  Wood   v.   Brooklyn,    14   Barb. 

98  Pac.   61;    Campbell   v.  Thomas-  425. 

ville   (Ga.),  64  S.  E.  815.  84  Thompson   v.   Mt.   Vernon,   11 

7S  Coggins  V.  Griffin,  5  Ga.  App.  Ohio  St.  688. 
1;   62  S.  E.  659. 


§  282  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  442 

some  statute  is  void.^^  Under  a  power  authorizing  a  city  to 
pass  an  ordinance  making  a  sale  or  gift  of  liquor  a  nuisance, 
it  cannot  enact  an  ordinance  making  the  keeping  of  it  a  nui- 
sance.®^ Under  a  power  "to  regulate  or  prohibit"  the  sale  of 
liquor  a  town  cannot  provide  that  liquors  kept  for  sale  in 
violation  of  an  ordinance  shall  be  destroyed.**^  Under  a  power 
"to  make  such  by-laws,  rules  and  regulations  for  the  better 
government  of  the  town,  as  they  may  deem  necessary,"  an. 
ordinance  cannot  be  passed  making  it  "unlawful  for  any  bar- 
keeper, clerk  or  agent  or  any  person  whatever  to  keep  open, 
or  be  or  remain  in,  a  barroom  or  other  place  Avhere  spirituous 
or  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold,  between  the  hours  of  10  o'clock 
p.  M.  and  4  o 'clack  a.  m."^'*  And  under  a  somewhat  similar 
principle,  sales  of  liquors  by  wholesale  cannot  be  interdicted 
nor  druggists  be  compelled  to  keep  a  list  of  all  persons  to 
whom  they  sell  li([uors  on  prescriptions.®^  Under  a  general 
power  to  make  by-laws  and  punish  those  violating  them,  a 
city  cannot  enact  a  by-law  regulating  the  sale  of  liquors.^" 
An  ordinance  forbidding  the  sale  of  more  than  one  quart  a 
day  of  "near  beer"-'^  to  one  person  is  void.°- 

Sec.  282.     Amount  of  license  fees  or  taxes. 

A  State  may,  for  revenue  purposes  and  as  a  police  regula- 
tion, impose  a  license  for  the  carrj'ing  on  of  particular  branches 

s"")  Columbus   V.   Schaerr,   5   Ohio  "i  A      non-intoxicating       malt 

S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  100;   State  v.  To-  liquor, 

peka,  31  Kan.  452;   2  Pac.  593.  92  Campbell        v.        Thomasville 

se  Sullivan    v.     Oneida,     61    III,  (Ga.),  64   S.   E.  815. 

242.  A    city    cannot    adopt   an    ordi- 

87  Henke  v.  McCord.  55  Iowa,  nance  prohibiting  the  drinking  of 
378;   7  N.  W.  623.  liquor    "in    any    quantity    in    any 

88  State  V.  Thomas,  118  N.  C.  stairway,  areaway,  street  or  al- 
1221 ;  24  S.  E.  535.  ley,  or  on  any  sidewalk,"  because 

89  McCrea  v  Washington,  10  it  is  unreasonable,  depriving  a 
Ohio  Dec.  29;  19  Wkiy.  L.  Bull.  person  of  his  personal  liberty; 
66.  tliough  it  would  seem  that  it  can 

90  McMullen  v.  Charleston,  1  j)rohibit  the  drinking  of  liquor  in 
Bay  (S.  C),  46;  Zylstra  v.  the  street  or  on  the  sidewalk. 
Charleston,  1  Bay  ( S.  C.),  382;  Carthage  v.  Block  (Mo.  App.), 
Schroeder   v.   Charleston,   2   Const.  123  S.  W.  482. 

Rep.  726. 


443  MUNICIPAL   REGUIiATION.  §  282 

of  business,  including  that  of  retailing  intoxicating  liquors, 
and  may  confer  the  right  upon  a  municipal  corporation  with- 
in its  jurisdiction,  though  the  payment  of  the  license  fee  op- 
erates incidentally  as  a  tax  upon  the  dealer  or  consumer.^^  A 
law  conferring  such  a  power  and  an  ordinance  passed  under 
it  M'ill  not  be  unconstitutional^  nor  can  it  be  objected  to  on 
the  ground  that  the  same  license  fee  is  not  required  by  all  of 
the  cities  and  towns  of  the  State;  for  though  taxes  must  be 
uniform  throughout  the  city  or  town  levying  them,  they  need 
not  be  the  same  throughout  the  different  cities  and  towns.^*  It 
has  also  been  held  that  a  municipal  corporation  cannot  be  re- 
quired to  tax  all  vocations  or  pursuits  alike,  but  may  discrim- 
inate against  such  as  are  hurtful  or  dangerous  to  the  com- 
munity.°^  If  the  law  authorizing  such  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  require  a  license  from  a  retail  dealer  does  not  limit  the 
amount  to  be  paid  therefor,  such  corporation  in  the  exercise 
of  a  reasonable  discretion  may  determine  the  amount,  provided 
it  will  not  be  prohibition  in  effect.""-'  AVhat  will  amount  to  a 
prohibiting  tax  is  a  question  of  fact,  and  not  one  of  which  the 
courts  will  take  judicial  notiee.^^  As  to  what  would  be  a  pro- 
hibitory tax,  reference  must  be  had  to  the  population,  char- 
acter and  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  municipality,  and  the 

93  2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §793;  Minn.  175;  In  re  Mundj',  59  How. 

Cooley's    Const.    Lim.,    §201;    Mo-  (N.   Y.)    Pr.   359;    Commissioners 

bile  V.  Yerille,  3  Ala.  113;  City  of  v.   Patterson,   8   Jones    (N.   Car.), 

Elk  Point  V.  Vaughn,  1  Dak.  113;  Law,    182;    Portland    v.    Schmidt, 

Morris    v.   City   of   Pvome,    10   Ga.  13   Ore.    17;    Morrill   v.    State,   38 

532;  Douglasville  v.  .Johns,  62  Ga.  Wis.   428;    State  v.   Plainfield,  44 

423;   Brown  v.  State,  79  Ga.  473;  N.  J.  L.  118. 

Bennett    v.    People,    30    III.    389;  94  Wiley  v.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429; 

Coulterville  v.  Gillon,  72  111.  599;  Wells   v.   Torrey,    144   Mich.    689; 

Denneberg    v.    Chicago,     120     111.  108    N.    W.    423;     13    Det.    L.    N. 

627;   12  N.  E.  227;   Sweet  v.  City  378. 

of   Wabash,    41    Ind.    71;    City   of  o5  Ex  parte  Hurl,   49   Cal.   557; 

Frankfort  v.  Aughe,   114  Ind.   77;  Mayor,  etc.,  v.  Beasley,  1  Humph. 

Emerich  v.  Indianapolis,   118   Ind.  (Tenn.)    232. 

279;   20  N.  E.  795;    Shea  v.  City  so  Wiley  v.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429 

of  Muncie,  148  Ind.    14;   46  N.  E.  Van  Hook  v.   Selma,  70  Ala.  361 

138;    Keokuk    v.    Dresscll,    47    la.  97  Wiley  v.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429 

597 ;  State  v.  City  of  Leavenworth,  Sweet     v.     City     of     Wabash,     41 

36  Kan.  314;   State  v.  Pfeifer,  26  Ind.  7. 


§282 


TK^VrFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS, 


444 


general  policy  of  the  State  with  reference  to  its  liquor  legis- 
lation.^® The  amount  that  may  be  exacted  in  such  ease  for  a 
license  is  not  to  be  confined  to  the  mere  expense  of  issuing  the 
license,  but  may  be  for  a  sum  which  will  in  some  measure 
realize  a  reasonable  compensation  for  the  additional  expense 
of  police  supervision  of  the  business."^  In  Indiana  it  is  held 
that  a  city  ordinance  fixing  the  fee  for  a  retail  liquor  deal- 
er's license  at  $500  is  not  unreasonable  nor  objectionable;  ^  but 
in  other  States  it  has  been  held  that  a  fee  of  $1,000  is  too  great 
and  amounts  in  effect  to  prohibition.-  In  California  it  has 
been  adjudged  that  it  cannot  be  assmned  judicially  that  city 
ordinances  requiring  the  payment  of  $50  every  ninety  days 
for  the  privilege  of  retailing  intoxicating  liquors  in  quanti- 
ties less  than  one  quart  is  virtually  a  prohibition  of  the  sale 
of  such  liquors;  nor  is  an  ordinance  providing  for  a  license 
tax   of   $25   per   month,^    nor    is   one   providing    for    a    tax 


9sElk  Point  v.  Vaughn,  1  Dak. 
113;  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  18  Ga.  586; 
Wiley  V.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429; 
Sweet  V.  City  of  Wabash,  41 
Ind.  7. 

nn  Van  Hook  v.  Selma,  70  Ala. 
361. 

1  Wiley  V.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429; 
Sweet  V.  City  of  Wabash,  41 
Ind.  7. 

2  Ex  parte  Hurl,  49  Cal.  557 : 
Perdue  v.  Ellis,  18  Ga.  5'86;  Elk 
Point  V.  Vaughn,  1  Dak.  113;  46 
N.  W.  577;  Marion  v.  Chandler, 
6  Ala.  899;  United  States  Dis- 
tilling Co.  V.  Chicago,  112  111.  19; 
Mayor,  etc.,  v.  Beasley,   1  Humph. 

(Tenn.)  232.  Contra,  Ex  parte 
Burnett,  30  Ala.  461;  Craig  v. 
Burnett,    32    Ala.    728. 

A  $2,000  license  fee  has  been 
upheld.  Ex  parte  Sikes,  102  Ala. 
173;  15  So.  522;  24  L.  R.  A.  774; 
see  Kitson  v.  Ann  Arbor,  26  Mich. 
325. 

A  power  given  to  exact  a  license 


fee  from  brewers  of  "not  less  than 
$50,  nor  more  tlian  $500,"  and  to 
"grade,  class  and  fix  the  rate  of 
license  within  the  minimum  and 
maximum  amounts  designated," 
will  not  authorize  the  passage  of 
an  ordinance  requiring  brewers  to 
pay  "one-tenth  of  one  per  cent,  on 
the  amount  of  liquor  manufac- 
tured," but  requiring  them  to  pay 
at  least  $15  a  year  regardless  of 
the  amount  manufactured.  Kniper 
V.   Louisville.   7   Bush,  599. 

The  city  may  provide  to  whom 
the  license  fees  shall  be  paid,  un- 
der its  power  to  license.  Ex  parte 
Lawrence,  69  Cal.  608;  11  Pac. 
217. 

Tlie  Legislature  may  divert 
part  of  the  charges  into  the  coun- 
ty treasury,  by  amending  the 
citj^'s  charter  or  the  general  law. 
Winona  v.  Whipple,  24  Minn.  61. 

3  Ex  parte  Benninger,  64  Cal. 
201;  30  Pac.  846;  In  re  Guerrero, 
69  Cal.  88;    10  Pac.  361. 


445 


MUNICIPAL   KEGULATION. 


§282 


of  $50  per  quarter  or  $200  per  year  void  because  unreasonable 
and  oppressive  and  in  restraint  of  trade.*  In  fixing  such  fees 
a  classification  of  population  has  been  recognized  as  valid  '  and 
in  Wisconsin  where  a  statute  thus  fixing  the  license  fees  and 
providing  that  the  population  of  any  city  or  village  shall  be 
determined  by  the  last  preceding  enumeration  by  the  State 
or  general  government,  it  was  held  that  the  method  of  ascer- 
taining the  population  thus  pointed  out  w^as  exclusive  of  any 
other,  and  could  not  be  proved  by  parol  or  by  application 
for  a  new  census.'^  In  other  words,  that  the  method  prescribed 
by  statute  must  be  followed.  The  Legislature  may  authorize 
a  city  to  exact  a  higher  license  fee  than  the  State  exacts  for  its 
license  for  the  same  locality.^  The  presumption  is  that  the  ordi- 
nance is  valid  and  the  amount  of  the  fee  not  prohibitive  until 
its  invalidity  or  prohibitive  character  is  established  by  proper 
evidence.*  The  fact  that  a  liquor  license  fee  is  higher  than  the 
tax  on  dealers  on  other  commodities  cannot  be  construed  as  a 
discrimination.^ 


*Ex  parte  McNulty,  73  Cal 
632;   15  Pac.  368. 

5  Foster  v.  Burt,  76  Ala.  229 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Miller,  126  Pa. 
St.  137;  17  Atl.  623;  Common- 
wealth V.  Smoulter,  126  Pa.  St. 
— ;    137  Atl.  532. 

6  State  V.  Keaough,  68  Wis.  135; 
31  N.  W.  723. 

7Petitfills  V.  Jeanerette,  52  La. 
Ann.   1005;    27   So.  358. 

An  ordinance  prescribing  what 
steps  must  be  taken  to  secure  a 
license,  and  providing  that  the 
licensee  should  pay  for  it  at  a 
rate  that  might  from  time  to 
time  be  established,  though  ex- 
pressly repealing  an  ordinance  in 
relation  to  its  subject-matter  or 
inconsistent  with  its  terms,  does 
not  repeal  a  prior  ordinance  fixing 
the  amount  of  tlie  fee  to  be  paid 
yearly  for  the  license.  People  v. 
Mount,  186  111.  560;  58  N.  E.  360; 
affirming  87  111.  App.  194. 


s  Johnson  v.  Fayette,  148  Ala. 
497;  42  So.  621.  In  this  case,  in 
a  town  of  700  people,  there  were 
four  saloons  operating  under  li- 
censes of  $500  each.  Three  of 
these  saloons  made  a  net  profit 
from  $460  to  $800  yearly;  while 
the  remaining  one  was  closed  be- 
cause the  profit  was  not  satisfac- 
tory. The  license  fee  was  raised 
to  $750,  as  the  statute  authorized. 
It  was  held  that  this  was  not 
prohibitory. 

Recovery  by  city  of  fees  from 
county  in  Pennsylvania.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Schadt,  214  Pa. 
592;  64  Atl.  320;  Commonwealth 
V.  Scranton,  214  Pa.  505;  64  Atl. 
321. 

9  Lackman  v.  Walker,  52  Fla. 
297;  42  So.  461. 

A  city  can  not  adopt  an  ordi- 
nance providing  that  if  there  be 
a  dispute  as  to  the  amount  of 
fees  to   be    paid,    it   shall    be   re- 


§283 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


446 


Sec.  283.    License  fee,  limitation. 

Where,  by  an  act  of  the  Legislature,  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion has  the  power  and  authority  lo  license  and  regulate  the 


f erred  to  the  nearest  justice  of 
the  peace.  Baker  v.  Paris,  10  Up. 
Can.   26. 

An  ordinance  relating  to  the 
granting  of  licenses  does  not  re- 
peal one  fixing  the  rate  for  a  li- 
cense. People  V.  Mount,  186  III. 
560;  58  N.  E.  360;  affirming  87 
111.  App.   194. 

Where  a  statute  forbids  the  is- 
suance of  a  license  until  $500  has 
been  paid  into  the  city  treasury 
and  as  much  more  as  the  city 
may  exact,  the  city  cannot  au- 
thorize the  issuance  of  a  li- 
cense on  the  payment  of  less  than 
$500;  and  it  may  exact  a  sum  in 
excess  of  $500.  Kelly  v.  Fari- 
bault, 83  Minn.  9;  85  K  W.  720. 

A  tax  on  the  general  business 
conducted  in  a  store  maj'  be  levied, 
and  an  additional  tax  if  liquor  be 
sold  therein.  San  Luis  Obispo 
Co.  V.  Greenberg,  120  Cal.  300; 
'52  Pac.   797. 

Under  a  power  to  regulate  the 
sale  of  liquors,  a  city  may  raise 
the  amount  of  the  license  fee 
after  it  has  granted  a  license  and 
require  the  licensee  to  ppy  the 
increase.  Wallace  v.  Cubanola, 
70  Ark.  395 ;  68  S.  W.  485 ;  Moore 
V.  Indianapolis,  120  Ind,  483;  22 
N.  E.  424. 

In  Louisiana,  the  statute  re- 
quiring the  publication  of  the  es- 
timates of  expenditures  by  the 
police  jury  applies  to  liquor  li- 
cense fees.  Swords  v.  Daigle,  107 
La.  510;  32  So.  94. 

A  failure  of  an  ordinance  to 
prohibit    a   licensee   from   "engag- 


ing in  the  business  of  selling  in- 
toxicating liquors  to  be  drunk  in 
or  about  the  premises  where  sold," 
but  requiring  him  to  pay  a 
certain  license  fee  per  annum  for 
each  place  where  he  retails 
liquors,  is  valid;  and  a  person 
selling  without  such  a  license  may 
be  fined.  Centerville  v.  Gayken, 
20  S.  D.  82;   104  N.  W.  910. 

Where  a  statute  requires  a 
liquor  license  fee  to  be  fixed  by 
ordinance,  an  ordinance  whicli 
provides  that  in  case  an  amend- 
ment to  the  city  charter  shall 
carry  at  an  election,  the  fees  shall 
be  as  therein  so  fixed  is  a  compli- 
ance with  such  statute.  Seattle 
V.  Clark,  28  Wash.  717;  69  Pac. 
407. 

Under  a  power  to  exact  a  li- 
cense for  the  business  of  retailing 
liquor,  either  as  a  police  regula- 
tion or  for  revenue,  or  even  for 
both,  an  ordinance  exacting  it  as 
a  revenue  will  be  construed  as  a 
police  regulation  in  order  to  up- 
hold it,  where  if  It  was  held  to 
be  a  revenue  measure,  it  would  be 
void  for  want  of  notice.  Swords 
V.  Daigle,  107  La.  510;   32  So.  94. 

The  imposition  of  a  tax  of  $50 
for  peddling  beer  is  not  author- 
ized where  a  statute  limits  the 
license  fee  for  the  sale  of  beer  to 
$20.  Hamel  v.  St.  Jean  Deschail- 
lons,  Rap.  Jud.  Que.  20  C.  S.  301. 

A  city,  by  its  charter,  was  em- 
powered to  levy  taxes  on  prop- 
erty and  exact  a  license  fee  from 
saloon  keepers;  a  general  statute 
provided    for    taxes    on    property 


447  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION,  §  284 

traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  within  the  corporate  limits  and 
"to  fix  the  price  or  tax  on  all  licenses,"  the  only  limitation 
on  the  power  and  discretion  of  the  municipality  in  fixing  the 
price  of  the  licenses  is  that  the  price  fixed  shall  not  be  so 
excessive  as  to  be  prohibitory;  and  whether  the  price  fixed  by 
an  ordinance  of  the  municipality  is  so  excessive  as  to  be  pro- 
hibitory must  be  determined  by  the  facts  and  particular  cir- 
cumstances of  each  ease.  In  so  determining  the  populousness 
of  the  municinality,  the  profitableness  of  the  business,  the 
character  of  the  business  proposf'd  to  be  licensed  and  its 
effect  upon  the  community,  the  additional  expense  necessarily 
entailed  by  a  police  supervision  of  the  business,  are  all  proper 
subjects  of  inquiry  in  arriving  at  a  legal  and  just  conclusion 
in  fixing  a  nriee  vhieh  will  vA  be  prohibitory.  In  such  case 
the  price  of  a  corporation  license  need  not  be  limited  to  the 
sum  fixed  by  the  law  of  the  State  on  a  license  to  retail.  As 
one  of  the  incidental  powers  of  a  municipal  corporation  the 
council  may  transcend  that  limit,  provided  the  ordinance  is 
not  in  its  nature  prohibitory. ^° 

Sec.  284.     Right  of  different  jurisdictions  to  exact  licenses. 

Under  a  general  power  to  license,  regulate  or  prohibit  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  a  municipal  corporation  may  regu- 

and  authorized  towns  to  \exy  lo  To\yn  of  Marion  v.  Chandler, 
taxes  on  business  carried  on  with-  6  Ala.  899;  Ex  parte  Burnett,  30 
in  their  limits,  not  in  excess  of  Ala.  461;  Craig  v.  Burnett,  32 
fifty  per  cent,  of  the  State  tax,  Ala.  728;  Miller  v.  Jones,  80  Ala. 
but  provided  that  its  provisions  89;  Ex  parte  Mayor  of  Anniston. 
should  not  abridge  their  privilege  90  Ala.  516;  7  So.  779;  Ex  parte 
to  exact  licenses  that  had  been  or  Cowert,  92  Ala.  94;  9  So.  225; 
might  have  been  granted  them  by  Ex  parte  Sikes,  102  Ala.  173;  15 
charter  or  special  act.  It  was  S.  E.  522;  Staats  v.  Washington, 
held  that  their  powers  to  tax  45  N.  J.  L.  318. 
liquor  dealers  was  not  limited  to  Amount  of  fee  allowable  in  Mis- 
50  per  cent,  of  the  State  tax.  souri.  Warrensburg  v.  MoHugh, 
Canova  v.  Williams,  41  Fla.  509;  122  Mo.  649;  27  S.  W.  523. 
27  So.  30.  An  ordinance  in  case  of  a  de- 
Difference  between  exacting  a  linquency  to  pay  a  fee  may  pro- 
license  for  selling  and  for  carry-  vide  that  interest  and  an  attorney 
ing  on  the  liquor  business.  Co-  fee  for  collection  shall  be  added, 
lusa  County  v.  Seube  (Cal.),  53  New  Iberia  v.  Moss  Hotel  Co., 
Pac.  654.  113  La.  1022;  37  So.  913. 


§  284  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  448 

late  such  sales  in  quantities  larger  than  those  for  which  pro- 
vision is  made  by  the  general  law  of  the  State;  ^^  and  such  a 
corporation,  with  the  necessary  power  in  its  charter,  may 
regulate  to  the  extent  of  prohibiting  such  sales  by  persons 
who  are  not  licensed  therefor,  though  the  sale  of  such  liquors 
be  not  prohibited  by  the  laws  of  the  State.^^  Such  corpora- 
tions, unless  debarred  by  statute  from  doing  so,  have  the  power 
to  exact  licenses  from  persons  who  have  State  and  county 
licenses,  as  well  as  other  persons  who  keep  shops  for  the  sale 
of  such  liquors.^^  The  obtaining  of  a  license  from  a  city  or 
town  does  not  relieve  a  liquor  dealer  of  the  necessity  of 
obtaining  a  State  and  county  license  where  the  city  or  town 
charter  contains  nothing  w^hich  excludes  the  right  of  the  State 
or  county  to  demand  a  license  to  make  such  sales ;  ^*  on  the 
other  hand,  the  grant  of  a  license  by  a  State  or  county  does 
not  interfere  with  the  powers  of  another  jurisdiction,  such  as 
that  of  an  incorporated  city  or  tow^n,  to  exact  a  license,  the 
enactment  being  in  the  nature  of  a  restraint  upon  the  traffic. 
The  powers  exercised  by  municipal  corporations  in  such  eases 
are  superadded  to  those  exercised  by  a  State  or  county. ^^ 

11  Denneby  v.  Chicago,  120  111.  i^  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughn,  1  Dak. 
627;  12  N.  E.  227;  Miller  v.  108;  Cuthbert  v.  Conley,  32  Ga. 
Amnion,  145  U.  S.  421;  12  Sup.  211;  McKinney  v.  Town  of  Salem, 
Ct.  884;   36  L.  Ed.   759.  77    Ind.    213;    Warden    v.    Louis- 

12  City  of  Davenport  v.  Kelly,  7  ville,  11  Ky.  L.  Kep.  179;  Com- 
la.  103  City  of  Burlington  v.  Kel-  monwealth  v.  Helbeck,  101  Ky. 
lar,  18  la.  59;  Nightengale,  Pe-  166;  40  S.  W.  245;  Independence 
titioner,  11  Peck,  167;  Bush  v.  v.  Noland,  21  Mo.  394;  Bailey  v. 
Seabury,  18  Johns,  418;  Elk  Point  State,  .30  Neb.  855;  47  N.  W.  208; 
V.  Vaughn,  1  Dak.  113;  46  N.  W.  State  v.  Frances,  95  Mo.  44;  8 
577.  S.    W.    1;    State   v.    Langdon,    31 

isLutz  V.  Crawfordsville,  109  Minn.  316;  17  N.  W.  859;  Am- 
Ind.  466;  10  N.  E.  411;  State  v.  brose  v.  State,  6  Ind.  351;  Wight- 
Cheyenne,  7  Wyo.  417;  52  Pac.  man  v.  State,  10  Ohio,  452;  Co- 
975.  hoes  V.  Moran,  25  How.  Pr.  385; 

1*  State  V.  Eastbrook,  6  Ala.  Thon  v.  Commonwealth,  31  Gratt. 
653;  Page  v.  State,  11  Ala.  849;  '887;  Angerhoffer  v.  State,  15  Tex. 
Matter  of  Lawrence,  69  Cal.  608;  App.  613;  Craddock  v.  State,  18 
State  V.  Sherman,  50  Mo.  265 ;  Tex.  App.  567 ;  West  v.  Green- 
State  V.  Harper,  58  Mo.  App.  26;  ville,  39  Ala.  69;  Eppenheimer  v. 
Stat«  v.  Propst,  87  N.  Car.  Commonwealth,  7  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
660;  State  v.  Cheyenne,  7  Wyo.  (abstract)  223. 
417;  Mobile  v.  Rouse,  8  Ala.  515. 


449  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  285 

Though  a  statute  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquor  without  a  license, 
yet  a  city  may  adopt  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  sale  of  the 
same  liquor  as  a  beverage.^"  So  a  statute  forbidding  sales  on 
certain  hours  of  a  day  creates  one  offense,  while  an  ordinance 
preventing  the  keeping  open  of  a  saloon  on  another  hour  of 
the  same  day  creates  a  distinct  offense.^^  A  State  may  impose 
one  tax  on  the  liquor  trade  and  a  city  another  if  it  be 
empowered  by  the  Legislature  to  do  so.^*  An  ordinance  pre- 
venting sales  from  10:30  p.  m.  to  5  a.  m.  is  valid,  notwith- 
standing a  general  statute  forbids  the  keeping  of  liquor  for 
sale  or  the  keeping  open  any  place  on  Sunday  where  liquors 
are  kept  or  sold.^® 

Sec.  285.    Licenses  by  different  jurisdictions  may  be  re- 
quired. 

A  municipal  corporation,  if  authorized  by  its  charter  or  by 
law  so  to  do,  may  require  a  dealer  in  intoxicating  liquors  to 
obtain  a  license  from  the  municipal  authorities  and  pay  a  fee 
therefor,  notwithstanding  he  may  have  paid  for  and  obtained 
licenses  from  the  United  States  and  the  State.  And  in  the 
event  that  such  a  license  is  not  procured,  or  for  valid  and 
legal  cause  is  refused  to  an  applicant,  he  will  not  be  authorized 
to  sell  such  liquors,  and  may  be  prosecuted  for  violating  an 
ordinance  providing  for  the  issuing  of  the  license.-"  The 
contrary  of  this  might  be  true  if  a  license  were  a  contract  and 
conferred  a  vested  right  to  continue  the  trade  without  further 
hindrance  or  imposition ;  but  such  is  not  the  case.     A  license 

10  Hill    V.   Dalton.    72    Ga.    314;  20  state    v.    Eastbrook,    6    Ala. 

State  V.  Langdon,  31   Minn.   316;  653;   Ex  parte  Lawrence,   69  Cal. 

17  N.  W.  859.  608;  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughn,  1  Dak. 

1- Cohoes  V.  Moran,  25  How.  Pr.  113;    Ciithbert    v.    Conly,    32    Ga. 

385.  211;  McKinney  v.  Town  of  Salem, 

18  Wolf    V.    Lansing,    53    Mich.  77    Ind.   213;    Mason   v.   Trustees, 
367;   19  N.  W.  »8.  etc.,  67  Ky.    (4   Bush)    406;   State 

19  State  V.  Welch,  36  Conn.  215.       v.    Clark,    54    Mo.    17;     State    v. 
Effect     in     Kentucky    where     a       Harper,    58    Mo.    17;     Furnan    v. 

toA\Ti  grants  a  license  and  the  Knapp,  19  Johns.  24'8:  State  V. 
county  refuses  one.  Koch  v.  Probst.  87  N.  Car.  560;  Common- 
Commonwealth,  119  Ky.  47'6;  84  wealth  v.  Sweitzer,  129  Pa.  St. 
S.  W.  533 ;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  122.  644 ;  State  v.  Mancke,  18  S.  C.  81. 


§  286  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  450 

is  not  a  contract;  it  is  a  restrictive  special  tax,  imposed  for 
the  public  good  and  in  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the 
State.  As  the  power  to  grant,  withhold  or  annul  licenses  to 
sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  an  exercise  of  the  police  power,  it 
follows  that  no  limitation  can  be  placed  upon  its  exercise  by 
any  statutory  provision.  It  is  a  power  incapable  of  surrender 
or  annihilation.^^  Such  a  license  is  a  restriction  upon  the 
traffic,  and  the  grant  of  a  license  by  one  jurisdiction  will 
not  authorize  the  person  to  whom  it  is  granted  to  violate  the 
laws  of  another  jurisdiction.  In  imposing  one  restriction 
there  is  neither  an  express  nor  an  implied  undertaking  that 
no  other  jurisdiction  shall  refra^'n  from  imposing  a  restriction, 
in  the  form  of  a  license,  upon  those  who  are  engaged  in  selling 
intoxicating  liquors.  One  who  accepts  such  a  license  from 
the  United  States  does  it  with  the  understanding  and  implied 
consent  that  an  additional  license  maj'^  be  required  by  the 
State;  and  the  same  is  true  in  reference  to  the  municipal  cor- 
porations within  the  State  if  he  holds  licenses  from  the  United 
States  and  the  State.  Not  only  may  such  corporations  exact 
licenses  from  persons  who  have  such  government  and  State 
licenses,  but  also  of  "all  other  persons  who  keep  shops  for  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  be  used  on  the  premises."  ^- 

Sec.  286.    United  States  license,  effect. 

A  receipt  of  a  United  States  internal  revenue  collector  for 
a  tax  on  the  business  of  a  retail  or  wholesale  dealer  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  or  a  license  issued  thereunder  is  no  authority  to 
sell  intoxicating  liquors  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  a  State  or 
the  ordinances  of  a  municipal  corporation.  The  granting  of 
such  a  license  is  regarded  as  nothing  more  than  a  mere  form 
of  imposing  a  tax,  and  of  implying  nothing  except  that  the 
licensee  shall  be  subject  to  no  penalties  under  the  laws  of  the 

siMugler  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  39  N.  W.  394;  Burnside  v.  Lin- 
623;  8  Sup.  Ct.  273;  Emrich  v.  coin  County  Court,  SB  Ky.  423. 
City  of  Indianapolis,  118  Ind.  22  stone  v.  Mississippi,  10  U.  S. 
279;  20  N.  E.  79,5;  State  v.  Bon-  814;  Lutz  v.  Crawfordsville,  109 
nell,  119  Ind.  494;  22  N.  E.  301;  Ind.  466;  10  N.  E.  411;  Frank- 
State   V.   Mullenhoff,    74    la.   271;  fort   v.    Aughe,    114    Ind.    77;    15 

K  E.  802. 


451  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  286 

United  States  provided  he  pays  the  tax.-^  Such  a  license 
gives  no  authority.  It  is  a  mere  receipt  for  taxes.  In  such 
cases  the  general  Government  very  properly  recognizes  the 
power  of  State  governments  to  regulate  their  internal  police, 
but  when  a  State  has  conferred  the  authority  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  then  the  general  Government  claims  the  right 
to  tax  the  exercise  of  the  business  thvis  authorized.  When  a 
State  in  the  exercise  of  an  undoubted  power  has,  however, 
prohibited  a  business,  Congress  disclaims  all  intention  to 
confer  the  right  to  authorize  the  exercise  of  such  prohibited 
business  in  opposition  to  the  State  laws.  But  when  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  prohibited  by  State  authority, 
the  general  Government  then  claims  the  right  to  impose  this 
revenue  tax  upon  the  exercise  of  the  occupation.  Otherwise 
there  would  be  necessarily  a  conflict  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
two  governments  that  would  lead  to  confusion,  if  not  to 
conflict  of  jurisdiction.  Such  power  has  never,  since  the 
organization  of  the  Government,  been  claimed  or  exercised. 
It  has  been  admitted  in  the  past  by  statesmen  of  every  class, 
as  well  as  of  eminent  jurists,  that  each  State  has  the  sole 
power  to  regulate  its  own  internal  police;  to  defend  and 
punish  crime ;  to  declare  and  enforce  the  rights  of  its  citizens ; 
and  to  establish  the  relations  and  prescribe  the  duties  of  its 
citizens.  It  has  never  been  suggested  that  Congress  could 
interfere  with  or  exercise  such  a  power.  And  to  hold  that 
Congress  could  license  citizens  of  a  State  to  violate  its  laws 
would  be  an  invasion  of  the  constitutional  power  of  the  State 
that  would  be  subversive  of  our  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment.-' Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  that  a  United  States 
license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  no  defense  to  an  indict- 
ment for  unlawfully  selling  such  liquors  in  a  State  where  the 

23  McGuire  v.  Commonwealth,  7  Holbrook,    92    Mass.     (10    Allen) 

U.  S.    (3  Wall.)   387;  License  Tax  200;    Commonwealth  v.  McNamee, 

Cases,   72   U.    S.    (5    Wall.)    462;  113    Mass.    12;    Commonwealth    v. 

In    re    Jordan     (D.    C),    49    Fed.  Sanbourn;  116  Mass.  61;   State  v. 

23«;  Commonwealth  v.  Thornley,  Funk,  27  Minn.  318;  7  N.  W.  359. 
88    Mass.     (6    Allen)     445;    Com-  2<  Block    v.    Town    of    Jackson- 

monwealth  v.  O'Donnell,  90  Mass.  ville,  36  III.  301. 
(8  Allen)    548;  Commonwealth  v. 


§  287  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  452 

sale  of  such  liquors  is  entirely  prohibited  by  law;-^  nor  in  a 
State  governed  by  a  local  option ;  ^^  nor  in  a  State  where  such 
sales  are  unlawful  without  first  having  obtained  a  State  or 
municipal  license  to  sell  them.-^  In  a  criminal  prosecution 
under  the  laws  of  a  State  or  the  ordinances  of  a  municipal 
corporation  for  unlawfully  selling  intoxicating  liquors,  the 
holding  of  a  United  States  license  by  the  offender  does  not 
raise  a  presumption  of  guilt.-* 

Sec.  287.     Keeping  liquor  for  sale  or  saloon  open. 

The  usual  general  welfare  clause  of  a  city  charter  has  been 
held  sufficient  to  authorize  the  city  to  adopt  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  keeping  of  liquors  for  unlawful  sales  within 
its  corporate  limits.^"  But  it  cannot  prohibit  the  keeping  of 
liquor  whose  sale  it  cannot  prohibit.'"'  A  city  may  require 
saloons  to  be  closed  certain  hours  of  the  night,  notwith- 
standing a  statute  provides  "that,  in  granting  licenses,  cor- 
poration authorities  shall  comply  wth  whatever  general  law 
of  the  State  may  be  in  force  relative  to  granting  licenses," 
and  that  no  State  statute  prescribes  hours  for  closing.''^    But 

25  state  V.  McCleary,  17  la.  44;  derson  v.  Heywood,  109  Ga.  373; 
State  V.  Stutz,  20  la.  488;  State  34  S.  E.  590;  Papworth,  lOG  Ga. 
V.  Baughman,  20  la.  497;  State  378;  32  S.  E.  363;  Little  v.  State, 
V.  Stommel,  84  la.  751;  52  N.  W.  123  Ga.  503;  51  S.  E.501;  Reese  v. 
557;   State  v.  Delano,  54  Me.  501.  Newnan,    120    Ga.    198;    47    S.    E. 

26  Territory  v.  O'Connor,  5  Dak.  500 ;  Alexander  v.  Atlanta  ( Ga. ) , 
397;   41   N.  W.   746.  64   S.   E.   1105;    Athens   v.   At.lan- 

27Pierson  v.  State,  3D  Ark.  219;  ta    (Ga.  App.),  64  S.  E.  71. 

Commonwealth     v.     Scheckles,     78  so  Duren    v.    Stephens,    126    Ga. 

Va.   36.  496;    54   S.    E.    1045;    Fontana    v. 

28  State  V.  Stutz,  20  la.  488.  Grant,  6  Kan.  App.  462-,   50  Pac. 

29  Brown    v.    Social    Circle,    105  104. 

Ga.  834;   32  S.  E.  141;   Papworth  31/,,,  re   Wolf,    14   Neb.   24;    14 

V.   Fitzgerald,   105  Ga.  491;    32  S.  N.     W.    i660;     Commonwealth     v. 

E.    363;     Moran    v.    Atlanta,    102  Matthews,  129  Mass.  485;   Platle- 

Ga.  840;    30  S.   E.  298;   Cunning-  ville  v.  Bell,  47  Wis.  488;  Jordan 

ham  V.    Griffin,    107    Ga.    690;    33  v.  Xicolin,  84  Minn.  367;  87  -V.  W. 

S.  E.  664;   Robinson  v.  Americus,  915.       In    re    GreystocK,    12    Up. 

121  Ga.   180;  48  S.  E.  924;  Paulk  Can.   4.>8;   In  re  Bright,  12  C.  P 

V.   Sycamore,   105   Ga.  501;    31    S.  (Ont.)    433;   Croker  v.   Board    (N. 

E.  200.     Tlie   ordinance  is   consti-  J.    Ch.),    63    Atl.    901.       Contra, 

tutional.       Osburn     v.     Marietta,  Hayes    v.    Thompson,   6    Can.   Cr. 

118   Ga.   53;    44  S.   E.   807;    Hen-  Cas.  227. 


453 


MUNICIPAL    REGULATION. 


§288 


an  ordinance  prohibiting  sales  between  6  p.  m.  and  6  a.  m.  has 
been  held  void,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  unreasonable ;  •''-  and 
so  was  one  prohibiting  sales  during  the  hours  on  the  first 
three  days  court  was  in  session  in  the  town.^^  Yet  an  ordi- 
nance closing  saloons  from  10  p,  m.  to  4  a.  m.  is  valid.^*  Under 
a  power  to  regulate  and  control  the  liquor  traffic  for  the 
preservation  of  peace,  good  order,  public  safety,  improve  the 
morals,  order^  comfort  and  convenience  of  a  city,  it  may  pass 
an  ordinance  compelling  saloons  to  close  on  election  days.^^ 
But  an  ordinance  cannot  be  adopted  compelling  saloons  to  be 
closed  at  times  the  State  statutes  permit  them  to  be  kept  open 
for  sales  of  liquors."*' 

Sec.  288.     Ordinance,  when  not  conflicting  with  statute — 
Keeping  liquor  for  unlawful  sale. 

As  long  as  the  owner  of  intoxicating  liquors  retains  posses- 
sion of  them,  intending  to  deliver  them  on  an  unlawful  con- 


32  Ward  V.  Greenville,  8  Baxt. 
■228;    35    Am.    Rep.    700. 

33  Grills  V.  Jonesboro,  8  Baxt. 
247. 

34  Staats  V.  Washington,  45  N. 
J.  L.  418;  Morganstern  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 94  Va.  7'87;  26  S.  E. 
402;  Von  Der  Leith  v.  State,  60 
N.  J.  L.  46;  37  Atl.  436;  Ex 
parte  Stephen,  114  Cal.  27'8;  46 
Pac.   86. 

35  Iowa  City  v.  Mclnnery,  114 
Iowa  586;   87  N.  W.   498. 

36  h>  re  Brodie,  38  Up.  Can.  580 
Baker  v.  Paris,  10  Up.  Can.  621 
In  re  Arkell,  38  Up.  Can.  594 
In  re  Barclay,  12  Up.  Can.  86 
Daniels  v.  Burforc  10  Up.  Can 
478;  McGill  V.  License  Commis 
sioners,   21    Ont.   Rep.   665. 

In  Illinois  a  city  cannot  re- 
cover botli  the  penalty  pre- 
.scribed  by  the  ordinance  requir- 
ing saloons  closed  on  Sundays  and 
maintain  an  action  on  the  saloon 
keeper's  bond  for  same  violation. 


Jenkins  v.  Danville,  79  111.  App. 
339. 

In  order  to  uphold  an  ordi- 
nance forbidding  a  liquor  dealer  to 
keep  any  part  of  liis  house  open 
on  Sunday,  it  was  held  that  it 
should  be  construed  so  as  to  pre- 
vent the  keeping  open  any  part 
of  the  division,  apartments  or 
connected  section  of  the  houst; 
used  for  the  liquor  business. 
Orme  v.  Tuscumbia,  150  Ala.  520; 
43    So.    584. 

Under  a  power  to  suppress  a 
saloon  a  city  cannot  pass  an  or- 
dinance declaring  that  every  sale 
of  liquor  made  in  the  city  shall 
be  deemed  to  have  been  made  in 
a  saloon.  Sparta  v.  Booroni,  129 
Mich.  555;  89  N.  W.  435;  8  Det. 
L.   K    1100. 

Under  its  usual  powers,  a  city 
may  even  forbid  a  saloon  to  be 
kept  open  at  prohibited  times  for 
the  sale  of  cigars  and  non-intox- 
icating liquors.  Croker  v.  Board 
(N.  J.  Ch.),  63  Atl.  901. 


§  289  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  454 

tract  of  sale,  such  possession  is  within  a  municipal  ordinance 
which  prohibits  the  keeping  of  such  liquors  for  unlawful  sale. 
Such  an  ordinance  will  not  conflict  with  a  statute  of  the  State 
making  it  an  offense  to  sell  such  liquors.  While  it  hovers  on 
the  margin  of  such  a  statute,  it  does  not  overlap  it.  If  there 
is  a  keeping  for  unlawful  sale  the  ordinance  is  violated, 
whether  any  sale  is  made  or  not.  In  ease  such  a  sale  ensued, 
the  statute  is  violated ;  but  this  does  not  cancel  the  relation  of 
the  ordinance.  An  offense  against  one  jurisdiction  cannot  be 
wiped  out  by  committing  another  against  another  jurisdiction. 
The  only  effect  of  such  an  ordinance  is  to  prevent  preparation 
for  violating  the  statute.  That  an  offender  will  be  liable  to 
prosecution  under  the  statute  for  unlawful  selling  when  a 
sale  is  consummated,  Avill  not  hinder  his  being  punished  under 
ordinance  against  keeping  for  unlawful  sale.  The  two  offenses 
are  distinct  and  independent.^'^ 

Sec.  289.     Prohibiting  owner  to  enter  saloon  on  Sunday. 

An  ordinance  is  unreasonable  and  void  which  undertakes 
to  prevent  the  owner  of  a  saloon  and  his  agents,  clerks  or 
employes  entering  his  saloon  on  Sunday  without  first  obtaining 
a  written  permission  from  the  city  authorities  wherein  is 
stated  the  length  of  time  he  or  they  may  remain  therein.^* 
In  North  Carolina  a  similar  ordinance,  with  many  additional 
restrictions,  was  held  valid.  This  ordinance  required  a  view 
of  the  interior  of  the  saloon  from  the  exterior  to  be  given; 

37  Mayson  V.  City  of  Atlanta,  77  1092;     Smith    v.    Mayor,    etc.,    3 

Ga.   662;    Menkin   v.   City    of   At-  Head  24.5;    Maxwell   v.   Jonesboro 

lanta,  78  Ga.  f)68;   2  S.  E.  559.  Corp..    11    Heisk,    257;     Ward    v. 

ssNewbern      v.      :McCann,      105  Mayor,    etc.,    8    Baxt.    22S;    Rich- 

Tenn.   159;    58   8.  W.    114;   50  L.  mond  v.  Dudley,  129  Ind.  112;  28 

R.     A.    47'6.       [Citing    Breyer    v.  X.  E.  312;   13  L.  R.  A.  587;  Yick 

State,    102    Tenn.    110;    50   S.   VV.  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  .S.  356;  6 

769;    Judefind    v.    State,    78    Md.  S.  €t.  10G4;  30  L.  Ed.  220;  Mayor 

510;  2S  A.  405;  23  L.  R.  A.  721;  v.  Rodecke,  40  Md.  217.1     See  also 

McNeill    V.    State,    92   Tenn.    720;  State  v.  Thomas,  118  N.  C.  1221; 

23  S.  W.  52;   McKinney  v.  Xash-  24   S.   E.   535;    Chicago   v.   Netch- 

ville,  96  Tenn.   79,  81;    33   S.   W.  er,    183    HI.    104      55   N.    E.    307; 

724;    Johnson  v.   City   of   Chatta-  Eureka   v.    Jackson,   8   Kan.   App. 

nooga,   97    Tenn.    24-8;    36    S.    W.  49;    54  Pac.  5. 


455  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  290 

required  all  liquors  to  be  served  at  a  counter ;  forbade  chairs 
and  tables;  forbade  the  use  of  side,  rear  or  trap  doors, 
elevators  or  stairways,  or  the  keeping  open  the  saloon  from 
8  p.  M.  to  6  A.  M. ;  prohibited  pool  and  billiard  tables,  tenpin 
alleys,  gaming,  or  other  devices;  forbade  the  maintenance  of 
a  restaurant  or  other  room  connected  with  the  barroom,  or  in 
the  same  building,  unless  separated  by  solid  perpendicular 
walls  in  which  were  no  oneninsrs;  and  authorized  a  revocation 
of  a  license  for  the  violation  of  its  provisions.^^  In  Idaho  it 
was  held  to  be  a  reasonable  ordinance  which  forbade  the  pro- 
prietor of  a  saloon  to  permit  anyone,  himself  and  family  ex- 
cepted, to  enter  it  on  hours  during  which  sales  could  not  be 
made.*" 

Sec.  290.    Ordinance  declaring  sale  of  liquor  a  nuisance. 

A  town  ordinance  which  declares  the  selling  of  intoxicating 
liquors  a  nuisance  and  imposes  a  fine  for  the  offense  is  valid 
if  the  corporate  powers  conferred  upon  the  town  are  broad 
enough  to  authorize  the  ordinance.     Such  an  ordinance  may 
not  be  defeated  upon  the  ground  that  intoxicating  liquors  are 
property,  that  the  right  of  acquiring,  holding,  using  and  dis- 
posing of  them  is  both  a  natural  and  constitutional  right,  and 
that  such  right  cannot  be  invaded  by  declaring  it  to  be  an 
offense;  that  the  rVht  mav  be  recrulated  but  not  destroyed. 
Some  of  our  natural   riM^ts  we  must   and   do   surrender  or 
modify  in  entering  into  the  social  state,  and  in  like  manner  a 
part  of  both  our  natural  and  social  riphts  in  enter'ng  into  the 
political  state.     The  surrender  and  modification  of  these  are 
such  as  become  indispensable  to  the   good  government,  the 
due  regulation,  and  well-beintr  of  society,  and  so  paramount 
to   the   individual   good,   and   are   comprehended   under   the 
police  powers  of  government  so   far  as  criminal  justice  is 
administered.     In  such  case  the  act  and  the  thing  with  its 
use  must  be  judged  and  characterized  by  its  effect ;  and  when 
these  bring  it  wdthin  the  reason  and  mischiefs  of  the  law, 

39  Paul    V.    Was]  :n£;tnn,    1^4    N.  i"  Slnto    v.    Cnlloway,    11    Idaho 

C.   363;   47   S.   E.  793;   65  L,   R.       719;    84   Pac.   27.      Cntra,  Regina 
A,  902.  V.  Belmont,  35  Up.  €an.  298. 


§  291  traffic;  in  intoxicating  liquors.  456 

though  it  be  of  a  new  class  of  acts  or  things,  or  uses,  it  must 
fall  under  the  power  of  government  to  regulate  or  suppress, 
as  the  public  good  may  require  the  one  or  the  other;  and  of 
these  lawgivers  must  be  the  judge.  It  will  not  do  to  say,  as  we 
may,  that  under  the  police  power  we  may  carefully  protect 
the  public  morals  and  the  profligate  from  the  evils  of  gaming, 
horse  racing,  cock  fighting;  from  obscenity  of  prints  and 
pictures;  from  horses  and  exhibitions  of  mountebanks  and 
rope  dancers;  from  the  offensive  smells  of  useful  trades  and 
hog  pens;  from  the  manufacture  and  exhibition  of  fireworks 
and  squibs ;  from  rogues,  idlers,  vagabonds  and  vagrants ;  and 
from  the  dangers  of  pestilence,  contagion  and  gunpowder;  and 
yet  that  the  right  to  sell  a  slow  and  sure  poison,  as  a  common 
beverage,  must  remain  intact  and  not  amenable  to  police  regu- 
lations for  its  suppression,  although  all  the  other  evils  to- 
gether will  not  destroy  a  tithe  of  the  human  lives,  nor  produce 
more  moral  degradation,  or  suffering,  wretchedness,  and 
misery  in  the  social  relation  of  society;  or  pauperism,  va- 
grancy and  crime  in  the  political  community,  or  pecuniary 
destitution  of  individuals  and  families,  than  will  the  constitu- 
tionally protected  right  of  destroying  our  neighbors  and 
fellows,  for  the  selfish  end  of  our  individual  private  gains.*^ 

Sec.  291.    Regulating  days  and  hours. 

It  is  now  well  established  by  the  authorities  that  in  the 
interest  of  public  safety  and  of  good  morals,  the  Legislature 
of  a  State,  as  a  police  regulation,  has  the  power  to  prohibit 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  during  certain  prescribed 
days*-  and  hours,*^  and  by  the  exercise  of  such  power  may 
require  the  proprietor  of  a  saloon  or  place  where  intoxicating 
liquors  are  sold  as  a  beverage  to  securely  close  the  same  during 

41  Yodlard  v.  Jacksonville,  15  Welch.  36  Conn.  21 5;  Kerwisch  v. 
111.    588.  Atlanta,   44   Ga.    204;    Schwuchow 

42  Quintard      v.      Corcoran,      50       v.  Chicago,  68  111.  444. 

Conn.  34;   Thomasson  v.  State,  15  43  Baldwin    v.    Chicago,    68    111. 

Ind.   449;   Decker  v.  Sargent,   125  418;   Hedderich  v.  State,  101  Ind. 

Ind.    404;    Reithmiller    v.    People,  .5'64;    State  v.   Gerhardt,   145   Ind. 

44  Mich.  280;  6.  N.  W.  667;  State  439;   44  N.  E.  469. 
y.   Anabs,    20   Mo.    214;    State    v. 


457  MUNICIPAL  REGULATION.  §  291 

such  prescribed  days  or  hours,  and  permit  no  one  to  enter 
therein  during  the  times  when  the  sale  of  such  liquors  is  thus 
forbidden,  and  that  it  may  delegate  such  power  to  the  munic- 
ipal corporations  within  the  State.**  Independently  of  such 
legislative  authorization,  such  corporations  may,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  their  police  power,  provide  by  ordinance  that  all 
places  in  which  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold  as  a  beverage  be 
closed  at  a  certain  hour  in  the  evening  and  not  opened  until 
a  certain  hour  the  next  morning;  that  during  such  time  the 
doors  shall  be  securely  locked,  all  screens  removed  from  them 
and  the  windows,  and  that  no  person  shall  be  permitted  to 
enter  or  remain  therein  except  those  living  and  employed 
therein ;  and  the  same  rules  and  regulations  may  be  extended 
to  Sundays,  legal  holidays  and  election  days.*^  Such  police 
power,  however,  cannot  be  exercised  in  an  arbitrary  way  by 
such  corporations,  but  must  be  in  every  case  reasonable  in  the 
restraints  put  upon  those  who  are  acting  by  legislative  or  legal 
authority  in  the  business  of  selling  such  liquors.  They  may 
not  make  police  regulations  that  will,  in  effect,  prohibit  such 
sales,  or  unreasonably  interfere  with  them,  but  they  may 
impose  reasonable  regulations  for  the  peace  and  good  order 
of  the  community.  The  reasonableness  of  such  an  ordinance 
or  regulation  must  depend  on  the  fact  of  each  case.  An  ordi- 
nance closing  all  bars  for  the  sale  of  such  liquors  at  an  early 
hour  might  be  reasonable  in  a  small  retired  town  where  the 
public  travel  and  convenience  would  not  require  accommoda- 
tion, and  the  only  purpose  in  keeping  them  open  after  that 
time  would  be  to  encouraoe  tippling,  drunkenness,  disorder, 
and  other  vices ;  while  such  an  ordinance  would  be  unreason- 
ably restricted  in  cities  or  thoroughfares  where  public  travel 
demands  that  places  be  kept  open  for  refreshment  at  later 

44Statev.  Welch,  36  Conn.  215;  I5asig,    128    Ind.    271;     Staats    v. 

Morris  V.  Rome,  10  Ga.  532;  State  Washington,    36    La.    Ann.    912; 

V.   Clark,  28  X.  H.   176;    State  v.  Ex    parte    Wolfe,     14     Neb.     24; 

Freeman,   38   X.    H.   426;    Hudson  Staates   v.   Washington,   44    N.   J.. 

V.   Geary,   4   R.   T.   485;    Plattville  L.     605;     Staates    v.    Washington, 

V.   Bell.   43   Wis.   488.  45  X.  J.  L.  318;  Cabel  v.  Houston, 

45Lutz    V.     Crawfordsville,     10!)  29  Tex.  335. 
Ind.  466;    10   N.   E.   41;    Davis  v. 


§  291  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  458 

hours.  In  every  case  a  large  discretion  must  be  given  to  the 
governing  body  who  are  charged  with  the  responsibility  of 
maintaining  the  peace  and  good  order  of  the  community ;  but 
in  no  case  will  it  be  free  from  the  supervision  of  the  courts, 
which  must  conserve  individual  rights,  while  those  of  the 
public  are  carefully  guarded.  Both  are  effected  by  keeping 
all  municipal  bodies  within  the  terms  of  their  charters.*^  Such 
an  ordinance  will  in  no  way  infringe  upon  the  business  of  one 
who  holds  a  license  from  the  State  and  county  authorities  to 
sell  intoxicating  liquors  at  retail,  even  though  there  may  not 
be  a  like  statute  enacted  by  the  State.  A  license  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors  is  a  restriction  upon  the  traffic,  and  the  grant 
of  a  license  by  one  jurisdiction  does  not  authorize  the  person 
to  whom  it  is  granted  to  violate  the  law  of  another  jurisdic- 
tion. In  imposing  one  restriction  there  is  neither  an  express 
nor  implied  undertaking  that  no  other  jurisdiction  shall  re- 
frain from  imposing  a  reasonable  restriction,  in  the  form  of  a 
license  or  otherwise,  upon  those  engaged  in  selling  intoxicating 
liquors.  Thus,  it  is  well  settled  that  a  grant  of  a  license  by 
the  United  States  does  not  interfere  with  the  right  of  the 
traffic  by  exacting  a  license  fee  or  imposing  other  restraints.*^ 
There  is  no  constitutional  right,  where  a  license  is  granted,  to 
sell  every  day  and  every  hour  in  the  day.*^  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Tennessee,  however,  has  held  that  an  ordinance  of  a 
municipal  corporation  forbidding  licensed  retailers  of  spiritu- 
ous liquors  to  sell  between  the  hours  of  6  p.  m.  and  6  a.  m.  is 
invalid,  because  it  is  an  unreasonable  exercise  of  the  police 
powers  of  the  municipal  corporation.  The  court  said:  "The 
State  recognized  the  retail  trade  in  liquors  as  legal  on  condi- 
tion that  the  retailer  pays  for  the  privilege  and  procures  a 
license.  This  license  confers  upon  him  the  right  to  sell  for 
one  year,  subject,  of  course,  to  the  general  laws  of  the  State, 
declaring  it  unlawful  to  sell  on  specified  days  and  at  specified 
places.  With  these  two  exceptions  the  retailer  has  the  author- 
ity of  the  State  to  follow  his  trade,  day  or  night,  for  a  year. 

<6  Staates  v.  Washington,  44  N.  ^7  Lutz    v.    Crawfordsville,     109 

J.  L.  605;  Decker  v.  Sargent,  125       Ind.  466;    10  N.   E.  411. 
Ind.  404;  25  N.  E.  458.  <»  staates  v.  Washington,  44  N. 

J.  L.  m5. 


459  MUNICIPAL   REGUL^VTION.  §  291 

*  *  *  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  municipal  cor- 
poration had  no  power,  under  the  pretext  of  public  regula- 
tion, to  prohibit  the  exercise  of  a  right  conferred  by  the  State. 
Whenever  this  is  done,  and  whatever  the  extent,  the  prohibi- 
tion merely  is  a  prohibition,  is  unreasonable,  oppressive  and 
invalid.  The  only  reason  which  we  can  see  for  restraining 
the  trade  for  two  hours  before  dark  and  for  two  hours  after 
daylight  is  simply  for  the  purpose  of  prohibition  to  that 
extent.  The  reason  may  be  a  sound  one  when  viewed  simply 
as  a  prohibitory  measure;  it  might  be  equally  sound  if  the 
prohibition  was  total  and  absolute.  But  the  State  has  virtually 
forbidden  a  municipal  corporation  to  exercise  its  police  powers 
for  purposes  of  prohibition  merely.  To  be  legitimate  the  pro- 
hibition must  be  so  restricted  as  not  to  interfere  unreasonably 
or  oppressively. ' '  *"  There  has  been  some  diversity  of  deci- 
sions as  to  what  will  constitute  a  reasonable  hour.  Ordinances 
have  been  held  valid  which  require  saloons  to  be  closed  at 
9  o'clock,-'"  or  at  10  o'clock,'^  or  at  11  o'clock  at  night; '-  also 
at  10  o'clock  at  night  until  5  o'clock  in  the  morning."  But 
an  ordinance  requiring  all  saloons  to  be  closed  between  certain 
hours,  "unless  by  special  leave  of  the  president"  of  the  town 
is  void,  because  it  is  an  attempt  to  confer  arbitrary  power  on 
an  executive  officer  to  direct  the  enforcement  of  the  ordinance 
or  not,  at  his  discretion.^* 

49  Ward  V.  Mayor,  etc.  67  Tenn.  ton,  44  N.  J.  L.  318;  43  Am.  Rep. 

228;     Grille    v.     Mayor,    etc.,     67  402;    Platteville  v.   Bell,   43   Wis. 

Tenn.  247.  "^88. 

Under  a  power  to  close  saloons  52  Decker    v.    Sargent,    125    Ind. 

"temporarily,"    the    police    cannot  404;   25  N.  E.  458. 

order    tliat     "be     so     temporarily  na  iiorris   v.    City   of   Rome,    10 

closed    until    further    notice,"    al-  Ga.   532.     Sec   §293. 

though  the  Legislature  might  have  54  Little    Chute    v.    Van    Camp, 

authorized  the  city  to  adopt  an  or-  136  Wis.  526;   117  N.  W.  1012. 

dinance     conferring     such     power.  A    statute   requiring  saloons    to 

State  V.  Strauss,  49  ^Id.  288.  close     wherever     "any     denomina- 

50  Smith    V.    KnoxviUe,    3    Head  tion  of  Christian  people  are  hold- 
245  ing  divine  service"  in  the  town  is 

51  Ex  parte  Wolfe,  14  Xebr.  24;  void.      Gilhous    v.    Wells,    64    Ga. 
14  N.  W.  660;   State  v.  Washing-  192. 


§§292,293        TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  460 

Sec.  292.    Sales  on  Sunday,  election  day  or  holidays. 

Under  the  general  power  to  regulate  the  liquor  traffic  a 
city  may  prohibit  sales  on  Sundays,  election  days  or  holidays.^^ 
But  a  statute  empowering  a  city  to  regulate  the  "selling  or 
giving  away"  of  liquor  on  Sunday  will  not  authorize  the 
adoption  of  an  ordinance  forbidding  anyone  to  "sell,  give 
away,  furnish,  or  cause  to  be  furnished  or  delivered,"  any  in- 
toxicating liquor  so  far  as  it  relates  to  one  procuring  liquor 
for  one  at  his  request,  for  the  ordinance  so  far  as  it  forbids 
a  delivery  is  invalid  except  in  connection  with  a  sale  or  gift.^*^ 
Under  its  power  to  restrain  the  sale  a  city  cannot  require  a 
saloon  to  be  closed  or  forbid  sales  when  the  State  laws  permit 
it  to  be  open  or  sales  to  be  made.^^  An  ordinance  is  not  void 
for  uncertainty  w^hich  provides  that  "no  person  or  persons 
licensed  to  keep  a  restaurant  or  beer  saloon,  or  either,  within 
the  limits  of  the  city,  shall  keep  open  on  the  Sabbath;"  for 
the  meaning  of  the  ordinance  is  that  their  proprietors  shall 
temporarily  cease  to  entertain  the  public,  or  cease  to  entertain 
the  public  on  that  day.^® 

Sec.  293.     Sales  at  prohibited  hours. 

Under  its  general  powers  a  city  may  prohibit  sales  after 
certain  hours  of  the  night ;  as  from  10  p.  m.  to  4  a.  m.  ;  "^  or 

55  state  V.  Ludwig,  21  Minn.  Minn.  355;  105  N.  W.  965;  In  re 
202;  Cranor  v.  Albany,  44  Ore.  Barclay,  12  Up.  Can.  86;  In  re 
144;  71  Pac.  1042;  Jordan  v.  Nic-       Ross,   14   Can.   Pac.   171. 

olin,  84  Minn.  307;  87  N.  W.  915;  5s  Richards    v.    Bayonne,    61    N. 

State  V.  Maciniak,  97   Minn.   355;  J.  L.  496;    39  At).  708. 

105  N.  W.  965;   Edis  v.  Butler,  8  A   city   may   authorize   sales   be 

Ohio  N.  P.  183;    11   Ohio   St.  &  v.  made    on    Sunday;     and    a    State 

P.    Dec.    245 ;     Richards    v.    Bay-  may  empower  it  to  pass  an  ordi- 

onne,   61    X.    J.    L.    496;    39    Atl.  nance  permitting  such  sales  with- 

708.  in  its  boundaries,  though  if  it  liad 

56  Xorris  v.  Oakman,  138  Ala  not  passed,  it  the  sales  would  have 
411;   35  So.  450.  violated    a    State    law.      State    v. 

57  Moore  v.  Kelley,  136  Mich.  Kessels,  120  Mo.  App.  233;  96 
139;    98    N.    W.    989;     10    Detroit  S.    W.    494. 

Leg.  N.    1002;    Mueller   v.  People,  59  staats  v.   Washington,   45  N. 

24   Colo.  251;    48   Pac.   965;    Peo-  J.  L.  418;   McNulty  v.  Toopf,   116 

pie  V.  Rush,  113  Mich.  539;   71  X.  Ky.   202;    75   N.   W.   258;    25   Ky. 

W.  863;   State  v.      Marciniak,  97  L.   Rep.   430;    Bennett  v.    Pulaski 


461  MUNICIPAI-   REGULATION.  §  294 

between  8  p.  m.  and  6  a.  m.  ;  '^°  but  one  prohibiting  druggists 
selling  at  night,  they,  under  a  general  law,  not  being  per- 
mitted to  dispense  liquors  at  any  time  as  drink,  is  invalid."^ 
In  Tennessee  it  has  been  held  that  an  ordinance  requiring 
saloons  to  close  during  the  night  time  was  valid,  and  that 
notwithstanding  the  town  was  situated  on  the  State  line  and 
immediately  across  that  line  Avere  saloons  which  were  monop- 
olizing the  entire  liquor  traffic,  both  day  and  night,  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  the  saloon  of  plaintiff  was  closed  at  night.®" 

Sec.  294.     Picnic  and  social  gatherings. 

Where  the  charter  of  a  city  gives  the  common  council  power 
to  pass  ordinances  to  license  and  regulate  or  pi-ohibit  inns  or 
taverns,  restaurants  and  beer  saloons  to  retail  intoxicating 
liquors,  the  power  thus  granted  to  the  common. council  cannot 
be  delegated  by  ordinance  to  the  mayor  or  anyone  else.  In  such 
case  the  power  of  the  common  council  is  limited  to  licensing 
places  occupied  by  the  applicants  in  which  the  business  of 
selling  intoxicating  liquors  is  to  be  carried  on  as  a  regular 
business;  and  the  common  council  has  no  power,  by  a  license 
or  permit,  to  authorize  the  sale  of  such  liquors  at  any  other 
place  than  one  regularly  licensed.     Hence,  an  ordinance  au- 

(Tenn.   Ch.  App.),  52  S.  W.  913;  pie  v.  Armstrong  (Mich.),  16  Am. 

47  L.  R.  A.  278.    [Citing  Robinson  St.  Rep.  584,  note  (s.  c.  41  N.  W. 

V.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Humph.  156;   34  275).]    But  not  from  6  p.  m.  to  0 

Am.    Dec.    627;    City   of   Memphis  A.  ii.  Ward  v.  Greeneville,  8  Baxt. 

V.    Memphis    Water   Co.,    8    Baxt.  228 ;  35  Am.  Rep.  700 ;  nor  during 

590;  Ward  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  Id.  229;  the  first  three  days  court  is  held  in 

Smith  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  3  Head,  245;  the  town.     Grills  v.   Jonesboro,  8 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Berry    (Ky.),   40  Baxt.  247.     See  §  291. 
Am.  St.  Rep.   161,  10  S.  W.  1026;  go  Raul   v.    Washington,    134   N. 

Phillips  V.   City  vf  Denver    (Colo.  C.   363;    47    S.    E.    793;    65   L.   R. 

Sup.),  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  230;  34  P.  A.  902. 

902;  City  of  Tarkio  v.  Cook   (Mo.  ei  McNulty    v.    Toopf,    116    Ky. 

Supp. ),  25  S.  W.  202 ;  Mayor,  etc.,  202;    75    S.    W.    258;    25    Ky.    L. 

V.  Beasly,  1   Humph.  241;   Ander-  Rep.    430.      In    this    case    it    was 

son   V.  City  of   Wellington    (Kan.  held  that  sales  at  wholesale  could 

Sup.),   19   P.   719;    Mayor  v.   Dry  not  be  confined  to  certain  hours  of 

Dock,  etc.,  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co.   (N.  the   day. 

Y.   App.),  28   Am.    St.   Rep.    614;  02  Bradford    v.    Jellico,    1    Tcnn. 

note    (s.   c.   30   K   E.   563);    Peo-  Ch.  App.  700 


§§  295,  296        TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  462 

thorizing  the  mayor,  upon  recommendation  of  a  common 
council,  to  issue  a  permit  for  the  sale  of  ale,  beer,  and  other 
malt  beverages,  at  picnics  or  social  gatherings,  for  a  license 
fee  will  be  illegal  and  void."^ 

Sec.  295.    Physician's  prescription. 

Under  a  charter  authorizinsr  a  town  to  license,  regulate  and 
suppress  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  an  ordinance  which 
provides,  under  penalty,  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any 
physician  to  give  a  prescription  to  f^vy  well  person,  or  who  is 
apparently  in  good  health,  to  enable  him  to  get  any  intoxi- 
cating liquor  to  be  used  as  a  beverage,  is  not  unauthorized, 
unreasonable  nor  oppressive:  neither  does  it  discriminate 
against  any  class  of  persons.  Tbp  oVijeet  of  such  an  ordinance 
is  to  suppress  the  evils  of  intemnerance.  but  not  to  prohibit 
the  use  of  intoxieatino-  liquors  for  medical  purposes.  No 
physician  is  bound  to  act  under  the  ordinance,  but  if  he  sees 
proper  to  avail  himself  of  the  privilege  given  by  it  he  is  bound 
by  its  terms,  and  can  only  give  a  prescription  for  the  purpose 
named  in  the  ordinance  and  for  no  other.  Such  a  restriction 
is  necessary  to  prevent  fraud  upon  the  law,  and  he  who  adopts 
the  profession  of  a  physician  must  conform  to  the  reasonable 
requirements  of  the  law  in  the  discharge  of  his  professional 
duties.®* 

Sec.  296.    Sales  to  minors  and  drunkards. 

Under  its  general  powers  a  city  may  adopt  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  sales  or  gifts  to  habitual  drunkards.*''  And  so  it 
may  prohibit  sales  to  minors.""  Under  its  general  powers  to 
make  such  by-laws  as  it  deem  necessary,  it  may  prohibit 
minors  entering  saloons  without  the  consent  of  their  parents 

63  Winants    v.    Bayonne,    44    N.  Contra,  Roberts  v.  Clinmire,  46 

J.  L.  114.  Up.  Can.   264;    In  re  Barclay,    12 

8*  Carthage    v.    Buckner,    4    111.  Up.    Can.    SG    (after   notice    given 

App.     317.       vSec     also    Selma    v.  not  to  sell). 

Brewer    (Cal.   App.),   98   Pac.   61.  "estate    v.    Austin,    114    N.    C. 

65  Woods    V.    Pineville,    19    Ore.  ®55;    19   S.   E.  919;   25   L.  R.   A. 

108;    23    Pac.    880;    /n    re    Grey-  283;    In   re   Brodie,    38    Up.    Can. 

stock,   12  Up.  Can.   458.  580. 


463  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  297 

or  guardians.^^  Under  a  power  to  regulate  ordinaries  and 
taverns  it  has  been  held  that  a  town  could  prevent  sales  to 
free  colored  persons.*^^  So  under  the  general  welfare  clause  a 
city  may  prohibit  minors  frequenting  or  loitering  in  saloons 
or  procuring  liquors.*'^  An  ordinance  is  not  invalid  which 
forbids  sales  to  minors  not  having  their  parents'  written  per- 
mission, but  permits  sales  to  such  as  have." 

Sec.  297.     Prohibiting  sales  in  States  having  local  option 
laws. 

In  those  States  where  local  option  laws  are  in  force,  whereby 
a  city  or  town  may  prohibit  sales  of  liquors  within  its  boun- 
daries, courts  seem  to  be  inclined  to  limit  the  power  of  a  city 
to  adopt  a  prohibition  ordinance,  or  rather  to  deny  the  power 
unless  it  be  clearly  given  in  its  charter  or  in  the  general  law, 
leaving  the  question  of  prohibition  to  be  decided  by  popular 
vote.  Thus,  where  no  election  had  been  taken  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  local  option  it  was  held  that  a  city  had  no  authority 
to  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquors.'^'  But  this  statement  must  be 
received  with  caution,  and  its  soundness  cannot  be  assured. 
Thus,  where  a  city  charter  required  the  question  annually  to 
be  voted  on  whether  a  license  should  be  issued  for  the  sale 
of  liquor  during  the  ensuing  year,  and  after  the  time  the  first 
vote  had  been  taken  an  ordinance  was  adopted  making  it  a 
misdemeanor  to  sell  liquor  without  a  license,  it  was  held  that 
the  ordinance  making  it  an  offense  to  sell  without  a  license, 
coupled  with  the  failure  to  provide  for  the  issuance  of  a 
license,  effectually  prohibited  the  sale  of  liquors  and  no  pro- 
hibitory ordinance  was  necessary  to  prevent  their  sales." 

67  state  V.  Austin,  114  N.  C.  an  ordinance  making  him  liable 
855;  19  S.  E.  919;  25  L.  R.  A.  if  his  servant  sells  liquor  to  a  mi- 
283.  nor  when  the  prosecution  is  for  a 

68  Washington  v.  Lasky,  5  sale  he  himself  has  made.  Areola 
Cranch  C.  C.  3S1;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  v.  Wilkinson,  233  111.  250;  84 
17230.      T^ut    not    for    selling    to  N.  E.  264. 

guests    at    the    bar    of    a    tavern.  ^o  Fitch    v.    Lewiston,     137    111. 

Werner  v.  Washington,  2  Hayw.  &  App.  '570. 

H.   17o;    Fed.   Cas.  No.    17416a.  •  i  Shreveport  v.  P.  Draiss  &  Co., 

69Lewistown   v.    Fitch,    130    111.  Ill  La.  511;  35  So.  727. 

App.    170.  '^2  Honck    v.    Ashland,    40    Ore. 

A   saloon   keeper   cannot   attack  117;   66  Pac.  697. 


§§298,299        TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  464 

Sec.  298.    Women  not  licensing — Constitutional  law. 

A  statute  providing  that  any  male  inhabitant  having  other 
specific  qualifications  may  obtain  a  license  by  proceeding  in 
the  manner  therein  described,  by  implication  prohibits  women 
from  obtaining  a  license."  It  is  a  maxim  of  the  law  that 
the  express  mention  of  one  person  or  thing  is  "the  exclusion 
of  another;"  ''■*  or,  as  stated  by  another  eminent  author,  "What 
is  expressed  makes  what  is  silent  to  cease."  "^  And  a  person 
answering  the  description  required  by  such  a  statute,  being 
prosecuted  for  selling  without  a  license,  cannot  complain  that 
an  unjust  discrimination  is  made  by  the  statute  against  women 
and  non-residents,  for  it  is  a  well  established  principle  that 
only  those  who  are  prejudiced  by  an  unconstitutional  act  will 
be  heard  to  make  an  objection  to  it.  Courts  will  not  listen  to 
those  who  are  not  aggrieved  by  an  invalid  law.^'' 

Sec.  299.    Women  in  saloons. 

An  ordinance  is  valid  which  prohibits  the  assembling  or 
employment  of  women  in  saloons.'^  Power  to  pass  such  an 
ordinance  is  given  by  an  authority  to  prevent  vice  and  im- 
morality, to  preserve  public  peace  and  good  order,  and  to 
license  and  regulate  saloons.'^  So  a  city  may  prohibit  the 
employment  of  women  in  saloons,  even  though  women  may  be 
licensed  to  sell  liquors  at  retail,  or  that  the  wife  of  a  licensed 
dealer  may  sell  drinks  in  his  saloon. ^'^  But  under  an  ordi- 
nance preventing  women  being  entertained  in  saloons,  the 
proprietor  of  a  saloon  w^ho  serves  women  in  his  restaurant, 
located  across  a  hall  from  his  saloon,  with  food  and  wine  does 
not  violate  its  provisions.^*'    An  ordinance  may  even  go  so  far 

"Woodford    v.    Hamilton,     139  S.    108;    48   L.   Ed.    365;    24    Sup. 

Ind.  481;    39  X.  E.  47.  Ct.    219;    affirming    29    Colo.    488, 

-4  Wharton's    Legal    Maxims,    p.  503;    69    Pac.    590,    1125;     Cronin 

11.  V.   Denver,    192   U.   S.    115;    48   L. 

73  Coke  Litt.,  210a.  Ed.  368;   24  Sup.  Ct.  220. 

"8  Wagner  v.    Town   of   Garrett,  "«  People    v.    Case    (Mich.),    16 

118  Ind.  114;  20  X.  E.  706.  X.  W.  558. 

7"  GreJHier    v.    Hoboken     (X.    J.  'o  Hoboken  v.  Goodman,  68  X.  J. 

L.),  53  Atl.  693;  Denver  v.  Dome-  L.   217;    51   Atl.    1092. 

dian,    15   Colo.   App.   36;    60    Pac.  so  Denver  v.  Domedian,  15  Colo. 

1107;    Cronin    v.    Adams,    192    U.  App.   76;    00   Pac.   1107. 


465  MUNICIPAL.   REGULATION.  §  300 

as  to  prevent  females  entering  saloons  or  wine  rooms,^'  or  a 
sale  of  liquor  to  them.^- 

Sec.  300.    Wine  rooms. 

The   meaning   of   the    words   "wine   rooms,"   as   used    in 
conunon  parlance,  is  a  room  to  which  females  resort  to  obtain 
intoxicating  liquors.    Usually  they  are  resorts  of  lewd  women 
who  there  seek  opportunities  to  make  the  acquaintances  of 
men.      They   are    also   frequently   places   into   which   young 
women  are  lured,  not  infrequently  to  their  ruin,  by  designing 
men  and  women.    In  all  instances  they  have  direct  connection 
with  a  saloon  and  are  under  the  control  of  the  saloon  keeper. 
It  has  been  found  necessary  to  suppress  them  in  many  States, 
and  cities  have  been  empowered  to  do  so.^^    It  is  often  diffi- 
cult to  determine  whether  a  particular  room  falls  within  the 
prohibitory  provisions  of  a  statute  or  ordinance.     Sometnnes 
these  rooms  are  mere  stalls  opening  off  a  larger  room.    Thus, 
where  an  ordinance  prohibited  the  construction  or  mainte- 
nance  of   booths,    stalls   or   other   inelosures,   with   curtains, 
screens  or  partitions  in  or  connected  with  a  barroom,  and  the 
barroom  w^as  seventy-five  feet  long  by  nineteen  feet  wide,  at 
the  rear  of  which  was  cut  off  by  partition  a  square  division, 
nineteen  feet  square,  in  which  were  kept  a  table  and  chairs,  a 
doorway  being  in  the  partition  but  having  neither  door  nor 
curtain  nor  screens,  it  was  held  that  such  division  fell  within 
the  prohibition  of  the  ordinance,  being  an  inclosure  within  the 
meaning  of  that  word  as  used  therein.^*     Such  an  ordinance 
is  a  reasonable  regulation  of  the  liquor  traffic  and  is  author- 
ized by  a  grant  of  power  to  license  and  regulate  all  persons 
dealing  in  intoxicating  liquors.    The  words  "other  inclosure" 
include  only  such  inelosures  as  are  of  the  same  kind  as  stalls 
and  booths. ^^ 

81  state    V.    Nelson,      10      Idaho  s*  State  v.  McGregor,   88   Minn. 

522;    79    Pac.    79;     67    L.    K.    A.       74;    92   N.   W.    509. 
g(^g  85  state  V.  Barge,  82  Minn.  256; 

82  (Campbell       v        Tliomasville       84  N.  W.  911;  C^ronin  v.   Adams, 
(Ga)     64    S     E     815  1^2  U.   S.    108;    24   Sup.   Ct.  219; 

83  Denver  v.  Domedian,  15  Colo.       48  L.  Ed.   365;   affirming  29  Colo. 
App.  36;  60  Pac.  1107.  488,  503;  69  Pac.  590,  1125;  Cro- 


§§301,302        TRiVFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  466 

Sec.  301.    Requiring  a  county  license. 

A  town  has  the  right  by  an  ordinance  to  limit  the  licenses 
issued  by  it  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  such  persons 
as  have  procured  and  hold  a  license  from  the  board  of  county 
commissioners.  Such  an  ordinance  is  a  reasonable  one.  A 
person  who  obtains  a  license  from  such  a  board  may  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  sho\ATi  his  fitness  to  be  trusted  with  the  sale 
of  such  linuors.  before  a  tribunal  whore  +he  ri?bt  of  remon- 
strance is  secured.  Towns  are  not  provided  with  the  ample 
machinery  for  prosecuting  innuiries  into  the  character  and 
fitness  of  applicants  as  are  such  boards,  and  so  it  is  a  reason- 
able exercise  of  the  power  to  reirulate  and  restrain  to  require 
that  an  applicant  for  a  town  license  shall  have  complied  with 
the  law  of  the  State  by  securing  a  license  from  the  board  of 
commissioners  of  the  county  iu  which  the  town  is  located.*^ 

Sec.  302.  Repeal  of  statute  by  implication,  when  not  ac- 
complished. 
The  fact  that  a  municipal  corporation  is  authorized  by  the 
Legislature  to 'pass  ordinances  regulating  the  traffic  in  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  and  declaring  the  sale  thereof  without  a 
municipal  license  a  nuisance  does  not  thereby  repeal  by  im- 
plication a  general  law  of  the  State  upon  the  same  subject. 
While  a  license  from  such  corporation  will  protect  the  holder 
of  it,  yet  if  the  corporation  authorities  fail  or  refuse  to  grant 
a  license,  the  general  law  of  the  State  would  be  violated  by  a 
sale  within  the  corporate  limits  and  the  aggressor  might  be 
punished  under  it.  The  fixing  the  rates  and  granting  a 
license  by  a  municipal  corporation  excuses  from  liability  to 
the  municipal  ordinances,  but  cannot  excuse  from  liability  to 
the  penal  ordinances  of  the  State.^^  It  is  a  maxim  in  the 
construction  of  statutes  that  the  law  does  not  favor  a  repeal 
by  implication,  and  it  has  accordingly  been  held  that  where 

nin  V.  Denver,   192  U.  S.   115;   24  114;   20  N.  E.   706;   Linkenhelt  v. 

Sup.     Ct.    220;     48    L.    Ed.    368;  Garrett,    118    Ind.    599;    20   N.    E. 

State  V.  Nelson,  10  Idaho  522;  79  708. 

Pac.   79;   67  L.  R.  A.   868;   Ends-  87  Gardner    v.    People,     20     111. 

ley  V.  vState  (Ind.),  88  N.  E.  62.  431;     Sloan    v.    State,    8    Blackf. 

80  Wagner   v.   Garrett,    118   Ind.  (Ind.),   361. 


467 


MUNICIPAL   REGULATION. 


§303 


two  acts  are  seemingly  repugnant,  they  must,  if  possible,  be 
so  construed  that  the  latter  may  not  operate  as  a  repeal  of 
the  former;  the  repeal  must  be  specific. ^^  Nor  will  mere  in- 
convenience, marked  by  the  similarity  of  two  statutes,  justify 
the  courts  in  declaring  that  the  earlier  is  repealed  by  the 
latter.^^  It  has  also  been  held,  in  pursuance  of  this  rule,  that 
an  act  is  not  repealed  by  implication  when  the  Legislature 
had  no  intention  to  repeal  it.^** 


Sec.  303.    Regulation  of  saloon  room — Location  of  saloon. 

Under  a  power  to  regulate  and  license  a  city  may  require  a 
licensee  to  carry  on  the  business  personally,  and  that  the  rooms 
in  which  he  conducts  his  liquor  traffic  shall  not  be  adjacent 
to  any  theater  or  place  where  variety  show  entertainments 
are  conducted."^  So  it  may  require  the  saloon  to  be  open  to 
the  public  gaze.®^  So  it  may  prevent  all  sales  in  any  side, 
back  or  upper  room,  or  in  any  alcove,  booth  or  box  connected 
with  the  saloon  f^  and  may  prohibit  all  communicating  pass- 
age ways  between  a  place  where  liquors  are  sold  and  billiard 


88  Dwarris  on  Statutes  and  their 
Construction,      ■674 ;       Ledgvvick's 
Stat,  and  Const.  Law,  p.   127;  Ex 
parte  Yerger,  8  Wall.    (U.  S.)   85, 
105;    Bruce   v.    Schuyler,   4    Gilm. 
(III.),    221;    Blain    v.    Bailey,    25 
Ind.    165;     Jeffersonville,    etc.    R. 
Co.,   112   Ind.  93;    13   N.   E.   403 
State    V.    Oarlock,    14    Iowa    444 
State   V.   Langden,  29   Minn.   393 
Bowen  v.  Lease,  5   Hill.    (N.  Y.), 
221. 

89  Mitchell  V.  Duncan,  7  Fla. 
13;  Robinson  v.  Riffey,  111  Ind. 
112;  12  N.  L.  141;  State  v.  Ber- 
ry, 12  Iowa  58;  Wilson  v.  Shor- 
ick,  21  la.  332;  Waldo  v.  Bell, 
13   La.   Ann.   329. 

90  Tyson  v.  Posttethwait,  13  111. 
728;  Coghill  V.  State,  37  Ind.  111. 

An  ordinance  prohibiting  the 
sale  of   liquors,   under   a  penalty, 


is  repealed  by  a  later  ordinance 
permitting  a  sale  under  an  ordi- 
nance. Barton  v.  Gadsden,  79 
Ala.  495. 

An  ordinance  covering  the  en- 
tire subject  matter  of  a  prior  or- 
dinance repeals  it.  State  v. 
Brunswick,  2  N.  J.  Law  J.  240. 

91  State  V.  Scatena,  84  Minn. 
281;   87  N.  W.  764. 

92  Lincoln  Center  v.  Linker,  360 
Kan.  App.  6;  51  Pac.  807;  Croker 
V.  Board  (N.  J.  Ch.),  63 
Atl.  901.  See  Mesken  v.  High- 
lands, 9  Colo.  App.  255;  47  Pac. 
846;  Morganstern  v.  Common- 
wealth, 94  Va.  787 ;  26  S.  E.  402 ; 
but  see  section  on  "Screens"  and 
"Wine  Rooms." 

93  Sandys  v.  Williams,  46  Ore. 
327;    80   Pac.   642. 


§§  304,  305        TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  468 

tables  kept ;  "*  or  forbid  gambling,  profane  swearing,  blas- 
phemous or  insulting  language,  or  any  indecency  or  disorderly 
conduct  therein."^  But  an  ordinance  that  "every  person 
receiving  a  shop  license  shall  confine  the  business  of  his  shop 
solely  and  exclusively  to  the  keeping  and  selling  of  liquor, ' '  is 
void,  because  in  restraint  of  trade.^*^  And  a  city  cannot 
compel  persons  not  selling  liquors  to  remove  the  saloon  signs 
from  over  their  doors;  ^^  but  it  may  require  a  saloon  to  have  a 
saloon  sign  over  its  entrance.'*^  Under  a  power  to  regulate  a 
city  may  forbid  the  use  of  tables  and  chairs  in  a  saloon,  ex- 
cepting one  for  the  bartender  or  proprietor  to  use.®^ 

Sec.  304.     Lights  burning  in  saloon. 

In  Canada  an  ordinance  prohibiting  a  light  in  a  saloon  from 
12  o'clock  midnight  until  5  a.  m.,  and  requiring  a  saloon  to  be 
then  closed  and  unoccupied  except  by  the  keeper  and  his 
family,  has  been  held  void ;  ^  but  in  New  Jersey  it  has  been 
held  that  an  ordinance  forbidding  a  light  burning  in  the 
saloon  between  7  a.  m.  and  midnight  on  Sunday  was  valid.^ 

Sec.  305.     Screens — Exposure  of  room  to  view. 

Unless  especially  empowered  a  city  cannot  adopt  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  the  removal,  from  the  doors  or  windows  of  a 
saloon,  of  all  screens  and  other  obstructions  to  the  view  of  the 
interior  of  and  business  transacted  in  the  saloon.  Such  an 
ordinance  is  prohibition  of  a  lawful  business  and  not  a  mere 
regulation  of  it.^  So  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  exposure 
of  liquors  for  sale  where  dry  goods  are  kept  or  exposed  for 
sale  is  void,  not  being  an  exercise  of  the  police  powers  for  the 

9*  In  re  Neilly,  37  Up.  Can.  289 ;  99  Pate    v.    Jonesboro,    75    Ark. 

In  re  Arkell,  38  Up.   Can.   594.  276;   87  S.  W.  437. 

95  In    re    Brodie,    38    Up.    Can.  i  Regina    v.    Belmont,     35     Up. 

580   (a  licensediinn).  Can.  298. 

96 /jj,    re    Croonie,    6    Ont.    Bep.  2  Croker   v.   Board    (N.  J.   Ch.), 

188.  63  Atl.  flOl. 

^- In    re    Bright,    12    Can.    Pac.  3  Steffy     v.     Monroe    City,     135 

433.  Ind.   466;    35   N.   E.    121;    41   Am. 

98  Regina    v.     Lennox,     26     Up.  St.   436 ;    Champer   v.  Greencastle, 

Can.   141.  138    Ind.    339;    35    N.    E.    14;    24 

L.  R.  A.  768;  46  Am.  St.  390. 


469  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §§  306-308 

protection  of  the  public,*  But  an  ordinance,  enacted  under  a 
provision  authorizing  a  city  to  regulate  sales  of  liquore,  re- 
quiring the  removal  of  obstructions  from  the  interior  view  of 
the  room  during  the  times  sale  may  not  be  made,  has  been 
held  valid.^ 

Sec.  306.     Prohibiting  the  carriage  of  liquors. 

A  city  or  town  may  not  prohibit  a  carrier  or  its  agent  de- 
livering liquors  shipped  to  the  consignee  from  another  State, 
and  collecting  the  purchase  price  and  remitting  it  to  the  con- 
signor.    Such  an  ordinance  is  void.^ 

Sec.  307.     Police  visiting  saloon. 

Under  a  power  to  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors, 
a  municipality  may  provide  that  the  police  or  excise  inspector 
shall  have  at  all  times  access  to  all  licensed  saloons  except 
during  the  time  the  law  or  ordinances  require  them  to  be 
closed.'^ 

Sec.  308.    Penalties    essential. 

The  power  conferred  by  a  Legislature  upon  the  municipal 
corporations  of  a  State  to  enact  ordinances  authorizes  or 
of  necessity  implies  the  power  of  such  corporations  to  impose 
penalties  for  the  violation  of  such  ordinances;  and  without 
provision  for  such  a  penalty  a  penal  ordinance  is  non- 
enforcible.^    The  power  to  suppress,  regulate  and  restrain  the 

4  Chicago    V.    Netcher,    183    111.  e  Carthage   v.   Muniiell,   203   III, 

104;    55    N.   E.    707;    48   L.  R.    A.  474;    67  N.   E.   831;   affirming  105 

201.  111.    App.     119,    citing    Langel    v, 

5McNulty     V.    Toopf,     1L6    Ky,  Bushnell,    197    111.    20;    63    N.    E. 

202;    75    S.    W.    258;    25    Ky.    L.  1086;    58   L.   R.   A.   266. 

Eep.    430;    Regina    v.    Martin,    21  T^Croker  v.  Board    (N. -J.   Ch.), 

Ont.  App.  145;  Regina  v.  Belmont,  63  Atl.  901;  Commonwealth  v.  Du- 

35   Up.  Can.  298;    Bennett  v.   Pu-  cey,    126   Mass.   269. 

laski    (Tenn.  Ch.),  52  S.  W.  913;  «  Mayor,    etc.    v.    Guillo,    3    Ala. 

47   L.   R.   A.   278.      See   People   v.  137;    Mason    v.    Shawneetown,    77 

Carrel,    118   Mich.   79;    76   N.   W.  111.      533;      Mount      Pleasant      v. 

118;   Endsley  v.   State    (Ind.),   88  Breeze,    11    Iowa   399;    Shreveport 

N.   E.  '62.  V.  Rocs,  35  La.  Ann.  1010;  Grover 


§  309  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  470 

use  of  intoxicating  liquors  embraces  the  authority  to  adopt 
the  usual  means  employed  for  such  purpose.  The  merely 
adopting  an  ordinance  which  declares  that  liquor  shall  not  be 
sold,  without  imposing  any  penalty  for  its  non-observance, 
would  not  tend  in  the  slightest  degree  to  accomplish  the  end 
sought.  The  imposition  of  a  fine  fnr  the  breach  of  such  ordi- 
nance is  the  means  usually  authorized  by  the  Legislature,  and 
none  are  more  proper;  occasionally  provision  is  made  for 
imprisonment,  and  this  is  legitimate.^  Under  a  power  to  re- 
quire a  license  a  city  may  inflict  a  penalty  for  a  sale  with- 
out such  license.^" 

Sec.  309.    Penalties,  greater  and  additional — Infliction. 

Municipal  corporations  may  exercise  powers  by  ordinances 
regulating  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  beyond  those  au- 
thorized by  the  general  laws  of  the  State,  provided  they  are 
not  inhibited  from  doing  so  by  a  statute  of  the  State,  and  in 
such  cases  may  provide  for  greater  penalties  than  are  pro- 
vided for  by  the  laws  of  the  State. ^^  Likewise  they  may 
impose  additional  penalties  to  those  inflicted  by  the  State,  and 
there  are  undoubtedly  good  reasons  why  this  may  be  done. 
Particular  acts  may  be  far  more  injurious  and  the  temptation 
to  commit  much  greater  in  a  crowded  town  or  city  than  in 
the  State  generally.     They  consequently  require  more  severe 

V.    Huckins,   26   Mich.   4?6;    Town  penalty    for    outside    such    limits. 

of  Tipton  V.   Yakey,  72  Mo.  380;  Johnson    v.    Bessemer,     143    Mich. 

Hookset  V.  Amoskeag,  etc.  Co.,  44  313;    106  N.    W.   852;    12   Detroit 

N.    H.    105;    Reinhard    v.    Mayor,  Leg.  N.  081. 

etc.,  2   Daly    (N.  Y.)    243;   Barter  A   failure   to   provide   a  pehalty 

V.     Commonwealth,     3     Pa.     260;  renders    the   ordinance   void.      As- 

Trigally     v.     Memphis,     6      Cold.  toria   v.   Wells,   68    Kan.    787;    75 

(Tenn.)    382;   Winooski  v.   Yokey,  Pac.   1026. 

49    Vt.    292.      See     Louisville     v.  io  Ex   parte   Guerrero,    €9    Cal. 

Worden,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  88;    10    Pac.    261;    Deitz    v.    City 

402.  of   Central,   1    Colo.   323;    King  v. 

»City   of  Pekin  v.   Smelzell,   21  Jacksonville,   2  Scam.    (111.)    305; 

111.  464.  Warrensburg  v.   McHugh,   122  Mo. 

An   ordinance    inflicting    a    pen-  649;    27    S.    W.    523;      Meyer     v. 

alty  for  operating  a  saloon  with-  Bridgeton,  37  N.  J.  L.   160;   Clin- 

in  certain  limits  of  the  city  is  not  tonville  v.   Keating,  4  Denio,  341. 

void,   for   St.   t^ilure   to  provide   a  "  Pekin  v.  Smelzel,  21  111.  464, 


471  MUNICIPAL   REGULATION.  §  310 

measures  for  prevention.  State  laws  are,  of  course,  for  the 
general  good  and  cannot  always  answer  the  peculiar  wants  of 
particular  localities.  The  power  of  making  general  laws  be- 
longs exclusively  to  the  State,  but  local  legislation  may  be 
delegated  to  the  municipal  corporations.  Their  acts  under  the 
power  thus  delegated  are  valid  when  there  is  no  conflict,  and 
superadded  penalties  are  not  inconsistent  with  those  previously 
imposed.^- 

Sec.  310.     Revocation  of  license — Conditional  ordinance, 

AYhere  power  is  rightfully  conferred  on  a  city  to  entirely 
prohobit  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  or  to  regulate  and 
license  the  same,  at  discretion,  the  city  may  grant  the  privilege 
of  selling  such  liquors  on  such  terms  and  conditions  as  it 
may  see  fit  to  impose,  and  has  ample  power  to  impose,  as  a 
condition,  that  a  license  granted  shall  be  subject  to  revoca- 
tion on  the  violation  of  any  of  the  statutes  of  the  State  or  of 
the  ordinances  regulating  the  traffic.  In  such  a  case,  where 
absolute  control  over  the  whole  subject  of  granting  licenses  is 
conferred,  the  city  may  impose  any  other  conditions  calculated 
to  protect  the  community,  preserve  the  order  and  suppress 
vice,  such  as  closing  the  licensed  place  on  election  days,  holi- 
days or  Sundays,  or  the  closing  of  the  same  at  a  particular 
hour  each  evening;  and  for  a  violation  of  any  of  these 
conditions  provide  for  a  forfeiture  of  the  license.  Such  power 
grows  out  of  the  fact  that  it  is  discretionary  with  the  city  to 
prohibit  the  sale  of  such  liquor  or  to  grant  a  license  for  thfiir 
sale  on  such  terms  as  it  may  choose.'-  A  person  who 
takes  out  a  license  to  engage  in  a  business  he  otherwise  would 

12  Wood   V.    Brooklyn,    14    Barb.  etc.,    43    Ga.    421;    Sprayberry    v. 

(N.     Y.)     425;     Wallace    v.     Cu-  Atlanta,    87    Ga.    124;     13    S.    E. 

banola,  70  Ark.  395;  {>8  S.  W.  485.  197;    Wiggins  v.  Oiicago,  -68   111. 

A   city   cannot   inflict   a  greater  372;    Schwuchow    v.   Chicago,    GS 

penalty      than      the      limitations  111.  444;    Huber  v.   Baugh,  43   la. 

placed    upon    it    by     the     statute.  291;    Optumwa   v.   Schaub,   52   la. 

Minneapolis  v.  Olson,  76  Minn.  1;  515;    3    N.    W.    529;    Hildreth    v. 

78  N.  W.  877.  Crawford,   65    la.   359;    21   N.   W. 

13/nre  Bickerstaff,  70  Cal.  35;  677;     Martin    v.    State,    23    Neb. 

11    Pac.   393;    Whitten   v.   Mayor,  371. 


§  310  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  472 

have  no  right  to  carry  on,  takes  the  privilege  subject  to  the 
restrictions  and  burdens  imposed  by  the  ordinance  under 
which  alone  it  can  issue,  and  his  act  in  accepting  the  license  is 
a  recognition  of  the  ordinance  and  estops  him  from  denying 
its  validity.^''  In  such  case  the  burden  is  cast  upon  the 
licensee  in  order  to  protect  himself  in  the  enjoyment  of  his 
license,  to  see  to  it  that  no  violation  of  the  law  or  ordinance 
be  committed  upon  the  licensed  premises;  and  he  cannot  claim 
that  an  offense  committed  thereon  was  committed  without  his 
knowledge  or  consent. ^^  Under  ' '  full  power  and  authority  to 
regulate  the  retail  of  ardent  spirits."  and  "at  their  discretion 
to  issue  a  license  to  retail  or  to  withhold"  it,  a  city  may  enact 
an  ordinance  providing  that  upon  a  conviction  of  a  licensee 
of  a  violation  of  the  State  liquor  law  it  shall  revoke  his  city 
license.^"  So  it  may  provide  that  a  violation  of  its  liquor 
license  ordinance  shall  work  a  revocation  of  the  license  issued 
thereunder,^'^  or  require  the  applicant  to  consent  to  a  revoca- 
tion at  the  will  of  the  city  council.^*  A  city  may  provide  by 
ordinance  for  the  trial  of  a  licensee  for  a  violation  of  the 
liquor  license  law  and  for  the  revocation  of  his  license  ;^*'  but 
it  cannot  delegate  its  power  to  revoke  a  license  to  a  court  try- 
ing the  offender.-^  A  statute  may  authorize  a  city  to  revoke  a 
license,  in  its  discretion,  without  cause,  on  refunding  the  value 
of  the  unexpired  term.-^ 

14  Launder   v.    Chicago,    111    III.  R.   A.  902;   Carr  v.  Augusta,   124 
291.  Ga.    116;    52   S.   E.   300.      Contra, 

15  People    V.    Meyers,    95    N.    Y.  In  re  Bright,    12   Ont.   Rep.   433; 
223.  Shreveport    v.    Draiss   &   Co.,    Ill 

Although    a    statute    forbids    a  La.  511 ;  35  So.  727 ;   Smith  v.  To- 
city  issuing  a  license  for  less  than  ronto,  16  C.  P.   (Ont.)   200. 
one  year,  it  does  not  prevent  the  is  Wells    v.    Torrey,    144    Mich, 
city   from   adopting   an   ordinance  689;    108   N.   W.   423;    13   Detroit 
providing    for    its    revocation    on  Leg.  N.  37'8. 

the    licensee     committing    certain  i9  Langen    v.    Wood    River,    77 

offenses.    State  v.  Dwyer,  21  Minn.  Xeb.  444;   109  N.  W.  748. 
512.  20  state  v.  Milwavikee,  129  Wis. 

16  Sprayberry  V.  Atlanta,  87  Ga.  562;     109    N.    W.    421.      See    also 
120;   13  S.  E.  197.  Baker  v.  Paris,  10  Up.  Can.  21. 

!■  Schwuchow     v.     Chicago,     68  21  State    v.     Pierce    County,    50 

111.  444;   Paul  v.  Washington,  134       Wash.  650;   97  Pac.  77S. 
N.    C.   363;    47   S.   E.   793;    65   L. 


473        '  MUNICIPAL   BEGULATION,  §§  311-313 

Sec.  311.     Ordinance  annulled  by  subsequent  statute. 

The  Legislature  has  full  power  to  enact  a  statute  in  general 
terms  which  will  annul  previous  ordinances  of  a  city;  as,  for 
instance,  taking  away  the  power  of  a  city  to  enact  such  ordi- 
nances. And  so  if  a  State  adopts  general  prohibition  that  will 
annul  all  license  ordinances  without  an  express  provision  to 
that  effect."-  And  so,  under  a  power  to  adopt  special  legis- 
lation, if  the  Legislature  adopt  a  prohibition  law  for  a  county, 
the  effect  would  be  to  annul  all  city  or  town  liquor  licensing 
ordinances  of  cities  or  towns  situated  in  such  county.  Such 
is  the  case  when  a  county  adopts  local  option,  except  that  the 
ordinances  are  not  annulled  but  temporarily  suspended.-^ 

Sec.  312.     Exceptions  to  prohibitory  ordinances. 

Where  a  State  law  permits  sales  for  certain  special  pur- 
poses, or  where  a  statute  authorizes  a  city  to  adopt  an  ordi- 
nance prohibiting  sales  of  liquor  except  for  such  purposes — as 
medicinal,  mechanical  or  sacramental  purposes — an  ordinance 
which  does  not  except  or  permit  sales  for  such  purposes  has 
been  held  voicl.^*  On  the  contrary,  such  an  ordinance  has 
been  held  valid ;  -^  and  in  the  same  State  from  which  the  first 
case  is  cited  another  court  of  co-ordinate  jurisdiction  has  held 
such  an  ordinance  valid.-" 

Sec.  313.     Ordinance  in  part  void. 

If  an  ordinance  be  in  excess  of  the  power  of  a  city  to  pass 
it,  of  course  the  entire  ordinance  is  void ;  but  not  infrequently 
only  a  part  of  it  is  in  excess  of  such  power,  and  then  it  is 
always  a  question  whether  the  valid  part  can  remain  and  be 

22  Platteville  v.  McKernan,  54  ing  under  an  ordinance  and  un- 
Wis.  4i87;  11  N.  W.  798;  Adams  der  a  subsequent  statute,  see  State 
V.    Stephens,    88    Ky.    443;     11    S.       v.  Brady,  41  Conn.   588. 

W.   427;    Ottawa    v.   La   Salle,    11  24  Akerman  v.  Lima,  7   Ohio  N. 

111.  339.  P.    92;    8    Ohio   S.   &   €.    P.    Dec. 

23  Turner    v.    Forsyth,    78    Ga.       430. 

683;     3     S.     E.     649;     Ex    parte  25  Houck    v.    Asliland,    40    Ore. 

Brown,  38  Tex.   Cr.  App.  2D5;    42  117;  66  Pac.  697. 

S.  W.   554.  2oEdis  v.   Butler.   8   Ohio  N.   P. 

As  to  difference  in  time  of  clos-  183;   11  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  245. 


§  314         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  474 

enforced.  In  this  respect  in  determining  this  question  the 
same  rules  apply  as  apply  in  determining  the  validity  of  a 
statute  which  in  part  infringes  upon  some  provision  of  the 
Constitution. -''*  Thus,  if  a  city  can  only  require  a  license  for 
sales,  and  it  requires  a  license  for  one  class  of  sales  and  pro- 
hibits sales  of  another  class,  as  to  the  latter  class  the  ordi- 
nance is  void,  yet  as  to  the  other  class  it  remains  in  force,  and 
a  license  as  to  that  class  may  be  enforced."^  And  this  was 
held  true  where  a  city  could  prohibit  the  sale  of  malt  and 
vinous  liquors  and  could  not  spirituous,  but  undertook  to 
prohibit  the  sale  of  any  of  them.-^  And  where  a  city  could 
not  prevent  the  sale  of  li(|uors  in  quantities  of  five  gallons  or 
over,  and  it  passed  an  ordinance  preventing  the  sale  of  any 
quantity,  it  was  held  to  prohibit  sales  of  less  than  five  gallons, 
though  void  as  to  sales  of  five  gallons  or  over."^  And  the 
same  rule  applies  to  one  prohibiting  sales  by  anyone  when 
the  city  has  no  power  to  prohibit  sales  by  a  drug'gist.^*'  An 
attempt  to  permit  a  transfer  of  a  license  does  not  avoid  the 
other  provisions  of  the  ordinance  forbidding  sales  without  a 
license.^^ 

Sec.  314.     Ordinance  in  conflict  with  Constitution. 

It  does  not  require  the  citation  of  a  decision  of  a  court  to 
establish  the  proposition  that  an  ordinance  in  conflict  with  a 
provision  of  the  State  or  Federal  Constitution  is  absolutely 
void.-''-  If  it  is  in  conflict  when  enacted  with  a  provision  of 
the  Const'tution,  a  subsequent  amendment  of  that  provision  so 
as  to  remove  the  conflict  will  not  render  the  ordinance  valid ;  ^^ 
nor  does  such  an  amendment  so  amend  the  city's  charter  as 
to  give  it  power  it  did  not  possess  before.^*  But  a  constitu- 
te* 77ar  parte  Stephen,  114  Cal.  so  Ex  parte  Cowert,  92  Ala.  94; 
278;    46   Pac  »6.                                         9  So.  225. 

2T  Ilarbaugh    v.    Monmouth,    74  3i  Wallace  v.  Cubanola,  70  Ark. 

111.   3G7;    Wagner   v.   Garrett,    118       305;    08  S.  W.  485. 
Ind.   114;   20  N.  E.  706.  a2  Baldwin     v.     Smith,     82     111. 

28Eldora  v.  Burlingame,  62  la.       162. 
32;     17    N.    W.    148;    €an trill    v.  33  Mt.    Pleasant    v.    Vansice,    43 

Sainer,  59  Iowa,  26;  12  N.  W.  Miph.  361;  5  X.  W.  378;  38  Am. 
753.  Rep.  193. 

29  State    V.    Priester,    43    Minn.  "-*  Dewar    v.    People,    40    Mich. 

373;  45  N.  W.  712.  401;  29  Am.  Rep.  545. 


475  5IUN1CIPAL   BEGUIx.\TION.  §  315 

tional  provision  giving  the  inhabitants  of  a  State  religious 
freedom  does  not  prohibit  the  enactment  of  an  ordinance  for- 
bidding the  sale  of  liquors  or  the  keeping  open  of  saloons  on 
Sunday ;  ^°  nor  does  an  ordinance  imposing  a  reasonable  regu- 
lation upon  the  sale  of  liquors,  or  even  prohibiting  trafficking 
in  them,  violate  the  provisions  of  a  Constitution  prohibiting 
the  deprivation  of  a  person  of  his  liberty  or  property.^® 
Where  a  citj^  openly  and  defiantly  enacted  an  ordinance 
authorizing  the  sale  of  liquors  in  the  face  of  a  provision  of 
the  Constitution  prohibiting  such  sale,  it  was  held  that  pro- 
ceedings in  the  nature  of  a  quo  icarranto  lay  to  annul  the 
authority  attempted  to  be  thus  given. "^  Likewise  a  city 
charter  in  conflict  Avith  the  Constitution  is  void  to  the  extent 
of  the  conflict."'' 

Sec.  315.    City  conducting  a  dispensary. 

A  power  to  control  and  direct  the  sales  of  liquor  within  its 
limits  will  not  authorize  a  city  to  enter  upon  the  sale  of 
liquors  by  organizing  a  dispensary  and  appointing  officers  to 
sell  the  liquors,  although  done  in  the  interest  of  temperance.^* 
Nor  does  the  general  welfare  clause  of  a  city's  charter 
empower  it  to  do  so.*^  Under  the  North  Carolina  statute" 
the  State  established  a  dispensary  board  in  certain  cities  and 
authorized  the  board  of  aldermen  to  name  the  members  of 
the  board  and  to  approve  the  bonds  of  the  treasurer  and 
manager;  but  the  city  simply  acted  as  the  agent  of  the  State 
to  name  the  meml)ers  of  the  dispensary  board  and  it  was  not 
engaged  in  the  liquor  traffic  in  violation  of  its  charter  provi- 
sions forbidding  it.^-     In   South  Carolina  an  ordinance  de- 

ssGabe!    v.    Houston,    29    Tex.  39  Lofton  v.  Collins,  117  Ga.  434; 

335.  43    S.    E.    708;    61    L.   R.   A.    150; 

36  Tanner    v.    Alliance,    29    Fed.  Barnesville   v.    Murphey,    113   Ga. 

196;    Markle   v.    Akron,    14    Ohio  779;  39  S.  E.  413. 

5S^  40  Leesburg  v.  Putnam,   103  Ga. 

3T  State     V.     Topeka,     30     Kan.  110;  29  S.  E.  602;  State  v.  Rusli- 

653;    2    Pac.    387;    31    Kan.    452;  ing,   140  Ala.   187;   36  So.   1007. 

2  Pac.  597;   State  v.  Leavenworth,  4i  Laws   1890,  c.  254. 

36   Kan.   314;    13  Pac.   591.  42  Garsed  v.  Greensboro   (N.C.), 

3s  Morrilton   v.  Gomer,   75    Ark.  35  S.  E.  254. 
45-8;    87    S.    W.    1024. 


§§316,317        TR^^FFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  476 

daring  all  liquors  contraband  except  those  sold  by  the  State's 
agent  was  held  not  inconsistent  with  the  State  dispensary  law 
Avhich  declared  all  liquors,  except  domestic  wines,  not  labeled 
and  certified  to  as  having  been  bought  from  a  State  dispensary 
should  be  contraband. *^^ 

Sec.  316.    Appointment  of  liquor  agents. 

Under  laws  providing  for  it,  cities,  towns  or  counties  may 
appoint  agents  for  the  sale  of  liquors  within  their  boundaries, 
under  proper  conditions.^*  These  agents  are  not  considered 
as  officers  of  the  cities  holding  over  as  officers  do,  and,  there- 
fore, their  employment  ceases  at  the  end  of  the  time  for  which 
they  were  appointed  or  employed.^^  If  the  liquor  statute 
requires  him  to  be  appointed  and  give  a  bond,  until  he  is  duly 
appointed  and  gives  his  bond  he  has  no  authority  to  act ;  *^ 
and  until  then  he  cannot  bind  the  city  by  purchasing  liquor 
on  its  account,  when  that  may  be  done.*'^  An  agent  duly 
selected  may  usually  appoint  such  sub-agents  as  will  enable 
him  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  law.*^ 

Sec.  317.     Duties  and  powers  of  public  liquor  agents. 

If  an  agent  make  illegal  sales  he  is  liable  the  same  as  if  he 
were  not  an  agent. *^     Any  agreement  on  his  part  for  a  profit 

43  Easley  v.  Pegg,  '63  S.  C.  98 ;  of  tlie  community.  Waters  v. 
41   S.  E.   IS.  McDowell,   126  Ga.   807;    56  S.  E. 

44  State  V.  City  Council,  42  S.  J>5 ;  and  in  South  Carolina  the  lo- 
C.  222;  20  S.  E.  221;  26  L.  R.  A.  cation  of  one  may  be  enjoined  un- 
345;  Atkins  v.  Randolph,  31  Vt.  der  certain  circumstances.  Crox- 
226.  ton  V.  Truesdale.  75  S.  C.  418;  5fi 

estate  V.  Weeks,  67  :\Ie.   60.  S.  E.   45. 

46  Commonwealth  v.  Pillsbury,  Controlling  a  division  of  the 
12  Gray  127.  profits  between  the  city  and  coun- 

47  Atkins  V.  Randolph,  31  Vt.  ty,  Clarke  Co.  v.  Herrington,  113 
226;    Foxcroft  v.    Croker,    40   Me.  Ga.  234;   38  S.  E.  852. 

308.  Under    the    Georgia    dispensary 

48  State  V.  Marley,  78  Conn.  law  the  persons  appointed  to  sell 
330;  62  Atl.  85.  See  as  to  law  liquors  are  governmental  officials 
in  New  Hampshire.  Opinion  of  and  not  liquor  dealers  subject  to 
justices,  72  N.  H.  605;  55  Atl.  a  tax.  Dispensary  Corars.  v. 
043.  Thornton   (Ga.),  31   S.  E.   733. 

In   Georgia  the  question   of  the  49  State  v.   Keen,   34    Me.    300; 

continuance    of    a    public    dispen-       State  v.  Putnam,  38  Me.  296. 
eary  may  be  submitted  to  a  vote 


477  MUNICIPAL   BEGULATION.  §  317 

to  himself  in  the  sale  of  the  city's  liquor  is  void,  being  con- 
trary to  public  policy/'*^  He  must  sell  for  cash  and  not  on 
credit,  whatever  the  customs  may  be  in  the  vicinity/*^  If  the 
law  requires  him  to  purchase  from  a  State  agent,  he  cannot 
purchase  from  another  and  bind  his  city.'^-  At  the  end  of  his 
term  he  must  account  for  all  monies  received  and  liquors  on 
hand/'^ 

50  Baldwin    v.    Coburn,    39  Vt.           52  Laiiter   v.    Allenstown,   58    N. 
441.  H.    289. 

51  Mansfield     v.     Stonehan,  15           53  Washington  v.  Eames,   6   Al- 
Gray  149.  len  417. 


CHAPTER   VI. 
LICENSES. 


SECTION. 

318.  Definition. 

319.  A  personal  trust. 

320.  Imposes   no   public   duties — 

Purpose   of   license. 

321.  Not  a  tax. 

322.  License  distinguished  from  a 

tax. 

323.  Inlierent    and    common    law 

right  to  sell   liquors  with- 
out a  license. 

324.  License  to  sell  not  a  vested 

right. 

325.  License  not   property. 

326.  Neither  a  contract  nor  prop- 

erty. 

327.  Effect  of  enactment  of  pro- 

hibition and  a  license  law. 

328.  Repeal  of  licensing  laws  af- 

ter license  issued. 

329.  License  by  implication. 

330.  Taken  subject  to  subsequent 

legislation. 

331.  Annullment     of     license     by 

change   of  law. 

332.  License  prospective,  not  ret- 

rospective. 

333.  Retroactive  effect  of  license. 

334.  Impossibility  to  secure  a  li- 

cense. 

335.  Neglect  or  improper  refusal 

to  grant  a  license. 


SECTION. 

336.  Performance  of  requisites  to 
obtain    a    license    not    a    li- 
cense. 

337.  What  a  license  does  and  does 

not   authorize. 

338.  Agent      or      servant,      when 

protected  by  license  of  his 
principal. 

339.  Sale    by    servant    when    his 

master    holds    no    license — 
Illegal    sales. 

340.  Servant's   license   no   protec- 

tion for  his  master. 

341.  Partnership  license. 

342.  Number  of  licenses  an  indi- 

vidual may  or  is   required 
to   hold. 

343.  City  may  require  license  in 

addition  to  a  State  license. 

344.  'City  license  not  a  defense  to 

a  State  violation. 

345.  United        States        license — 

State  license. 

346.  U.  S.  Government  license  no 
defense  to   State  license. 

347.  Duration  of  license. 

348.  Expired   license. 

349.  "On"    and    "off"    license. 

350.  Void   license — Collateral    at- 

tack. 


Sec.  318.     Definition. 

In  its  proper  sense,  a  licen.se  is  a  permit  to  do  business  that 
cannot  be  done  Avithout  it.^     It  is  synonymous  with  "author- 

iSonora    v.    Curtin,      137      Cal.       or,    31    Colo.    173;    74    Pac.    458; 
683;   70  Pae.  074;   Board  v.  May-       People  v.  Rains,  20  Colo.  489;   39 

478 


479 


LICENSES. 


§318 


ity"  or  "permission."  =  "The  popular  understanding  of  the 
word  license  undoubtedly  is.  a  permission  to  do  something 
which  without  the  license  would  not  be  allowable.  This  we 
are  to  suppose  was  the  sense  in  which  it  was  made  use  of  in 
the  Constitution.  But  this  is  also  the  legal  meaning."^  It 
is  essentially  a  grant  to  those  to  whom  it  is  given  or  extended, 
not  enjoyed  by  persons  generally.*  It  is  "granted  by  some 
competent  authority  to  do  an  act  which  without  such  authority 
would  be  illegal.""''  "The  object  of  a  license  is  to  confer  a 
right  that  does  not  exist  without  a  license.""  "A  common 
right  is  not  the  creation  of  a  license."  '  As  used  in  the  liquor 
laws  of  a  State,  "a  license  is  a  privilege  granted  by  the  court, 
or   other   competent    authority,   to   sell   liquor."^     Where    a 


Pac.  341;  Standard  Oil  Co.  v. 
Commonwealth,  119  Ky.  75;  82  S. 
W.  1020;  26  Ky.  L.  Rep.  985;  Ft. 
Smith  V.  Hunt,  72  Ark.  556;  82 
S.  W.  163;  6C  L.  R.  A.  238; 
Schweirman  v.  Highland  Park 
(Ky.),  113  S.  W.  507. 

It  is  not  a  privilege  that  any 
citizen  may  demand.  It  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  favor.  Schweirman  v. 
Highland  Park  (Ky.),  113  S.  W. 
507. 

2  Harmon  v.  Chicago  (III.),  26 
N.  E.  697;  Neuman  v.  State,  76 
Wis.  112;  +5  N.  W.  30;  Win- 
oski  V.  Gokey,  49  Vt.  282;  Sin- 
not  v.  Davenport,  22  How.  227 ; 
16  L.  Ed.  243;  San  Francisco  v. 
Liverpool,  etc.  Co.,  74  Cal.  113; 
15  Pac.  380;   7  Am.  St.  425. 

a  Youngblood  v.  Sexton,  32 
Mich.  406;  20  Am.  Rep.  '654; 
Chilvers  v.  People,  11  Mich.  43; 
Adler  v.  Whitbeck,  44  Ohio  St. 
439;   9  N.  E.  672. 

estate  V.  Frame,  39  Ohio  St. 
399;  Adler  v.  Whitbeck,  44  Ohio 
St.  439;   9  N.  E.  672. 

fi  Pullman  Southern  Car  Co.  v. 
Nolan,    22    Fed.    276;    Metcalf   v. 


Hart,  3  Wyo.  513;  27  Pac.  900; 
31  Am.  St.  122;  Caldwell  v.  Ful- 
ton, 7  Casey  (Pa.)  475;  72  Am. 
Dec.  760;  Shurman  v.  Ft.  Wayne, 
127  Ind.  109;  26  N.  E.  560;  11 
L.  R.  A.  378;  Hockett  v.  Wilson, 
12  Ore.  25;  6  Pac.  652;  Ander- 
son V.  Brewster,  44  Ohio  St.  576; 
9  N.  E.  683;  State  v.  Hipp,  38 
Ohio  St.  199;  State  v.  Hardy,  7 
Xeb.  377. 

8  Chilvers  v.  People,  11  Mich. 
43;  Adler  v.  Whitbeck,  44  Oiiio 
St.  539;   9  N.  E.  672. 

-  State  V.  Frame,  39  Ohio  St. 
399 ;  State  v.  Peel,  etc.,  Co..  36  W. 
Va.  802;  15  S.  E.  1000;  17  L.  R. 
A.  385. 

8  Hubman  v.  State,  61  Ark.  482; 
33  S.  W.  843;  Silver  v.  Sparta, 
107  Ga.  275;  33  S.  E.  31;  Chi- 
cago V.  Collins,  175  111.  445;  51 
N.  E.  907;  49  L.  R.  A.  408;  67 
Am.  Rep.  224. 

The  term  "liquor  license"  may 
mean  the  paper  writing  which 
usually,  though  not  necessarily, 
is  the  evidence  of  the  license;  or 
it  may  be  used  to  designate  the 
permission    to    sell    liquors.      Fie- 


§319 


TR-VFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


480 


statute  prohibited  the  taking  of  liquor  into  a  certain  territory 
without  a  permit  issued  by  the  lieutenant-governor,  and  an- 
other statute  authorized  a  municipality  in  this  territory  to 
require  a  license,  it  was  held  that  the  permit  was  not  the 
license  and  did  not  dispense  with  the  obtaining  of  a  license 
from  the  municipality."  The  license  must  be  a  written  one, 
it  has  been  held,  or  it  is  not  a  license.^** 


Sec.  319.     A  personal  trust. 

A  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquor  is  granted  to  the 
recipient  of  it  because  of  his  personal  fitness  to  receive  it  and 
act  thereunder.  It  is  a  personal  trust,  not  tranferable,  and 
not,  because  of  its  non-transferability,  an  asset  of  his  estate 
on  his  decease  or  assignment  in  bankruptcy.^^ 


genston  v.  Mulligan,  63  X.  J.  Eq. 
179;  51  Atl.  191;  United  States 
V.  Cutting,  3  Wall.  441;  18  L.  Ed. 
241;  Elmore  v.  Overton,  104  Ind. 
548;  4  X.  E.  197;  54  Am.  Rep. 
343,  or  it  may  mean  both,  as 
where  a  statute  authorizes  the  at- 
tachment and  sale  of  liquor  li- 
censes and  all  rights  and  interests 
therein.  Quinnipac  Brewing  Co. 
V.  Hackbarth,  74  Conn.  392;  50 
Atl.   1023. 

Under  authority  to  license  a 
city  cannot  stretch  its  powers  so 
as  to  prohibit.  Ex  parte  Sikes, 
102  Ala.  173;  15  So.  522;  24  L. 
R.  A.  774. 

In  Pennsylvania  a  statute  pro- 
vided that  if  a  "party  licensed" 
should  die  or  remove  his  license 
might  be  transferred  by  tlie  au- 
thority granting  it,  or  a  license 
be  granted  liis  successor  for  the 
remaining  part  of  the  year;  and 
it  was  lield  that  a  person  remov- 
ing from  tlic  State  between  the 
time  of  granting  the  license  and 
payment  of  the  fee  was  a  "party 


licensed."      In    re    Umholtz,     191 
Pa.   St.    177;    43   Atl.   75. 

9  Queen  v.  Salterio,  1  Ter.  L.  R. 
.301. 

10  Connecticut  Breweries  Co.  v. 
Murphy,  81  Conn.  145;  70  Atl. 
450. 

The  requiring  of  a  license  is  a 
proper  exercise  of  the  police  pow- 
er. Campbell  v.  Jackman  Bros. 
(Iowa),  IIS  X.  W.  755;  Appeal 
of  Allyn,  81  Conn.  534;  71  Atl. 
794. 

Usually  a  license  is  necessary 
to  sell  intoxicating  liquors.  Pra- 
ter v.  Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L. 
Rep.   344. 

11 //I  re  Buck's  Estate,  185  Pa. 
St.  57;  39  Atl.  821;  64  Am.  St. 
816;  Watkins  v.  Grieser,  11  Okla. 
302;  66  Pac.  332;  Furman,  etc. 
Co.  V.  Long.  113  Ala.  203;  21  So. 
339;  In  re  Whitlock's  License,  30 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  34;  In  re  Miller, 
171  Fed.  263;  In  re  Conner  &  Co., 
171  Fed.  201;  Tracy  v.  Ginzberg. 
189  Mass.  260;   75  X.  E.  637. 

Although   a   license   is   no   part 


481  LICENSES,  §§  320, 321 

Sec.  320.    Imposes  no  public  duties — Purpose  of  license. 

"License  to  a  person  to  follow  any  particular  trade  or 
business, ' '  it  was  said  in  a  New  York  case,  ' '  is  not  an  appoint- 
ment to  office,  nor  does  it  confer  any  of  the  powers  or  priv- 
ileges of  a  public  officer.  It  is  a  mere  license  to  follow  his 
calling,  whatever  it  may  be.  The  duties  to  be  performed  are 
not  public  duties,  and  the  public  have  no  interest  in  their  per- 
formance or  omission.  The  ob.ject  of  the  license  is  for  the 
purpose  of  controlling  the  business  and  preventing  its  being 
conducted  in  a  manner  injurious  to  the  public  welfare.  Be- 
yond that  the  public  interest  is  not  affected,  and,  if  the  licensee 
neglects  to  act  under  his  license,  the  public  cannot  com- 
plain."^- 

Sec.  321.    Not  a  tax. 

A  tax  is  not  a  license ;  it  does  not  come  within  the  definition 
of  a  license.  "Within  this  definition,!^  a  mere  tax  upon  the 
traffic  cannot  be  a  license  of  the  traffic,  unless  the  tax  confers 
some  right  to  carry  on  the  traffic  which  otherwise  would  not 
have  existed.  We  do  not  understand  that  such  is  the  case 
here.  The  very  act  which  imposed  this  tax  repealed  the  pre- 
vious law,  which  forbade  the  traffic  and  declared  it  illegal. 
The  trade  then  became  lawful,  whether  taxed  or  not ;  and  this 
law,  in  imposing  the  tax,  did  not  declare  the  trade  illegal  in 
case  the  tax  was  not  paid.  So  far  as  we  can  perceive,  a  failure 
to  pay  the  tax  no  more  renders  the  trade  illegal  than  would  a 
like  failure  of  a  farmer  to  pay  his  tax  on  his  farm  render  its 
cultivation  illegal.     The  State  has  imposed  the  tax  in  each 

of    an    estate's    assets,   yet    if   the  warranto.    State  v.  Gibbs  (X.  H.), 

administrator     make     a     personal  74  Pac.  229. 

profit     out     of     it,     and     if     he  12  People  v.  Beard,  33  How.  Pr. 

treat   it   as  a   part  of   the   estate,  32;     People    v.    Acton,    48    Barb. 

his  personal  creditors  cannot  reach  524. 

the  profits  he  derives  from  its  i3  "The  object  of  a  license  is  to 
uses.  Asherbach  v.  Carey  (Pa.),  confer  a  right  that  does  not  ex- 
73  Atl.  435.  ist  without  a  license."  Chilvers 
A  licensee  is  not  an  officer  of  v.  People,  11  Mich.  43,  49;  Kitson 
the  State,  and  his  right  to  sell  v.  Ann  Arbor,  26  Mich.  325;  Do- 
under  it  cannot  be  tested  by  quo  ran  v.  Phillips,  47  Mich.  228;   10 

N.  W.  350. 


§  321  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  482 

ease,  and  made  such  provision  as  has  been  deemed  needful  to 
insure  its  payment ;  but  it  has  not  seen  fit  to  make  the  failure 
to  pay  a  forfeiture  of  the  right  to  pursue  the  calling.  If  the 
tax  is  paid,  the  traffic  is  lawful ;  but  if  it  is  not  paid,  the  traffic 
is  equally  lawful.  There  is  consequently  nothing  in  the  case 
that  appears  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  license.  The  State  has 
provided  for  the  taxation  of  a  business  which  was  found  in 
existence,  and  the  carrying  on  of  which  it  no  longer  prohibits ; 
and  that  is  all.  But  it  is  urcred  that  by  taxing  the  business 
the  State  recognizes  its  lawful  character,  sanctions  its  exist- 
ence, and  participates  in  the  profits — all  of  which  is  within  the 
real  intent  of  the  prohibition  of  license.  The  lawfulness  of 
the  business,  if  by  that  we  understand  merely  that  it  is  no 
longer  punishable,  and  is  capable  of  constituting  the  basis  of 
contracts,  was  undoubtedly  recognized  when  the  prohibitory 
law  was  repealed ;  but  as  the  illegality  of  the  traffic  depended 
on  that  law,  so  its  lawfulness  now  depends  upon  its  repeal; 
the  tax  has  nothing  to  do  with  it  whatever.  Now,  it  is  not 
claimed,  so  far  as  we  are  aware,  that  the  repeal  of  the  pro- 
hibitory law  was  incompetent;  and  if  not,  the  mere  recogni- 
tion of  the  lawfulness  of  the  traffic  cannot  make  the  tax  levy 
or  any  other  law  invalid.  It  is  only  the  recognition  of  an 
existing  and  conceded  fact,  and  the  courts  cannot,  if  they 
would,  refuse  to  recognize  it.  The  idea  that  a  State  lends  its 
countenance  to  any  particular  traffic  by  taxing  it,  seems  to  us 
to  rest  upon  a  very  transparent  fallacy  It  certainly  over- 
looks or  disregards  some  ideas  that  must  always  underlie  taxa- 
tion. Taxes  are  not  favors ;  they  are  burdens ;  they  are 
necessary,  it  is  true,  to  the  existence  of  government,  but  they 
are  not  the  less  burdens,  and  are  only  submitted  to  because  of 
the  necessity.  It  is  deemed  advisable  to  make  careful  provi- 
sions to  preclude  these  burdens  becoming  needlessly  oppres- 
sive ;  but  it  is  conceded  by  all  the  authorities  that  under  some 
circumstances  they  may  be  carried  to  an  extent  that  will  be 
ruinous  to  individuals.  It  would  be  a  remarkable  proposition, 
under  such  circumstances,  that  a  thing  is  sanctioned  and 
countenanced  by  the  Government  Avhen  this  burden,  which 
may  prove  disastrous,  is  imposed  upon  it ;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  pounced  upon  and  condemned  when  the  burden  is 


483  LICENSES.  §  322 

withheld.  It  is  safe  to  predict  that  if  such  was  the  legal  doe- 
trine  any  citizen  would  prefer  to  be  visited  with  the  untaxed 
forms  of  government  rather  than  with  those  testimonials  of 
approval  which  are  represented  by  the  demands  of  the  tax 
gatherer."  "Taxes  upon  business  are  usually  collected  in  the 
form  of  license  fees;  and  this  may  possibly  have  led  to  the 
idea  that  seems  to  have  prevailed  in  some  quarters,  that  a  tax 
implied  a  license.  But  there  is  no  necessary  connection  what- 
ever between  them.  A  business  may  be  licensed  and  yet  not 
taxed,  or  it  may  be  taxed  and  yet  not  licensed.  And  so  far  as 
the  tax  being  necessarily  a  license,  that  position  is  frequently 
made  by  law  for  the  taxation  of  a  business  that  is  carried  on 
under  a  license  existing  independent  of  the  tax."  ^* 

Sec.  322.    License  distinguished  from  a  tax. 

There  seems  to  be  a  little  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
definition  of  a  license.  It  is  defined,  in  its  general  sense,  as  a 
"permission  granted  by  some  competent  authority  to  do  an 
act  which,  without  such  permission,  would  be  illegal."  ^•'  This 
agrees  in  substance  with  the  definition  as  given  in  a  number 
of  cases.'"     A  license  is  essentially  the  granting  of  a  special 

1*  Youngblood     v.      Sexton,     *2  does  not  aiitliorize  a  tax,   though 

Mich.  402 ;  20  Am.  Rep.  654.  a  fee  for  it  sufficient  to  cover  the 

A  license  "is  a  part  of  the   po-  cost   of   issuance    and    its   enforce- 

lice    regulations    of    the    country,  ment  may  be  exacted ;   but  if  the 

and  the   fee  is  rather   intended  to  fee  is  so  high  as .  to  amount  to  a 

prevent    the    indiscriminate    open-  prohibitory   tax,   it   cannot  be  ex- 

ing  of  such  establishments  than  to  acted.      Ottumwa    v.    Zekind,    95 

raise   revenue  by   taxation.      It   is  Iowa   922;    C4  N.   W.  622;    29   L. 

in  no  proper  sense  a  tax."     Burch  R.  A.  734;  58  Am.  St.  447;  Hoef- 

v.  Savannah,  42  Ga.  596  ling  v.  San  Antonio,  85  Tex.  228; 

Power  given  a  city  "to  license"  20   S.   W.   S5;    16   L.   R.   A.  608; 

gives   implied   power  to  tax  when  Burlington    v.    Putman    Ins.    Co., 

such  is  tlie  manifest  intention.    St.  31    Iowa   102;    State  v.  Ilerod,   29 

Joseph    V.    Ernst,    95    Mo.    360;    8  Iowa    123. 

S.  W.  558;   St.  Charles  v.  Elener,  i^  Bouvier's  Law  Die,  art.   "Li- 

155  Mo.  671;    56  S.   W.   291.     So  cense";    State    v.    Hipp,    38    Ohio 

does  a  power  "to  license  and  reg-  St.   206. 

ulate."      San    Jose    v.    San    Jose,  m  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Augusta,  50 

etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Cal.  475.     But  as  Ga.    530;    Chilvers    v.    People,    11 

a  rule  the  mere  power  to   license  Mich.  43;    Youngblood  v.  Sexton, 


§  322  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  484 

privilege  to  one  or  more  persons,  not  enjoyed  by  citizens 
generally,  or,  at  least,  not  enjoyed  by  a  class  of  citizens  to 
which  the  licensee  belongs.  A  common  right  is  not  the  crea- 
ture of  a  license.'^  The  result  of  the  definitions  M'hich  have 
been  given  of  a  license  as  implied  in  its  etymology,  is  in  con- 
formity to  the  sense  in  which  the  word  is  ordinarily  used,  and 
may  be  regarded  as  strictly  accurate.  That  is  permitted  which 
cannot  be  done  without  permission ;  and  to  say  that  a  person 
is  permitted,  licensed,  to  do  what  he  may  lawfully  do  without 
permission,  is  a  misuse  of  the  words.  The  distinction  between 
a  tax  upon  a  business  and  what  might  be  termed  a  license,  is, 
that  the  former  is  exacted  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  busi- 
ness is  carried  on,  and  the  latter  is  exacted  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  right  to  carry  it  on.  In  the  one  case  the  in- 
dividual may  rightfully  engage  in  and  carry  on  the  business 
M'ithout  paying  the  tax ;  in  the  other,  he  cannot.  Hence,  unless 
it  can  be  shown  that  a  simple  tax  on  the  liquor  traffic  enlarges 
the  privileges  of  those  engaged  in  it,  or  confers  a  right  that 
did  not  previously  exist,  there  is  no  ground  for  saying  the  tax 
is  a  license  of  the  business.'*  A  license  being  of  the  nature  of 
a  privilege,  it  would  be  a  strange  incongruity  to  grant  one 
the  privilege  of  bearing  the  burden  of  a  tax.  A  tax  which 
may  be  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  restraining  what  is 
opposed  to  the  public  interests,  would  hardly  be  called  a 
license  to  do  that  which  is  sought  to  be  restrained.  The  two 
things  are  entirely  distinct  in  their  characteristics.  A  license 
may  exist  without  the  imposition  of  a  tax,  and  a  tax  may  be 
imposed  without  the  granting  of  a  license.^" 

32  Mich.  406;  Plenler  v.  State,  11  v.   Bartley,   4    S.   R.    (N.   S.    W.), 

]S^eb.  547;.Andler  v.  Whitbeck,  44  290;  21  W.  X.  C.   (N.  S.  W.),  81; 

Ohio  St.  539;   Anderson  v.  Brews-  State  v.  Miller,  114  Iowa  396;  87 

ter,  44  Ohio  St.  576;  9  N.  E.  683.  N.  W.  287;   Doran  v.  Phillips,  47 

"State  V.   Frame,   39    Ohio   St.  Mich.  228;   10  N.  W.  350;  Allyan, 

399.  Appeal  of,  81   Conn.  534;   71  Atl. 

isAdler    v.    Whitbeck,    44    Ohio  794;   Brown  v.  State   (Tenn.),  114 

St.  539.  8.    W.     198;     State    v.    Plainfield, 

19  Anderson  V.  Brewster,  44  Ohio  44   X.   J.   L.    118;    Courtwright  v. 

«t.  576;   9  X.  E.   683.     For  cases  Xewaygo,  96  Mich.  290;  55  X.  W. 

on   this   generally,  see  Peterawold  808. 


485  LICENSES.  §  323 

Sec.  323.     Inherent  and  common  law  right  to  sell  liquors 
without  license. 

A  law  or  uuiiiicipal  ordinance  authorizing  the  licensing  of 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  cannot  be  defeated  as  uncon- 
stitutional on  the  ground  that  the  traffic  in  such  liquor  is 
dangerous  and  hurtful  to  society;  that  the  right  to  engage  in 
the  retail  traffic  of  such  licfnors  is  not  an  inherent  or  in- 
alienable riglit.  and  that  no  such  right  existed  at  common  law. 
It  is  true  that  brothels  and  gaming  houses  were  at  common 
law  under  all  circumstances  held  to  be  nuisances,  but  ale  houses 
and  other  places  in  which  intoxicating  liquors  were  sold 
to  be  drunk  were  not  so  held  or  regarded  unless  they  became 
disorderly,  and  in,  such  cases  it  was  not  the  mere  sale  of  the 
liquors  Avhich  constituted  them  nuisances  but  it  was  the  dis- 
orderly conduct  therein;  or,  in  other  words,  the  disorderly 
manner  in  which  they  were  conducted  or  kept,  and  in  such 
cases  it  was  immaterial  whether  the  keepers  thereof  were 
licensed  or  unlicensed.  The  first  general  statute  restricting 
and  regulating  the  keeping  of  ale  houses  and  tippling  houses 
was  passed  by  the  British  Parliament  in  1552,  and  was  the  act 
of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Parliament  of  Edward  VI.  This 
statute  constitutes  Chapter  25,  page  391,  of  the  English 
Statutes  at  Large,  1540  to  1552.  The  preamble  to  this  statute 
declares:  "For  as  much  as  intolerable  hurts  and  troubles  to 
the  commonwealth  of  this  realm  doth  daily  grow  and  increase 
through  such  abuses  and  disorders  as  are  had  and  used  in 
common  ale  houses  and  other  houses  called  tippling  houses, 
it  is  therefore  enacted  by  the  King,  our  Sovereign  Lord, ' '  etc. 
At  common  law  prior  to  the  passage  of  this  statute,  any 
person  had  the  right,  without  a  license,  to  keep  and  maintain 
ale  houses  and  tippling  houses.  Such  business  was  not  re- 
garded as  a  public  offense,  but  was  considered  and  held  to  be 
a  means  of  livelihood   which  one   was   free  to   follow.-'^     In 

20  2     Cooley's     Blackstone     {4th  dall,    3    Salk.    27;    Anonymous,    .3 

ed.),    p.    714;     1    Hawkins    P.    €.  Salk.    24,    25;     King    v.    Marriot, 

(Cum.  Ed.),  p.  714;    1    Bishop  on  4  Mod.    144   and   notes;    Faulkner 

Crim.    Law    (7th    ed.),    Sec.    505;  case,     1      Saund.     240;      King     v. 

1  Bisliop  on  Statutory  Crimes    ( 3(1  Ivyes,    2    Showers,    357 ;    State    v. 

ed.),    Sees.    984,    98'5;    Stevens    v.  Bertheol,   6    Blackf.   474;    39    Am. 

Watson,  1  Salk.  45;   King  v.  Ran-  Dec.    442;     State    v.    Milliken,    8 


§  323  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  486 

Bishop  on  Statutory  Crimes,  it  is  said:  "It  is  at  common 
law  lawful  to  keep  a  properly  regulated  inn,  ale  house  or 
tippling  house,  which  severally  are  indictable  only  when  dis- 
orderly. Hence,  a  fortiori,  the  simple  selling  of  intoxicating 
drinks  is  not  a  common  law  crime;  but  from  an  early  period 
in  English  legislation  during  ante-colonial  times,  and  thence 
downward  to  the  present  day  with  us,  statutes,  in  various 
forms  of  provisions,  have  been  enacted  as  aids  to  the  sup- 
pression of  erroneous  evils  which  the  use  or  abuse  of  inebri- 
ating liquors  have  wrought.  Indeed,  the  old  English  enact- 
ments of  this  sort  are  numerous,  and  they  have  largely  been 
the  models  for  legislation  in  our  States."-^  The  dicta  or  ex- 
pressions of  the  higher  courts,  both  State  and  Federal,  that 
the  right  to  engage  in  the  retail  traffic  of  intoxicating  liquor 
is  not  an  inherent  or  inalienable  right  invariably  occur  in  con- 
nection with  the  restricted  and  unregulated  traffic  in  such 
liquors  and  not  as  an  argument  to  defeat  laws  and  ordinances 
regularly  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  licensing  and  regulating 
the  sale  of  such  liquors.-^  In  the  language  of  Mr.  Justice  Greer : 
"It  is  not  necessary,  for  sake  of  justifying  the  State  legislation 
now  under  consideration,  to  array  the  appalling  statistics  of 
misery,  pauperism  and  crime  which  have  their  origin  in  the 
abuse  of  ardent  spirits.  The  police  power,  which  is  exclusive- 
ly in  the  States,  is  alone  competent  to  the  correction  of  these 
great  evils,  and  all  measures  of  restraint  or  prohibition  neces- 
sary to  effect  the  purpose  are  within  the  scope  of  that  author- 
ity.-^ As  has  been  aptly  said  by  another  learned  judge :  "The 
power  is  signally  exercised  in  legislation  designed  to  diminish 
and  prevent  the  demoralization  and  impoverishment  and  the 
nvimberless  vices  and  miseries,  which  as  the  mere  concomitants 
and  consequences  of  a  free  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors,  by 
restraining  or  prohibiting  them."  ~* 

Blackf.  260;    Welsh   v.   State,   126  23  License    Cases,    5    How.    504; 

Tnd.  71;  25  N.  E.   883;  Sopher  v.  People   v.   Walling,  53   Mich.  264; 

State,  169  Ind.  177;  81  X.  E.  913;  18  N.   W.  807. 
Commonwealth  v.   McDonough,   13  24  State  v.  Fitzpatrick,   16  R.  I. 

Allen    (Mass.)    581.  54;  11  Atl.  767 ;  Appeal  of  Allyan, 

211   Bishop  on  dim.  Law    (7th  81  Conn.  5.34;  71  Atl.  794;   Camp- 
ed.), See.  505.  bell    v.    .Tackman    Bros.     (Iowa), 

22Sopher  v.  State,  1(>9  Ind.  177;  118   N.   W.   755. 
81  N.  E.  913. 


487  LICENSES.  §  324 

Sec.  324.     License  to  sell  not  a  vested  rig-lit. 

The  enactment  of  a  law  regulating  the  liquor  traffic  is  an 
exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  State.  The  police  power  is 
a  governmental  one,  and  permits  obtained  under  laws  enacted 
in  its  exercise  are  not  contracts.  In  enacting  laws  for  the  reg- 
ulation of  the  business  of  retailing  liquors,  a  sovereign  power 
is  asserted,  and  its  exercise  does  not  confer  upon  any  officer 
authority  to  make  a  contract  which  will  abridge  or  limit  the 
great  and  important  attribute  of  sovereignty.  Sovereigns  may 
make  contracts,  which,  under  the  Constitution,  will  preclude 
them  from  impairing  vested  rights  by  subsequent  legislation, 
but  this  result  never  follows  the  exercise  of  a  purely  police 
power.  The  right  to  legislate  for  the  promotion  and  security 
of  the  public  safety,  morals  and  welfare  can  not  be  surren- 
dered or  bartered  away  by  the  Legislature.  Accordingly,  the 
uniform  decisions  of  the  courts  have  been  to  the  effect  that  a 
license  to  retail  intoxicating  liquors  is  nothing  more  than  a 
permit ;  it  is  neither  a  contract  nor  a  grant.  It  is  a  restrictive 
special  tax,  imposed  for  the  public  good,  in  the  exercise  of 
the  police  power  of  the  State.  It  may  be  changed  or  even 
annulled  by  the  supreme  legislative  power  of  the  State  when- 
ever the  public  welfare  demands.  Under  a  license  the  licensee 
acquires  no  vested  right  or  contractual  interest.  lie  takes 
the  license  with  the  tacit  condition  and  the  full  knowledge 
that  the  matter  is  at  all  times  within  the  control  of  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  State,  and  is  deemed  to  have  consented  to  all 
proper  conditions  and  restrictions  which  have  been  imposed 
by  the  Legislature,  or  may  in  the  future  be  imposed  by  it  in 
the  interest  of  the  public  morals  and  safety  relative  to  the 
traffic  in  such  liquors,  or  to  the  place  wherein  he  was  granted 
such  permit  to  sell  the  same,  notwithstanding  their  burden- 
some character.  And  a  law  regulating  or  authorizing  munici- 
pal corporations  to  regulate  and  impose  restrictions  upon  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  an  exercise  of  the  police  power 
of  the  State,  and  neither  the  State  nor  the  municipality  can, 
by  any  sort  of  contract,  license  or  permit,  abdicate,  embarrass 
or  bargain  away  its  right  to  exercise  the  pov/er  in  such   a 


§  325  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  488 

measure  as  it  may   thereafter   deem   the    public    welfare  re- 
quires.^^ 

Sec.  325.    License  not  property. 

A  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  a  contract  be- 
tween the  State  or  a  municipal  corporation  and  the  person 
licensed,  giving  the  latter  vested  rights,  protected  on  general 
principles  and  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  against 
subsequent  legislation ;  nor  is  it  property  in  any  legal  consti- 
tutional sense.  It  has  neither  the  qualities  of  a  contract  nor 
of  property,  but  is  simply  a  temporary  permit  to  do  what 
would  otherwise  be  an  offense  against  a  general  law  or  an 
ordinance.  It  forms  a  portion  of  the  internal  police  powers 
of  the  State  or  municipal  corporation,  is  issued  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  police  power,  and  is  subject  to  the  direction  of  the 
State  or  municipal  government,  which  may  modify,  revoke  or 
continue  it  as  the  State  or  corporation  may  deem  fit,  even 
though  l)ased  upon  a  valuable  consideration.  For  this  reason 
the  holder  of  such  a  license  cannot  complain  that  the  obliga- 
tion of  a  contract  has  been  impaired  or  that  he  has  been  unduly 

25  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  ]\Iiss.  462 ;   State  v.  Clarke,  54  Mo. 

U.  S.  25;  Powell  v.  State,  69  Ala.  17;    Metropolitan    Board    v.    Bar- 

10;    Kaffsmith   v.    People,   8    Colo.  rie,    34    N.    Y.    659;     Rowland    v. 

175;   La  CroLx  v.  Fairfield  Co.,  49  State,    12   Tex.    App.    418;    Hedges 

Conn.  591;  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughan,  v.    Titus,    47    Ind.    145;    State   v. 

1     Dak.     113;     Brown     v.     State,  Mullenhoff,    74    Iowa,   271;    37   N. 

82    Ga.    224;    Sprayberry    v.    At-  Vv.    329;    State   v.    Isabel,    40   La. 

lanta,  87  Ga.   120;    13   S.  E.   197;  Ann.  340;   4  So.  1 ;   Reithmiller  v. 

McKinney  v.  Salem,  77   Ind.  213;  People,    44    Mich.   280;     6    K    W. 

Moore  v.  City  of  Indianapolis,  120  667;   People  v.  Warden,   17   N.  Y. 

Ind.   483;    State  v.   Gerhardt,    145  Misc.  Rep.  1;  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  837; 

Ind.    439;    Shea   v.    City    of    Mun-  affirmed    6    N.    l".    App.    Div.    520; 

cie,    148    Ind.    14;    Columbus    City  39     N.    Y.     iSup.     582;     Common- 

V.    Cutcomp,    61    Iowa    672;    Pro-  wealth  v.  Sellers,   130  Pa.   St.  32; 

hibitory  Cases,  24  Kan.  700;   Fell  18    Atl.     541;     15    Atl.    891;     25 

V.    State,    42    Md.    71;    Calder    v.  Wkly.   .X.    C.   154;    Commonwealth 

Kurby,     5     Gray     (Mass.),     597;  v.   Donahue,    149   Pa.   St.    104;    24 

Commonwealth    v.     Brennan,     103  Atl.    188;    30    Wkly.    N.    C.    134; 

Mass.    70;    Hearn    v.    Brogan,    64  West  v.  Bishop,  110  Iowa  410;   81 

Miss.    334;    Wheeler    v.    State,   64  N.  W.  696. 


489  LICENSES.  §  326 

deprived  of  his  property.-"  Those  powers  which  are  inherent 
in  all  governments,  and  the  exertion  of  which,  as  emergen- 
cies may  demand,  is  essential  to  the  well-being  of  organized 
society,  cannot  be  abridged  or  weakened  or  their  vigor  im- 
paired by  contract  or  bargain.-^  The  right  to  legislate  for  the 
promotion  and  security  of  the  public  safety,  morals  and  wel- 
fare cannot  be  surrendered  or  bartered  away  by  the  Legis- 
lature.-^ 

Sec.  326.    Neither  a  contract  nor  property. 

A  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  a  contract  be- 
tween the  State  or  municipality  issuing  it  and  the  licensee. 
This  question  has  been  discussed  in  the  chapter  on  constitu- 
tional law,  but  it  Avill  bear  a  short  review  here.  "These 
licenses  to  sell  liquor,"  said  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New 
York,  "are  not  contracts  between  the  State  and  the  persons 
licensed,  giving  the  latter  vested  rights,  protected  on  general 
principles  and  by  the  United  States  Constitution  against  sub- 
sequent legislation,  nor  are  they  property  in  any  legal  or  con- 
stitutional sense.  They  have  neither  the  qualities  of  a  con- 
tract or  of  property,  but  are  merely  temporary  permits  to 
do  what  otherwise  would  be  an  offense  against  a  general  law. 
They  form  a  portion  of  the  internal  police  system  of  the  State, 
are  issued  in  the  exercise  of  its  police  powers,  and  are  subject 
to  the  direction  of  the  State  government,  which  may  modify, 
revoke  or  continue  them,  as  it  may  deem  fit.  If  the  act  of 
1857  had  declared  that  licenses  under  it  should  be  irrevocable 
(which  it  did  not.  but  by  its  very  terms  they  are  revocable), 
the  Legislature  of  subsequent  years  would  not  have  been  bound 

26  Brown  v.   State,   82  Ga.  224;  645;    Moore    v    Indianapolis,    120 

Block  V.  Jacksonville,  36  111.  301;  Ind.   483;    22  N.  E.  424. 

Moore  v.  City  of  Indianapolis,  120  2S  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97 

Ind.  483;   Prohibitory  Amendment  U.   S.  25;   Patterson  v.  Kentucky, 

Cases,  24  Kan.  700;   Fell  v.  State,  97  U.  S.  501;   Stone  v.  Mississip- 

42    Md.    71;    Calder    v.    Kurby,    5  pi,    101    U.   S.   814;    McKinney   v. 

Gray  (Mass.)  597;  Commonwealth  Town  of  Salem,  77  Ind.  213;   Fre- 

V.    Brennan,    103    :\rass.    70;    Met-  lei^h  v.  State.  8  Mo.  606;   State  v. 

ropolitan    Board,    etc.,    v.    Barrie,  Gerhardt,    145    Ind.    439;     44    N. 

34  N.   Y.  '659.  E.   469;    33   L.   R.   A.    3l3;    Horn- 

2TBoyd    V.   Alabama,    94    U.   S.  ing  v.   Wendell,   57   Ind.    171. 


§326 


TR.VFFIC   IN    IXTOXICATIKG   LIQUORS. 


490 


by  the  declaration.  The  necessary  powers  of  the  Legislature 
were  all  subjects  of  internal  police,  being  a  part  of  the  general 
grant  of  legislative  power  given  by  the  Constitution,  and  cannot 
be  sold,  given  away  or  relinquished."  "^  The  legal  qualities  of  a 
license  are  strikingly  brought  into  light  when  it  is  borne  in  mind 
that  the  power  authorizing  their  issuance  may  revoke  them 
at  any  time  without  either  a  liability  to  compensate  the  holders 
for  the  losses  the  holders  sustain  by  the  revocation  or  even  to 
return  the  fees  or  any  part  of  them  paid  for  them,  or  may 
even  increase  the  unpaid  fees  before  the  license  has  expired 
and  make  the  continuance  of  the  life  of  the  license  to  depend 
upon  the  payment  of  the  increased  amount.^"  And  likewise  it 
is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  rule  that  if  a  licensee  holds  a 
license  from  the  State,  the  latter  may,  while  it  is  in  force, 
authorize  a  municipality  to  exact  another  license  before  it 
shall  be  lawful  to  sell  under  the  first,  although  the  statute 
authorizing  a  municipality  to  require  the  license  is  enacted 


29  Metropolitan  Board  v.  Barrie, 
34  X.  Y.  959;  Moore  v.  Indian- 
apolis, 120  Ind.  483;  22  N.  E. 
424;  Brown  v.  State,  82  Ga.  224; 
7  S.  E.  '915;  Fell  v.  State,  42 
Md.  71;  20  Am.  Rep.  83;  Cald- 
er  V.  Kurby,  5  Gray  597 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Brennan,  103  Mass. 
70;  State  v.  New  Orleans,  113 
La.  371;  3'6  So.  999;  Meehan 
V.  Board,  73  N.  J.  L.  382;  64 
Atl.  689 ;  Martin  v.  State,  23  Neb. 
371;  Plenler  v.  State,  11  Md. 
547;  .State  v.  Carron,  73  N.  H. 
434;  62  Atl.  1044;  Powell  v. 
State,  69  Ala.  10;  Hearn  v.  Bro- 
gan,  64  Miss.  334;  1  So.  246; 
Rowland  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App. 
418;  Columbus  v.  Cutcomp,  61 
Iowa  672;  17  N.  W.  47;  State  v. 
Clarke.  54  Mo.  17;  14  Am.  Rep. 
471 ;  'SlcCny  v.  Clark.  104  Iowa.  491 ; 
73  N.  W.  1050;  Nelson  v.  State, 
17  Ind.  App.  403;   46  N.  E.  941; 


People  V.  Schmitz,  7  Cal.  App. 
330 ;  94  Pac.  407 ;  State  v.  Lichta, 
130  Mo.  App.  284;  109  S.  W.  825; 
State  V.  Roberts  (N.  H.),  C9  Atl 
722 ;  Kresser  v.  Lyman,  74  F.  765 ; 
Hevren  v.  Reed,  126  Cal.  219;  58 
P.  530 ;  La  Croix  v.  Commission- 
ers, 50  Conn.  321;  47  Am.  Rep. 
648;  Sprayberry  v.  City  of  At- 
lanta, 87  Ga.  120;  13  S.  E.  197; 
McCoy  V.  Clark,  104  Iowa  491; 
73  N.  W.    1050. 

30  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  120 
Ind.  493;  22  N.  E.  424;  McKin- 
ney  v.  Salem,  77  Ind.  213;  State 
V.  Bonnell,  119  Ind.  494;  21  N. 
E.  1101;  Stone  v.  Mississippi,  101 
U.  S.  814;  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachu- 
setts, 97  U.  S.  25;  Burnside  v. 
Lincoln  Co.,  m  Ky.  423;  7  S.  W. 
276;  i)  Ky.  L.  Rep.  63^5;  Mugler 
V.  Kansas.  123  U.  S.  623;  8  Sup. 
Ct.  273 ;  Prohibitory  Amendment 
Cases,  24  Kan.  700. 


49] 


LICENSES. 


§327 


after  the  State's  license  has  been  issued,  and  while  it  is  in 
force.^^ 


Sec.  327.     Effect  of  enactment  of  prohibition  and  a  license 
law. 

The  effect  of  the  adoption  of  a  constitutional  provision  in 
favor  of  total  prohibition  is  to  annul  all  statutes  on  the  sub- 
ject of  licenses  then  in  foree.^-  And  a  sale  after  such  pro- 
vision goes  into  force,  under  a  license  previously  issued  and 
which  by  the  terms  had  not  expired,  is  illegal.^^     So  where  a 


31  Elk  Point  V.  Vaughn,  1  Dak. 
113;  46  N.  W.  577;  McKinney  v. 
Salem,  77  Ind.  213;  Decker  v.  Mc- 
Gowan,  '59   Ga.   805. 

In  New  York  liquor  tax  certifi- 
cates are  property  only  in  a  qual- 
ified and  restricted  sense.  Peo- 
ple V.  Flynn,  18  N.  Y.  597;  77 
N.  E.  1194;  affirming  110  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  279;  9-6  N.  Y.  St.  655; 
and  reversing  48  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
159;  96  N  Y.  Sup.  653;  Lyman 
V.  Malcom  Brewing  Co.,  160  N. 
Y.  96;  54  N.  E.  577;  55  N.  E. 
408;  affirming  40  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
46;  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  634;  Frank 
V.  Forgotston,  61  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1118;  Duncan  v.  Clement  (X.  Y. ), 
119  N.  Y.  Supp.  374.  In  Brit- 
ish Columbia  a  license,  "like  other 
contracts,  carries  the  elements  of 
mutuality,"  subject  to  forfeiture 
for  its  violation,  /n  re  Clay,  1 
B.  C,  pt.  II,  300. 

The  owner  of  a  liquor  license  or 
a  liquor  tax  certificate  may  in- 
voke the  general  rules  of  law  to 
protect  it  in  any  proceedings  in- 
tended for  the  forfeiture  of  his 
rights  therein.  Lyman  v.  .ilal- 
com  Brewing  Co.,  160  N.  Y.  96;  54 
N.  E.  577 ;  affirming  40  N.  Y.  App. 
Div  46;  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  634;  Frank 


v.  Forgotston,  61  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1118;  llillard  v.  Giese,  25  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  222;  49  N.  Y.  Sup.  286; 
In  re  Livingston,  24  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  51;   48  N.   Y.    Supp.  989. 

In  Washington  it  is  held  that 
where  the  right  to  transfer  a  li- 
quor license  is  recognized  by  a 
statute,  it  becomes  valuable  prop- 
erty, subject  to  barter  and  sale. 
Deggender  v.  Seattle,  etc.  Co.,  41 
Wash.    385;    83    Pac.    898. 

So  long  as  the  State  recognizes 
the  right  to  make  and  sell  liquor, 
the  occupation  is  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  law,  but  the  license 
may  be  revoked.  F.  W.  Cook 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Garber,  168  Fed. 
942. 

32  State  v.  Tonks,  15  P.  I.  385; 
5  Atl.  636;  State  v.  Dorr,  82  Me. 
212;  19  Atl.  171;  State  v.  Swan, 
14  N.  W.  492. 

33  Prohibitory  Amendment  Cas. 
24  Kan.  700. 

Other  phases  under  such  a  pro- 
vision can  be  seen  in  the  follow- 
ing cases:  Coggeshall  v.  Groves, 
16  R.  I.  18;  11  Atl.  296;  Frank- 
lin v.  Wostfall,  27  Kan.  614; 
State  V.  Clark,  15  R.  I.  383;  5 
.Atl.  6.35;  State  v.  Kane,  !5  R.  I. 
395;   6  Atl.  783. 


§§  328,  329        TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  492 

statute  for  licensing  the  sale  of  liquors  is  adopted,  and  which, 
prohibits  all  sales  except  under  license  is  of  so  general  a  char- 
acter that  it  repeals  a  previous  prohibitory  law ;  ^*  but  a  stat- 
ute prohibiting  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  liquors  "to  be 
used  as  a  beverage"  is  not  affected  by  a  general  statute  of 
subsequent  data  prohibiting  the  manufacture  and  sale  of 
liquors  for  "other  purposes.""^  Of  course,  a  general  licens- 
ing statute  which  repeals  all  previous  laws  concerning  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquors  will  remit  all  penalties  incurred  under 
such  laws,  unless  there  be  a  saving  clause.^^ 

Sec.  328.    Repeal  of  licensing  law  after  license  issued. 

As  a  license  is  not  a  contract,  and  the  holder  of  it  has  no 
vested  right  therein  within  the  meaning  of  that  phrase  in 
the  Constitution,  it  follows  that  there  is  no  limitations  on  the 
right  of  the  Legislature  or  on  the  city  when  it  has  issued  the 
license  to  repeal  the  statute  or  ordinance  under  which  it  has 
been  issued,  although  the  repeal  may  result  in  absolute  prohibi- 
tion by  the  annulment  of  the  license. ^^  Saving  clauses  may, 
however,  preserve  or  keep  in  force  licenses  then  issued  until 
they  expire  by  the  limitations  prescribed  by  the  law  repealed.^* 

Sec.  329,     License  by  implication. 

The  complying  with  all  the  requirements  to  secure  a  license 
is  not  the  equivalent  of  a  license  actually  granted  or  issued. 

34  Culler  V.  state,  42  Conn.  55;  State,    14   Tex.   App.    31;    Monroe 

State   V.    Spokane   Falls,    2    Wash.  v.  State,  8  Texas  App.  343;  1-rath- 

40;   25   Pac.  903.  er    v.    State,    14    Tex.    App.    453; 

sn  State  v.  Kane,   ^5  l\.  1.  3:>5;  Dawson  v.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  670; 

6    Atl.   783.     In   this   case   a   pro-  8    S.   W.   820;    Wells   v.   State,   24 

hibitory    clause    in    the    Constitu-  Tex.  App.  230;   5  S.  W.  830. 
tion  forbade  the  manufacture  and  37  pieuler  v.  State,  11  Neb.  547; 

sale  of  liquors  "to   be   used   as   a  10  N.   W.    481;    State   v.   Holmes, 

beverage,"   and   it   was    held   that  38    N.    H.    225     (Adams   v.    Ilack- 

the  Legislature  could  enact  a  law  ett,   27   N.   H.   289;    59   Am.   Dec. 

forbidding  their   manufacture  and  376,  is  not  the  law  on  this  point)  ; 

sale   for   "other  purposes."  Badgett    v.    State    (Ala.),    48    So. 

30  State    V.    Sutton,    100    N.    C.  54. 
476 ;  6  S.  E.  687.  38  Menken    v.    Atlanta,    78    Ga. 

Such    is   the  case  by   the   adop-  668;  3  So.  414;  Griffin  v.  Atlanta, 

tion    of    local    option.      Freese    v.  7'8  Ga.  679;   4  So.   154. 


493  LICENSES.  §  329 

If  it  were,  then  the  license  would  practically  be  one  bj'^  impli- 
cation, or  a  quasi  parol  license,  things  or  conditions  the  stat- 
utes do  not  recognize.^''  And  statutes  or  ordinances  cannot  be 
construed  as  impliedly  granting  licenses  or  permits  to  sell  in- 
toxicating liquors.  This  rule  is  very  well  illustrated  in  a  num- 
ber of  cases.  Thus,  where  the  selectmen  of  a  town  in  Massa- 
chusetts, having  full  authority  so  to  do,  ordered  an  officer  of 
the  town  to  cause  all  saloons  to  be  closed  on  an  hour  named, 
and  intimating  an  intention  to  prosecute  all  offenders  in  a  cer- 
tain contingency,  a  defendant  claimed  the  result  of  such  action 
was  that  he  w^as  entitled  to  sell  liquor  at  times  and  under 
circumstances  not  covered  by  this  order  and  intimation,  but 
the  court  refused  to  uphold  his  claim,  because  to  do  so  would 
be  in  effect  to  hold  that  a  license  had  been  granted  by  impli- 
cation.^*^ A  statute  provided  that  any  person  who,  after  the 
fifteenth  of  January,  in  any  year,  engaged  in  or  carried  on  any 
business  for  which  a  license  is  required  should  be  amenable  to 
the  law,  and  it  was  held  that  no  one  was  justified  in  sell- 
ing liquors  before  that  date  without  first  procuring  a  license.*^ 
And  a  law  providing  that  a  license  shall  not  be  granted  out- 
side of  cities  and  towns,  and  making  it  unlawful  to  sell  with- 
out a  license,  does  not  authorize  a  sale  within  these  munici- 
palities without  a  license  first  obtained.^-  Under  no  pretense 
of  legitimate  construction  of  a  statute,  where  a  yearly  license  is 
granted  can  it  be  claimed  that  the  infliction  of  a  fine  for 
conducting  the  business  of  selling  intoxicating  liquors  during 
any  year  shall  be  an  implied  permission  to  continue  to  conduct 
the  business  without  a  license  for  the  remainder  of  such  year.^^ 

3»  state  V.  Moore,  14  X.  H.  451;  even    to    the     knowledge     of     the 

Lawrence  v.  Gracey,   11  John   179.  courts. 

^0  iCommonwealth     v.     Mathews,  Where    a    city    was    empowered 

129  Mass.  485.  to  license  the  sale  of  liquors,  and 

*i  Moog     V.     Espalla,     93     Ala.  a    statute    provided    that    such    a 

'303 ;    9   So.  596.  license     should     not     authorize    a 

■12  State  V.  Cofield,  22  S.  C.  301.  sale   "unless   the  .State   license   be 

43  State    V.    ilcBride,   4   MeCord  obtained    and    the    State    tax    be 

332.  paid    before    the    grant    thereof," 

In  one  State,  and  perhaps  more,  it  was  held  that  the.  county  court 

this    practice    is    secretly    pursued  had  no  power  to  refuse  a  license, 

by  connivance  of  the  police  force,  because    the    purpose    of    the    law 


§  330  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  494 

Sec.  330.    Taken  subject  to  subsequent  legislation. 

From  what  has  already  been  said,  the  conclusion  is  readily 
reached  that  a  licensee  accepts  his  license,  not  only  subject  to 
all  laws  then  in  force  having  a  bearing  upon  and  regulating 
the  liquor  traffic,  but  also  subject  to  all  reasonable  (indeed, 
they  may  be  unreasonable  if  reasonable  in  the  estimation  of 
the  Legislature")  regulations  and  restraints  that  may  be  adopt- 
ed in  the  future;  and  conditions  to  that  effect  need  not  be 
inserted  in  the  license  itself.**  Thus  a  law  enacted  after  a 
license  is  issued  may  forbid  sales  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  a 
drunkard  or  minor;  for  no  one  has  or  can  acquire  a  vested 
right  to  ruin  the  health  and  morals  of  his  fellow  beings.*^ 
And  so  a  licensee  may  be  forbidden  to  sell  on  holidays,  although 
it  was  lawful  to  do  so  when  he  received  his  license;*^  or  he 
may  be  forbidden  after  the  license  goes  into  force  to  give  away 
or  sell  food  upon  the  licensed  premises,  even  though  the  stat- 
ute under  which  it  is  issued  permitted  selling  or  giving  away 
of  food,  and  provided  that  every  license  issued  under  its  pro- 
visions shall  })e  valid  for  the  term  for  which  it  was  granted, 
and  that  "the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  holder  thereof  dur- 
ing such  term  shall  be  governed  by  the  laws  in  force  imme- 
diately prior  to  the  taking  effect  of  this  act,"  and  the 
subsequent  law  provided  that  those  provisions  of  the  earlier 
law  "relating  to  the  transfer,  cancellation  or  revocation  of 
a  license,  the  collection  of  penalties,  or  prosecution  for  the 
violation  of  law,  shall  continue  in  force  as  to  any  license  which 
has  not  expired  at  the  time  this  act  takes  effect  until  the 
expiration  thereof. "  ^'^     So  a  licensee  may  be  required  by  a 

was    fully    met    by    the    payment  *^  Hedges  v.  Titus,  47  Ind.  145 ; 

of  the  State  tax.     Griffith  v.  Com-  Commonwealth  v.  Sellers,   130  Pa. 

momvealth,    14    Ky.    L.    Rep.    (ab  St.    32;     18    Atl.    541;     25    Wkly. 

stract)    303.  N.  C.   154;    15   Atl.  891    (sales  to 

If  a  city  have  no  power  to  ex-  minors  forbidden). 

act    a    license,    the    State    license  ^e  Reithmiller      v.      People,      44 

will    authorize   sales    within    such  Mich.   280;    6   N.   W.  {567. 

city.      Baldwin     County     v.    Mil-  4^  In    this    instance    the    subse- 

lidgcville,  4"2  Ga.   325.  quent  statute  was  an  entirely  new 

4*  Baldwin  v.  Smith,  82  111.  162;  statute,    repealing    the    old    stat- 

State  V.  Isabel,  40  La.  Ann.  340;  ute,  under   which  the   license  had 

4  So.  1 ;  y.  VV.  Cook  Brewing  Co.  been    issued,    but   continuing   such 

V.  Garber,  I'GS  Feb.  942.  old   license    in    force     under     the 


495 


LICENSES. 


§331 


subsequent  statute  to  sell  in  certain  increased  quantities  and 
be  forbidden  to  sell  liquors  to  be  drunk  upon  the  premises.*^ 
And  so  the  State  may  require  a  licensee  to  take  out  a  city 
license  before  he  can  continue  his  sales  under  his  State 
license/^  So  the  fee  for  the  license  then  in  force  may  be 
increased  for  the  remainder  of  the  term.^'' 


Sec.  331.    Annulment  of  license  by  change  of  law. 

Th?  passage  anrl  adoption  of  a  constitutional  or  statutory 
provision  by  which  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  prohib- 
ited will  have  the  effect  of  repealing  by  implication  all  laws 
authorizing  the  issuance  of  licenses  and  of  annulling  those 
which  may  have  been  issued  previously  under  laws  authoriz- 
ing them  to  be  issued,  unless  their  continuance  for  the  time 
they  were  issued  is  saved  by  a  proviso  ;^^  and  the  same 
will  be  true  of  the  passage  and  adoption  of  a  local  option 
law.^-     It  cannot  be  said  in  either  of  these  events  that  th-e  con- 


clause  above  quoted.  People  v. 
Warden,  6  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  520; 
39  N.  Y.  Supp.  &82,  affirming  17 
N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  1 ;  3S  N.  Y.  Supp. 
837. 

48  Commonwealth  v.  Donahue, 
149  Pa.  St.  104;  24  Atl.  188;  30 
Wkly.  N.  C.   124. 

The    following    decisions    cannot 
be  said  to  be  in   accord  with  the 
later  and  better  considered  cases 
Rome    V.    Lumpkin,    5    Ga.    447 
Hannibal  v.  Guyott,   1«  Mo.  515 
Adams   v.    Hackett,    7    Post.    289 
59  Am.  Dec.  376;   State  v.  Baker, 
32    Mo.    App.    9«.      The     case     of 
State    V.    Andrews,    26    Mo.    171, 
was  an  instance  of  statutory  con- 
struction;   and   the   cases   of   Leh- 
ritter  v.  State,  42  Ind.  482;  State 
V.    MullenhofT,    74    Iowa    271;    37 
N.    W.    329;    and    Watts  v.    Com- 
monwealth,  7'8   Ky.   329,   involved 
a     saving     clause     in     subsequent 
statute. 

In  Gilhon  v.  Wells,  04  Ga.   192, 


was  involved  an  ordinance  requir- 
ing all  persons  then  or  thereaf- 
ter holding  licenses  to  close  their 
drinking  places  when  "any  de- 
nomination of  Christian  people" 
were  holding  church  in  the  town. 
It  was  held  void,  but  it  was  void 
as  to  future  licensees. 

49  Elk  Point  V.  Vaughn,  1  Dak. 
113;  46  N.  W.  577. 

50  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  120 
Ind.  483;    22  N.   E.  424. 

51  Brown  v.  State,  82  Ga.  224; 
7  S.  E.  915;  Prohibitory  Amend- 
ment Cases,  24  Kan.  700;  Calder 
v.  Kurby,  71  Mass.  (5  Gray) 
597;  Wheeler  v.  State,  64  Miss. 
462;  State  v.  Tonks,  15  R.  I.  385; 
5  Atl.   636. 

52  Menken  v.  Atlanta,  78  Ga. 
668;  2  S.  E.  559;  State  v.  Cook, 
24  Minn.  247;  Wheeler  v.  State, 
64  Miss.  462;  Robertson  v.  State, 
12  Tex.  App.  541;  Ex  parte  Lynn, 
19  Tex.  App.  293. 


§  331  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  496 

stitutional  provisions  that  no  law  "impairing  the  obligation 
of  contracts  shall  be  passed,"  and  that  "no  man's  property 
shall  be  taken  by  law  without  just  compensation"  have  been 
violated.  This  is  so  because  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquor 
is  not  a  contract,  nor  a  property  right,  nor  a  vested  interest 
of  any  sort.  It  is  merely  a  permission  to  engage  in  a  business 
which  is  hurtful  to  society,  which  the  law  regards  with  dis- 
favor, and  which  may  be  withdrawn  at  any  time.^^  In  accept- 
ing such  a  license  the  licensee  does  it  with  the  knowledge  that 
it  is  at  all  times  within  the  control  of  the  Legislature,  and  he 
will  be  deemed  to  have  consented  to  all  proper  conditions  and 
restrictions  which  have  been  or  may  be  imposed  in  the  fu- 
ture, relative  to  the  traffic  in  such  liquors,  notwithstanding 
their  burdensome  character  and  that  he  may  have  paid  a  val- 
uable consideration  for  the  license.'^*  It  is  the  peculiar  prov- 
ince of  the  State,  either  by  constitutional  or  legislative  enact- 
ment, or  through  authority  delegated  to  its  municipalities,  to 
exercise  its  police  power  for  the  protection  of  the  lives,  health, 
and  property  of  its  citizens,  as  well  as  to  maintain  good 
order  and  preserve  public  morals.  It  is  everywhere  conceded 
that  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  affects  all  these  subjects, 
and  that  it  is,  hence,  a  proper  subject  for  police  regulation. 
It  is  essential,  therefore,  that  the  power  to  regulate  shall  be 
a  continuing  one,  ever  present  and  available,  to  be  exercised 
by  the  State  as  the  emergency  may  require.  Hence,  the  rule 
that  neither  the  State  nor  any  of  its  agencies  to  whom  the 
power  has  been  delegated,  can  divest  themselves  of  the  right 
to  impose  such  other  additional  restrictions  upon  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors  tjs  the  maintenance  of  good  order  or  the 
preservation  of  public  morals  may  seem  to  require. ^'^ 

K3  People    V.    Hawley,    3     Mich.  Brewing   Co.   v.   Garber,    168   Fed. 

330;     Schwuchow    v.    Chicago,    ('-S  942. 

111.  444;   Fell  v.  State,  42  Md    71;  55  Moore    v.     Indianapolis,     120 

Metropolitan  Board  v.   Barrie,  34  Ind.  483;    22  X.  E.  424. 

N.  Y.  659.  Tims    the    Legislature    may    au- 

^*  Haggart  v.   Stehlin,   137   Ind.  thorize  a  city  by  ordinance  to  an- 

43;   35  N.   E.   997;    State  v.  Ger-  mil  a  State  license  then   in  force, 

hardt,  145  Ind.  439;   44  N.  E.  469;  Cuthbert    v.    Conly,    32    Ga.    211. 

Shea  V.  City  of  Muncie,   148   Ind.  The  case  of  Rome  v.  Lumpkin,   5 

14;    43    X.    E.    138;    F.    W.   Cook  Ga.   447,   is  no  longer   an   author- 
ity. 


497  LICENSES.  §  332 

Sec.  332.     License  prospective,  not  retrospective. 

A  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  should  bear  date  of  the 
day  upon  which  it  is  issued ;  it  takes  effect  from  that  day.    It 
does  not  relate  back  to  the  order  or  judgment  granting  it, 
unless  there  is  a  statute  providing  that  it  shall  do  so.    Dating 
it  back  so  as  to  legalize  sales  made  between  the  date  of  the 
order  or  judgment  and  the  issuing  of  the  license  will  not  have 
that  effect.^**     It  cannot  act  retrospectively  so  as  to  condone 
offenses  against  the  statute  prior  to  its  issue.    It  is  the  license 
properly  dated  and  issued,  and  not  the  order  or  judgment 
granting  it,  that  authorizes  an  applicant  to  sell  at  retail.    The 
order  or  judgment  is  not  the  license ;  and  when  the  license  is 
obtained  and  dated,  it  looks  forward,  and  not  backward.     It 
cannot  have  relation  so  as  to  cover  an  intermediate  space.   The 
order  or  judgment  granting  a  license  is  but  one  of  the  pre- 
liminary steps  in  procuring  it.     Such  an  order  or  judgment 
may  have  been  made  or  rendered,  and  the  applicant  then  re- 
fuse to  pay  the  license  fee  or  execute  the  bond  required  by 
the  statute.     The  statutes  in  such  cases,  almost  invariably, 
provide  for  the  payment  of  the  fines  and  costs  assessed  against 
the  licensee  for  violations  of  the  law  and  all  civil  damages  occa- 
sioned by  unlawful  sales  made  by  him.     The  sureties  on  such 
a  bond  can  not  be  held  liable  to  pay  fine  and  costs  or  civil 
damages  which  have  been  or  may  be  adjudged  against  the 
licensee  on  account  of  anything  done  before  the  execution 
of  the  bond,  though  done  after  the  making  of  the  order  or 
rendering  of  the  judgment  granting  the  license.     An  appli- 
cant in  such  case  cannot  be  under  license  unless  at  the  same 
time  he  is  under  bond,  nor  can  he  obtain  a  license  until  he  has 
paid  the  license  fee."    The  principle  here  involved  is  the  same 

56Zecrlin     V.     Carver     Co.,     72       pher    v.  State,    157    Ind.    360;    61 
Minn.  17;  74  N.  W.  901.  ^^-   K.    785;    State  v.   Pittman,   10 


57  Edwards  v.  State,  22  Ark 
■2'53;  Johnson  v.  State,  60  Ga 
634 ;  Reese  v.  Atlanta,  63  Ga.  344 
Hunter  v.  State,  79  Ga.  365 
Moore  v.  People,  109  111.  499 
Wiles     V.     State,     33     Ind.     293 


Kan.  o93 ;  Commonwealth 
Welsh,  144  Mass.  356;  11  N.  E 
423;  State  v.  Shaw,  32  Me.  570 
People  V.  Foster,  64  Mich.  715 
People  V.  DeGroot,  111  Mich.  245 
State    V.     Hughes,    24    Mo.     147 


Keiser  v.'  State,  78  Ind.   206;   So-       State    v.    O'Connor,    65    Mo.    App. 


§  332  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  498 

under  the  United  States  internal  revenue  laws.^^  A  receipt 
for  a  license  fee  in  such  case  is  not  retroactive,  and  cannot 
be  admitted  in  evidence  on  a  charge  for  retailing  liquor  during 
a  period  of  time  prior  to  its  issuance.  And  this  principle  has 
been  applied  where  a  sale  was  made  after  an  application  for 
a  license  had  been  made,  but  the  license  could  not  be  obtained 
until  afterwards,  because  of  the  fact  that  there  was  no  officer 
authorized  to  issue  it ;  ''^  also,  where  the  licensee  had  given  a 
bond,  which  was  defective  because  one  of  the  sureties  was 
disqualified,  although  the  bond  was  given  in  good  faith  and 
w^as  sufficient  in  form  and  had  been  approved  by  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities.''^  Where  an  ordinance  provided  all  licenses 
should  be  taken  out  during  the  first  week  in  April  and  the 
first  week  in  October,  to  continue  one  year  from  those  weeks, 
but  permitted  the  granting  of  licenses  at  other  times  if  the 
applicant  paid  for  a  full  year,  it  was  held  that  a  licensee  tak- 
ing out  his  license  in  December,  which  would  expire  during 
the  first  week  of  the  following  October,  could  not  justify  a 
sale  made  in  November  immediately  preceding  the  Decem- 
ber he  took  it  out,  although  he  received  a  receipt  for  a  license 
beginning  the  previous  October.^^  In  the  same  State  it  was 
held  that  the  penalty  was  not  remitted  by  the  issuance  of  the 
license,  although  the  ordinance  under  which  it  was  issued  pro- 
vided that  after  suit  commenced  for  a  penalty  no  person  should 
be  permitted  to  take  out  a  license  without  the  payment  of 

325;    Overseen,  etc.,  v.   Warner,  3       overruled   in    Keiser   v.   State,    78 


Hill  (N.  Y.),  150;  Kingston  ^ 
Osterhondt,  23  Hun  (N.  Y.),  66 
State  V.  Cofield,  22  S.  C.  301 
State  V.  Luddington,  33  Wis.  107 
State     V.     Fisher,    33    Wis.     155; 


Ind.  430.  See  State  v.  Strath- 
mann,  4  Mo.  App.  (abstract),  633. 
In  Missouri  a  license  takes  ef- 
fect from  the  date  of  its  delivery; 
and  antedating  it  does  not  affect 


Brown  v.  State,  27   Tex.  335.  its    validity.       State    v.    Leonard 

68  United    States    v.    Angel,    11  (Mo.),   116  S.  W^  14. 

Fed.   Rep.    155.  When  a  license  bears  two  dates, 

59  Bolduc  V.  Randall,  107  Mass.  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the 

121;  State  V.  McNary,  88  Mo.  143.  true  date  of  its  issuance.     Fagan 

soWolcott  v.   Judge,    112   Mich.  v.  State    (Del.),   74  Atl.  692. 

311;  70  N.  W.  831.     The  cases  of  ei  Charleston     v.      Feckman,      3 

Vannoy  v.  State,  64  Ind.  447,  and  Rich.  L.  385. 

State  V.  Wilcox,  66  Ind.  557,  are 


499  LICENSES.  §  333 

the  penalty.®-  On  the  day  an  applicant  applied  for  a  city 
license  and  paid  one-half  the  license  fee,  a  statute  was  passed 
prohibiting  the  issuance  of  a  license  to  a  person  who  should 
not  have  paid  the  county  fee  as  well  as  the  city  fee.  City 
licenses  expired  December  31st,  and  the  application  was  made 
during  the  following-  January.  In  the  following  July  he  ob- 
tained his  license,  in  which  it  was  recited  that  it  was  good  until 
the  following  December  31st.  Two  days  before  he  had  paid 
this  half  of  the  license  fee  he  made  a  sale  of  liquor.  It  was  held 
that  his  license  did  not  have  such  a  retroactive  effect  as  to 
enable  him  to  escape  the  penalty  of  selling  without  a  license.'^' 
The  fact  that  no  board  had  been  created  to  issue  the  license 
at  the  time  of  the  application  will  not  excuse  a  sale  thereafter 
made  and  before  the  license  was  issued.®*  If  a  license  be  pro- 
duced covering  the  period  of  sale,  the  prosecution  may  show 
that  it  had  been  antedated.®^ 

Sec.  333.    Retroactive  effect  of  license. 

Whether  or  not  a  license  can  have  such  a  retroactive  effect 
as  legalizes  past  illegal  sales  has  been  a  divided  [question  in 

62  Charleston     v.     Schmidt,     11       cases  are  recognized  as  sound  de- 
Rich.  L.  343.  cisions. 

But   see   Charleston    v.    Corleis,  A  statute  providing  for  a  license 

2  Bailey   (S.  €.),  186.  during   a    "calendar   year"   means 

63  State  V.  Mancke,  18  S.  C.  81.  the  year  from  January  1st  to  De- 
64Bolduc  V.  Randall,  107  Mass.  cember  31st,   inclusive,  and  not  a 

221  period  of  twelve  months  commenc- 
es Commonwealth  V.  Welch,  144  ing  at  any  fixed  or  designated 
Mass.  356;  11  N.  E.  423;  State  v.  month,  and  terminating  with  the 
Leonard  (Mo.),  116  S.  W.  14.  day  of  the  corresponding  month  in 
In  the  case  of  Rome  v.  Knox,  14  the  next  succeeding  year.  Carroll 
How.  Pr.  268,  a  new  law  made  it  v.  Wright,  131  Ga.  728;  63  S.  W. 
impossible  to  renew  a  license  that  260.  See  also  Crothers  v.  Mon- 
had  expired  April  first  until  July  teith,  11  Manitoba,  373. 
first,  when  the  renewal  was  dated  When  license  may  become  efTec- 
back,  and  sales  in  the  interval  five  in  England.  Rex  v.  John- 
made  legal;  and  a  like  ruling  was  ston,  75  L.  J.  K.  B.  22«;  [1906] 
made  in  Pahner  v.  Doney,  2  1  K.  B.  228;  94  L.  T.  377;  54  W. 
Johns.  Cas.  346.  But  at  the  pres-  R.  347;  30  J.  P.  118;  22  T.  L.  R. 
ent  day  (these  were  early  cases)  226. 
it  is  exceedingly  doubtful  if  these 


§  333  TRAFFIC   IX   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  500 

the  past;  but  it  may  now  be  regarded  as  settled  that  it  can- 
not. Where  a  license  was  granted,  thereafter  a  sale  made  at 
the  place  for  which  it  was  granted,  a  prosecution  then  insti- 
tuted, and  the  next  day  the  requisite  bond  was  filed  and  the 
license  issued,  dated  back  to  the  date  of  the  grant,  it  was 
held  that  it  could  have  no  such  retroactive  effect  as  to  relieve 
the  licensee  from  the  penalty  he  had  incurred  by  making  the 
sale,  although  the  license,  being  only  for  one  year,  began  to 
run  on  the  day  it  was  granted.*"^  "The  order  of  the  board 
is  not  the  license,"  said  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  "nor 
does  it  alone  confer  the  power  to  retail.  It  is  but  one  of  the 
preliminary  steps  in  procuring  the  license.  The  order  may 
be  made,  but  the  applicant  may  refuse  to  pay  the  fee  or  exe- 
cute the  bond,  without  which  he  is  not  entitled  to  the  license. 
It  is  the  license  itself,  properly  procured,  that  confers  the  right 
to  retail  under  the  statute,  and  until  it  is  issued  no  such 
right  is  conferred.  It  is  made  a  penal  offense  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors  by  a  less  quantity  than  a  quart  at  a  time, 
or  to  sell  any  quantity  to  be  drunk  or  suffered  to  be  drunk 
in  the  vendor's  house  without  such  license,  and  it  is  not  in 
the  power  of  the  county  board  or  the  auditor  to  grant  a  license 
extending  back  to  a  prior  date,  so  as  to  cover  offenses  already 
committed.  The  license  can  only  take  effect  from  the  date 
it  is  issued."®^  In  another  line  of  cases,  however,  it  is  held 
that  the  subsequent  issuance  of  the  license  so  far  legalizes  the 
sale  as  to  enable  the  vendor  of  the  liquor  to  escape  the  penalty 

66  Keiser  v.   State,   78    Ind.   430  State,   78  Ind.  430,  and  Dudley  v. 

(overruling   Vannoy   v.    State,    64  State,    91    Ind.    312,   are   made    to 

Ind.  447,  and  State  v.  Wilcox,  60  turn     upon     the     fact     that     the 

Ind.    557);    Houser    v.    State,    18  grantee    had    not    filed    his    bond, 

Ind.  106;   Schlict  v.  State,  31  Ind.  which   he    must   have   done  before 

246;  Wiles  v.  State,  33  Ind.  206;  getting  his  license,  when  the   sale 

Fagan  V.  State  (Del.),  74  Atl.  692.  was    made;    but   even    though   the 

«7  Wiles   V.    State,   33   Ind.    206.  bond  had  been  filed,  and  no  license 

To    same    effect    are    many    cases.  taken  out,  the  sale  would  now  be 

Edwards   v.    State,   22    Ark.    253;  held  illegal  by  the  great  majority 

Lawrence  v.  Gray,  11  Johns.   179;  of  cases.)     State  v.  Bach,  36  Minn. 

State    V.    Hughes,    24    Mo.     147;  234;    30  N.   W.   764;    Kingston   v. 

State  V.  Brooks,  94  Mo.  App.  57;  Osterhaudt,   23    Hun,    66;    United 

67  S.  W.  933:  Dudley  v.  State,  91  States  v.  Angell,   11   Fed.   34. 
Ind,  312.      (The  case  of  Keiser  v. 


501  LICENSES.  §  334 

of  the  statute.  The  overruled  cases  of  the  Indiana  court  very 
well  express  the  view  of  the  courts  upon  this  point:  "If  he 
had  been  prosecuted  for  this  sale,  before  he  obtained  his 
license,  he  would  have  been  liable  perhaps,  upon  conviction, 
to  the  penalty  imposed  by  statute.  But  it  seems  to  us  that, 
after  he  had  paid  his  license  fee  and  had  obtained  a  license, 
in  due  course  of  law,  which  covered  the  day  on  which  the  sale 
was  made,  the  sale  which  had  been  illegal  for  the  want  of  such 
license,  was  thereby  legalized,  and  the  offense  was  thereby 
pardoned,  if  the  expression  may  be  allowed,  at  least  to  the 
extent  that  he  could  not  and  ought  not  to  be  thereafter  pros- 
ecuted or  convicted.  The  proper  officers  under  the  law  hav- 
ing received  his  money,  and  having  thereupon  issued  him  a 
license  which  in  terms  authorized  him  to  make  the  sale  for 
which  he  was  afterward  indicted,  we  are  clearly  of  the  opinion 
that  these  facts  operated  as  a  complete  bar  to  this  prosecu- 
tion. ' '  ^'^  And  where  a  city  ordinance,  by  statute,  was  required 
to  "relate  back  to  the  regular  semi-annual  periods  of  April 
and  October,"  it  was  held  that  a  license  would  relate  back  to 
one  or  the  other  of  those  dates,  as  the  case  might  be,  so  as  to 
cover  a  sale  thereafter  and  before  the  license  was  issued.*^® 
It  is  error  to  admit  evidence  of  a  sale  before  the  statute 
prohibiting  it  took  effect.""  A  license  issued  in  the  after- 
noon does  not  cover  a  sale  in  the  forenoon  of  the  same  day.'^^ 
Of  course,  where  a  license  begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  its 
issuance  and  not  from  the  date  of  the  grant,  the  result  is  the 
same.''- 

Sec.  334.    Impossibility  to  secure  license. 

It  is  no  excuse,  when  a  charge  is  preferred  for  a  sale  without 
a  license,  that  none   could  be   procured,   under   any  circum- 

68  Vannoy  v.  State,  64  Ind.  447 ;  issued,  the  subsequent  issue  of 
State  V.  Wilcox,  06  Ind.  557;  9  tlie  license  is  no  defense.  Chailes- 
Cei;^;.  L.  Jr.  408.  (These  cases  ton  v.  Schmidt,  11  Rich.  (S.  C.) 
overrule  the  earlier  Indiana  cases  343. 

cited   above.)      But  see    Keiser   v.           to  State    v.    Dunning,    14    S.    D. 

State,  78  Ind.  430.  316;    85  K   W.   589. 

69  Charleston  v.  Corleis,  2  "i  Campbell  v.  Strangways,  3  C 
Bailey  (S.  C),  186.  P.  Div.   105. 

Yet  if  suit  had  been  brought  for  72  Brown  v.  State,  27  Tex.  335; 

the  penalty  before  the  license  was       Bolduc  v.  Randall,  107  Mass.  121;' 


§  334  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  502 

stances.^-^  This  statement  is  very  well  illustrated  by  an  Indi- 
ana case.  The  Ohio  River  constitutes  the  boundary  between 
that  State  and  Kentucky,  low-water  mark  on  the  north  side 
of  the  river  being  the  southern  boundary  of  the  State  of  Indi- 
ana, but  Indiana  has  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  civil  and  crim- 
inal cases  with  the  State  of  Kentucky  on  the  river.  If  a  vio- 
lation of  the  criminal  law  occurs  on  the  river  the  offense  may 
be  charged  as  having  been  committed  in  the  county  opposite 
the  place  where  the  act  was  committed  constituting  the  crime. 
Where,  therefore,  intoxicating  liquors  were  sold  without  license 
in  a  boat  anchored  in  the  river  opposite  an  Indiana  county, 
south  of  low-water  mark,  on  the  Indiana  side,  it  was  held 
proper  to  charge  and  try  the  offense  as  having  been  committed 
in  that  county,  and  the  fact  that  no  provision  had  been  made 
by  law  for  granting  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  upon 
the  Ohio  River  did  not  authorize  their  sale  without  a  license. 
"It  will  thus  be  seen,"  said  the  court,  "that  the  criminal 
laws  of  the  State  extend  to  and  are  in  force  on  the  Ohio  River 
where  such  river  constitutes  the  southern  boundary  of  the 
State.  The  contention  of  the  appellant,  that  because  no  pro- 
vision is  made  by  law  for  granting  a  license  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors  upon  the  Ohio  River,  he  has  a  right  to  sell 
without  a  license,  is  not  tenable.  As  it  is  made  unlawful  to 
retail  intoxicating  liquors  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State 
without  a  license  so  to  do,  and  as  there  is  no  law  authorizing 
the  granting  of  a  license  to  sell  upon  the  waters  of  the  stream, 
it  may  be  that  as  to  the  space  between  low-water  mark  on  the 
Kentucky  side,  we  have  absolute  prohibition  in  so  far  as  the 
right  to  sell  liquors  by  retail  is  involved.  The  difficulty  at- 
tending the  detection,  arrest  and  punishment  of  violators  of 
the  law  engaged  in  the  retail  liquor  business  on  the  water 
would  seem  to  furnish  a  sufficient  reason  to  the  Legislature 

Commonwealth      v.      Welch,      144  6  So.  i638;   Smith  v.  Adrian,  ^^lan. 

Mass.  35fi;    11  N.  E.  423.  (Mich.)    4&5;    Hunzinger  v.  State, 

In    Missouri    it    begins     to    run  39  Neb.  653;  58  N.  W.  194;  Shan- 

from   date   of   delivery.      State   v.  non  v.  State,  39  Neb.  65«;   68  N. 

Leonard   (Mo.),  116  S.  W.  14.  W.    196;    Sochi   v.   State,   39   Neb. 

73  State  V.    iuckcr,  45   Ark.  55;  659;    58    N.    W.    19«;    Rowels    v. 

State  V.  Brown,  41  La.  Ann.  771;  State,  39  Neb.  059;  58  N.  W.  197. 


503  LICENSES.  §  334 

for  withholding  a  license  to  sell  upon  the  Ohio  and  Wabash 
Rivers,  when  such  rivers  constitute  the  boundary  of  the  State. 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  we  are  not  dealing  with  a  person  nav- 
igating the  Ohio  River,  engaged  in  interstate  commerce,  but 
the  case  before  us  is  one  where  the  offender,  not  engaged  in 
navigation,  anchors  his  boat  near  the  Indiana  line  and  engages 
in  the  business  of  retailing  intoxicating  liquor  without  a 
license.  Such  a  case,  in  our  opinion,  falls  both  within  the 
letter  and  the  spirit  of  our  statute,  and  it  is  no  defense  to  say 
that  the  law  makes  no  provision  for  granting  a  license  to 
sell  at  that  place.  "^*  Nor  is  it  an  excuse  that  no  one  is  em- 
powered to  issue  the  license;  for  if  a  person  cannot  obtain  a 
license  he  has  no  right  to  sell.^^  Nor  is  it  any  excuse  that 
the  licensing  board  or  court  absolutely  refuses  to  grant  one 
a  license,  however  much  he  may  be  entitled  to  it,  for  its  re- 
fusal to  grant  the  license  does  not  repeal  the  statute.'^  It  is 
not  a  defense,  in  a  prosecution  by  a  municipality,  for  a  vio- 
lation of  the  ordinance  that  a  license  could  not  be  issued  by 
it  for  that  portion  of  the  city  where  the  sale  was  made ;  '^^  nor 
is  it  a  defense  that  the  city  clerk  was  so  ill  that  none  could 
be  issued,  and  after  the  sale  one  was  issued  and  dated  back 
to  the  time  when  the  old  license  should  have  been  renewed.''* 
And  it  is  not  a  defense  when  the  limit  has  been  reached  in  the 
number  of  licenses  that  can  be  issued  for  the  locality,  as  shown 
by  the  official  record,  for  the  accused  to  produce  an  unrecorded 
license  and  prove  thereunder  he  made  the  sale  charged  to  have 
been  an  illegal  oue.^**  Practically,  in  diametrical  opposition  to 
this  line  of  cases  is  another  line  which,  under  proper  con- 

74  Welsh  V.  state,   126  Ind.  71;       ton,   24   Pick.   352.     Xew  York  v. 
25  N.  E.   &S3;   9  L.  R.  A.  664.  Mason,    1    Abb.   Pr.    344;    4   E.   D. 

As  to  sale  in  Michigan  on  one  of  Smith,   142;   State  v.   Downer,   21 

the    great    lakes,     see    People    v.  Wis.    274;    State    v.    Kantler,    33 

Bouchard,  82  Mich.  156;  46  N.  W.  Minn.  69;  21  N.  W.  85G;  State  v. 

232;   9  L.  R.  A.  106.  Funk,  27  Minn.  318;  7  N.  W.  359; 

75  Rosenham    v.    Commonwealth,  Brock  v.  State,  65  Ga.  437 ;   Kad- 
(Ky.);     2    'S.     W.    230;     3     Ky.  gihn  v.   Bloomington,   58   111.   229. 

L.   Rep.   519;    Bolduc  v.    Randall,  77  Indianapolis    v.    Fairchild,    1 

107  Mass.  121;  State  v.  McNearj',  Ind.   315. 

88  Mo.   143.  78  Reese  v.  Atlanta,  63  Ga.  344. 

76  Commonwealth     v.     Blacking-  79  State  v.  Shaw,  32  Me.  570. 


§  335         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  504 

ditions,  excuse  the  person  making  the  alleged  illegal  sale,  as 
where  a  licensed  dealer,  after  his  license  expired,  and  before 
the  next  possible  meeting  of  the  licensing  board  for  the  issu- 
ing of  licenses,  continued  to  sell  until  its  next  meeting,  and 
then  took  out  a  license/"**  And  where  the  system  of  licensing 
took  effect  July  first  and  a  new  license  law  took  effect  April 
first,  it  was  held  that  no  offense  was  committed  by  an  old 
license  holder  making  sales  during  the  interval,  although  his 
license,  by  reason  of  the  new  law,  was  not  in  force  during 
that  interval.^^ 

Sec.  335.    Neglect  or  improper  refusal  to  grant  a  license. 

Licenses  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  are  not  matters  of  right. 
This  has  been  repeatedly  decided.  Therefore,  the  neglect  or 
the  improper  refusal  or  the  intentionally  wrongful  refusal  of 
the  licensing  board  or  court  or  officers  to  grant  or  issue  a 
license  to  an  applicant,  although  he  has  clearly  shown  him- 
self entitled  to  it,  will  not  justify  him  in  engaging  in  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  without  a  license ;  and  when  pros- 
ecuted for  a  violation  of  the  statute  by  making  sales  without 
a  license  covering  the  period  of  such  sales,  he  cannot  show  that 
he  had  taken  all  the  necessary  steps  to  secure  one,  but  was 
wrongfully  refused,  or  that  the  board  or  court  officer  had  negli- 
genth'  failed  to  issue  it.*-  So  a  refusal  of  the  licensing  board  to 
grant  any  licenses  whatever,  even  though  they  had  no  discretion 
in  the  matter  of  their  issuance,  however  arbitrarily  made,  will 
not  justify  an  applicant  (or  anyone  else)  in  engaging  in  the 
liquor  traffic.*^  In  such  an  instance  the  applicant  must  pur- 
sue his  remedy  by  appeal  or  mandamus ;  ^*  and,  of  course, 
if  the  board  has  a  discretion  in  the  granting  of  a  license,  he 
is  without  relief.     The  fact  that  the  attempted  adoption  of 

80  Palmer  v.  Doney,  2  Johns.  Wis.  274;  Commonwealth  v. 
Cas.  340.  Blackington,  24  Pick.  352. 

81  Rome  V.  Knox,  14  How.  Pr.  s*  Brock  v.  State,  65  Ga.  437; 
268.  State    v.    Jamison,    23    Mo.    330; 

82  State  V.  Huntley,  29  Mo.  App.  Kansas  City  v.  Flanders,  71  Mo. 
278;  Reese  v.  Atlanta,  63  Ga.  344.  281;   Kadgihn   v.  Bloomington,  58 

83  Mayor    v.    Mason,     4    E.     D.  111.  229. 
Smith,   142;    State  v.   Downer,  21 


505  LICENSES.  §  336 

local  option  is  void,  but  the  licensing  board  has  erroneously 
held  it  valid,  and  consequently  refused  the  application  for  a 
license,  will  not  justify  the  applicant  in  engaging  in  liquor 
traffic.^^  Nor  can  he  justify  his  action  in  selling  without  a 
license  on  the  ground  that  the  district  in  which  prohibition 
prevailed  has  voted  in  favor  of  license,  when  he  has  not  se- 
cured one.*''  And  if  his  license  has  expired  and  he  has  made 
application  for  its  renewal,  he  cannot  excuse  himself  upon 
the  plea  that  it  was  the  practice  that  between  the  date  of  the 
expiration  of  the  license  and  the  granting  of  a  renewal,  where 
proceedings  for  a  renewal  were  pending,  it  was  customary  to 
continue  in  the  traffic,  and  that  police  officers  assured  him  he 
would  not  be  prosecuted  or  was  immune  from  prosecution.^^ 
Where^  however,  the  license  issued  was  only  evidence  of  the 
permit  granted,  and  an  ordinance  authorizing  the  town  clerk 
to  issue  it  upon  compliance  with  its  provisions,  the  court  held 
the  mere  clerkly  failure  of  that  office  to  issue  the  formal  per- 
mit would  not  subject  the  applicant  to  a  prosecution  for  hav- 
ing violated  its  provisions  in  making  a  sale  M'ithout  its 
issuance. ^^ 

Sec.  336.    Performance  of  requisites  to  obtain  a  license  not 
a  license. 

The  performance*of  all  the  requisites  to  obtain  a  license — 
the  filing  of  the  application,  the  obtaining  and  filing  of  the 
written  consent  of  the  adjoining  property  owners,  the  order 
for  the  issuance  of  the  license,  any  or  all  of  these  is  not  or  are 
not  the  equivalent  of  the  issuance  of  a  license.^''  This  is  espe- 
cially true  if  the  applicant  bas  not  paid  the  license  fee;^"  or 
the  licensing  board  have  a  discretion  in  granting  the  license 

85  Curry  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  so  Roberts  v.  State,  26  Fla.  360; 
477;    13  S.  W.  773.                                   7    So.    861;    State    v.    White,    23 

86  State  V.   Cron,   23  Minn.    140.       Ark.  275;    Brook  v.   State,   65  Ga. 

87  State  V.  ^rady,  14  R.  I.  508.  437;  State  v.  Racli,  36  Minn.  234; 
ssprather  v.  People,  85  III.  36.  30  IST.  W.  764;  State  v.  Huntley, 
Of  this  case  it  may  be  observed       29  Mo.  App.  278;   Curry  v.  State, 

that   the  clerk   was   reaUv   an   au-  28  Tex.   App.  477;    13   S.   W.   773. 

tomatic    machine    for    issuinsr    the  flo  Dudley  v.  State,  91  Tnd.  312; 

license   when    a   certain    condition  Houser  v.  State,  18  Ind.  106. 
had  been  brought  about. 


§  336         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  506 

and  have  made  no  order  for  it.''^  In  one  ease  it  was  said :  "It 
is  argued  that  the  defendant  tendered  the  money  and  de- 
manded a  permit  to  sell  liquor,  and  that  the  officer  whose  duty- 
it  was  to  grant  the  permit  refused  to  grant  it,  and  for  this 
reason  the  defendant,  in  selling  without  a  license,  was  not 
legally  liable  for  such  selling.  But  this  is  not  correct,  because 
it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  defendant  offered  to  pay 
the  money  or  not,  as  his  authority  for  selling  could  only  be 
shown  by  the  proper  license.  If  the  defendant  was  entitled  to 
the  permit  and  license,  he  could  have  compelled  ®^  the  proper 
officers  to  grant  them.  This  he  did  not  do,  but  proceeded  to 
sell  without  authority,  and  hence  laid  himself  liable  to  the 
penalties  of  the  law.  "''^  But  where  an  applicant  had  taken 
all  the  steps  that  were  required  of  him  to  secure  a  license,  in- 
eluding  the  payment  of  the  license  fee,  it  was  held  that  the 
jury  were  warranted  in  acquitting  his  bartender  who  had  made 
a  sale  for  his  employer.^*  So  w^here  an  applicant  had  com- 
plied with  all  the  requirements  of  an  ordinance  to  secure  a 
license  and  had  paid  his  fee,  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  to 
be  convicted  merely  because  of  the  failure  of  the  clerk  of 
the  town  to  issue  the  license ; "''  and  in  the  same  State  it  was 
held  that  a  refusal  of  the  authorities  to  issue  the  license,  where 
they  had  no  discretion,  would  justify  the  applicant  to  pro- 
ceed upon  the  retail  of  liquor.^*^  But  where  the  president  of 
the  town  board  refused  to  approve  the  applicant's  bond  or  to 
sign  the  license,  it  was  held  that  sales  could  not  be  made  upon 
the  application.'"'  Yet  where  a  licensing  board  refused  to 
grant  a  license,  but  on  appeal  to  the  court  a  judgment  was 
entered  that  he  was  entitled  to  one,  and  thereupon  he  paid  the 
license  fee  and  tendered  a  sufficient  bond  which  the  county 
auditor  refused  to  approve  and  also  refused  to  issue  the 
license;  and  the  remonstrators  then  appealed  from  this  judg- 

"1    New  York  v.  INIason,  4  E.  D.  Welsh,    144   Mass.   356;    11    X.   E. 

Smith,    142.  423;  Vannoy  v.  State,  «4  Ind.  447. 

92  See    Brock    v.    State,    65    Ga.  04  state  v.  White,  23  Ark.   275. 

437;   Kadgihn  v.   Bloomington,  58  03  prather  v.  People,  85  111.  36. 

Til.  229.  oG  Zanone     v.     Mound    €ity,     11 

03  Roberts  v.  State,  20  Fla.  360;  r.radw.    334. 

7     So.     861;      Commonwealth     v.  "t  Franklin  v.   Stringam,  56  111. 

App.   104. 


507  LICENSES.  §  337 

raent  to  the  Supreme  Court,  and  after  the  appeal  to  the  Su- 
preme Court  had  been  taken,  and  after  the  fee  had  been  paid, 
and  after  the  auditor,  by  command  of  the  court,  had  approved 
the  bond,  the  applicant  sold  liquor,  it  was  held  he  could  not  be 
prosecuted  for  selling  liquor  AV'thout  a  license,  the  court  say- 
ing: "An  applicant  for  a  license,  who  has  obtained  a  proper 
judgment  declariiip-  his  ri-^ht  to  a  license,  and  has  properly 
tendered  the  requisite  fee  and  bond,  cannot  be  successfully 
prosecuted  for  violating  the  l^w.  for  he  has  done  all  that  it 
was  in  his  power  to  do,  and  all  that  the  law  renuired  of  him. 
The  violation  of  law  is  on  the  part  of  the  ministerial  officer 
who  withholds  the  license.  The  case  is  utterly  unlike  that  of 
one  who  sells  without  having  tendered  either  fee  or  bond,  and 
after  sale  makes  tender  of  both  bond  and  fee.  In  the  one 
case  there  is  wrong  on  the  part  of  the  applicant;  in  the  other 
there  is  none;  in  the  one  case  there  is  the  possibility  of  an 
evasion  of  the  law,  in  the  other  there  is  an  earnest  effort  to 
obey  the  law  before  undertaking  to  sell.  The  applicant  can- 
not be  in  the  wrong  where  he  has  done  all  that  it  was  in 
his  power  to  do.  A  man  cannot  be  denied  a  statutory  right 
because  a  public  officer  has  made  it  impossible  to  fully  com- 
ply with  the  statute;  to  hold  otherwise  would  be  equivalent 
to  declaring  that  a  man  may  be  denied  the  benefit  of  a  stat- 
ute for  not  doing  what  was  legally  impossible.  If  the  proper 
officer  should  demand  the  fee  and  bond  and  offer  a  license 
relating  back  to  the  .iudgment  and  the  appellant  should  refuse 
to  execute  the  bond  or  pay  the  fee,  and  should  thereafter  retail 
liquor,  he  would,  doubtless,  be  subject  to  prosecution,  but 
as  long  as  he  honestly  keens  Inmself  in  the  position  of  doing 
all  that  he  can  do  to  comply  with  the  law,  he  cannot  be  pros- 
ecuted for  a    criminal  offense."  °^ 

Sec.  337.    What  a  license  does  and  does  not  authorize. 

What  a  license  does  authorize  depends  upon  the  law  under 
which  it  is  issued  and  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  issued. 
Thus,  under  an  early  statute  of  Ohio  it  was  held  that  a  license 
to  keep  a  tavern  was,  according  to  the  true  meaning  of  the  act, 

98  Padgett  V.  state,  93  Ind.  3&6. 


,§337 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


508 


a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  at  retail ;  "^  and  a  like 
decision  was  rendered  in  South  Carolina/  although  a  decision 
otherwise  was  also  rendered  in  that  State,-  and  a  decision 
similar  to  the  latter  was  rendered  in  New  York."*  So  that  it 
has  been  held  that  a  license  to  Jceep  a  saloon  does  not  necessa- 
rily authorize  the  licensee  to  engage  in  the  sale  or  to  sell  in- 
toxicating liquors.*  And  a  licensed  restaurant  keeper  cannot 
supply  his  customers  with  intoxicating  liquors  under  his 
license; "'  nor  can  they  be  sold  under  a  confectioner's  license.^ 
So  a  statute  authorizing  sales  in  small  quantities  cannot  be 
construed  to  authorize  sales  of  liquors  to  be  drunk  on  the  prem- 
ises, even  though  the  licensee  is  an  innkeeper,  where  a  statute 
forbids  sales  of  liquors  to  be  drunk  at  the  place  of  sale.'^  So 
a  license  to  sell  from  a  quart  to  five  gallons  is  not  a  license 
to  retail  liquors.^  A  license  to  sell  for  one  purpose  will  not 
authorize  a  sale  for  another  purpose.^     Nor  can   a  licensee 

99Hirn  v.  State,   1   Ohio  St.   15.  «, State   v.   Xewcomb^  107   N.   C. 

So   in   KentucKy.     Commonwealth       900;    12    S.    E.    53.      In    this   case 
V.  Kemp,   14  B.  Mon.  385.  the  charter  of  the  city  of  Greens- 


1  State  V.  Chamblyss,  1  C'heves, 
220;  34  Am.  Dec.  593.  So  in 
Maine.  State  v.  Woodward,  34 
Me.   293. 

2  Commissioners  v.  Dennis,  1 
Cheves,  229. 

3  Benson  v.  Moore,  lo  Wend. 
260;  Commonwealth  v.  Jordan,  18 
Pick.  228;  Hannibal  v.  Guyott,  18 
Mo.  515. 

*  Kitson  V.  Ann  Arbor,  26  ]\Iich. 
325. 

5  Commonwealth  v.  Markoe,  17 
Pick.  465 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Jor- 
dan, 18  Pick.  228 ;  State  v.  Cohen 
35  Md.  236. 

6  Xew  Orleans  v.  Jane,  34  La. 
Ann.  667. 

7  People  V.  Smith,  69  N.  Y.  175; 
reversing  Smith  v.  People,  9  Hun, 
446;  Commonwealth  v.  Mandeville, 
142  Mass.  469 ;  8  N.  E.  327 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Frost,  155  Mass. 
273;   34  N.   E.  334. 


boro  prohibited  the  county  com- 
missioners granting  a  license  to 
retail  liquors  in  the  city  without 
the  consent  of  the  city,  but  per- 
mitted them  granting  licenses  to 
sell  in  quantities  of  five  gallons 
or  less. 

The  defendant  cannot  give  evi- 
dence that  he  thought  he  was  sell- 
ing five  gallons  when  the  liquor 
sold  Avas  less  than  that  quantity. 
People  V.  Nylin,  236  111.  19;  86  N. 
E.  156;  affirming  139  111.  App. 
500  In  this  case  it  was  also  held 
that  there  must  be  five  gallons  of 
quiet  liquor  after  it  had  been  re- 
leased from  confinement  and  the 
gas,  froth  or  foam  arising  when 
the  liquor  is  released  from  the 
vessel  in  which  it  is  contained  can- 
not be  considered  in  determining 
the  quantity  of  liquor  sold. 

9  State  V.  Adams,  20  Iowa,  486; 
Curd  V.  Commonwealth,  14  B. 
Mon.  386. 


509  LICENSES.  §  337 

justify  sales  under  his  license  in  violation  of  the  criminal  laws 
of  the  State,  though  no  reference  be  made  in  his  license  or  in 
the  licensing  statutes  to  such  laws.^**  So  where  a  board  of 
county  commissioners  had  the  power  to  make  an  order  pro- 
hibiting sales  within  three  miles  of  any  college,  after  they 
had  made  such  an  order  it  was  held  that  a  license  granted 
by  them  for  sale  of  liquors  at  a  place  within  the  limits  thus 
prescribed  would  not  be  a  justification  to  the  licensee  in  mak- 
ing sales  thereunder ;  for  the  reason  that  when  the  board  had 
entered  the  prohibition  order  its  powers  were  exhausted,  and 
it  could  neither  revoke  nor  modify  its  action/^  So  if  a  statute 
prohibit  the  sale  of  liquor  within  a  certain  distance  of  a 
factory,  a  license  for  the  county  will  not  authorize  a  sale 
within  the  prohibited  area.'^  A  license  to  sell  "bottled  beer" 
by  the  quart  will  not  authorize  a  sale  by  the  quart  when  the 
liquor  is  drawn  from  casks.^"  A  license  to  sell  at  a  particular 
place  will  not  justify  a  sale  at  another  place,  or  on  certain 
premises  a  sale  off  the  premises,^*  nor  to  conduct  the  business 
in  more  than  one  place.^^  A  licensee  under  a  wholesale  license 
cannot  sell  at  retail/"  Nor  is  a  licensee  authorized  to  sell  in 
violation  of  law  simply  because  he  holds  a  license,^^  as  on  Sun- 
day^^  or  out  of  hours.^** 

i»  Lambert  v.  State,   8  Mo.  492.  i'- Zinner  v.  Commonwealth   (Pa. 

11  Wilson  V.  State,  35  Ark.  414.  St.),      14      Atl.      431;      State     v. 

1--J  Barnes  v.  State,  49   Ala.   342.  Walker,  4  Shep.    (Me.)   241;   State 

13  Harris  v.  People,  1  Colo.  App.  v.  Fredericks,  16  Mo.  382  State  v. 

289;    2'8  Pac.   1133.  Hnghes,     24     Mo.     147.       Keeping 

1+  State    V,    Prettyman,    3    Har.  three  bars  at  one  place  is  permis- 

(Del.)    570;   Hochstadler  v.  State,  sible.      St.    Louis    v.    Gerardi,    90 

73     Ala.     24;     Commonwealth     v.  Mo.  640;    3   S.  W.  408. 

Estabrook,    10    Pick.    293;    Wason  is  People    v.    Greiser,    67    Mich. 

V.  Severance,  2  N.  H.  501;   People  490;    35  N.   W.  87. 

V.   Davis,  45   Barb.   494;    State  v.  it  Lambert  v.  State,  8  Mo.  492; 

Moody,    95    X.    C.   '656;    Horan    v.  Horning  v.  Wendell,  57  Ind.   171; 

Travis   Co.,    27    Tex.    226;    Pearce  Gouin  v.  State,  8  Mo.   493;    Brua 

v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  150;  32  v.  State,  8  Mo.  496. 

S,    W,   '697;    Travis   v.    State,    37  is  State  v.  Ambs,  20  Mo.  214. 

Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  4'86;   3'6  S.  W.  589.  1 9  Maxwell      v.      Jonesboro,      11 

Heisk.   257. 


§  338  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  510 

Sec.  338.     Agent  or  servant  when  protected  by  license  of 
his  principal. 

A  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  transferable,  but 
a  licensee  who  has  not  forfeited  his  license  may  cai|ry  on  the 
business  by  an  agent  at  the  place  designated  in  the  license,  and 
the  agent  will  not  be  responsible,  criminally,  for  selling  with- 
out a  license.  If,  however,  under  a  statute  Avhich  requires  the 
applicant  for  a  license  to  be  a  resident  vrhere  the  application 
is  made,  the  licensee  moves  from  the  county  or  State,  he  can  not 
continue  the  business  under  his  license  by  an  agent.  This  is 
so  because  the  license  in  such  case  is  a  personal  privilege,  not 
transferable,  and  the  personal  fitness  of  the  licensee  is  a  mat- 
ter of  legislative  concern ;  the  fitness  not  merelv  when  an 
applicant,  but  also  at  all  times  while  in  the  enjoyment  of  the 
privilege.  The  purpose  of  a  Legislature  in  providing  for  the 
granting  of  such  a  license  is  to  regulate  the  traffic,  in  part, 
through  the  particular  persons  found  by  the  proper  authori- 
ties to  be  qualified  to  have  charge  and  control  of  the  business.^*' 
Yet,  however,  in  Alabama  and  Kentucky  it  has  been  held 
that  a  license  having  been  granted  to  one  man  to  keep  a 
tavern  in  a  particular  house,  and  he  having  removed  from  it, 
another  man,  being  indicted  for  retailing  linuor  in  the  same 
house,  may  prove  in  defense  that  he  did  it  as  the  aeent  of 
the  licensee  under  the  latter's  license.^^  The  weight  of  author- 
ity, however,  we  think  is  affainssf  i'hp  AUiliqmq  an^l  TToritncky 
decisions,  and  there  is  reason  for  thinking  so.  A  review  of 
the  statutes  upon  this  subject  forces  the  conclusion  that  there 
has  been  a  manifest  purpose  shown  by  the  Lesrislaturp  to  place 
about  tbe  retail  traffic  a  safegruard  by  way  of  presf^ribinsr  for 
licensees  oualifications  tendiner  to  minimize  the  inevitable  evils 
of  the  business.    The  object  of  such  statutes  is  not  to  encour- 

2oPickons  V.  State,  20  Tnd.  116;  152;    People    v.    Buffum,    27    Hun 

Krant  v.  State,  47  Ind.  519;  Run-  (N.  Y.),  216;    State  v.  McNeeley, 

yon  V.  State,  52  Ind.  320;   Reiser  60  N.  C.  232;  Younir  v.  Stevenson. 

V.    State,    58    Ind.    379;     Shaw    v.  73  Ark.  4S0;   86  S.  W.  1000. 

State,    56     Ind.     188;     Pierce     v.  2t  Thompson    v.    State,    37    Ala. 

Pierce,  17  Ind.  App.  107;  46  N.  E.  151;    Barnes  v.   Commonwealth,   2 

480;   Duncan  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Dana    (Ky.),  38e. 
B.  Mon.    (Ky.)    281;   38  Am.  Dec. 


511  LICENSES.  §  338 

age  the  traffic,  but  rather  to  narrow  its  dangers,  the  extent  of 
which  is  largely  dependent  upon  the  qualifications  of  the 
particular  persons  to  whom  the  control  of  the  business  is 
entrusted.  It  is  plain  that  very  much  of  such  contemplated 
restraining  influences  would  be  less  likely  to  be  exercised 
by  proprietors  continuously  away  from  the  neighborhood  of 
the  business,  and  unaccjuaintod,  therefore,  with  the  persons 
of  their  customers  and  their  habits,  and  unable  to  personally 
supervise  the  conduct  of  the  business.  Such  statutes  contem- 
plate, not  merely  that  the  licensee  shall  remain  within  limits 
where  he  ma\^  be  reached  by  legal  process,  but  also  that  he 
shall  remain  where  he  will  have  the  ability  to  see  personally 
that  the  business  is  carried  on  within  the  restrictions  placed 
upon  it  by  law.--  And  for  like  reasons  the  placing  of  such  a 
business  in  the  hands  of  an  agent  must  be  real  and  not  for 
the  purpose  of  evading  the  law,  and  therefore  the  appointing 
a  vendee  by  the  vendor  of  a  saloon  or  other  place  where  intox- 
icating liquors  are  retailed,  as  his  agent,  will  afford  such 
vendee  no  protection  under  the  vendor's  license.-^  This  state- 
ment is  well  illustrated  in  a  case  where  B  agreed  to  pay  A  for 
his  license  to  keep  a  saloon  and  sold  liquors  in  an  adjoining 
room,  renting  the  room  from  C,  the  saloon  not  being  at  all 
under  the  control  of  A.  It  was  held  that  A's  license  was  no 
protection  to  B.^*  Of  course,  if  the  principal  cannot  make 
sales  at  any  other  place  than  the  one  licensed,  his  agent  in 
making  them  at  another  place  is  not  protected  by  the  license."^ 
But  a  license  for  a  place  does  not  necessarily  confine  the  agents 
in  the  performance  of  his  duties  to  the  licensed  premises ;  for 
his  principal  may  send  him  out  to  solicit  and  take  orders,  and 

22  state  V.  Dudley,  33  Ind.  App.  same  as  if  his  principal  had  made 
640;  71  N.  E.  976;  Sawyer  v.  it.  State  v.  Hunt,  29  Kan.  762; 
Sanderson,  113  Mo.  App.  233;  88  Barnes  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Dana, 
S.  W.   151.  388;   Duncan  v.  Commonwealth,  2 

23  Heath  v.  State,  105  Ind.  342;  B.   Mon.   281;    38   Am.    Dec.    152; 
4    N.    E.    901;    Commonwealth    v.  People  BufTum,  27  Am.  216. 
Branaman,  8  B.  Mon.    (Ky. )    374.  24  Commonwealth   v.    Branamon, 
See  Keiser  v.  State,  58  Ind.  379.  8  B.  Mon.  374. 

If   the   principal    has    a   license,  2n  People    v.    Lester,    80    Mich, 

the   ag-ent,    in   making   a   sale    for       643;  45  N.  W.  492. 
his  master,   will   be   protected   the 


§  339  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  512 

he  will  not  be  liable  if  he  do  not  deliver  the  goods  sold,  the 
place  of  delivery  being  confined  to  the  licensed  premises.-'' 

Sec.  339.     Sale    by    servant    when    his    master    holds    no 
license — Illegal  sales. 

The  usual  statute  prohibiting  sales  without  a  license  or  per- 
mit has  been  held  not  to  apply  to  an  agent  or  servant  merely 
selling  his  principal's  or  master's  liquors,  he  not  otherwise 
violating  the  law.  Thus  in  England  a  statute  provides  that 
"no  person  shall  sell  or  expose  for  sale  by  retail  any  intox- 
icating liquors  without  being  duly  licensed  to  sell  the  same, 
or  at  any  place  where  he  is  not  authorized  by  his  license  to 
sell  the  same.  Any  person  selling  or  exposing  for  sale  by 
retail  any  intoxicating  liquor  which  he  is  not  licensed  to  sell 
by  retail,  or  selling  or  exposing  for  sale  any  intoxicating  liquor 
at  any  place  where  he  is  not  authorized  by  his  license  to  sell 
the  same"  is  liable  to  certain  penalties.  It  was  held  that  this 
statute  did  not  apply  to  a  sale  of  his  master's  property  by 
a  servant  under  orders.  "The  sale  which  is  prohibited,"  said 
Chief  Justice  Russell,  "must  be  a  sale  by  the  pei*son  who  ought 
to  be  licensed.  The  sale  struck  at  is  a  sale  by  the  master  or 
the  principal."-^  But  if  he  acted  knowingly  he  can  be  con- 
victed under  the  Act  of  1848,-^  making  it  an  offense  to  aid 
and  abet  in  the  illegal  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor.-^  In  the 
case  just  cited  it  was  held  that  an  unlicensed  sale  at  a  bar 
within  the  precincts  of  the  House  of  Commons  by  a  servant 
of  the  House  of  the  liquors  of  the  House,  by  the  direction  of 
the  committee,  did  not  render  him  liable  under  the  provision 
of  the  statute  above  quoted.  But  "if  a  servant  having  no 
authority  to  sell  at  all.  chooses  to  make  a  sale,  he  not  being 
a  licensed  person,  is  liable  to  penalties  under"  the  statute 

2GlTang  V.  Gillett,  14  Kan.   140.  2s  n   and  12  Vict.  c.  43. 

2T  Williamson   v.  Norris    [1899],  -"'Williamson   v.  Norris,  supra; 

1  Q.  B.  7;  '62  J.  P.  790;   68  L.  J.  Wilson  v.  Stuart,  32  L.  J.  M.   C. 

Q.  B.  31;   47   W.  R,  94;   79  L.  T.  198;  3  B.  &  R.  913;  27  J.  P.  661; 

415;  15  T.  L.  R.  18;  19  €ox.  C.  C.  8  L.  T.  277;   Burnett  t.  State,  42 

203;   Newell  v.  HemingAvay,  53  J.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  600;  .62  S.  W.  1063; 

P.  324;  €arrico  v.  Commonwealtli,  Richardson   v.    Commonwealth,    11 

5    Ky.    L.    Rep.     (abstract)     605;  Ky.  L.   Rep.    (abstract)    174. 
State  V.  Sterns,  28  Kan.  154. 


513  LICENSES.  §  339 

quoted,''"  In  the  case  just  cited  the  defendant,  who  was 
licensed  to  sell  by  retail,  at  his  brewery,  beer  for  consump- 
tion off  the  premises,  employed  a  drayman  to  deliver  beer 
to  customers  onlj^  who  had  previously  given  orders  for  it. 
He  had  been  expressly  ordered  not  to  sell  or  deliver  beer  to 
other  persons,  and  to  bring  back  to  the  brewery  any  beer 
which  he  was  unable  to  deliver.  The  drayman  sold  and 
delivered  some  bottled  beer  from  his  van  to  persons  in  a  street 
who  had  not  previously  ordered  it.  It  was  held  that  the 
defendant  was  not  liable,  not  having  violated  the  statute,  the 
drayman  not  having  had  any  delegated  authority  to  sell,  and 
what  the  drayman  did  was  outside  the  scope  of  his  authority.^^ 
The  decision  of  the  English  courts  would  seem  to  be  reason- 
able, but  their  doctrine  has  not  always  been  accepted  in  this 
country.  In  Vermont  it  was  said  of  an  agent  who  illegally 
sold  liquors:  "The  agent  who  does  the  act  can  stand  in  no 
better  situation  than  his  principal.  He  justifies  under  him, 
and  if  the  principal  had  no  authority  to  sell  the  agent  would 
have  none."-''-  The  rule  announced  in  this  quotation  has 
been  adopted  in  many  cases,  and  they  hold  that  the  fact  the 
servant  made  the  sale  for  his  master  is  no  defense  if  the  latter 
was  unlicensed.^^  Indeed,  the  decisions  have  gone  so  far  as  to 
hold  that  the  good  faith  of  the  agent  or  servant  is  immaterial; 
for  at  his  peril  he  must  ascertain  whether  his  principal  holds 

30  Boyle  v.  Smith    [1906],   1  K.  215;   Commissioners  v.  Dougherty, 

B.   432;    70   J.    P.    115;    75   L.    J.  65  Barb.  332;  State  v.  Bryant,  14 

K.  B.  2'82;  94  L.  T.  30;  54  W.  R.  Mo.    340;    Abel   v.   State,   90   Ala. 

519;  22  T.  L.  R.  200.  631;  8  So.  760;  Hays  v.  State,  13 

•'1  See  also  Regina  v.  Gilroys,  4  Mo.    246;    Davidson    v.    State,    27 

Se.  Sess.  Cas.  3(1  Series,  656.  Tex.    App.    262;     11    S.    W.    371; 

32|State   V.    Bugbee,   22    Vt.    32.  State    v.    Kriechbaum,    81     Iowa, 

This  was  said,  however,  in  a  case  633;     47    N.    W.    872;     Baird    v. 

where    the    defendant   was    not   in  State,  52  Ark.  326;   12  S.  \V.  566; 

the   employ   of    the    liquor   owner,  Cloud  v.  State,  36  Ark.  151;  Rana 

and  where  he  voluntarily  sold  the  v.   State,  51   Ark.   481;    11   S.   W. 

liquors.  692;    State    v.    Deevers,    38    Ark. 

33Wason  V.   Underbill,  2  N.  H.  517;    Berning    v.    State,    51    Ark. 
505;  Commonwealth  v.  Hadley,  11  550;   11  S.  W.  882.     Contra,  Corn- 
Met.    66;    State    v.    Chastain,    19  monwealth   v.   Holland,   7    Ky.   L. 
Ore.   176;   23   Pac.  963;   People  v.  Rep.   (abstract)   299. 
Drennan,  86  Mich.  445;   49  N.  W. 


§  339         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  514 

a  valid  license.  "As  statutes  of  this  character  bind  the  party 
to  know  the  facts  and  to  keep  them  at  his  peril,  neither  the 
motive  nor  the  intent  of  the  defendant  can  relieve  him,  when 
a  sale  is  made  without  a  license.  The  intent  is  immaterial 
M'hen  the  statute  makes  the  act  indictable  irrespective  of  guilty 
knowledge ;  and  in  such  case  ignorance  of  fact,  no  matter  how 
insincere,  can  be  no  defense.  It  is  enough  that  under  the  stat- 
ute the  commission  of  the  act  prohibited  constitutes  the 
offense,  irrespective  of  the  motives  or  knowledge  of  the  de- 
fendant, and  as  his  principal  had  no  license  to  sell,  the 
defendant  must  stand  for  him,  so  far  as  appertains  to  this 
prosecution."^*  But  a  servant  may  carry  on  his  master's 
business  at  a  place  and  have  sole  charge  thereof,  and  will 
not  be  guilty  of  selling  Avithout  a  license  if  his  master  hold 
a  license  for  that  place. ^^  One  selling  in  violation  of  a  prohi- 
bition law  cannot  justify  his  conduct  on  the  ground  that  he 
was  in  fact  acting  for  his  principal.^"  So  an  agent  or  bar- 
tender carrying  on  for  his  principal  the  business  of  a  common 
seller  is  liable  unless  his  principal  has  a  license.^^  So  if  he 
keeps  liquors  for  illegal  sale  for  a  non-resident  principal, 
he  is  guilty  of  maintaining  a  nuisance.^^  And  if  he  makes 
a  sale  his  master  could  not  make  under  his  license,  he  is  liable.^" 
Thus  where  a  servant  engaged  to  clean  up  a  saloon  on  Sun- 
day carried  whisky  from  the  barkeeper  to  a  purchaser,  who 
stood  outside  the  door,  it  was  held  that  he  was  guilty  of  assist- 
ing in  an  illegal  sale.'**'  But  a  purchase  of  liquor  for  another 
without  the  State  is  not  an  offense  in  him  within  a  statute 

3*  state    V.     Chastain,     19     Ore.  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  174;  Henry 

176;   23  Pac.  9G3.  v.  State,    (Tex.),   116  S.  W.   ir62. 

3'' Runyan  v.  State,  o2  Ind.  320;  37  Commonwealth   v.   Hadley,    11 

State  V.  Dudley,  33  Ind.  App.  640;  Met.  66;   Commonwealth  v.  Drew, 

71  N.  E.  975.  3  'Cush.  279. 

It    would    be    otherwise    if    the  38  Commonwealth  v.  Callone,  154 

agency  was  a  mere  subterfuge  to  Mass.  115;  27  N.  E.  8S1.  . 

avoid   the  law,   the   servant   being  so  People    v.    Metzger,    95    ilicli. 

an  unfit  person   to  hold   a  license  121;  54  N.  W.  {539;  Cagle  v.  State, 

and  could  not  obtain  one  for  tliat  S7   Ala.   93;  >G  So.  300. 

reason.     Heath  v.   State,   105   Ind.  -Jo  Burnett  v.  State,  42  Tex.  Cr. 

342;  4  N.  E.  901.  App.  600;  62  S.  W.  1063. 

38  Bauman  v.  Commonwealth,  14 


515  LICENSES.  §  340 

making  it  an  offense  to  aid  or  procure  an  unlawful  sale  or 
purchase  or  other  disposition  of  liquor,  nor  within  the  pro- 
vision of  a  statute  making  it  an  offense  to  act  as  agent  for  a 
purchaser  in  procuring  an  unlawful  purchase.*^ 

Sec.  340.     Servant's  license  no  protection  for  his  master. 

If  the  master  have  no  license,  he  cannot  shield  himself  under 
his  servant's  license.  If  the  servant  sells  his  master's  liquors 
the  sale  is  by  the  master  and  not  by  the  servant.  Thus  a 
defendant  entered  into  a  contract  to  supply  liquor  at  an 
exhibition,  and  arranged  with  one  Jenkins,  a  licensed  person, 
that  he  (Jenkins)  should  obtain  what  was  known  as  an  occa- 
sional license  for  the  sale  of  liquors  at  the  exhibition.  The 
defendant,  who  was  not  a  licensed  person,  anplied  on  behalf 
of  Jenkins  for  an  occasional  license,  and  it  was  granted  to 
Jenkins.  I  inuors  were  sold  at  the  exhibition  by  bar  maids 
who  were  ordinarily  employed  by  Jenkins  in  his  business  at 
his  licensed  premises,  but  who  for  the  time  thev  were  at 
the  exhibition  were  paid  by  the  defendant.  The  liquors  so 
sold  were  sent  to  the  exhibition  by  the  order  of  the  defend- 
ant, who  subsequently  paid  for  them.  The  proceeds  of  the 
sale  were  put  into  the  till  at  the  bar  and  then  taken  away 
by  Jenkins's  son.  w^ho  was  in  the  employment  of  the  defend- 
ant. The  defendant  was  occasionally  in  the  room  where  the 
liquors  were  sold,  but  did  not  with  his  own  hands  sell  any 
liquors.  Jenkins  attended  at  the  bar  and  personally  sold 
liquors,  and  was  in  control  of  the  bar  and  serving  staff,  but 

41  Vernon    v.    State     (Ala.),    50  ing  the  business,  it  was  held  that 

So.  57.  he  was  an  employe  of  the  licensee 

Where  tlie  defendant  purchased  and   was  protected  by  his  license, 

a     bankrupt     licensee's     stock     of  Earnard    v.   ,btate    (La.),    48    So. 

liquor    and    sold    it   back    to    him,  438. 

taking  a  mortgage  on   it,   but  re-  A   servant   cannot   sell    his   own 

taining    possession    of    the    goods  liquors  under  his  master's  license, 

himself    to    secure    the    purchase  Ruemmeli    v.     Cravens,    13    CHcla. 

price;    and    they   agreed   that  the  342;    74   Pac.    908;    7^    Pac.    188. 

defendant      should      conduct     the  But  see   State   v.    Keith,   37   Ark. 

business  as  manager  until  the  pur-  1)6;  Johnson  v.  State,  37  Ark.  98, 

chase  price  was  paid,  and  then  re-  and  Lane  v.  State,  37  Ark.  273. 
ceive  a  stated  salary  for  conduct- 


§  341         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  51G 

was  not  paid  for  such  services,  nor  did  he  receive  a  share  of 
the  profits  of  the  sale.  It  was  held  that  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  an  illegal  sale.*^ 

Sec.  341.     Partnership  license. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  any  male  inhabitant  of  the 
State,  of  good  moral  character,  is  entitled  to  a  license  to  sell 
intoxicating  liquors,  and  that  it  should  "be  unlawful  for  any 
person  or  persons  to  directly  or  indirectly  sell"  intoxicating 
liquors  without  a  license,  the  license  may  be  granted  to  two 
persons  jointly,  as  to  partners;  but  if  granted  to  one  person 
and  he  then  forms  a  partnership  with  another,  the  unlicensed 
person  is  not  protected  by  the  license  in  sales  he  may  make ;  *^ 
though  if  the  arrangements  between  them  did  not  constitute 
them  as  partners,  and  the  one  selling  was  in  law  the  agent  of 
the  other,  he  would  not  be  guilty  of  a  violation  of  a  statute 
prohibiting  unlicensed  persons  making  sales.'**  In  passing 
upon  a  question  of  this  kind  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana, 
after  referring  to  the  statute  making  it  "unlawful  for  any 
person  or  persons  to  directly  or  indirectly  sell"  intoxicating 
liquors  Anthout  first  procuring  a  license,  and  after  deciding 
that  a  license  might  be  granted  to  two  persons  jointly,  said: 
"We  think,  as  a  corollary  *  *  *  that  a  joint  sale  by,  or  a 
sale  for  the  joint  benefit  of,  two  or  more  persons,  of  said  arti- 
cles jointly  owned  by  such  persons,  if  the  sale  be  made  by  one 
of  said  persons,  who  has  no  separate  license,  will  be  unlawful, 
unless  the  whole  number  of  persons,  by  or  for  whom  such 
joint  sale  is  made,  have  first  procured  the  required  license,  and 
that  a  license  to  one  of  two  or  more  persons  will  not  legalize 
a  sale  made  by  the  other  or  others  of  said  persons,  who  have 
no  license,  even  though  it  be  a  sale  of  articles  which  the 
licensed  person  might  lawfully  sell,  and  in  which,  and  the 
sale  whereof  he  was  equally  interested  with  the  other  or  others 
making  such  sale.     Such,  in  our  opinion,  is  a  fair  interpreta- 

*2  Dunning    v.    Owen    [1907],    2  4?,  Shaw    v.    State,    56    Ind.    88; 

K.  B.  237;  71  J.  P.  3'83;  76  L.  J.  Commonwealth  v.  Hall,  8  Gratt. 
K.  B.  796.  &88. 

^^Kelser  v.  State,  58  Ind.  379. 


517  LICENSES.  §  341 

tion  of  the  present  liquor  law  of  this"  State.  It  recognizes  the 
fact  that  two  or  more  persons,  as  partners  or  joint  owners, 
may  engage  in  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  in  quantities 
less  than  a  quart  at  a  time,  and  it  provides  that  it  shall  be 
unlawful  for  such  persons  to  make  such  sales,  without  having 
first  procured,  from  the  proper  board  of  commissioners,  the 
proper  lieonsf'."  The  court  then  refers  to  the  statute  pro- 
viding that  the  applicant  for  a  license  must  ''be  a  fit  person 
to  be  entrusted  with  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor,  and  if  he 
be  not  in  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated,  but  in  no  case 
shall  a  license  be  granted  to  a  person  in  the  habit  of  becom- 
ing intoxicated,"  and  adds:  "From  the  last  clause  of  this 
proviso  it  will  be  observed  that  it  contains  a  positive  pro- 
hibition against  the  granting  of  a  license,  in  any  case,  to  any 
person  who  is  in  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated.  Ordina- 
rily, anyone  can  form  a  copartnership  in  business  with  anyone 
else,  without  regard  to  his  personal  habits  and  without  let 
or  hindrance  from  the  law.  If  we  should  hold  that  a  license 
granted  to  one  person  would  inure  to  the  benefit  and  protec- 
tion of  his  partners,  the  effect  of  such  a  decision  might  well 
be  to  virtually  license  persons  who  were  all  the  time  drunk  or 
intoxicated,  and  wholly  unfit  for  the  peculiar  trust  conferred 
by  the  license.  The  law  recognizes  the  fact  that  some  persons 
are  fit  and  others  are  not  fit  for  this  particular  business,  but 
the  construction  of  the  law  advocated  by  appellant's  counsel, 
if  carried  out.  would  necessarily  abolish  this  distinction  and 
render  nugatory  the  provisions  of  this  proviso.  Such  a  con- 
struction this  court  will  not  give."  "The  license  to  Besselman 
was  certainly  not  a  license  to  appellant;  nor  can  it  be  con- 
strued to  be  a  license  to  both  Besselman  and  the  appellant. 
Appellant's  counsel  insists  that,  in  making  the  sale  in  question, 
appellant  was  the  agent  of  Besselman,  and  would,  therefore, 
be  protected  by  the  latter 's  license.  A  partner  is  the  agent  of 
his  copartner  in  partnership  matters;  but  where,  as  in  this 
case,  a  partner  sells  copartnership  property,  in  which  each 
partner  has  an  equal  interest,  he  is  rather  the  agent  of  the 
firm  than  of  the  individual  partner,  in  making  of  such  sale."  " 

45  Shaw  V.  State,  56  Ind.  188. 


§  341  TKAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  518 

In  an  Alabama  ease  the  question  was  more  tersely  put  in  this 
way:  "A  license  to  retail  affords  protection  only  for  those 
acts  which,  in  law,  are  merely  the  acts  of  the  person  to  whom 
it  was  granted.  If  granted  to  an  individual,  it  affords 
protection  only  for  those  acts  which,  in  law,  are  merely  his  acts 
as  an  individual.  If  granted  to  a  partnership,  it  affords 
protectioTi  only  for  those  acts  which,  in  law,  are  acts  of  the 
firm.  A  license  to  an  individual  cannot  be  a  license  to  a  part- 
nership. ' '  *^  In  consonance  with  this  reasoning,  a  license  to  a 
firm,  one  member  of  which  is  a  member  of  another  firm, 
confers  no  right  upon  the  latter  firm  to  sell  liquor;  "  although 
if  one  member  of  a  licensed  firm  purchase  out  his  partners 
he  may  continue  the  business  under  the  license  issued  to  the 
partnership;  *^  and  so  may  the  remaining  partner,  if  for  any 
reason  the  others  retire,  and  the  question  of  his  fitness  to  hold 
the  license  cannot  be  raised,  for  that  was  settled  when  the 
license  was  issued  to  the  firm.''^  Of  course,  in  a  case  of  this  kind 
the  question  of  partnership  or  no  partnership  is  always  to  the 
front.  Thus,  where  a  defendant  in  a  prosecution  for  selling 
without  a  license  was  the  owner  of  the  premises  where  the 
sale  was  made,  and  he  made  the  sale  pursuant  to  and  in  com- 
pliance with  the  terms  of  a  written  contract  between  him  and 
another  who  had  a  license,  whereby  he,  the  defendant,  leased 
the  premises  to  the  licensee  for  a  saloon,  upon  the  condition 
that  such  licensee  should  furnish  the  stock  necessary  to  carry 

46  Long  V.  State,  27  Ala.  32;  Rex  v.  Hoffman,  22  Juta,  32. 
Ex  parte  Leveille,  Stephens'  Can-  Contra,  State  v.  Zermmehler,  110 
adian   Digest   [1877-1'8'81],   p.   474,       Iowa,   1;   81   N.  W.   154. 

§155;   Lovejoy  v.  •Commonwealth,  49  State    v.    Gebhardt,    3    Jones 

13  Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract),  976.  (N.  €.),  178;   In  re  Kornman,   13 

47  Wharton  v.  Kino,  69  Ala.  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  147;  23  Pittb. 
365.  Log.    J.    (N.    S.)    476. 

48  United  States  v.  Denis,  37  If  an  action  be  brought  by  a 
Fed.  46^;  United  States  v.  Glab,  firm  to  recover  back  the  price  of 
1  McCrary,  lOB;  Commonwealth  liquor  sold  in  violation  of  law, 
V.  James,  98  Ky.  30;  32  S.  W.  the  presumption  is  that  it  was 
219;  17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  588;  James  v.  made  by  the  partner  who  had  au- 
Commonwealth,  16  Ky.  L.  Rep.  thority  to  sell;  and  if  that  be  not 
(abstract)  AA5.  So  held  in  South  true,  the  defense  must  show  it. 
Africa.  Queen  v.  Ware,  12  Juta.  Webber  v.  Williams,  36  Me.  512. 
4;  but  later  the  contrary  was  held. 


519  LICENSES.  §  341 

on  the  business,  that  the  defendant  in  the  name  of  the  licensee 
should  make  all  purchases  and  sales  of  the  stock,  pay  all  debts 
and  expenses  incurred  in  carrying  on  the  business  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale,  and  for  his  services  and  the  rent  of  his 
building  should  receive  all  the  profits  of  the  business,  except  a 
certain  sum    per  diem,  which  was  to  be  paid  the  licensee,  it 
was  held  that  the  defendant  and  licensee  were  not  partners, 
but  principal  and  agent,  and  that  the  sale  by  the  defendant 
was  protected  by  the  license/'"    Whore  a  partnership  may  hold 
a  license,  if  one  of  the  partners  sell  liquors  illegally,  prima 
facie,  all  are  liable;"^  but  if  the  accused  was  not  present  or 
dissented  from  or  protested  airainst  the  sale,  he  is  not  liable; 
for  the  fact  they  were  partners  did  not  imply  an  agreement 
by  them  as  part  of  their  partnership  undertaking:  to  violate 
the  laws  of  the  State  by  illegal  sales  of  liquors."    The  question 
of  guilty  or  not  guilty  turns  upon  the  question  of  agency,  and 
the  same  rules  applicable  to  an  illegal  sale  by  a  servant,  where 
it  is  sought  to  hold  his  master  liable  for  his  illegal  act,  applies 
Avhen  it  is  sought  to  hold  one  partner  guilty  for  his  partners' 
illegal  act;  and  the  same  presumptions  prevail,  though  per- 
haps more  strongly.     In  a  more  recent  case  in  Indiana,  the 
one  from  which  a  quotation  has  been  made  above,  it  was  held 
that  a  partnership  could  not  hold  a  license.    The  statute  con- 
strued by  the  court  provided  that  "no  license  shall  be  granted 
to  any  other  than  a  male  person  over  the  age  of  twenty-one 
years,"  and  that  "no  more  than  one  license  shall  be  granted 
or  issued  to  any  one  person,  and  in  no  case  to  any  person  other 
than  the  actual  owner  and  proprietor  of  such  business,  who 
must  apply  in  his  own   name."     "It   is  evident,"  said   the 
Appellate  Court  of  that  State,  "that  it  was  the  intention  of 
the  Legislature  that  the  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  at 
retail  should  only  be  issued  to  one  person,  and  guided  by  the 
established  principles  of  construction  [that  the  express  men- 
tion of  one  person  or  thing  is  the  exclusion  of  another] ,  it  is 
clear  that  two  or  more  persons  are  inhibited  by  the  statute 
from  obtaining  a  license  jointly  or  as  partners,  and  hence 

soKeiser  v.  State,   58  Ind.   379.  "  Acree    v.    Commonwealth,    13 

81  Hooper  v.  Commonwealth,   11       Bush,  353. 
Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)    369. 


§  342  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  520 

cannot  engage  as  partners  in  retailing  intoxicating  liquors 
under  the  law."  '"'^ 

Sec.  342.     Number  of  licenses  an  individual  may  or  is  re- 
quired to  hold. 

Aside  from  the  question  of  holding  a  license  under  differ- 
ent jurisdictions,  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  altogether  a  matter 
of  statute  whether  a  person  may  hold  more  than  one  license. 
If  the  license  is  a  permit  to  retail  liquor  within  a  certain 
political  division  of  the  State,  and  is  not  confined  to  a  partic- 
ular place,  then,  of  course,  only  one  license  is  required  to 
retail  at  one  or  any  number  of  places  within  that  division, 
the  statute  not  forbidding  the  maintenance  of  more  than  one 
single  place  of  business ;  but  if  the  statute  requires  the  license 
to  be  issued  for  a  particular  place  within  the  political  division, 
then  it  is  clear  that  if  the  licensee  desires  to  carry  on  business 
at  another  place  therein  he  must  have  a  license  for  that  place. 
Whether  he  can  obtain  it  will  depend  upon  the  words  of  the 
statute.  So  under  a  license  issued  for  one  political  division 
of  the  State  it  is  clear  that  sales  and  the  business  must  be 
confined  to  that  division,  unless  in  making  such  sales  they 
are  made  through  the  medium  of  an  agent  taking  orders.  But 
it  is  clear  that  under  a  license  to  either  manufacture  or  sell 
at  wholesale  a  licensee  cannot  sell  at  retail,^*  though  there 
would  be  no  objection  to  a  retailer  selling  at  wholesale,  unless 
he  was  expressly  forbidden  by  the  statute  to  do  so.  And,  of 
course,  as  we  have  elsewhere  seen,  a  license  for  one  thing 
cannot  be  used  for  another,  as  a  license  to  keep  a  confection- 
ery cannot  confer  the  right  to  sell  liquors;  and  if  the  con- 
fectioner desires  to  sell  liquors  he  must  also  obtain  a  license 
for  that   purpose. ^^      And   so   of   a   licensed    retail    grocer.-"'" 

53  Spaulding  v.  Nathan,  21  Ind.  App.  6.33;   Burcli  v.  Savannah,  42 

App.  122;   51  N.  E.  742.  Ga.   590. 

But  in  a  subsequent  case,  where  55  Xew   Orleans  v.  Jane,   34  La. 

a  license   was   issued   to   two   per-  Ann.  667. 

sons,  the  same  court  held  that  the  ^6  State    v.    Sies,    30    La.    Ann. 

bond  they  gave  was  valid,     fetate  918;    Mobile   v.   Ricliards,  9S   Ala. 

V.  Gelding,  28   Ind.  App.  233;   62  594;    12    So.   793;    Police   Jury  v. 

iN".  E.  502.  Marrero,   38   La.   Ann.  '896;    State 

84  See    State    v.    C'nren,    35    Md.  v.  Sheriff,  38  La.  Ann.  975;  Kelly 

230;   Schumm  v.  Gardener,  25  111.  v.  Dwyer,  7  Lea,  180. 


521  LICENSES.  §  343 

Usually  a  person  engaged  in  selling  liquors  must  have  as  many- 
licenses  as  he  has  different  and  distinct  bars  or  places  to  sell 
liquor.^^ 


Sec.  343.     City  may  require  license  in  addition  to  State 
license. 

There  is  nothing  to  prevent  a  State  authorizing  a  munici- 
pality to  exact  a  license,  notwithstanding  a  person  holds  a 
license  issued  by  the  State.  This  is  a  common  practice.'^* 
And  a  city  license  issued  to  a  person  will  not  excuse  him  from 
taking  out  a  State  license.'^''  Even  a  statute  providing  that 
retailers  procuring  a  license  from  a  city  shall  not  be  required 
to  pay  anything  to  the  county  for  the  privilege  of  selling 
liquor  will  not  excuse  them  from  taking  out  a  State  license 
under  a  statute  requiring  a  license.*"'  A  city  may  enact  an 
ordinance,  after  the  State  has  is^jued  a  license,  requiring  all 
persons  selling  liquor  within  her  boundaries  to  take  out  a 
license  under  the  ordinance;  and  the  fact  that  the  licensee 
under  the  State  law  held  a  license  issued  prior  to  the  adoption 
of  the  ordinance  will  not  excuse  him  from  a  compliance  with 
the  provisions."^  The  fact  that  a  city's  charter  gave  it  ex- 
clusive power  to  license  liquor  dealers  does  not  even  raise 
a  presumption  that  such  dealers  are  exempt  from  a  general 

57  In  re  Lyman,  59  N.   Y.  App.  N.   E.   795 ;    Freeman  v.  Common- 

Div.    217;    69    N.    Y.    Supp.    309;  wealth,  8  Bush,  139;  Independence 

affirming      (N.     Y.     Misc.     Rep.)  v.   Noland,   21    Mo.    394;    Furman 

67  N.  Y.  Supp.  48;  Huber  v.  Com-  v.  Knapp,  19  Johns.  248;  Warden 

monwealth   (Ky.),  112  S.  W.  583:  v.  Louisville,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  179; 

33    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1031;    State    v.  11   S.   W.  774. 

Falkenheimer    (La.),    49    So.    214.  59  Davis  v.  State,  4   Stew.  &   P. 

ssHaug  V.  Gillett,  14  Kan.  140;  (Ala.)  83;  Stevenson  v.  Hunter, 
Gillen  v.  Riley,  27  Xeb.  158;  42  2  Ohio  K  P.  300;  5  Ohio  S.  &  C. 
N.  W.  1054;  In  re  Lawrence,  69  P.  Dec.  27;  Austin  v.  State,  10 
Ala.  608;  11  Pac.  217;  Paton  v.  Mo.  591;  Broomfield  v.  State,  10 
People,  1  Colo.  77;  People  "".  Mo.  556;  Gritiith  v.  Common- 
Raines,  20  Colo.  48^;  39  Pac.  wealth,  14  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract) 
341 ;  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughn,  1   Oak.  303. 

113;     46    N.    W.    577;     Sloan    v.  co  State    v.    Esterbrook,    6    Ala. 

State,    8   Blackf.   361;    Emerick   v.  fi53. 

Indianapolis,     118    Ind.    279;     20  oi  Cuthbert  v.  Conly,  32  Ga.  211. 


§  344  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS,  522 

law  of  the  State  taxing  liquor  dealers ;  ®-  although  statutes 
may  be,  and  have  been,  so  worded  as  to  exclude  the  right  of 
the  State  to  exact  a  license  within  a  city  or  town,  the  whole 
authority  of  the  State  having  been  delegated  to  the  munici- 
pality ;  "^  or  the  statute  may  be  so  drafted  as  to  prohibit  the 
exacting  by  the  city  of  a  license  from  any  one  holding  a  State 
license,*'*  or  the  State  exacting  one  when  the  city  has  done  so."^ 
Where  a  statute  permitted  a  city  to  exact  a  license  from  any 
person  retailing  liquors  within  a  certain  distance  beyond  its 
boundaries,  that  was  held  not  to  prohibit  the  State  also  requir- 
ing a  license  of  him.^^ 

Sec.  344.     City  license  not  a  defense  to  a  State  violation. 

The  grant  of  a  right  to  the  common  council  of  a  city  by 
the  Legislature  of  a  State  to  fix  the  rate  of  all  licenses  for  the 
retailing  of  intoxicating  liquors  should  be  construed  to  mean 
for  a  city  purpose  only ;  and,  the  fact  that  a  sale  of  such  liquors 
is  made  within  the  city  by  a  licensee  of  the  city,  but  in 
violation  of  a  general  statute  of  the  State  upon  the  same 
subject,  cannot  in  a  prosecution  by  the  State  be  defeated 
because  of  the  existence  of  such  ordinance.  Corporate  pow- 
ers are  granted  for  the  benefit  of  the  corporators.  They 
afford  additional  privileges  and  impose  additional  obligations, 
but  do  not  exempt  such  corporations  from  any  of  their 
obligations  as  citizens  of  the  county  and  State  in  which  the 
corporation  is  situated.  As  inhabitants  of  incorporated  cities 
or  towns  they  may  be  taxed  for  city  and  town  purposes,  but 

62  Decker    v.    McGowan,    59    Ga.  151;    State   v.   Williams,   143   Ala. 

805;    State    v.    Sherman,    50    Mo.  501 ;  39  So.  276. 

265 ;  State  v.  Harper,  58  Mo.  530 ;  63  Hetzer  v.  People,  4  Colo.  45 ; 

Parsley    v.     Hutchins,    47    N.     C.  Bennett    v.    People,    30    111.    389; 

159;    State    v.    Propst,    87    N.    C.  State   v.    Schmail,    25   Minn.   370; 

660;    Commonwealth    v.   Sweitzer,  Phillips  v.  Tecumseh,  5  Neb.  312; 

129  Pa.  St.  644;    18  Atl.  569;   25  Ex  parte   Schmitker,  6   Neb.    108. 

Wkly.  N.  C.    151;   Commonwealth  64  Chastain   v.   Calhoun,   29   Ga. 

V.    Berghman,    129    Pa.    644;     18  333. 

Atl.    570;    25    Wkly.    N.   C.    151;  osstate  v.  White,  115  La.   779; 

Commonwealth  v.  .Shultz,  129  Pa.  40  .So.  44. 

644;   18  Atl.  571;  25  Wkly.  N.  C.  ee  Emerick   v.   Indianapolis,    118 

Ind.  279;  20  N.  E.  795. 


523  LICENSES.  §  345 

they  are  not  thereby  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  contrib- 
uting their  proportion  of  the  public  charges  in  their  capac- 
ity as  citizens  of  the  State  at  large."'' 

Sec.  345.     United  States  license — State  license. 

Inasmuch  as  any  resident  or  inhabitant  of  a  State  is  a  resi- 
dent or  inhabitant  of  the  United  States,  it  follows  that  if  the 
United  States  requires  a  license  that  fact  cannot  excuse  the 
licensee  from  taking  out  a  license  under  the  State  if  the  State 
requires  a  license  to  sell  liquors.'"''  A  distiller  holding  a 
license  from  the  United  States  to  distill  or  manufacture 
whisky  does  not  authorize  him  to  manufacture  or  sell  his  man- 
ufactured product  without  a  State  license  where  a  State  stat- 
ute requires  him  to  take  out  a  State  license  to  manufacture 
whisky  or  to  sell  it.""  This  is  true  even  if  he  sell  through  an 
agency  in  a  town  where  his  distillery  is  not  located.''**  Under 
a  Federal  license  the  licensee  cannot  even  sell  his  domestic  or 
own  manufactured  wine,  if  a  State  statute  requires  a  State 
license.''^  This  applies  also  to  a  Federal  licensee  selling  liquors 
on  board  a  steamer  plying  on  waters  within  a  State's  juris- 
diction.'- This  question  has  also  been  put  at  rest  by  a  special 
provision  of  Congress  providing  that  "the  payment  of  any 

07  Davis   V.    State,    4    Stevens   &  10   Allen,   200;    Commonwealth   v. 

Porter    (Ala.),  83;  Sloan  v.  State,  Keenan,    11    Allen,   262;    Conmion- 

8  Blackf.   (Ind.)    361;   Lewadag  v.  wealth    v.    McNamee,     113    Mass, 

State,  4  Ind.  ClI.  12;     'Commonwealth     v.     Sanborn, 

osMcGuire     v.     Commonwealth,  116  Mass.   61;    State  v.   Funk,  27 

3    Wall.   387;    18   L.   Ed.    226;   In  Minn.  318;  7  N.  W.  359;  State  v. 

re   Jordan,   49    Fed.   238;    Pierson  Downs,   116  N.  C.  1064;   21   N.  E. 

V.    State,    39   Ark.    219;    Black   v.  689;     Territory     v.     O'Connor,     5 

Jacksojpville,  3G  111.  301;   State  v.  Dak.  597;  41  N.  W.  746;   3  L.  R. 

McCleary,    17    Iowa,   44;    State   v.  A.    355;    Territory    v.    Gonnell,    2 

Carney,    20    Iowa,    82;     Boyd    v.  Ariz.  339;    16  Pac.  209. 

State,      12     Lea      (Tenn.),      687;  C9  State    v.    Hazell,    100    N.    €. 

State    V.    Stulz,     20     Iowa,     488;  471;   6  S.  E.  404. 

State  V.  Baughman,  20  Iowa,  497;  ^o  pietz   v.    State,   68   Wis.   538; 

Stommel  v.  Timbal,  84  Iowa,  336;  32  N.  W.  763. 

51  N.  W.   159;    Commonwealth   v.  7i  State  v.   Delano,  54  Me.   501. 

Thorniley,     G     Allen,     445;     Com-  72  Commonwealth     v.     Sheckler, 

monwealth   v.    O'Donnell.   8   Allen,  78  Va.  36. 
548;  Commonwealth  v.  Hornbrook, 


§346 


TRAFFIC   IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS. 


524 


tax  imposed  by  the  internal  revenue  laws  for  carrying  on  any 
trade  or  business  shall  not  be  held  to  exempt  any  person  from 
any  penalty  or  punishment  provided  by  the  laws  of  any 
State  for  carrying  on  the  same  within  such  State,  or  in  any 
manner  to  authorize  the  commencement  or  continuance  of  such 
trade  or  business  contrary  to  the  laws  of  such  State  or  in 
places  prohibited  by  municipal  law;  nor  shall  the  payment 
of  any  such  tax  be  held  to  prohibit  any  State  from  placing 
a  duty  or  tax  on  the  same  trade  or  business,  for  State  or 
other  purposes."  "^ 


Sec.  346.  United  States  Govemment  license  no  defense  to 
State  violation. 
The  payment  of  a  tax  imposed  by  the  United  States  upon 
retail  liquor  dealers  is  not  a  protection  against  the  violation 
of  a  State  statute  prohibiting  or  regulating  the  sale  of  intox- 
icating liquors.  When  a  State,  in  the  exercise  of  an  undoubted 
power,  has  prohibited  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  within 
the  State,  Congress  disclaims  all  intention  to  confer  the  right 
to  authorize  the  exercise  of  such  prohibited  business  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  State  laws.  But  when  a  State  has  conferred  the 
authority  to  sell  such  liquors,  then  the  general  government 
may  claim  the  right  to  tax  the  exercise  of  the  business  thus 


73  Rev.  St.  U.  S.  187S,  §3243. 
Another  statute  expressly  pro- 
vides that  the  word  "State"  shall 
include  a  "territory."  Rev.  St. 
U.  S.  1878,  §  3140.  Construed, 
Territory  v.  O'Connor,  5  Dak. 
397;  41  X.  W.  746:  3  L.  R.  A. 
35.5. 

A  licensee  under  the  Federal 
Government,  when  indicted  for 
selling  liquors  in  violation  of  a 
State  statute,  is  not  entitled  to 
remove  the  suit  into  the  Federal 
court  for  that  district  under  the 
Federal  statute  for  the  removal 
of  suits,  providing  that  "a  suit 
or  prosecution  against  any  offi- 
cer of  the  United  States  or  other 


person,  for  or  on  account  of  any 
act  done  under  the  revenue  laws 
of  the  United  States,  or  under 
color  thereof,  or  for  or  on  ac- 
count of  any  right,  authority  or 
title  set  up  or  claimed  by  such 
officer  or  other  person  under  any 
such  law  of  the  United  States." 
Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.  1878,  §  643;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Casej-,  12  Allen, 
214;  State  v.  Elder,  54  Me.  381. 
A  licensee  under  the  Federal  stat- 
ute cannot  take  into  or  sell  liquor 
in  an  Indian  country,  even  if 
such  country  be  a  part  of  his  dis- 
trict. United  States  v.  Forty- 
three  Gallons  of  Whisky,  108  U. 
S.  491;   2  Sup.  Ct.  906. 


525  LICENSES.  §  347 

authorized  and  to  impose  a  revenue  tax  upon  the  exercise  of 
the  occupation.  In  other  words,  the  general  government  rec- 
ognizes the  power  of  the  State  governments  to  regulate  their 
internal  police.  Any  other  rule  would  necessarily  result  in 
confusion  and  lead  to  a  conflict  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  two 
governments.  Such  power  has  never,  since  the  organization 
of  the  Government,  been  claimed  or  exercised.  Indeed,  to 
hold  that  Congress  can  license  citizens  of  a  State  to  violate  its 
laws,  would  be  an  invasion  of  the  constitutional  power  of  the 
State,  which  would  be  subversive  of  our  republican  form  of 
government.^* 

Sec.  347.    Duration  of  license. 

As  a  rule  a  license  begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  its  issu- 
ance, and  usually  expires  within  a  year  from  that  date.  And 
if  the  limitation  is  a  year  it  cannot  be  construed  as  extending 
over  a  period  of  a  year  and  a  day.'^^  In  many  States  all 
licenses  are  granted  for  a  fixed  period,  and  all  expire  on  the 
same  date,  and  the  fact  that  a  license  is  granted  after  that 
date  does  not  continue  it  in  force  beyond  the  succeeding  date, 
although  if  granted  on  the  first  date  it  would  have  continued 
a  full  year.^"  If  a  State  authorize  the  granting  of  a  license 
for  a  year  the  licensing  board  cannot  grant  it  for  a  part  of 
a  year ''"'  unless  the  statute  expressly  authorizes  it.^"  A 
licensing  board  may  grant  a  license  which  will  begin  to  run 

74  License    Case,    46    U.    S.     (5  wealth  v.  Sanburn,  116  Mass.  01; 

How.)    574;   McGuire  v.   Common-  State    v.    Funk,    27     Minn.    318; 

wealth,   70  U.   S.    (3   Wall.)    387;  State   v.    Hazel,    100    X.    C.    471; 

In  re  Jordan,   49   Fed.   Rep.   23«;  State  v.   Downs,   116  N.   C.    1064; 

Pierson    v.    State,    39    Ark.    219;  21    S.    E.    689;    Commonwealth    v. 

Black  V.  Town  of  Jacksonville,  36  Sheckels,   78  Va.   36. 

111.    301;    State    v.    McCleary,    17  Tsgchwarm    v.    State,    82    Ind. 

la.    44;    State   v.   Carney,    20    la.  470;    see  State  v.  Sumter  Co.,   22 

i82;     State    v.    Bausrhman,    20    la.  Fla.   1,  and  Reiisch  v.  Lincoln,  78 

497;   Stommel   v.   Timbrel,   84   Li.  Neb.  828;   112  N.  W.  377. 

336;    51   N.  W.   159;    State  v.  De-  76  Disbrow  v.   Sanders,   1   Denio, 

lano,  54  Me.   501;   Commonwealth  149. 

V.    Thornley,    88    Mass.    (6    Allen)  v- Gnrley    v.   State,  -65   Ga.    157. 

445 ;  Comnionwealtli  v.  Keenan,  93  78  People  v.  Ganey,  8  Hun,  GO. 
Mass    (11    Allen)    262;    Common- 


§  348  TBAFP^IC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  526 

after  the  terms  of  the  commissioners  have  expired;  and  the 
fact  that  their  terms  expired  before  the  date  the  license  was 
to  take  effect  cannot  be  used  to  shorten  its  lifeJ®  The  term 
of  a  license,  by  statute,  may,  however,  begin  to  run  from  the 
date  of  the  payment  of  the  license  fee  and  not  from  the  date 
it  is  issued,  that  depending  upon  the  statute ;  ^  but  in  Indiana 
the  license  begins  to  run  from  the  date  it  is  granted,  and  not 
from  the  date  of  its  issuance.^^  In  England  "occasional" 
licenses  are  issued  to  licensed  keepers  of  public  houses  to  carry 
on  the  traffic  in  liquors  at  some  other  designated  place  for  a 
period  of  time  ''not  exceeding  three  consecutive  days  at  any 
one  time. "^-  When  these  licenses  (or  rather  permits  to  sell 
off  the  licensed  premises)  are  granted,  they  are,  for  the  time 
being,  a  complete  protection  to  the  holder  if  he  in  other 
respects  obey  the  law.^^"  In  fact,  they  are  permits  to  sell 
liquors  for  a  period  not  over  three  days  at  a  designated  place, 
but  subject  to  all  the  regulations  and  requirements  pertain- 
ing to  sales  under  a  regular  license.  A  license  for  a  "calendar 
year"  means  from  January  1st  to  December  31st,  inclusive, 
and  not  for  a  period  of  twelve  months  commencing  at  any 
fixed  date  and  terminating  with  the  corresponding  date  next 
year.®* 

Sec.  348.    Expired  license. 

An  expired  license  is  no  better  than  no  license  at  all.  The 
licensee  selling  under  it  is  in  no  better  position  than  if  he  had 

79  Hendersonville  v.  Price,  90  59  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  533;  112  N. 
N.  C.  423;  2  8.  E.  155.  Y.  Siipp.   475. 

80  Brown  v.  State,  27  Tex.  335.  When  a  license  expires.     Green- 
si  Keiser  V.   State,   78   Ind.   430       ough  v.  Narragansett    (R.   I.),  71 

(overruling   Vannoy    v.    State,   64  Atl.  574.     In  Manitoba.    Crothers 

Ind,  447;   State  v.  Wilcox,  66  Ind.  v.   Monteith,    11   Manitoba,   373. 

557 ) .  The    issuing    officer    cannot,    by 

82  25  and  20  Vict.  c.  22,  §13;  insisting  that  the  license  was  to 
Patterson's  Licensing  Act,  p,  288.  continue     until     it     was     revoked, 

83  Stevens  v.  Emson,  1  Exch.  prolong  a  license  beyond  the  date 
Div.  100;  40  J.  P.  484;  45  L.  J.  fixed  by  law  for  its  expiration. 
M.  C.  63;  33  L.  T.  821.  State  v.  Brown   (Iowa),  109  S.  W. 

84  Carroll   v.    Wright    (Ga.),   63  1011. 
S.   E,   260;    see   People   v.   Moore, 


527  LICENSES.  §  349 

never  held  a  license.  He  may  not  even  sell  the  stock  he  held  on 
hand  when  it  expired.^'^  In  certain  instances,  however,  as  has 
elsewhere  been  stated,  sales  after  the  expiration  of  a  license 
and  before  it  could  be  renewed  or  another  obtained  have  been 
excused  where  a  renewal  or  license  was  thereafter  secured  as 
soon  as  the  law  permitted  its  issuance.*® 

Sec.  349.    "On"  and  "off"  licenses. 

In  England  licenses  are  divided  into  two  classes,  "on" 
and  "off"  licenses.  How  this  distinction  arose  is  thus  stated 
by  Pattei*son:  "In  1830  it  was  deemed  'expedient  for  the 
better  supplying  of  the  public  with  beer  in  England  to  give 
greater  facilities  for  the  sale  thereof  than  are  at  present 
afforded  by  licenses  to  keepers  of  inns,  ale  houses  and  victual- 
ing houses. '  ^^  The  Beer  House  Act,  1830,  was  accordingly 
passed,  authorizing  any  person  being  a  householder  assessed 
to  the  poor  rate  except  sheriffs'  officers,  etc.,  to  obtain  from 
the  excise,  on  payment  of  two  guineas  a  year,  a  license  to  sell 
beer  by  retail.  This  license  authorized  the  holder  to  sell  beer 
by  retail  in  his  dwelling  house,  whether  for  consumption  on 
the  premises  or  not,  but  was  issued  subject  to  certain  condi- 
tions expressed  on  the  face  of  it,  for  the  breach  of  which  he 
was  subject  to  heavy  penalties.  These  conditions  were  sub- 
stantially the  same  as  in  the  case  of  the  innkeeper's  license, 
but  the  closing  hours  were  more  strictly  defined.  In  1834 
it  was  found  that  much  evil  had  arisen  from  the  management 
and  conduct  of  these  beer  houses.  The  Beer  Plouse  Act  of 
1834  ®*  was  accordingly  passed,  by  which  a  distinction  was 
made  between  retail  licenses  for  consumption  on  the  prem- 
ises and  off  retail  beer  licenses.    The  former  were  to  cost  tliree 

85  United    States    v.    Angell,    11  should    expire   on    a   certain   date, 

Fed.  34;   State  v.  McNett,  5  Pen.  this   was   held   not   to   protect   the 

(Del.),   334;    61    Atl.    689;    Tracy  licensee    on    a    prosecution    for    a 

V.    Ginzberg,    189    Mass.    260;    75  sale    after    such    date.      State    v. 

N.   E.  637.  Brown    (Iowa),    109   S.    W.    1011. 

88  Where   the   issuing   officer   in-  st  Beer   House   Act   of    1830,    U 

serted    a    clause    that    the    license  Geo.  IV  and  I  Will  4,  c.  64. 

was  to  continue  until  revoked,  and  ss  4  and  5  Will  4,  c.  85. 
a   statute   provided   that  all   sales 


|§  350  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  528 

guineas  a  year  and  the  latter  one  guinea.  The  latter  were  to 
be  granted  practically  in  the  same  way  as  under  the  produc- 
tion to  the  excise,  by  the  applicant,  of  a  certificate  that  he 
was  of  good  character,  signed  by  six  rated  inhabitants  of  the 
parish.  The  licenses,  Avhether  on  or  off,  were  held  subject  to 
the  same  conditions  as  under  the  previous  act,  with  the  same 
penalties,  a  slight  change  being  made  in  the  closing  regula- 
tions."^^ Subsequently  on  and  off  licenses  for  selling  wine 
and  also  licenses  for  selling  spirits  were  permitted.^*' 

Sec.  350.    Void  license — Collateral  attack. 

A  sale  under  a  void  license  is  the  same  as  a  sale  without 
any  license  whatever.  A  void  license  is  no  protection,  how- 
ever bona  fide  may  have  been  the  intention  of  the  licensee  not 
to  violate  the  law.**^  Such  was  held  to  be  the  case  where  a  town 
board  was  composed  of  a  mayor  and  three  aldermen,  to  which 
an  application  was  made  for  a  license.  One  of  the  aldermen 
moved  that  a  license  be  granted  the  applicant,  but  the  mayor 
refused  to  put  the  question,  and,  therefore,  one  of  the  two 
remaining  aldermen  put  the  question  and  he  and  the  alderman 
moving  the  question  voted. for  it.  The  clerk  of  the  board  re- 
fused to  enter  the  action  upon  the  minutes,  but  the  two 
aldermen  voting  for  it  signed  an  order  granting  the  license, 
approved  the  applicant's  bond,  and  a  license  otherwise  was 
duly  issued.  It  was  held  that  the  license  was  void  and  no 
protection  for  sales  under  it.®-  But  if  a  license  be  duly  granted 
by  a  board  or  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  application  for 
it,  its  validity  cannot  be  collaterally  attacked  in  order  to 
secure  a  conviction  of  the  licensee  under  a  charge  of  a  sale 
withoTit    authority   to    make   it."^      But    notwithstanding    the 

89  Patterson's  Licensing  Acts,  p.  410;  44  So.  156;  State  v.  Raj', 
4.  119  La.  417;   44  So.  417. 

90  32  and  33  "Vict.  e.  27;  33  92  Hugonin  v.  Adams  (Miss.), 
and  34  Vict.  c.  29.  33  So.  497. 

91  Alexander  v.  State,  77  Ark.  93  Ludwig  v.  State,  18  Ind.  App. 
294;  91  S.  W.  181;  State  v.  518;  48  N.  E.  390;  Common- 
Moore,  1  Jones  (N,  C),  276;  Ex  wealth  v.  Graves,  18  B.  Mon.  33; 
parte  Dimond,  2  N.  S.  W.  L.  R.  Goff  v.  Fowler,  3  Pick.  300;  City 
207;     State    v,    Laborde,    IIQ    La.  Oouncil    v.   Hollenback,    3    Strobh. 


529  LICENSES.  §  350 

general  rule  that  a  license  cannot  be  collaterally  attacked,  it 
has  been  held  that  an  inquiry  may  be  instituted,  as  to  whether 
it  had  been  properly  obtained,  in  an  action  for  a  sale  without 
a  license.^*  And  so  it  has  been  held  in  England  that  if  the 
licensee  was  a  person  to  whom  a  license  could  not  be  issued, 
his  license  was  no  protection  upon  a  charge  of  a  sale  without 
one ;  ^^  and  this  is  also  true  if  it  was  issued  for  a  local  option 
district,  or  where  local  option  had  become  effective.®^ 

355;    Hornaday   v.  State,   43    Ind.  649;    Thompson   v.   Harvey,   4    H. 

306.  &  N.  254;   28  L.  J.  M.  C.  163;  23 

s*Ex    parte    Dimond,    2    N.    S.  J.  P.  150. 

W.  L.  R.  207.  9c  state     v.     Laborde,     1 19     La. 

95Regina   v.   Vine,   L.   R.    10   Q.  410;    44   So.    156;    State    v.    Ray. 

B.  195;   35  J.  P.  213;  44  L.  J.  M.  119  La.  417;   44   So.  159. 

C.  60;    31    L.   T.   842;    23   W.   R. 


CHAPTER   VII. 
PERSONS  ENTITLED  TO  A  LICENSE. 


SECTION. 

SECTION. 

351.     Eligibility. 

357. 

Restaurant  in  capitol  build- 

352.    Married   women — Female. 

ing. 

353.     Corporations. 

358. 

Holder  of  house. 

354.     Joint     and     partnership     li- 

359. 

Boat  license. 

censes. 

360. 

Canteen — Street  railway  car. 

355.     Manufacturers. 

361. 

Who  must  have  a  license. 

355a.  Wholesalers. 

362. 

Wholesalers. 

356.     Hotel   keeper — Innkeeper.  363.     Native  or  domestic  winea. 

Sec.  351.    Eligibility. 

The  right  to  a  license  to  sell  liquors  at  retail  is  usually 
restricted  to  a  certain  class  of  persons;  but,  as  a  rule,  no  such 
restrictions  are  placed  upon  a  license  to  sell  at  wholesale. 
The:"e  is  no  question  of  the  right  and  power  of  a  State  to 
restrict  a  license  to  retail  to  a  certain  class,  as  has  been  shown 
in  the  chapter  on  constitutional  law.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
further  discuss  that  phase  of  the  subject.  Usually  the  statutes 
restrict  the  right  to  a  license  to  an  inhabitant  of  the 
State.  The  object  of  this  is  to  enable  the  State  to  secure  a  better 
control  over  the  traffic.  If  the  licensee  is  required  to  be  an 
inhabitant  of  the  State,  however,  he  need  not  be  an  inhabitant 
of  the  town,  or  city  or  county  wherein  he  seeks  a  permit  tc 
carry  on  the  business  of  retailing  linuors;  it  is  sufficient  if 
he  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  State. ^  Of  course,  the  distinction 
between  an  inhabitant  and  a  citizen  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
for  while  an  inhabitant  must  reside  in  a  State  a  citizen  does 

1  Ex  parte  Laboyleaux,   65   Ind.  A    male    innabitant    cannot    in- 

545;    Murphy    v.    Board,    73    Ind.  sist    an    ordinance    is    invalid    be- 

483 ;   State  v.  Dudley,  33  Ind.  App.  cause   women   cannot   obtain   a   li- 

640;  71  N.  E.  975;  Welsh  v.  State,  cense   under    it.      Wagner  v.    Gar- 

126  Ind.   71;    25  N.  E.  883;   9  L.  rett.  118  Ind.   114;   20  N.  E.  706. 
II.  A.  664. 

530 


531  PERSONS  ENTITLED  TO  A  LICENSE,  §  351 

not  necessarily  do  so.-  Statutes  often  restrict  the  license  to 
an  inhabitant  of  a  county,  or  a  city,  or  a  town,  or  even  a 
township;  and  when  such  is  the  case  the  applicant  must  be 
an  inhabitant  of  the  political  subdivision  for  which  he  seeks 
the  license;  and  not  only  that,  but  he  must  remain  an  in- 
habitant during  the  life  of  the  license,  for  if  he  do  not  and 
move  out  of  it  he  will  forfeit  his  license,  and  his  servant 
retailing  liquors  over  this  bar  after  his  master  has  removed 
will  not  be  protected  by  his  master's  license.^  This  is  par- 
ticularly true  if  the  licensee  remove  from  the  State.*  As  a 
rule,  statutes  require  licensees  to  be  persons  of  good  moral 
character,  and  when  such  was  the  ease  it  was  held  that  a 
refusal  of  a  license  to  the  keeper  of  a  house  of  prostitution  was 
proper.^  Not  infrequently  statutes  provide  that  an  applicant 
who  has  been  convicted  of  a  violation  of  the  liquor  laws  shall 
not  be  entitled  to  a  license,  but  unless  the  statute  expressly  so 
provides,  that  is  no  ground  for  refusing  him  a  license.^  But  a 
statute  providing  that  "any  person  having  a  license  as  a 
dramshop  keeper"  who  sells  on  Sunday  shall  be  subject  to  a 
fine,  forfeit  his  license,  and  not  be  entitled  to  another  license 
for  two  years,  applies  only  to  a  licensed  dealer  M^ho  has 
violated  the  statute  and  not  to  an  unlicensed  person  selling  on 
Sunday,  though  he  may  be  liable  to  a  penalty.'^  In  New  York 
it  was  held  that  an  application  will  not  be  refused  solely  on 
the  ground  that  the  applicant  eighteen  years  before  had  been 
convicted  of  a  felony  and  then  pardoned.^  The  fact  that  an 
applicant  may  have  once  been  intoxicated  does  not  disqualify 
him  under  a  statute  requiring  the  licensee  to  be  "a  fit  person 
to  be  intrusted  with  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors"  and  "not 
in  the  habit   of  becoming   intoxicated."^     Other   species   of 

2  Welsh   V.   State,    126   Ind.    71;  t  state    v.    Hambright.    33    Mo. 
25  N.  E.  8'83;   9  L.  R.  A.  «64.  394;   see  also  Eegina  v.  Eoper,  63 

3  State  V.  Dudley,  33  Ind.  App.  L.   J.   M.    C.   68;    10    R.    598;    70 
r.40;    71    N.    E.    975;    Runyan    v.  L.   T.   409;    58   J.    P.    512. 
State,   52   Ind.    320.  8  People    v.    Sackett,    17    N.    Y. 

4  Kraut   V.    State,    47    Ind.    519.       Misc.    Rep.   406;    40    N.   Y.  Supp. 
sQuachita    Co.    v.    Rolland,    60       413.      The   pardon   wiped   out   the 

Ark.  5\Q-  31  S.  W.  144.  oflense   and   made   the    person    re- 

e  Golden    v.    Bingham,    61    Ind.       ceiving  it  a  new  man  in  law. 
l,9g_  9  Calder    v.    Sheppard,    61    Ind. 

219;   Miller  v.  Wade,  58   Ind.   91. 


§  351         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  l.IQUORS,  532 

immorality  besides  intoxication  may  lie  made  an  effectual 
objection  to  an  applicant ;  ^"  for  one  may  be  an  immoral  man 
Adthin  the  sense  that  term  is  used  in  the  statutes  without 
being  addicted  to  intoxication.^^  Such  would  be  the  case  of 
one  who  frequents  gambling  places,  though  the  statute  makes 
no  reference  by  that  name  to  the  unfitness  of  an  applicant/- 
If  the  statute  prohibits  the  issuance  of  a  license  to  any  person 
convicted  of  a  certain  crime,  the  fact  that  an  applicant  had 
been  so  convicted  but  on  appeal  the  judgment  was  reversed  or 
set  aside  will  not  be  a  bar  to  his  application.^^  An  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  issuance  of  a  license  to  any  person  who  has 
either  carried  on  or  is  carrying  on  his  business  in  a  certain 
manner  applies  to  an  applicant  who  so  carried  on  his  business 
before  the  ordinance  was  adopted.^*  A  statute  providing  for 
the  issuance  of  a  license  to  druggists,  to  sell  for  medicinal 
and  other  purposes,  does  not  require  the  applicant  to  be  a 
pharmacist.^'  A  statute  requiring  the  application  to  be 
for  a  designated  place  or  house  does  not  require  the  applicant 
to  reside  on  such  place  or  in  such  house,  though  it  may  require 

10  Grumman  v.  Holmes,  7G  Ind.  A  plea  of  guilty,  followed  bv  a 
585.                                                                suspension   of   sentence,   is   a   con- 

11  Hill  V.  Perry,  82   Ind.  28.  viction,   and   prevents   the   issuing 
i2Groscap   v.    Rainer,    111    Ind.       of  a  license  where  the  statute  pro- 

361;     39    N.    E.    47;    Whissen    v.  Aides    no   license   shall  issue  to   a 

Furth,  36'6   Ark. ;    84   S.   W.   500 ;  person  convicted  of  a  felony.    Peo- 

68  L.   R.   A.    161.  pie  v.  Lyman,  33  N.  Y.  Misc.  Eep. 

13  Appeal    of    Smith,    65    Conn.  243;  68  N.  Y.  Supp.  331. 

135;   31   Atl.  529;   Horton  v.  Cen-  Under  a  discretionary  power  to 

tral  Falls    (R.  I.),  35  Atl.  962.  grant    licenses    to    sell    liquors    in 

14  Foster  v.  Board,  102  Cal.  quantities  not  less  than  a  quart, 
483;  37  ^  '.  7'63;  41  Am.  St.  a  licensing  board  may  grant  a  li- 
194;  ai,.  see  Regina  v.  Vine,  L.  cense  to  a  druggist.  In  re  Sus- 
R.  10  Q.  B.  195;  39  J.  P.  213;  quehanna  Co.,  3  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 
44  L.  J.  M.  C.  60;   31  L.  T.  842;  616. 

23  W.  R.  649,  where  a  conviction  That   the  applicant  must  be   an 

of    a    felony    previous    to    the    en-  inhabitant    of    the    political    sub- 

actment   of   tlie   statute   prevented  division    of    the    State    for    which 

a  transfer  of  the  license,  it  evad-  he   applies  for  a  license,  see   Mil- 

ing  the  license.  ler   v.    Made,   58    Ind.   91;    People 

15  Owens  v.  People,  56  111.  App.  v.  Davis,  36  N.  Y.  77;  affirming 
569;  see  In  re  Gillham  (Iowa),  45  Barb.  494;  State  v.  County 
99  N.  W.  179.  Ct.  GG  Mo.  App.  96. 


533  PERSONS  ENTITLED  TO  A  LICENSE.  §  351 

him  to  reside  in  the  political  subdivision  for  which  such  license 
is  to  be  granted,  as  where  an  innkeeper  may  take  out  a 
license.^*^  A  statute  prohibiting  a  "police  official  "  from  taking 
out  a  license  does  not  apply  to  the  mayor  of  the  city,  though 
ex  officio  he  is  a  member  of  the  police  force ;  ^^  nor  does  it 
apply  to  an  alderman,  though  the  board  of  aldermen  has 
power  to  appoint  and  remove  members  of  the  police  force.^* 
Where  a  statute  provided  that  a  license  should  not  issue  to  a 
person  of  "bad  fame,"  proof  of  the  fact  that  he  was  living  in 
adultery,  but  coupled  with  no  evidence  as  to  his  reputation 
in  the  neighborhood,  was  held  not  to  show  he  was  a  man  of 
"bad  fame"  within  the  sense  it  was  used  in  the  statute;  '^  for 
a  man  to  be  of  "bad  repute"  must  be  generally  known  as 
such,  and  merely  living  with  another  man's  wife  does  not 
bring  him  within  the  statutory  meaning  of  the  word.-"  Where 
a  statute  provided  that  a  permit  to  sell  liquor  should  not  be 
granted  to  a  pharmacist,  and  no  other  person  was  entitled  to  a 
license,  and  a  pharmacist  should  not  be  granted  a  permit  if  six 
months  prior  to  the  application  he  had  been  unlawfully  con- 
ducting a  pharmacy,  it  was  held  that  if  an  applicant  within 
that  period,  without  a  permit,  sold  alcohol  to  be  used  in  "pre- 
serving a  specimen,"  though  he  himself  assisted  in  putting 
the  liquor  to  its  intended  use,  he  was  not  entitled  to  a  license.-'- 
Where  an  applicant  for  a  second  license  was  shown  to  have 
so  screened  his  place  of  business  as  to  amount  to  a  violation 

16  state    V.    Hill,    52    N.    J.    L.  lo /«    re    Pool,    14    Vict.    L.    K. 
326;    19   Atl.   789;    The   People   v.       519. 

Hartmann,  10  Hun.  602;  O'Roiirke  20  Potter    v.    Bowling,    5    W.    N. 

V.  People,  3  Hun.   225;   5  Thomp.  (N.  S.  W.)    143. 

&  C.  496.  -^  In  re  Heery,   124  Iowa,  358; 

17  People     V.     Gregg,     59     Hun,  100  N.  W.  43;  In  re  Willielm,  124 
107;    13   N.   Y.    Supp.    114;    35   N.  Iowa  380;    100   N.  W.   44.     Effect 
Y.  Supp.   757.  of  judgment  of  conviction  by  con- 
is  People    V.    Hannon,    59    Hun,  sent.      In    re    Thomas,    117    Iowa 

617;    19  N.  Y.   Supp.   117;    35   N.  275;    90  N.  W.  581.     But  an  un- 

Y.  St.  Rep.  117.  lawful  sale  of  soda  waters  or  ci- 

As    to    producing    certificate    of  gars  does  not  disqualify  him  as  a 

good    moral    character,    see    In    re  licensee.      In     re      Mausley,      136 

Hunter,    24    Ont.    522     (reversing  Iowa  66;    113  N.  W.  548. 
24  Ont.  153)  ;  In  re  Greystock,  12 
Up.    Can.    458. 


,ys5i 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


534 


of  the  law,  a  license  was  refused."  But  in  Pennsylvania  it 
was  held  that  a  single  sale  in  violation  of  law  would  not 
justify  a  refusal  of  the  application  for  a  license.^^  And  where 
an  applicant  had  been  granted  a  license,  executed  his  bond  in 
good  faith,  but  the  bond  was  void  because  of  a  technical  defect, 
it  was  held  that  he  was  not  guilty  of  a  criminal  offense  in 
making  sales  and  was  entitled  to  another  license.-*  A  statute 
of  Kentucky  provided  that  a  license  should  not  be  granted 
"to  any  person  of  bad  character,  or  who  does  not  keep  an 
orderly,  law-abiding  house;"  and  it  was  held  that  the  county 
court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  refusing  a  license  to  an 
applicant  who  had  sold  liquor  without  a  license  and  also  to 
minors.-"  So  liquors  sold  at  a  place  forbidden  by  law  is  suffi- 
cient to  authorize  not  only  the  refusal  of  a  new  license  but 
a  revocation  of  one  in  existence.^"    A  statute  provided  that  no 


22  In  re  MacRae  (Neb.),  106  N. 
W.    1020. 

23Babb  V.  Taylor,  2  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  38;   38  W.  N.  C.  440. 

24  North  V.  Barringer,  147  Ind. 
224;  46  N.  E.  531.  In  Indiana 
even  a  conviction  of  the  applicant 
for  a  violation  of  the  law  in  the 
sale  of  li(iUors  does  not  necessarily 
show  him  to  be  unfit  to  receive  a 
license.  Golden  v.  Bingham,  61 
Ind.  198;  Lynch  v.  Bates,  139  Ind. 
206;   39  K  E.  919. 

25  Appeal  of  Candill  (Ky.),  t>6 
S.  W.  723;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  2139; 
Watkins  v.  Grieser,  11  Okla.  302; 
66  Pac.  332. 

26 /,i  re  Clement,  125  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  676;  110  N.  Y.  Supp. 
57,  59. 

In  England  "The  real  resident 
holder  and  occupier"  of  the  house 
in  which  he  seeks  a  license  must 
be  sleetping  upon  the  premises. 
Rex  v.  Manchester  JJ.,  ^8  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  358  [1899];  1  Q.  B.  571; 
8  L.  T.  531;  47  W.  R.  410  63  J. 
P.  360;  Regina  v.  Sherman,  67  L. 
J.    Q.    B.    460     [1898];     1    Q.    B. 


578;  Nix  V.  Nottingham  JJ.,  63 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  854  [1899];  2  Q.  B. 
294;  81  L.  T.  41;  47  W.  R.  628; 
63  J.  B.  628.  ( In  this  case  it  was 
held  that  the  mere  fact  that  a 
person  receives  a  salary  as  a  man- 
ager of  a  brewery  company  and 
pays  over  to  it  the  profits  made 
out  of  the  sale  of  its  beer,  did  not 
prevent  him  being  the  "real  resi- 
dent  holder   and   occupier." 

In  British  Columbia  a  Japanese 
is  entitled  to  a  license.  In  re 
Kanamiira,    10   B.   C.   Rep.   354. 

A  statute  prohibited  the  grant- 
ing of  a  second  application  during 
a  license  year  where  the  appli- 
cant's previous  license  had  been 
denied  because  he  was  an  unsuit- 
able person,  or  where  a  previous 
application  during  the  year  had 
been  refused  on  the  ground  that 
the  place  was  not  a  suitable  one. 
It  was  held  that  the  prohibition 
within  the  year  applied  where  the 
person  or  the  place  had  become 
a  suitable  person  or  place.  Ap- 
peal of  D'Amato,  80  Conn.  357; 
68  Atl.   445. 


535  PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO   A   LICENSE.  §  351 

one  ever  convicted  of  a  felony  should  hold  a  license ;  but  one 
who  had  been  convicted  and  then  pardoned  was  held  eligible 
for  a  license,  the  pardon  removing  all  his  disability."^  In 
England  a  statute  prohibits  the  issuance  of  a  license,  or  the 
renewal  of  a  license,  to  anyone  "convicted  of  permitting  his 
premises  to  be  a  brothel."  In  construing  this  statute  it  is 
held  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  the  offense;  it  is  not 
material  there  was  no  outward  sign  of  its  indecency,-^  or  there 
was  no  disorderly  conduct.-"  Proof  that  the  licensee  per- 
mitted the  place  to  be  used  for  the  purposes  of  prostitution 
once  is  some  evidence  to  support  the  charge  of  permitting  the 
premises  to  be  used  as  a  brothel.^"  The  fact  that  the  licensee 
had  permitted  prostitutes  to  frequent  his  place  of  business  was 
held  sufficient  to  warrant  the  justices  refusing  him  a  license.^* 
A  license  to  sell  liquors  is  in  the  nature  of  a  personal  trust, 
and  whoever  applies  for  a  license  must  not  only  be  able  and 
competent  to  carry  out  that  trust,  but  he  must  be  willing  to 
do  so.'^  If  an  applicant  meets  the  requirements  of  the  statute, 
the  licensing  board  must  grant  him  a  license,  except  where  it 
has  a  discretion  in  the  matter.^^  But  it  cannot  dispense  with 
the  necessary  qualifications  in  the  applicant.^*  An  application 
cannot  be  refused  solely  on  the  ground  that  no  man  of  good 
moral  character  would  engage  in  the  liquor  traffic,  and,  there- 

27  Hay  V.  Tower  Division,  59  J^.  Grieser,    60    Pac.    332 ;     1 1    Okla. 

J.   M.   C.   79;   24  Q.   B.  Div.   561;  302;     see     Simpson     v.     Comnion- 

62    L.   T.   290;    38   W.  R.   414;    54  wealth    (Ky.),   9/   S.   W.   404;    30 

J.    P.    500.      See    also    People    v.  Ky.   L.   Pvep.    132. 

Sackett,    17    N.    Y.    Mis.    407;    40  33  Harrison    v.    People,    195    III. 

N.  Y.  Supp.  413.  406;    -63   N.    E.    191;    reversing  91 

28Regina  v.  Rice.  L.  R.   1   C.  C.  111.   App.   421. 

R.  21;    35  L.  J.  M.  C.  93;    13   L.  34  Appeal    of    Hums,    76    Conn. 

T.  382;    14  W.  xi.  56.  395;    56    Atl.    611. 

29  Greig  v.  Bendeno,  E.  B.  &  E.  If  a  licensee  consent  to  the  en- 

133;  27  L.  J.  M.  C.  294.  tering   of   a   decree   of   conviction. 

soRegina   v.    Justices,   46   J.   P.  "in   a   spirit   of  compromise,"   but 

312;   Webb  v.  Catchlove,  50  J.  P.  under  an  agreement  that  it  shall 

795.  not  bar  his   riglit  to  a  second   li- 

31  Sharp    V.    Hughes,    57    J.    P.  cense,  yet  the  judgment  will  have 

104.  that    effect.      In    re    Thoma,    117 

32 /m.    re    Krug,    72    Neb.    676;  Iowa,  275;  90  N.  W.  581. 
101     N.     W.     242;      Watkins     v. 


§  352  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  536 

fore,  the  application  shows  the  applicant  is  not  a  man  of  good 
moral  character,  for  such  a  rule  would  invalidate  the  law 
itself.^^ 

Sec.  352.    Married  Women — Female. 

The  usual  statute  restricts  a  license  to  a  "male  inhabitant" 
or  a  "resident  male"  or  a  "voter;"  and,  therefore,  prohibits 
licenses  being  granted  to  females.  So  many  of  the  statutes 
require  the  licensee  to  give  a  bond  with  sureties  for  his  good 
behavior  or  to  pay  damages  under  certain  conditions.  This 
has  been  claimed  to  prevent  a  married  woman  from  taking  out 
a  license,  because  she  could  not  bind  herself  by  her  bond.  But 
here  the  argument  largely  fails  because  of  the  many  recently 
enacted  married  women  enabling  acts.  Under  a  statute  pro- 
viding that  any  male  inhabitant  over  twenty-one  years  of  age, 
and  giving  proper  notice,  may  obtain  a  retail  license,  it  was 
held  that  it  impliedly  forbade  the  granting  of  a  license  to  a 
female."''®  In  New  Zealand  it  is  held  that  "The  Married 
Woman's  Property  Act"  does  not  authorize  the  issuance  of  a 
license  to  a  married  woman,  the  prohibition  being  an  implied 
one.^^  In  Australia  a  married  woman  cannot  obtain  a 
license ;  ^^  but  in  Ncav  South  Wales,  a  part  of  that  country, 

3"  In   re    Phillips,    82    Neb.    45 ;  the       application.         Appeal       of 

116   N.  W.  950.  D'Amato,    SO    Conn.    357;    &8    Atl. 

In  Pennsylvania,  stockholders  in  445.     As  to  place,  see  In  re  Rez- 

a    brewing    company    cannot    take  nor  Hotel   Co.,   34  Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

out  a  license  to  retail  liquor.     In  525. 

re     Consumers'     lirewing     Co.,     4  s^  Woodford    v.     Hamilton,     139 

Lack.  Leg.  N.  165;  20  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Ind.  4'81;   39  N.  E.  47. 
Rep.  597;   7  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.   193.  A    male    cannot    object    to    the 

A  statute  prohibiting  the  licen-  validity  of  a  statute  or  ordinance 

sing  of    the    keeper    of   an    eating  because  a  female  cannot  obtain  a 

house  or  of  a  restaurant  or  of  a  license.      Wagner   v.    Garrett,    118 

saloon    will    not    prevent    the    is-  Ind.    114;    20   N.   E.   706. 
suance  of  a   license  to  the  keeper  37  in   re    Roche,   7    N.    Z.   L.    R. 

of    a    drug    store    who    sells    soda  206;    Callander   v.   Allen,   6   N.   Z. 

water  and  ice  cream.  In  re  Henry,  L.  R.  436. 
124    Iowa,   35'8;    100  N.    W.   43.  38  Regina   v.    Nicolson,    10    Vict. 

In    some    States    a    person    de-  L.  R.  255.     But  a  married  woman 

nied  a  license  cannot  make  a  sec-  has   held   a   license   in   that   coun- 

ond     application     within     a     year  try.     Chailes   v.   Bones,   22   Austr. 

from    the    first    application;    they  L.  T.  97;  6  Austr.  L.  R.  209. 
are  incapacitated  thereby  to  make 


537  PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO    A    LICENSE  §  353 

it  would  seem  she  can  when  not  living  with  her  husband ;  ^'' 
while  in  Michigan,  the  traffic  being  legal,  a  married  woman, 
living  with  her  husband,  may  execute  the  proper  bond  and 
carry  on  the  business  of  retailing  liquors.*" 

Sec.  353.     Corporations. 

Where  a  general  statute  was  in  force  providing  that  the 
words  "person  or  persons"  might  extend  to  and  be  applied 
to  corporations  as  well  as  individuals,  it  was  held  that  a 
statute  for  licensing  persons  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  author- 
ized the  licensing  of  a  corporation/^  But  it  cannot  be  said 
that  this  decision  could  be  accepted  in  many  of  the  States 
under  the  provisions  of  their  liquor  laws,  for  how  can  it  be 
said  that  a  corporation  is  a  "male  inhabitant,"  or  "twenty- 
one  years  of  age,"  or  "of  good  moral  character?"  And  it  has 
been  held  that  a  statute  requiring  the  "person"  applying  for 
a  license  to  be  twenty-one  years  of  age,  of  good  moral  char- 
acter, a  law-abiding,  an  assessed,  and  tax-paying  citizen  could 
not  be  applied  to  a  corporation  or  an  incorporated  club.*' 
Where  a  corporation  is  entitled  to  a  license,  a  license  issued 
to  one  of  its  stockholders  for  the  place  it  owais,  to  retail 
liquors,  with  the  intention  on  the  part  of  the  licensing  board 

39  J5/a?  parte  Day,  15  X.  S.  W.  A  foreign  corporation  was  held 
L.  R.  420.  ,o   be    a  trafficker   in   liquors   and 

40  Amperre  v.  Kalamazoo,  59  subject  to  tax  where  it  main- 
Mich.  78;  26  X.  W.  222.  So  held  tained  a  store  in  Ohio  and  sold 
in  Kentucky.  Caldwell  v.  Grimes,  liquors  and  collected  payment 
7  Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)    (501.  therefor.     Reyman  Brewing  Co.  v. 

41  Heidelberg  Garden  Co.  v.  Brister,  179  U.  S.  445;  45  L.  Ed. 
People,  124  111.  App.  331;  affirm-  269;  21  ,Sup.  Ct.  201;  see  Jung 
ed  233  III.  290;  84  X.  E.  230;  In  Brewing  Co.  v.  Commonwealth, 
re  Gulf  Brewing  Co.,  11  Pa.  Co.  (Ky.);  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  267;  98 
Ct.   Rep.   346;   Connecticut    Brew-  S.  \V.  307. 

eries    Co.    v.    Murphy,     81     Conn.  In    Pennsylvania    a    license    will 

145;      70     Atl.     450;      Enterprise  not  be  granted  an   insolvent  liotel 

Brewing  Co.  v.  Grimes,   173  Mass.  company.  In  re  Cambridge  iSprings 

252;   53  X.  E.  855.  Co.,  20   Pa.   Co.  Ct.  Rep.  564;   see 

42  State  V.  St.  Louis  Club,  125  In  re  Pittsburg  Brewing  Co.,  12 
Mo.  30'8;  28  S.  W.  604;  26  L.  R.  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  176;  30  Pittsb. 
A.  573;  see  State  v.  Moniteau  Co.  Leg.  J.  (N.  S.)  179. 

Ct.  45  Mo.  App.  387. 


§  35-1  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  538 

that  the  corporation  may  sell  liquors  thereunder,  will  not  pre- 
vent sales  of  its  liquors  by  it  being  illegal  and  subjecting  it 
to  a  criminal  prosecution  for  making  a  sale  without  a  license  so 
to  do." 


Sec.  354.    Joint  and  partnership  licenses. 

"Where  a  statute  authorized  the  issuance  of  "licenses  to 
persons  to  keep  inns"  this  was  construed  to  authorize  the 
issuance  of  a  license  to  two  persons  jointly,  though  other  parts 
of  the  statute  referred  to  the  licenses  in  the  singular  number.** 
But  where  a  statute  provided  "that  no  license  shall  be  granted 
to  any  other  person  than  a  male  person  over  the  age  of  twenty- 
one  years,"  and  "no  more  than  one  license  shall  be  granted 
or  issued  to  any  one  person,  and  in  no  case  to  any  person  other 
than  the  actual  owner  and  proprietor  of  said  business,  who 
must  apply  in  his  own  name,"  it  was  said  that  it  was  "evident 
that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Legislature  that  the  license 
to  sell  intoxicating  liquor  at  retail  should  only  be  issued  to 
one  person,  and  *  *  *  jt  is  clear  that  two  or  more  per- 
sons are  inhibited  by  the  statute  from  obtaining  a  license 
jointly  or  as  partners,  and  hence  cannot  engage  as  partners  in 
retailing  intoxicating  liquors  under  the  law.  "'*^  But  in  the 
same  State,  and  by  the  same  judge  w^o  wrote  the  opinion  from 
which  the  above  quotation  has  been  made,  it  was  held  that 

*3  Connecticut   Brewei'ies   Co.   v.  for    a    sale    in    violation    of    law. 

Murphy,    81    Conn.    145;    70    Atl.  United  States  v.  Ames  Mercantile 

450.  Co.,     2     Alaska,     74;      Enterprise 

In    Pennsylvania    even    a    regis-  Brewing  Co.  v.  Grimes,  173  Mass. 

tered  corporation  cannot  secure  a  252;   53  N.   E.   855. 

license.     In  re  Peter   Schoenhofen  In     Rhode     Island     a     domestic 

/brewing  Co.,  8  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  141 ;  corporation  is   a   "citizen   resident 

42  VV.  N.  C.  402.  of  the  State,  and  entitled  to  a  11- 

As   a   rule.   States   requiring   li-  cense."     Greenough   v.   Board    (R. 

censes  of  wholesalers   or  distiller-  I.),  74  Atl.   785. 

ies  or  breweries   permit   the   issu-  44  state    v.    Hill,    52    N.    J.    L. 

iince  of   licenses   to  them,   though  32G;    19   Atl.   789;   State  v.  Moni- 

not  to  retail  liquor.     In  re  Hast-  teau  Co.  Ct.  45  Mo.  App.  387. 

ings  Brewing  Co.    (Xoh.).   119   X.  "tr,  Spat,l(^J^^<T  y.  Xathnn.  21    Ind. 

W.  27.  App.  122;  51  jN.  E.  472. 

A  corporation   may   be   indicted 


539 


PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO   A   LICENSE. 


§355 


where  two  persons  jointly  took  out  a  license  and  executed  a 
joint  bond  they  could  not  set  up  the  invalidity  of  the  bond 
when  sued  upon  it  to  recover  damages,  the  court  saying: 
"They  acted  under  the  bond  as  though  it  was  valid  and  bind- 
ing, and  every  sense  of  justice  demands  that  for  any  violation 
of  its  conditions  they  should  atone  for  resulting  injuries."*" 
In  British  Columbia  the  statute  requires  the  applicant  for  a 
license  to  be  a  "person,"  and  as  a  firm  is  not  a  person,  a 
partnership  license  cannot  be  issued.^^ 


Sec.  355.    Manufacturers. 

Statutes  forbidding  the  retail  of  liquors  without  a  license 
forbid  a  manufacturer  selling  his  own  products  at  retail  with- 


4fi  State  V.  Golaing.  28  Ind. 
App.  233;    62  N.  E.  502. 

In  these  two  cases  the  Appel- 
late Court  seems  to  liave  over- 
looked an  earlier  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  which  was  bind- 
ing upon  it  by  statute,  holding 
that  a  license  could  be  issued  to 
two  or  more  persons,  "which  li- 
cense will  legalize  any  sale  made 
by  or  for  said  persons."  Shaw  v. 
State,  5'6  Ind.  188;  but  cites 
Keiser  v.  State,  58  Ind.  379,  to 
the  effect  that  such  a  license  is 
illegal;  yet  that  case  does  not 
lay  down  any  such   proposition. 

It  seems  that  in  Missouri  a  li- 
cense cannot  be  granted  to  a  part- 
nership. See  State  v.  Scott,  9G 
Mo.  App.   620;   70  S.  W.  736. 

*7  In  re  Wah  Yum  &  Co.,  11  B. 
C.  154;  Ex  parte  Blain,  12  Ch. 
Div.  522,  533. 

There  are  a  number  of  cases 
that  recognize  the  validity  of 
joint  or  partnership  licenses;  but 
the  question  whether  a  license  can 
be  issued  to  two  or  more  jointly 
or    as   partners    was    not    strictly 


before  them.  Sec  Long  v.  State, 
27  Ala.  32;  Wharton  v.  King,  69 
Ala.  365.  But  in  these  cases  the 
question  was  practically  before 
the  court,  and  the  defendants 
were  held  justified  in  selling  un- 
der the  partnership  license. 
United  States  v.  Davis,  37  Fed. 
468;  United  States  v.  Glab,  1 
McCrary,  166;  and  State  v.  Ger- 
hardt,  3  Jones    (N.  C),   178. 

In  Australia  it  has  been  held 
that  one  joint  owner  may  take 
out  a  license,  over  the  other  joint 
owner's  objection,  for  the  joint 
premises.  Ex  parte  Slack,  7  Vict. 
L.  R.  28. 

In  Ontario  a  statute  disquali- 
fying a  licensee  to  hold  an  ollice 
does  not  extend  to  his  partner 
lawfully  holding  a  license  in  his 
own  name.  Regina  v.  Booth,  3 
Ont.  App.  144;  9  C.  P.  452;  see 
Regina  v.  Conway,  46  Up.  Can.  85. 

A  member  of  a  licensed  firm 
cannot  sell  his  own  liquor  at  a 
place  not  licensed.  State  v.  Mc- 
Nett,  5  Penn.  334  (Del.)  61  Atl. 
869.     See  §362. 


355 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


540 


out  one;  and  the  fact  that  he  has  taken  out  a  license  as  a 
manufacturer  affords  him  no  defense  against  a  charge  of  sell- 
ing at  retail  without  a  license.*^  A  brewer  cannot  sell  his  own 
beer  off  his  premises  where  a  statute  requires  a  license  for  the 
sale  of  liquors  before  they  can  be  sold  from  any  specified 
place/^  Where  a  sale  of  a  certain  quantity  or  less  requires  a 
license,  then  a  brewer,  or  distiller,  or  a  wine  merchant  cannot 
sell  his  own  products  in  the  forbidden  quantities/'^  A  tax 
levied  on  one  "engaged  in  distilling  and  rectifying  alcohol  or 
malt  liquors"  does  not  apply  to  a  brewer.'*^  If  the  evidence 
shows  that  a  person  applying  for  a  wholesaler's  license  intends 
to  covertly  conduct  an  establishment  for  the  business  of  a 
bottler  in  all  its  branches,  a  licensing  board  does  not  abuse 
its  discretion  in  refusing  to  grant  it/^-  Manufacturers  of 
liquor  from  the  product  of  any  farm  or  garden  in  Tennessee 
were   held   liable   for   the   licjuor   tax    imposed    on    manufac- 


48  Keller  v.  State,  11  Md.  525; 
69  Am.  Dec.  226;  People  v. 
■Greiser,  67  Mich.  490;  35  N.  W. 
87;  State  v.  Schroeder,  43  Minn. 
231;  45  N.  W.  149;  45  Minn.  44; 
47  N.  W.  308 ;  see  §  362  on  wliole- 
salers. 

49Pietz  V.  State,  68  Wis.  53S; 
32  N.  W.  763. 

soKurth  V.  State,  87  Tenn.  134; 
5  S.  W.  593;  Clemmens  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 6  Rand.  681.  Contra, 
State  V.  Jaeger,   63   Mo.   403. 

51  iState  V.  Weckerling,  38  La. 
Ann.  36. 

In  Kentucky,  a  foreign  brew- 
ery selling  beer  in  that  State  must 
pay  an  annual  tax  to  the  State 
for  such  agency,  and  it  cannot 
sell  at  any  other  point  than  that 
at  which  the  agency  is  located. 
Jung  Brewing  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  98  S.  W.  307; 
80  Ky.  L.  Rep.  267;  Common- 
wealth V.  Xunan  (Ky.),  104 
S.  W.   731;    31   Ky.  L.   Rep.   1090. 


In  Pennsylvania  a  brewery  com- 
pany has  a  right  to  a  license  for 
more  than  one  brewery  operated 
by  it;  and  its  stockholders  can- 
not take  out  a  license  to  sell  at 
retail.  In  re  Consumers  Brewing 
Co.,  4  Lack.  Leg.  K  165;  20  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  Rep.  597;  7  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 
193.  See  also  In  re  Pittsburg 
Browing  Co.,  12  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
129,  holding  that  a  brewery  com- 
pany is  also  entitled  to  a  whole- 
saler's license.  In  re  Pittsburg 
Brewing  'Co.,  29  Pittsb.  Leg.  J. 
(N.  S.)  349.  In  re  Pittsburg 
Brewing  Co.,  12  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
176;  30  Pittsb.  Leg.  J.  (N.  S.) 
179. 

r,2  In  re  Ferch,  27  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  92. 

In  Delaware  a  hotel  keeper 
cannot  combine  a  wholesale  liquor 
selling  business  with  his  hotel 
business.  In  re  Nundy,  3  Penne- 
will,  282;  51   Atl.  605. 


541  PERSONS  ENTITLED  TO  A  LICENSE.         §  355a 

tiirers ;  ^^  and  so  in  North  Carolina.^*  A  brewer  who  retails 
his  own  manufactured  product  from  a  saloon  on  the  same  lot 
on  which  his  brewery  is  situated  is  not  protected  by  a  statute 
permitting  all  persons  to  sell  without  a  license  articles  manu- 
factured by  themselves  within  the  State,  the  retail  of  the 
liquor  from  a  saloon  and  its  immediate  sale  from  the  ])re\very 
being  two  separate  branches  of  business.''-"'  In  Kentucky  dis- 
tillers of  spirituous  liquors  could  take  out  licenses  to  sell  "at 
their  distillery,  residence  or  own  warehouse,"  and  to  retail 
peach  and  apple  brandy  they  manufacture,  "at  the  place  of 
manufacture  or  the  distillery."  It  was  held  that  did  not 
authorize  the  grant  of  a  license  to  a  brandy  distiller  to  sell  at 
his  residence/'" 

Sec.  355a.     Wholesalers. 

Whether  or  not  a  wholesale  dealer  shall  take  out  a  license 
depends  on  the  terms  of  the  statute.  If  sales  of  a  quart  or 
less  is  prohibited  without  a  license,  then  sales  of  over  a  quart 
do  not  require  a  license.  But  a  law  may  be  so  drawn  as  to 
require  wholesalers  equally  with  retailers  to  take  out  a  license, 
in  which  event  the  former  cannot  excuse  himself  on  the 
ground  that  he  does  not  sell  liquors  as  a  beverage.^^  The 
character  of  the  seller's  business  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
question,  that  being  merely  one  of  the  quantity  sold.^"*  Where 
a  statute  requires  a  manufacturer  to  pay  a  "manufacturer's 
tax,"  he  cannot  sell  even  his  own  liquor  at  retail,  the  same 

53  Webb  V.  state,  11  Lea,  662.  104  Ky.  323;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  5S1; 

5*  State   V.   Patterson,   98   N.   C.  47    S.   W.   216;    Commonwealth   v. 

657;  4  S.  E.  47.  Asbury,    104  Ky.   320;    20   Ky.   L. 

A    State   cannot   levy   a   tax   on  Rep.  574;   47  S.  VV.  217;   see  also 

a  sale  of  whisky  within  the  State  State     v.     McNett,     5     Pen.     334 

but  which  at  the  time  was  stored  (Del.)    61  Atl.  869. 

without  such  state.     Voss  v.  Hag-  •>''  State    v.    Cummings,    17    Neb. 

erty,   11  Ohio  Dec.  408;   26  Wkly.  311;     22    N.     \V.     545;     State    v. 

L.  Bull.  268;    Christ   Diehl   Brew-  Turner,   18   S.  C.   103. 

ing  Co.   V.   Spencer,    29   Ohio   Cir.  ss  state  v.   Schroeder,   43   Minn. 

Ct.  Rep.  512.  231;   45  S.  W.  149;   45  Minn.  44; 

r.3New  Orleans  v.  Guth,   11   La.  47  N.  W.   308    (State  v.   Orth,   38 

Ann.  405.  Minn.    150;    36  N.   W.    103,   is  no 

56  Commonwealth     v.      Holland,  longer  an  authority). 


§  355a 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


542 


statute  requiring  retailers  to  pay  a  tax  for  the  privilege  of 
selling  at  retail.^^  Where  a  statute  defined  "trafficking"  in 
liquors  as  buying  and  selling,  not  including  "the  manufac- 
turing and  sale  thereof  by  the  manufacturer, ' '  it  was  held  that 
wholesale  dealers  not  manufacturers  were  liable  to  a  tax 
under  a  statue  taxing  "the  business  of  trafficking  in  intoxi- 
cating liquors;"®**  but  this  same  statute  does  not  apply 
to  a  broker  selling  whisky  stored  in  another  State,  by  trans- 
ferring warehouse  receipts ;  *^^  nor  does  it  impose  a  tax  on 
one  making  a  single  sale,  for  he  is  not  a  person  engaged  in 
"buying  or  procuring  and  selling  of  intoxicating  liquors.""^ 
Under  a  Tennessee  decision  one  who  sells  wine  made  from 
grapes  raised  on  his  own  farm  in  quantities  less  than  a  quart 
is  not  a  wholesale  but  a  retail  dealer;  *^^  and  a  manufacturer, 
in  that  State,  selling  in  unbroken  packages  at  his  place  of 
manufacture,  is  not  a  wholesale  dealer  liable  to  taxation  "as 
other  merchants."®^    A  wholesaler  does  not  lose  his  standing 


59  People  V.  Greiser,  67  Mich. 
490;  35  N.  W.  87;  People  v.  New- 
man, 99  Mich.  148;  57  N.  W.  1073. 

In  Pennsylvania  a  bottler  may 
sell  by  the  keg  without  a  whole- 
sale license.  In  re  Johnson,  1 
Daiiph  Co.  Rep.  40;  20  Pa.  Cr. 
Ct.  Rep.  464;  7  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 
248. 

60  Senior  v.  Ratterman,  44  Ohio 
St.  661;  11  N.  E.  321;  affirming 
17  VVkly.  L.  Bull.  115. 

61  Voss  V.  Hagerty,  21  Ohio  Dec. 
408;   26  Wkly.  L.   Bull.   268. 

62  Voss   V.  Hagerty,  supra. 
63Kurth  V.  State,  86  Tenn.  134; 

5  S.  W.  593;  see  Webb  v.  Baird, 
11  Lea,  667. 

64  Taylor  v.  Vincent,  12  Lea, 
282;  47  Am.  Rep.  338;  State  v. 
Lowenhaught,  11  Lea,  13;  State 
V.  Tarver,  11  Lea,  658;  Webb  v. 
State,  11  Lea,  662;  Webb  v.  Baird, 
11  Lea,  667. 

For  a   definition  of  a  wholesale 


dealer,  see  Flournoy  v.  Grady,  25 
La.  Ann.  591. 

A  wholesaler  cannot  purchase 
beer  by  the  barrel,  then  bottle  it 
and  sell  it  by  the  bottle.  In  re 
Stambaugh,  31  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
243.  But  in  England,  where  a 
dealer  in  beer  must  sell  it  in 
casks  containing  not  less  than 
four  and  a  half  gallons,  or  in  not 
less  than  two  dozen  reputed  quart 
bottles  at  one  time  to  be  drunk 
or  consumed  elsewhere,  he  can- 
not be  treated  as  selling  without 
a  license  because  he  sells  in  pint 
instead  of  quart  bottles,  if  the 
quantity  sold  at  one  time  is  the 
same.  Fairclough  v.  Roberts,  24 
Q.  B.  Div.  350;  54  J.  P.  421;  59 
L.  J.  M.  C.  54;  62  L.  T.  700;  38 
W.  R.  330. 

A  statute  restricting  the  times 
of  sale  at  retail  has  no  ap- 
plication to  a  sale  by  wholesale. 
Regina  v.   Jenkins,  55  J.  P.  824; 


543 


PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO    A    LICENSE. 


§355a 


as  such  merely  because  he  sells  to  a  consumer  and  not  to  a 
retail  dealer,  so  long  as  he  sells  in  wholesale  quantities.^^' 
Sales  by  a  distiller  at  his  distillery  or  at  his  residence  are 
"sales  in  the  usual  course  of  trade"  within  the  meaning  of  a 
statute  exempting  from  its  provisions  sales  made  by  manufac- 
turers "in  the  usual  course  of  trade."*"'  A  statute  which 
provides  that  "distillers  have  the  privilege  of  selling  at  their 
residence  any  spirits  of  their  own  manufacture,"  docs  not 
authorize  each  member  of  a  distillery  firm  to  sell  the  procfuct 
of  the  distillery  at  his  residence ;  and  if  each  member  of  such 
firm  does  sell  at  his  residence  all  are  lial)le,  even  though  if  the 
distillery  was  owned  by  one  person  he  could  lawfully  sell  at 
his  residence.'*^  A  statute  permitting  sales  by  a  distiller  at 
his  residence  does  not  permit  a  sale  at  his  store  room.®^ 

61  L.  J.  M.  C.  57;  65  L.  T.  857;  principal  under  his  own  license  is 
40  W.  R.  318. 

When  a  manufacturer  storing 
liquor  must  pay  a  wholesaler's 
tax  under  the  Ohio  Dow  Act. 
Reyman  Brewing  Co.  v.  Bristor, 
92  Fed.  28. 

An  ordinance  providing  that 
anyone  selling  liquors  without  a 
license  may  be  fined,  applies  to  a 
sale  at  wholesale.  Cofer  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  87  S.  W.  2G4; 
27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  934;  Common- 
wealth V.  Nunan  (Ky.),  104  S. 
W.  731;   31   Ky.  L.  Rep.   1090. 

One  who  solicits  orders  in 
Washington  for  a  brewery  in  New 
York  is  not  a  brewer's  agent  un- 
der the  Act  of  Congress,  32  U.  S. 
Stat,  at  L.  €27,  requiring  brew- 
ers' agents  to  pay  a  tax.  Bert- 
zell  V.  District  of  Columbia,  21 
App.  D.  C.  49. 

In  Oklahoma,  under  the  liquor 
law  ( Wilson's  Rev.  &  Ann.  Stat. 
1903,  pp.  841,  843,  §§1  and  8) 
exacting  a  license  of  persons  sell- 
ing liquor  at  wholesale,  an  agent 
selling  liquors  of  his  non-resident 


not  protected  if  his  principal  has 
no  license.  Ruemmeli  v.  Cra- 
vens, 13  Okla.  342;  74  Pac.  908; 
13  Okla.  342;  76  Pac.  188. 

65  State  v.  Bock,  167  Ind.  559; 
79  N.  E.  493  (five  gallovs  under 
the  statute). 

66  Commonwealth  v.  Jarrell,  8 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  783;  Webb 
v.  Commonwealth,  7  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)  299;  Robinson  v.  Com- 
monwealth,   7    Ky.    L.    Rep.     (ab- 

Commonwealth    v. 
Ky.    L.    Rep.     (ab- 


stract) 453; 
Holsapple,  9 
stract)     437. 

6"  Hooper  v 
Ky.  L.  Rop.    ( 

68  Moody  v 
Ky.    L.    Rep. 


.  Commonwealth,   11 
abstract)    369. 
,    Commonwealth,    6 
(abstract)    219. 


In  West  Virginia,  under  §§  54, 
55  and  62  of  the  Code  of  1899,  a 
brewery  must  pay  a  license  tax 
to  carry  on  its  business  and  also 
take  out  a  license  to  sell  its  man- 
ufactured product.  State  v. 
Schmulbach  Brewing  Co.,  56  W. 
Va.  333 ;  49  S.  E.  249. 

In   Ohio,   a   statute   imposed   a 


§  356  TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  544 

Sec.  356.     Hotel  keeper — Innkeeper. 

In  certain  States  licenses  are  restricted  to  keepers  of  hotels, 
and  what  shall  be  necessary  to  constitute  a  hotel  is  defined  or 
declared.  Thus,  in  New  York  the  statute  •*"  provided  that  a 
license  might  be  granted  to  the  keeper  of  a  hotel  which  had 
ten  furnished  rooms  for  guests.  It  was  held  that  the  fact  that 
two  of  the  rooms  were  connected  with  doors  did  not  make  it 
a  hotel  of  only  eight  rooms,  and  that  the  objection  on  that 
ground  to  the  license  being  granted  was  frivolous. '^°  Under 
this  statute  a  hotel  is  defined  to  be  a  house  kept  open  for  the 
entertainment  of  all  who  come  to  it  without  having  any 
previous  agreement  concerning  the  duration  of  the  stay  or 
terms  of  the  entertainment.'^^  The  fact  that  a  building  has 
upon  it  a  sign  as  a  "boarding  house,"  or  does  not  keep  a  safe 
for  valuables,  or  have  a  register  or  private  stable  accommoda- 
tions, does  not  necessarily  prevent  it  from  being  a  hotel.  Nor 
does  the  fact  Avhere  it  has  been  used  exclusively  as  a  hotel 
at  a  certain  time  deprive  it  of  the  privilege  of  being  licensed 
as  a  hotel,  because  after  that  date  the  barroom  has  been 
removed  to  another  part  of  the  hotel. "^  But  if  portions  of  it 
be  rented  at  times  to  tenants  it  cannot  be  said  that  it  had 
been  continuously  occupied  as  a  hotel  within  the  meaning  of 
the  liquor  law  of  that  State  requiring  a  building  for  which  a 
license  is  applied  to  have  been   continuously  occupied  as  a 

tax  on  a  trafficker  in  liquors.     A  could    sell    its    own    products    at 

brewery     company     maintained     a  wholesale  in  another  county  with- 

storage    house    at    some    distance,  out  taking  out  a  wholesale   deal- 

and  in  another  part  of  the  town,  er's  license   there.     State  v.  Capi- 

f rom  its  brewery,  took  orders  and  tol  Brewing  &  Ice  Co.    ( Ala. ) ,  50 

delivered  beer  from  this  house.    It  So.  312. 

was    held    it    was    subject    to    the  eo  Laws   1896,  c.   112,  §31. 

tax  imposed  on  traffickers.    Christ  ^o  In  re   Purdy,   40   N.   Y.    App. 

Deal  Brewing  Co.  v.  Beck,  30  Ohio  Div.   133;   57  N.  Y.  Supp.  629. 

Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  226.  ^i  in    re    Brewster,     39     N.     Y. 

In  Alabama,  a  statute   imposed  Misc.   Rep.    689;    80   N.   Y.   Supp, 

a   license    tax   on    wholesale    deal-  066,  citing  Cromwell  v.  Stephens, 

ers   in   beer    exclusively,   but   pro-  3  Abb.  Prac.    (N.   S.)    26;   Matter 

vided     that     any     brewery     could  of   Moulton,   59  App.   Div.  27 :    69 

sell    its    own   manufactured    prod-  N.  Y.  S.  14;   Taylor  v.  Monnot,  4- 

ucts   at  wholesale  without  taking  Duer,    116;    Wint€rmute   v.   Clark, 

out  a   license.     It   was   held   that  5   Sandf.  242. 

a  licensed   brewery  in  one  county  ^-  In  re  Brewster,  supra. 


545  PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO   A   LICENSE,  §  356 

hotel.^^  A  New  York  statute  required  a  hotel  for  which  a 
license  was  applied  to  have  at  least  six  bedrooms,  each  having 
an  independent  access  by  doors  from  the  hall,  in  addition  to 
the  rooms  occupied  by  the  servants  and  the  keeper's  family. 
In  order  to  comply  with  the  law  the  keeper's  family  vacated 
one  of  the  six  bedrooms,  after  the  tax  certificate  had  been 
applied  for,  and  lodged  in  the  hall,  into  which  the  other  five 
bedrooms  opened,  the  vacated  room  being  upon  another  floor. 
It  was  held  that  the  hotel  was  not  constructed  in  compliance 
with  the  ]aw.^*  Where  some  of  the  bedrooms  of  the  hotel  did 
not  comply  with  the  statute  as  to  floor  area  and  cubic  feet  of 
space  when  the  application  was  made,  it  was  held  that  a  license 
could  not  be  granted.'^'*  Under  this  statute  a  boarding  house 
cannot  be  construed  to  be  a  hotel/''  Under  the  Act  of  Con- 
gress of  March  3,  1S93,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  commissioners  for 
Washington  in  licensing  an  applicant  for  a  hotel  who  claims 
to  be  the  proprietor  or  lessee  thereof,  to  determine  whether 
he  is  such  proprietor  or  lessee,  and  whether  the  building  is 
an  established  hotel ;  and  their  decision,  they  having  a  dis- 
cretion in  the  matter,  will  not  be  reviewed  by  a  writ  of 
certiorari  in  the  matter,  nor  will  it  be  reviewed  upon  a  writ  of 
mandamus.''^  In  Kentucky  it  is  held  that  one  may  be  a 
"tavern  keeper"  though  his  receipts  from  the  bar  exceed  those 
from  the  tavern  proper;  and  whether  there  be  a  necessity  for 
a  tavern  at  the  place  depends  upon  whether  there  are  persons 
who  naturally  desire  or  seek  accommodations  at  the  one  in  ques- 
tion, and  not  whether  accommodations  can  be  secured  at  other 
places.^^ 

-3  In  re  Brewster,  supra.  ''^  In  re  Ryon,   39   N.   Y.   Misc. 

74 /n   re  McMonagle,   41    N.    Y.  Rep.   698;    80  N.   Y.   Supp.    1114; 

Misc.   Rep.   407;    84   N.   Y.   Supp.  affirmed    85   N.    Y.   App.   621;    83 

1068.  N.  Y.  Supp.  123. 

A  building  with  six  rooms,  two  76 /n  re  Harper,  30  N.  Y.  Misc. 

of   which    are   well    furnished   and  Rep.  663;   64  N.  Y.  Supp.  524. 

two    containing    single    beds    and  77  United  States  v.  Johnson,   12 

mattresses     only,     the     remaining  U.  S.  App.  D.  C.  545. 

two    being    unfurnished ;    between  78  Schneider    v.     Commonwealth 

the   rooms   being  only   thin   parti-  (Ky.),  Ill  S.  W.  303;   33  Ky.  L. 

tions,    and    only    part    lighted,    is  Rep.  770. 

not   a    hotel.  In   re    Place,    27    N.  Where    the    liquor    law    defines 

Y.  App.  Div.  561;  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  what  shall  constitute  an  hotel  en- 

g40.  titled  to  a  license,  a  building  code 


§§357,358        TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


546 


Sec.  357.    Restaurant  in  capitol  building. 

It  has  been  held  that  the  congressional  restaurants  located 
and  conducted  in  the  capitol  building  at  Washington,  D.  C, 
under  congressional  committees  need  not  take  out  licenses ;  ^^ 
but  in  England  it  would  seem  that  restaurants  in  the  House 
of  Parliament  are  subject  to  the  licensing  acts.^'' 


Sec.  358.     Holder  of  house. 

In  England  a  license  to  sell  beer  or  cider  by  retail  could 
formerly  be  granted  only  to  a  person  who  was  a  "real  resident 
householder  and  occupier  of  the  dwelling-house  in  which  he" 
should  apply  to  be  licensed.  The  house  had  to  be  rated  for 
taxation  at  not  less  than  fifteen  pounds  per  annum  if  situated 
in  certain  places;  or,  in  certain  other  places,  rated  at  a  rent 
or  annual  value  of  eleven  pounds  per  annum;  or,  in  still 
certain  other  places,  at  a  rent  or  annual  value  of  eight 
pounds.'^'  Under  this  act  a  house  used  partly  as  a  grocer's 
shop  and  partly  as  a  beer  house  is  deemed  qualified  for  a 


enlarging  that  definition  of  an  ho- 
tel is  not  controlling.  In  re  Clem- 
ent, 129  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  229;  113 
N.  Y.  Supp.  392. 

Under  the  Pennsylvania  Act, 
1887,  p.  108,  a  hotel,  to  be  li- 
censed, must  have  for  the  "exclu- 
sive use  of  travelers  at  least  four 
bedrooms  and  eight  beds."  In  re 
Knoblauch's  License,  28  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  323. 

As  to  keeper  of  European  hotel 
and  the  tax  he  must  pay.  Mc- 
Clure  V.  Krumbholz,  9  Pa.  Dist. 
R.  544;  31  Pittsb.  L.  J.  (N.  S.) 
3;    14  York  Leg.  Rec.  31. 

Persons  who  go  into  a  hotel  for 
the  purpose  of  procuring  and 
drinking  liquor  are  not  "guests." 
Commonwealth  v.  Moore,  145 
Mass.  244;  13  N.  E.  893;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Barnes,  138  Mass. 
511. 

Where   a   statute   provided   that 


the  privilege  to  sell  liquor  should 
not  be  enjoyed  by  any  licensee  to 
keep  a  tavern,  cofi'ee  house,  board- 
ing house  or  restaurant,  it  was 
held  that  a  license  to  keep  a  cof- 
fee house  was  not  a  license  to  sell 
spirituous        liquors.  Common- 

wealth V.  Woods,  4  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)    2-62. 

As  to  the  necessity  for  a  hotel 
license  in  the  neighborhood,  see 
In  re  Reznor  Hotel  Co.'s  License, 
34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  525. 

79  Page  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 20  App.  D.  C.  469. 

80  Williamson  v.  Norris  [1899], 
1  Q.  B.  7;  62  J.  P.  790;  fil  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  31;  47  W.  R.  {>4;  79  L.  T. 
415;  15  T.  L.  R.  18;  19  Cox.  C. 
C.  203. 

81  Beer  House  Act  [L840],  3  and 
4  Vict.  c.  01;  Patterson's  Licens- 
ing Acts    (19th  Ed.),  p.  245. 


547 


PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO   A   LICENSE. 


§359 


license.-^-  To  be  a  real  resident  holder  and  occupier,  the 
applicant  must  at  least  sleep  on  the  premises.  Hence,  a  rail- 
way arch  used  as  a  beer  house  was  held  not  qualified  because 
no  one  slept  in  it,  and  it  was  not  a  dwelling-house.*^  So  a 
person  who  is  upon  the  premises  of  a  restaurant  twelve  hours 
each  day,  and  has  his  meals  there,  is  not  a  real  resid;>nt  holder 
and  occupier."*  The  fact  that  the  applicant  is  paid  a  salary 
by  brewers,  and  has  to  pay  over  to  them  the  profits  made  upon 
the  sale  of  the  beer,  does  not  of  itself  in  law  prevent  him  from 
being  the  "real  resident  holder  and  occupier."*"'  Unless  an 
applicant  for  a  justice's  license  or  certificate  is  a  "real  resi- 
dent holder  or  occupier,"  his  application  must  be  denied.*" 


Sec.  359.     Boat  licenses. 

Not  infrequently  boats  are  required  to  take  out  licenses, 
whether  they  make  sales  when  in  port  or  on  their  voyages.    A 


82Garrety  v.  Potts,  L.  R.  6  Q. 
B.  86;  35  J.  P.  l&S;  40  L.  J.  M. 
€.  1;  23  L.  T.  554;   19  W.  R.  127. 

83  Regina  v.  Allmey,  35  J.  P. 
534. 

8*  Regina  v.  Manchester,  J.  J. 
[1899],  1  Q.  B.  571;  63  J.  P.  360; 
68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  358;  47  W.  R.  410; 
80  L.  T.  531.  This  is  now  chansed 
by  statute.  Licensing  Act,  1902, 
2  Edw.  7,  c.  28,  §  22 ;  Patterson's 
Licensing  Act    (19th  Ed.),  p.  624. 

85  Xix  V.  Nottingham,  J.  J. 
[1899],  2  Q.  B.  294;  68  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  854;  63  J.  P.  628;  47  W.  R. 
628;  81  L.  T.  41;   15  T.  L.  R.  463. 

86  Rex  V.  Woodhouse,  J.  J. 
[1906],  2  K.  B.  501;  70  J.  P. 
485;  75  L.  J.  K.  B.  745;  s.  c. 
Leeds  v.  Ryder  [1907],  App.  Cas. 
420;  71  J.  P.  484;  76  L.  J.  K.  B. 
1032;  97  L.  T.  261. 

This  qualification  for  a  license 
does  not  apply  to  a  license  to  sell 
off  the  premises,  or  wliat  is  term- 
ed   an    "off"    license.      Regina    v. 


DeRutzen,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  55;  40 
J.  P.  150;  33  L.  T.  726;  24  VV.  R. 
343;  45  L.  J.  M.  C.  57. 

The  overseers  or  justices  could 
not  be  compelled  to  certify  that 
an  applicant  was  a  real  resident 
occupier.  Regina  v.  Kensington, 
J.  J.  12  Q.  B.  654;  12  J.  P.  743; 
Regina  v.  Langridge,  24  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  73;  2  C.  L.  R.  1657;  but  they 
could  be  ordered  by  mandamus  to 
inquire  and  determine  that  fact. 
Ex  parte  Piddlesden,  IS  J.  P.  391. 
.1  certiorari  to  quash  tlie  excise 
license  on  tlie  ground  that  the 
licensee  is  not  a  real  resident 
holder  of  the  premises  does  not 
lie.  Regina  v.  Salford,  18  Q.  B. 
687;  s.  c.  Eic  parte  Salford,  16 
J.  P.  649.  A  license  issued  to  a 
real  resident  holder  without  the 
justice's  certificate,  is  valid, 
though  it  would  not  be  if  he  were 
not.  Thompson  v.  Harvey,  4  H. 
&  N.  254 ;  28  L.  J.  M.  C.  163 ;  23 
J.  P.   150. 


§359  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  548 

statute  of  Tennessee  provided  that  any  person  selling  liquors 
on  steamboats  must  pay  a  privilege  tax,  in  lieu  of  other  taxes, 
of  $250  per  annum;  and  it  was  held  that  the  boat  making  a 
trip  from  one  port  to  another  port  in  the  State  Avas  subject  to 
this  tax,-^  In  New  South  Wales  the  statute  authorizing  the 
exacting  of  a  license  from  vessels  is  not  restricted  to  sea- 
going vessels,  but  applies  to  a  vessel  on  inland  waters.^*  A 
packet  license  issued  in  that  country  authorizes  the  master 
of  the  packet,  being  a  vessel  by  which  pasengers  are  carried 
"from"  any  place  to  any  "other  place,"  to  sell  liquor  "during 
his  passage  between  such  places."  A  steamer  was  placed 
on  a  river  between  W  and  P,  going  from  W  to  P  on  one  day, 
stopping  there  for  the  night,  and  returning  the  next  day.  A 
passenger  to  P,  who  was  returning  the  next  day,  was  allowed 
to  stop  on  board  the  steamer  on  the  night  that  she  lay  at  P. 
Liquor  was  sold  to  this  passenger  on  board  the  steamer  while 
she  lay  at  P.  It  was  held  that  the  sale  was  not  made  during 
the  passage  of  the  steamer  and  the  sale  was  illegal.  If  the 
sale  had  been  at  a  stopping  place  between  W  and  P  it  Avould 
have  been  a  sale  during  passage  and  would  have  been  valid. 
The  sales  on  board  the  steamer  were  restricted  to  passengers, 
and  it  was  immaterial  that  a  passenger  did  not  pay  for  his 
passage.^** 

s^  Foppiauo  V.  Speed,   113  Tenn.  lice  District  during  the  time  pro- 

167;   82,  S.  W.  222.  liibited   in  public   laws.      5   and   6 

88  Ex  parte  Bogan,  8   N.   S.   W.  Vict.    c.    44,    §  5 ;    Patterson's    Li- 

L.  R.   409.  censing  Acts,  p.  256. 

80  Stuart  V.  CuUen,   1-6  X.  Z.  1^.  A    sale    on    a    river    steamboat 

R.   336.  while  stopping  in  a  town,  without 

In    Gi'eat    Britain,    commanders  a  license  from  the  town,  is  a  vio- 

of     vessels     carrying     passengers  lation  of  a  statute  requiring  ven- 

from  one  part  of  the  United  King-  dors   in   such   town   to   have   a   11- 

dom   to  another,   must   have   a   11-  cense;   and  the  boat  is  a  "house" 

cense.      Licensing   Acts    [1828],    9  within    the    meaning    of   the    stat- 

Geo.  4,  c.  47;   4  and  5  Will  4,  c.  ute    against    keeping    a    tippling 

75,  §  10;  5  and  6  Vict.  c.  44,  §  5;  house.     Commonwealth  v.   Neff,  9 

43  and  44  Vict.  c.  20,  §  45;  53  and  Ky.  L.  Rep.   (abstract)   442.     Sale 

•54    Vict.    CQ.    21,    28;    Patterson's  as  on  a  boat  in  Lake  Huron.    Peo- 

Licensing  Acts,  pp.   176,  256,  544.  pie  v.  Bouchard,  82  Mich.  156;  46 

Liquors    cannot    be   sold  on   boats  N.  VV.  232;   9  L.  R.  A.  106. 
at  anchor  in  the  Metropolitan  Po- 


549  PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO   A   LICENSE.  §§360,361 

Sec.  360.     Canteen — Street  railway  car. 

Under  the  New  Brunswick  statute  the  militia  may  maintain 
a  canteen  in  that  country,  under  the  king's  regulations,  with- 
out a  license.^"  And  by  statute  this  is  the  case  in  England.^^ 
A  statute  requiring  a  "vehicle"  plying  for  hire  to  procure  a 
license  does  not  apph^  to  a  street  railway  car."^ 

Sec.  361.     Who  must  have  a  license. 

The  usual  statute  is  directed  against  sales  of  liquors  as 
beverages,  but  many  of  them  are  broader  than  that.  It  is  a 
general  rule  that  all  persons  carrying  on  a  traffic  in  intoxi- 
cating liquors  must  have  a  license  so  to  do  of  the  character 
required  by  the  statute.  Indeed,  most  of  the  statutes  go  farther 
and  prevent  all  sales  and  gifts  by  unlicensed  persons.  Thus, 
in  Nebraska,  a  statute  prohibited  even  so  much  as  the  keeping 
of  intoxicating  liquors  for  sale,  but  excepted  therefrom,  in  a 
precautionary  clause,  liquors  kept  for  home  consumption;  and 
it  was  held  that  the  fact  a  person  kept  liquors  for  home 
consumption  did  not  authorize  him  to  sell  or  keep  for  sale 
liquors  without  a  license  or  permit."^  So  a  wine  vinter,  making 
wine  from  ^apes  grown  on  his  own  land,  who  retails  the 
liquor  over  his  own  bar  must  have  a  license."*  So  a  con- 
fectioner must  have  a  license,®^  and  a  grocer,^*^  and  a  Pullman 
car  conductor  selling  on  his  ear  when  passing  through  a  State 
requiring  a  license  to  sell  liquors,"^  and  a  druggist,  unless  the 
statute  especially  excepts  his  sales  from  its  provisions,"®  and 

00  Ex   parte   Patchell,    34    N.    B.  »+ Mandeville  v.  Baudot,  49    La. 

258.  Ann.  236;    21   So.  2rrS. 

91  Licensing  Act  [1872],  35  and  85  New  Orleans  v.  Jane,  34  La. 
36  Vict.  c.  94,  §  72 ;  Licensing  Act  Ann.    667. 

[1902],    2    Edw.    7,    c.    28,    §23;  96  State    v.    Brackett,    41    Minn. 

Patterson's     Licensing     Acts,     pp.  33 ;    42  N.  W.  548. 

475,    478,    625.  "^  La   Xorris    v.    State,    13    Tex. 

92  Rex  V.  Wall,  7  Hawaii,  760.  App.  33;  44  Am.  Rep.  699. 

93  Holt  V.  State,  62  Neb.  134;  86  98  Brown  v.  State;  9  Neb.  189; 
N.  VV.  1073;  Montpelier  v.  Mills,  2  N.  W.  214;  Wright  v.  People, 
171  Ind.  175;  85  N.  E.  6;  Keller  v.  101  111.  126;  Rochester  v.  Upnian, 
State,  11  Md.  525;  '69  Am.  Dec.  19  Minn.  108;  Stormus  v.  Com- 
226;  State  v.  Stiefel,  74  Md.  546;  monwealth,  105  Ky.  619';  49  S. 
22  Atl.  1;  State  v.  White,  115  La.  W.  451;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1434;  re- 
779;  40  So.  44.  versing   47    S.    W.    262;    Eastman 


§  361  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  550 

a  tavern  keeper.-''-'  But  where  a  license  is  required  for  sales 
not  exceeding  a  certain  quantity  at  a  time,  a  license  for  a  sale 
exceeding  that  amount  is  not  necessary.^  A  statute  requiring 
all  persons  who  "sell"  liquors  to  pay  a  license  tax,  does  not 
require  a  person  carrying  on  the  "business"  of  selling  liquors 
to  take  out  a  license."  A  statute  requiring  a  dramshop  keeper 
in  a  city  or  town  to  procure  a  license  from  such  city  or  town 
does  not  require  him  to  have  a  county  or  State  license.^  A 
licensing  statute  excepting  from  its  provisions  sales  "by  the 
maker,  brewer,  or  distiller  thereof,  not  to  be  drunk  on  the 
premises,"  and  declaring  that  brewers  and  distillers  shall  not 
sell  liquors  "in  less  quantities  than  unbroken  packages,  or  less 
than  packages  of  one  gallon  each,  and  they  shall  pay"  a 
certain  license  fee  per  annum  "for  the  privilege  of  selling 
liquors  as  aforesaid,"  requires  a  license  for  all  sales  in  un- 
broken packages  of  not  less  than  one  gallon,  but  only  when 
the  liquor  is  sold  to  be  consumed  on  the  premises.^  The  fact 
that  a  municipality  has  voted  in  favor  of  licensing  the  sale  of 
liquors  does  not  release  a  vendor  of  liquors  from  his  duty  to 
take  out  a  license."'  And  where  a  State  law  requires  a  vendor 
of  liquore  to  have  a  State  license,  a  subsequent  statute 
empowering  a  certain  town  to  exact  a  license  of  a  vendor  of 
liquors  within  its  limits  and  to  restrain,  regulate  and  control 
"to  the  entire  exclusion  of  any  control  or  right  to  regulate 
or  restrain,  in  said  matters,  by  any  board,  officer,  person,  or 
municipality  of  this  county,"  the  liquor  traffic,  does  not  dis- 
pense with  a  State  license  for  a  vendor  of  liquors  selling 
within  the  limits  of  such  town.*'    Under  the  phrase  that  "all 

V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.),   20    Ky.  i  Hunter   v.   State,   79   Ga.   365; 

L.  Rep.   1639;   40   S.  W.  795.  Con-  5  S.  E.  134. 

tra  in  Texas.     Gil)~()n  v.  State,  34  -Ex  parte  Mason,  102  Cal.  171; 

Tex.  Cr.  App.  218;  29  S.  W.  1085;  36  Pac.  401. 

Prinzel  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  "•  State  v.  Pittman,  10  Kan.  593, 

274;   33  S.  W.  350.  *  State   v.    Stiefel,   74   Md.    546; 

»9Page    V.    State,    11    Ala.    849;  22  Atl.   1. 

Crown    Point    v.    Warner.    3    Hill,  s  State    v.   Cron,   23   Minn.    140. 

150;   Commonwealth    v.   Woods,   4  estate  v.   Nolan,  37   Minn.    10; 

Ky.      L.      Rep.      (abstract)      2G2.  33   N.   Yi.  36;    Williams  v.   State, 

Contra,  State  v,  Pittman,  10  Kan.  52  Tex.   Cr,  App,  371;    107  S.   VV. 

593,  1121. 


551 


PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO   A   LICENSE. 


§361 


persons  who  shall  sell"  intoxicating  liquors  must  take  out  a 
license,  a  wholesaler  must  have  one.'^  So  a  person  whose 
license  has  expired  must  have  a  license,  even  though  the  police 
authorities  induce  him  to  believe  none  was  necessary  if  he  had 
his  old  license  renewed  and  dated  back.*  A  statute  which 
makes  it  an  offense,  without  a  license,  to  offer  or  expose  for 
sale  "or  solicit  or  receive  orders"  requires  an  agent  soliciting 
orders  in  a  county  adopting  such  law  at  a  local  option  election 
to  have  a  license  even  though  he  solicits  orders  for  a  principal 
who  lives  in  another  county,  has  his  place  of  business  there, 
and  in  which  no  license  is  required.^  A  person  selling  liquors 
by  sample,  as  the  agent  of  a  non-resident,  the  goods  being 
shipped  to  the  purchaser  by  the  principal  from  another  State, 
or  from  the  place  of  business  of  the  non-resident,  need  not 
have  a  license.^"  So  where  an  ordinance  makes  no  mention  of 
a  written  permit  in  ordti  to  sell  liquors,  none  is  required." 
So  a  general  statute  levying  a  tax  upon  the  occupation  of  a 


estate  V.  Cummings,  17  Neb. 
311;   22  N.  W.  545. 

8  State  V.  Brady,  14  R.  I.  508; 
People  V.  Gault,  104  Mich.  575; 
62  N.  W.  724. 

estate  v.  Swift,  35  W.  V^a.  542; 
14  S.  E.  135.  See  Smith  v.  State, 
109  Ga.  227;  34  S.  E.  325;  Acme 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Fletcher,  109  Ga. 
463;    34  S.  E.  558. 

In  Texas  the  statute  is  broad 
enough  to  require  a  person  sell- 
ing medicated  bitters  to  have  a 
license.  Prinzel  v.  State,  35  Tex. 
€r.  App.  274;   33  S.  W.  350. 

In  England  a  statute  permitted 
the  children  of  officers  in  the  Pen- 
insular War  to  set  up  and  exer- 
cise a  trade  in  any  city  without 
let,  suit  or  molestation,  notwith- 
standing any  statute,  law,  evi- 
dence, custom,  or  provision  to  the 
contrary.  It  was  held  that  such 
a  person  must  have  a  license  to 
sell  liquors,  the  statute  having 
reference    only    to    customs,    char- 


ters, by-laws  and  the  like  ex- 
isting in  particular  localities; 
and  that  the  general  statutes  re- 
lating to  liquor  licenses  and  sales 
were  not  affected  by  the  special 
statute.  Killin  v.  Swatton,  61 
J.  P.  150;  76  L.  T.  55;  45  VV.  K. 
235;  13  T.  L.  R.  121;  IS  Cox  C. 
C.  477. 

In  Georgia  an  indigent  Confed- 
erate soldier  is  exempt  from  a  li- 
cense for  sale  of  "near  beer,"  but 
not  from  reasonable  municipal 
regulations  for  its  sale.  Camp- 
bell V.  Thomasville  (Ga.),  64  S. 
E.  '815. 

10  McCarthy  v.  Gordon,  16  Kan. 
35;  Riley  v.  Bancroft,  51  Neb. 
864;  71  N.  W.  745. 

A  gift  of  a  drink  to  a  prospec- 
tive purchaser  by  a  traveling 
agent  is  a  violation  of  law.  State 
v.  Jones,  88  Minn.  27:  92  N.  W. 
468. 

11  Moore  v.  People,  109  111.  499. 


5  361 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


552 


liquor  dealer,  and  providing  that  druggists  selling  liquors  on  a 
physician's  prescription  shall  not  be  exempted  from  its 
provisions,  does  not  require  druggists  selling  liquors  on 
prescriptions  in  local  option  prohibition  counties  to  have  a 
license.^-  So  a  statute  requiring  "all  persons"  selling  in- 
toxicating liquors  to  have  license  so  to  do  has  no  application 
to  an  officer  levying  upon,  with  an  execution,  and  selling  a 
stock  of  liquors  by  virtue  thereof  at  public  auction. ^^  Nor 
need  an  administrator  of  a  deceased  liquor  dealer  have  a 
license  to  sell  the  liquors  belonging  to  the  estate,  though  he 
may  not  sell  them  at  retail."  And  so  may  an  assignee  in  in- 
solvent proceedings  under  a  State  statute  providing  for  such 
insolvent  proceedings.^^ 


12  Gibson  v.  Stat^-,  .34  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  218;  29  S.  W.  1085;  see  Prin- 
zel  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 
274;   33  S.  W.  350. 

13  Wildermuth  v.  G)le,  77  Mich. 
483 ;  43  N.  W.  889 ;  State  v.  John- 
son, 33  X.  H.  441 ;  Nichols  v.  Val- 
entine, 36  Me.  322;  see  United 
States  V.  Overton,  2  Cranch.  C.  C. 
42,  and  In  re  Blumenthal,  125  Pa. 
St.  412;   18  Atl.  395. 

1*  Williams  v.  Throop,  17  Wis. 
463. 

13  Gignonx  v.  P.ilbrnck,  63  X.  1' 
22. 

In  Kentucky  it  has  been  held 
that  a  person  who  is  not  a  mer- 
chant, without  a  license  may  sell 
whisky  in  small  quantities  to  be 
consumed  oflF  the  premises.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Wheeler,  79  Ky.  284. 

A  brewer,  having  his  business 
in  another  State,  may  make  an 
exclusive  business  arrangement 
with  a  person  residing  in  a  li- 
censing iState  for  the  purchase 
and  sale  of  his  beers,  though  he 
is  not  a  licensed  dealer  in  such 
licensing  State.  New  York  Brew- 
feries  Co.  v.  Baker,  C8  Conn.  337; 
26  Atl.  785. 


W'here  an  ordinance  requires  a 
license  from  any  person  engaged 
in  the  business  of  selling  beer 
brewed  out  of  the  city,  to  dealers 
therein,  foreign  brewers  keeping 
beers  in  storage  in  the  city,  and 
delivering  it  from  time  to  time 
to  local  dealers  buying  it,  must 
take  out  a  license.  Jung  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  Frankfort,  100  Ky.  409; 
.38  S.  W.  710;   18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  855. 

A  general  statute  requiring  a 
license  to  sell  beer  does  not  apply 
to  a  manufacturer  wlio  has  taken 
out  a  license  under  another  stat- 
ute and  providing  that  a  licensee 
thereunder  shall  not  be  liable  to 
pay  any  tax  or  license  fee  for  sell- 
ing his  manufactured  product.  In 
re  Biederman,  3  Pennewill  (Del.). 
284;   51  Atl.  602. 

A  statute  assessing  a  tax 
against  persons  selling  liquoi'S, 
but  excepting  "registered  phar- 
macists holding  permits,"  does  not 
render  a  pharmacist  liable  for  tlie 
tax  who  sells  in  violation  of  his 
permit.  Shonkwiler  v.  Stewart, 
104  Iowa,  67;   73  N.   W.  479. 

Although  a  distiller  may  be  re- 
quired to  hold   a  license   and   not 


553 


PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO   A   LICENSE. 


§362 


Sec.  362.    Wholesalers. 

Under  various  heads  and  in  various  sections  has  been  dis- 
cussed in  a  limited  extent  the  question  of  licenses  for  whole- 
sale dealers.  In  this  connection  we  note  a  few  other  cases. 
A  statute  forbidding  a  sale  without  a  license  applies  not  only 
to  retail  sales,  but  also  to  sales  at  wholesale.^*'  And  a  license 
to  sell  at  wholesale  will  not  cover  a  retail  sale,"  however  dis- 
guised it  may  be.^*  Unless  a  statute  fix  what  shall  constitute 
a  wholesale  or  a  retail  transaction,  or  fixes  the  amount  that 
may  be  sold  without  a  license,  it  is  a  question  of  fact  whether 
a  transaction  is  a  sale  at  wholesale  or  retail.'"  If  a  charge 
be  made  of  a  sale  at  retail,  and  the  evidence  shows  one  at 
wholesale,  which  is  lawful,  there  can  be,  of  course,  no  convic- 
tion.-'' The  classification  made  by  dealers  themselves,  where 
no  statute  defines  a  sale  at  wholesale,  in  their  trade  are  con- 
trolling, and  if  it  be  shown  that  the  transaction  is  a  sale  at 
wholesale  according  to  such  classification,  a  peremptory  charge 


even  then  sell  in  less  quantities 
than  a  gallon,  yet  that  will  not 
limit  his  sales  to  dealers  alone. 
In  re  Lauk's  Appeal,  2  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  53;   39  W.  N.  C.  42. 

In  Illinois  a  statute  required 
all  persons  selling  intoxicating 
liquors  to  take  out  a  license;  and 
this  was  held  to  include  a  drug- 
gist. Wright  V.  People,  101  111. 
126.  But  a  Kentucky  statute  pro- 
hibiting a  "merchant"  from  sell- 
ing liquors  was  held  not  to  apply 
to  an  apothecary  combining  mer- 
chandise with  his  stock  of  drugs. 
Anderson  v.  Commonwealth,  9 
Bush,    569. 

A  statute  forbidding  a  tax 
levied  on  a  wholesale  grocer  will 
not  prevent  his  prosecution  for 
selling  intoxicating  liquors  from 
his  establishment  by  retail.  Mo- 
bile V.  Richards,  98  Ala.  594;  12 
So.  793;  Burch  v.  Savannah,  42 
Ga.  596;  Dearen  v.  Taylor  County 
Court,  9'8  Ky.  135;   32  S.  W.  402; 


Flournoy  v.  Grady,  25  La.  Ann. 
591. 

Under  the  Mississippi  Act  of 
1896,  p.  39,  c.  35,  a  license  to  sell 
hoppenweis,  hop  tea  and  white 
hops,  though  malt  liquors,  is  not 
required.  Harland  v.  Adams,  76 
Miss.  308;  24  So.  262. 

10  Dolson  V.  Hope,  7  Kan.  161. 
See  §  359a  on  Manufacturers. 
Contra,  Commonwealth  v.  Rosen- 
baum,  6  Ky.  L.  Rep.  575. 

17  Commonwealth  v.  Rosenbaum, 
6  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  365, 
575;  State  v.  Quinn,  170  Mo.  176; 
70  S.  W.  1117. 

18  Pence  v.  ■Commonwealth,  5 
Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)    608. 

10  Pence  v.  Commonwealth,  5 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  608;  En- 
gle  V.  Commonwealth,  7  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  (abstract)  830;  Pence  v. 
Commonwealth,  6  Ky.  L.  Rep.  113. 

20  Luton  V.  Palmer,  69  Mich. 
610;  37  N.  W.  701. 


§  362  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  554 

to  find  for  the  defendant,  who  has  been  charged  with  retailing, 
is  proper."'  But  where  a  statute  permitted  sales  of  five  gal- 
lons and  over  without  a  license,  a  sale  of  five  gallons  or  more 
of  beer,  which  was  placed  on  ice  for  the  buyer  by  the  seller 
at  the  latter 's  place  of  business  and  then  delivered  in  quan- 
tities of  less  than  five  gallons  was  held  to  be  a  sale  at  retail.-- 
"Where  a  statute  permitted  sales  "at  wholesale"  without  a 
license,  but  did  not  define  what  constituted  a  sale  at  wholesale, 
yet  another  statute  provided  that  a  manufacturer  might  sell  one 
gallon  or  more  without  license,  it  was  considered  that  all  sales 
of  a  gallon  or  more  was  a  sale  at  wholesale.-^  Where  a  stat- 
ute for  a  county  prohibits  the  sale  and  use  of  intoxicating 
liquors,  and  provides  for  the  repeal  of  all  laws  authorizing 
the  county  "to  grant  license  to  retail  liquors,"  this  will  not 
prohibit  sales  in  the  county  at  wholesale.^*  A  statate  which 
permits  sales  by  wholesale  dealers  and  defines  a  wholesale 
dealer  as  "a  person,  firm  or  corporation  whose  sole  business 
in  connection  with  the  liquor  traffic  is  to  sell  ax,  wholesale 
to  retail  dealers  licensed  by  the  laws  of  the  State  or  to  whole- 
sale liquor  dealers  or  to  druggists  or  pharmacists  who  are 
licensed  as  such  by  the  State  Board  of  Pharmacy,"  a  sale  at 
wholesale  to  an  unlicensed  person  who  himself  is  not  a  whole- 
saler, is  a  violation  of  the  statute.-^  A  license  issued  for  sale 
only  at  M'holesale  is  not  invalid  as  a  wholesale  license,  simply 
because  it  does  not  authorize  sales  at  both  wholesale  and  re- 
fail  as  it  might  have  done.-° 

2iEngle    V.     Commonwealth,     7  Nylin,  236  III.   19;   86  N.  E.   150; 

Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)    830.  affirming  139  111.  App.  500. 

22  Mahan   v.    Commonwealth,    21  23  Lloyd    v.    Dollison,    23     Ohio 

Ky.  L.  Rep,  1807;   56  S.  W.  529;  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  571. 

Adair    v.    Commonwealth,    21    Ky.  24  Commonwealth  v.  Ties,  13  Ky. 

L.    Rep.     1818;     56     S.    W.    530;  L.  Rep.    (abstract)    230. 

Mays  V.  Commonwealth,  3  Ky.  L.  25  Shelton    v.    State    (Ind. ),    89 

Rep.    (abstract)    327;    see   Walker  Ind.   800. 

V.     "Commonwealth,      (Ky.)  ;      75  As    to   manufacturers    in   South 

S.  W.  242;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  401.  Carolina  and  the  Dispensary  law, 

A    statute    permitting    sales    of  see   State  v.   Ross,   58   S.   C.   444; 

five    gallons    of    beer    at    a    time  36  S.  E.  659. 

means  five  gallons  of   still  liquor,  26  Williams    v.    Louis,    14    Kan. 

and  not  five  gallons  of  froth  and  605. 
solid   liquor  combined.     People  v. 


555  PERSONS   ENTITLED   TO    A    LICENSE.  §  363 

Sec.  363.     Native  or  domestic  wines. 

Elsewhere  -"*  has  been  discussed  to  some  extent  the  manu- 
facture and  sale  of  native  wines,  or  Avines  manufactured  from 
grapes  grown  in  the  State  or  on  the  premises  of  the  manu- 
facturer. These  statutes  are  so  different  in  their  details  that 
a  discussion  of  the  cases  is  hardly  practicable.  As  an  illus- 
tration, thus  in  Texas,  as  late  as  1877,  a  sale  of  wine  without 
a  license  was  lawful  only  when  made  in  a  separate  establish- 
ment, and  not  where  other  liquors  were  sold.-^  And  where  a 
person  who  manufactures  wine  from  grapes  grown  on  his  own 
premises  may  sell  it  without  a  license,  he  cannot  sell  wine  made 
from  grapes  grown  on  his  own  premises  to  which  have  been 
added  other  grapes.-^  But  the  grapes  may  be  grown  by  him 
on  leased  premises."^  Where  a  statute  permitted  one  holding  a 
manufacturer's  license  to  sell  licjuors  in  quantities  not  less  than 
a  gallon  at  the  place  where  made,  but  not  to  be  drunk  there; 
and  another  statute  provided  that  every  person  holding  or 
purchasing  personal  property  for  the  purpose  of  adding  to 
it  by  any  process  of  manufacturing,  refining,  or  by  combina- 
tion of  different  materials,  should  be  a  manufacturer,  it  was 
held  that  a  person  who  takes  new  wine  and  puts  it  through  a 
process  which  clarifies  and  refines  it,  by  adding  an  ingredient 
thereto,  was  a  manufacturer,  and  must  have  a  license.^" 

26*  Pee  Index  for  references.  29  Stephens    v.    Henderson,     120 

STHiggins    V.    Rinker,    47    Tex.  Ga.   2LS;    47    S.   E.  498. 

393.  30  State  v.  Bahnenkamp,  188  Mo. 

28  State  V.  Miller,  104  Mo.  App.  App.    172. 

297 ;   78  S.  W.  643. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 
ISSUANCE  OF  LICENSES. 


SECTION.  sect: 

3'64.     Authority   to   grant.  386. 

How   license   law   construed.       387. 

The  application,  its  form. 

Delegation      of      power      to       3BS. 
license.  389. 

Oath  of  applicant. 

Notice  of  application.  390. 

Recommendation    of     appli-       SDL 
cant. 

Consent      to      granting      of       392. 
license.  393. 

Consents    where    saloon    has       394. 
been   abandoned  or   discon- 
tinued. 395. 

Saloon   near    dwelling,    con- 
sent of  owners.  396. 

What   is   a   dwelling  requir-       397. 
ing  consent  of  owners. 

(Signers  to  consent  on  recom-       398. 
mendation.  399. 

Saloon     near      church — Dis- 
tance, how  measured.  400. 

Saloon  near  schoolhouse. 

Saloon  near  fair  or  factory.       401. 

Saloon    in    resident   part   of 
city.  402. 

Moral  qualification  of  appli- 
cant. 403. 

Residence   of   applicant. 

Remonstrance.  404. 

Signatures    to    remonstrance 
— Power     of     attorney     to       405. 
sign — Revocation.  406. 

Who   may   remonstrate. 

Withdrawal     of     signatures       407. 
from   remonstrance. 


365. 
366. 
367. 

368. 
369. 
370. 

371. 

372. 


373. 

374. 

375. 

376. 

377. 
378. 
379. 

380. 

381. 
382. 
383. 


384. 
985. 


A  majority  remonstrance. 

Day  for  hearing  application, 
appointing. 

Hearing  application. 

Continuance     of     hearing — 
Adjourned  meeting. 

Evidence    at   hearing. 

Licensing  board  acting  upon 
its  own   information. 

Discretion  of  licensing  board. 

Character   of    discretion. 

Discretion   of   municipalities 
in  granting  licenses. 

Review  or  control  of  discre- 
tion of  licensing  board. 

Reasons  for  refusal. 

Unsuitable       buildings       or 
place. 

Limiting  number  of  saloons. 

Order    granting  or   refusing 
the  license. 

Mandamus      to      secure      a 
license. 

Mandamus    under    the    Eng- 
lish  Licensing  Acts. 

Injunction   to   restrain    issu- 
ance of  license. 

Liability     for     refusing     li- 
cense. 

Appeal  from  order  granting 
or  refusing  license. 

W^rit  of  prohibition. 

From    what    orders    an    ap- 
peal may  be  taken. 

Persons  entitled  to  appeal — 
Parties. 

556 


557  ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES,  §  364 

SECTION.  SECTIOX. 

408.  Rights    of    licensee    pending       412.    <:ollateral     attack     upon 

appeal.  license — Quo   warranto. 

409.  Sale  pending  appeal   to   !Su-       413.     Void  license. 

preme  Court.  414.     Member    of    licensing    board 

410.  Certiorari  a     prohibitionist — Interest. 

411.  Renewal  of  license.  415.     Criminal   liability   of   licens- 

ing   oHicer. 

Sec.  364.    Authority  to  grant. 

In  discussing  the  application  to  obtain  a  license  or  the  grant- 
ing of  one,  the  first  thing  in  the  natural  order  of  the  discus- 
sion is  the  power  to  grant  a  license ;  for  if  there  be  no  power 
to  grant  one  none  can  be  obtained.  This  statement  is  very 
well  illustrated  by  the  Indiana  case,  holding  that  no  power  or 
authority  had  been  conferred  upon  the  licensing  board  to  issue 
a  license  for  sales  to  be  made  below  low-water  mark  on  the 
Ohio  River,  and  yet  a  sale  made  there  was  illegal  and  sub- 
jected the  salesman  to  punishment.^  Statutes  confer  the  power 
upon  local  boards  or  courts  to  grant  licenses  under  certain  con- 
ditions ;  and  unless  such  power  is  conferred,  no  board  or  court 
can  grant  the  prayer  of  an  applicant  for  a  license ;  and  if  it 
attempt  to  do  so  its  action  will  be  void  and  confer  no  rights 
or  protection."  There  is  no  constitutional  objection  to  granting 
such  powers  to  the  courts,  where  the  courts  must  find  certain 
facts  to  exist  before  it  orders  the  license  issued ;  for  the  find- 
ing of  these  facts  is  the  exercise  of  judicial  powers.^  It  might 
be  otherwise  if  the  duty  imposed  on  the  court  was  merely 
clerical,  requiring  it  to  issue  a  license  to  all  applicants  regard- 
less of  fitness  and  without  discretion.  In  England  justices  of 
the  peace  for  the  local  municipal  division,  when  assembled  for 
that  purpose  grant  or  refuse  the  application  for  a.  license,* 

1  Welsh   V.   State,    126    Ind.   71;  940;    Bryan    v.    DeMoss,    34    Ind. 

25  N.  E.  8'83;  9  L.  R.  A.  664;  see  App.  473;   73  N.  E.  156;  Bryan  v. 

State   V.   Hall,   2   Bailey    (S.  C),  Jones,  34  Ind.  App.  /OS;  73  \'.i  E-. 

151.  1135;    State   v.   Gorman,    171    Ind. 

2. State  V.   Fort    (Mo.   App.),  81  58;  85  N.  E.  763. 

S.  W.  476.  *6  Edw.  7,  c.  42   [190(5];   9  Geo. 

3  Intoxicating   Liquor    Cases,   25  4,  c.  61,  §§  I  and  9   [1828];    Pat- 
Kan.  751;  37  Am.  Rep.  284;  Com-  terson's    Licensing    Act,    pp.    179; 
nionwealth   v.   Petri,   122  Ky.  20;  195,  761. 
90    S.    W.    987 ;    25    Ky.    L.    Rep.  In  that  country  a  transfer  of  an 


§  364  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  558 

The  power  to  grant  and  issue  a  license  may  be  conferred  upon 
the  clerk  of  a  court,^  or  upon  the  city  council.®  The  authority 
to  grant  the  license,  however,  is  never  divided,  and  a  grant  of 
power  to  one  court  or  local  body,  or  officer,  cannot  be  exer- 
cised by  another  court,  or  local  body  or  officer.  The  grant  is 
an  exclusive  one."  Whatever  court,  local  body  or  officer  is  des- 
ignated to  grant  the  license  it  or  he  cannot  exceed  the  limi- 
tions  conferred  by  the  statute ;  for  if  he  do,  its  or  his  act  will 
be  void.  Thus  a  license  cannot  be  issued  by  it  for  a  place 
where  prohibition  prevails,  either  by  positive  statute  or  by 
the  adoption  of  local  option.*  And  if  a  city  council  has 
adopted  a  rule  that  no  license  shall  issue  unless  the  applica- 
tion receives  the  favorable  vote  of  six,  a  license,  so  long  as 
this  rule  stands,  cannot  be  issued  upon  the  vote  of  four  or 
five.^  So  if  only  one  license  can  be  issued  per  thousand  inhab- 
itants, licenses  in  excess  of  this  limitation  are  void.^°  But  pri- 
vate arrangements  or  contracts  place  no  restraints  upon  a 
court  or  licensing  board ;  as  where  there  is  a  clause  in  the 
licensee's  deed  for  the  place  to  be  licensed  x^roviding  that  no 
intoxicating  liquor  shall  be  sold  thereon.  A  license  for  such 
a  place  is  valid.^^  Although  a  court  may  have  a  superintend- 
ing general  control  over  county  courts  authorized  to  issue  a 
license,  yet  that  will  not  authorize  it  to  restrain  a  county  court 

outlying  parish  of  a  county  to  an-  App.  194;  Hartig  v.  Seattle 
other  county,  or  other  area  within  (Wash.),  102  Pac.  408. 
it,  under  the  County  Police  Act  The  mayor  may  give  a  casting 
of  1840,  does  not  also  transfer  vote  on  an  application  for  a  li- 
the licensing  jurisdiction.  Regina  cense.  In  re  Hastings  (Xeb. ),  119 
V.  Worcestershire   [1891)],   1   Q.  B.  N.  W.  27. 

59;  eS  L.  J.  Q.  B.   109;   62  J.  P.  7  See  Wiggins  v.  Varner,  67  Ga. 

S»6;  47  W.  Pv.  134;  79  L.  T.  393;  583;    Cooke  v.   Common  Pleas,  51 

15  T.  L.  R.  45;    19  Cox  C.  C.  198.  N.  J.  L.  85;   16  Atl.  176;   Broom- 

5  0'Driscoll  V.  Viard,  2  Bay   (S.  field  v.  State,  10  Mo.  556. 

■C),  316;   see  also  Commonwealth  s  Jones  v.  Moore  Co.,  106  X.  C. 

V.  Hill,  127  Pa.  540;   19  Atl.  141;  436;    11    S.  E.  514. 

State    V.    Rosenblatt,    9   ]\Io.    App.  »  Commonwealth   v.   Moran,    148 

587.  Mass.  453;   19  N.  E.  554. 

estate    v.    Columbia,    17    S.    C.  lo  Commonwealth  v.  Hayes,   149 

80;  People  v.  Mount,  186  111.  560;  Mass.  32;    20   N.  E.   456. 

58    N.    B.   360;    affirming    87    111.  n  State   v.   Busby,   44   N.   J,   L. 

627. 


559 


ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES, 


§365 


from  granting  one.'-  A  statute  empowering  a  city  to  enact 
ordinances  to  license  saloons  and  taverns  requires  it  to  enact 
an  ordinance  for  that  purpose  before  it  can  exact  or  grant 
one.'^'  A  State  may  abdicate  its  right  to  issue  licenses  and  con- 
fer it  upon  cities  and  towns  to  its  own  exclusion/*  If  a  county 
or  district  has  adopted  local  option,  forbidding  the  sale  of 
liquors  therein,  then  no  board  or  council  can  thereafter  issue 
a  license  to  sell  liquors  in  such  county.^^  And  a  license  granted 
contrary  to  law  is  no  protection.^^  A  license  granted  by  two  of 
three  licensing  commissioners  without  the  presence  or  consent 
of  the  third,  and  when  they  are  not  legally  assembled  for 
that  purpose,  is  void.'^  In  granting  a  license  a  board  of  coun- 
ty eonunissioners  is  not  the  agent  of  the  State.^* 

Sec.  365.    How  lioeinse  law  construed. 

Licenses  or  permits  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  at  retail  or 
as  beverages  are  regarded  rather  as  grants  of  privileges  on 
the  part  of  the  State  than  as  confirming  rights  to  persons  to 


12  State  V.  Fort,  75  Mo.  App. 
214;    81   S.   W.  470. 

A  mayor  and  alderman  do  not 
jlisqualify  themselves  to  act  by 
signing  the  applicant's  petition. 
Ferguson  v.  Brown,  75  Miss.  214; 
21  So.  603. 

13  Ellis  V.  Board,  59  N.  J.  L. 
151;  35  Atl.  795;  Meyer  v.  De- 
catur, 125  111.  App.  556;  In  re 
Ryan  (Neb.),  112  N.  W.  599; 
Greunbauch  v.  Lelande,  154  Cal. 
679;  98  Pac.  1059. 

Members  of  a  board  appointed 
in  an  unconstitutional  manner 
cannot  issue  a  license  when  a  de 
jure  board  is  in  existence.  Dien- 
stag  V.  Fagan,  74  N.  J.  L.  418; 
65  Atl.  1011.  A  license  issued  by 
a  de  facto  board  is  valid.  Taber 
V.  New  Bedford,  177  Mass.  197; 
58  N.  E.  640.  A  city  may  adopt 
an  ordinance  authorizing  one  of 
its   committees  to   issue  a  license, 


with  the  right  of  appeal  to  tho 
council.  Cooke  v.  Loper.  151  Ala. 
546;  44  So.  78.  Or  confer  the 
power  on  a  police  board.  Greun- 
bauch V.  Lelande,  154  Cal.  679; 
98    Pac.    1059. 

Instate  V.  Harden,  62  W.  Va. 
313;  58  S.  E.  715;  60  N.  E.  394. 

15  Commonwealth  v.  Pool,  16 
Ky.  L.  Rep  (abstract)  351; 
Young  V.  Commonwealth,  14  Bush, 
101 ;  Padgett  v.  State,  157  Ala.  20; 
48   So.  54. 

16  Commonwealth  v.  Markoe,  17 
Pick.   465. 

17  Palmer  v.  Doney,  2  Johns. 
Cas.   346. 

Unless  power  is  given  to  board 
to  grant  a  license,  it  cannot  grant 
one.  Stat«  v.  Police  Jury,  116  La. 
767;    41    So.   85. 

18  State  V.  Gorman,  171  Ind.  58; 
85  N.  E.  763. 


§  366  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  560 

traffic  in  intoxicating  liqiTors.  This  is  unquestionably  the 
view  taken  by  the  courts  and  the  Legislatures  during  the  last 
three-quarters  of  a  century.  And  while  a  licensee  has  the  right 
to  pursue  his  trade  under  his  license  and  be  protected  therein, 
if  he  infringes  no  law  regulating  his  business,  yet  he  is  liable 
to  meet  with  regulations,  even  prohibitory  legislation,  that  he 
would  meet  with  in  no  other  legitimate  trade  or  profession. 
And  while  an  applicant  is  entitled  to  a  license  of  he  brings 
himself  within  the  provisions  of  the  law,  yet  he  must  squarely 
do  so  before  he  can  bring  proceedings  to  coerce  the  issuance 
to  him  of  a  license.  For  these,  and  perhaps  other  reasons  stat- 
utes regulating  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  especially  as 
beverages,  and  the  process  for  procuring  of  a  license  are 
strictly  construed ;  and  the  applicant  for  a  license  must  com- 
ply strictly  with  their  provisions  if  he  would  be  successful  in 
his  application.^^ 

Sec.  366.     The  application,  its  form. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the  application  for  a 
license  must  be  made  to  the  court,  board  or  officer  author- 
ized to  issue  it ;  for  a  license  issued  by  any  other  would  be  a 
nullity.^°  The  applicant  for  a  license  must  in  all  things  com- 
ply with  the  requirements  of  the  statute,-^  in  order  to  secure 

19  In     re     Hoyniak     License,     9  -o  Bingham    Co.    v.    Fidelity    & 

Kulp.     (Pa.)     368;    United    States  Deposit  Co.,  13  Idaho,  34;   88  Pac. 

V.  Johnson,   12   U.   S.   App.   D.   C.  829;    State    v.    Moniteau    Co.    Ct. 

©2.     Tax  certificates  in  New  York  45   Mo.   App.   387;    Slater  v.   Fire 

stand      upon      a      little      different  &  Police  Board,  43  Colo.  225;   96 

ground    from   licenses.      People   v.  Pac.  554;  In  re  Liquor  License,  1 

Flynn,   110  N.  Y.  App.   Div.  279;  B.    &   C.    (N.    S.)    257;    State   v. 

■96  N.  Y.  Supp.  655;   reversing  48  Young,    17  Kan.  414.     To  be  filed 

N.  Y.   Misc.   Rep.    159;    96   N.  Y.  an      application      need      not      be 

Supp.     653.       Construed     strictly  marked    "filed."      Keller   v.    Leon- 

against  applicants  and  liberally  to  ard    (Mo.),  116  S.  W.   14.     A  city 

carry  out  their  provisions.     In  re  may    require    a    written    applica- 

Hering    (X.  Y.),  117  X.  Y.  Supp.  tion.       Campbell     v.     Thomasville 

747;   In  re  Place,   27  X.  Y.   App.  (Ga.),  64   S.   ii..  815. 
Div.    561;    50    X.    Y.    Supp.    640;  -^  In     re     Hoyniak     License.     9 

Malken  vi   Chicago,  217   111.   471;  Kulp.    (Pa.)   368;  Cxreen  v.  South- 

75    N.   E.    54'8;    affirming    119    111.  ard,  94  Tex.   470;    61    S.   W.    705; 

App,   542.  reversing  59   S.  W.   839. 


561  ISSUANCE   OP    LICENSES.  §  366 

it;  which  means  that  he  must  present  a  sufficient  written 
petition,  for  all  statutes,  we  believe,  require  a  written  appli- 
cation.-- Petitions,  however,  lacking  in  some  formalities  are 
not  necessarily  so  defective  as  to  justify  the  denial  of  their 
prayers  for  licenses.  Thus,  where  the  statute  provided  that 
applications  for  licenses  should  be  for  the  right  to  retail 
"liquors,  wines  or  beer,"  a  petition  to  sell  "spirituous  or  in- 
toxicating liquors,  or  wine  and  beer,"  is  sufficient.-^  If  the 
applicant  need  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  political  division 
for  which  he  seeks  a  license,  of  course  he  need  not  state  that 
he  is  such  an  inhabitant  in  his  petition.-*  If  the  license  is 
to  be  issued  for  a  particular  place,  then  the  petition  must 
contain  a  reasonably  certain  description  of  the  place  for  which 
the  license  is  sought;  but  it  is  sufficient  if  so  reasonably  full 
and  certain  that  it  points  out  the  exact  location,-^  as  the  one- 
story  frame  building,  situated  on  the  east  sixty-six  feet  in 
length  and  twenty-five  feet  in  width"  of  a  designated  town 
lot;^''  or  "No.  1005  Elizabeth  Avenue,  the  corner  of 
Spring  Street,  in  said  city.  "-^  Upon  a  petition  for  a 
license  at  one  place,  a  license  cannot  be  granted  for  another 
place.-**  The  fact  that  the  building  to  be  licensed  is  not  yet 
built  when  the  application  is  made  is  immaterial,  if  the  place 
be  otherwise  properly  described.^^  A  statute  required  the  ap- 
plicant to  designate  in  his  petition  the  place  in  which  he  pro- 
posed to  retail  liquors,  the  particular  place  ailid  house  to  be 
designated  in  the  license,  and  it  was  held  in  a  suit  on  his  bond 
that  a  license  for  sale  of  liquors  in  a  town  where  the  streets 

22Corbett   v.    Duncan,    63    Miss.  J.   M.   C.    132;    66   L.   T.   371;    56 

'84;   McCreary  v.  Rhodes,  63  Miss.  J.    P.    87;    Green   v.    Southard,   94 

308;    In  re   Donmoyer,  9    Pa.   €r.  Tex.   470;    61    S.   W.    705,    revers- 

Ct.  Rep.  303.  ing   59   S.   W.   839. 

23  State  V.  Jefferson  Co.,  20  26  ^a,  par<e  Miller,  98  Ind.  451 ; 
Fla.  425;  Hearn  v.  Brogan,  64  Zn  re  Burns  (Ind.),  87  N.  E.  1028. 
Miss.  334;  1  So.  246;  Moss  v.  27  Qrcutt  v.  Reingardt,  46  JM. 
Warren  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  123  S.  J.  L.  337;  State  v.  Swallum,  111 
W.   1157.  Iowa   37;    82   N.   W.   439. 

24  Murphy  v.  Board,  73  Ind.  28  Tanner  v.  Bugg,  74  Mo.  App. 
483.  Iff.. 

25  Murphy  v.  Board,  73  Ind.  29  Moran  v.  Creager,  27  Ind. 
483;    Regina   v.    Peckridge,   61    L.  App.  659;  €2  N.  E.  61 


§  366  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  562 

were  not  named  nor  the  buildings  numbered  was  valid,  though 
in  the  application  and  in  such  license  the  place  was  desig- 
nated only  as  such  to^A^l.^°  It  is  not  sufficient  to  describe  the 
place  as  "the  lower  floor  of  the  front  room  of  the  two-story 
brick  building,"  situated  on  a  certain  lot  at  a  street  corner, 
under  a  statute  requiring  the  applicant  to  state  in  his  appli- 
cation "the  precise  location  of  the  premises  in  which  he  desires 
to  sell. "  ^^  If  the  houses  in  a  town  be  not  numbered,  failure  to 
give  a  number  is  not  fatal  to  the  application.^^  A  description 
that  the  place  is  "at  No.  G  Building,  in  the  town  of  H,  County 
of  H,  on  parts  of  lots  Nos.  1 1  and  12  in  block  No.  3,  division 
one,"  does  not  necessarily  cover  two  separate  places  of  busi- 
ness, and  is  suffieient.^^  So  a  description  as  follows  was  held 
sufficient  on  appeal :  ' '  That  certain  storeroom  and  dwelling, 
containing  storeroom,  three  rooms  and  cellar,  and  occupied  last 
year  as  a  wholesale  liquor  store  by  your  petitioner,  situate  in 

the  Eleventh  Ward,  Pittsburg,  in  said  county,  being . "  ^* 

An  application  for  a  license  in  a  city  where  the  streets  are 
numbered  describing  the  places  as  "No.  —  Street,  in  the  city 
of  G,  county  of  G,"  was  held  sufficient  in  the  description;^^ 

30  Green  v.  Southard,  94  Tex.  in  the  basement,  or  on  the  ground 
470;  61  S.  W.  705,  reversing  59  floor,  or  any  otlier  floor  in  said 
S.   W.   839.  building,  on  either  of  said  streets, 

31  The  statute  "requires  not  would  satisfy  the  description  in 
only  that  the  exact  location  of  the  application.  There  is  no  spe- 
the  room  in  which  he  desires  to  cific  description  of  the  room.  It  is 
sell  be  specifically  described,  but  evident  that  said  application  was 
that  the  room  itself  be  specifically  insufficient."  Mace  v.  Smith,  164 
described,  and,  if  there  is  more  Ind.  152;  72  X.  E.  1135;  Green  v. 
than  one  room  in  the  building,  Southard,  94  Tex.  470;  61  S.  W. 
that  the  room  in  which  the  appli-  705;  reversing  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
cant    desires    to    sell    be    specifi-  59  S.   W.  839. 

cally  described  and   located.     The  32  Douthitt  v.    State    (Tex.   Civ. 

biiilding   described    fronts   on    two  App.),   82   S.    W.    352;    judgment 

streets,   and   the  words  'the   lower  modified,  83   S.   W.   795. 

floor    of    the    front    room    of    the  33  Cox   v.   Thompson    (Tex.    ("iv. 

two-story    brick    building'    do    not  App.)   85  S.   W.  34;   Cox  v.  State, 

specifically    describe    the    location  (Tex.  Civ.   App.),  85  S.  W.   1199. 

of  said  room  in  the  building.     As  34  Jn  re  Walker's  License,  24  Pa. 

the    words    'lower    floor'     in     said  Super.  Ct.  90. 

description,    apply    to    the    room,  35  Douthitt  v.   State    (Tex.   Civ. 

and  not  to  the  building,  any  front,  App.),  87  S.  W.   190;    Dougherty 


563  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES.  §  366 

and  so  was  "Windsor  Hotel,"  situated  in  United  School  Dis- 
trict, Nos.  2,  100,  103  and  104  in  Colored  School  District  No. 
192.^'^  A  defective  or  insufficient  description  in  the  petition 
may  be  cured  by  the  order  of  the  court  granting  the  license 
wherein  a  correct  description  of  the  place  is  inserted.^^  If  the 
application  must  be  supported  by  the  petition  of  persons  re- 
siding within  the  district,  an  erasure  of  the  name  of  the  n'^ti- 
tioner  and  a  substitution  of  another  name  will  not  authorize 
the  grant  of  a  license;  ^*  and  if  the  name  of  the  owner  of  the 
premises,  where  the  liquor  is  to  be  sold,  is  not  stated,  when 
that  is  necessary,  the  petition  cannot  be  amended  by  its  inser- 
tion nor  a  new  petition  be  filed ;  ^^  nor  can  a  petition  be  amend- 
ed as  to  a  material  matter  after  the  time  for  filing  it  has 
passed.*"  If  a  certain  number  of  persons  must  endorse  the 
petitioner's  application,  it  is  no  objection  that  part  of  them 
have  endorsed  the  application  of  others  which  is  then  pend- 
ing.*^ "WTiere  a  statute  requires  the  petition  to  contain  at  least 
two  names  of  reputable  freeholders  of  the  county,  to  become 
the  applicant's  sureties  on  his  bond,  and  also  a  statement  that 
these  freeholders  are  hana  fide  freeholders  of  land  worth  over 

V.  Richmond    (R.  I.),  74  Atl.  G25.  38  Polk  Co.  v.  Johnson,   21   Fla. 

Under    the    Indiana    statute    it    is  577. 

evident  this  description   would  not  39  /n    re    Donnioyer,    9    I'a.    Co. 

be   sufficient.  Ct.   Rep.   303. 

36 /n  re  Lofland    (Del.),  66  Atl.  *o  in  re  Sherry,   12   Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

361.  Rep.   129. 

The    petition   may   be   amended.  A  statement   in   tlie   application 

Moss  V.  Warren    (Tex.   Cr.  App.),  that  consents  had  been  previously 

123  S.  W.   1157.  hied   with   reference   to  the   prem- 

37  Cravens     v.     Adair     Co.     Ct.  ises  does   not   make    them   a   part 

(Ky.),    17    Ky.    L.    Rep.    71;    30  of     the     application.       People     v. 

S.    W.    414;     State    v.    Cauthorn,  Walker,  60  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.   130; 

40     Mo.      App.      94;      Waugh      v.  112  N.   Y.   Supp.    1021. 

Graham,   47   Neb.   153;    66  N.    W.  *^  In  re  Meredith,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

301.  Rep.  82. 

In    England     the     justices    may  Nor  is  it   if   some  of   them   are 

prescribe  the  metes  and  bounds  of  not  qualified,  if  enough  having  the 

the  licensed  premises.     Stringer  v.  qualifications  have  signed   it.      In 

Huddersfield,  J.    J.,   40   J.   P.   22;  re  Schmidt's  License,  37  Pa.  Sup. 

33    L.    T.    568.      See    Rushton    v.  Ct.   420. 
Bromley,  J.  J.,  52  J.  P.  760. 


§  366  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  564 

and  above  all  incnmbrances  a  certain  sum  of  money,  an  ap- 
plication which  fails  to  set  forth  the  names  of  two  freeholders 
and  their  qualifications  is  fatally  defective."  Where  a  statute 
restricted  licenses  to  a  person  twenty-one  years  of  age  or  over 
who  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  a  resident  of  the  State 
and  of  good  moral  character,  and  requiring  the  applicant  to 
present  a  written  application  containing  a  full  statement  that 
he  "may  lawfully  be  licensed,"  an  application  Avhich  omitted 
a  statement  as  to  these  qualifications  was  held  fatally  defec- 
tive.*^ But  if  the  order  granting  a  license  recites  all  the  ju- 
risdictional facts,  the  license  is  valid;  notwthstandiug  the  de- 
fects in  the  petition.**  In  jMissouri,  where  taxpayers  were  re- 
quired to  sign  a  petition  for  a  license  to  be  granted  to  a  par- 
ticular person,  it  was  held  not  necessary  for  the  applicant  to 
sign  the  application.*^  Usually  it  is  not  necessary  for  the 
application  to  contain  a  .statement  concerning  what  qualities 
of  liquors  the  applicant  desires  to  sell.*"  The  fact  that  the 
petition  is  directed  to  an  authority  net  empowered  to  issue  a 
license  is  immaterial  if  it  is  presented  to  the  proper  au- 
thority, and  it  accepts  and  acts  upon  it,  granting  the  license,*'' 
though  it  may  refuse  to  accept  it.  If  the  petitioner  must  first 
obtain  the  written  consent  of  the  owners  of  real  estate  situated 
within  a  certain  distance  of  the  place  to  be  licensed,  then  his 

42  In  re  Bailey,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  corder's  office,  under  a  statute  re- 
172.  quiring  all  charters  of  corpora- 
ls People  V.  Board,  9  Hun  94;  tions  to  be  so  recorded,  hi  re 
36  K  Y.  Supp.  678;  Jones  v.  Gulf  Brewing  Co.,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
Thro,  2  Mo.  App.  1303;  Corbett  Rep.  346;  nor,  for  a  wholesale 
V.  Duncan,  63  Miss.  84;  McCreary  license,  "the  name  and  present 
V.  Rhodes,  63  Miss.  308.  address  of  the  applicant,  and  how 
**  State  V.  Cauthorn,  40  Mo.  long  he  had  resided  there."  In  re 
App.   94.  Brewing    Co.,    14    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

■ts  State  V.  Heege,   37   Mo.   App.  188. 

338.  47  Slater     v.     Fire     and     Police 

40  Hearn   v.    Brogan,    64     Miss.  Board,  43  Colo.  225 ;    96  Pac.  554. 

334;    1    So.   24-6;    Brown  v.   Lutz,  In   Pennsylvania    the    names    of 

36  Xeb.  527;  54  N.  W.  860.  the  persons  to  be  licensed  must  be 

In    Pennsylvania    it    was    held  given,  or  the  license  petition  will 

that  a  corporation  applying  for  a  be    fatally    defective.      Appeal    of 

license   need    not    state    that    its  Miller,  13  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  272;   13 

charter   is    of    record    in    tlie    re-  York  Leg.  Rec.  199. 


565  ISSUANCE   OP   LICENSES.  §  366 

application  must  contain  a  statement  that  he  has  the  requisite 
number  of  assents,  by  stating'  the  number  of  owners  within 
that  area  and  the  number  who  have  given  their  consent,  or 
possibly,  by  stating  that  a  majority  within  that  area  have 
consented  thereto  in  writing."*^  Where  a  statute  required  a 
petition  to  be  signed  by  at  least  thirty  resident  freeholders  if 
there  were  sixty  resident  freeholders  in  the  district,  a  petition 
signed  by  a  majority  of  the  resident  householders  was  held 
sufficient  where  less  than  sixty  resident  freeholders  resided  in 
the  district/^  Where  a  bond  for  the  license  had  to  be  filed  with 
the  application,  and  reference  in  the  application  made  to 
the  sureties,  it  was  held  inadmissible  to  fill  the  blank  spaces  for 
them  with  the  names  of  the  sureties  after  the  application 
was  filed. ^^  But  where  the  spaces  for  the  names  of  the  sureties 
in  the  petition  were  left  blank,  but  on  the  same  sheet  was  a 
properly  executed  bond  with  sureties,  it  was  held  that  the 
petition  could  be  amended,  it  being  shown  that  it  was  sworn 
to  after  the  bond  had  been  executed.^^  A  license  granted  upon 
a  petition  in  which  a  material  fact  is  defectively  stated  is  not 
void,  if  there  has  been  a  full  and  prior  hearing  upon  it;  as 
where  the  applicant  must  be  a  hotel  proprietor,  and  he  did  not 
expressly  state  he  was  the  proprietor.^^  So  where  an  appli- 
cant had  to  be  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  it  was  so 
alleged,  but  it  was  also  alleged  that  he  was  born  in  Ireland,  it 
was  held  that  it  was  not  fatally  defective  on  the  ground  that 

48  In  re  Bridge,  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  pecuniary    ability   of   the   sureties 

1105;   36  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  533;  25  need   not  be   set  forth   in   the  pe- 

Misc.   Rep.    213;    55   N.    Y.    Supp.  tition.      In    re     Fonney,     28     Pa. 

54.  Super.  Ct.   71  ;   and  that  it  is  not 

49Somers  V.  Vlasney   (Neb.).  80  a   fatal    defect    to   omit    to   allege 

N.  W.   1036.  that  the  hotel  for  which  a  license 

50  7n  re  Matthew,  213  Pa.  269:  is  requested  had  at  least  four 
63  Atl.  837;  reversing  28  Super.  bedrooms,  as  the  law  reijuired. 
Ct.  384.  Jn   '^^   Knoblauch,   28    Pa.    Super. 

In  re   Regan,   213   Pa.    279;    G2  €t.  323;  but  in  view  of  the  above 

Atl.   841;   reversing  28   Super.   Ct.  cited  cases  in  tlie  Supreme  Court, 

38g  these  two  cases  may  be   regarded 

51  Zn  re  Oberfell,   28  Pa.   Super.  as  of  doubtful   authority. 

<^t.  68.  •'•-  Appeal    of    Burns,    76    Conn. 

In    the    same    State    it    is    held       395;   56  Atl.  611. 
that  the  certificate  relating  to  the 


§  367  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  56G 

it  omitted  to  state  how  he  became  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States.'^^  Where  an  ordinance  required  the  licensing  board  to 
investigate  the  qualification  of  the  applicant  and  the  suita- 
bility of  the  premises,  and  at  least  five  freeholders  should 
sign  the  petition,  it  was  held  not  necessary  for  the  petitioner 
to  state  the  signers  were  freeholders. ^''  However,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  petition  be  sufficient  to  contain  allegations  of 
facts,  to  confer  jurisdiction  on  the  board  granting  the  license, 
whatever  they  may  be,  or  the  proceedings  and  the  license  will 
be  void.^'' 

Sec.  367.    Delegation  of  power  to  license. 

No  one  except  the  authority  empowered  can  grant  or  issue 
a  license;  that  authority  cannot  delegate  its  power,  and  if  it 
attempt  to  do  so  the  license  issued  under  the  delegated  power 
will  be  a  nullit^^  Such  w^as  adjudged  to  be  the  case  where 
the  Board  of  County  Commissioners  attempted  to  empower 
the  county  attorney  to  grant  the  application  of  a  petitioner 
for  a  license,^*^  or  the  county  clerk,  although  he  was  the  clerk 
of  the  board.'"'"  Nor  can  a  city  council  delegate  its  power  to 
license  to  the  mayor  of  the  city.^^  The  rule,  however,  that  the 
authority  to  grant  or  issue  a  license  does  not  apply  to  the 
mere  clerical  work  in  issuing  it,  aside  from  the  signing; 
and  when  the  license  is  signed  by  the  officer  designated 
by  law  it  is  the  act  of  the  board  or  court  ordering  it  issued.^'' 

53  7n  re  Walsh,  208  Pa.  582;  57  a  license  be  refused  a  secona  ap- 
Atl.  933 ;  reversing  24  Pa.  Super.  plication  cannot  be  made  for  one 
•Ct.  87.  year     thereafter.       Commonwealth 

54  Hayes  v.  Board,  6  Cal.  App.  v.  Schoenthaler  (Ky.),  122  S.  W. 
520;   92  Pac.  492.  828. 

55  State  V.  Fort,  107  Mo.  App.  56  Hennepin  Co.  v.  Robinson,  16 
567;   81   S.  W.   47G.  Minn.  381. 

Upon    one    application    two    li-  57  Thorn  v.  Atlanta,  77  Ga.  661; 

causes  for  distinct  barrooms  in  sep-  Mayson   v.    Atlanta,   77    Ga.   662; 

arate    buildings    cannot    probably  McCrea  v.  Billingslea,  89  Md.  767 ; 

be  granted.     In   such   an   instance  43   Atl.  42. 

a    separate    license   for    each    bar-  ss  State    v.    Bayonne,   44    N.    J. 

room   must  be  taken  out.     Huber  L.   114. 

V.   Commonwenlth    (Ky.),    112    S.  59 /n  re  Bickerstafl,  70  Cal.  35; 

W.  583;    33  Ky.  L.  Rep.   1031.  11   Pac.   393. 

Under   the   Kentucky   statute   if 


^^^  ISSUANCE  OF  LICENSES.  §§  368, 369 

Sec.  368.    Oath  of  applicant. 

In  Alabama,  under  a  statute  of  1882-83,  the  applicant  was 
required  to  file  with  his  application  an  oath  or  affidavit  that 
he  would  not  violate  the  liquor  laws  in  certain  of  its  pro- 
visions, and  it  was  held  that  the  oath  was  necessary  to  give 
the  licensing  board  jurisdiction,  and  if  it  was  not  filed  any 
license  issued  on  the  application  was  void.""  An  affidavit  or 
oath  is  sometimes  required  as  to  the  genuineness  of  the  sig- 
natures of  coiisent  fik^d  with  the  petition,  and  when  this  is  the 
case  the  affidavit  or  oath  must  be  made  upon  personal  knowl- 
edge, not  upon  knoMdedge  ascertained  from  others.^^ 

Sec.  369.    Notice  of  application. 

In  almost  all  States  notice  of  the  application  for  a  license 
must  be  given.  In  all  instances  it  is  held  that  this  notice  is 
necessary  to  give  the  licensing  board  jurisdiction ;  and  in  this 
respect  the  law  must  be  fully  complied  with,  for  a  compliance 
in  part  is  not  sufficient.  The  full  time  of  the  notice  must 
run  before  any  acttion  can  be  taken."-  The  notice  must  be 
published  in  the  English  language  and  in  an  English  news- 
paper when  a  notice  must  be  publisbed  in  a  newspaper  unless 
the  statute  olherwise  provides.*'^  Where  the  statute  required 
two  weeks'  notice,  and  tbe  first  publication  was  on  the  fifth 
of  the  month  for  a  hearing  on  the  eighteenth,  but  on  that  day 
on   objections  of   remonstrators,   the  hearing   was  adjourned 

00  Russell   V.   State,   77   Ala.  89.  157;  Zielke  v.  State,  42  Neb.  750 ; 

61  State   V.   Sumter  Co.,  22   Fla.  60  K  W.  1010;  Ilochfelcl  v.  Sutii- 

^'^■*-  erland,    15    Juta    101;    Parsons    v. 

When    a    statute    required    the  George,    17    Juta    192;    Muncev  v. 

applicant    to   present   an   affidavit  Collins       ( Iowa ) ,      106      N.    '  W. 

as   to   the    value    of   his    stock,    it  262;   Ormerod   v.  Chadwick,   16  M. 

was   held   that  this   affidavit    need  &  W.  687;  2  N.  Sess.  697;   Retina 

not     accompany     the    application.  v.  James,  12  J.  P.  262;   Regina  v. 

State  V.  Seibert,  97  Mo.  App.  212,  Hayhurst,  61    J.    P.   88;    Ex  parte 

71    S.    VV.    95.      It   was   also   held  Clayton,     63     J.     P.     688;    In    re 

that  an  order  annulling  the  license  O'Connor,    Temp    Wood     (Manito- 

because  an  insufficient  affidavit  on  ba),  284;   Pisar  v.  State,  56  Neb. 

this  point  had  been  filed,  was  er-  455;    76  N.  W.  869;   Goodwine  v. 

roneous.  Flint,  28  Ind.  App.  36;   60  xV.   K. 

62Pelton  V.  Drummond,  21  Neb.  1102. 
492;    32    N.    W.     593;     State     v.  6=  State  v.  Jersey  City,  54  N.  J. 

Murphy,  51   N.  J.  L.  250;    17-Atl.  L.  437;  24  Atl.  571. 


§369 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


568 


until  the  twenty-second,  it  was  held  that  the  license  was  void/'* 
If  a  daily  paper  be  used,  then  there  must  be  daily  publications 
of  the  notice ;  but  if  a  weekly  paper  be  used,  then  publication 
by  the  week  is  sufficient/^  When  the  first  publication  was  on 
the  twenty-second  of  the  month,  for  a  hearing  on  the  sixteenth, 
it  is  sufficient,  though  the  paper  be  not  mailed  until  the  follow- 
ing day,  where  no  action  is  taken  until  a  day  thereafter  on 
the  application  of  remonstrants/*'  The  publication  may  be 
shown  by  the  affidavit  of  the  printer/^  Unless  the  statute  au- 
thorize it,  the  licensing  board  cannot  select  the  newspaper  in 
which  the  n'otice  shall  be  published/''  Where  a  statute  re- 
quired the  notice  to  be  published  in  a  newspaper  having  the 
largest  circulation  in  the  county,  it  was  held  that  the  decision 
of  the  applicant  on  that  point  w^ould  be  respected,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  charge  of  fraud/''  In  some  instances  the  names  of 
those  petitioning  must  be  published ;  ^°  but  a  failure  to  pub- 
lish their  marks,  when  they  so  sign  is  immaterial/^    If  a  license 


61  Pel  ton  V.  Drummond,  21  Nvi-Ii. 
492;   32  N.  W.  593. 

65  State  V.  South  Omaha,  33 
Neb.  856;  51  N.  W.  291;  In  re 
Hedgreen  (Xeb.),  Ill  N.  W.  786; 
Feil  V.  Kitchen  Bros.  Hotel  Co., 
57  Neb.  204;  77  N.  W.  344. 

66  Brown  v.  Lutz,  36  Neb.  r.27 ; 
54  N.  W.  860;  Feil  v.  Kitclien 
Bros.  Hotel  Co.,  57  Neb.  204;  77 
N.   W.  344. 

67  Rosewater  v.  Pinzenham,  38 
Neb.  835;  57  N.  W.  563.  This 
case  discusses  the  question  of  the 
several  editions  of  a  no'v^papfr, 
■without  any  particular  determi- 
nation of  the  question,  except  that 
it  is  a  question  for  the  licensing 
board. 

6S  Rosewater  v.  Pinzenhaiu,  38 
Neb.  835;  57  N.  W.  563;  Feil  v. 
Kitchen,  etc.  Co.,  47  Neb.  204; 
77   N.   W.   344. 

6»  Feil  V.  Kitchen,  etc.  Co.,  57 
Neb.  204;  77  N.  W.  344;  Lamhert 
T.   Stevens,    29    Neb.    283;    45    N. 


W.  263;  In  re  Hedgren  (Neb.), 
Ill  N.  W.  786. 

But  in  Oklahoma,  on  a  remon- 
strance, the  applicant  must  prove 
that  the  two  newspapers  in  which 
the  notice  was  published  had  the 
largest  circulation  in  tho  coun- 
ty. Smith  V.  Young,  13  Ok) a. 
134;   74  Pac.   104. 

It  may  be  remarked  that  un- 
less a  statute  requires  it,  a  no- 
tice need  not  be  given.  State  v. 
Moniteau  Co.  €t.,  45  Mo.  App.  387, 
and  that  a  statute  requiring  a 
notice  for  retail  license  has  no 
application  to  a  wholesale  license. 
Evans  v.  Commonwealth,  95  Ky. 
231;    24    S.    W.    632. 

70  Ex  parte  Smeltzer,  17  W.  N. 
(N.  S.  W.),  190. 

71  State  V.  Sumter  Co.,  22  Fla.  1. 
So   is   a   failure   to   publish   the 

names  of  the  attesting  witnesses. 
Ferguson  v.  Brown,  75  Miss. 
214;    21    So.  603. 


569  ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES.  §  369 

he  granted  on  an  insufficient  notice,  it  may  be  revoked." 
Where  a  statute  re(iuired  a  notice  to  be  posted  at  the  court 
house  door  and  at  four  public  places  in  the  neighborhood  where 
the  liquor  was  to  be  sold;  and  the  applicant  swore  he  posted 
four  notices  ten  days  before  the  day  of  hearing,  hanging  one 
on  a  tack  on  the  front  door  of  his  dwelling  house,  one  on  a  tree 
opposite  on  the  margin  of  the  highway  and  two  on  the  tele- 
graph poles  three  hundred  yards  away,  but  no  one  saw  the 
notice  on  the  door  nor  the  one  on  the  tree,  and  it  was  proven 
the  applicant  posted  the  notice  after  dark,  and  several  citi- 
zens swore  they  never  saw  any  notice,  although  they  were  on 
the  outlook  for  them,  it  was  held  that  there  had  not  been  such 
a  "posting"  of  a  notice  as  the  laAV  required.^^  Tn  England, 
where  notices  must  be  given  to  certain  police  officers  twenty- 
one  days  before  the  licensing  justices  meet,  the  mode  of  com- 
puting the  twenty-one  days  is  to  exclude  the  day  of  holding 
the  general  annual  meeting  or  the  adjournment  day  when  the 
licensing  can  be  granted,  and  to  also  exclude  the  day  on  which 
the  notice  is  given. '^^  So  in  that  country  notice  for  certain 
hours  on  two  consecutive  Sundays,  "within  the  space  of  twen- 
ty-eight days  before  such  application  is  made,"  the  applicant 
must  cause  a  notice  of  his  application  to  be  posted  "on  the 
principal  door  or  on  one  of  the  doors  of  the  church  or  chapel 
of  the  parish."  This  is  construed  to  mean  a  Church  of  Eng- 
land, and  if  posted  on  the  "notice  board"  near  the  door  that 
will  be  sufficient.'^'''  The  notice  must  also  be  posted  on  the 
principal  door  of  his  shop ;  but  it  is  held  that  a  notice  affixed 
to  the  floor  boards  in  the  doorway  of  an  incomplete  building 
will  be  sufficient. '^'^    Where  the  application  was  for  one  kind  of 

72  Commonwealth  v.  Redman,  Salisbury,  4  C.  B.  32 ;  In  re  Rail- 
121  Ky.  158;  88  S.  W.  1073;  28  way  Sleepers  Co.,  29  C  h.  Div. 
Ky.  L.  Rep.   117.  204;    Regina   v.    Powell,   62   L.    J. 

73  Commonwealth  v.  Rcvhnan,  M.  C.  174  [1893];  2  Q.  B.  158;  5 
stipra.  R.    486;    70    L.    T.    138;    57    J.   P. 

74  Regina  v.  Aberdare,   14  Q.  B.  24. 

854;    Regina   v.    Shropshire,   8    A.  75  Empson  v.  Met.  Board,  25  J. 

&  E.   173;  Young  v.  Higgin,  6  M.  P.  677;   3  L.  T.  624. 

&  W.  49;   Chambers  v.  Smith,   12  7o  Regina   v.    Sharp,    42    Sol.   J. 

M.    &    W.    2;    Robinson    v.    Wad-  572. 

dington,   13  Q.   B.   753;   Norton  v. 


§  369  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  570 

license,  an  "on"  license,  and  the  notice  was  for  another  kind, 
an  "off"  license,  the  discrepancy  was  held  immaterial,  for 
the  matter  of  sales  was  only  a  difference  in  the  manner  of 
sales/^  In  some  countries  notice  must  be  given  to  a  police  offi- 
cer. In  England  "to  one  of  the  overseers  of  the  parish" 
or  township,  and  formally  to  the  superintendent  of  police  of 
the  district.  In  one  case  a  petty  sessional  division  included  a 
borough  that  had  a  chief  constable,  and  the  rest  of  the  division 
a  superintendent  of  police ;  and  it  was  held  that  the  notice  was 
rightly  served  on  the  superintendent  in  whose  part  of  the  divi- 
sion the  house  was  situated.''^  This  notice  must  be  served  per- 
sonall}^  or  at  the  residence  or  office  of  the  superintendent  of 
police,  and  it  is  not  enough  to  serve  it  by  leaving  it  at  the 
residence  of  one  of  the  police  officers  of  his  district  which  he 
occasionally  visited,  and  not  at  his  residence  or  office.''^  Where 
an  Irish  statute  required  service  of  notice  of  the  application 
to  be  made  upon  the  two  next  resident  magistrates,  service 
at  the  place  of  business  where  a  magistrate  ordinarily  trans- 
acts his  commercial  business,  and  where  he  is  found  during 
working  hours  of  the  day,  was  held  sufficient.**"  Where  a  notice 
w'as  given  by  the  secretary  of  a  company,  but  it  did  not  con- 
tain an  expressed  statement  that  he  gave  it  on  behalf  of  the 
company,  the  notice  Avas  held  sufficient. ^^  In  Indiana  a  no- 
tice is  required  to  be  published  in  a  weekly  newspaper  at  least 
twenty  days  before  the  meeting  of  the  board  of  county 
commissioners  at  which  the  application  will  be  presented ;  and 
it  is  held  that  only  one  publication  twenty  days  before  the 
board  meets  is  sufficient.*-  "Where  a  notice  was  published  in  a 
newspaper  sixteen  miles  away,  in  another  county,  from  the 
town  for  which  a  license  was  sought  and  mailed  in  bulk  to  a 
person  residing  in  the  town,  who  remailed  them  to  subscribers, 
and  only  three  copies  were  sent  to  the  township  in  which  the 

-T  Ex    parte    Clayton,    0.3    J.    P.  "  Rerrjna  v.  Riley,  53  J.  P.  452; 

788.     So  see  Regina  v.  Plackbnrn,  Rogina   v.   Birley,   55  J.   P.  88. 

J.  J.,  42  J.  P.  775;  43  J.  P.   ill:  so  Rex  v.  Tyrone  Justice  [1901], 

Regina  v.  Darwen  J.  J.,  30  L.  T.  2  Irish  Rep.  497. 

(X.   R.)    444.  81  RofTina  v.  Lyon.  62  J.  P.  357. 

78  Regina  v.  Birley,  55  J.  P.  88.  *^^  Perdue   v.   Gill,   35   Ind,   App. 

99;   73  N.  E.  844. 


571  ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES.  §  369 

town  was  situated,  and  in  the  seven  nearest  to^^^lships  thereto 
the  circulation  of  the  paper  did  not  exceed  a  dozen  copies,  the 
notice  was  published  but  once,  and  only  one  copy  of  the  paper 
in  which  it  was  published  came  to  the  townshii),  and  that  was 
received  by  the  applicant ;  and  other  newspapers  of  general 
circulation  were  printed  and  published  in  the  county  and 
town  for  which  the  license  was  to  be  issued,  and  the  applicant 
testified  that  his  purpose  in  using  the  newspaper  he  did  was 
to  defeat  the  people  of  the  townshi})  who  opposed  the  grant- 
ing of  the  license,  it  was  held  that  the  notice  given  was  in- 
sufficient. "Notice  in  the  case  at  bar,"  said  the  court,  "was 
not  only  published  with  the  intent  to  avoid  giving  actual 
notice  to  the  voters  of  Pike  Township,  but  the  paper  in  which 
it  was  published  had  '>io  circulation  among  the  parties  in  inter- 
est, and  wholly  failed  of  the  purpose  for  which  notice  by 
publication  is  intended.  The  notice  not  only  did  not  comply 
with  the  plain  meaning  of  the  statute,^' but  was  fraudulent 
in  its  purpose  and  design."*''  If  additional  names  be  added 
to  the  petition  after  notice  has  been  published,  a  new  notice 
is  not  necessary.^'"  When  the  statute  requires  the  applicant 
to  give  the  notice,  the  county  clerk  with  whom  his  application 
must  be  filed  cannot  give  the  notice.^*^  In  a  number  of  States 
a  description  of  the  place  for  which  a  license  i  i  sought  must 

S3  The  applicant  "shall  give  no-  avoid  giving  actual  notice  to  the 
tice  to  the  citizens  of  the  town-  party  in  interest,  the  proceedings 
ship,  town,  city,  or  ward  in  which  based  upon  such  notice  may  be 
he  desires  to  sell,  by  publishing,  held  voidable,  even  though  the  let- 
in  a  weekly  newsjiaper  in  the  ter  of  the  statute  has  been  ob- 
county,  a  notice,  stating  the  pre-  served."  Lynn  v.  Allen,  145  Ind. 
cise  location"  of  the  place  for  584;  44  N.  E.  646;  see  Webber  v. 
which  the  license  is  desired.  Curtis,  104  111.  309. 
Burns  R.   S.    1901,    §7278.  ss  Thompson    v.    Egan,    70    Xcb. 

84Goodwine    v.    Flint,    28    Ind.  169;  97  N.  W.  247. 

App.  36;  60  N.   E.    1102.  so  Watkins   v.  Grieser,    U   Okla. 

"The    purpose    of    the    statute,  302;   66  Pac.  332. 

namely,  that  notice  may  reach  the  As  a   rule,   the  liquor  licensing 

party    interested,    should    be   kept  acts  control  the  manner  of  giving 

in  view.     So  it  has  been  held  that  notice    and   not    the   general    stat- 

whore    the    publication    has    been  utes   on    legal    notices.      Sun,   etc., 

made  by  design  in  an  obscure  pa-  Co.  v.   IJennett,  26  Pa.  Super.  €t. 

per,    with    the    obvious    intent    to  243. 


§  369  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  572 

be  inserted  in  the  notice.  In  this  respect  there  is  no  differ- 
ence between  the  description  that  must  be  inserted  in  the 
application  than  that  inserted  in  the  notice ;  bnt  we  note  a 
few  cases.  Thus  a  notice  for  a  license  in  a  building  on  lot  23, 
Main  Street,  in  the  town  of  B  is  insufficient  if  there  is  a 
"Lot  East  23"  and  a  "Lot  AVest  23,"  both  on  Michigan  Street, 
and  there  is  no  ^Main  Street.**^  "A  certain  building  on  lot  1, 
block  14,"  is  sufficient,  where  the  particular  location  of  the 
place  where  the  business  is  carried  on  must  be  given. ^^  Where 
a  statute  required  the  name  of  the  applicant  to  be  published 
in  full,  the  class  of  a  license  he  desired  and  a  description  of 
the  premises,  giving  street  and  number,  if  practicable,  and 
designating  the  building  or  the  part  of  the  building  to  be  used, 
it  was  held  that  a  notice  giving  the  first  and  surname  of  the 
applicant,  with  his  middle  initial,  the  class  of  license  desired, 
and  describing  his  place  of  business  as  "in  a  building  known 
as  'Kenwood's  Block,'  ou  the  east  side  of  Marced  Street,  at  the 
corner  of  South  Street,"  was  sufficient,  the  applicant  occupy- 
ing a  room  in  the  block,  the  third  from  the  corner  of  the  two 
streets,  with  a  druggist's  sign  in  front  of  the  room,  neither  the 
block  nor  the  street  being  numbered,  and  wrote  his  name  as 
it  was  used  in  the  notice. ^^  But  describing  the  premises  as 
"the  first  floor  of  a  builclins:  situntc-d  on  the  easterly  side  of 
South  Main  Street,  owned  by  Catharine  Bearce,"  is  not  suf- 
ficient under  the  same  statute.^"  Nor  is  a  notice  under  this 
statute  to  secure  a  license  for  "J.  F.  Bearce  &  Son"  suffi- 
cient."^ A  notice  describing  the  place  as  a  room  fronting  on 
Main  Street  in  a  building  situated  on  part  of  a  lot  described 
by  the  ordinarj^  description,  giving  the  part  of  the  lot  where 
the  building  is  situated,  is  sufficient.®^  A  statute  requiring  a 
description  of  the  place  to  be  licensed  to  be  published  must 
be  complied  with  to  give  the  licensing  board  jurisdiction."^    In 

87  Barnard  v.  Graham,   120  Tnd.  Cumberland,  17  R.  T.  222;  21  Atl. 
13'5;    22  N.   E.   112.  347. 

88  Whitlock  V.   Bartholomew,  91  oi  Commonwealth       v.       Bearce, 
Iowa,  246;  59  N.  W.  76.  supra. 

8»Breconier     v.      Packard,      13«  92  Kunkel  v.  Abell,  170  Ind.  305; 

Mass.  50.  84   x.   e.   503. 

80  Commonwealth  v.  Bearce,  150  93  Muncey  v.  Collins  (Iowa),  106 

Mass.  389 ;  23  N.  E.  99 ;  Dexter  v.  N.  W.  262. 


573  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES.  §  370 

England  it  is  held  that  the  situation  of  the  premises  need  not 
be  described  as  strictly  as  in  a  conveyance;  thus  a  notice  for  a 
license  for  "house  or  shop  at  the  market  place  in  C"  was  held 
sufficient,  although  there  were  seventeen  houses  not  uumljered 
in  the  market  place."'*  The  fact  that  the  building-  is  not  in 
existence  when  the  notice  is  given  is  immat»'rial,  if  it  is  in 
existence  when  the  license  is  issued.""'  In  Iowa,  upon  filing  a 
general  denial  to  the  petition  containing  the  consents  of  elec- 
tors, the  county  attorney  must  "cause  notice  thereof  to  be 
served  on  the  person  or  persons  filing  said  statement  of  con- 
sent." This  is  held  not  to  refpiire  notice  to  the  persons  who 
filed  the  consent  of  the  city  council  nor  to  the  resident  free- 
holders within  fifty  feet  of  the  site  of  the  proposed  saloon; 
nor  to  the  county  auditor,  the  statute  containing  no  such 
requirement.-'" 

Sec.  370.     Recommendation  of  applicant. 

In  some  States  the  applicant  must  present  to  the  licensing 
board  a  recommendation  of  his  fitness  to  hold  a  license.  This 
recommendation  differs  from  an  assent  or  consent  to  the 
granting  of  the  license,  for  in  the  latter  instance  a  recom- 
mendation is  not  necessarily  involved,  though  it  may  be  if  this 
statute  is  broad  enough  to  make  it  so.  If  a  recommendation 
is  required,  it  must  be  furnished,  for  its  existence  is  a  juris- 
dictional fact.  The  recommendation  must  comply  with  the 
terms  of  the  statute ;  it  must  be  a  full  statutory  recommenda- 
tion." And  the  fact  that  the  statute  requiring  the  produc- 
tion of  a  recommendation  from  a  majority  of  the  householders 

oi  Regina  v.   Penkridge,  56  J.  V.  nullc.l.      :McXeal   v.    Ryun.   56    N. 

87;   66  L.  T.  ,371;    61   L.  J.  M.  C.  ,1.  L.  443;  28  Atl.  552. 
132  «7  Ixjng    V.    State,    27    Ala.    32 ; 

osMoran    v.    Creagan,    27     Iml.  Ex  parte  Cox,  l^  Ark.  &SS;  Vnrdy 

App.  659;   62  N.  E.  61.  v.    Sinton,    50   Cal.    133;    State    v. 

96Fitzgibbon  V.  Macy,  118  loua,  D'Alemberto,   30   Fla.  545:    H   So. 

440;   92  N.  W.  78.  '905;     Metcalfe    v.    State,    76    Ga. 

Alicense  granted  by  a  citv  council  308;    Darling  v.  Boesch.  -67   Iowa, 

at  a  special  meeting  on  a  few  hours'  702 ;  25  N.  W.  887  ;  House  v.  Sta^e, 

notice,   without    notice   of    the   ob-  41  Miss.  737;  Eureka  v.  Davis,  21 

ject   of   the    meeting,   will   be    an-  Kan.  578;    Read   v.  Board    (N.  J. 

L.),  71  Atl.   120. 


§  370  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  574r 

of  a  district  does  not  provide  any  means  or  method  of  obtaiu- 
inj^  such     recommendation  or  of  ascertaining  such  majority 
does  not  render  it  void.^^    A  statute  requiring  the  production 
of  a  recommendation  of  a  certain  percentage  of  the  house- 
holders and  freeholders  residing  within  the  corporate  limit.s 
of  the  town  for  which  the  license  is  to  be  issued  is  not  com- 
plied with  by  producing  a  petition  containing  the  requisite 
percentage  of  householders  and  freeholders  of  the  "town  and 
district,"  and  mandamus  proceedings  based  thereon  to  compel 
the  issuance  of  a  license  must  fail  because  of  this  variance.'''' 
Where  a  license  could  issue  only  upon  the  recommendation  of  the 
grand  jury,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  grand  jury  to  discriminate  be- 
tween proper  and  improper  persons ;  and  they  cannot  refuse  to 
recommend  anyone  because  they  did  not  want  to  discriminate 
between  the  applicants.^    A  statute  requiring  an  applicant  to 
produce  a  petition  recommending  him  as  a  person  "of  good 
reputation  and  a  sober  and  suitable  person  to  receive"  a  license ; 
the  application  is  insufficient,  if  it  omit  the  statement  that  the 
petitioner  is  "of  good  reputation. "  -  Under  this  same  statute  a 
petition  which  contains  an  averment  that  a  partnership  is  of 
good  reputation,  but  contains  no  averment  that  such  are  the  re- 
putations of  the  individual  members  of  the  firm,  is  insufficient.^ 
A  statute  requiring  a  city  auditor  to  issue  a  license  to  an 
applicant   producing   an   endorsement   on   his   application   of 
the  board  of  police  commissioners  that  he  has  proven  him- 
self to  be  a  person  of  good  moral  character,  repeals  a  prior 
ordinance  of  such  city  that  the  applicant  should  obtain  the 
written  consent  of  the  majority  of  the  adjacent  property  hold- 
ers before  obtaining  his  license,  although  the  statute  provided 
that  all  ordinances  in  force  at  the  time  the  statute  was  adopted, 
and   not   inconsistent   with   its  provisions,   should   remain   in 
force.*     Signing  a  recommendation   for   one  kind  of  license 

08  Jones  V.  Hilliard,  69  Ala.  300.  *  Ex  parte  Jofleo,   40   Mo.   App. 

09  Glenn  v.  Lynn,  «9  Ala.  COS;       300. 

7  So.  924 ;  /»  re  Cohn  (Xeb.),r21  A    statute    authorizing    a    board 

N.  W.   107.  of  excise  to  grant  a  license  to  any 

1  Cohen  v.   Jarrett,  42   Md.   571.  person    of    good    moral    character 

2  Corbet  v.  Duncan,  03  Miss.  84.  approved  by   it,   on  a   written   ap- 
3Loeb  V.   Duncan,   tiS   Miss.   89.  plication    signed    by    him,    repeals 


575 


ISSUANCE   OP   LICENSES. 


§371 


does  not  disqualify  a  person  from  signing  a  recommendation 
for  another  kind.^  Petitioners  cannot  withdraw  their  names 
after  license  is  refused  in  order  to  defeat  mandamus  proceed- 
ings.'' Under  its  general  powers  a  city  may  require  an  appli- 
cant to  present  a  certificate  of  four  municipal  electors  as  to  his 
good  moral  character  and  honesty,  and  also  a  certificate  from 
the  proper  officers  that  he  has  paid  the  license  fee  and  signed 
a  bond  conditioned  to  abide  by  the  by-laws  of  the  city  council 
for  the  regulation  of  the  sale  of  liquors.'  If  a  license  be 
granted  without  the  requisite  number  of  signatures,  the  licens- 
ing officer  may  refuse  to  sign  the  license,  notwithstanding  the 
licensing  board  or  municipal  council  has  granted  it.* 


Sec.  371.     Consent  to  granting  of  license. 

In  some  of  the  States  statutes  are  in  force  requiring  the 
applicant  for  a  license  to  secure  the  assent  of  a  certain  num- 
ber, or  a  certain  percentage,  of  the  voters,  residents  or  inhab- 
itants of  the  district  in  which  he  desires  to  retail  liquors. 
Occasionally  a  statute  requires  him  to  secure  the  consent  of  a 
certain  number  of  those  residing  within  a  designated  distance 
of  the  place  where  he  proposes  to  open  his  establishment  for 
their  sale.    In  whatever  form  thev  are  drawn,  this  consent  is  a 


a  prior  statute  requiring  a  peti- 
tion of  twenty  freeholders  to  be 
presented  before  the  license  ■-•an 
be  granted.  People  v.  ILirtnian, 
10  Hun,  602. 

•''  Orcutt  V.  Reingardt,  40  N.  J. 
L.   337. 

6  Harlan  v.  State,  13G  Ala.  150; 
33   So.  858. 

A  blank  form  of  petition,  not 
addressed  to  any  court,  nor  desig- 
nating any  town  where  tlie  sign- 
ers reside,  not  asking  for  tlie 
granting  of  a  license  to  any  per- 
son, the  signers  named  being  ap- 
pended to  blank  books  indepen- 
dent of  any  petition,  is  insuffi- 
cient. -State  V.  Tulloch,  lOS  Mo 
App.  32;   82  S.  VY.  645. 


'  III  re  GrcA'stock,  12  Up.  Can. 
458;  In  re  Hunter,  24  Ont.  5J2; 
reversing  24  Ont.    153. 

s  Welsford  v.  Weidlein,  23  K.m. 
601. 

Affidavits  arc  incompetent  to 
prove  the  qualifications  of  t!ie  pe- 
titioners. //(  re  Klamni  (Neb.), 
117  N.   W.  991. 

The  wife  of  an  applicant,  though 
a  freeholder,  cannot  sign  his  ap- 
plication. In  re  Powell  (Neb.), 
119   N.    W.    0. 

A  statute  requiring  "freehold- 
ers" to  sign  the  application  re- 
quires bona  fide  freeholders,  and 
not  such  as  aie  made  freeholders 
merely  to  enable  them  to  sign  tlie 
application.     In  re  Powell,  supra. 


§371 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


576 


jurisdictional  factor,  and  without  it  the  licensing  board  can- 
not proceed  and  cannot  grant  the  license.  If  it  do,  the  license 
will  be  void."  But  if  the  petition  have  liot  a  sufficient  number 
of  signatures  when  filed,  others  may  be  added  before  the 
license  is  granted,  and  then  when  it  is  granted  it  will  be  valid.^" 
A  statute  which  requires  the  signature  to  be  written  in  the  pres- 
ence of  two  witnesses  does  not  require  them  to  attest  the 
signature.^ ^  Statutes  sometimes  require  the  applicant  to  file 
his  affidavit  that  he  of  his  own  knowledge  knows  that  the 
persons  whose  names  are  attached  to  his  petition  did  actually 
sign  it;  and  when  that  is  the  case  he  cannot  base  his  affidavit 
upon  the  information  of  others.^'  A  petition  and  consent 
entitled  "Petition  and  consent,  under  section  17,  known  as  the 
'Mulct'  "  law,  and  stating:  "The  undersigned  residents  and 
voters  of  0,  respectively  petition  and  consent  that  said  city 
of  0  shall  be  put  under  the  operation  of  the  provisions  of 
said  law,"  is  sufficient  under  a  statute,  requiring  that  a  "writ- 
ten statement  of  consent  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  voters" 


'•>  Ex  parte  Cox,  19  Ark.  688; 
Purdy  V.  Sinton,  56  Cal.  133; 
Metcalf  V.  State,  76  Ga.  308; 
Darling  v.  Boescli,  67  Iowa,  702; 
25  X.  W.  887:  House  v.  State,  41 
Miss.  737;  State  v.  Weber,  20 
Xeb.  467;  30  X.  W.  531;  State  v. 
Moore,  46  X.  C.  276;  Hillsboro  v. 
Smith,  110  X.  C.  417;  14  S.  E. 
972;  State  v.  Seibert,  98  Mo.  App. 
212;  71  S.  ^Y.  95;  Cooper  v.  Hunt, 
103  Mo.  App.  9;  77  S.  W.  483; 
Martens  v.  People,  85  111.  App. 
-66;  affirmed  186  111.  314;  57  X. 
E.  871;  Wiseman  v.  St.  Laurent, 
3  Man.  S.  C.  108;  In  re  Forest, 
23  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  600;  Backman 
V.  Phillipsburg,  68  X.  J.  L.  552; 
53  Atl.  620;  Tanner  v.  Bugg,  74 
Mo.  App.  190;  State  v.  Higgins, 
71  Mo.  App.  180;  Van  Xortwich 
V.  Bennett,  62  X.  J.  L.  151;  40 
Atl.  689 ;  Davanney  v.  Hanson,  60 
W.  Va.  3;  53  S.  E.  603;  Tattersal 


V.  Xevels,  77  Xeb.  843;  110  X.  W. 
708;  State  v.  Xew  Orleans,  117 
La.  715;  42  So.  245;  Common- 
wealth V.  Elmore  (Ky. ),  58  S.  VV. 
369;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  510;  Wels- 
ford  V.  Weidlein,  23  Kan.  601; 
State  V.  Wooten  (Mo.  App.),  122 
S.   W.    1101. 

10  State  V.  Jefl'erson  Co.,  20 
Fla.  425;  Livingston  v.  Corey,  33 
Xeb.  366;  50  X.  W.  263;  Back- 
man  V.  Phillipsburg,  68  X.  J.  L. 
552;  53  Atl.  620.  Contra,  In  re 
Bridge,  36  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  533; 
25  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  213;  55  X. 
Y.  Supp.  54;  56  X.  Y.  Supp.  1105; 
In  re  Forst,  208  Pa.  St.  578;  57 
Atl.  991;  affirming  23  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  600. 

11  State  V.  Sumter  Co.,  22  Fla.  1. 
Instate   V.   Sumter   Co.,  22   Fla. 

364;  Scott  v.  Xaacke  (Iowa),  122 
X.   W.   824. 


577  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES.  §  371 

be  filed  with  the  county  auditor/"  If  an  applicant  circulate 
several  petitions,  having  materially  different  captions,  he  can- 
not combine  the  several  names  under  one  caption  in  order  to 
secure  the  requisite  number.'*  A  person  who  has  signed  both 
the  petition  and  counter-petition  may  withdraw  his  name  from 
the  latter  by  signing  a  second  petition  for  the  granting  of 
the  license.'^'  A  name  cannot  be  withdrawn  from  a  petition  if 
it  would  defeat  the  board's  jurisdiction,  unless  the  board 
consent  thereto.'"  Consents  to  the  issuance  of  the  order  can- 
not be  filed  after  the  petition  is  filed  even  under  an  order 
of  the  court.'"  Consent  of  at  least  a  majority  of  the  property 
owners  and  tenants  in  the  block  where  the  saloon  will  be 
located,  means  the  entire  block  from  street  to  street  and  not 
from  the  street  to  an  alley.'^  A  "block"  within  the  meaning 
of  a  statute  requiring  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  the  owners 
of  real  estate  "within  the  frontage  of  the  block  in  which  such 
liquors  are  to  be  sold"  means  more  than  a  square  made  up 
of  two  platted  subdivisions,  one-half  of  which  is  designated 
as  a  block  in  one  of  these  subdivisions.'"  In  such  a  case  con- 
sent therefor  must  be  signed  by  the  owners  of  a  majority  of 
the  frontage  of  the  block  on  all  the  streets  enclosing  it;  and 
it  is  not  sufficient  if  signed  only  by  a  majority  on  the  side  of 
the  block  where  the  saloon  is  to  be  located.-"  The  c/)unty  treas- 
urer receiving  the  fee  and  issuing  the  tax  certificate  in  New 
York  may  determine  the  fact  whether  the  applicant  is  entitled 
to  a  license  without  regard  to  the  statements  made  in  his 

13  state  V.  Meteer,  94  Iowa,  42;  icQrcutt  v.  Reingardt,  46  N.  J. 

02   N.   W.    684;    Wliite  v.    McCul-  L.     337;     see     Scott     v.     Naacke 

lough    (Neb.),   123  N.  W.   1034.  (Iowa),   122  N,  W.  824. 

In   Iowa   the   sufficiency   of   thi^;  '^'^  In  re   Lord,    32   N".    Y.    Misc. 

petition     may    be     determined     on  223;   66  N.  Y.  Supp.  252. 

collateral  attack;  for  it  is  a  mere  is  Perkins    v.    Loux,    14    Idaho, 

ministerial   act.      State  v.    Aohert,  607 ;    95    Pac.    694. 

95  Iowa,  210;    63  N.  VV.  557.  i9  Slater     v.     Fire     and     Police 

1*  Collins    V.    Barrier,    64    Miss.  Board,  43  Colo.  225;   96  Pac.  554. 

21;   8  So.   164;   State  v.  Scott,  96  20  Slater     v.     Fire     and     Police 

Mo.  App.  620;  70  S.  W.  736.  Board,    supra;    Harrison    v.    Peo- 

13  Perkins      v.      Henderson,      68  gile,    195    III.    466;    63    X.   E.    191; 

Miss.  631;    9    So.   897;    see   Tuttle  reversing  97  111.  App.  421;   People 

V.    Poechert     (Iowa),    121    N.    W.  v.    Griesbach,    211    111.    35;    71    N. 

1057.  E.   874;    reversing    112    111.    App, 


§371 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


578 


petition.^^  A  consent  signed  by  the  husband  without  author- 
ity and  without  her  knowledge,  is  not  invalid  when  he  owns 
the  building.--  Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  change  the 
effect  of  a  written  petition.-"  If  a  freeholder  sign  a  permit 
and  then  sell  his  freehold,  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  tax 
year,  the  licensee  must  file  a  new  statement  of  consent  by  the 
purchaser,  although  if  there  had  been  no  sale  another  state- 
ment would  be  unnecessary.-*  Under  a  statute  requiring  the 
written  consent  of  the  nearest  hona  fide  residents,  at  least  five 
of  whom  must  be  freeholders,  irrespective  of  county  lines, 
means  nearest  the  proposed  place  of  sale;  those  who  reside 
nearest  the  place  are  those  who  must  give  their  consent, 
whether  they  reside  in  the  county  next  where  the  application 
is  made  or  in  a  city  or  town,  even  though  the  act  specifically 
provides  that  it  shall  not  apply  to  incorporated  towns  or 
cities.-^  Where  a  statute  required  a  consent  to  contain  the 
proper  names  of  two-thirds  of  the  assessed  tax-paying  citizens 
in  the  block  where  the  saloon  is  to  be  located  "as  shown  by 
the  last  previous  annual  assessment  and  vote  of  the  cit}^"  un- 

192;  Chicago  v.  O'Hare,  124  111. 
App.  290;  Theuer  v.  People,  211 
111.  296;  71  N.  E.  997;  affirming 
113  111.  628.  (In  this  ease  it  was 
held  that  the  park  commissioners 
had  fHJwer  to  sign  for  park  front- 
age.) 

21  People  V.  Haag,  11  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  74;   42  N.  Y.  Supp.  886. 

In  New  Vork  the  assent  may  be 
revoked  at  any  time  before  the 
county  treasurer  acts  upon  the 
petition  and  issues  his  tax  cer- 
tificate. In  re  Advance,  59  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  440;  69  X.  Y.  Supp. 
314.  As  to  in  Iowa,  see  Kane  v. 
Grady,  123  Iowa,  260;  98  N.  W. 
711.  ' 

22 /«  re  BuUard,  113  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  1.59;  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  1011. 

23  Griesbach  v.  People,  226  111. 
65;  80  N.  E.  734;  affirming  127 
111.  App.  462. 


In  Montana  Ji  petition  for  a  sec- 
ond license  on  the  expiration  of 
the  old.  one  is  necessary.  State 
V.  Settles,  34  Mont.  448;  87  Pac. 
445. 

A  city,  under  its  general  pow- 
ers, may  require  an  applicant  to 
present  a  petition  having  therein 
the  written  assent  of  property 
owners  in  the  vicinity.  Baton 
Rouge  V.  Butler,  118  La.  73;  42 
So.  '640. 

24  Conway  v.  Fayett*  Co.,  132 
Iowa,  510;  109  N.  W.  1074;  State 
V.  New  Orleans,  117  La.  715;  42 
So.  245. 

2r.  Ballew  v.  State,  84  Ga.  138; 
10  S.  E.  623;  but  see  State  v. 
Greenway,  92  Iowa,  472;  61  N. 
W.  239;  Tuttle  v.  Poechert,  121 
N.  W.   1057. 


579  ISSUANCE   OP   LICENSES.  §  372 

less  such  a  consent  is  presented  showing  the  qualifications  of 
the  subscribers  the  licensing  board  must  refuse  to  issue  a 
license.-''  Wliere  a  certain  percentage  of  the  voters  at  the  last 
preceding  election,  as  shown  by  the  poll  lists,  nnist  sign  the 
consent,  the  names  on  such  consent  paper  must  appear  on  the 
poll  books  of  such  election,  and  names  appearing  on  the  writ- 
ten consent  not  identical  with  the  corresponding  names  on  the 
poll  list  cannot  be  counted.'" 

Sec.  372     Consents  where  saloon  ha^  been   abandoned  or 
discontinued. 

In  New  York  "when  the  nearest  entrance  to  the  premises 
described  in"  the  petitioner's  "statement  as  those  in  which 
traffic  in  liquor  is  to  be  carried  on  is  within  two  hundred  feet, 
measured  in  a  straight  line,  of  the  nearest  entrance  to  a  build- 
ing or  buildings  occupied  exclusively  for  a  dwelling,"  it  is 
necessary  to  fde  the  written  consents  of  at  least  two-thirds  of 
the  owners  of  such  building  or  buildings;  but  it  is  provided 
that  "such  consent  shall  not  be  required  in  cases  where  such 
traffic  in  liquor  was  actually  lawfully  carried  on  in  said  prem- 
ises so  described  in  said  statement  on  March  23,  1896,  nor  shall 
such  consent  be  required  for  any  place  described  in  said 
statement  which  was  occupied  as  a  hotel  on  said  last  men- 
tioned date,  notwithstanding  such  traffic  in  liquors  was  not 

26  state  V.  Packett  (Mo.),  Ill)  the  place  selected  for  its  sale,  it 
S.  W.  25.  was  held  void,  because  prohibit- 
Under  the  Iowa  statute  a  sig-  ory  and  not  a  regulation  of  the 
nature  by  a  mark  must  be  wit-  sale.  Campbell  v.  Thomasville 
nessed  to  be  counted.  Scott  v.  (Ga. ),  64  S.  E.  15. 
Naacke  (Iowa),  122  N.  W.  824.  In  New  York,  if  the  application 
,  27 Scott  V.  Naacke  (Iowa),  122  is  correct  in  form,  the  county 
X.  W.  824.  treasurer  must  issue  the  certifi- 
Whei'e  an  ordinance  limited  a  cate  unless  it  appears  by  the  cer- 
license  to  sell  "near  beer"  to  a  tilled  statement  of  the  result  of 
space  of  900  yards  on  a  single  an  election  that  such  certificate 
street,  including  the  parks  and  in-  cannot  be  issued;  but  this  certi- 
tersecting  streets,  and  requiring  fied  statement  need  not  be  filed 
the  consent  of  all  owners  and  oc-  with  the  county  treasurer.  In  re 
cupants  of  stores  and  residences  Krumbliolz,  GO  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
within  a  radius  of  ten  miles  from  534;    113  N.  Y.  Supp.   1060. 


§372 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS 


580 


then  carried  on  thereat."  The  privileges  thus  conferred  to 
maintain  a  sak)On  without  the  consent  of  property  owners 
does  "not  attach  to  the  property  in  perpetuity  and  is  not  a 
thing  that  necessarily  runs  with  the  land.  It  may  be  lost  by 
abandonment  or  non-use,  when  the  facts  or  circumstances  are 
such  as  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  the  owner  intended  to 
discontinue  the  liquor  traffic  at  the  place.  When  that  inten- 
tion is  clearly  established  the  period  of  time  during  which  the 
place  is  vacant  or  used  for  other  purposes  is  immaterial."-* 
Accordingly  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that  a  tenant  prior  to 
the  application,  whose  lease  expired  May  6,  1899,  moved  out 
sixteen  days  before  his  lease  expired,  was  not  such  a  dis- 
continuance of  the  liquor  traffic  as  amounted  to  an  abandon- 
ment of  the  premises,  and  that  consents  of  owiiers  of  dwell- 
ing houses  within  two  hundred  feet  were  not  necessary.'^ 
And  a  like  holding  was  made  where  the  tenant  was  ejected  for 
non-payment  of  his  rent.'^°  This  statute,  in  its  exception, 
does  not  extend  or  apply  to  buildings  afterwards  purchased 
and  annexed  to  the  liotel.^^    And  while  the  statute  requires  a 


28  7n  re  Hawkins,  165  N.  Y. 
1G8;  S'S  N.  E.  884;  reversing  28 
N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  383;  59  N.  Y. 
Supp.  888;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  1141; 
66  N.  Y.  Supp.  1132;  In  re  Kleve- 
shall,  30  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  361;  63 
N.  Y^  Supp.  741  ;/h  re  Ritchie,  18 
N.  Y'.  Misc.  Rep.  341;  40  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1106;  People  v.  Lanmerti, 
18  N.  Y.  Misc.  341;  40  N.  Y. 
iSupp.  1107;  affirmed  14  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  628;  43  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1161;  18  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  343; 
In  re  Bridges,  25  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
213;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  54;  affirmed 
36  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  533;  55  N.  Y. 
Supp.  54;  People  v.  Hamilton,  25 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  428;  49  N.  Y. 
Supp.  605;  In  re  Lyman,  34  N. 
Y.  App.  390;  54  X.  Y.  Supp.  294; 
In  re  Kessler,  28  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
336;  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  888;  163 
N.  Y.   205;   57  X.  E.  402;   In  re 


McVicker,  21  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
383;  45  X.  Y.  Supp.  1008;  In  re 
Seranely,  40  X.  Y.  Supp.  1106; 
18  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  341;  In  re 
Laper,  165  X.  Y.  618;  59  X.  K. 
1125;  In  re  Moulton,  168  X.  Y. 
C45;  61  X.  E.  1135;  In  re  Clem- 
ents, 52  X.  Y.  Misc.  325;  102  X. 
Y.  Supp.  178;  affirmed  118  X.  Y. 
App.  Div.  575;  103  X.  Y.  Supp. 
157. 

•-«/h  re  Hawkins,  165  X.  Y. 
188;  58  X.  E.  884.  (In  Kessler's 
case,  163  X.  Y.  205;  57  X.  E. 
402 ;  reversing  28  X.  Y.  :Misc.  Rep. 
383 ;  59  X.  Y.  Supp.  888,  the  ques- 
tion was  not  raised.) 

30 /j,,  re  Moulton,  59  X.  Y.  App. 
Div.  25;   69  X.  Y.  Supp.   14. 

■••1  In  re  Haight,  33  X.  Y.  Misc. 
544;  68  X.  Y.  Supp.  920;  In  re 
Ireland,  41  X.  Y.  :\Iise.  Rep.  425; 
84   X.   Y.   Supp.    1100, 


581 


ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES. 


§373 


particular  statement  of  the  dwellings,  churclies  and  school- 
houses  within  two  hundred  feet,  yet  if  it  be  shown  that  the 
place  was  a  licensed  place  on  March  23,  1896,  and  had  been 
continuously  used  since,  it  is  not  necessary  to  insert  any  alle- 
gations with  reference  to  such  buildings;  and  if  a  willfully 
false  allegation  in  reference  thereto  be  inserted,  it  being  im- 
material, will  not  prevent  the  issuance  of  a  license.^- 


Sec.  373.     Saloon  near  dwelling- — Consent  of  owners. 

Statutes  frequently  require  the  consent  of  the  o^siiers  of 
a  dwelling  house  within  a  certain  distance  of  the  proposed 
site  of  a  saloon,  and  others  forbid  the  location  of  a  saloon 
within  a  certain  distance  of  a  church  or  sehoolhouse.  These 
statutes  are  enacted  chiefly  concerning  saloons  in  cities  and 
towTis.  A  statute  of  this  kind  has  been  frequently  before  the 
courts  in  New  York.  This  statute  of  that  State  requires  the 
consent  of  owners  of  a  chvelling,  the  "nearest  entrance"  of 
which  is  within  two  hundred  feet,  measured  in  a  straight  line, 


Under  the  Xew  York  statutes, 
if  a  saloon  burn  down,  and  two 
months  are  taken  to  rebuild  it, 
it  is  not  a  building  in  continuous 
use  as  a  saloon,  and  new  consents 
are  required.  In  re  Kesler,  28 
N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  336;  59  X.  Y. 
Supp.  888.  See  where  tenant  va- 
cated a  saloon  without  his  land- 
lord's consent,  and  new  consents 
were  held,  not  necessary.  In  re 
Laper,  53  X.  Y.  Div.  576;  66  N. 
Y.  Supp.  13;  affirmed  105  N.  Y. 
filS;   59   N.   E.    1131. 

For  instances  where  a  licensee, 
by  discontinuance  of  his  business, 
did  or  did  not  lose  his  right  to 
continue  such  business,  see  In  re 
Zinzow,  18  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  653; 
43  X.  Y.  Supp.  714;  People  v. 
Hamilton,  25  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
428;  49  X.  Y.  Supp.  605;  People 
V.  Hamilton,  21  Misc.  Rep.  375; 
47  N.  Y.  Supp.   190;  In  re  Hawk- 


ins, 165  X.  Y.  188;  58  X.  E.  884; 
reversing  54  X.  Y.  App.  617;  66 
X.  Y.  Supp.  1132;  In  re  Place,  27 
X.  Y.  App.  Div.  561;  50  X.  Y. 
Supp.  640;  In  re  Place,  34  X.  Y. 
App.  Div.  389;  54  X.  Y.  Supp. 
294;  In  re  Salisbury,  19  X.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  340;  44  X.  Y.  Supp. 
291. 

32  In  re  Hawkins,  165  X.  Y. 
168;  58  X.  E.  8'84;  reversing 
66  X.  Y.  Supp.  1132;  In  re  Kess- 
ler,  163  X.  Y.  205;  57  X.  E.  402; 
In  re  Moulton,  59  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
25;   69  X.  Y.  Supp.   14. 

What  is  a  "new  place"  for  a 
liquor  license  under  the  Xew  Jer- 
sey statute.  Wright  v.  Board,  75 
X.  J.  L.  28;   66  Atl.  1061. 

What  is  an  abandonment,  see 
Quigley  v.  Monsees,  56  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  110;  106  X.  Y.  Supp.  167; 
and  In  re  Cowles,  34  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  447;   69  X.  Y.  Supp.  756. 


§  373  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  582 

of  the  ''nearest  entrance  *  *  "  to  the  premises  described 
in  said  statement  [or  application  for  a  tax  certificate  or  per- 
mit] as  those  in  which  liquor  is  to  be  carried  on."  ^"  Another 
provision  of  the  statute  requires  the  applicant  to  describe  "the 
premises  where  such  business  is  to  be  carried  on,  stating  the 
street  and  number  if  the  premises  have  a  street  and  number, 
and  otherwise  such  apt  description  as  will  reasonably  indicate 
the  locality  thereof,  and  also  the  specific  location  on  the  prem- 
ises of  the  bar  or  place  at  which  liquors  are  to  be  sold." 
Under  the  construction  given  this  act  in  determining  the  dis- 
tance the  saloon  must  be  located  from  a  dwelling  house  the 
nearest  entrance  of  such  house  must  be  the  one  taken  into 
account,  though  there  be  several  other  entrances  to  it,  and  it 
makes  no  difference  that  this  nearest  entrance  is  a  side  or  rear 
entrance  and  not  the  front  entrance.^*  So  in  determining 
the  "nearest  entrance"  of  the  saloon  to  the  dwelling  house, 
that  one  must  be  taken  which  is  nearest,  though  it  be  a  rear 
or  side  door  or  front  door,  no  difference  being  made  between 
a  front  entrance  or  any  other  entrance. ^^  In  ascertaining  the 
distances  between  the  two  entrances  a  straight  line  must  be 
used,  ''disregarding  all  other  obstructions."  ""  If  a  rear  door 
or  any  other  door  l)e  permanently  closed  it  cannot  be  consid- 
ered an  "entrance."""     Where  an  owner  of  a  dwelling  cut  a 

33  Laws    1897,    p.    220,    c.    312,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  1142;  In  re  Kupp, 

§17,   subdiv.    8.  54  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  1;    105  N.  Y. 

This     statute     is     strictly     con-  Supp.   467. 

strued  against  applicants  and  lib-  3r,  /,[,   re    McMonagle,    41    N.    Y. 

orally  construed   to  carry   out  its  Misc.   Kep.   407;    84   N.    Y.   vSupp. 

provisions.  In  re  Hening   (N.  Y. ),  liMi. 

117     N.     Y.     Supp.     747;     In    re  -«/»  re  McMonagle,  84  N.Y.  Supp. 

Place,    27    N.    Y.    Ap]..    Div.    5G1;  lOG;  In  re  Ruland,  21  N.  Y.  Misc. 

50  N.   Y.   Supp.   (Ml).  Rep.    504;    47    N.    Y.    Supp.    561; 

.".4  lyi    re    Sanderson,    ;)4    N.    Y.  In  re  Bridge,  36  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

Misc.    Rep.    375;    (19    N.    Y.    Supp.  533;   55  N.  Y.  Supp.  54;  25  N.  Y. 

028;  In  re  Veeder,  31  N.  Y.  Misc.  Misc.    Rep.    54;    56    N.    Y.    Supp. 

Rep.  569;  65  N.  Y.  Supp.  517;  In  1105. 

re  Cheney,  3-5  Misc.  Rep.  598;   72  37 /n    re    Malaghan,    184    N.    Y. 

N.    Y.   Sui>p.    134;    In  re  McMon-  253;    77   N.   E.    12;    affirming    103 

agle,  41  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  407;  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  355;  95  N.  Y.  Supp. 

N.    V.      Supp.    1068;    In  re   Mala-  1142;   In  re  Purdy.  40  N.  Y.  Div. 

ghan,  184  N.  Y.  253;  77  N.  E.  12;  133;  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  629. 
affirming  108  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  355 ; 


583  ISSUANCE   OP   LICENSES.    •  §  374 

new  door  in  his  dwelling,  after  an  application  had  been  made 
and  on  the  day  the  license  was  granted,  with  the  evident 
intent  to  prevent  the  issuance  of  a  license,  it  was  held  that 
his  action  did  not  prevent  the  issuance  of  the  license  nor  call 
for  its  cancellation  upon  his  petition  therefor.^^  Where  a 
liquor  dealer  was  unable  to  secure  the  consent  of  the  necessary 
number  of  property  owners  within  two  hundred  feet  for  a 
saloon  in  his  basement,  erected  a  partition  therein  of  ceiling 
lumber,  leaving  a  dead  space  between  the  partition  and  the 
basement  wall,  useless  and  unoccupied;  and  his  new  room 
was  a  few  inches  beyond  the  two  hundred  foot  limit,  it  was 
held  that  this  was  a  mere  subterfuge  to  evade  the  statute,  and 
that  he  must  have  the  consent  of  the  owner  whose  property 
lay  within  two  hundred  feet  of  the  room  as  it  was  before  it  was 
changed.^^  An  applicant  f  )r  a  license  cannot  evade  the  law 
requiring  him  to  procure  the  consents  of  owners  of  dwellings 
within  a  certain  distance  of  his  saloon  by  putting  upon  them 
small  business  signs,  in  order  to  create  the  impression  that 
they  were  business  houses.'"  Where  there  is  an  entrance  to  the 
saloon  from  a  rear  yard,  but  there  is  no  entrance  to  the  yard 
except  through  the  rear  entrance  of  the  house,  the  nearest 
"entrance"  as  designated  in  the  New  York  statute  is  not  this 
rear  entrance.*^ 

Sec.  374.    What  is  a  dwelling  requiring  consent  of  owners. 

In  New  York  the  statute  requires  the  owners  of  a  building 
used  exclusively  as  a  dwelling  or  church  to  give  their  consent 
to  the  location  of  a  saloon  within  a  certain  distance  of  it,  and  if 
it  is  not  exclusively  used  as  a  dwelling  or  church  no  consent 
is  required.  Under  this  statute  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that 
a  dressmaker  used  a  house,  working  therein,  but  having  out  no 
sign,  did  not  deprive  it  of  its  exclusive  character  as  a  dwell- 
ing house ;  *-  and  of  course,  this  statute  does  not  require  the 

38  7n  re  Cheney,  35  N.  Y.   Misc.  4i /«  re  Rupp,    122   N.   Y.   App. 

Rep.  598;   72  N.  Y.  Supp.    134.  Div.   891;    106   N.   Y.   Sup.i.    116b; 

39McColl    V.    Rally,    127    Iowa,  affirming  55  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  313; 

f)33;   103  N.  W.  972.  106  N.   Y.  Snpp.    193. 

*o  In  re  Rasquin,  37  N.  Y.  Misc.  *- In  re  Ruland,  21  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Rep.  693;  76  N.  Y.  Supp.  404.  Rep.  504;  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  561. 


§  375  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  584 

consent  of  the  owners  of  a  business  building.*^  Woodsheds  of 
rough  boards,  loosely  joined  and  unplastered  and  never  used 
for  living  purposes  until  the  evening  before  the  application  was 
tiled  are  not  dwelling  houses.*^  But  owners  of  vacant 
dwellings  must  be  counted,  and  all  vacant  houses  intended 
for  dwellings.^"'  Under  this  statute  a  house  may  be  a  dwelling 
though  used  occasionally  for  Avashing.*"  The  fact  that  the 
dwelling  is  an  addition  to  a  business  block,  having  no  inside 
communication,  but  used  exclusively  for  a  dwelling,  having  its 
own  street  number,  does  not  deprive  it  of  its  character  as  a 
dwelling/^  Unfinished  dwellings  cannot  be  counted  as  dwell- 
ings.^^ If  the  house  be  double,  it  may  be  treated  as  two 
houses  in  ascertaining  the  requisite  number  of  consents ;  *" 
though  the  building  ma,y  be  so  constructed  as  to  prevent  that.''" 
Thus,  a  frame  building  (this  one  was  on  the  rear  end  of  the 
lot),  costing  about  twelve  hundred  dollars,  divided  into  seven 
equal  parts  by  wooden  partitions,  each  part  about  eight  feet 
wide,  was  held  to  be  only  a  single  building.^^  A  small  house, 
costing  only  thirty-five  dollars,  of  one  room  and  moved  within 
two  hundred  feet  of  the  site  of  the  proposed  saloon,  is  not  a 
building  "occupied  exclusively  as  a  dwelling."  ^-  But  it  may 
be  otherwise  if  occupied  permanently.^^  And  letting  rooms 
by  the  week  or  month  does  not  deprive  the  house  of  its  char- 
acter as  a  dwelling."'^ 

Sec.  375.     Signers  to  consent  or  recommendation. 

The  statute  prescribes  V\"ho  shall  sign  the  consent  or  recom- 
43  7n  re  Ireland,  41  N.  Y.  Misc.  so  7,^    re    Clement,     US    X.     Y. 

Eep.  42.5;  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  1100.  App.   Div.   575;    10.3   X.    Y.    Supp. 

44 /n  re  Lyman,  24  N.  Y.  Aluc.       157;    affirming    103    X.     f.    bapp. 

Eep.  552;   53  X.  Y.  Supp.  577.  447. 

45  In  re  Rnland,  21  X.  Y.  Misc.  si  /„  ,-e  Patterson,  43  Miic.  Rii>. 
Eep.  504;    17   X.   Y.    Supo.   561.           498;  89  X.  Y.  Supp.  437;   see  a^so 

46  In  re  Lyman,  26  X.  Y.  Supp.       In  re  Clement,  18  X.  Y.  App.  Di"\ . 
S68;   57  X.  Y.  Supp.  48S.  575;    103  X.  Y.  Supp.   157. 

4T/n  re  Lyman,  20  X.   Y.  Supp.  ^^  Jn   re    Vail,    38    X.    Y.    Misc. 

568;  57  X.  Y.  Supp.  488.  Rep.  392;   77  X.  Y.  Supp.  903. 

53  In  re  Ryan,  85  X.  Y.  App. 
Div.  621;  83  X.  \'.  Supp.  123;  af- 
firming 39  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  698; 
80  X.  Y.  Supp.   1114. 

54 /n  re  Veeder,  31  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  560;  65  X.  Y.  Supp.  517. 


48  In    re 

■Clements,    58 

N.     Y. 

Misc.  Rep. 

638;    111   X.  Y. 

Supp. 

1073. 

49  In    re 

Patterson,    43 

X.    V. 

Misc.   Rep. 

498;    89   X.    Y. 

Supp. 

437. 

585  ISSUANCE   OP   LICENSES,  §  375 

mendation ;  and  only  such  can  be  counted  as  have  the  proper 
qualifications  in  determining  whether  a  sufficient  number  have 
signed  it,  although  if  others  sign  it  that  would  not  avoid  the 
consent  or  recommendation.  Where  a  statute  required  that 
the  application  should  "be  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  regis- 
tered voters  of  the  election  district,  as  shown  by  the  registra- 
tion list  at  the  date  of  the  application,"  this  list  must  be 
considered  in  determining  whether  a  majority  had  signed  the 
application ;  and  if  they  had  not,  the  issuance  of  a  license 
cannot  be  coerced.^^  If  the  applicant  be  a  registered  voter  he 
must  be  considered  the  same  as  any  other  registered  voter,  and 
may  sign  his  own  petition.-^*^  Where  a  statute  requires  "resi- 
dent householders"  within  fifty  feet  of  the  place  of  business 
to  give  their  consent,  only  persons  residing  in  the  city  by 
which  the  license  is  granted  are  included.^''  But  a  statute 
requiring  the  consent  of  the  nearest  bona  fide  residents,  five 
of  A^hom  snould  be  freeholders,  irrespective  of  county  lines, 
nearest  the  place  of  busniess,  includes  persons  residing  nearest 
the  place  of  business  although  in  the  adjoining  county.'^^  Unless 
the  statute  requires  it,  the  freeholders  nearest  the  place  of 
business,  to  be  qualified  to  sign  the  petition  or  give  their 
consent,  need  not  reside  upon  their  freeholds.^'^  A  statute 
requiring  the  assent  of  a  majority  of  the  "assessed  tax-paying 
citizens"  of  a  town,  includes  married  and  single  women 
assessed  for  taxes,  and  minors  owning  property  who  have 
guardians,  but  not  citizens  residing  outside  the  town  though 
owning  property  in  and  assessed  therein."''  Under  this  statute 
mere  taxpayers  are  not  qualified;  the  signers  must  be  "as- 

55  state  V.  D'Alemberte,  30  Fla.  withstanding  the  easement  of  the 

545;    11  So.  905;   Scott  v.  Naacke  public  to  use  the  street  for  travel, 

(Iowa),  122  N.  W.  824.  tlie   "owner   of   real  estate"  with- 

50  State  V.  Sumter  Co.,  22  Fla.  1.  in  twenty-five  feet  of  the  premises, 

57  State  V.   Greenway,   92   Iowa,  and  so  may  object  to  the  granting 

472;    61   N.  W.  239.  of  the  license.     Morian  v.  Gallag- 

58BaIlew  V.  State,  84  Ga.  138;  lier,  199  Mass.  486;  85  N.  E.  579. 
10  S.  E.  623.  00  state   v.   Howard   Co.   Ct.,   90 

59  State  V.  Meteer,  94  Iowa,  42;  Mo.  593;    2  S.  W.   788;    see  State 

62  N.  W.  684.  V.    Meyers,   80    Mo.    601;    Scarritt 

A  person  who  owns  the  fee  of  a  v.     Jackson,     89     Mo.     App.     585; 

street    in    front    of    premises    for  Thompson  v.  Egan    (Neb.),  97  N. 

which  a  license  is  sought,  is,  not-  W.  247. 


§375 


TRAi^FIC   IN   INTOXICATINQ   LIQUORV?, 


586 


sessed,  tax-paying  citizens."  *"  A  conveying  of  valueless  land, 
without  consideration,  cannot  make  the  grantees  respectable 
citizens  and  freeholders  to  be  counted  with  others  giving  their 
consent  when  the  statute  requires  those  consenting  to  have 
those  qualifications.^-  A  person  occupying  a  house  as  a  resi- 
dent is  a  house  holder  under  a  statute  requiring  the  consent 
of  hona  fide  householders."^  A  statute  requiring  the  consent 
of  a  majority  of  bona  fide  householders  "or"  property  owners 
is  satisfied  by  the  consent  of  either.***  Where  a  statute  re- 
qnired  the  signatures  of  thirty  freeholders  to  a  petition  before 
a  license  could  be  granted,  it  was  held  that  if  there  was  less 
than  sixty  freeholders  in  the  district,  a  majority  of  those 
therein  was  sufficient.''^  A  minor's  consent  to  a  saloon,  if  he 
be  a  property  owner,  may  be  given  by  his  guardian,  but  he 
personally  cannot  give  it."**  One  joint  tenant  may  give  the 
consent  of  all  his  co-tenants.*'^  An  owner  of  a  lot  whose  con- 
sent has  been  purchased  cannot  be  counted."^     A  property 


61  state  V.  Heege,  37  Mo.  App. 
338;  State  v.  Kingsburg,  105  Mo. 
App.  22;  78  S.  W.  641;  see  State 
V.  Moniteau  Co.  Ct.,  45  Mo.  App. 
387. 

62  Smith  V.  Board,  46  X.  J.  L. 
312;  Austin  v.  Atlantic  City,  48 
N.  J.  L.  118;  3  Atl.  65;  Colglazier 
V.  McClary  (Neb.),  98  N.  W.  670; 
Bennett  v.  Otto,  68  Neb.  652;  94 
N.  W.  807;  Backman  v.  Phillips- 
burg,  68  N.  J.  L,  552;  53  Atl. 
620;  Dye  v.  Posen,  79  Neb.  149; 
112  N.  W.  332. 

A  statute  disqualifying  free- 
holders who  have  signed  a  peti- 
tion from  signing  a  second  peti- 
tion within  a  year  therefrom,  has 
no  application  to  freeholders  who 
signed  a  petition  before  its  pas- 
sage. Williams  v.  Bayonne,  55 
N.  J.  L.   GO;    25  Atl.  407. 

Under  a  Pennsylvania  statute, 
persons  so  illiterate  that  they  can- 
not  write   their  own   names    can- 


not sign  the  petition;  signing  by 
mark  is  not  sufficient,  hi  re  Grant, 
2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  87;  In  re 
Faulkner,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  86. 

63  Shephard  v.  New  Orleans,  51 
La.  Ann.  847;   25  So.  542. 

64  Shephard  v.  New  Orleans, 
supra. 

65  Somers  v.  Vlasney,  64  Neb. 
383;  89  N.  W.  1036. 

66  People  V.  Griesbach,  211  111. 
35;  71  N.  E.  874;  reversing  112 
111.   App.    192. 

67  People   V.   Griesbach,  supra. 
But  in  the  case  of  joint  owners 

it  has  been  held  that  he  must  have 
their  consent.  In  re  Cowles,  34 
N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  447;  59  N.  Y. 
Supp.   756. 

esTheurer  v.  People.  211  111. 
296;  71  N.  E.  997;  affirming  113 
111.  App.  628.  In  this  case  before 
Tiearing  a  signer  withdrew  his 
signature,  and  it  was  held  that 
he    could    not    be    counted.      The 


^87  ISSUANCE    OP   LICENSES.  §  375 

o\\Tier  may  sign  by  an  authorized  agent  if  no  statute  expressly 
forbids  it-/^  and  so  may  an  executor  with  power  to  sell.'" 
In  determining  whether  a  petition  has  a  sufficient  number  of 
signers,  signatures  of  partnerships  cannot  be  counted. ^^  A 
statute  requiring  a  majority  of  assessed,  tax-paying  citizens 
and  guardians  in  the  block  to  sign  the  petition  does  not  require 
a  majority  of  the  male  taxpayers,  a  majority  of  the  female 
taxpayers,  and  a  majority  of  the  guardians  to  sign  it,  but  only 
a  majority  of  all  these  three  classes  of  persons.^-  The  petition 
need  not  recite  that  it  is  sio-ned  by  a  maioritv  of  the  assessed 
taxpayers;  it  is  sufficient  that  the  order  of  the  board  recite 
fhat  fact."  In  Nebraska  the  homestead,  the  title  to  which 
is  in  the  husband  and  on  which  his  wife  lives,  and  also  when 
the  title  to  it  is  hers,  and  they  live  on  it  jointly  together,  is 
not  a  freehold  withih  the  meaning  of  the  linuor  law.''*  A 
widower  entitled  to  the  use  of  his  deceased  wife's  real  estate 
during  his  life  is  such  a  freeholder  as  may  sign  a  recommenda- 
tion for  a  license.'^  In  Georgia,  a  statute  requiring  a  certain 
number  of  citizens  to  sign  the  petition,  only  voters  are  re- 
garded as  citizens.^*^  A  city  may  adopt  an  ordinance  sT)ecify- 
ing  the  number  of  persons  and  their  qualifications  who  must 
sign  a  petition  for  a  license,  and  it  will  be  bound  thereby  so 
long  as  the  ordinance  is  not  repealed;  and  the  granting  of  a 
license  by  the  common  council  is  not  a  repeal  of  the  ordi- 
nance."    In  South  Africa  the  majority  of  voters  must  be 

purcliase    in   this   case  was   where  Ct.  600;  afiirmed  208  Pa.  St.  578; 

an  owner  of  property   filed  a  pro-  57  Atl.  991. 

test,  and  then  the  applicant  leased  72  state  v.    Fort,   107   IMo.   App. 

of  him  his  premises,  the  payment  328;   81  S.  W.  476. 

of  rent  being   upon  the  condition  ^3  State  v.  Fort,  supra.     Contra, 

that   a   license   be   issued;    and   it  Tanner  v.  Bugg,  74  Mo.  App.  19G. 

was   held   that  the  rent   was  paid  74.Cobbey's     Ann.     St.,     §  717'5; 

to  the  owner  for  his  signature.  Campbell  v.  Moran,  71   Neb.  615; 

cnTheurer  v.  People,  supra;  In  99  N.  W.  498. 

re    McCov,    104    N.    Y.    App.    Div.  7r.  Harlan     v.     State,     136     Ala. 

215;   93  N.  Y.   Supp.   401.  150;   33  So.  858. 

10  In  re  McCoy,  104  N.  Y.  App.  to  Wray    v.    Harrison,    116    Ga. 

Div.  215;  93  N.' Y.  Supp.  401.  93;   42  S.  E.  351. 

71 /»   re    Forest,    23    Pa.    Super.  77Bachman    v.    Phillipsburg,    68 

N.  J.  L.  552;   53  Atl.  620. 


§  375  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  588 

determined  b3'  the  voters'  official  roll,  and  evidence  aliunde  is 
inadmissible.'**  In  Mississippi,  voters  signing  a  petition  must 
be  voters  under  the  constitutional  provision  regarding  the 
payment  of  their  taxes,  but  payment  of  such  taxes  by  the  pro- 
posed licensee,  with  their  consent,  does  not  disqualify  them.'" 
A  statute  provided  that  any  freeholder  M-ho  had  recommended 
a  person  for  a  license  could  not  within  that  year  recommend 
any  other  person,  was  held  to  prevent  him  recommending  any 
other  person  during  any  part  of  the  year  covered  by  the  first 
application.^"  Mere  possession  of  real  estate  does  not  make  a 
person  such  a  freeholder  that  he  may  sign  a  petition.*^  Where 
a  statute  requires  a  signer  of  a  petition  to  read  it  or  have  it 
read  to  him,  a  person  signing  it  who  does  not  read  it,  nor  to 
whom  it  is  read,  cannot  be  counted  as  a  signer ;  ^-  anfl  if  a 
license  be  issued  upon  a  petition  containing  an  insufficient 
number  of  competent  signers,  it  may  be  revoked. ^^  The  hus- 
band owning  land  may  consent,  though  his  wife  does  not  join 
him.^*  Under  the  statute  proof  that  the  signer  is  a  freeholder 
need  not  be  as  conclusive  as  in  an  ejectment  proceeding.^^ 
A  husband  is  not  the  agent  of  his  wife  to  such  an  extent  that 
he  may  give  her  consent  where  he  and  she  hold  an  estate  by 
entireties.*^^  Partners  in  real  estate  must  consent  as  indi- 
viduals and  not  as  partners,  so  that  all  must  sign  the  written 

'■s  Gibson    v.    Manley,    11    Juta,  ho.  filed  "simultaneously"  witli  the 

191.  application;     and    a    consent    filed 

79  Ferguson   v.   Brown,   75   Miss.  with  an  application  by  one  pei-son 
214;  21  So.  603.  cannot  be  used  twenty  days  later 

80  Cope  V.   Soniers   Point,   73  N.  for  an  application  filed  by  another 
J.  L.  376;    64  Atl.  15G.  person.      In   re   Griffin,   56    N.    Y. 

siSwihart    v.    Hansen,    76   Neb.  Misc.  Eep.  21;   106  N.  Y.  Supp.  24. 

727 ;   107  N.  W.  &62.  Signatures    preceding    the    con- 

s- In  re  Veasey    (Del.),  63  Atl.  senting   clause   cannot   be   counted 

SOI.  under     a     statute     requiring     the 

s:!  7n  re  Bullard,  113  N.  Y.  App.  written   consent    to    be    "executed" 

Div.  159;    98  N.  Y.  Supp.   1011.  and   acknowledged   as    a   deed.     In 

^*  In  re  Bullard,  113  N.  Y.  App.  re  Griffin,  supra. 

Div.  159;   98  N.  Y.  Supp.  1011.  so  Quigley  v.  Monsees,  56  N.  Y. 

85  Starkey  V.  Palm,  80  Neb.  393 ;  Misc.   Eep.   110;    106   N.   Y.   Supp. 

114  N.  W.  287.  167. 

In   New  York  the  consent  must 


589  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES.  §  376 

consent."  A  lessee  cannot  give  consent  though  he  represents 
the  owner  as  a  general  real  estate  agent,  and  though  he  may 
also  be  interested  in  the  profits  on  a  sale  of  such  real  estate.^** 
A  lessee  cannot  sign  the  consent  petition.*"  Where  a  statute 
provided  that  if  objections  be  filed  by  the  occupants  or  owners 
of  the  greater  part  of  the  land  within  two  hundred  feet  of 
the  proposed  site  of  the  saloon  no  license  should  be  granted, 
account  must  be  taken  of  a  park  owned  by  the  city,  for  the 
city  is  its  owner  or  occupant  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute ;  ''^  but  the  park  board  could  give  its  assent  thereto  on 
behalf  of  the  city.°^ 

Sec.  376.    Saloon  near  schoolhouse— Distance,  how  measured. 

Statutes  in  several  States  forbid  the  maintenance  of  a  saloon 
within  a  certain  distance  of  a  church  or  place  of  worship; 
and  other  statutes  have  a  like  prohibition  with  relation  to 
colleges  and  schoolhouses.  Likewise  a  few  statutes  may  be 
found  with  similar  prohibitory  clauses  with  reference  to  other 
public  buildings,  as  an  orphan  asylum  or  a  soldiers'  home. 
All  such  statutes  are  constitutional,  and  within  the  circle 
thus  prescribed  no  license  can  be  granted;  and  all  licenses 
attempted  to  be  granted  are  void.**-     The  chief  questions  in 

87  Close  V.  O'Brien,  135  Iowa,  Such  a  law  is  not  a  tax.  In  re 
305;    112   N.   W.    SOO.                                Place,    27    N.    Y.    App.    Div     561; 

88  7n   re   Rupp,   54   X.   Y.   Misc.       50  N.  Y.  Supp.  640. 

Rep.  1;   105  N.  Y.  Supp.  407.  A     law     prohibiting     a     saloon 

89  American  Woolen  Co.  v.  North  within  200  feet  of  a  church  or 
Smithfield,  28  R.  I.  546;  69  Atl.  schoolhouse,  except  in  a  place  oc- 
203;  In  re  Sherry,  25  N.  Y.  Misc.  cupied  by  a  hotel,  was  amended 
Rep.  361;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  421.  by  providing  that   the  prohibition 

90  Dexter  v.  Sprague,  22  R.  1.  should  not  apply  to  a  place  oc- 
324-    47    Atl.   889.  cupied  as  a  hotel  when  the  former 

oiTheuer  v.  People,  211  111.  296;  act  took  effect.     This  was  held  to 

71    N.   E.    997;    affirming    113    111.  be    a    legislative   interpretation   of 

App.   628.  the  first  statute,  which,  therefore. 

Paying  tax  so  voters  could   be-  related  to  a  place  occupied   for   a 

come    qualified    to    sign    petition.  hotel   when   it   took   effect.     In  re 

Ferguson  v.  Brown,  75  Miss.  214;  Place,  supra. 

21    So.    603.  A    license    granted    within     the 

92  Sexton    v.   Board    (X.    J.   L.),  prohibited  area  is  void.     €ommon- 

09    Atl.    470;    State  v.   Pawtucket  wealth  v.  Whelan,   134  Mass.  206. 
(R.   I.),   46   Atl.   1047. 


§  376  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  590 

this  connection  to  be  considered  are  what  buildings  come  within 
the  definitions  of  the  statute  and  by  what  rule  of  measurement 
shall  the  prohibited  distance  be  ascertained.  As  a  rule,  in 
the  case  of  a  church,  little  difficulty  can  arise.  However,  a 
few  cases  of  contest  have  arisen  on  this  point.  Thus,  where 
"Faith  Curists, "  an  organized  body  of  men  and  women,  held 
meetings  for  Bible  study  and  also  for  secular  and  religious 
instruction  of  the  young,  in  a  building  occupied  on  the  first 
floor  in  the  rear  for  storage  purposes,  the  upper  part  as  a 
dwelling,  and  the  front  room  downstairs  for  their  meetings, 
it  was  held  that  such  building  was  not  a  church  nor  did  such 
persons  constitute  a  church  organization  within  the  meaning 
of  a  liquor  statute  forbidding  a  saloon  within  two  hundred 
feet  of  a  church.'''  Some  of  these  statutes  apply  to  camp- 
meetings  or  "incorporated  camp-meetings."  °*  Under  a  statute 
prohibiting  a  saloon  within  a  certain  distance  of  "a  building 
occupied  exclusively  as  a  church,"  a  building  ten  by  sixteen 
feet,  located  on  an  alley  and  occasionally  used  by  an  unincor- 
porated association  for  religious  purposes,  and  which  was 
built  and  used  in  order  to  defeat  the  grant  of  a  license,  the 
society  having  headquarters  elsewhere  in  the  town,  is  not  such 
a  building  as  the  statute  describes.^^  Under  a  statute  pro- 
hibiting a  saloon  within  a  certain  distance  "of  a  building 
occupied  exclusively  as  a  church,"  a  lot  owmed  by  a  religious 
society  on  which  a  building  has  been  commenced  but  not  com- 
pleted does  not  come  within  its  prohibition.^^  But  if  the  main 
floor  of  a  building  is  occupied  exclusively  as  a  church  it  is  a 
church,  notwithstanding  its  basement  may  be  used  by  other 

93  Geo  V.   Board    (N.   J.  L. ),  6.3  also  Foster  v.  Speed   (Tenn.),   Ill 

Ati.   870.  S.  W.  925. 

9*  Sexton   V.   Board    (N.   J.   L. ),  A  camp-meeting  is  "a  place  set 

G9  Atl.  470.  apart  for  the  worship  of  Almiglity 

In  this  case  a  special  city  char-  God."     State  v.  Hall,  2  Bailey   (S. 

ter  empowering  the  city  to  license  C),  151. 

saloons  was  held  to  he  subject  to  ss  /n   re    Vail,    38    N.    Y.    Misc. 

a    previous    general    statute    pro-  Rep.   392;   77   N.  Y.   Supp.   903. 

hibiting    saloons    within   one    mile  06  People  v.  Lammerts,  18  N.  Y. 

of    an    "incorporated    camp-meet-  Misc.    Rep.    343;    40   N.   Y.    Supp. 

ing."     The    camp-meeting    in   this  1107;   In  re  Rupp,  54  N.  Y.  Misc. 

case  was  Asbury  Park,  N.  J.    See  Rep.  1 ;   105  N.  Y.  Supp.  467. 


591  ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES.  §  376 

relig-ious  and  charitable  organizations."^  A  dwelling  house 
was  bought  by  a  society  and  used,  without  alteration,  for 
religious  purposes.  The  pastor  occupied  the  second  story  as  a 
dwelling.  Church  services  and  Sunday-school  were  held  on 
the  parlor  floor.  A  woman  with  her  children  occupied  the 
third  floor,  and  to  some  extent  superintended  the  work  on  the 
premises.  It  was  held  that  this  was  not  a  building  used 
"exclusively  as  a  church"  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.''^ 
But  in  the  case  of  a  Jewish  synagogue,  where  the  upper  floor 
was  used  exclusively  for  church  purposes,  the  lower  floor  for 
Sunday-school  services  and  as  a  meeting  place  of  three  lodges 
of  a  benevolent  and  fraternal  character,  each  of  which  paid 
rent  to  the  synagogue,  the  membership  in  the  lodges  being 
limited  to  Jews  by  birth,  though  not  to  members  of  the  con- 
gregation, it  was  held  that  the  building  was  "exclusively  occu- 
pied as  a  church. ' '  ^^  The  occupation  of  the  basement  of  a 
church  by  societies  of  a  charitable,  literary  and  patriotic  char- 
acter, at  various  fixed  times,  their  membership  being  prin- 
cipally composed  of  members  of  the  congregation,  and  the 
object  being  to  raise  money  for  the  church,  will  not  deprive 
the  building  of  its  characteristics  as  a  church.^  Upon  the 
question  of  a  cancellation  of  a  license  because  issued  within 
too  close  a  distance  of  a  church,  it  is  immaterial  how  long  it 
has  been  or  will  be  used  as  a  church,  if  it  was  so  used  before 
the  application  for  a  license  was  made.-  In  all  these  instances 
the  question  of  distance  is  usually  the  chief  one  discussed. 
Where  a  statute  forbade  the  issuance  of  a  license  within  two 
hundred  feet  of  the  curtilage  of  a  church  edifice,  it  was  held 
that  the  measurement  must  be  made  from  its  nearest  point  to 
the  nearest  point  of  the  premises  to  be  licensed,  although  the 
entrance  to  the  latter  building  was  more  than  two  hundred 
feet  from  the  church's  curtilage.^     Where  the  limit  was  two 

97  In  re  Zinow,   18   N.  Y.  Misc.  i  hi    re   Liquor   Tax    Certificate, 
Rep.  653;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  714.             23  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  446;  51  N.  Y. 

98  7n  re  Finley,  58   N.  Y.  Misc.       Supp.   281. 

Rep.  639;    110  N.  Y.  Supp.  71.  -In  re  Korndorfer    (N.  Y.),   49 

99 /n    re    McCusker,    47    N.    Y.       JST.  Y.  Supp.  559. 
App.  Div.  Ill;  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  201.  3  Lanning  v.   Board    (N.  J.  L.), 

68  Atl.  1083. 


§  376  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  592 

hundred  feet  from  a  church,  it  Avas  held  that  closing  the 
entrance  to  the  saloon  and  making  anotlier  next  the  street 
and  more  than  that  distance  from  the  church  did  not  make  it 
lawful  to  maintain  the  saloon.*  "Where  the  entrance  to  the 
church  must  be  two  hundred  feet  from  a  saloon,  then  any 
saloon  within  a  circle  having  such  entrance  as  its  center  and 
a  radius  of  two  hundred  feet  will  forbid  its  maintenance.''^ 
In  determining  the  distance  between  the  nearest  entrance  of 
the  church  and  the  saloon  the  shortest  and  most  direct  dis- 
tance between  the  two  points  must  be  taken,  without  regard  to 
the  way  the  streets  run  between  them.^  Such  is  the  case 
under  an  act  of  Congress  '^  forbidding  the  sale  of  liquor  within 
one  mile  of  the  soldiers'  home  property  located  in  the  District 
of  Columbia — the  measurement  to  be  made  in  a  level  plane 
from  the  outside  walls  of  the  enclosure  in  a  straight  line,  and 
not  by  the  shortest  avenue  of  travel  between  the  nearest 
entrance  and  the  place  to  be  licensed.^  In  the  case  of  a  church 
it  was  held  from  the  nearest  point  of  the  church  edifice.'' 
If  there  is  any  serious  doubt  which  of  two  places  is  the  actual 
entrance,  the  courts  will  usually  hold  that  the  one  within  the 
prohibited  distance  is  the  one  and  prohibit  the  maintenance 
of  the  saloon.^''  Where  a  special  statute  forbade  the  sale  of 
liquor  within  three  miles  of  a  specially  named  church,  and 
after  its  enactment  a  new  church  building  was  erected,  it  was 
held  that  the  new  building  must  be  accepted  as  the  point 

*/n  re  Zinzow,   18  N.   Y.  Misc.  137  Mass.   572;    Commonwealth  v. 

Eep.  653;   43  N.  Y.  Supp.   714.  Heaganey,    137    Mass.   574;    In  re 

5  In  re  Cheney,   35  N.  Y.   Misc.  Lewis,   26   X.  Y.   Misc.   Eep.   532; 
Eep.    598;    72   N.    Y.    Supp.    134;  57   N.   Y.   Supp.    676. 

Meyer  v.   Baker,   120   111.  567;    12  7  26   U.   S.   Stat,   at  Large,   797. 

K.   E.   79 ;    Kramer    v.   Marks,   64  s  United    States    v.   Johnson,    12 

Pa.  St.  151.  App.   D.   C.   92;   In  re  Veeder,   31 

6  7m   re   Liquor   Tax    Certificate,  N.   Y.   Misc.    Eep.   569;    65   N.   Y. 
23  N.  Y.  Misc.  Eep.  446;  51  N.  Y.  Supp.    517. 

Supp.      281;      Commonwealth      v.  o  Geo   v.   Board    (X.   J.   L.),   63 

Jones,    143    Mas^.    573;     8    X.    E.  Atl.   870. 

603;    In  re    Liquor   Locations,    13  lo/n  re  Finley,  58  X.   Y.  Misc. 

E.   I.   733;    Commonwealth   v.   Ev-  Eep.    639;     110    X.    Y.    Supp.    71. 

tr.son,    140    Mass.    434;     5    X.    E.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Whelan,  134 

155;     Commonwealth    v.    Jenkins,  Mass.  206. 


593 


ISSUANCE    01'\  LI'JENSES. 


§377 


from  which  to  begin  the  measurement  of  the  three  mile  limit.'' 
If  the  statute  prohibits  sales  within  three  miles  of  two 
churches,  then  a  sale  within  the  limit  of  one  of  them  though 
more  than  three  miles  from  the  other  is  prohibited.'^  Where 
the  statute  forbids  sales  within  three  miles  of  a  named  rail- 
road during  its  construction,  the  zone  covered  by  this  three 
miles  was  construed  to  be  a  moving  one  and  to  apply  only  to 
that  part  of  the  road  under  construction  for  the  time  being.''' 
Subterfuges  to  evade  the  statute  are  usually  unsuccessful. 
Thus,  where  a  person  licensed  to  sell  liquor  just  beyond  the 
prescribed  limits,  cut  an  opening  between  it  and  his  adjoining 
building  and  rented  the  latter  for  saloon  purposes,  it  was  held 
that  this  was  a  clear  invasion  of  the  terms  of  the  statute.'* 


Sec.  377.     Saloon  near  schoolhouse. 

Where  a  statute  forbade  sales  within  a  certain  distance  of 
any  academy,  university  or  institution  of  learning,  it  was 
held  that  it  did  not  apply  to  a  public  school  supported  by  the 


instate  V.  Eaves,  106  N.  C.  752 
11  S.  E.  370. 

12  Carlisle  v.    State,  91   Ala.    1; 
8  So.  386. 

13  State  V.  Hampton,  77  N.  C. 
52G. 

While  a  number  of  the  cases 
cited  are  instances  of  illegal  sales, 
yet  they  are  applicable  to  the 
granting  of  licenses;  for  as  the 
sales  were  prohibited  by  statute, 
no  license  could  make  them  legal. 
Alvon  V.  Pawtucket  (R.  I.),  16 
Atl.    1047. 

i*7n  re  Place,  27  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  561;    50  N.  Y.  Supp.  640. 

A  statute  forbidding  the  grant- 
ing of  a  license  to  sell  liquors  in 
a  place  of  amusement,  does  not 
forbid  the  granting  of  a  license 
for  a  part  of  the  premises  not 
having     any     communication     be- 


tween it  and  the  other  part.  In 
re  Martz,  12  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  521. 
In  Rhode  Island  a  statute  for- 
bade the  granting  of  a  license  for 
a  saloon  where  the  owners  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  land  within 
200  feet  of  the  site  objected.  This 
was  held  to  include  land  in  an- 
other State  within  the  two  hun- 
dred feet  limit;  and  objections 
filed  by  those  residing  in  the 
granting  State  owning  the  greater 
part  of  the  land  within  200  feet 
was  not  sufficient.  American 
Woolen  Co.  v.  North  Smithfield, 
28  R.  I.  546;    6'8  Atl.  719. 

An  ordinance  which  provides 
that  no  new  saloon  should  be  lo- 
cated within  500  feet  of  a  church, 
hut  leaves  the  old  saloons  free  to 
carry  on  the  business,  is  void. 
Mandeville  v.  Bard,  111  La.  806; 
35  So.  915. 


§377 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


594 


State,  even  though  taught  in  a  building  formerly  used  as  a 
college.^^  A  school  building  having  a  library  room  in  which 
charitable,  temperance  and  religious  societies  meet,  paying  a 
nominal  rent,  is  still  a  building  occupied  "exclusively"  as  a 
schoolhouse.^"  In  some  States,  even  though  no  statute  cover 
the  subject,  the  licensing  board  may  refuse  a  license  for  a 
saloon  to  be  located  near  a  public  school/'  Where  a  statute 
forbids  the  location  of  a  saloon  within  two  hundred  feet  of  a 
parochial  or  public  school,  nor  "in  such  proximity  to  a  char- 
itable institution  as  may  be  detrimental  to  the  same,"  a 
parochial  school  supported  by  private  funds  is  such  an  institu- 
tion as  the  statute  covers/**  Under  such  a  statute  the  licensing 
board  have  a  discretion  to  renew  a  license  where  the  statute 
permits  a  renewal ;  but  it  is  held  that  no  place  is  suitable  for 
a  saloon  which  is  so  near  a  charitable  institution  building  that 


isBlackwell    v.    State,    36    Ark. 
178. 

16  7n  re  Lyman,  48  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  275 ;  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  846. 

17  7n  re  Curtin,  19  Vict.  L.  R. 
12;  14  Austr.  L.  T.  228;  Eslinger 
V.  East,  100  Ind.  434.  "In  de- 
termining the  fitness  or  unfitness 
of  an  applicant,  it  was  proper  for 
the  board  of  commissioners  to  take 
into  account  the  place  where  he 
desired  to  sell  intoxicating 
liquors,  its  proximity  to  the  court 
house,  schoolhouse,  churches  and 
all  other  surroundings,  for  the 
reason  that  it  might  be  that  only 
a  man  possessed  of  an  extraordi- 
nary degree  of  circumspection  and 
caution  could  fitly  conduct  the 
business  at  that  place  on  account 
of  the  situation  and  surround- 
iiigs."  State  v.  Gerhardt,  145  Ind. 
439;  44  N.  E.  469;  Haggart  v. 
Stethlin,  137  Ind.  43;  35  N.  E. 
997;  22  L.  R.  A.  577;  Harrison 
V.  People,  222  111.  150;  78  N.  E. 
52;  Queen  v.  McPheraon,  24  Nov. 


Sco.    378;    In   re   Quinn,    32    Nov. 
Sco.   542. 

The  same  rule  was  applied  to 
a  reformatory  for  girls,  though 
there  was  a  wall  ten  feet  high 
between  the  saloon  site  and  the 
reformatory  grounds.  Kretzmann 
V.  Dunne,  228  111.  31;  81  N.  E. 
790;    affirming   130   111.   App.   469. 

Under  a  power  enabling  a  park 
board  to  forbid  any  ofTensive  busi- 
ness within  a  certain  distance  of 
a  park,  it  may  forbid  a  saloon. 
In  re  Arszman,  40  Ind.  App.  218; 
81   N.  E.  680. 

A  statute  prohibiting  sales  of 
liquor  within  half  a  mile  of  any 
"building  premises  or  land,"  oc- 
cupied by  a  State  hospital,  in- 
cludes a  garden  kept  by  the  State 
hospital  on  contiguous  premises 
owned  by  it.  Such  a  statute  is 
liberally  construed.  In  re  Brady 
(N.  Y.),  106  N.  Y.  Supp.  921. 

18  Appeal  of  Schusler,  81  Conn. 
276;   70  Atl.  1029. 


595  ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES.  §  377 

it  will  be  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  institution;  and 
the  fact  that  the  site  for  the  parochial  school  was  bought  after 
the  saloon  had  been  located  did  not  deprive  the  licensing 
board  of  its  power  to  refuse  to  renew  the  license. ^^  A  saloon 
and  a  sehoolhouse  were  situated  within  a  triangle  formed  by 
three  streets,  A,  B  and  C.  and  within  four  hundred  feet  of 
each  other.  The  saloon  stood  on  a  lot  on  C  street,  and  this 
lot  ran  through  to  A  street,  the  latter  having  a  lower  grade 
than  C  street,  so  that  there  was  a  cellar  basement  in  the 
building  with  doors  opening  into  the  lot  on  A  street  side, 
where  the  building  was  thirty  feet  distant  from  the  street. 
The  barroom  in  the  building  opened  into  a  common  hallway, 
from  which  stairs  led  into  the  basement.  The  sehoolhouse 
faced  an  angle  made  by  the  junction  of  A  and  B  streets,  and 
had  entrances  from  both,  the  lot  being  inclosed  by  a  fence 
with  a  gate  at  the  entrance  from  each  street.  It  was  held 
that  it  was  competent  for  the  .jury  to  find  that  the  saloon  and 
sehoolhouse  were  on  the  same  street,  and  that  being  true  they 
were  within  less  than  four  hundred  feet  of  each  other.-** 
Where  a  statute  forbade  the  location  of  a  saloon  within  two 
hundred  feet  of  a  sehoolhouse,  but  provided  that  it  should 
not  apply  to  buildings  then  in  existence  and  used  respectively 
for  school  and  saloon  purposes,  and  the  business  of  saloon 
keeping  in  the  building  having  been  abandoned,  after  the 
passage  of  the  statute,  by  the  proprietor,  who  was  a  lessee  of 
the  building  and  who  removed  therefrom  leaving  such  build- 
ing vacant,  it  was  held  that  thereafter  a  new  saloon  could  not 
be  established  in  such  building,  not  coming  within  its  ex- 
ception.-' Such  a  statute  does  not  apply  to  a  nurse  training 
school.-- 

19  Appeal  of  Schusler,  supra.  21  /,}  re  Lewis,   26   N.   Y.   Misc. 
Evidence    of    a    renewal    of    an-       Rep.    532;    57    N.    Y.    Supp.    676. 

other  license  for  a  place  near  the  See   also   In  re  Heming    (N.   Y.), 

school   was   held   in   this   case   im-  117   N.  Y.   Supp.  747. 

material;    for   the   board   was   un-  What    evidence    is    sufficient    to 

fettered   by    what    had    been    done  show  a  school  is  a  public  school, 

in   dealing  with   any  other  appli-  see  Commonwealth  v.  Whelan,  134 

cant   for    a   renewal.  Mass.  206. 

20  Commonwealth    v.    Heaganey,  --  flatter   of   Townsend,    129   N. 
137   Mass.  574.  Y.  App.  Div.  909;   114  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1149. 


§§  378,  379      TRiVFFic  in  intoxicating  liquors.  596 

Sec.  378.     Saloon  near  fair  or  factory. 

Where  a  statute  forbade  sales  within  a  certain  distance  of 
an  agricultural  fair,  it  was  said  that  a  place  where  manu- 
factured and  agricultural  products  were  received  and  placed 
on  exhibition  for  the  purpose  of  awarding  premiums  for  their 
excellence  was  an  agricultural  fair,  although  conducted  for  a 
profit.-^  Inasmuch,  however,  as  an  agricultural  fair  is  of  a 
temporary  character,  the  question  whether  a  license  shall  be 
granted  within  a  certain  distance  of  it  is  not  covered  by 
statutes ;  it  is  usually  a  sale  of  lic^uor  within  a  certain  distance 
that  is  prohibited;  and  when  that  is  the  case  even  a  licensed 
saloon  keeper  may  not  sell  liquor  when  the  fair  is  being  held.-* 
Where  a  statute  forbade  sales  within  a  prescribed  distance  of 
a  factory,  and  a  mortgage  on  it  was  foreclosed  and  the  factory 
sold  to  others,  the  prohibition  was  held  to  still  continue,  not 
being  personal  to  the  original  ownership.-^ 

Sec.  379.     Saloon  in  resident  part  of  city. 

Statutes  occasionally  are  enacted  forbidding  the  location  of 
a  saloon  in  a  residence  part  of  a  city  or  town.  Thus,  a  statute 
authorized  a  municipality  to  exclude  sales  of  liquors  from 
"the  suburban  or  residence  portion  of  such  city,  and  confine 
the  places  where  such  sales  may  be  made  to  the  business  por- 
tion of  such  city,"  and  an  ordinance  adopted  in  pursuance  of 
this  power  thus  given  declared  that  it  should  "be  unlawful 
for  any  person  or  persons  to  sell  any  intoxicating  liquors  to  be 
used  in  or  upon  the  premises  in  the  residence  portion  of  said 
city  of  Muncie,  but  all  such  sales  shall  be  excluded  from  such 
portions  of  such  city,  and  all  places  where  such  sales  may  be 
made  shall  be  confined  to  the  business  portion  thereof."  The 
statute  was  not  questioned,  but  the  ordinance,  it  was  con- 
tended, was  invalid  because  vague,  and  because  it  did  not 
define  the  residence  and  business  portions  of  the  city.  The 
court,  however,  did  not  agree  with  the  contention,  holding 
the  ordinance  valid,  and  also  holding  that  what  was  a  resi- 

23  state    V.    Long,    48    Ohio    St.  24  Heck    v.    State,    44    Ohio    St. 

609;  28  N.  E.  1038.  536;   9  N.  E.  305. 

26  Ashurst  V.  State,  79  Ala,  276. 


597  ISSUANCE    OP    LICENSES.  §  379 

dence  portion  of  a  city  was  a  question  of  fact  for  the 
court ;  and  the  same  was  true  of  the  business  portion.-*'  In  a 
subsequent  case  the  ordinance  defined  the  resident  and  busi- 
ness portions  of  the  city  by  specific  boundaries;  and  it  was 
held  that  the  city  could  do  this,  but  it  was  also  held  that  the 
ordinance  was  only  prima  facie  evidence  of  what  territory 
within  the  resident  boundaries  was  a  resident  territory,  and 
that  evidence  was  admissible  to  show  that  it  was  not,  the  coun- 
cil not  being-  able  to  define  conclusively  what  was  and  what  was 
not  the  resident  portion  of  a  city.  The  court  took  occasion  to 
say  that  the  words  "residence"  and  "suburban"  did  not 
mean  the  same  thing,  saying:  "The  suburban  portion  of  a 
city  is  the  outlying  part,  that  portion  which  is  remote  from 
the  center  of  trade  and  population,  where  the  houses  are, 
generally,  more  or  less  scattered,  and  where  many  of  the  im- 
provements and  advantages  enjoyed  by  the  central  and  more 
densely  populated  parts  of  the  city  are  wanting.  The 
suburban  part  of  a  city  may  be  used  for  business,  or  it  may 
be  occupied  by  residences,  or  it  may  be  used  for  both  resi- 
dence and  business  purposes.  But  in  either  case,  police  sur- 
veillance and  protection  are  usually  less  thorough  and  efficient 
than  in  the  central  parts  of  the  city,  and,  however  occupied, 
the  same  reasons  exist  for  excluding  from  such  portions  of 
the  city  places  of  resort  and  offensive  occupations  which  may 
breed  disorder  and  threaten  the  quiet  and  safety  of  the  neigh- 
borhood.""^ Where  a  statute  foi-bade  the  granting  of  a 
license  for  a  saloon  to  be  located  in  a  "purely  residential  part 
of  a  town,"  it  was  held  a  portion  of  a  street,  eleven  hundred 
feet  long,  having-  thereon  fifty-eight  buildings,  such  portion 
of  the  street  being  very  thickly  settled,  the  houses  small  and 
for  the  most  part  occupied  by  Italians  and  negroes,  this  por- 
tion of  the  street  containing  four  small  groceries  in  buildings 
occupied  also  as  dwellings,  and  also  containing  two  licensed 
saloons,  was  not  such  a  portion  of  the  city  as  the  statute 
defined.-^ 

26  Shea  V.  Muncie,   W^   Ind.   14:  27  Rowland    v.    Greencastle,    157 

4G   N.   E.    13S.  Tiid.   591;    62  N.   ¥..   474. 

Such  a  statute  is  constitutional.  2s  Appeal    of    Hewitt,    70    Conn. 

Andreas   v.   Beaumont    (Tex.   Civ.  085;    58    Atl.   231. 

App.),   113   S.   W.  614.  As     to     discrimination     in     the 


§  380  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  598 

Sec.  380.     Moral   qualification   of   applicant. 

Statutes  not  infrequently  require  the  licensee  to  be  a  man 
of  good  moral  character,-^  or  forbid  the  granting  of  a  license 
to  a  person  not  fit  to  be  entrusted  with  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors,  or  to  a  person  in  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated. 
Such  is  the  case  in  Indiana.'*'  Under  the  Indiana  statute  the 
fitness  of  the  applicant  is  a  question  of  fact,"^  and  a  witness 
cannot  usurp  the  right  of  the  court  or  board  or  jury  hearing 
the  application  by  stating  that  the  applicant  is  or  is  not  a 
fit  person.-''^  The  applicant's  unfitness  may  be  proven  by 
specific  acts  of  immorality  and  by  the  kind  of  saloon  he 
formerly  kept  or  is  then  keeping.^^  It  may  be  shown  that  he 
has  violated  the  criminal  laws  of  the  State.^*  But  a  single  con- 
viction of  an  applicant  of  having  violated  the  liquor  laws 
does  not  necessarily  show  that  he  is  an  unfit  person  to  be 
licensed."'^  Immoral  conduct  covers  other  kinds  of  immorality 
than  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated  and  may  be  made  the 
grounds  of  a  remonstrance.^'^  Thus,  as  bearing  on  this  ques- 
tion, it  may  be  shown  that  the  saloon  will  be  located  near  a 
school  or  college,  as  evidence  from  which  the  court  or  jury 
may  determine  of  his  fitness  to  there  sell  liquors. ^'^  But  the 
court  cannot  say  to  a  jury  trying  the  question  that  a  single 

amount  of  licenses  between  places  34  Groscup   v.   Rainier,   111    Ind. 

being   void,   see    Howard    v.    State  361;    12    X.    E.    694;    Bronson    v. 

(Fla.),  47  So.  963.  Dunn,  124  Ind.  252;  24  N.  E.  749; 

29  Character  means  the  estima-  Hardestj'  v.  Hine,  135  Ind.  72;  34 
tion  in  which  a  man  is  held  by  N.  E.  701;  Bourjohn's  Applica- 
those  who  are  acquainted  with  tion,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  33;  Meitz- 
him.  Leader  v.  Yell,  33  L.  J.  M.  ler's  Application,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
C,  p.  233.  Rep.  37 ;  Appeal  of  Wright,  1  Wil- 

30  Burns    R.    S.    1008,    §§8319,  cox,   85. 

8324.  35  Golden    v.    Bingham,    61    Ind. 

31  Reiser  v.  Lines,  57  Ind.  431;  198.  But  frequent  violations  are 
Ilardesty  v.  Hine,  135  Ind.  72;  34  sufficient.  In  re  Quirck,  17  Pa. 
K   E.   701;    Pelley   v.   White,    14]  Co.    Ct.   Rep.   327. 

Ind.  688;   41  Ind.  354.  36  Grummon   v.   Holmes,  76  Ind. 

32  Stockwell  v.  Brent,  97  Ind.  58o;  Groscup  v.  Rainier,  111  Ind. 
474.  361;    12  N.  E.  694. 

33  Stockwell  v.  Brent,  97  Ind.  37  Eslinger  v.  East,  100  Ind.  434, 
474;    Bolton    v.    Hegner,  82    Neb. 

772;    118  N.  W.   1096. 


599  ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES,  §  380 

act  of  intoxication  shows  such  immoral  conduct  as  renders  the 
applicant  unfit ;  nor  does  it,  in  fact,  show  him  to  be  a  person 
in  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated.^*'  Occasional  drinking 
does  not  show  the  applicant  is  an  unfit  person  to  be  licensed.^" 
If  trial  of  the  applicant's  fitness  is  had  bj'^  a  jury,  then  the 
court  must  not  instruct  the  jury  what  is  necessary  to  show 
him  to  be  a  fit  man  to  be  licensed,  for  that  is  a  question  for 
the  jury.*"  The  burden  is  upon  the  applicant  to  show  that 
he  is  not  an  immoral  man  and  that  he  is  not  in  the  habit  of 
becoming  intoxicated,  though  that  involves  proof  of  a  nega- 
tive; and  he  must  produce  evidence  of  those  facts  if  he 
desires  to  secure  a  license  unless  it  is  waived  or  the  facts  are 
admitted.*^  And  if  he  shows  himself  to  be  such  a  man  he  is 
entitled  to  his  license;*-  and  it  cannot  be  denied  him  upon 
the  gTound  that  anj-  man  who  will  engage  in  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  is  an  immoral  man.*^  A  common  gambler 
or  a  man  who  frequents  gambling  houses  may  be  denied  a 
license,  although  not  specified  under  the  statute  referred  to 
as  one  of  the  causes  for  refusing  him  a  license;  but  such  con- 
duct may  be  regarded  as  acts  of  immorality."  If  two  petition 
for  a  license,  the  fact  that  one  absconds  does  not  necessarily 
defeat  the  application  of  the  other.*^  Habitual  violations  of 
the  liquor  law  are  sufficient  to  defeat  the  applieation,**^  as 
are  repeated  violations  of  the  criminal  laws  of  the  State. *^  In 
Nebraska  the  statute  makes  an  applicant  unfit  to  receive  a 

38  Lynch  v.  Bates,  139  Ind.  206;  43  A    juror    so    thinking    is    in- 

38  N.  E.  806.  competent   to   sit   on   the   trial   of 

"9  Calder   v.    Sheppard,    61    Ind.  the  application.     Chandler  v.  Rue- 

219.  belt,  83  Ind.  139. 

40 Reiser  v.  Lines,  57   Ind.  431;  ■"  Groscap   v.   Rainier,    111    Ind. 

Hardesty    v.    Hine,    135    Ind.    72;  361;    12   N.   E.   694;    Stockwell   v. 

34  N.  E.  701;  Pelly  v.  Willis,  141  Brent,  97  Ind.  474. 

Ind.  688;  41  N.  E.  354.  45  Polk   Co.   v.   Johnson,  21    Fla. 

41  Goodwin    v.    Smith,    72    Ind.  578. 

113;   Castle   v.    Bell,    145   Ind.   8;  4g  Brunson    v.    Dunn,    124    Ind. 

44  N.  E.  2;   Chandler  v.  Ruebelt,  252;  24  K  E.  740. 

63    Ind.    139;    Regina   v.    Pilgrim,  47  Bourjohn's  Application,  2  Pa. 

L.  R.  6  Q.  B.   96;    35   J.  P.    169;  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  33;   Meitzler's  Appli- 

40  L.  J.  M.   V.'.   3;   23  L.   T.   410;  cation,    2    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    Rep.    37; 

19  W.  R.  99.  Bolton    v.    Becker,    82    Neb.    772; 

42  Miller   v.    Wade.    58    Ind.    91.  119  N.  W.  14. 


§381 


TRAI'FIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS, 


600 


license  if  within  a  year  before  his  application  he  has  violated 
the  liquor  law  in  a  single  instance ;  and  under  it  a  single  sale 
to  an  habitual  drunkard  is  sufficient  to  defeat  the  applica- 
tion ;  *^  and  other  things  tending  to  show  the  applicant 's  unfit- 
ness may  be  shown,  though  not  enumerated  in  the  statute.*^ 
It  may  be  shown  that  the  applicant  jDermitted  gambling  to  be 
carried  on  in  his  premises,  or  gamblers  and  dissolute  persons 
to  frequent  there/**  or  kept  gambling  instruments.'^  It  is  not 
a  sufficient  reason,  however,  for  refusing  a  license,  that  a 
former  proprietor  had  violated  the  law.'-  If  a  corporation 
can  be  licensed,  the  moral  character  of  the  applicant  is  not  a 
question  to  be  considered.'^^  If  the  licensing  board  improperly 
grant  a  license  where  the  applicant  has  violated  the  law  that 
does  not  prevent  it  denying  a  second  application  because  of 
such  violation.'* 


Sec.  381.     Residence  of  applicant. 

Statutes  require,  often,  that  the  applicant  be  a  resident  or 
inhabitant  of  the  State,  or  even  of  the  licensing  district;  and 
that  is  a  jurisdictional  fact  which  either  gives  or  withholds 


48  state  V.  Kaso,  2.5  Xeb.  607 : 
41  X.  W.  558;  State  v.  Cass  Co., 
12  Xeb.  54;  10  X.  W.  571;  Liv- 
ingston V.  Corey,  33  Xeb.  366 ; 
50  X.  W.  363;  In  re  Phillips,  82 
Xeb.  45;    118  X.  W.   1098. 

40  State  V.  Hanlon,  24  Xeb.  608 ; 
.•59  X.  W.   780. 

soStockwell  V.  Brent,  97  Incl. 
474;  Bolton  v.  Hegner,  82  Neb. 
772;  118  X.  W.  1096;  Hardesty 
■V.  Hine,  135  Ind.  72;  34  X.  E. 
701 ;  Woods  V.  Garvey,  82  Xeb. 
776;    118  X.   W.    1114. 

siPelley  v.  Wills,  141  Ind.  688: 
41   X.  E.   354. 

^-  Appeal  of  Dorbemeck,  1  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  99;   38  WTcly.  X.  C.  90. 

53  In  re  Prospect  Brewing  Co., 
127  Pa.  523;  17  Atl.  1090;  24  W. 
N.  C.  177. 


54  Louisville  v.  Hendricks  (Ky.), 
116  S.  W.  747.  In  this  ease  it 
was  held  that  a  board  was  not 
justified  in  rejecting  an  applica- 
tion because  the  applicant  had 
kejit  a  disorderly  house  on  one 
day  by  permitting  disorderly  per- 
sons engaged  in  election  frauds 
to  assemble  on  election  day  in  his 
saloon;  for  the  keeping  of  a  dis- 
orderly house  on  one  day  was  not 
evidence  that  a  disorderly  house 
was  kept  within  the  statute;  see 
also  United  States  v.  Johnson,  12 
App.  D.  C.  545. 

Where  the  applicant  must  be  a 
taxpaying  male  citizen,  that  fact 
he  must  show  to  get  a  license. 
State  V.  Cooper  County,  66  Mo. 
App.    96, 


601  ISSUANCE    OP    LICENSES  §  382 

jurisdiction  to  or  from  the  licensing  board.  A  license 
granted  in  violation  of  the  statute  in  this  respect  is  void,  not 
voidable,  although  if  granted  the  presumption  is  that  the 
licensee  was  a  proper  person  to  receive  it.^^ 

Sec.  382.     Remonstrance. 

The  form  and  substance  of  a  remonstrance  is  seldom  regu- 
lated by  statute ;  but  the  terms  of  the  statute  not  infrequently 
require  certain  specifications  to  be  made  in  order  to  defeat  a 
license.  Of  course,  the  remonstrance  must  be  presented  to  the 
licensing  board,  and  not  infrequently  it  must  be  filed  a  certain 
length  of  time  before  the  date  of  hearing.  This  is  eminently 
fair;  for,  as  the  remonstrance  usually  brings  forward  new 
matter — matter  not  stated  in  the  application,  or  only  inci- 
dentally stated— the  applicant  ought  to  be  given  time  to  meet 
the  charges  made  in  it  against  him.  Where  a  statute  required 
that  an  application  for  a  license  should  lie  over  for  a  month 
"for  consideration  and  the  reception  of  counter  petitions,"  it 
was  held  that  after  the  month  thus  rcciuired  a  counter  petition 
may  be  presented,  but  it  must  be  done  before  the  license  is 
granted."'"  Nor  can  a  remonstrance  be  filed  on  appeal ;  "  but 
it  may  be  amended  by  making  the  objections  more  specific  and 
by  adding  new  specifications  under  the  original  objections, 
where  no  new  parties  are  introduced.^**     If  there  be  only  a 

55McGee  v.  Beal,  03  Miss.  455;  fnd.   App.   329;    (v8  N.  E.  929;    70 

People    V.    Davis,    45    Barb.    494;  N.     E.     999.        Sunday     must     be 

36  N.  Y.  77.    iSee  State  v.  Cooper  counted     as     a    day.       Shaffer     v. 

County,  66  Mo.   App.  96;   and  In  Stern,    160    Ind.    375;    66    N.    E. 

re   Burns    (Ind.),    87    N.   E.    1028.  1004;   Lee  v.  Scliull    (Ind.),  88  N. 

56  Rogers     v.     Hahn,     '63     Miss.  E.  521. 
'578;     Flynn    v.    Taylor,    145    Ind.  "'7  Miller    v.    Wade,   58   Ind.   91; 

633-     44    N.    E.    540;    Conwell    v.  List  v.  Padgett,  !)6  Ind.  120;  Sana- 

Overmeyer,    145    Ind.    698;    44    N.  sack  v.  Aden.   108  Ind.  5.59;  78  N. 

E.    548;    Vanderlip    v.    Derby,    19  E.   675;    79   N.   E.   457;    80  N.   E. 

Neb.    165;    26   N.   W.   707.  151 ;  State  v.  Gorman,  171  Ind.  58; 

Where    a    statute    allows    a    re-  85  N.  E.  763. 
monstrance   to   be   filed  on    a   cer-  ss  Stockwell    v.    Brent,    97    Ind. 

tain  day,   a   remonstrator  has  the  474;    Hardesty    v.    Hine,    135    Ind. 

whole   of  such   day   to   file  his   re-  72;   34  N.  E.  701;  Bryan  v.  Jones, 

monstrance,   up   to   twelve   o'clock,  34  Ind.  App.  701;    73  N.  E.   113*5. 
midnight.    Sexton  v.  Goodwine,  33 


§  382  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  602 

single  remonstrator  and  he  dismiss  his  remonstrance  on  appeal, 
a  new  party  cannot  then  appear  and  file  a  new  remonstrance,^'' 
nor,  in  fact,  sign  the  old  remonstrance  and  thus  make  it  his 
oAvn.  Resistance  against  the  granting  of  a  license  can  only  be 
made  by  a  remonstrance ;  "^  and  a  remonstrance  can  only  be 
filed  for  the  causes  specified  in  the  statute.®^  Its  sufficiency 
may  be  tested  by  a  demurrer  for  want  of  necessary  allegations 
of  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  remonstrance,  but  not  by  a 
motion  to  strike  it  from  the  files.*^-  The  allegations  of  a 
remonstrance  should  be  specific,  not  general.  They  must  set 
forth  the  particulars  wherein  the  applicant  is  not  entitled  to 
a  license.  Thus,  to  remonstrate  simply  "on  account  of  im- 
morality" is  not  a  sufficient  allegation.  "This  may  mean  the 
immorality  of  the  applicant  or  the  immorality  of  the  traffic. 
A  remonstrance  on  the  immorality  of  the  applicant,  or  of  his 
unfitness  otherwise  to  be  entrusted  with  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  ought  to  set  forth  the  particulars  of  the 
immorality  imputed  to  him,  of  his  unfitness  otherwise,  with 
such  reasonable  degree  of  certainty  as  will  advise  him  of  the 
nature  of  the  charge  against  him,  so  that  he  may  be  able  to 
meet  it."^"  This  ruling  was  made,  it  should  be  observed, 
where  the  applicant  for  a  license  must  have  been  "a  fit  person 
to  be  entrusted  with  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor,"  and 
"not  in  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated."*^*  The  remon- 
strance must  be  directed  against  the  granting  of  a  license  to  a 
particular  person,  and  it  cannot  be  made  against  the  granting 
of  any  license ;  '^'^  but  a  remonstrance  against  the  granting  of 
a  license  to  "J  W   or   any   applicant"   is   good   as  against 

59  Miller    v.    Wade,    58    Ind.    91.  121;    38  N.   E.   472;    Ehrenfied   v. 

GO  Ex  parte  Miller,  98  Ind.  451;  Kenncy,    14  N.   Z.   L.   R.    19. 

State    V.    Moniteau,    45    Mo.    App.  63  Grummon  v.  Holmes,  76  Ind. 

387.  585. 

ci  Gates  v.  Hern,   150   Ind.  370;  64  Groscup   v.   Rainier,    111    Ind. 

50  N.  E.  299;   State  v.  Moniteau,  301;     12    N.    E.   ■694;    Watkins   v. 

45  Mo.  App.  387;   In  re  Justin,  2  Grieser,  11  Okla.  302;  m  Pac.  332. 

Pa.     Co.     Ct.     Rep.     22.       Contra,  63  State    v.    Gerharat,    145    Ind. 

Watkins  v.  Grieser,  11   Okla.  302;  439;    44    N.    E.    469;    Massey    v. 

66  Pac.   332.  Dunlap.    146    Ind.    350;    44    N.    E. 

62  Fletcher    v.    Crist,    139    Ind.  641;   Pize  v.  Eraser,  17  Ont.  Rep. 

635. 


603  ISSUANCE   OP  LICENSES.  §  382 

"J.  W."®^  But  where  the  statute  provided  that  ''no  license 
shall  be  granted  to  any  person  residing  within  any  town  or 
township  where  a  majority  of  the  freeholders  in  such  town  or 
township  shall  remonstrate  against  granting  the  same,"  it  was 
held  that  a  general  remonstrance  against  the  granting  of  a 
license  to  any  one,  not  naming  any  person  whatsoever,  was  suffi- 
cient.^^ But  this  was  a  local  option  law  under  the  right  of  re- 
monstrance. Separate  remonstrances,  identical  or  not  identical, 
may  be  filed  against  the  same  applicant  by  different  remon- 
strators.'^^  If  a  statute  reouires  the  remonstrance  to  be  veri- 
filed  by  affidavit,  a  remonstrance  filed  without  an  affidavit  will 
not  be  considered."''  Where  a  statute  provided  "that  no 
license  should  be  granted  to  authorize  the  sale  of  liquors  at 
any  building  or  place  where  the  owners  or  occupants  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  land  within  two  hundred  feet  of  such 
building  or  place  shall  file  with  the  board  their  ob.iection,"  it 
was  held  that  it  was  sufficient  to  allege  "that  the  undersigned 
were  [are]  the  owners  of  the  greater  part  of  the  property" 
within  that  distance. '^°  If  a  remonstrance  be  filed  in  time  but 
at  the  session  of  the  licensing  board  at  which  notice  was 
given  that  it  would  be  heard  and  the  applicant  does  not  bring 
it  on  for  a  hearing,  but  gives  a  new  notice  that  it  will  come 
up  at  the  next  session,  the  remonstrance  remains  on  file  and 
must  be  passed  upon  at  such  second  session. '^^  A  single 
remonstrance  against  two  or  more  applicants  cannot  be  con- 
es Thompson  v.  Hiatt,  145  Ind.  Upon  a  mandamus  to  compel 
530;  44  N.  E.  486.  (These  In-  the  licensing  board  to  hear  a  re- 
diana  decisions  were  under  a  stat-  monstrance,  it  is  no  defense  to 
ute  providing  that  on  the  filing  the  issuing  of  the  writ  that  the 
of  a  remonstrance,  it  sliould  be  remonstrance  is  untrue;  for  that 
unlawful  "to  grant  such  license  question  can  only  be  heard  upon 
to  such  applicant  therefor.")  the  hearing  on  the  remonstrance. 
Collins  V.  Barrier,  G4  Miss.  21;  State  v.  Reynolds,  18  Neb.  431; 
8  So.  164.                                                    25  N.  W.  610;  State  v.  Pearse,  31 

C7  Woods    V.     Pratt,     5     Blackf.       Neb.  562;   48  N.  W.  391. 
377.  70  Lonsdale   Co.    v.  Cumberland, 

OS  Wilson    V.    Mathias,    145    Ind.        18  R.  T.  5;    25  Atl.  655. 
493;   44  N.  E.  486;   Flynn  v.  Tay-  7i  McLaughlin      v.      Wisler.      28 

lor,   145  Ind.   533;    44   N.   E.   546.       Ind.  App.  61;   62  X.  E.  73;   Rhode 
«9/n  re  Palmer,   3   Pa.   Co.   Ct.       Island  Perkins,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Dwyer, 
314.  19  R.  I.  643;   36  Atl.  2. 


§  382  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  604 

sidered ;  a  remonstrance  must  be  filed  against  each  applicant.' - 
In  England  it  may  be  shown  that  the  applicant  had  kept  a 
disorderly  house."^  The  remonstrance  need  not  state  the 
political  division  for  which  the  application  has  been  made;  it 
is  sufficient  if  it  identify  the  application.'*  A  remonstrance 
must  be  filed  with  the  licensing  board;  but  if  sent  to  the 
board,  and  they  order  it  preserved  in  its  files,  that  is  a  suffi- 
cient filing.'^^  AVhere  a  statute  provides  that  if  a  majority  of 
the  voters  of  the  district  remonstrate  against  the  granting  of 
a  license  to  an  applicant,  no  license  shall  be  granted,  no 
grounds  or  cause  of  remonstrance  need  be  stated.^'*  A  remon- 
strance remains  on  file  after  the  petition  for  a  license  is  with- 
drawn, and  on  renewal  of  an  application  it  is  applicable 
thereto  and  must  be  considered."^  Where  a  statute  provided 
that  a  remonstrance  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  that  the 
names  upon  it  have  been  properly  and  lawfully  signed  and 
that  their  owners  qualified  to  sign  the  remonstrance  unless 
the  right  to  sign  shall  be  denied  by  a  pleading  under  the 
oath  of  the  applicant ;  upon  filing  such  a  pleading  the  burden 
is  upon  the  remonstrators  to  establish  their  qualifications  as 
well  as  the  authority  of  the  persons  by  whom  their  names 
were  signed  and  attached  to  the  remonstrance.^^  The  use  of 
the  initials  of  the  Christian  name  is  sufficient ;  ^®  and  a  signa- 
ture may  be  corrected,  even  if  signed  by  an  attorney  in  fact.®" 

72Massey    v.    Dunlap,    146    Ind  Eesler     (Ind.),     88     N.     E.     516; 

350;   44  N.  E.  641.  Beliler  v.  Adiley   (Ind.),  88  N.  E. 

73Regina    v.    Miskin   Higher,    J.  877. 

J.   [1893]    1   Q.  B.  275;    5  R.   121;  "Rhode     Island,     etc.,     Co.     v. 

67  L.   T.  680;    41    W.  R.  252;    57  Ovvyer,  19  R.  I.  643;    36  Atl.  2. 

J.    P.    263;    Cogill   v.   Queenstown  "s  Miller    v.    Reeder    (Ind.),    88 

21    Juta,    262.  X.    E.    516;    Honey    v.    Guilaimie 

74  Bryan  V.  DeMoss,  34  Ind.  App.  (Ind.).  88   X.   E.   937. 

473;  73  N.  E.  156;  Bryan  v.  Jones.  to  Miller  v.   Reed,  supra;  Carel- 

34  Ind.  App.  473;   73  N.  E.   1135.  ton    v.    Rug,    149    Mass.    550;    22 

75Moores  v.  State,  69  Xeb.  653;  X.  E.  55;   5  L.  R.  A.   19;    14  Am. 

96   N.   W.   225.  St.   Rep.    446. 

76  Boomer  shine     v.     Uline,     159  so  Miller  v.   Reed,   supra. 
Ind.  500;  65  X.  E.  513;  Miller  v. 


605 


ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES. 


§383 


Sec.  383.     Signatures  to  remonstrance — Power  of  attorney 
to  sign — Revocation. 

The  remonstrance  must  be  in  writing  and  duly  signed  by 
the  remonstrator.  His  signature  is  essential.  But  the  signa- 
ture may  be  written  with  a  pen  or  pencil  or  a  typewriter, 
unless  a  statute  prevents  the  use  of  the  latter.  A  printed 
signature  is  sufficient.*^  An  attorney  duly  authorized  by 
those  entitled  to  remonstrate  may  execute  a  remonstrance  for 
them  against  the  granting  of  a  license;  and  this  he  may  do 
])y  having  his  agent  or  clerk  or  typewriter  sign  the  remon- 
strance.**- Under  powers  of  attorney  one  person  may  be  author- 
ized to  sign  the  names  of  remonstrants  not  only  to  one  remon- 
strance but  to  any  number  of  remonstrances.  It  is  not  necessary 
that  the  power  of  attorney  should  be  to  sign  a  remonstrance 
against  a  particular  application,  but  it  may  be  against  any 

the  implement  which  the  signer 
may  use? — a  polygraph,  for  ex- 
ample or  types,  or  a  stamp. 
*  *  *  The  law  requires  sign- 
ing merely  as  an  indication  and 
proof  of  the  parties'  assent."  1 
Opinions  of  Attorney  General,  670. 
"The  typewriter  is  a  modern 
convenience.  The  signature  made 
by  it  was  in  this  case  the  signa- 
ture of  the  attorney,  the  operator 
being  in  fact  his  agent,  exactly  as 
the  keys  and  the  types  were  his 
agent.  It  has  the  same  validity 
as  if  written  by  his  own  hand — 
indeed,  within  the  meaning  of  the 
law,  it  becomes  his  proper  hand- 
writing." Ardery  v.  Smith,  35 
Tnd.  App.  94;  73  X.  E.  840  (cit- 
ing Nye  V.  Lowry,  82  Ind.  316; 
Croy  V.  Busenbark.  72  Tnd.  48). 

82  Ardery  v.  Smith,  35  Ind. 
App.  94;  73  N.  E.  840;  Shaffer  v. 
Stern,  160  Ind.  375;  66  N.  E. 
1004;  Jones  v.  Nugent,  31  Tnd. 
App.  '697;  67  N.  E.  195;  McClan- 
ahan  v.  Breeding  (Ind.),  88  N.  E. 
69'5. 


81  Ardery  v.  State,  35  Ind.  App. 
94;  73  N.  E.  840;  Hamilton  v. 
State,  103  Ind.  96;  53  Am.  Rep. 
491;  Williams  v.  McDonald,  58 
Cal.  527 ;  Hancock  v.  Bowman,  49 
Cal.  413;  Pennington  v.  Baehr,  48 
Cal.  565;  Herrick  v.  Morrill,  37 
Minn.  250;  33  N.  W.  849;  5  Am. 
St.  Rep.  841;  Mezchen  v.  More, 
54  Wis.   214;    11   N.  W.  534. 

Where  a  statute  required  the 
.Secretary  of  State  to  sign  war- 
rants, the  Attorney  General  gave 
an  opinion  tliat  a  warrant  printed 
from  a  chopper  plate  with  his  sig- 
nature engraved  thereon  was  suf- 
ficient, saying:  "There  would  be 
great  difficulty  in  maintaining  the 
proposition  as  a  legal  one,  that 
when  the  law  required  signing,  it 
means  that  it  must  be  done  with 
pen  and  ink.  No  book  has  laid 
down  the  proposition,  or  even 
given  color  to  it.  I  believe  that 
a  signature  made  with  straw 
dipped  in  blood  would  be  equally 
valid  and  obligatory;  and  if  so, 
where   is   the  legal   restriction   on 


§383 


TIL^ITIC   IN    INIOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


606 


and  all  applications  then  pending  before  the  licensing  board 
or  at  any  time  thereafter  presented  without  any  designation 
ol  the  applicants  against  whom  the  remonstrances  are  to  be 
presented.  Such  a  power  of  attorney  continues  in  force  until 
revoked.^''  In  some  States,  however,  the  statutes  make  cer- 
tain requirements  concerning  signatures,  as  where  a  signature 
by  mark  must  be  attested;  and  when  that  is  true,  unattested 
signatures  cannot  be  considered.^*  A  power  of  attorney  ex- 
ecuted by  several  persons  is  several  as  to  each  one;  and  the 
death  of  one  or  more  of  them  does  not  work  its  revocation. ^^ 
A  power  of  attorney  to  sign  the  name  of  the  person  executing 
it  "to  any  and  all  remonstrances  against  persons  who  may 
give  notice  of  an  intention  to  apply  for  a  license  and  also  to 
sign  his  name  to  remonstrance  or  remonstrances  against  the 
granting  of  a  license  to  any  person  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors 
in  the  township"  is  an  unlimited  remonstrance  in  time,  being 
in  the  nature  of  a  trust  after  its  acceptance,  and  is  not  dis- 


ss Ludwig  V.  Cory,  158  Ind.  582; 
64   N.   E.   14. 

In  this  case  the  power  of  at- 
torney was  as  follows:  "Know  all 
men  by  these  presents,  that  we, 
the  undersigned  legal  voters  of 
Lawrence  Township,  Marion  Coun- 
ty, Indiana,  have  constituted  and 
appointed,  and  do  herebj'  constitute 
and  appoint,  Perry  C.  Apple,  of 
Lawrence  Township,  Indiana,  our 
true  and  lawful  attorney  for  us, 
and  in  our  names,  place  and  stead, 
to  sign  any  and  all  necessary  pa- 
pers and  remonstrances  against 
the  granting  by  the  board  of  com- 
missioners of  Marion  County,  In- 
diana, to  any  applicant  therefor, 
any  license  to  sell  spirituous, 
vinous,  malt  or  other  intoxicating 
liquors  under  the  laws  of  thei, 
State  of  Indiana,  with  the  privi- 
lege of  allowing  the  same  to  be 
drunk  on  the  promises,  at  any 
and  all  places  or  locations  within 


said  Lawrence  Township."  Sea 
also  Castle  v.  Bell,  145  Ind.  8; 
44  N.  E.  2;  Coehill  v.  Reynolds, 
156  Ind.  14;  58  N.  E.  1029;  White 
v.  Ferguson,  29  Ind.  App.  144; 
64  N.  E.  49;  Rogle  v.  Mattox,  159 
Ind.  584;  65  N.  E.  743;  Fried  v. 
Nelson,  30  Ind.  App.  1;  65  N.  E. 
216;  Andery  v.  Smith,  35  Ind. 
App.  94;  73  N.  E.  840;  ShalTer 
V.  Stern,  160  Ind.  375;  66  N.  ¥. 
1004;  Cain  v.  Allen,  168  Ind.  8; 
79  N.  E.  201,  896;  Regdance  v. 
Haines,  168  Ind.  140;  79  N.  E. 
752. 

84  Faber  v.  Wilder,  70  Ark.  449 ; 
69  Ark.  260. 

A  power  of  attorney  to  sign  a 
remonstrance  may  be  revoked  as 
'd  past  and  future  signing  by 
filing  a  revocation  with  the  licens- 
ing board.  Davis  v.  Affleck,  34 
Tnd.  App.  572;   73  N.  E.  283. 

sr.  Shaffer  v.  Stern,  160  Ind. 
375;   66  N.  lii.   1004. 


607  ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES.  §  384 

cretionary  as  to  its  execution. ""  But,  as  a  rule,  a  power  of 
attorney  to  sign  a  remonstrance  is  at  an  end  when  the  remon- 
strance, duly  signed,  is  filed  with  the  licensing  board  or  its 
clerk.*^  Names  appended  to  a  remonstrance  under  a  power 
of  attorney  may  be  withdrawn  by  those  executing  the  power 
of  attorney  who  authorized  their  signatures  attached  thereto, 
at  any  time  before  the  licensing  board  have  acted  upon  the 
remonstrance.^'^  This  may  be  done  by  filing  with  the  board  a 
revocation  of  their  signatures. ^^  Such  a  power  is  not  one 
coupled  with  an  interest ;  and  it  may  be  revoked  at  any  time ;  ^^ 
and  this  may  be  done  by  signing  another  power  of  attorney 
authorizing  a  person  to  withdraw  the  signature  from  the 
remonstrance."^  But  until  the  power  to  withdraw  the  signa- 
ture has  been  executed,  it  is  no  objection  to  a  person  who 
has  remonstrated  that  he  cannot  sign  the  remonstrance  be- 
cause of  his  having  executed  a  power  of  attorney  authorizing 
the  withdrawal  of  his  name.-'-  The  revocation  of  a  power  of 
attorney  takes  place  from  the  time  the  agent  has  actual  notice 
of  it.^^  Persons  who  in  no  way  signed  a  remonstrance  cannot 
withdraw  therefrom.*^* 

Sec.  384.    Who  may  remonstrate. 

The  statutes  usually  designate  who  may  remonstrate  against 
the  granting  of  a  license,  and  when  they  do  no  other  person 
can  remonstrate.  In  Iowa,  any  citizen  may  appear  and 
remonstrate  or  oppose  the  granting  of  a  license ;  ^'^  and  in 
Indiana  the  board  of  county  commissioners  who  have  refused 
to  grant  the  license  may  appear  on  appeal  and  oppose  its 
granting.^*^     The  remonstrance  need  not  set  forth  the  quali- 

86  McClanahoun      v.       Breeding  ^-  Miller  v.  Tlessler,  supra. 
(Ind.),  88   N.  E.  695.  93  Honey    v.    Guilaume     (Ind.), 

87  Miller  v.  Resler  (Ind.),  88  88  N.  E.  937;  Behler  v.  Achley 
N.  E.  516.    See  Nichols  v.  Lehman,        (Ind.),  89  N.  E.  877. 

42   Ind.  App.  384;    85  N.  E.   786.  9*  Behler    v.   Achley    (Ind.),    89 

88 Lee   V.    Schull    (Ind.),  88   N.  N.   E.  877. 

E.   521.  95  Darling   v.    Boesch,    67    Iowa, 

87  Miller    v.    Ressler     (Ind.),   88  702;    25   N.   W.   887;    Leighton  v. 

N.  E.  516.  Maury,  76  Va.  865. 

90  Miller  v.   Ressler,  supra  96  Murphy    v.     Monroe    Co.,    73 

91  Miller  v.  Ressler,  supra;  Lee  Ind.  483. 
V.  Schull    (Ind.),  8S  N.  E.  '521. 


§  384  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS,  608 

fications  of  the  remonstrators ;  it  need  not  show  that  they  are 
voters,  or  that  they  constitute  a  majority  of  the  voters  in  the 
licensing  district  where  a  majority  is  necessary  to  be  effective, 
for  a  remonstrator  cannot  know  when  he  signs  the  remon- 
strance that  the  requisite  majority  will  sign  it.^^  It  need  not 
show  the  residences  of  those  remonstrating."'*  If,  pending  the 
proceedings,  a  remonstrator  ceases  to  possess  the  qualifications 
enabling  him  to  sign  the  remonstrance,  his  name  must  be 
stricken  out,  although  that  defeat  the  whole  remonstrance  pro- 
ceedings.-'" If  more  than  one  remonstrance  be  filed,  and  those 
signing  one  of  them  are  not  qualified  to  remonstrate,  that  one 
may  be  stricken  out,  but  it  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  do  so 
unless  their  names  are  essential  to  make  up  the  requisite 
number  of  remonstrators  in  order  to  defeat  the  application.^ 
In  Rhode  Island  a  railroad  company  may  remonstrate  in  its 
corporate  name  by  its  superintendent  on  direction  of  its 
general  manager  who  has  the  right  to  so  direct ;  and  no  formal 
vote  of  the  board  of  directors  is  necessary  to  authorize  him 
to  give  such  direction.-  In  Virginia  any  citizen  may  remon- 
strate and  appeal,  and  by  so  doing  he  will  render  himself 
liable  for  costs ;  ^  and  a  still  later  statute  allows  any  person 
who  may  feel  himself  aggrieved  the  right  to  object.*  It  is 
no  objection  to  a  remonstrator  that  he  is  personally  interested 
in  the  result,  as  where  a  newspaper  proprietor  objects  that 
the  notice  should  have  been  printed  in  his  newspaper,  because 
it  had  the  largest  circulation,  and  not  in  that  of  a  rival 
proprietor.'  AVhere  no  statute  prescribed  the  qualifications 
of  the  remonstrators  it  was  held  that  any  resident  of  the 
territory,  or  a  non-resident  who  was  a  taxpayer  therein,  might 

»7  Head   v.   Doelileman,   148  Ind.  i  Fletcher     v.     Crist,     1.39     Ind. 

145;     46    N.     K.     585;     Bryan    v.  121 ;  38  N.  E.  472. 

Jones,    34    Ind.    App.    701;    73    N.  2  Lonsdale    Co.    v.    Cumberland, 

E.    1135;    Little   v.   Thompson,   24  18  R.  I.  5;   25  Atl.  655. 

Ind.    146;    Bryan    v.    DeMoss,    34  a  Leighton  v.  Maury,  76  Va.  865. 

Ind.    App.    473;     73    N.    E.    156.  *  Lester    v.    Price,    83    Va.   648; 

Contra,  In  re  Law  and  Order  So-  3  S.  E.  529. 

ciety,  185  Pa.  572;  40  Atl.  92.  s  Fell    v.    Kitchen    Bros.    Hotel, 

08  Bryan  V.  DeMoss,  34  Ind.  App.  57  Xeb.  204;    77  N.  W.  344.     See 

473;   73  N.  E.  150.  In  re  Law  and  Order  Society,  185 

»9List  V.  Padgett,  96  Ind.   126.  Pa.  572;  40  Atl.  92. 


609  ISSUANCE    OP    LICENSES.  §  385 

remonstrate.''  A  statement  that  the  remonstrators  are  "resi- 
dents and  voters"  snfficiently  states  that  they  are  "legal 
voters."'^  A  statute  provided  that  if  a  remonstrance  signed 
by  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  any  township,  or  ward 
in  any  city,  shou]d  be  filed,  no  license  shall  be  granted,  was  re- 
enacted  after  the  Supreme  Court  had  held  that  remonstrators 
must  be  voters  of  the  ward  of  a  city  wherein  the  applicant 
desired  to  locate  his  saloon ;  and  it  was  held  that  it  would  be 
presumed  the  statute  was  re-enacted  with  that  construction, 
nothing  to  the  contrary  being  contained  in  the  amendment.* 

Sec.  385.     Withdrawal  of  signatures  from  remonstrance. 

A  remonstrator  is  not  at  liberty  to  withdraw  his  name  from 
the  remonstrance  at  any  time  he  may  see  fit.  Thus,  where  the 
statute  provided  that,  "If,  three  days  before  any  regular 
session  of  the  board  of  commissioners  of  any  county,  a  remon- 
strance in  writing,  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters 
of  any  township  or  ward  in  any  city,  situated  in  said  county, 
shall  be  filed  with  the  auditor  of  the  county,  against  the 
granting  of  a  license  to  any  applicant  for  the  sale  of  spiritu- 
ous, vinous,  malt,  or  other  intoxicating  liquors,  under  the  law 
of  the  State  of  Indiana,  with  the  privilege  of  allowing  the 
same  to  be  drunk  on  the  premises  where  sold,  within  the 
limits  of  said  township,  or  city  ward,  it  shall  be  unlawful 
thereafter  to  grant  such  license  to  such  applicant,"  it  was 
held  that  within  this  three  days  period  a  remonstrant  could 
not  withdraw  his  name;  but  "until  the  beginning  of  this 
three  day  period,  whether  the  remonstrance  has  been  placed 
on  file  or  not,  any  remonstrator  must  be  deemed  to  have 
the   absolute   right   by   some   affirmative   act   of  his   own   to 

fiWatkins   V.    Grieser,    11    Okla.  Furth,    73    Ark.    366;     84    S.    W. 

302;  66  Pac.  332;  Somers  v.  Vlas-  500;    6'8    L.    R.   A.    161. 

ney,  04  Neb.  383;   89  N.  W.   1036.  Where    a   remonstrator    did   not 

7  Head    v.    Doehleman,    148    Ind.  testify    fully    as    to    his    qualifica- 
145;  46  N.  E.  585.  tions,    it    was    held    that    his    dis- 

8  Miller  v.  Givens,  41  Ind.  App.  qualification    might    be    shown   on 
401;  83  N.  E,  1018.  cross-examination.    Miller  v.  Ress- 

In  Arkansas  any  private  citizen       ler   (Ind.),  88  N.  E.  51'6. 
may     remonstrate.        Whissen     v. 


§  385  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  610 

withdraw  his  name  from  such  remonstrance.  But,"  added 
the  court,  "if  this  right  is  not  exercised  prior  to  the  be- 
ginning of  the  first  day  of  this  three  days'  period,  it  no 
longer  exists.""  And  the  court  makes  this  quotation  from  a 
similar  case  showing  the  reasons  why  a  remonstrator  should 
not  be  then  allowed  to  withdraw  his  name:  "This  motion 
came  too  late.  Rights  had  been  acquired  and  money  expended 
on  the  faith  of  the  order  made  upon  the  first  report  [in  the 
ditch  proceedings],  and  justice  requires  that  a  petitioner 
should  not  be  allowed  to  destroy  rights  which  his  own  act  had 
been  the  means  of  creating.  The  case  is  not  at  all  like  that 
of  an  ordinar}'  civil  action,  for,  in  such  a  proceeding  as  this, 
the  public  and  many  persons  have  a  common  interest,  and 
he  who  sets  on  foot  the  proceedings  cannot  be  permitted  to 
end  it  to  the  injury  of  the  public  and  others  by  dismissing 
the  petition."  ^"  In  Arkansas,  after  petition  has  been  filed  for 
a  revocation  of  an  order  entered  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquors, 
the  petitioners  may  not  withdraw  their  names,  even  for  good 
cause  shown ;  but  they  may  protest  against  the  granting  of 
the  praj'er  of  their  own  petition  on  the  ground  that  it  does 
not  contain  the  names  of  a  sufficient  number  of  qualified  in- 
habitants within  the  territory.^^  If  remonstrators  have  signed 
the  remonstrance  by  an  attorney  in  fact,  they  may  file  a 
statement  with  the  licensing  board,  after  the  remonstrance  is 
filed,  revoking  the  powers  of  attorney,  as  to  past  and  future 

9  State    V.    Gerhardt.     145    Ind.  v.  Godwine,  33  Ind.  App.  329;  68 

J39 ;  44  N.  E.  469  ;  Davis  v.  Affleck,  N.  E.  929 ;  70  N.  E.  99<) ;  Wiseman 

34  Ind.   App.   572;    73   N.  E.  283.  v.    Dugas,    6    Mon.    S.    C.    133;    6 

loCarr  v.  Boone,   108   Ind.  241;  Quebec    Q.    B.     133;     Simpson    v. 

9  N.   E.   110;    State  v.  Reingardt,  Commonwealth    (Ky.),    97    S.    W. 

46  N.  J.  L.  337;   In  re  Sargeant,  404;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  132. 

13   Nat.   Bank   Reg.    144;    Noonan  n  Phillips  v.  Goe,  85  Ark.  304; 

V,  Orton,  31    Wis.  265;    Loving  v.  108  S.  W.  207. 

Brackett,    3    Pick.    403;    Winslow  In   Illinois   any   person   consent- 

V.   Newlan,  45  111.    145;    White  v.  ing   to    the    issuance   of   a    license 

Prifogle,    146    Ind.    64;    44   N.    E.  may   witlidraw    his    name    at    any 

fl26;  Sutherland  v.  McKinney,  146  time     before     the     application     is 

Ind.  Ill;   45  N.  E.  1048;   Conwell  finally    passed    upon.      Theurer    v. 

V.    Overmeyer,    145    Ind.   698;    44  People,    211    111.   '2»6;    71    N.    £. 

!N.   E.  o4'8;    State  v.   Coleman,  34  997;    113  111.  App.  628. 
Neb.  440;  51  N.  W.  1025;  Se.xton 


611  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES,  §  386 

acts  of  such  attorney,  and  withdraw  their  names  from  the 
remonstrance.^-  Where  a  statute  gives  a  remonstrator,  until 
three  days  before  the  day  set  for  hearing  the  application  for 
a  license,  the  right  to  withdraw  his  name  from  the  remon- 
strance, he  must  exercise  his  right  prior  to  the  beginning  of 
the  first  day  of  this  three  day  period." 

Sec.  386.    A  majority  remonstrance. 

Statutes  sometimes  provide  that  if  a  majority  of  the  voters 
or  inhabitants  of  the  political  district  for  which  a  license  is 
sought  shall  file  a  remonstrance  before  it  is  issued,  no  license 
shall  be  granted ;  and  in  Indiana  the  statute  goes  so  far  as  to 
prevent  not  only  a  license  issued  to  the  applicant,  but  one 
issued  to  any  person  for  a  period  of  two  yeare  thereafter, 
when  what  is  called  a  "blanket"  remonstrance  is  filed.  This 
is  local  option  under  another  form,  and  such  a  law  is  consti- 
tutional.^* Under  the  Indiana  statute  the  remonstrance  must 
be  "signed  by  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters  of  any  township, 
or  any  ward,  in  any  city  situated  in"  the  county  wherein  the 
application  is  made.^"'  Under  this  statute  no  one  but  a  legal 
voter  of  the  ward  of  a  city,  or  of  the  township,  can  sign  the 
remonstrance ;  ^"^  and  the  remonstrator  need  not  assign  any 
objection  to  the  applicant  nor  assign  any  reason  for  the  objec- 
tion.'^ A  majority  of  the  votei*s  of  the  licensing  district  must 
sign  the  remonstrance ;  '^  and  when  that  is  done  no  license 
can  be  issued. ^^     This  remonstrance  need  not  be  filed  at  the 

12  Davis  V.  Affleck,  34  Ind.  App.  la  Massey   v.    Dunlap,    14G    Inch 

572;   73   N.  E.  283,  350;    44  N,  E.  641, 

i3iSexton   V,   Goodwine,    33    Ind,  i7  Boomershine     v.     Uline,     159 

App.  329;  68  X.  E.  929;   70  X,  E.  Ind.  500;   65  X.  E.  513.     See  also 

999,  Davis  v.  Board,  7  Cal,  App,  571; 

Instate    V,    Gerhardt.    145    Ind.  95   Pac.    170, 

439;   44  X.  E.  469;   Cain  v.  Allen,  is  Moran     v.     Cregan,     27     Ind. 

168  Ind.  8;   79  X.  E.  201;   Wilcox  App.  659;   62  X,  E,  61. 

V.  Bryant,  159  Ind,  379;   59  X.  E.  i9  Wilcox    v,    Bryant,    156    Ind. 

1049;    Boomershine   v.    Uline,    159  379;    59    X,    E,    1049;    Shaffer   v. 

Ind.   500;    65    Ind,    513;    Hoop   v.  Stern,    160    Ind.    375;     66    N,    E. 

Affleck,    162    Ind,    564;    70    X,    E.  1004,      See    also    In    re    Connors, 

978,  Temp  Wood  (Manitoba),  284,  993; 

15  Burns    K.    S.    1908,    §8332;  Woods  v.  Pratt,  5  Blackf.  377. 
Acts   1895,   p.  248,   §9. 


§  386         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  L.IQUORS.  612 

same  session  of  the  licensing  board  at  which  the  application 
is  made ;  but  if  it  is  on  file  when  the  application  is  made,  no 
license  can  be  granted.""  Under  this  Indiana  statute  voters 
may  remonstrate  against  the  grant  of  a  license  to  any  appli- 
cant or  against  all  applicants;  and  if  a  proper  number  has 
signed  the  remonstrance  the  board  of  county  commissioners — - 
the  licensing  board — have  no  power  to  proceed  any  farther, 
but  must  refuse  a  license;  and  no  license  can  be  issued  for 
two  years  if  the  remonstrance  is  a  "blanket"  remonstrance. 
Upon  filing  this  "blanket"  remonstrance  the  remonstrators 
become  adverse  parties  to  all  subsequent  applicants,  and  each 
side  is  entitled  to  a  hearing  thereon,  the  burden  being  upon 
the  remonstrators  to  show  that  a  majority  of  the  voters  had 
signed  the  remonstrance.  If  an  applicant  has  been  denied  a 
license  he  cannot  apply  until  two  years  thereafter  has  expired  ; 
but  a  new  applicant  may,  and  he  may  contest  the  validity  of 
a  prior  remonstrance  which  the  board  has  held  sufficient,  for 
he  has  not  had  his  day  in  court.  The  "blanket"  remonstrance 
cannot  be  filed  until  an  application  for  a  license  has  been 
made,  and  until  the  application  is  made  the  board  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  sufficiency  of  a  remonstrance. 
Under  this  statute  voters  may  authorize  an  agent  or  attorney 
to  sign  for  them  a  special  or  "blanket"  remonstrance. 
Voters  have  no  right  to  withdraw  from  the  general  or 
"blanket"  remonstrance  after  the  beginning  of  the  three 
d?rv^  period  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  sessions  of 
the   board   before   which   the   remonstrance   must    be   filed.^^ 

20  McLaughlin  v.  Wisler,  28  Ind.  McKinney,  14G  Ind.  611;  45  N.  E. 
App.  61;    61    N.   E.   73.  1048;     Sexton     v.     Goodwine.     33 

21  Cain  V.  Allen,  168  Ind.  8;  79  Ind.  App,  329;  68  N.  E.  929; 
JV.  E.  201;  Jones  v.  Alexander,  Davis  v.  Affleck,  34  Ind.  App. 
167  Ind.  395;  79  N.  E.  368;  Ra-  572;  73  N.  E.  283;  Ragle  v.  Mat- 
gadanz  v.  Haines,  168  Ind.  140;  tox,  159  Ind.  584;  65  N.  E.  743; 
79  N.  E.  359,  1085;  Anderson  v.  Lee  v.  Shnll  (Ind.),  88  N.  E. 
Webber,  39  Ind.  443;  79  N.  E.  521;  Miller  v.  Resler  (Ind.),  88 
1055;  Kunkle  v.  Abel.  167  Ind.  N.  E.  516;  Honey  v.  Guilaiime 
434;  79  N.  E.  753;  State  v.  Ger-  (Ind.),  88  N.  E.  937;  McClana- 
hardt,  145  Ind.  439;  44  N.  E.  han  v.  13reedi«g  (Ind.),  88.  N.  E. 
469;    White   v.   Prifoglc,    146   Ind.  695. 

64;   44  N.  E.  926;    Sutherland  V. 


613  ISSUANCE    OP   LICENSES.  §  386 

If  because  a  majority  of  legal  voters  remonstrate 
against  granting  a  license  to  an  applicant  to  sell  liquors  a 
license  is  refused,  and  the  applicant  appeals,  and  before  the 
cause  is  tried  in  the  court  to  which  an  appeal  was  taken  a 
majority  of  the  legal  voters  file  with  the  county  board,  as 
provided  by  law,  a  remonstrance  against  granting  licenses  to 
all  persons,  and  that  fact  is  duly  presented  to  the  Appellate 
Court,  the  appeal  of  the  applicant  will  be  dismissed,  thus 
leaving  him  Avithout  a  license.--  Filing  a  remonstrance  on 
Friday  next  before  the  meeting  of  the  county  board  on  the 
next  Monday  is  soon  enough,  under  the  provision  requiring 
the  remonstrance  to  be  filed  three  days  before  the  board 
meets.-^  This  statute  provides  that  ''the  number  to  constitute 
a  majority  of  voters  shall  be  determined  by  the  aggregate 
vote  east  in  said  to\ATiship  or  ward  for  candidates  for  the 
highest  office  at  the  last  election  preceding  the  filing  of  such  re- 
monstrance, ' '  -*  and  it  is  construed  to  re(iuire  the  remonstrance 
to  be  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  aggregate  vote  east  in  the 
township  for  candidates  at  the  general  election  last  preceding 
the  filing  of  the  remonstrance  where  an  application  is  made 
to  conduct  a  saloon  at  some  place  in  the  township  outside  of 
the  limits  of  an  incorporated  city;  but  where  the  applicant 
desires  to  obtain  a  license  to  operate  a  saloon  in  a  ward  of  an 
incorporated  city,  then  the  majority  of  voters  is  determined 
by  an  aggregate  of  the  vote  of  that  particular  w^ard  as  cast 
at  the  general  city  election  preceding  the  filing  of  the  remon- 
strance, for  the  highest  municipal  office  to  be  filled  at  such 
election.  The  phrase  "candidates  for  the  highest  office  at  the 
last  election"  means  the  governor,  if  a  governor  was  elected 
at  the  last  State  election  preceding  the  filing  of  the  remon- 
strance, if  the  applicant  desired  to  obtain  a  license  to  sell  in 
a  township  beyond  the  limits  of  an  incorporated  city;  in  the 
event  a  governor  w^as  not  elected  at  that  election,  then  the 
votes  cast  for  Secretary  of  State  become  the  standard.  "When 
the  application  is  for  a  license  to  conduct  a  saloon  in  an  in- 

22  Sanasack    v.    Ader,    108    Ind.        160  Ind.  375;   66  X.  E.  1004;  Sex- 
659;   7'8  N.  E.  675;   79  N.  E.  457.       ton    v.    Goodwine,    33    Ind.    App. 

23  Flynn  v.  Taylor,  145  Ind.  533 ;        329 ;  68  N.  E.  929. 

44   N.    E,    546 ;    Shaffer   v.    Stern,  24  Acts   1905,  p.   248,   §  9. 


§386 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS. 


614 


eorporated  city,  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters  of  the  ward  is 
determined  by  the  aggregate  vote  cast  therein  for  mayor  at 
the  last  preceding  election,  and  in  the  event  no  mayor  was 
elected  at  that  election,  then  the  majority  is  determined  in 
like  manner  by  the  vote  cast  in  the  ward  for  councilman.-" 
The  change  of  the  boundaries  of  a  city  ward  does  not  pro- 
hibit the  voters  therein  from  remonstrating  against  an  appli- 
cation, but  the  voters  taken  from  the  ward  cannot  be  counted 
on  the  remonstrance,  and  they  should  be  deducted  from  the 
vote  of  the  ward  in  estimating  the  total  number  of  voters. 
The  number  to  be  deducted  must  be  ascertained  by  parol 
evidence  of  witnesses  who  are  able  to  testify  who  the  voters 
cut  off  from  the  ward  are.-°     If  a  remonstrator  die  before  a 


25  Massey  v.  Dunlap,  14G  Ind. 
350;  44  N.  E.  145;  46  N.  E.  585; 
Shatler  v.  Stern,  100  Irul.  375;  66 
N.  E.  1004;  Kunkle  v.  Abell,  167 
liid.  434;  79  N.  E.  753.  The  "last 
election  preceding  the  tiling  of  the 
remonstrance"  means  a  general 
and  not  a  special  election.  Kun- 
kle V.  Abell,  supra. 

26  Abbott  V.  Inman,  35  Ind.  App. 
262;   72  N.  E.  284. 

The  statute  prescribes  the  form, 
and  all  that  is  necessary  is  to  use 
the  form  thus  given.  (Jain  v.  Al- 
len, 167  Ind.  8;  79  N.  E.  201,  896; 
Kagadanz  v.  Haines,  168  Ind.  140; 
79  N.  E.  352. 

An  ex  parte  determination  ot 
the  validity  of  a  remonstrance  is 
a  nullity.  Jones  \.  Alexander, 
167   Ind.  395;   79   X.  E.   368. 

After  the  decision  in  Massey  v. 
Dunlap,  svpra,  the  statute  was 
amended  so  as  to  read:  "The  num- 
ber to  constitute  a  majority  of 
the  voters  herein  referred  to  shall 
be  determined  by  the  greatest  ag- 
gregate vote  Citst  in  said  town- 
ship or  ward  for  candidates  for 
any  office  at  the  last  election  pre- 


ceding the  filing  of  such  remon- 
strance." The  word  "greatest" 
was  inserted  before  aggregate  and 
"any"  substituted  for  "highest." 
This  was  held  to  require  the  stand- 
ard to  be  that  by  which  the 
number  of  voters  required  to  sign 
the  remonstrance  in  a  township 
must  be  tested  or  measured  is  a 
majority  of  the  greatest  aggre- 
gate vote  cast  for  all  candidates 
for  any  particular  office  at  the 
last  preceding  election.  Where  an 
application  is  made  for  a  license 
to  sell  in  a  township  outside  of 
an  incorporated  city  therein,  the 
test  under  the  section  as  amended 
is  not  now  confined  alone  to  the 
aggregate  vote  cast  at  said  gen- 
eral election  for  all  the  candi- 
dates for  governor  or  Secretary  ol 
State,  as  the  case  might  be,  but 
t!ie  test  must  be  the  greatest  ag- 
gregate vote  cast  for  all  candi- 
dates for  any  office,  regardless  of 
the  rank  of  such  office.  The  vote 
cast  for  candidates  upon  the  State 
ticket  is  not  alone  to  be  the  test; 
but  if  the  greatest  aggregate  vote 
cast  at  the  election  is  for  candi- 


615 


ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES. 


§387 


remonstrance  is  considered,  his  name  cannot  be  considered  in 
order  to  make  up  the  requisite  number.-'  Where  a  voter  may 
sign  an  applicant's  petition,  if  he  thereafter  sign  a  remon- 
strance, his  name  cannot  be  counted  on  either  side.-* 


Sec.  387.    Day  for  hearing  application,  appointing. 

Statutes  prescribe  the  time,  usually,  when  the  application 
for  a  license  will  be  heard,  as  at  the  next  term  of  the  licensing 
board,  or  its  next  sitting  as  fixed  by  the  statute.  Under  the 
English  statute  notice  is  given  of  the  place,  day  and  hour 
when  the  licensing  justices  will  sit  to  hear  applications;  and 
when  they  meet  they  may  adjourn  over  to  a  time  and  place, 
of  which  notice  must  be  given. -°     In  some  States  on  filing  of 


dates  upon  either  the  State, 
county  or  township  ticket,  such 
vote,  under  tlie  circumstances, 
must  be  the  test  or  standard  by 
which  the  required  number  of 
votes  must  be  measured.  In  case 
a  general  remonstrance  is  filed 
a^rainst  granting  a  license  in  a 
ward  of  a  city,  then  the  number 
of  remonstrators  "must  at  least 
constitute  a  majority  of  the  great- 
est aggregate  or  combined  vote 
cast  in  such  ward  for  all  candi- 
dates for  any  city  oilice,  regard- 
less of  the  rank  of  such  office,  at 
the  last  election  held  preceding 
the  tiling  of  the  remonstrance." 
Kunkle  v.  Abell,  1G7  Ind.  434;  79 
N.  E.  753. 

When  the  remonstrance  is 
against  granting  the  license  in  the 
township,  voters  in  the  towns  and 
cities  in  the  township  must  be 
counted  in  determining  the  ag- 
gregate number  of  voters  in  the 
township.  Moran  v.  Creagan,  27 
Ind.  App.   659;  62  N.  E.   61. 

-' Strydon  v.  Yiiiidak',  20  Juta, 
385. 

28  Fotheringham  v.  George,  19 
Juta,  532, 


Under  a  Kentucky  statute,  when 
a  remonstrance  is  made  against 
the  grant  of  a  license,  tiie  c<jurt 
must  make  an  order  defining  the 
neighborhood,  after  which  the 
burden  is  on  the  Commonwealth 
to  show  that  all  those  signing  the 
remonstrance  constitute  a  major- 
ity of  the  legal  voters  of  that 
neighborhood.  Guinn  v.  Cumber- 
land Co.  Ct.  (Ky.),  99  S.  W.  274; 
28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  759.  Wliere  sixty- 
nine  voters  were  in  the  neiglibor- 
hood,  and  forty-three  signed  a  re- 
monstrance, four  of  whom  with- 
drew their  names,  it  was  held  that 
tlie  application  should  be  with- 
drawn, though  ten  of  the  signers 
had  also  signed  the  petition  for 
the  license.  Simpson  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  97  S.  W.  404;  30 
Ky.  L.  Rep.   132. 

As  to  sufliciencj'^  of  number  of 
remonstrators  in  a  New  York  vil- 
lage, see  People  v.  Lyman,  48  N. 
Y.  App.  Div.  484;  G2  N.  Y.  Supp. 
902;    alFirmed   163   N.  Y.  602;    57 

^.  ]:.  1120. 

23  See  Regina  v.  Anglesey,  59 
J.  P.  743;  65  L.  J.  M.  C.  12;  15 
R.  614;   Regina  v.  Armstrong,  65 


§387 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


616 


a  remonstrance  the  licensing  board  must  set  the  application 
down  for  hearing  and  give  notice  of  the  time  of  hearing;  and 
if  it  refuse  to  do  this  mandamus  lies  to  compel  it  to  do  it. 
And  a  license  granted  without  a  hearing  may  be  canceled 
by  the  courts.^"  Under  such  a  statute  reasonable  time  must 
be  given  the  parties  to  produce  their  evidence.'^  If  all  parties 
concerned  consent  before  the  board  to  a  time  for  a  hearing, 
they  cannot  afterwards  object  that  they  did  not  have  notice.^- 
A  failure  to  give  notice  of  the  hearing  deprives  a  party  of  a 
reasonable  opportunity  to  be  heard,  and  the  action  of  the 
licensing  board  may  be  set  aside  or  annulled.^^  No  objections 
can  be  made  to  the  granting  of  a  license  before  the  day  for 
the  hearing  if  all  remonstrances  are  withdrawn,  and  it  is  too 
late  to  file  any  other  remonstrances.^*  "Where  by  statute  a 
licensing  board  cannot  meet  until  9  a.  m.,  an  order  dismissing 
a  remonstrance  made  at  8  a.  m.  is  void.^'' 


L.  J.  M.  C.  35;  Licensing  Act 
1828,  9  Geo.  4,  c.  61,  §§2,  5; 
Patterson's  Licensing  Acts,  pp. 
186,  191. 

30  State  V.  Reynolds,  18  Neb. 
431;  25  N.  W.  610;  State  v.  Han- 
Ion,  24  Neb.  608;  39  N.  W.  780; 
Vanderlip  v.  Derb}%  19  Neb.  165; 
26  N.  W.  707. 

31  Clark  V.  State,  24  Neb.  263; 
38  N.  W.  752;  State  v.  Coleman, 
34  Neb.  440;  51  N.  W.  1025. 
From  10  P.  M.  to  9  A.  M.  next 
morning  is  not  a  reasonable  time. 
State  V.  Weber,  20  Neb.  467;  30 
N.  W.   531. 

32  Hollenbeck  v.  Drake,  37  Neb. 
680;  56  N.  W.  296. 

33  Trustees  v.  Board,  56  N.  J. 
L.  411;  29  AtL  150;  Hinchman  v. 
Stoepel,  54  N.  J.  L.  4S6;  24  Atl. 
401;  State  v.  Mathews,  51  N.  J. 
L.  253;  17  Atl.  154;  McNeal  v. 
Eyan,  56  N.  J.  L.  443;  28  Atl.' 
552;  Jn  re  Bowman,  167  Pa.  644; 
31   Atl.   932. 


Where  an  application  can  be 
acted  iipon  only  after  the  expira- 
tion of  two  weeks  after  the  giving 
of  notice,  the  granting  of  a  license 
fourteen  days  after  the  first  pub- 
lication is  premature.  Pisar  v. 
State,  56  Neb.  455;  76  N.  W.  869. 

The  application  may  usually  be 
continued  imtil  the  next  term. 
Cox  V.  Burnham,  120  Iowa,  43 ; 
94  N.  W.  265;  but  see  Rhode 
Island,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Board  (R.  I.), 
46  Atl.   1063. 

34  Middlekauir  v.  Adams,  76 
Neb.  265;   107  N.  W.  232. 

35  Swan  V.  Wilderson,  10  Okla. 
547;  62  Pac.  422. 

A  license  granted  by  a  city 
council  at  a  special  meeting,  of 
which  no  general  notice  has  been 
given,  but  only  one  of  a  few  hours 
had  been  given  to  one  citizen  who 
had  made  a  request  to  be  heard, 
was  annulled.  McNeal  v.  Ryan, 
56  N.  J.  L.  443 ;  28  Atl.  552. 


617 


ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES, 


5  388 


Sec.  388.     Hearing  application. 

The  hearing  must  be  at  the  time  fixed  by  the  statute  or  as 
designated  in  the  notice,  and  the  application  cannot  be  heard 
and  the  license  granted  at  any  other  time.^*^  It  must  be  a 
public  one  given  to  all  the  parties.^'  Both  the  petitioners 
and  the  remonstrants  must  be  given  a  reasonable  opportunity 
to  prove  the  allegations  or  representations  made  in  his  appli- 
cation or  in  their  remonstrance.^^  If  no  opportunity  be 
given  and  the  license  be  granted  without  a  hearing,  it  may  be 
set  aside  in  a  proper  proceeding.^"  Thus,  a  license  granted 
at  a  special  meeting  of  the  board,  of  which  no  general  notice 
had  been  given,  but  a  notice  of  a  few  hours  was  given  to  a 
single  citizen  who  had  requested  a  hearing,  was  held  void.*** 
The  board  cannot  act  upon  the  face  of  the  application,  as  a 
rule,  nor  upon  the  face  of  the  remonstrance.*^  The  boai'd 
cannot  violate  its  own  rules  and  grant  a  license  at  a  time 
w^hen  they  require  the  application  to  be  heard  at  another 
time.*^  The  board  may  be  compelled  by  mandamus  to  grant 
a  hearing  and  hear  testimony,  though  its  decision  cannot 
t(hereby  be  controlled.*"     If  it  be  charged  that  the  notice  o^ 


36  state  V.  Kennedy,  1  Ala.  31; 
Dilkes  V.  Pancoast,  53  N.  J.  L. 
553;  22  Atl.  122;  Hinchman  v. 
Stoepel,  54  N.  J.  L.  486;  24  Atl. 
401;  State  v.  Mitchell,  127  Mo. 
App.  455;   105  S.  W.  655. 

37  Duliord  v.  Nolan,  46  N.  .J.  L. 
87;  State  v.  Mathews,  51  N.  J.  L. 
253;  17  Atl.  154;  Trustees,  etc., 
V.  Board,  56  X.  j.  l.  411;  29  Atl. 
150. 

38  State  V.  Coleman,  34  Neb. 
440;  51  N.  VV.  1025;  State  v. 
Hanlan,  24  Neb.  608;  39  N.  W. 
780;  Dufford  v.  Nolan,  46  N.  J. 
L.  87;  Steinkraus  v.  Hurlbert,  20 
Neb.  519;  30  N.  W.  940;  Ararey 
X.  Smith,  .35  Ind.  App.  94;  73  N. 
E.  840;  Watkins  v.  Grieser,  11 
Okla.  302;  66  Pac.  332;  Swan  v. 
Wilderson,  10  Okla.  547;  62  Pac. 
422. 

39  State  V.  Mathews,  51  N.  J.  L. 


253;  17  Atl.  154;  State  v.  Han- 
lan, 24  Neb.  608;  39  N.  W.  780; 
Brown  v.  Mathews,  51  N.  J.  L. 
253;  17  Atl.  154;  Dutlord  v.  No- 
lan, 46  N.  J.  i..  87. 

40  McNcal  V.  Ryan,  56  N.  J.  L. 
443;  28  Atl.  552;  State  v.  Weber, 
20  Neb.  467;    30  N.  W.  531. 

41  Dufford  V.  Nolan,  46  N.  J.  L. 
87;  State  v.  Reynolds,  18  Neb. 
431;  25  N.  W.  610;  State  v.  Ma- 
thews 51  N.  J.  L.  253;  17  Atl.  154; 
Dilkes  V.  Pancoast,  54  N.  J.  L. 
486;    24  Atl.  401. 

42  Trustees  v.  Board,  56  N.  J. 
L.  411;  29  Atl.  150;  In  re  Bow- 
man,  167  Pa.  644;   31   Atl.  932. 

43  Steinkraus  v.  Hurlbert,  20 
Neb.  519;  30  N.  W.  940;  State  v. 
Mathews.  51  N.  J.  L.  253;  17  Atl. 
1.54;  Dufford  v.  Nolan,  46  N.  J. 
L.   87. 


§  388  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  618 

the  application  was  not  published  in  the  two  newspapers  of 
the  county  having  the  largest  circulation,  the  applicant  must 
prove  that  they  did  have  such  circulation.'*'*  If  a  petition 
for  a  license  must  have  a  certain  number  of  the  signatures  of 
resident  taxpayers  upon  it,  and  a  remonstrance  is  filed 
alleging  that  some  of  those  signing  the  petition  are  not  resi- 
dent taxpavers,  the  applicant  must  prove  that  they  are,  or 
that  a  sufficient  number  of  competent  taxpayers  had  signed 
it.*^  Considerable  latitude  must  be  permitted  on  the  hearing 
in  order  that  facts  may  be  developed  and  the  intent  and  pur- 
pose of  the  law  observed.*^  The  fact  that  the  applicant  to 
carry  on  the  liquor  traffic  in  a  hotel  had  held  a  previous 
license  for  the  same  place  does  not  prevent  an  inquiry  as  to 
whether  he  conducts  such  a  hotel  as  the  law  requires  a  licensee 
to  have.^^  A  refusal  of  a  licensing  board  to  hear  evidence 
does  not  dispense  with  an  offer  of  it.  Avhere  the  action  of  the 
board  is  sub.i'ect  to  review  for  error  by  an  appellate  court.^^ 
Where  a  statute  provides  that  if  a  remonstrance  be  filed  by 
a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  township  wherein  the  license 
is  to  be  granted  no  license  shall  thereafter  be  granted,  the 
burden  is  on  the  remonstrators  to  show  that  the  requisite 
number  of  hona  fide  voters  have  signed  the  remonstrance  they 
put  on  file.''^  If  a  license  be  granted,  and  thereafter,  on  the 
same  daj^  even,  a  remonstrance  be  filed,  the  board  cannot  then 
adjourn  until  a  future  day  and  then  revoke  its  action.^" 
Where  a  statute  permits  a  druggist  to  take  out  a  license,  upon 

44  Watkins  v.  Grieser,  11  Okla.  E.  352;  Colglazier  v.  MeClarj' 
302;    66   Pac.   332.  (Neb.),  98  N.  V  .  679. 

45  VVatkins  v.  Grieser,  11  Okla.  so  Rhode  Island,  etc.,  Co.  v. 
302;    62   Pac.   332.  Board    (R.  I.),    16  Atl.   1063. 

46  VVatkins   v.   Grieser,   supra.  The   provisions    of    the    Indiana 

47  United  States  v.  Johnson,  12  Civil  Code  concerning  an  "agreed 
App.  D.  C.  545 ;  Louisville  v.  Hen-  case"  has  no  application  to  a  hear- 
dricks  (Ky.),  116  S.  W.  747;  ing  for  a  license  in  the  Circuit 
State  V.  HifTgins,  84  Alo.  App.  531.  Court  on   appeal.     North   v.   Bar- 

48 /w  re  Phelps    (Neb.),   116  N.  ringer,   147  Tnd.  224;   46N.  E.  531. 

VV.  681.  Nor    is    the    court    bound    by    an 

40  Jones  V.   Alexander,    168   Ind.  affreeinent  of  the  parties  in  enter- 

140;   7'8  N.  E.  368;   Cain  v.  Allen,  ing    into    stipulations    concerning 

167   Ind.   8;   79  N.  E.  201;    Raga-  the  evidence.     State  v.   Board,   76 

danz  V.  Haines,  168  Ind.  140;  79  N.  Neb.  741;   108  N.  W.  122. 


619  ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES.  §  389 

satisfactory  proof  that  he  is  in  good  faith  a  druggist,  he  has 
the  burden  to  show  that  faet.'''^  If  the  statute  requires  the 
application  to  be  made  a  certain  number  of  days  before  the 
first  day  of  the  term  of  the  court,  and  tlie  application  be  not 
filed  in  time,  the  license  will  be  void;"'-  but  the  coui't  may 
permit,  under  its  rules,  additional  petitions  and  remonstrances 
to  be  filed  after  that  time,  giving  all  concerned  ample  time 
to  examine  them  and  prepare  for  the  hearing.'"'^ 

Sec.  389.     Continuance    of    hearing — Adjourned    meetings. 

Whether  or  not  the  hearing  may  be  continued  until  another 
time  must  depend  upon  some  statute,  as  a  rule,  although  it 
may  be  safely  said  that  a  continuance  may  always  be  had 
unless  some  positive  statute  forbids  it.*''  In  England  the 
justices  are  required  "to  continue  such  meeting  by  adjourn- 
ment to  such  day  or  days,  and  to  such  place  or  places  within 
the  division  or  place  for  which  such  meeting  shall  be  holden, 
as  such  justices  may  deem  most  convenient  and  sufficient  for 
enabling  persons  keeping  inns  within  such  division  to  apply 
for  such  license.  "^^  Under  this  power  it  is  said  that  the 
justices  should  so  augment  the  adjournment  days  as  to  allow 
a  person  who  has  not  given  notice  for  the  general  annual 
licensing  meeting  to  give  such  notice  in  time  for  the  adjourn- 
ment day,  it  being  the  evident  object  of  the  Legisla- 
ture that  justices  should  facilitate  applications  rather  than 
render  them  difficult/'"  So  that,  where  an  applicant  applied 
at  the  general  meeting  for  a  spirit  dealer's  retail  license,  and 
failed  because  he  had  not  then  taken  out  the  dealer's  license, 
it  was  held  that  he  might  take  out  such  license  and  give  full 
notices  for  the  adjournment  day.^^     So  where  the  premises 

51  Hodges  V.  Metealf  Co.  Ct.  117  ss  Ale   House  Act,   1828,   9   Geo. 

Ky.  «I9;    78  S.   W.    177,   460;    25  4,  c.  61,  §    3;   Patterson's  Licens- 

Ky.  L.   Rep.   1553,  1706.  ing  Acts,  p.   188. 

^-  In  re  Crawford,  33  Pa.  Super.  so  Regina  v.   West  Riding,  J.  J. 

Ct.  338.  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  33;   34  J.  P.  44;   L. 

S3/M    re    Reznor    Hotel    Co.,    33  J.  M.  C.   17;    10  B.  &  S.  840. 

Pa.  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  525.  ^^  Regina   v.    Kirkdale,    J.    J.    1 

54  £a?  parte  Hatzen's  League,   5  Q.   B.   Div.   49;    40    J.   P.    39;    45 
Quebec,     Q.     B.     160;     Baxter    v. 
Leche,  79  L.  T.  138;  02  J.  P.  630. 


389 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


620 


were  not  of  sufficient  annual  value  at  the  date  of  the  general 
meeting,  it  was  hold  they  could  be  made  sufficient  in  time 
for  the  adjourned  meeting.^**  The  adjourned  meetings 
under  this  English  act  is  but  a  continuation  of  the  general 
licensing  meeting;  these  two  meetings  form  together,  in  con- 
templation of  law,  but  one  meeting.^''  If  the  licensing  justices 
hona  fide  entertain  doubt  as  to  the  propriety  of  granting  an 
application,  they  may.  at  any  such  meeting,  adjourn  the  con- 
sideration of  the  application,  although  the  applicant  has  re- 
ceived no  notice  of  objection  before  the  meeting  and  no 
objection  is  formally  made  at  the  meeting.  The  licensing 
justices  may  discuss  the  question  of  any  adjournment  in  pri- 
vate and  announce  their  decision  so  to  adjourn  the  case  with- 
out stating  any  reasons.""  Where  the  justices  declined  to 
grant  an  application  for  a  license  because  of  the  bad  character 
of  the  house,  being  frequented  by  prostitutes,  it  was  held  that 
they  might  decline  to  re-hear  the  same  application  on  the  same 
materials  at  the  adjournment  day,  though  a  sufficient  notice 
had  been  given. **' 


L.  J.  M.  C.  36;  33  L.  T.  603;  24 
W.  R.  205;  In  re  Byford,  69  J.  P. 
152. 

58  Regina  v.  West  Riding,  siipra. 

59  Regina  v.  Anglesey,  J.  J.  59 
J.  P.  743;  65  L.  J.  M.  C.  12;  15 
R.  614;  Regina  v.  Armstrong,  65 
L.  J.  M.  C.  35;  Weber  v.  Brink- 
head,  61   J.  P.   664. 

60  Regina  v.  Anglessey  J.  J., 
supra. 

ci  Ex  parte  Rusliworth,  23  L. 
T.    120;    34  J.  P.  676. 

For  other  English  cases  on  un- 
important points  here,  see  Regina 
V.  Bristol  J.  J.,  67  J.  P.  375;  Rex 
V.  Groom  [1901],  2  K.  B.  157;  65 
J.  P.  452;  70  L.  J.  K.  B.  636;  49 
W.  R.  484;  84  L.  T.  534;  17  T. 
L.  R.  433;  Regina  v.  P'arquhar,  L. 
K.  9  Q.  B.  258. 

In  Quebec  it  is  held  that  the 
licensing  commissioners   could   re- 


consider their  action  and  the  next 
year  grant  the  license  to  the  ap- 
plicant. Ex  parte  Hatzen's  Li- 
cense, 5   Q.   B.   ICO    ( Quebec ) . 

Under  the  English  statute  new 
business  cannot  be  taken  up  at 
an  adjourned  meeting.  Rex  v. 
Bristol  Justices,  89  L.  T.  474;  67 
J.  P.   375. 

Wliere  a  license  had  been  re- 
fused at  a  general  meeting,  and 
at  an  adjourned  meeting,  without 
notice,  it  was  granted,  the  license 
was  held  void.  Miles  v.  Rogers, 
36    N.    B.    345. 

If  no  meeting  be  lield  on  date  set 
by  the  statute,  mandamus  lies  to 
compel  the  court  to  convene  and 
hear  the  application.  Ex  parte 
Danaher,  27  N.  B.  554;  17  N.  B. 
44. 

Where  a  statute  required  the 
application    to    be    filed    ten    days 


621  ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES.  §  390 

Sec.  390.     Evidence  at  hearing. 

The  applicant  always  has  the  burden  to  prove  •  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence,  the  material  statements  in  his 
application  whether  a  remonstrance  be  filed  or  not.^-  The 
ordinary  rules  of  evidence,  especially  on  appeal,  should  be 
observed.  Thus,  on  an  appeal,  it  was  held  inadmissible  to 
ask  a  witness  if  he  considered  the  applicant  a  fit  person  to 
have  a  license."^  But  this  statement  must  be  received  with 
caution  when  the  hearing  is  before  the  licensing  board ;  and 
especially  where  that  board  has  a  discretion  in  granting  the 
license,  for  in  the  Indiana  case  just  cited  the  trial  was  before 
a  jury  who  were  to  find  whether  the  applicant  was  a  moral 
person  fit  to  be  entrusted  with  the  privilege  of  selling  liquors 
at  retail.  As  touching  the  fitness  of  the  applicant  from  a 
moral  point  of  view  and  his  fitness  to  keep  a  saloon,  the  eon- 
duct  of  the  persons  visiting  his  place  of  business  may  be 
shown,  although  he  sold  without  a  license  and  violated  no  law.*** 
So  it  may  be  shown  that  his  customers  gambled  or  played 
cards  for  money ;  ^^  or  that  he  permitted  minors  to  play  pool 
or  billiards  in  the  saloon  of  which  he  was  the  manager;  or 
throw  dice  when  things  of  value  were  lost  and  won ;  or  that  he 
sold  liquors  to  them  or  to  an  habitual  drunkard.""     Evidence 

"before   the  first  day  of   court   to  In  re   Prospect   Brewing  Co.,    127 
which    it    is    presented"    and    laid  Pa.  523;    17   Atl.   1090;   24  Wkly. 
before  the  court  at  the  "first  term  N.  C.  177;  Watkins  v.  Grieaer,  11 
thereafter,"   it  was   held  that   the  Okla.  302;  66  Pac.  332. 
matter  might  be  heard  at  a  spec-  His    residence    must    be    proven, 
ial   or   adjourned   term.      State   v.  unless    admitted.      Ex   parte   Pol- 
Mitchell,    127   Mo.   App.   455;    105  lock,  24  X.  S.  Wales,  144;   7  S.  K. 
S.  W.  055.  648;    Smith    v.    Young,    13    Okla. 
G2  Goodwin    v.    Smith,    72    Ind.  134;    74   Pac.    104;    In  re   Kern's 
113;     37    Am.    Rep.     144;     In    re  Appeal,  38  Wkly.  N.  C.  438. 
Reu's  Appeal    (Pa.),  38  W.  N.  C.  ss  stockwell    v.    Brant,    97    Ind. 
438;   Chandler  v.  Ruebelt,  83  Ind.  474;   Watkins  v.  Grieser,  11  Okla. 
139;    Brinkworth  v.   Shembeck,  77  302;  66  Pac.  332. 
Xeb.  71;    108   N.   W.    150;   Appeal  64,stockwell    v.    Brant,    97    Ind. 


of  Reed,  114  Pa.  452;  6  Atl.  910 
Whissen  v.  F-urth,  73  Ark.  366 
84    S.    W.   500;    68   L.  R.   A.    161 


474. 

65  Stockwell    V.    Brant,    97    Ind. 
474. 


In   re    Pollard,    127    Pa.    507;    17  66  piardesty    v.    Iline,    135    Ind. 

!Atl.    1087;    24   Wkly.   N.   C.    181;       72;  34  N.  E.  701;  Pelley  v.  Wills, 


§  390  TBAJ<^PIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  622 

as  bearing  on  the  moral  standing  and  fitness  of  the  applicant 
may  be  given  of  the  surroundings  of  the  site  of  the  proposed 
saloon,  as  that  it  is  near  a  schoolhouse,  or  a  church,  or  college,®'^ 
and  the  kind  of  business  he  intended  carrying  on.''^  Where 
the  statute  makes  the  granting  of  a  license  a  question  of  the 
needs  of  the  neighborhood,  evidence  upon  that  question  may 
be  given,®®  and  where  the  licensee  must  be  a  hotel  keeper  the 
practice  of  private  individuals  entertaining  travelers  may  be 
shown.'''  The  necessity  for  a  place  of  entertainment  is  not  an 
indispensable  one,  but  the  question  what  would  be  the  effect 
upon  efforts  of  those  in  the  neighborhood  to  secure  liquors 
illegally  if  the  license  be  refused  and  they  not  aft'orded  an 
opportunity  to  lawfully  secure  them  cannot  be  shown.'^^  But 
it  is  not  error  to  exclude  evidence  tending  to  show  that  free- 
holders certifying  to  the  applicant's  fitness  for  a  license  had 
not  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  facts.'-  By  demurring  to 
the  petition  a  remonstrant  does  not  admit  immaterial  state- 
ments therein.'^'"  The  allegations  of  the  remonstrance,  though 
under  oath,  are  not  evidence  concerning  the  matters  alleged 
in  the  petition.'^*  The  applicant  may  be  compelled  to  appear 
before  the  board  in  person  and  not  by  attorney  and  submit 
to  an  examination,  and  if  he  refuse,  his  application  may  be 
denied.''^  Even  though  there  be  no  opposition  to  the  granting 
of  the  license,  yet  the  applicant  must  prove  the  allegations 
contained    in    his    petition    if    the    board    requires    it."®      In 

141  Ind.  ■688;  41  N.  E.  354;  In  re  statute  does  not  apply  to  a  brew- 

Jvlamm    (Neb.),    117    N.    W.   991;  er's    or    distiller's    license.      In    re 

In  re  Adamek,  S2  Neb.   448;    118  Reigner,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  401. 

N.  W.   109.  T2  state  v.  Hill,  52  N.  J.  L.  396; 

cTEslinger    v.     East,     100     Ind.  19  Atl.  789. 

434;    State  v.   Gerhardt,    145    Ind.  -:  Devin    v.    Belt,    70    Md.    352; 

439;    44   N.   E.   469;    33   L.   R.    A.  17   Atl.    375. 

313.  ''■^In    re    McCuIlough,    51    Ark. 

08  State   V.   Gerhardt,   stipra.  159;   10  S.  W.  259. 

CO  In    re    Brczgcr,    34    Pa.    Sup.  "'•  In  re  Wheelin,   134   Pa.   554 ; 

Ct.  4-09.  19  Atl.  755;   26  W.  N.  C.  72. 

To7n    re    Seven,    2    Pa.    Co.    Ct.  ~"  Ex   parte    Morgan,    23    L.    T. 

P^ep.  75;  Appeal  of  Rccd,  114  Pa.  •605;    35  J.   P.   37;   Regina  v.   Pil- 

452;   6  Atl.  910;   In  re   Washing-  grim,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.   96;   35  J.  P. 

ton  Co.,  8  Pa.   Co.   Ct.  Rep.   169.  109;   40  L.  J.  M.  C.  3;   23  L.  T. 

Ti/n    re    Brownell,    11    Pa.    Co.  410;    19  VV.  R.  99. 
Ct.   Rep.   404.     Consequently  this 


623  ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES.  §  390 

England  evidence  of  convictions  against  previous  occupiers  of 
the  house,  although  the  character  of  the  applicant  is  good,  is 
evidence  that  the  house  is  of  a  disorderly  character/^  Though 
the  evidence  be  insufficient  to  convict  the  applicant  of  the 
offense  he  is  charged  with  having  committed,  yet  it  is  ad- 
missible for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  he  is  a  fit 
person  to  be  licensed.'^  On  the  question  of  immorality,  specific 
acts  may  be  shown/"  Where  a  statute  requires  an  officer  to 
canvass  in  the  towns  of  the  county  the  statements  of  consent 
given  by  voters  and  determine  the  result,  upon  an  issue  raised 
by  a  remonstrance,  evidence  showing  w'here  various  voters 
resided  is  admissible  to  show  the  number  of  voters  in  each 
particular  town.^"  Affidavits  are  inadmissible  to  prove  a  con- 
troverted fact,  for  an  opportunity  must  be  afforded  to  cross- 
examine  the  witnesses. ^^  The  fitness  of  the  applicant  to  be 
entrusted  with  the  sale  of  liquors  must  be  considered  with 
reference  to  the  place  where  he  desires  to  sell,  as  well  as  his 
moral  character  generally,  for  a  careful  and  prudent  man 
might  be  entrusted  with  the  sale  of  liquor  near  a  schoolhouse, 
for  instance,  when  a  man  whose  tendencies  were  to  conduct  a 

77  Regina  v.  Miskin  Higher  J.  J.,  70  J.  P.  197 ;  75  L.  J.  K.  B.  597 ; 

1  Q.  B.  275;   57  J.  P.  263;  Smith  94  L.  T.  7'S2. 

V.  Shann   [1898],  2  Q.  B.  347;   62  78  Watkins  v.  Grieser,    11   Okla. 

J.  P.  354;   67  L.  J.  Q.  B,  819;   79  302;   66  Pac.  332. 

L.  T.  77;    14  T.  L.  R.  443;    Lati-  79  vVatkins  v.   Grieser,   11   Okla. 

mer  v.  Birmingham  J.  J.,  60  J.  P.  302 ;    66    Pac.    332 ;    Stockwell    v. 

mOn.  Brant,  97   Ind.  474. 

In   England,  on   hearing  an  ap-  so  Porter  v.  Butter  field,  116  Iowa, 

plication    for    a    new    license,    the  725;    89   N.   W.    199;    Watkins   v. 

licensing    justices    have    a    discre-  Grieser,  11  Okla.  302;  66  Pac.  332. 

tion  as  to  whether  they  will  hear  si  Watkins  v.   Grieser,   11   Okla. 

the  evidence  on  oath  or  not;   and  302;    66  Pac.   332;    In   rv  Klamra 

if  a  person   desirous  of  tendering  (Neb.),   117   N.  W.   991.     Tliis  of 

evidence  refuses  to  be  sworn,  they  course  does  not  apply  to   proof  of 

may  refuse   to  hear  him.     Regina  publication   of   notice. 

V.  Sherman   [1898],  1  Q.  B.     578;  In   Iowa   the  official   register   of 

62  J.  P.  296;  67  L.  J.  Q.  B.  460;  the    State    is    conclusive    evidence 

78  L,  T.  320;   46  W.   R.   367;    14  as   to   the    number  of   inhabitants 

L.  T.  R.  2i69.     See  Dartford  Brew-  in  the  city  for  which  a  license  is 

ery  Co.  v.  County  of  London  Quar-  desired.     In  re  Sale  of  Intoxicat- 

ter  Sessions  [1906],  1  K.  B,  695;  ing    Liquors     (Iowa),    79    N.    W. 

260. 


§  390  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  624 

house  which  would  disturb  the  neighborhood  and  expose  the 
children  attending  the  school,  might  not  be  a  fit  man.*-  The 
fact  that  the  applicant  held  a  former  license  is  not  conclusive 
evidence  of  his  good  moral  character  when  a  second  applica- 
tion is  made,  and  on  such  second  application  the  licensing 
board  must  ascertain  his  fitness  at  that  time.^'  In  deter- 
mining whether  those  signing  the  petition  are  freeholders,  a 
witness  may  not  testify  that  the  signers  told  him  they  were 
freeholders  and  that  he  had  examined  a  list  of  freeholders  of 
the  town  prepared  by  a  county  official  and  found  their  names 
thereon,  where  it  is  necessary  to  prove  that  such  signers  were 
freeholders.^*  When  the  question  is  whether  the  applicant  is 
an  unfit  person  to  be  licensed,  it  is  sufficient  to  show  to  the 
judgment  of  reasonable  men  that  he,  or  those  who  may  be 
connected  with  him  in  carrying  on  the  business  of  the  place 
to  be  licensed,  is  in  any  respect  vmfit  for  carrying  on  the  busi- 
ness or  that  his  conduct  of  the  business  in  the  past  has  been 
improper,  illegal  or  likely  to  be  injurious  to  the  public  morals 
and  public  decency,  and  that,  therefore,  he  will  jjrobably  be 
unfit  to  carry  on  the  business  in  the  place,  in  order  to  defeat 
his  application.^^  A  rule  of  the  board  may,  in  some  States, 
dispense  with  the  production  of  evidence  touching  the  appli- 
cant's fitness  or  the  fitness  of  the  place  to  be  licensed,  where 
there  is  no  remonstrance.  Thus,  where  no  such  rule  had 
been  adopted,  but  the  board  announced  at  the  beginning  of  the 
hearing  a  ruling  which  the  applicant  might  fairly  have  in- 
terpreted to  relieve  him  from  the  production  of  oral  evidence 
upon  the  question  of  necessity  for  the  license  in  the  locality 
for  which  it  was  desired,  and  thereafter  the  board  refused 
the  license,  this  was  deemed  error;  but  the  error  was  cured 

82Kunkle     v.     Abell,     167     Ind.  si  Swihart    v.    Hansen,    76    Xeb. 

434;  79  N.  E.  753,  896.  727;   107  N.  W.  862. 

83  State  V.  Hiq;gins,  84  Mo.  App.  ss /n   re   Nolan,    16   Vict.   L.   R. 

531;    MeXeal    v.    Ryan,    56   N.    J.  227;   11  Austr.  L.  T.   156. 

L.  443 ;  28  Atl.  552 ;  United  States  Tlie    finding's    of    the    licensing 

V.    Johnson,    12    App.    Dec.    545;  board    will     seldom    be    disturbed 

Louisville  v.  Hendricks  (Ky.),  116  upon    the    weight    o    the   evidence. 

S.   W.   747.  In  re  MacRae,  75  Neb.  757;  106  N. 

W.    1020. 


625 


ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES.  §  391 


ty  the  board  setting  aside  its  order  of  refusal  and  hearing 
evidence.^" 

Sec.  391.     Licensing  board  acting  upon  its  own  informa- 
tion. 

A  licensing  board  is  not  a  mere  puppet  to  be  moved  merely 
by  an  application  for  a  license.     It  is  not  compelled  to  shut 
its  eyes  to  what  its  members  know  as  individuals.    And  whde 
it  must  be  governed,  as  a  rule,  by  the  evidence,  yet  it  may 
refuse  a  license  where  the  members  know  the  applicant  is  an 
unfit  person,  the  statutes  providing  that  upon  the  production 
of  certain  evidence  it  may   grant  a  license.     The  board  is 
endowed  with  the  duty  to  protect  the  community  from  the 
evil  effects  of  improper  men  coming  into  power  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  and  in  the  exercise  of  that  power  it  must  see 
that  the   public  is   protected.     "The   law   of   the   land   has 
decided,"  said  the   Supreme   Court  of  Pennsylvania,   "that 
licenses'  shall  be  granted  to  some  extent,  and  has  imposed  the 
duty  upon  the  court  of  ascertaining  the  instances  in  which 
the  license  shall  be  granted.     In  order  to  perform  this  duty 
properly,  the  act  of  assembly  has  provided  means  by  which 
the  conscience  of  the  court  may  be  informed  as  to  the  facts. 
It  may  hear  petitions,  remonstrances  or  witnesses;  and  we 
have  no  doubt  the  court  may,  in  some  instances,  act  of  its 
own  knowledge.     The  mere  appearance  of  an  applicant  for  a 
license,  when  he  comes  to  the  bar  of  the  court,  may  be  suffi- 
cient to  satisfy  the  judge  that  he  is  not  a  fit  person  to  keep 
a  public  house.    The  judge  is  not  bound  to  grant  a  license  to 
a  man  whom  he  knows  to  be  a  drunkard  or  a  thief,  or  has 
actual  knowledge   that  his   house   is  not  necessary   for   the 
public  accommodation.     The  object  of  evidence  in  such  cases 
is  to  inform  the  conscience  of  the  court  so  that  it  can  act 
intelligently  and  justly  in  the  performance  of  a  public  duty. 
"While  the  "act  of  deciding  in   such  cases  is,   perhaps,   quasi 
judicial,  the  difference  between  the  granting  or  withholding 
of  a  license  and  the  decision  of  a  question  between  the  parties 

oon  re  Brezger,  34  Pa.  Super.       Super.   Ct.   409;    In  re   Chambers, 
(Ct.    469;     In    re    Brown,     18    Pa.       18   Pa.   Super.   Ct.  412. 


§  391  TR.VFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  626 

to  a  private  litigation  is  manifest."^''  And  in  line  with  this 
quotation  it  has  been  held  that  the  commissioners  of  the 
District  of  Columbia  may  act  upon  their  own  knowledge  of 
the  fitness  of  the  applicant  and  his  premises  for  the  sale  of 
liquors — upon  personal  inspection  of  the  premises  and  upon 
the  unsworn  statements  of  police  officers ;  ^^  and  upon  their 
own  knowledge  that  he  had  violated  the  liquor  laws.^^  Mem- 
bers of  a  city  council  granting  a  license  may  determine 
from  their  own  personal  knowledge  that  an  applicant  is  an 
unfit  person  to  have  a  license,  and  may  deny  his  application 
without  further  investigation,  or  no  investigation,  and  with- 
out stating  the  reasons  on  which  it  bases  its  action.®**  And  so 
may  an  excise  officer  in  refusing  a  license;  and  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed he  did  act  upon  his  own  knowledge,  in  order  to  uphold 
his  decision."^  A  statute  or  ordinance  may  be  so  drafted, 
however,  that  a  licensing  board  must  hear  evidence  offered 
and  cannot  act  alone  upon  its  own  knowledge.  Thus,  an  ordi- 
nance provided  that  "if,  after  the  due  consideration  of  the 
same  by  the  board  of  supervisors,  the  petition  might  be  favor- 
ably acted  upon,"  it  was  held  that  the  phrase  "due  considera- 
tion" required  the  board  to  hear  the  application  on  its 
merits,  and  the  board  could  not  arbitrarily  refuse  to  hear 
evidence   touching   the    fitness   of   the    applicant   to   have    a 

87  In  re  Raudenbusch,  120  Pa.  the  kind  of  house  to  be  licensed, 
St.  32S;  14  Atl.  148;  In  re  Jor-  and  are  bound  to  see  that  the  re- 
gensen,  75  Neb.  401;  lOG  N.  W.  quirements  of  the  statutes  have 
462;  In  re  Reznor  Hotel  Co.,  34  been  complied  with."  Patterson's 
Pa.  Super.  €t.  525.  Licensing  Acts  (19th  Ed.),  p.  183. 

88  United  States  v.  Douglass,  19  soXcLormick  v.  Pfeiffer,  19  S. 
D.  C.  99;  United  States  v.  John-  D.  269;  103  N.  W.  31;  In  re 
son,  12  D.  C.  545;  Attorney  Gen-  Indiana  Co.,  6  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  358; 
eral  v.  Justices,  27  N.  C.  315;  Centerville  v.  Gayken,  20  S.  D. 
Burke   v.    Collins,    18    S.    D.    190;  82;   104  N.  W.  910. 

99  N.  VV.   1112;  In  re  Winder,  24  si  Cooper  v.  Hunt,  103  Mo.  App. 

Pa.  Co.    Ct.    Rep.   90.  9;   77  S.  W.  483;  Ex  parte  Slack, 

89  Appeal  of  Leister  (Pa.),  11  8  Vict.  L.  R.  144;  In  re  Logan,  22 
Atl.  387;  In  re  Raudenbusch,  120  Australia  L.  T.  109;  6  Austr.  L, 
Pa.  St.  328;    14  Atl.   148.  II.    253;     In    re    Chuya,    20    Pa. 

"The  justices  [in  England]  have       Super.  C'x.  410;   In  re  xleznor  Ho« 
in   most   cases  a   large   discretion       tel   Co.,  34  Pa.   Super.  Ct.  525. 
both  as  to  the  kind  of  person  and 


627 


ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES. 


U92 


license."-  In  Pennsylvania  where  a  license  for  a  hotel  could 
only  be  granted  where  it  was  "necessary"  to  have  a  hotel  at 
that  place,  it  was  held  that  the  judge  could  deny  the  applica- 
tion upon  his  individual  opinion  that  it  was  not  necessary."^ 


Sec.  392.    Discretion  of  licensing  board. 

In  some  of  the  States  if  an  applicant  shows  himself  to  come 
within  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  the  licensing  board 
have  no  discretion  in  the  granting  of  a  license  but  must 
award  it.*^*  But  this  cinnot  be  said  of  all  the  States,  for  in 
many  of  them  the  licensing  board  is  vested  with  a  large  dis- 
cretionary power  in  granting  or  refusing  a  license — the  facts 
in  such  case  to  be  considered  and  the  license  granted  or  re- 
fused in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretionary  power. ^^     Some 


82  Reed  v.  Collins,  5  Cal.  App. 
4-94;   90  Pa«.  973. 

83 /n.  re  Thomas,  169  Pa.  Ill; 
32  Atl.  100;  McCormick  v.  Pfeif- 
fer,   19  S.  D.  2G9;    103  N.  W.  31. 

The  licensing  board  should  de- 
termine all  the  circums.tance3, 
whether  of  a  general  or  limited 
nature.  Leigton  v.  Maury,  76  Va. 
865. 

04  Miller  v.  Wade,  58  Ind.  91; 
McLeod  V.  Scott,  21  Ore.  94;  26 
Pac.  lOGl;  29  Pac.  1;  State  v. 
Justices,  15  Ga.  408;  State  v.  New 
Orleans,  113  La.  371;  36  So.  999; 
Zanone  v.  Mound  City,  11  Bradw. 
334;  State  v.  Board,  45  Ind.  501; 
Ex  parte  Lester,  77  Va.  663; 
Henry  v.  Barton,  107  Cal.  535;  40 
Pac.  798;  Cox  v.  Jackson,  152 
Mich.  630;  116  N.  W.  456;  Rome 
V.  Duke,  19  Ga.  93 ;  Beach  v.  Stan- 
stead,  8  Quebec  S.  C  178;  Adams 
V,  Gormley,  69  Ga.  743;  Dough- 
erty V.  Commonwealth,  14  B.  Mon. 
239;  Hodges  v.  Metcalfe  Co.,  116 
Ky,  524;  75  S.  W.  381;  25  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  772. 


95  Ex  parte  Whittington,  34 
Ark.  394;  Schweirman  v.  High- 
land Park  (Ky.),  113  S.  W.  507; 
Ex  parte  Levy,  43  Ark.  42;  51 
Am.  Rep.  550;  In  re  Clore  &  Berry, 
2  B.  C.  131;  United  States  v. 
■Commissioners,  17  D.  C.  409; 
United  States  v.  Douglass,  19  D. 
C.  99;  United  States  v.  Johnson, 
12  D.  C.  '545;  Wiggins  v.  Varner, 
67  Ga.  583;  State  v.  Cheyenne 
(Wyo.),  52  Pac.  975;  Stanley  v. 
Monnet,  34  Kan.  708;  9  Pac. 
755;  Louisville  v.  Kean,  18  B. 
Mon.  9;  Bradley  v.  Thurston,  7 
Hawaii,  523 ;  Hennepin  Co.  v. 
Robinson,  16  Minn.  381;  Perkins 
V.  Ledbetter,  68  Miss.  327;  8  So. 
507;  Hanks  v.  Packett  (Mo.), 
119  S.  W.  25;  Austin  v.  State,  10 
Mo.  591 ;  State  v.  Holt  Co.  Ct.  39 
Mo.  521;  In  re  Nundy,  59  How. 
Pr.  359;  People  v.  Board  (N.  Y,), 
16  N.  Y.  Supp.  798;  People  v. 
Dalton,  7  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  558; 
28  N.  Y.  Supp.  491;  People  v. 
Mills,  91  Hun,  142;  35  N.  Y. 
Supp.  273;    People  v.  Murray,   38 


§392 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


628 


of  these  cases  turn  upon  the  use  of  the  word  ' '  may " ;  ^"^  but 
in  still  others  the  discretionary  power  is  allowed  though  the 
word  "shall"  be  used.  This  will  be  brought  out  by  attend- 
ing to  a  statement  of  the  cases.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that 
although  a  majority  of  the  voters  voted  "for  license,"  yet 
the  licensing  board  in  its  discretion  may  refuse  it ;  ^^  but  the 
board  may  not  grant  a  license  to  some  and  arbitrarily  refuse 
it  to  others."^  In  the  District  of  Columbia,  under  the  dis- 
cretionary power  given  .them  to  grant  licenses,  it  was  held 
that  the  board  of  commissioners  might  adopt  a  rule  that  no 
license  to  sell  at  retail  should  be  granted  to  a  grocery  or  pro- 
vision store.^^  The  exercise  of  a  discretion  in  refusing  a 
license  without  giving  a  reason  therefor  does  not  make  the 
act  one  of  arbitrary  refusal.^  Thus,  a  refusal  to  license  a 
saloon  at  a  street  corner  on  the  ground  that  the  other  three 
corners  had  each  a  saloon  and  no  more  was  needed  in  that 
vicinity,  is  the  exercise  of  such  a  discretion  as  will  not  be 


N.  Y.  Supp.   177;   People  v.  Mur- 
ray, 2  N.  Y.  App.  '607;   37  N.  Y. 
iSupp.    1Q96;    Attorney-General    v. 
Justices,    27    N.    C.    315;    Roy   v. 
Paroisse   de   St.   Paschal,   9   L.  N. 
(Can.)    275;    Muller  v.   Buncombe 
Co.,   89    N.   C.    171;    Hill.sboro    v. 
Smith,    110   N.  €.   417;    14   S.    E. 
972;   Schlandecker  v.  Marshall,  72 
Pa.  200;   Appeal  of  Leister   (Pa.) 
11   Atl.  387;    Centre  Co.  Licenses 
9     Pa.     Co.     Ct.     Rep.     376;     St 
Ames    V.     St.     Francis    de    Sales 
1    Quebec    S.    C.    463;    Appeal    of 
Doberneck,    1   Pa.    Super.   Ct.    99 
38    Wkly.    N.    C.    90;     Appeal    of 
Mead,    161    Pa.   375;    29    Atl.    21 
34  W.  ISr.  C.  373 ;  Appeal  of  Amer 
ican    Brewing    Co.,    161    Pa.    378 
29    Atl.    22;    Perry    v.    Salt    Lake 
City,    7    Utah,    143;    25   Pac.   739, 
998;    11    L.   R.   A.    446;    State   v. 
Stiff,  104  Mo.  App.  685;   78  S.  W; 
675;  In  re  Fanning,  23  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.   '622;    In    re    Trotter,    24    Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  28. 


It  does  not  follow  that  an  ap- 
I^licant  is  entitled  to  a  license 
merely  because  no  evidence  is  of- 
fered by  the  remonstrants.  In  re 
■Chuya,  20  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  410. 

96  Hamilton  Co.  v.  Bailey,  12 
yeb.  56;  10  N.  W.  539;  Ailstock 
V.   Page,   77  Va.  386. 

^T  Ex  parte  Whittington,  34 
Ark.  394;  Wiggins  v.  Varner,  67 
Ga.  583. 

^»Ex  parte  Levy,  43  Ark.  42; 
51  Am.  Rep.  550;  Sarle  v.  Pulaski 
€o.,  76  Ark.  336;  88  S.  W.  953; 
Reed  v.  Collins,  5  Cal.  App.  494; 
90  Pac.  973;  Meyer  v.  Decatur, 
125  111.  App.  556;  Van  Nortvvick 
V.  Bennett,  62  N.  J.  L.  151;  4G 
Atl.   689. 

99  United  States  v.  Commission' 
ers,   17   D.   C.   409. 

1  Stanley  v.  Monnet,  34  Kan. 
708;  9  Pac.  755;  In  re  Sperrig, 
7  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  131;  42  W. 
N.  C.  37. 


629  ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES.  §  392 

reversed.-  A  refusal  to  allow  a  licensee  to  sell  liquors  in  a 
different  locality  from  that  named  in  the  license  will  not  be 
disturbed  on  certiorari  unless  "arbitrarily  denied,  or  denied 
without  good  and  valid  reasons  therefor,"  as  the  statute  pro- 
vides.^ It  is  not  an  abuse  of  discretion  to  refuse  a  license  to  sell 
liquor  in  a  hotel  when  it  is  shown  that  the  applicant  is  not  a 
person  of  good  moral  character  and  that  his  house  has  not 
been  properly  conducted  in  the  past.^  So  it  is  not  an  abuse 
of  discretion  to  refuse  a  license  for  premises  of  bad  repute 
and  a  place  of  resort  for  disorderly  persons.'^  And  although 
a  statute  does  not  allow  a  licensing  board  any  discretion  in 
the  issuance  of  a  license,  yet  members  of  it  are  entitled  to 
exercise  a  sound  legal  discretion,  taking  into  consideration  the 
locality  and  the  wants  of  the  people  and  the  number  of 
retailers  in  the  neighborhood,*'  although  the  statute  provides 
that  it  "shall  grant"  a  license  "to  all  properly  qualified  ap- 
plicants. "  ^  In  the  licensing  of  a  hotel  in  Pennsylvania  the 
licensing  board  have  a  discretion  in  determining  whether  there 
be  a  necessity  for  a  hotel,  and  the  proper  certificate  of  the  stand- 
ing of  the  licensee  does  not  affect  their  right  to  use  that  discre- 
tion.^  Where  the  evidence  was  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  the 

2  People  V.  Board  (N.  Y.),  16  C.  90;  10  Q.  B.  Div.  213;  47  L.  T. 
N.  Y.  Supp.  798.  411;   31  W.  R.  273;    47  J.  P.  388. 

This  was   under   a   statute   pro-  >".  People  v.  Murray,  2  N.  Y.  App. 

viding  that   no   license   should   be  Div.  607;   37  N.  Y.  Supp,  1096. 
granted    unless    the    board    "shall  6  Attorney-General    v.    Justices, 

l>e      satisfied      upon      examination  27   N.  C.   315. 

*     *     *     that  a  license  may  prop-  7  Miller  v.  Buncombe  Co.,  89  N. 

erly   be   granted    for    such    sale    in  C.    171;    Hillsboro    v.    Smith,    110 

the    place    proposed."      People    v.  X.  C.  417;    14  N.  E.  972;   Perkins 

Dalton,   7   N.   Y.   Misc.   Rep.   558;  v.  Loux    (Idaho),  95  Pac.  694. 
28    N.    Y.    Supp.    491;    People    v.  s  Schlandecker    v.    Marshall,    72 

Murray,  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  177.  Pa.  200;   In  re  Reznor  Hotel  Co., 

3  People  V.  Board,  91  Hun,  269;  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  525;  Appeal 
39   N.  Y.   Supp.    158.  of  Mead,  161  Pa.  375;  29  Atl.  21: 

4  People  V.  Mills,  91  Hun,  142;  34  W.  N.  C.  373;  Appeal  of  Amer- 
36  N.  Y.  Supp.  273;  Sharpe  v.  ican  Brewing  Co.,'  161  Pa.  378; 
Wakefield,  60  L.  J.  M.  C.  73;  29  Atl.  22;  In  re  Chuya,  20  Pa. 
[1891],  App.  Cas.  173;  64  L.  T.  Super.  Ct.  410;  Campbell  v. 
180;  39  W.  R.  551;  55  J.  P.  197;  Thomasville  (CJa.),  64  S.  E.  815. 
Kay  V,  Oves  Darwen,  52  L.  J.  M.  This   does   not  apply  to   a   distil- 


§  392  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  630 

necessity  of  a  wholesale  license,  the  court  having  no  personal 
knoAvledge  of  the  matter,  and  there  was  no  objection  either  to 
the  applicant  or  his  place,  it  was  held  that  the  court  had  no 
discretion  in  the  matter  and  must  grant  the  license.'  "Where 
an  ordinance  provided  that  *'if,  after  due  consideration  of 
the  same  by  the  board  of  supervisors,"  they  might  act  favor- 
ably upon  the  petition  of  the  applicant,  the  phrase  "due 
consideration"  was  held  to  mean  a  consideration  of  the  appli- 
cation upon  its  merits,  based  upon  the  evidence,  and  the  board 
held  no  power  to  arbitrarily  refuse  a  license  without  a  suffi- 
cient hearing  of  the  evidence.'"  Where  a  statute  provides 
that  no  license  shall  be  granted  if  a  majority  of  the  voters 
remonstrate,  when  such  a  remonstrance  is  filed,  with  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  legal  names  thereto,  the  board  has  no  dis- 
cretion, and  must  refuse  the  license.'^  But  if  at  an  election 
for  license  or  no  license  the  election  results  in  favor  of 
licenses,  then  the  licensing  board  or  city  council  have  no  power 
to  arbitrarily  refuse  to  grant  a  license.'-  But  this  vote  does 
not  take  away  from  the  board  its  discretion  to  refuse  to  license 
an  improper  person  or  to  license  a  saloon  at  an  improper 
place. '^  Discretion  to  issue  a  license  is  a  thing  that  a  licensing 
board — not  even  a  city — can  bargain  away.'*     It  is  not  an 

ler's    license.      Appeal    of    Doyles-  439;    44  N.   E.   469;    33   L.   R.   A. 

town  Distillery  €o.,  41   VV.  N.  C.  313. 

313.  12  c.  B.  George  &  Bro.  v.  Win- 
It  may  be  remarked  that  the  Chester,  118  Ky.  429;  80  S.  W. 
cases  of  In  re  Pollard,  127  Pa.  1158;  26  Ky.  L.  Rep.  170. 
507;  17  Atl.  1087;  and  In  re  Pros-  i3  Riley  v.  Rowe,  112  Ky.  817; 
pect  Brewing  Co.,  127  Pa.  St.  523;  66  S.  W.  999;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  2168. 
17  Atl.  1090,  differ  from  the  other  i4  State  v.  Stiff,  104  Mo.  App. 
Pennsylvania  cases;  but  these  two  685;  78  S.  W.  675. 
decisions  are  based  upon  local  stat-  In  England  the  discretion  of  the 
utes  wherein  the  licensing  board  justices  is  limited  to  four  grounds 
was  given  no  discretion.  named   in   the   statute.     Ex  parte 

9  In  re  Winder,  24  Pa.   Co.  Ct.  Flinn,  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  1025  [1899]; 
Rep.   90.  2  Q.  B.  607;  81  L.  T.  221;  48  W. 

10  Reed   V.   Collins,   5    Cal.   App.       R.  29;   63  J.  P.   740. 

494 ;    90   Pac.   973 ;    In  re   Reznor  In   New    York    county    treasury 

Hotel  Co.,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  officials    cannot    refuce     to     issue 

525.  tax    certificates   where    a    vote    in 

11  State   V.    Gerhardt,    145    Ind.  favor  of  licenses  has  been  taken, 


631 


ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES. 


§392 


abuse  of  discretion  to  refuse  to  license  a  saloon  situated  neat  a 
church,^'*  nor  near  a  post-office  and  United  States  court  house, 
or  in  any  locality  where  children  and  women  visit  for  proper 
purposes.'"  But  where  a  Hawaiian  statute  provides  "that  no 
license  shall  be  issued  for  any  lodging  or  tenant  house,  hotel, 
boarding  house  or  restaurant  to  be  established  or  maintained 
in  any  location  which  in  the  opinion  of  the  executive  council  is 
unsuited  for  the  purposes,  or  which  the  executive  council 
believes  to  be  objectionable,"  it  was  held  that  it  was  void,  for 
the  reason  that  it  subjected  the  contractual  rights  of  persons 
to  the  arbitrary  discretion  of  the  council  and  contained 
nothing  to  guide  or  control  the  exercise  of  its  discretion.^^ 
"Where  a  city  was  empowered  to  issue  only  two  licenses  in 
every  half  block,  and  if  there  were  more  than  two  applica- 
tions for  any  half  block  the  council  should  determine  which 
should  be  accepted  on  the  question  of  priority  of  applications ; 
and  there  were  three  applications,  the  first  and  third  of  which 
were  granted;  it  was  held  that  this  fact  did  not  show  an  abuse 
of  discretion,  though  the  council  in  acting  on  the  applications 
did  not  discuss  the  priority  of  filing  nor  the  qualifications  of 
the  applicants.^* 


on  the  ground  that  the  statement 
of  the  town  clerk  a3  to  such  vote 
is  legally  insufficient.  People  v. 
Hamilton,  27  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
360;  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  959;  People 
V.  Hilliard,  28  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
140;   50  N.  Y.   Supp.  909. 

15  Dunne  v.  Kretzman,  130  ill. 
App.  469;  228  111.  31;  81  N.  E. 
790. 

16  Jungenheimer  v.  State  Jour- 
nal Co.,  81  Neb.  «30;  116  N.  W. 
•964;  In  re  Close  &  Berry,  2  B.  C. 
131;  Harrison  v.  People,  222  111. 
150;   7'8  N.  E.   52,  222. 

17  Tai  Kee  v.  Minister  of  In- 
terior, 12  Hawaii,  1^64. 

A  city  (or  officer)  having  a  dis- 
cretion to  grant  a  license,  is  not 
liable    for    refusing    to    grant    it. 


Stanstead  v.  Reach  [1899],  8 
Quebec  Q.  B.  276;  overruling  8 
Quebec  C.  S.   178. 

isEergeer  v.  DcLoach,  121  S.  E. 
591. 

Where  the  statute  provided  that 
the  county  court  "shall  grant"  a 
liquor  license  on  the  applicant 
bringing  hiinself  within  certain  re- 
quirements; and  then  declared 
that  on  appeal  the  circuit  court 
"may  grant  the  license,"  it  was 
held  that  the  latter  words  meant 
that  the  circuit  court  must  grant 
the  license  if  the  applicant, 
brought  himself  within  the  re- 
quirements, and  the  statute  did 
not  confer  upon  it  arbitrary 
power.  Leighton  v.  Maury,  76  Va. 
865. 


§  393         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  632 

Sec.  393.     Character  of  discretion. 

A  licensing  board,  however  broad  a  discretion  it  may  pos- 
sess, cannot  act  arbitrarily  and  deny  a  license. ^'^  The  dis- 
cretion that  will  justify  the  refusal  of  a  license  must  be  a 
legal  discretion  and  exercised  in  a  judicial  manner.-"  An  abuse 
of  discretion  may  consist  in  arbitrarily  refusing  the  license 
where  the  applicant  has  decided  that  the  facts  exist  entitling 
the  applicant  to  a  license.-^  The  fact  that  the  number 
of  remonstrants  exceeded  the  number  of  petitioners  for  a 
hotel  and  a  license  therein  is  not  conclusive  that  the  license 
is  not  a  matter  of  public  necessity,  its  refusal  to  grant  the 
license  does  not  show  an  arbitrary  use  of  its  discretion.--  The 
discretion  must  be  a  judicial  one  and  not  a  mere  capricious 
act,  regardless  of  the  special  circumstances  of  each  applicant.-^ 
''Discretion  is  a  science  or  understanding  to  discern  between 
falsity  and  truth,  between  right  and  wrong,"  it  has  been  said, 
"between  shadows  and  substance,  between  equity  and  color- 
less glasses  and  pretense,  and  not  to  do  according  to  the  will 
and  private  affections."-^  "Discretion  means,"  said  Lord 
Halsbury,  "something  is  to  be  done  within  the  discretion  of 
the  authorities,  that  something  is  to  be  done  within  the 
rules  of  reason  and  justice,  and  not  according  to  private 
opinions;  according  to  law  and  not  humor.  It  is  to  be  not 
arbitrarily  vague  and  fanciful,  but  legal  and  regular."-^   No 

19  Appeal  of  Kelminski,  164  Pa.  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  525;  Ensley  v. 
231;  30  Atl.  301;  35  W.  N.  C.  State  (Ind.),  88  N.  E.  62;  Leigh- 
309;     Centre    Co.    License,    9    Pa.       ton  v.  Maury,  76  Va.  865. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  376;  Appeal  of  Mead,  21  United  States  v.  Douglass,  19 

161   Pa.    375;    29   Atl.   21;    34   W.  D.  C.   99. 

JSI.    C.    373;    Appeal    of    American  22  7^    re    Sparrow,    138    Pa.    St. 

Brewing    Co.,     161     Pa.    378;     29  116;   20  Atl.  711;   In  re  King,  23 

Atl.   22.  VV.  N.  C.  152;   16  Atl.  487. 

20  Appeal  of  Doberneck,  1  Pa.  23  Regina  v.  Boteler,  4  B.  &  S. 
Super.  Ct.  99;  38  W.  N.  C.  90;  959;  33  L.  J.  M.  C.  101;  28  J.  P. 
Louisville  v.  Kean,  18  B.  Mon.  9;  453. 

State   V.  Durein,   70  Kan.    13;    80  24  Rooke's    Case     (40    Eliz.),    5 

Pac.   987;    affirming  78   Pac.    152;  Co.  Rep.   503;   Keighley's  Case    (7 

70  Kan.   1;    State  v.  Sheasley,  71  Jac.  1),  10  Co.  Rep.  501. 

Kan.   857;    80  Pac.  997;    State  v.  25  sharp    v,     Wakefield     [1891], 

New  Orleans,  113  La.  371;  36  So.  App.  Cas.  179. 

999;   In  re  Reznor  Hotel  Co.,  34 


633 


ISSUANCE    OP    LICENSES. 


§393 


action  lies  against  a  licensing:  board  for  a  refusal  to  exercise 
its  discretion  and  grant  a  license.-''  Under  the  English  Act  of 
1828  ^^  the  justices  may  rightly  refuse  a  new  license,  on  the 
ground  that  there  are  already  too  many  ale  houses,-®  or  that 
the  house  is  too  far  removed  from  police  supervision.-^  They 
do  wrong,  however,  to  lay  down  a  rule  before  hearing  the 
applications,  such  as  they  will  refuse  all  licenses,  except  the 
party  will  promise  to  take  out  an  excise  license  to  sell  spirits.^" 
Nor  can  they  lay  down  any  general  rule  beforehand  to  fetter 
their  discretion,  for  they  ought  to  consider  the  circumstances 
of  each  case  independently.^^  They  may  refuse  a  license  to  a 
person  who  does  not  intend  to  sell  under  it."-  But  neither  an 
officer  nor  a  licensing  board,  though  they  are  endowed  with 
discretionary  powers,  may  refuse  a  license  on  the  ground  of 
his  personal  views  that  the  scope  of  the  license  law  is  against 
public  policy.^' 


26  Bassett  v.  Goodchild,  3  Wils. 
121. 

27  9  Geo.  4,  c.  Gl. 

28  Regina  v.  Lancashire  J.  J., 
L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  97;  35  J.  P.  170; 
40  L.  J.  M.  C.  17;  23  L.  T.  401; 
19  W.  R.  204;  Regina  v.  Howard 
[190::],  2  K.  B.  3G3;  66  J.  P.  579; 
71  L.  J.  K.  B.  754;  86  L.  T.  839; 
51  W.  R.  21;    18  T.  L.  R.  090. 

29  Sharp  V.  VVakelield  [1891], 
App.  Cas.  173;  55  J.  P.  197;  60 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  209;  64  L.  T.  180;  39 
W.  R.  561;   7  T.  L.  R.  389. 

30  Regina  v.  Sylvester,  31  L.  J. 
M.  C.  93;  26  J.  P.  151;  2  B.  &  C. 
322;  5  L.  T.  794;  8  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
484. 

31  Regina  v.  Walsall,  24  L.  T. 
(O.  S.)  Ill;  18  J.  P.  757;  3  VV. 
R.  '69;    3    C.   L.   R.    100. 

32  Regina  v.  Wilkinson,  10  L. 
T.  370;   28  J.  P.  597. 

33  In  re  Indiana  Co.,  6  Pa.  Dist. 
Hep.   35'8. 

In  New  York  are  some  conflict- 


ing decisions  upon  the  right  of 
licensing  commissioners  to  refuse 
a  license  in  their  discretion.  If 
the  highest  Appellate  Court  has 
settled  the  question,  the  decision 
has  not  come  to  our  notice.  Un- 
der the  law  of  1902,  c.  401,  §  41, 
no  license  can  be  issued  if  a  ma- 
jority of  the  voters  have  voted 
for  prohibition  when  the  question 
was  submitted  to  them.  Without 
such  a  vote  having  been  taken, 
licensing  boards  refused  licenses 
on  the  ground  that  they  were 
elected  as  "no  license"  commis- 
sioners— no  statute  providing  for 
such  an  issue — and  it  was  held 
in  a  number  of  cases  that  they 
might  so  refuse.  People  v.  Turner, 
4  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  247;  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  913;  judgment  affirmed  71 
Hun,  614;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1148; 
People  v.  Warsaw,  4  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  547;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  739; 
People  v.  Randolph,  76  Hun,  224; 
27  N.  Y.  Supp.  41. 


§  394  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  634 

Sec.  394.    Discretion  of  municipalities  in  granting  licenses. 

In  the  absence  of  a  constitutional  inhibition  a  Legislature 
may  confer  upon  the  municipalities  of  a  State  the  right  to 
determine  the  places  where  saloons  may  be  kept  and  to  deter- 
mine that  question  upon  each  application.  In  determining 
such  question  other  considerations  than  mere  locality  must 
often  enter  into  the  consideration  of  the  suitableness  of  the 
place  for  a  saloon,  and  if  the  building  be  so  arranged  as  to 
render  violation  of  the  law  easy,  or  if  the  saloon  is  to  be  kept 
in  connection  with  a  house  of  prostitution,  or  if  it  be  not 
situated  upon  a  street  or  alley,  or  if  it  be  one  of  the  upper 
stories  of  a  building,  or  in  a  part  of  the  city  occupied  for 
residence  purposes  only,  or  near  a  school,  such  conditions 
would  certainly  afford  good  reasons  for  the  rejection  of  an 
application  for  a  license.^^  But  the  rule  is  that  a  common 
council,  empowered  to  issue  licenses,  has  no  discretion  if  the 
applicant  has  complied  with  all  the  requirements  of  the  statute 
and  ordinance.^'"'  Yet,  in  Kentucky  it  is  held  that  the  city 
authorities  have  a  judicial,  though  not  an  arbitrary  discretion 
in  refusing  a  license/'"  and  so  in  Mississippi,^"  and  New  York.^^ 

But  a  number  of   decisions   are  and    they    had    been    so    occupied 

to    the    contrary,    holding    such    a  for    fifty    years,    it    was    hali    an 

decision  "arbitrary"  and  "without  abuse  of   discretion  to  refuse  him 

good  or  valid  reasons."     People  v.  a    license.       Louisville    v.     Gagen 

•Claverack,  4  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  330;  (Ky.),  116  S.  W.  745;   118  S.  W. 

25  N.    Y.    Supp.    322;    People    v.  947. 

iSymonds,   4   N.    Y.   Misc.   Rep.   G;  s*  Sherlock   v.   Stuart,   &6   Mich. 

23  N.  Y.  Supp.  6-89;   McXaughton  193;     Dunne    v.    Kretzmami,    130 

V.  Argyle,  5  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  547;  111.  App.  469;  affirmed  228  111.  31; 

26  N.  Y.  Supp.  "29;  People  v.  81  N.  E.  790  •.  Perry  v.  Salt  Lake 
Brunswick,  13  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  City,  7  Utah,  143;  25  Pac.  739, 
537;   35  N.  Y.  Supp.  6.59.  998;    11  L.  R.  A.  446;  McCormick 

It   is  no   abuse   of  discretion   to  v.  Pfeifler,   10   N.  W.  31. 

refuse  a  license  for  an   unsuitab'e  33  Henry    v.    Barton,     107    Cal. 

place,    though    the    applicant    has  535;   40  Pac.  798;   Rome  v.  Duke, 

complied   fully   with   all   thu   stat-  19  Ga.  93;   Meyer  v.  Decatur,  125 

utes    and    possesses    the    requisite  111.   App.   556. 

moral     and     other     qualifications.  -"s  Louisville     v.     Kean,     18     B. 

Ex  parte  Abrams    (Tex.),    120   S.  Mon.  9. 

W.   883;    Ex  -parte  Clark    (Tex.),  •"  Perkins  v.  Ledbettor.  68  :Miss. 

120    S.    W.    892.      But    where   the  327;   8  So.  507. 

petitioner  had  occupied  the  prem-  ss  In  re  Nundy,  59  How.  Pr.  359. 
ises  with  a  saloon  for  ten  years, 


635 


ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES 


§395 


A  city  cannot  by  ordinance,  reserve  the  power  to  arbitrarily 
rpfnsf^  to  issue  a  license.^" 


refuse  to  issue  a  license.^" 


Sec.  395.    Review  or  control  of  discretion  of  licensing  board. 

Where  the  licensing  board  or  court  may  exercise  a  dis- 
cretion whether  it  will  grant  a  license,  unless  arbitrarily  ex- 
ercised, it  is  not  subject  to  control  by  a  writ  of  mandamus.*" 
And  this  is  true,  although  its  reasons  for  its  decisions  may 
be  erroneous.*^  And  even  where  an  appeal  lies  from  refusal 
to  grant  a  license,  the  discretion  of  the  board  in  refusing  the 
license  is  not  reviewable.^-  But  if  there  has  been  a  manifest 
and  arbitrary  abuse  of  the  discretion,  a  court  of  review  will 
intervene  upon  that  fact  appearing  of  record  and  set  aside 
the  order  of  refusal;*'   and  may  control  their  action  when 


39  Meyer  v.  Decatur,  125  111. 
App.  556. 

In  Oklahoma  a  statute  pro- 
vided that  a  licensee  of  a  county, 
on  presentation  of  his  license  to 
a  city  of  the  first  class,  should 
be  entitled  to  a  city  license;  and 
it  was  held  that  a  city  of  that 
class  within  the  county  could  not 
refuse  him  a  city  license.  Terri- 
tory V.  Robertson  (Okla.),  92  Pac. 
144. 

40  Dunbar  v.  Frazer,  78  Ala. 
538;  Ex  parte  Whittington,  34 
Ark.  394;  Batters  v.  Dunning.  49 
€onn.  479;  State  v.  Board,  45 
Ind.  501;  Devin  v.  Belt,  70  Md. 
352;  17  Atl.  375;  State  v.  Carver 
Co.,  60  Minn.  510;  02  N.  W.  1135; 
State  V.  Hudson,  13  Mo.  App.  61; 
Hamilton  Co.  v.  Bailey,  12  Neb. 
56;  10  N.  W.  539;  People  v.  Nor- 
ton, 7  Barb.  477 ;  Attorney  General 
V.  Guilford  Co.,  27  N.  C.  315; 
Jones  V.  Moore  Co.,  106  N.  C.  436; 
11  S.  E.  514;  Maxton  v.  Robeson, 
107  N.  C.  335;  12  S.  E.  92;  In  re 
Knarr,  127  Pa.  554;  18  Atl.  639; 
In  re  Collarn,  134  Pa.  551;  19  Atl. 
755;    26   W.  N.   C.   73;    Ex  parte 


Yeager,  11  Graft.  655;  In  re 
Cramer,  23  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  596; 
In  re  Chuya,  20  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
410;  Mathias  v.  Dulpin  Co.,  122 
N.  C.  416;  30  S.  E.  23;  I.  A.  West 
&  Co.  V.  Board,  14  Idaho,  353;  94 
Pac.  445;  hi  re  Henry,  124  Iowa, 
358;   100  N.  W.  43. 

•11  Ramagnano  v.  Crook,  85  Ala. 
226;  3  So.  845;  Wilcox  v.  Bryant, 
156  Ind.  379;  59  N.  E.  1049. 

42  Appeal  of  Hopson,  65  Conn. 
140;  31  Atl.  531;  Nepp  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 2  Duv.  546;  Raleigh 
V.  Kane,  47  N.  C.  288 ;  In  re  Con- 
way (Pa.),  1  Atl.  727;  Appeal  of 
Reed,  144  Pa.  459;  6  Atl.  910; 
In  re  Randenbusch,  120  Pa.  328; 
14  Atl.  148;  French  v.  Noel,  22 
Graft.  454;  Ex  parte  Clark,  69 
Ark.  435;  64  S.  W.  223;  In  re 
Friedman,  7  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  639. 

43  Nepp  V.  Commonwealth,  2 
Duv.  546;  Hoglan  v.  Common- 
wealth, 3  Bush,  147;  Thompson  v. 
Koch,  98  Ky.  400;  33  S.  W.  96; 
17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  941;  In  re  Excise 
License  (N.  Y.),  38  N.  Y.  Supp. 
425. 


§  396  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  636 

there  has  been  a  refusal,  by  a  Avrit  of  mandamus.*^  If  the 
board  or  court  has  a  discretion  in  the  issuance  of  a  license, 
it  cannot  be  prevented  from  issuing  it  by  an  injunction.'*^ 
And  where  a  writ  of  certiorari  lay  to  reverse  a  board's  action 
where  the  license  had  been  "arbitrarily  or  unreasonably  re- 
fused, ' '  it  was  held  that  the  hearing  must  be  on  the  writ,  the 
return,  and  the  papers  on  which  the  writ  was  granted,  and 
the  commissioners  having  stated  in  their  return  that  they  had 
determined  by  a  majority  vote  not  to  grant  any  license  to  the 
applicant,  their  action  could  not  be  reversed  because  the  ques- 
tion of  issuance  rested  in  their  discretion.*®  It  is  immaterial 
that  the  voters  of  the  licensing  district  have  expressed  them- 
selves favorably  to  the  issuance  of  the  license;  if  the  board 
has  a  discretion  in  issuing  it,  their  action  will  not  be  reviewed.*^ 
If  a  superior  court  undertakes  to  interfere  with  the  discretion 
of  the  licensing  board  or  court,  a  writ  of  prohibition  will  lie 
from  the  Supreme  Court  to  restrain  the  interference  by 
supersedeas  and  ^vrit  of  error.*^ 

Sec.  396.     Reasons  for  refusal. 

The  licensing  board  should  refuse  to  grant  an  application 
where  it  is  not  signed  by  a  sufficient  number  of  voters,  and 
if  there  Be  any  serious  questions  whether  some  of  those  sign- 
ing are  not  legal  voters,  and  by  deducting  their  names  from 
other  signers  the  application  would  not  be  signed  by  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  legal  voters,  their  action  will  not  be  con- 
trolled by  a  writ  of  mandamus.*®  An  habitual  drunkard 
who  had  kept  a  saloon  as  a  disorderly  house  and  is  incapable 
of  keeping  a  saloon,  should  be  refused  a  license. °'*    A  single  act 

44  Zanone  v.  Mound  City,  103  Schomaker,  15  >J.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
111.   552;    Heblick  v.   Hancock   Co.       048;   38  N.  Y.  Supp.  167. 

Ct.   (Ky.),  10  S.  W.  465.  *' Maxton   v.    Robeson    Co.,    107 

45  Leigh  V.   Westervelt,   2   Duer.       N.  C.  335;   12  S.  E.  92. 

618;  Ailstock  v.  Page,  77  Va.  386;  48  Ailstock  v.  Page,  77  Va.  386. 

Nasi    V.    Eden,    89    Wis.  610;    62  49  state  v.   Sumter   Co.,  22   Fla. 

X.   W.   409.  364. 

46  People  V.  Montgomery  (N.  ^o  Bronson  v.  Dunn,  124  Ind. 
Y.),  25  X.  Y.  Supp.  S73;  see)  252;  24  N.  E.  749;  Perkins  v. 
In  re  Bloomingdale,  72  N.  Y.  St,  Loux,  14  Idaho,  607;  95  Pac.  694; 
S50;    38   X.   Y.   Supp.   162;    In  re  In  re  Klamm    (Neb.),   117  N.  W. 

991. 


637  ISSUANCE   OP   LICENSES.  §  396 

of  intoxication  in  a  public  place,  tliongh  a  misdemeanor,  will 
not  justify  a  refusal  of  a  license,  if  there  be  no  other  objec- 
tions to  the  applicant."^  Where,  on  appeal,  a  trial  of  the 
application  is  had  by  a  jury,  the  question  of  the  applicant's 
fitness  is  one  for  the  jury  and  not  for  the  court.'-  If  the  ap- 
plication be  for  a  druggist's  license  to  sell  liquors  it  should 
be  denied  if  it  appear  that  the  applicant  merely  assumed 
the  vocation  of  a  druggist  in  order  to  secure  a  license  to  retail 
liquors. •'^'  In  such  an  instance  the  application  must  be  made  in 
good  faith  or  it  will  be  denied.  So  the  license  may  be  denied 
if  it  be  shown  that  the  applicant  had  sold  liquors  to  minors, 
knowing  them  to  be  such,  or  on  Sundays,  or  kept  a  gambling 
and  disorderly  house  within  a  year  or  less  before  the  date  of 
the  application,  or  did  all  those  unlawful  acts,  and  an  answer 
to  that  effect  in  an  application  for  a  writ  of  mandamus  to 
compel  the  issuance  of  the  license  is  sufficient.^*  It  ha.s  been 
held  that  although  by  statute  it  was  made  the  duty  of  the 
board  to  refuse  an  application  for  a  license  if  such  illegal 
acts  were  shown,  yet  that  did  not  limit  the  board  in  making  a 
refusal,  for  it  might  refuse  it  on  other  sufficient  grounds.^"' 
In  the  same  State  from  which  these  cases  are  cited  it 
was  made  a  misdeameanor  to  sell  adulterated  liquor.  On  an 
application  a  chemist  testified  that  he  had  analyzed  a  glass 
of  whisky  applicant  had  sold  within  a  year  before  (the  stat- 
utory limitation),  and  found  that  it  contained  common  sugar, 
charcoal  (which  might  have  come  from  the  barrel),  fusel  oil, 
and  tannate  of  iron;  that  the  iron  was  an  extraneous  mat- 
ter,   the    fusel   oil    resulted    from    the    process    of    distilling; 

51  Lynch  v.  Bates,  1.39  Ind.  206;  Neb.   607;   41  N.  W.  558;   Living- 

38  N.  E.  '806.  ston  v.  Corey,  33  Xeb.  366;  50  N. 

52Groscup  V.   Rainier,   111    Ind.  W.  263;   In  re  Quirk,   17  Pa.  Co. 

361;    12   N.   E.   694;    Hardesty   v.  Ct.  Rep.  327;  In  re  Bailey,  5  Pa. 

Hine,  135  Ind.  72;   34  N.  E.  701;  Dist.  Rep.  172;   In  re  Rutherford, 

Lynch  v.  Bates,   139   Ind.  206;   38  2    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    Rep.    78;    In    re 

N.    E.    806;    Pelley    v.    Wills,    141  Meredith,   2   Pa.   Co.   Ct.  Rep.   82; 

Ind.   688;    41   N.  E.   354.  In  re  Adamek,   82   Neb.   448;    118 

53  Evans    v.    Commonwealth,    95  N.  \V.   109. 

Ky.  231;   24  S.  W.  632.  ^^  State  v.  Hanlan,  24  Xeb.  608; 

54  State  V.  Cass  Co.,  12  Neb.  54;       39  N.  W.  780. 
10  N.  W.  571 ;    State  v.  Koso,  25 


§  396  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  638 

that  the  whisky  had  been  thinned  with  water,  and  sugar  was 
not  a  part  of  pure  whisky.  It  was  held  that,  although  only  a 
single  sale  was  shown,  the  license  must  be  denied.'"'"  It  has 
been  held,  where  the  application  and  license  had  to  specify 
the  place  where  the  saloon  would  be  located,  that  a  covenant 
in  the  deed  of  conveyance  prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquors  on 
the  premises  was  good  ground  for  refusing  the  license ;  ■'''  and 
it  has  also  been  held  that  it  was  not."'^  Where  the  application 
was  for  a  license  to  sell  liquors  in  an  amusement  building 
which  was  used  for  amusements  only  a  part  of  the  time, 
during  which  it  was  illegal  to  sell  liquors  therein,  it  was 
held  improper  to  refuse  a  license  merely  because  it  was 
an  amusement  building.'"  And  although  a  hotel  may  be 
needed  at  the  place  for  which  a  license  is  applied  (which  in- 
cluded the  right  to  sell  liquors  at  retail), „ which  must  be  shown 
before  the  license  could  be  granted,  yet  if  it  be  shown  that  the 
applicant  has  violated  the  law  his  application  must  be  re-; 
fused."''  Where  a  license  had  been  refused  a  year  before,  and 
the  situation  was  not  changed,  that  was  held  a  sufficient  reason 
for  refusing  it  a  second  time."^  The  fact  that  the  applicant 
is  not  a  resident  of  the  licensing  district  is  no  reason  for 
refusing  him  a  license  unless  the  statute  requires  him  to  have 
his  residence  there.*'-  A  distiller's  license  to  sell  at  whole- 
sale in  a  certain  city  has  been  refused  on  the  ground  that 
his  distillery  was  not  there  located,  the  distillery  was  not  nec- 
essary, the  applicant  Avas  not  doing  a  legitimate  business,  and 
a  former  occupant  had  violated  the  liquor  laws."^     The  fact 

56  Livingston   v.    Corey,   33   Neb.  Rep.  584;'  Appeal  of  D'Amato,  80 
3m;  50  N.  W.  2(53.  Conn.  357;   &8  Atl.  445. 

57  In    re    Snyder,    2    Pa.    Dist.  ^-  Appeal    of    Dorbeneek,    1    Pa. 
785;  In  re  Fanning,  23  Pa.  Super.  Super.  Ct.  99;  38  W.  N.  C  90. 
Ct.    622;    Jn    re    Trotter,    24    Pa.  ^^In  re  Johnson,    165   Pa.   315; 
Super.   Ct.   26.  31  Atl.  203. 

58  Barnegat,  etc.,  Ass'n  v.  Busby,  Subsequently    it   was    held    that 
44  N.  J.  L.  627.  the    requirements    that    the    place 

50  People  V.   Woodman,   5  N.  Y.  licensed  must  be  necessary  for  the; 

St.   Rep.   318.  accommodation   of   the   public   had 

60  Appeal    of    Wright,    1    Wilcox  no    application    to    a   distiller's    li- 

(Pa. ),   85;    Apjx-al   of   Leister,   20  cense.     Appeal  of  Gemas,    169  Pa. 

W.  N.  C.  224.  43;   32  Atl.  88;   36  W.  N.  C.  367. 

81  in  re  Johnson,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 


639 


ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES. 


§396 


that  an  applicant's  bartender  has  violated  the  liquor  laws 
without  the  applicant's  consent  or  knowledge  is  not  sufficient 
ground  upon  which  to  deny  him  a  license.*^*  If  the  evidence 
shows  that  the  applicant  is  seeking  a  license  for  two  places 
of  business — as  where  he  has  two  adjoining  houses  with  a 
passageway  between  them,  with  separate  front  entrances — a 
license  may  be  refused."^  So  if  he  already  has  a  license.*^^  If 
a  statute  forbids  a  second  application  within  a  year,  when  a 
refusal  of  a  license  has  been  made,  if  a  second  application  be 
made  there  must  be  an  absolute  refusal.''"    But  it  is  not  a  suffi- 


c4Pelley  v.  Wills,  141  Ind.  688; 
41  N.  E.  354. 

In  Pennsylvania,  in  the  absence 
of  the  absolute  necessity  for  a 
hotel  being  licensed,  the  prevail- 
ing sentiment  against  a  license 
being  granted  must  prevail.  In  re 
Smith,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  74;  In 
re  Justin,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  22; 
In  re  Bailey,  5  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 
172.  If  the  evidence  be  evenly 
divided,  it  must  be  granted;  and 
it  cannot  be  refused  on  evidence 
of  general  disorder  in  the  neigh- 
borhood, unless  the  applicant  be 
connected  with  the  disorder.  In  re 
Helling,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  76; 
In  re  Meredith,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 
82.  In  this  State,  if  two  apply 
for  licenses,  at  the  same  place, 
and  there  be  many  remonstrants 
against  one  house  and  only  a  few 
against  the  other,  that  is  evidence 
of  the  necessity  for  a  house  there 
and  of  the  good  character  of  the 
latter  applicant.  In  re  Meredith, 
2  Pa.  Cr.  Ct.  Rep.  82.  If  two  ap- 
ply for  a  license  to  sell  liquor  in 
the  same  hotel,  and  one  is  grant- 
ed and  the  other  continued,  on 
failure  of  the  one  securing  the  li- 
cense to  take  it  out,  the  other  may 
be  gi-antod  it  for  the  remainder  of 
the  licensing  year  on  payment  of 


the  necessary  part  of  the  fee.  In 
re  Russell,  1 1  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  505. 
If  there  be  a  general  request  for 
licensing  a  house,  a  license  will  be 
granted;  and  that  request  may  be 
shown  by  the  signature  to  a  pe- 
tion  for  it.  In  re  Brandlinger,  11 
]Montg.  Co.  L.  Rep.  93.  The  word 
"necessary,"  refusing  a  license  to 
be  granted  for  a  hotel  when 
"necessary"  is  not  construed  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word.  In  re  Erie 
Licenses,  4  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  167.  See 
In  re  Philadelphia  Licenses,  4  Pa. 
Dist.  Rep.  201.  But  the  judges 
may  deny  it  on  his  individual 
opinion  that  it  is  not  necessary. 

In  re  Thomas,  169  Pa.  HI;  3 
Atl.  100. 

In  re  Gerstlauer,  5  Pa.  Dist. 
Rep.  97. 

65  Papworth  v.  Goodnow,  104 
Ga.  653 ;  30  S.  E.  872 ;  In  re  Mertz, 
12  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  521. 

66  State  V.  Bonnell,  119  Ind. 
494;  21  X.  E.  1101.  See  Ott- 
man  v.  Young,  12  Hawaii,  303. 

87  White  V.  Atlantic  City  (N.  J. 
L.),  42  Atl.  710;  Hensley  v.  Met- 
calfe Co.,  115  Ky.  810;  74  S.  W. 
1054;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  204;  Ap- 
peal of  D'Amato,  80  Conn.  357; 
68  Atl.  445. 

A  license  caonot  be  refused  be- 


§  397  TRAFFIC    ]N    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  640 

cient  ground  for  a  refusal  that  the  applicant  "made  a  promise 
last  year  not  to  apply  for  a  license  this  year."®^  In  his  dis- 
cretion a  mayor  of  a  city  may  refuse  to  license  a  saloon  situated 
near  a  church.''-'  Where  a  statute  provided  that  "due  regard" 
must  be  had  in  granting  a  license  as  to  the  character  of  the 
persons  petitioning  for  a  license  and  their  number,  this  was 
held  to  include  the  personal  knowledge  possessed  by  the  mem- 
bers of  the  board,  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  and  the  oppor- 
tunities the  rcmonstrators  and  petitioners  had  to  know  the 
things  about  which  they  made  representations  or  state- 
ments.'" If  the  applicant  is  the  owner  of  a  building  for  which 
he  seeks  a  license,  and  he  has  permitted  the  law  to  be  there 
violated  by  his  tenants  in  the  conduct  of  the  liquor  business, 
when  he  had  the  legal  right  and  power  to  prevent  it,  he  may 
be  denied  a  license;  for  he  is  not  a  fit  person  to  hold  a 
license.''^ 

Sec.  397.     Unsuitable  buildings  or  plaxies. 

In  almost  every  State  and  country  statutes  specify  in  what 
kind  of  houses  liquors  shall  not  be  sold,  and  prescribe  the  kind 
of  houses  in  which  they  may  be  sold.  And  these  statutes  ex- 
tend so  far,  often,  as  to  provide  that  before  a  license  will  be 
granted  for  a  place  a  house  must  be  in  existence,  of  a  certain 
kind  and  structure.  In  England,  in  addition  to  these  require- 
ments, houses,  to  be  licensed,  must  be  of  a  certain  annual 
rental  value,  according  to  the  population.^-  In  addition  to 
that  no  one  can  obtain  a  license  unless  he  submit  a  plan  of 
his  premises   to  the  licensing  justice.'"     In   addition  to   this 

cause  a  requisite  affidavit  attached  '^o  In    re    Reznor    Hotel    Co.,    34 

to  a  petition  is  not  made  before  an  Super.  Ct.  525. 

officer  of  the  county,  unless  there  ^i  Appeal   of   ^Michael,    63   Conn. 

be   an    order   of    court    previously  583. 

adopted  requiring  it.     In  re  Brew-  72  Licensing  Act  1872,  35  and  36 

ing  Co.,  14  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  188.  Vict.  94,   §§45  to  47;   Patterson's 

68 /»  re  Donoghue,  5  Pa.  Super.  Licensing  Acts  (10  ed. ),  pp.  428  to 

Ct.  1 ;  40  W.  N.  C.  440.  433. 

«9  Dunne   v.   Kretzman,    130   111.  73  Licensing  Acts  [1902]  2   Edw. 

App.  469;  affirmed,  228  lU.  31;  81  7  c.  28,  §  11;  Patterson's  Licensing 

N.  E.  790.  Acts,  p.  601. 


641  ISSUANCE   OP    LICENSES.  §  397 

certain  alterations  in  the  premises  cannot  be  made  without 
their  consent,  and  all  applications  for  renewals  must  also  be 
accompanied  by  a  plan  of  the  licensed  premises.  Before  this 
act  of  1902  "the  power  of  justices  to  require  structural  alter- 
ation in  licensed  premises  was  not  in  a  satisfactory  state. 
Where  the  discretion  to  e,rant  or  refuse  either  new  licenses  or 
renewals  was  unlimited,  some  benches  took  advantage  of  this 
power  to  enforce  structural  alterations  An  applicant  was 
informed  that  unless  he  made  certain  alterations  his  appli- 
cation for  renewal  would  probably  be  refused  on  the  next 
occa>:!ion.  But  the  legality  of  this  course  was  open  to  ques- 
tion ;  for  the  power  to  grant  or  refuse  an  order  does  not 
imply  a  power  to  make  a  conditional  order. "  ^*  Under  the  Eng- 
lish law  now  justices  have  full  control  over  the  structure  of 
licensed  premises.'^  The  statute  specifically  provides  that 
on  renewal  of  a  license  the  justice  "may  by  order  direct  that 
within  a  time  fixed  by  the  order  such  alterations  as  they  may 
think  reasonably  necessary  to  secure  the  proper  conduct  of 
the  business  shall  be  made  in  that  part  of  the  premises  where 
intoxicating  liquor  is  sold  or  consumed."  A  failure  to  make 
the  alterations  subjects  the  licensee  to  a  fine  each  day  he  neg- 
lected to  comply  with  the  order.  In  one  instance  on  applica- 
tion for  a  renewal,  the  licensing  justice  ordered  that  a  back 
entrance  to  one  of  the  passages  in  the  licensed  premises  be 
closed  by  a  substantial  gate,  with  a  lock,  the  key  to  be  kept 
by  the  licensee  or  the  owners  of  the  premises,  the  gate  not  to 
be  opened  except  for  the  purpose  of  delivering  beer,  casks, 
or  other  goods  when  necessary,  or  for  private  use  by  the 
tenant  or  his  household  only;  and  that  all  lamps,  notices,  or 
boards  describing  this  entrance  as  a  backway  or  entrance  to 
the  licensed  house  should  be  removed.  No  liquor  was  in  fact 
sold  at  or  near  the  back  entrance  or  in  the  passageway  to  it,  nor 
was  it  shown,  in  a  prosecution  for  failure  to  comply  with 
the  order,  that  any  liquor  was  consumed  at  the  back  entrance 
or  in  the  passageway;  but  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  the 
consumption,  the  back  entrance  being  used  by  customers  for 

74     Patterson's    Licensing    Acts       2  K.  B.  563;  68  J.  P.  370;  73  L. 
(19    ed.),    p.    602.  J.  K.  B.  1005;  91  L.  T.  1;  52  W. 

"Bushell   V.   Hammond   [1904],       R.    453;    20   T.    L.   Pv.   413. 


§  397  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  642 

entering  or  leaving  the  premises.  It  was  held  that  the  power 
of  the  justice  under  the  statute  quoted  was  not  confined  to 
that  part  of  the  premises  where  liquor  was  actually  sold  or 
consumed,  but  included  the  means  of  access  thereto.''^  So 
where  the  licensed  premises  had  doors  giving  access  respective- 
ly from  different  streets  to  a  part  of  the  premises  where  liquor 
was  sold,  the  justice  made  an  order  that  one  of  the  doors 
be  kept  locked  and  not  used  except  on  the  previous  order  stated 
above;  but  here  it  was  held  that  they  had  exceeded  their  au- 
thority, because  the  statute  referred  only  to  structural 
alterations."  In  the  first  of  these  cases  undoubtedly  the 
justice  could  have  refused  to  renew  the  license,  or  even 
grant  a  new  one,  if  the  premises  had  not  been  altered  to 
comply  with  his  wishes;  while  in  the  other  they  could  not  do 
so.  In  Rhode  Island  a  statute  provided  that  no  license  should 
be  granted  for  the  sale  o^  liquors  in  any  place  except  licensed 
taverns,  to  which  an  entrance  should  not  be  allowed  other 
than  directly  from  a  public  traveled  way,  and  it  was  held 
that  this  meant  a  straight  and  immediate  entrance,  and  one 
to  a  barroom  requiring  a  circuitous  or  crooked  route  of  travel 
from  the  street  thereto  Avas  such  an  entrance  as  the  statute  for- 
bade.'^^  But  when  a  statute  provided  that  a  barroom  should  be 
so  arranged  that  all  parts  of  it  could  be  seen  from  the  street 
or  highway;  and  it  also  provided  that  an  applicant  should 
in  his  application  "specifically  describe  the  room"  and  its 
"exact  location,'  it  was  held  no  objection  to  the  granting 
of  the  license  that  it  was  not  shown  to  be  such  a  room  as  all 
parts  of  it  could  be  seen  from  the  street  or  highway,  for  the 
applicant  was  not  required  to  state  that  fact  in  his  application, 
and  there  was  therefore  no  way  to  try  the  question ;  but  if  the 
licensee  did  not  so  arrange  his  room  before  he  sold  liquor  there- 
in, he  would  be  liable  to  fine  and  punishment. '*'    Where  a  stat- 

7oBushelI  V.   Hammond,  supra.  P.    438;    73    L.    J.   K.    B.   848;    91 

7T  Smith    V.    Port.smoutli,    J.    J.  L.  T.  383;   20  T.  L.  R.  526 

[1906),  2  K.  B.  229;   75  L.  J.  K.  7S  State  v.  Conley,  22  R.  I.  397; 

B.  851;  95  L.  T.  5;  54  W.  R.  598;  48    Atl.    200. 

22  T.  L.  R.  650,  rcviTsing  70  J.  P.  ^o  Gates  v.  Haw,   150  Ind.   370; 

157.      A3    to    appeal,    see    Rex    v.  50   N.   E.   299. 

Bath   [1904],  2  K.  B.  570;   68  J.  In  Australia  if  a  licensee  make 


643  ISSUANCE  OF   LICENSES.  §  398 

lite  required  a  saloon  to  be  so  arranged  either  with  a  window  or 
glass  door  or  otherwise  that  the  whole  barroom  could  be  seen 
from  the  street,  it  was  held  that  a  paved  alley  sixteen  feet  wide 
passing  through  the  middle  of  the  block  was  not  a  street,  and 
therefore  a  saloon  could  not  be  located  upon  it.*°  A  grant  to 
an  applicant  to  conduct  a  saloon  in  a  "lower  room"  of  a  desig- 
nated building  does  not  give  him  the  right  to  conduct  a 
saloon  upon  the  lower  floor  of  that  building.*^  A  statute  of 
Connecticut,  forbidding  sales  of  liquor  in  any  building  con- 
trolled by  the  State  or  any  "county  or  town"  has  no  appli- 
cation to  a  building  controlled  by  a  "city."  ^- 

Sec.  398.     Limiting  number  of  saloons. 

Not  infrequently  statutes  limit  the  number  of  saloons  that 
may  be  located  in  the  licensing  districts  or  within  the  neigh- 
borhood. And  even  that  is  not  the  case,  if  a  licensing  board 
has  a  discretion  to  grant  the  licenses,  it  may  refuse  one  if  the 
neighborhood  is  already  sufficiently  supplied.  An  instance  of 
this  is  reported  in  a  New  York  case,  where  a  licensing  board 
refused,  in  its  discretion,  to  license  a  saloon  on  the  fourth 
corner  of  a  street  crossing,  the  other  three  corners  being  sa- 
loons, on  the  ground  that  the  neighborhood  was  sufficiently 
supplied. ^^  And  we  have  seen  that  under  the  Pennsylvania 
statute  it  must  be  shown  that  the  hotel  for  which  a  license  is 
sought  is  necessary  to  the  vicinity.     These  cases  need  not  be 

a  substantial  addition  to  his  ute  would  be  so  construed  in  any- 
building  so  as  to  alter  its  orig-  Western  State  wliere  the  word 
inal  design,  he  must  take  out  a  "town"  is  construed  as  a  generic 
new  license.  Lagagnanmis  v.  term.  See  State  v.  Craig,  132 
Cruikshank,   1   Vict.   L.   R.   97.  Ind.    54;    31    N.    E.    352;    Indian- 

80  State  V.  Harrison,  1G2  Ind.  apolis  v.  Higgins,  141  Ind.  1;  40 
542;  70  N.  E.  877.  N.  E.   671. 

81  Price  V.  Lincoln,  130  Til.  sa  Poople  v.  Board  (N.  Y.),  16 
App.  254.  N.   Y.   Supp.   798.     See  People  v. 

ssApi^eal    of    Camp,    80    Conn.  Dalton,   7   N.   Y.  Misc.   Rep.  558; 

272;   68  Atl.  444.  28    N.    Y.    Supp.    491;    People    v. 

This  construction  put  upon  the  Murray,  38  N.   Y.  Supp.   177;    In 

word    "town"    is    because    of    the  re    McCrary,    31    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

character    of    towns    in    Connecti-  192. 
cut.     It   is    doubtful   if   the   stat- 


§  398  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  644 

cited  again.  Occasionally  a  licensing  board  is  empowered  to 
arbitrarily  reduce  the  number  of  saloons  in  a  neighborhood, 
by  refusing  to  renew  licenses.^^  Statutes  limiting  the  number 
of  licenses  that  may  be  granted  in  a  neighborhood  are  held 
to  apply  to  retail  and  not  to  wholesale  licenses ;  ^^  and  they 
also  refer  to  the  number  applied  for  and  not  the  number 
when  the  act  went  into  force.^°  If  the  limit  has  been  reached 
and  a  license  lapses  a  new  license  may  be  issued  in  its  place.*' 
Where  a  statute  limited  the  number  in  a  city,  and  declared 
they  were  to  be  apportioned  among  the  wards,  it  was  held 
that  no  particular  number  need  be  granted  in  a  particular 
ward.''^  Of  course,  a  licensing  board,  cannot  arbitrarily  refuse 
to  grant  licenses  and  thereby  give  those  already  licensed  a 
monopoly  of  the  retail  business,^^*  but  that  question  comes  un- 
der the  arbitrary  use  of  a  discretion.  Under  a  discretion  in 
the  granting  of  a  license  the  city  may  adopt  an  ordinance  limit- 
ing the  number  of  licenses  it  will  grant  within  its  limits ;  and 
this  power  is  given  it  when  it  is  charged  with  policing  and 
maintaining  good  order  within  its  boundaries  with  a  specified 
number  of  police  officers  which  it  may  appoint ;  for  in  such 
an  instance  it  has  unusual  ground  for  exercising  its  discre- 
tion.^^ So  a  city  may  limit  the  number  under  a  power  ex- 
pressly given  by  statute.^"  In  this  same  State  no  license  must 
be  granted  if  there  be  enough  for  the  neighborhood,  and  no 
second  application  can  be  made  for  that  place  during  the 
licensing  year,  nor  by  any  person  who  has  been  denied  a 
license  during  the  year  on  the  ground  that  he  is  an  unsuit- 
able person.  It  was  held  that  a  denial  of  a  license  on  the 
ground  that  no  license  was  needed  in  the  neighborhood  was  a 
denial  on  the  ground  that  the  place  was  an  unsuitable  one.®^ 

8*  Hewitt  V.  Invercargill,   12  N.  ss  Jamieson  v.   Blaine,  38  X.  B. 

Z.  L.  R.  631.  508. 

85  McKenzie   v.   Hogg,    13   N.   Z.  ss*  Nor  can  a  city.     In  re  Bro- 
L.  R.  158.  die,  38  Up.  Can.  580;   In  re  Bar- 

86  Bull  V.  Licensing  Justices,  12  clay,  12  Up.  Can.  80. 

Austr.   L.   T.   82.      See   Ottman   v.  89 /n   re    Jugenheimer,    81    Neb. 

Young,  12  Hawaii  303.  83G;   116  N.  W.  966. 

87  In  re  Winchester,  8  Austr.  L.  so  In  re  Bayless,  15  Ont.  13. 

R.    (C.  N.),   19.  91  De  Amato,  80  Conn.  357;    68 

Atl.  445. 


645  ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES.  §  399 

Sec.  399.    Order  granting  or  refusing  the  license. 

Perhaps  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down  concerning  what 
the  order  granting  or  refusing  the  license  should  contain. 
That  is  a  matter  almost  wholly  statutory,  if  not  entirely  so, 
depending  upon  the  particular  statutory  provisions  of  the 
locality  in  each  case.  So  caution  must  be  used  in  the  examina- 
tion of  the  cases  to  see  whether  the  licensing  body  is  a  board, 
incorporated  or  not,  or  a  court,  for  there  seems  to  be  a  line 
of  distinction  drawn  between  the  order  of  a  mere  board  and 
that  of  a  court  granting  the  license,  althougk  it  is  often  diffi- 
cult to  discern  it.  Where  a  court  grants  a  license  its  act  is 
a  judicial  one  and  the  sufficiency  of  the  order  must  be  con- 
sidered from  that  point  of  view.**-  The  board  or  court,  or 
whatever  body  or  person  grants  or  refuses  the  license  cannot 
delegate  its  powers  to  do  so  to  another;  it  must  itself  act  in 
the  matter.®"  In  the  ease  of  a  common  council  granting  the 
license  iit  does  not  act  as  a  court.*'*  The  licensing  body  is 
without  power  to  grant  the  license  to  any  other  person  than 
the  applicant,  as  where  the  applicant  has  no  interest  in  the 
license,  and  it  is  for  the  exclusive  use  of  another  who  is 
the  proprietor  of  the  business."'  It  cannot  grant  it  for  a 
district  w^here  prohibition  has  been  adopted.''*'  If  there  be 
several  members  of  the  licensing  body,  then  the  license 
cannot  issue  unless  a  majority  vote  in  favor  of  its  issuance;  ^^ 
but  it  is  not  illegal  because  one  of  their  number  was  not 
present  at  a  prior  hearing.®^     The  grant  of  the  license  is  an 

92Holl€nback  v.  Drake,  37  Neb.  576;    101   N.  W.  242;   In  re  Tier- 

680;    56    N.    W.    296;    Webber    v.  ney,  70  Neb.  704;  99  S.  W.  518. 

Lane,  99  Mo.  App.   69;    71   S.  W.  a*  State    v.    Columbia,    17   S.    C. 

1099;    Ck)oper    v.    Hunt,    103    Mo.  80. 

App.    9;    77    S.    W.    483;    Schade  9r, /„.  re  King   (Neb.),  10  N.  W. 

V.    Russell     (Mo.    App.),     110    S.  242. 

W.     667;      Territory     v.     Miguel,  se  Strickland  v.  Knight,  45  Fla. 

18    Hawaii    402;     State    v.     Fort,  712;   36  So.  363. 

i07    Mo.    App.    328;     81     S.     W.  97  Appeal    of    Hewitt,    76    Conn. 

476;   Appeal  of   Hewitt,   76   Conn.  685;  58  Atl.  231. 

685;  58  Atl.  231.  98  Appeal   of  Hewitt,  supra. 

93  Hennepin  Co.  v.  Robinson,  16  Where    a    special    meeting    was 

Minn.   381;    In  re   Krug,   72  Neb.  called  for  another  purpose,  it  was 


§  399  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  64fe 

adjudication  of  all  the  questions  essential  to  be  considered.^^ 
But  it  is  not  res  judicata  nor  conclusive  when  a  renewal  or 
second  license  is  applied  for,  because  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
board  or  court  to  ascertain  if  the  applicant  is  a  fit  man  as  of 
the  date  of  the  renewal  or  of  the  second  application.^  If  the 
order  contains  a  finding  that  the  requisite  number  of  persons 
have  signed  the  application  or  petition,  its  decision  cannot  be 
reviewed  in  a  proceeding  for  an  injunction  to  enjoin  the 
granting  of  the  license  on  the  ground  of  fraud.-  In  some 
States  the  order  granting  the  license  must  be  drawn  up  with 
strictness  or  the  license  will  be  void.  Thus,  in  Missouri  it  was 
held  that  an  order  to  be  sufficient  must  show  affirmatively 
that  the  petition  purported  to  be  signed  by  the  requisite 
number  of  citizens,  or  embraced  a  statement  that  the  court 
found  as  a  fact  a  majority  of  such  citizens  had  signed  the 
petition  and  that  the  applicant  had  the  statutory  qualifica- 
tions ;  ^  that  is,  that  all  the  jurisdictional  facts  necessary  to 
authorize  the  granting  of  a  license  must  affirmatively  appear 
on  the  face  of  the  proceedings.*  On  refusing  a  license,  how- 
ever, the  matter  is  different,  and  the  court  is  not  even  required 
to  state  its  reasons.'"  Where  the  licensing  board  acts  judicially, 
as  the  common  council  of  a  city,''  the  officer  whose  duty  it  is 

lield    that    the    board    rightly    re-  cessity.      In    re    Hunter,    24    Ont. 

fused   to    grant    a    liconse,    in   the  522;   reversing  24  Ont.  153. 

absence    of   some   of   its   members.  s  State  v.  Page    (Mo.  App. ),  80 

Riley  v.   Rowe,    112   Ky.   817;    66  S.  W.  912. 

S.  W.  999;   23   Ky.  L.  Rep.  2168.  *  State   v.   Seibert,   97  Mo.  App. 

99 /w.  re  Justices,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  212;    71    S.   W.   95.      In   this   case 

Rep.    22;     Connecticut    Breweries  the  petition  had  not  been  on   file 

Co.  V.  Murphy,  81  Conn.   145;    70  ten   days   as   the   statute   required 

Atl.  450.  before    the    hearing   of    the    appli- 

1  State  V.  Higgiii.s,  84  Mo.  App.  cation;  and  it  was  held  that  the 
531;  In  re  Pittsburg  Brewing  Co.,  board  of  commissioners  were  with- 
16  Pa.  Sujjer.  Ct.  215.  out   Jurisdiction    to    hear   tlie    aj)- 

2  Cooper  V.  Himt.  103  Mo.  App.  plication. 

9 ;  77  S.  W.  483.  ^  /„,  re  Hilleman,   1 1   Pa.  Super. 

Where    a    statute    required    the  Ct.  567 ;   see  Nortwick  v.  Bennett, 

applicant    to    file    a    certificate    of  62  N.  J.  L.   151. 

character   with  the   inspectors   be-  6  Hollenbeck   v.  Drake,   37   Xeb. 

fore    a    license    was    granted,    this  680;    56    X.    W.    296;    Webber   v. 

was  held  to  be  an  imperative   ne-  Lane,  90  Mo.  App.  69;   71   S.   W. 


647 


ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES. 


§400 


to  issue  the  license — as  the  mayor  who  has  the  power  of  veto — 
cannot  refuse  to  do  so  on  the  ground  that  the  board  or  council 
ordered  the  license  granted  on  an  insufficient  petition.^  The 
order  granting  the  license  is  one  thing  and  the  license 
another,  and  to  complete  the  transaction  the  license  must  be 
duly  issued.  A  license  issued  without  the  granting  of  it  is 
invalid,  even  if  issued  and  signed  by  all  the  members  of  the 
licensing  board  who  are  required  to  sign  the  order  granting 
it.^  Where  the  statute  does  not  require  the  averment  in  the 
petition  that  the  applicant  is  a  man  of  good  character,  there 
need  be  no  finding  as  to  that  effect  inserted  in  the  order.** 
If  the  license  has  once  been  granted  it  cannot  be  recalled  or 
the  grant  set  aside.'"  In  granting  or  refusing  a  license  the 
licensing  board  is  not  the  agent  of  the  State.' ^ 


Sec.  400.    Mandamus  to  secure  a  license. 

It  scarcely  needs  authorities  to  sustain  the  statement  that 
where  the  licensing  board,  court  or  officer  has  a  discretion 


lOnO;  Schade  v.  Eussell  (Mo. 
App.),  110  S.  W.  G67. 

T  Schade  v.  Rus.sell  (Mo.  App), 
110  S.  W.  667.  Cojitra,  In  re 
Qiiinn,  32  N.  S.  542. 

8  Connecticut  Breweries  Co.  v. 
:\Iurphy,  81  Conn.  14'5;  70  Atl.  450. 

3  In  re  Sauer,  23  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
Rep.  463. 

^0  Ex  parte  Fearn,  00  J.  P.  177. 
Contra,  Ex  parte  Hatjen's  License, 
5  Q.  B.  160  (Quebec). 

Any  citizen  has  the  right  to  in- 
spect reports  and  papers  in  tlie 
custody  of  an  officer  used  in  hear- 
ing an  application  for  a  license; 
and  to  be  furnished  copies  thereof 
on  payment  of  the  fees  prescribed 
by  statute.  Commonwealth  v. 
Blair,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  488. 

Amending  liquor  tax  certificate, 
wlien  cannot  be  done.  In  re  Lit- 
tleton, 113  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  471; 
99  N.  Y.  Supp.  417 

A  recital  in  an  order  requiring  a 


license  that  evidence  submitted  on 
tlie  application  was  considered  and 
due  regard  had  to  the  number 
and  character  of  the  witnesses  is 
conclusive  upon  the  petitioner  that 
he  had  a  hearing.  In  re  Doyles- 
town  Distilling  Co..  9  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  90. 

A  refusal  to  grant  a  license  for 
a  hotel  on  the  ground  that  a  hotel 
at  that  place  is  not  necessary  for 
the  public  is  not  res  judicata  as  to 
the  same  place  and  the  same  per- 
son on  a  subsequent  year.  Usu- 
ally tl'e  refusal  of  the  license,  or 
even  its  granting,  ought  not  to 
have  any  or  but  little  weight  on 
a  subsequent  year.  In  re  Reznor 
Hotel  Co.,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.   525. 

11  State  v.  Gormon,  171  Ind. 
58;   85  N.  E.  763. 

\iinc  pro  tunc  entries  cannot  be 
contradicted  by  parol  evidence  to 
show  that  they  are  void.  State 
V.  Leonard    (Mo.),  116  S.  W.  14. 


§400 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


64!^ 


whether  it  will  grant  or  refuse  a  license,  mandamus  does  not 
lie  to  control  its  discretion  nor  compel  it  to  issue  the 
license.^^  But  where  the  issuance  of  a  license  is  merely  a 
ministerial  act,  and  a  proper  application  in  form  has  been 
refused,  a  writ  of  mandamus  will  be  granted  to  compel  the 
issuance  of  a  license.^^  The  court  will  not  upon  mere  moral 
grounds  deny  the  writ/*  The  writ  will  not  be  granted  before 
the  day  of  hearing  the  application  and  where  the  publication 
of  notice  has  not  yet  been  completed. ^^     If  a  city  has  not 


12  United  States  v.  Douglas,  10 
D.  C.  99;  Maxton  Co.  v.  Robeson 
Co.,  107  N.  C.  335;  12  S.  E.  92; 
Eve  Simson,  78  Ga.  120;  Dunbar 
V.  Frazer,  78  Ala.  538;  In  re 
Johnson,  165  Pa.  315;  31  Atl. 
203;  State  v.  Cass  Co.,  12  Neb. 
54;  10  N.  W.  571;  Commonwealth 
V.  Fell,  144  Pa.  426;  22  Atl.  915; 
28  W.  N.  C.  429;  State  v.  Stiff, 
104  Mo.  App.  685 ;  78  S.  W.  675 ; 
In  re  Sparrow,  138  Pa.  116;  20 
Atl.  711;  27  W.  N.  C.  47;  In  re 
King  (Pa.),  16  Atl.  487;  23  W.  N. 
C.  152;  Schlandeeker  v.  Mar- 
shall, 72  Pa.  St.  200;  In  re  Col- 
larn,  134  Pa.  St.  551;  19  Atl. 
775;  Batters  v.  Dunning,  49 
Conn.  479 ;  Jones  v.  Moore  Co.  106 
N.  C.  436;  11  S.  E.  514;  Devin  v. 
Belt,  70  Md.  352;  17  Atl.  375; 
In  re  Knarr,  127  Pa.  St.  554;  IS 
Atl.  639;  Stanley  v.  Monnett,  34 
Kan.  708;  9  Pac.  755;  Heblich 
V.  Hancock  Co.  (Ky.),  10  S.  W. 
405;  State  v.  Hudson,  13  Mo. 
App.  61 ;  In  re  Baxter,  12  Up. 
Can.  139;  Leeson  v.  Board,  19 
Ont.  67 ;  Barnes  v.  Wilson  Co.,  135 
N.  E.  27;  47  S.  E.  737;  S.tate  v. 
Northfield,  94  Minn.  81;  101  N. 
W.  1063;  St.  Amour  v.  St.  Fran- 
cis de  Sales,  7  Q.  B.  (Que.)  479; 
Privet  V.  Sexton,  16  C.  L.  J.  192; 
Smart  v.  Hochelaga,  4  Leg.  News 


(Can.),  255;  State  v.  Langan,  149 
Ala.  647;  43  So.  187;  I.  A.  West 
&  Co.  V.  Board,  14  Idaho  353;  94 
Pac.  445;  State  v.  Williams,  143 
Ala.  501;  39  So.  270;  Commo»- 
wealth  v.  Kerns,  2  Pa.  Super.  Ot. 
59;  State  v.  Higgins,  84  Mo.  App. 
531. 

13  Braconier  v.  Packard,  136 
Mass.  50;  Territory  v.  McPherson, 
6  Dak.  27;  50  N.  W.  351;  Schade 
v.  Russell  (Mo.  App.),  110  S.  W. 
667  ;  State  v.  Wooten  ( Mo.  App. ) , 
122  S.  W\  1101;  Ex  parte  Gibson, 
2  N.  S.  W.  L.  R.  203;  Harlan  v. 
State,  136  Ala.  150;  33  So.  858; 
Baker  v.  Griffith  (N.  C),  66  S.  E. 
565;  State  v.  McCammon  (Mo. 
App.),  86  S.  W.  510;  Common- 
wealth V.  Blackburn  (Ky.),  122  S. 
W.  818:  Rex  v.  Kingston,  J.  J.  86; 
L.  T.  589;  66  J.  P.  547;  Cox  v. 
Common  Council,  152  Mich.  630; 
116  N.  W.  456;  State  v.  Turner, 
210  Mo.  77;  107  S.  W.  1064;  St. 
Louis  V.  Weitzel,  130  Mo.  600;  31 
S.     W.     1045;     State    v.     Packett 

(Mo.),  119  S.  W.  25;  Holland  v. 
State  (Fla.),  47  So.  963;  State 
v.  Cass  County  Ct.  (Mo.),  119  S. 
W.    1010,   1014. 

14  State  V.  Jefferson  County,  20 
Fla.    425. 

15  Eamagnano  v.  Crook,  88  Ala. 
450;  7  So.  247. 


649 


ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES. 


§400 


conferred  upon  its  tax  collector  power  to  issue  a  license  he 
cannot  be  compelled  to  issue  one  as  a  tender  of  fees  though 
it  might  have  given  him  the  power.^«     If  the  applicant  has 
a  license  unexpired,  and  he  is  entitled  to  only  one,  he  must 
fail   in   his   application.!^      If   the   license   be   refused    m    a 
capricious  manner  without  any  cause,  but  arbitrarily,  a  writ 
of  mandamus  will  be  issued  to  require  its  grant,  though  the 
licensing  board  is  endowed  with  discretion  to  grant  or  refuse 
a  license ;!«    and   that    is   true   if    it    places   its   refusal   on 
untenable  grounds,  or  on  grounds  that  the  statute  does  not 
specify  as  reasons  for  a  refusal/''     But  in  Massachusetts  the 
courts  have  gone  so  far  as  to  hold  that  a  mayor  may  refuse  to 
sign  a  license  granted  by  the  city  council  if  he  in  good  faith 
believes  the  applicant  has  not  complied  with  all  the  provi- 
sions of  the  law;  and  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  sign  it.^' 
Mandamus  lies  to  compel  a  licensing  board  to  grant  a  hear- 
ing;-^ but  not  to  meet  and  hear  an  application  if  its  term 


16  Puckett  V.  State,  33  Fla.  385 ; 
14   So.  834. 

A  retail  liquor  dealer  desiring  a 
license  is  a  person  "beneficially 
interested"  under  a  statute  award- 
ing the  writ  of  mandamus  to  any- 
one beneficially  interested  in  a 
controversy.  Territory  v.  Mc- 
pherson,   6    Dak.    27;    50    N.    W. 

351. 

Instate  V.  Bonnell,  119  Ind. 
494;  21  N.  E.  1101;  State  v.  Mil- 
ler,'l29  Mo.  App.  390;  108  S.  W. 
603. 

18  Zanone  v.  jNlound  City,  103  Ind. 
552;  New  Orleans  v.  Smythe,  116 
La.  685;  41  So.  33;  In  re  Spar- 
row, 138  Pa.  St.  116;  20  Atl.  692; 
C.  B.  George  &  Bro.  v.  Winchester, 
118  Ky.  429;  80  S.  W.  1158;  26 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  170;  State  v.  New 
Orleans  (La.),  36  So.  999;  Trem- 
blay  V.  Pointe-au-Pic,  13  L.  N. 
(Can.),  386;  Edson  v.  Hatley,  27 
L.   C.  J.   312;    Godfrey  v.   St.   Fe- 


lix, 14  L.  N.  (Can.),  297;  Mont- 
pelier  v.  Mills,  171  Ind.  175;  85 
N.  E.  6;  Chicago  v.  O'Hara,  124 
111.  App.   290. 

19  7)1  re  Prospect  Brewing  Co., 
127  Pa.  St.  537;   17  Atl.  1090. 

20  Deehan  v.  Johnson,  141  Mass. 
23;  6  N.  E.  240.  But  see  Schade 
V.  Russell    (Mo.  App.),  110  S.  W. 

667. 

In  such  an  instance  the  appli- 
cant is  not  justified  in  selling 
without  a  license  because  his  ap- 
plication has  been  unjustly  re- 
fused.   Brock  V.  State,  65  Ga.  437. 

21  Regina  v.  Sylvester,  50  J.  P. 
246;  Regina  v.  Thomas,  61  L.  J. 
M.  C.  ul  [1892],  1  Q.  B.  426;  66 
L.  T.  289;  40  W.  R.  478;  56  J.  P. 
151;  Ex  parte  Foley,  29  N.  B.  113; 
Falconer  v.  Williams,  14  N.  Z. 
L.  R.  502;  Hawkins  v.  Common 
Council  (Mich.),  79  N.  W.  570; 
Ex  parte  Donaher,  27  K  B.  554; 
17  N.  B.  44. 


§  400  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  65^ 

has  expired.^-  In  determining  whether  or  not  an  applicant  is 
entitled  to  a  license  under  an  ordinance  the  court  will  not 
follow  the  construction  put  upon  it  by  the  common  council 
when  it  refused  a  license,  but  will  put  its  own  construction 
vipon  it.-^  Whether  or  not  a  licensing  board  has  the  authority 
to  grant  a  license  may  be  raised  in  an  application  for  a  writ 
of  mandamus ;  '*  and  so  may  the  validity  of  a  local  option  elec- 
tion.'^ The  writ  may  be  issued  against  a  common  council  of  a 
city  in  a  proper  case,  but  not  where  the  council  have  a  dis- 
cretion in  the  matter.-*^  Unless  there  be  an  ordinance  for  the 
granting  of  a  license  a  city  cannot  be  compelled  to  issue 
one,  and  the  fixing  of  the  amount  to  be  paid  for  a  license  to 
keep  a  saloon  is  not  such  an  ordinance.-"  If  it  appear  that 
the  petitioner  for  the  writ  is  under  indictment  for  a  violation 
of  the  liquor  laws  his  application  will  be  delayed  until  he  is 
brought  to  trial  and  acquitted  upon  the  charges,  or  they  be 
dismissed.-^  A  city  cannot  repeal  its  license  order  after  an 
application  for  a  writ  of  mandamus,  and  thus  escape  being  com- 
pelled to  issue  a  license,  where  it  has  in  force  another  ordinance 
providing  that  the  repeal  of  an  ordinance  shall  not  affect  pend- 
ing suits.-"  If  an  officer  only  has  discretion  as  to  the  sufficiency 
of  the  bond  tendered  he  may  be  compelled  to  issue  a  license 
if  a  sufficient  bond  has  been  first  tendered.^"  The  writ  of 
mandamus  cannot  be  resorted  to  to  test  the  reasonableness  or 

22  People  V.  Saratoga  Co.,  7  Abb.  v.  Common  Council,  152  Mich. 
Prac.  34.  630;    116  N.  W.  456;   Hawkins  v. 

If  there  be  a  cause  of  doubt  it  Common    Council    (Mich.),    79   N. 

is   resolved   against  the  petitioner  W.    570;    Keefer    v.    Hillsdale,    70 

for  the  writ.     State  v.  Miller,  129  Mich.  413;   38  N.  W.  277. 

Mo.  App.  390;   108  S.  W.  603.  27  Crotty    v.    People,    3    Bradw. 

23  Harrison  v.  People,  195  111.  465;  Ex  parte  Persons,  1  Hill  655. 
466;  63  N.  E.  191,  reversing  97  111.  28  State  v.  Weeks,  93  Mo.  499; 
App.  421.  6  S.  W.  266. 

24  Evans  v.  Police  Jury,  114  La.  29  State  v.  Baker,  32  Mo.  App. 
771;    38   So.   555.  98. 

25  People  v.  Hamilton,  27  N.  Y.  3o  state  v.  Ruark,  34  Mo.  App. 
Misc.  Rep.  308 ;  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  325 ;  Bean  v.  County  Court,  33  Mo. 
584.  App.  635;    Burke  v.  Collins,  18  8. 

28  State  v  Northfield  (S.  D.),  D.  190;  99  N.  W.  1112.  But  see 
101  N.  W.  1063;  Hippen  v.  Ford,  Devine  v.  Board,  121  Mich.  433; 
129   Cal.   315;    61    Pac.   929;    Cox       80  N.  W.   109. 


651  ISSUANCE   OP   LICENSES.  §400 

unreasonableness  of  a  license  fee  fixed  by  a  city.^^  Where  a 
return  alleged  that  the  application  was  denied  on  the  sole 
"ground  that  there  is  a  decided  preponderance  against  the 
granting  of  the  license  in  favor  of  the  remonstrances  that  have 
been  filed  against  it,"  and  denied  none  of  the  averments  of  the 
petition  for  the  writ,  mandamus  was  awarded.''-  In  New  York, 
however,  by  reason  of  the  express  provisions  of  a  statute,  a 
court  will  review  the  action  of  commissioners  of  excise  in  re- 
fusing a  license.  The  statute  requires  them  to  send  up  all  the 
evidence  upon  which  they  acted ;  ^^  but  it  will  not  award  the 
applicant  a  jury  trial.^*  But  if  there  be  evidence  from  which 
the  commissioners  were  justified  in  refusing  the  license,  their 
decision  will  not  be  disturbed.^^  "Where  the  answer  to  the  peti- 
tion for  the  writ  was  that  the  relators  claimed  to  be  hotel  pro- 
prietors (to  which  only  a  license  could  be  granted),  but  they 
had  no  established  hotel,  only  having  a  cheap  lodging  house 
which  they  used  for  immoral  purposes,  it  was  held  that  this  an- 
swer must  ])e  taken  as  true,  and  the  application  for  the  writ  de- 
nied.^" Where  an  application  was  refused  on  the  ground  that  a 
former  license  held  by  the  applicant  had  been  revoked  accord- 
ing to  an  agreement  with  him  to  the  effect  that  it  should  be  if 
he  was  convicted  during  the  year  of  having  violated  both  an  or- 
dinance and  a  statute,  it  was  held  that  a  conviction  of  a  viola- 
tion of  the  statute  and  not  of  the  ordinance  was  not  sufficient 
cause  for  the  refusal. ^^  In  Nebraska  the  writ  does  not  lie  to 
compel  the  license  board  to  reduce  the  testimony  to  writing 
and  place  it  on  file,  on  behalf  of  a  remonstrant,  where  it  does 
not  appear  that  the  license  was  granted  over  his  protest.^* 

3 J  'State  V.  Hardy,  7  Neb.  377.  3*  People  v.  Excise  Comnirs.,  64 

Contra,  State  v.  Police  Jury,  120  Hun  632;   18  N.  Y.  Sup.  621.    See, 

La.   163;   45  So.  47.  however,  People  v.  Woodman,  su- 

S2ln  re   Sparrow,    20   Atl.   692.  pra. 

See   also   In  re   Prospect   Brewing  35  People   v.  Andrews,   22  Jones 

Co.,    127    Pa.   523;    17    Atl.    1090;  &  S.  183. 

24  W.  N.  C.  177,  where  a  long  re-  3o  United   States  v.  Johnson,   12 

turn  to  the  petition  was  held  in-  App.  D.  C.  545. 

sufficient,   l)ecause   it   set  out   con-  37  Cox  v.   Common  Council,    152 

elusions  and  not  facts.  Mich.  630;    116  N.  W.  456. 

33  People  V.  Woodman,   15  Daly  3s  Moore  v.  State,  58  Neb.  608; 

20;  IN.  Y.  Supp.  335.  79  N.  W.  163. 


§  400         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUOR.S.  652 

The  validity  of  a  city  annexation  may  be  tested  on  application 
for  a  writ  of  mandamus."-^  Where  the  result  of  a  local  option 
election  has  been  properly  certified  to,  the  regularity  of  such 
election  cannot  be  tested  in  a  mandamus  proceedings.*"  Nor 
will  the  court  compel  a  board  or  mayor  of  a  city  to  issue  a 
license  for  a  place  where  the  saloon  would  be  a  nuisance ;  *'■ 
nor  compel  the  issuance  of  a  license  in  violation  of  a  statute, 
or  where  a  license  was  granted  but  not  issued,  then  revoked 
in  order  to  give  the  license  to  another,  and  mandamus  was 
sought  to  compel  the  issuance  to  the  latter.*-  Mandamus  may 
issue  if  the  fee  fixed  by  a  city  council  is  so  high  as  to  abso- 
lutely prohibit  the  sale  of  liquor,  as  w^here  it  had  been  fixed 
at  $5,000,  which  the  testimony  all  showed  absolutely  barred 
the  maintenance  of  a  saloon  in  the  district.  The  court  granted 
the  writ  on  condition  the  applicant  pay  one-half  that  amount.*^ 
If  a  remedy  be  given  by  appeal  that  must  be  resorted  to  for 
relief,  and  not  a  resort  to  a  w^rit  of  mandamus  be  made.** 
The  burden  is  always  upon  the  applicant  for  a  writ  of  manda- 
mus to  show  he  had  complied  with  the  statutes  or  the  ordi- 
nance, as  the  case  may  be,  concerning  the  issuance  of  a  license 
before  he  applied  for  the  writ ;  *^  and  the  fact  that  he  alleges 
in  his  petition  for  the  writ  that  the  board  will  not  grant  any 
license  whatsoever  will  not  be  an  excuse  on  his  part  for  not 

39  People  V.  Harrison,  191  111.  ceeding  to  procure  the  issuance  of 
257;  61  N.  E.  99,  affirming  92  111.  a  city  license,  the  applicant  must 
App.   643.  show  the  city  council's  consent  to 

40  State  V.  Martin,  55  Fla.  538;  its    issuance.      Devanney    v.    Han- 
46  So.  424;   Kermon  v.  Blackburn,  son.  60  W.  Va.  3;  53  S.  E.  603. 
127  Ky.  39 ;  104  S.  W.  968 ;  31  Ky.  If  remonstrators  be  present  when 
L.  Rep.   1256;   State  v.  Davis,  119  a    city   council   grants   the   license 
La.  247;  44  So.  4.  and  do  not  object,  they  cannot  se- 

41  Swift  V.  People,  63  111.  App.  cure  a  writ  of  mandamus  to  re- 
453.  voke    it.      Middlekauff    v.    Adams, 

42Haslem    v.    Schnarr,    30    Ont.  76  Xeb.  265;    107  N.  W.  232. 

89.     See  Leeson  v.  Board,   19  Ont.  44  Malmo    v.    Fairfield    Co.,    72 

67.  Conn.    1;    43   Atl.    485. 

43  State  V.  Police  Jury,   120  La.  45  Hippen  v.  Ford,  129  Cal.  315; 

163;   45  So.  47.  61  Pac.  929;   Harlan  v.  State,  136 

This   certainly   smacks    of   judi-  Ala.    150;    33   So.   858;    Meyer   v. 

cial  legislation.  Decatur,   125  111.  App.  556. 

In  the  case  of  a  mandamus  pro- 


653  ISSUANCE    OP   LICENSES.  §  401 

»?omplying  with  the  statute.^*'  If  the  case  be  submitted  upon 
the  pleadings,  and  the  answer  denies  the  allegations  contained 
in  the  petition,  the  writ  must  be  denied.*"  The  petitioner  has 
the  burden  not  only  to  show  that  he  has  complied  with  the  law, 
but  also  that  he  is  a  fit  person,  such  as  the  statute  requires,  to 
be  entrusted  with  a  license.*^  A  licensing  board,  not  having  the 
duty  or  power  to  determine  the  validity  of  an  election  in  a 
town  on  the  question  of  license  or  no  license,  cannot  be  re- 
quired by  mandamus  to  issue  a  license  in  a  town  where  its 
records  show  that  a  majority  had  voted  against  a  license.'*" 

Sec.  401.     Mandamus  under  the  English  Licensing  Acts. 

We  take  the  following  extract  from  Paterson's  Licensing 
Acts,^°  which  sets  forth  succinctly  the  English  Practice:  "As 
justices  derive  all  their  authority  to  grant  licenses  from  the 
Alehouse  Act,  1828,  as  amended  by  later  statutes,  they  are 
bound  to  hear  and  determine  all  applications  on  the  merits, 
aad  if  they  fail  to  do  so,  and  thereby  some  applicant  has  not 
been  duly  heard,  the  only  remedy  usually  is  for  the  high 
court  to  grant  a  mandamus  directing  the  justices  to  hear  the 
application  over  again.  The  fact  that  the  justices  made  a 
mistake  in  law  sometimes  is  a  ground  for  a  mandamus,  but 
usually  is  treated  as  a  misfortune  which  cannot  be  remedied. 
*It  is  obvious  that  the  distinction  between  an  erroneous  decision 
and  a  failure  to  hear  and  determine  according  to  law  may 
be  very  fine,  and  the  eases  on  the  subject  show  that  it  is  so. 
I  take  the  governing  principle  to  be  that  if  the  justices  have 
applied  themselves  to  the  consideration  of  a  section  of  an  act 
of  Parliament,  and  have,  no  matter  how  erroneously,  deter- 
mined the  question  which  arises  upon  it,  before  them,  their 

46  Riley   V.   Rowe    (Ky.),    66    S.  49  Underwood  v.  P'airfield  Coun- 
W.    999;    23    Ky.    L.    Rep.    2168;  ty,  67   Conn.  411;   35  Atl.  274. 
Commonwealth  v.  McClure,  204  Pa.  Mandamus    lies    to    compel    the 
196;   53  Atl.  759.  financial  officer  of  a  city  to  issue 

47  Conlee  v.  Clay  City  (Ky. ),  a  receipt  to  an  applicant  where 
102  S.  W.  862;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  such  a  receipt  is  a  necessary  step 
533.  to    secure    a    license.      Holland    v. 

48Conlee    v.     Clay    City,    supra.       State  .( Fla. ) ,  47  So.  963. 
Harrison  v.   Dickinson    (Tex.   Civ.  5°  19  ed.  p.   101. 

App.),   113  S.  W.  776. 


§  401  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  654 

decision  cannot  be  reviewed  by  process  of  mandamus.  That  is 
so,  whether  there  is  an  appeal  from  their  decision  or  not.  If 
there  is  an  appeal  mandamus  will  not  lie ;  if  there  is  not,  their 
decision  is  final.  But  when  it  appears  that  they  have  taken 
into  consideration  matters  which  are  absolutely  outside  the 
ambit  of  their  jurisdiction,  and  absolutely  apart  from  the 
matters  which  by  law  ought  to  be  taken  into  consideration, 
then  they  have  not  heard  and  determined  according  to  law."  ^^ 
Instances  of  mandamus  issuing  where  justices  have  not  heard 
and  determined  according  to  law  are  to  be  found  in  R.  v.  De 
Rutzen,^^  where  justices  took  into  consideration  matters  out- 
side the  statutes  under  which  they  are  purported  to  act ;  R.  v. 
Bowman,^^  where  they  granted  a  license  on  the  payment  of  a 
sum  of  money  for  a  public  purpose,  and  R.  v.  Catham,  supra, 
where  they  purported  to  grant  the  transfer  of  a  license  from 
a  person  who  had  not  theretofore  kept  the  premises  as  an 
inn.  The  question  is  also  discussed  by  a  divisional  court 
(Darling  and  Channell,  JJ.),  in  R.  v.  Nicholson,^*  from  whose 
decision  there  was  an  appeal  which  turned  upon  another  point. 
A  mandamus  will  lie  to  command  the  justices  to  hear  an  ap- 
plication for  a  new  license,  if  they  refuse  to  entertain  it ;  but 
when  once  the  justices  hear  and  adjudicate,  there  is  often  no 
remedy,  if  they  refuse  to  grant  a  license  of  any  kind,  though 
in  some  cases  there  may  be  a  remedy  by  mandamus,  owing 
to  the  neglect  of  some  preliminary  condition.^"  "When  justices 
refuse  the  renewal  of  a  license  and  are  required  by  statute 
to  state  the  grounds  of  refusal,  as  under  the  "Wine  and  Beer- 
house Act,  1869,  sec.  8,  and  the  Licensing  Act,  1904,  sees. 
1  (1),  9  (3),  and  they  do  not  state  them,  a  mandamus  will 
be  granted  commanding  them  to  hear  and  determine  the  appli- 

si  Wills,    J.,    in    R.    V.    Gotham  T.  230;    46  W.  R.  512;    14  T.  L. 

11898],  1  Q.  B.  802;  62  J.  P.  435;  R.   303. 

67    L.   J.    Q.   632;    78    L.   T.    468;  ^4  [1899]   2  Q.  B.  455;   63  J.  P. 

46  W.  R.  512;  14  T.  L.  R.  307.  564;  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  715;    15  T.  L. 

52  [1875]    1  Q.   B.  D.   55;    40  J.  R.  358. 

P.    150;    33   L.  T.   726;    24   W.   R.  f^^  R.   v.    Monmouth,   L.   R.   5   Q. 

343;   45  L.  J.  M.  C.  67.  B.  251;  34  J.  P.  566;  39  L.  J.  Q. 

"  [1898]    1  Q.  B.  663;  62  J.  P.  B.  77;  21  L.  T.  748;  R.  v.  Angle- 

374;    67  L.  J.  Q.  B.  463;    78   L.  sey,  J.  J.  [1892],  1  Q.  B.  852. 


655 


ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES. 


§401 


cation."®  If  the  quarter  sessions  refuse  to  hear  an  appeal  owing 
to  some  mistake  in  law,  a  mandamus  may  be  applied  for,  but 
care  must  be  taken  to  do  so  within  two  calendar  months  after 
the  refusal  by  the  sessions.^^  Should  a  mandamus  be  granted, 
and  the  justices  seek  to  evade  it,  the  prosecutor  may  traverse 
the  return  which  they  make  in  answer  to  the  writ  of  man- 
damus.'^*  Thus,  in  one  case  a  mandamus  issued  to  the  justices 
and  they  heard  the  case  over  again  and  came  to  the  same  con- 
clusion, and  the  applicant,  by  pleading,  raised  an  issue  for 
trial  as  to  whether  the  justices  really  heard  the  case  or  merely 
pretended  to  hear  it  over  again.^'*  And  this  course  of  travers- 
ing the  return  is  always  open  to  the  applicant.*'*'  When  a  man- 
damus is  issued  to  justices  it  is  not  generally  framed  so  as  to 
compel  them  to  grant  the  license,  but  merely  to  hear  and  de- 
termine"^ and  the  justices  on  hearing  the  case  again  have  in 
most  cases  the  same  jurisdiction  to  entertain  all  objections  to 


56  R.  V.  Thomas  [1892],  1  Q.  B. 
426;  56  J.  P.  151;  66  L.  T.  289; 
61  L.  J.  M.  C.  141;  40  W.  R. 
478;  Ex  parte  Smith,  R.  v.  Sur- 
rey or  Chertsey,  J.  J.,  3  Q.  B. 
D.  374;  42  J.  P.  598;  47  L.  J.  M. 
C.  104;  26  W.  R.  682;  R.  v. 
Sykes,  1  Q.  B.  D.  52;  40  J.  P. 
39;  45  L.  J.  LI.  C.  39;  78  L.  T. 
566;  24  W.  R.  141;  Tranter  v. 
Lancashire,  J.  J.,  51  J.  P.  454; 
R.  V.  Lancashire,  J.  J.,  54  J.  P. 
580;   64  L.    T.  562. 

57  Crown  Office  Rules  [1906],  r. 
68 ;  R.  V.  Gloucestershire,  J.  J.,  54 
J.  P.  519. 

58  R.  V.  Staffordshire,  J.  J.;  R. 
V.  Pirehill,  14  Q.  B.  D.  13;  49  J. 
P.  36;  54  L.  J.  M.  C.  17;  51  L. 
T.   (n.  8.)    534;  33  W.  R.  205 

59  R.  V.  Pirehill,  J.  J.,  49  J.  P. 
453. 

0  R.  V.  King,  or  Manchester, 
J,  J.,  20  Q.  B.  D.  430;  52  J.  P. 
164;  57  L.  J.  -•  20;  58  L.  T. 

607;  36  W.  R.  i>00. 


61  In  R.  V.  Denbigh,  J.  J.,  Ex 
parte  Fisher,  59  J.  P.,  708  n.,  tlie 
divisional  court  on  making  the 
rule  absolute  for  a  mandamus  to 
hear  and  determine,  expressed  an 
opinion  that  the  applicant  ought  to 
have  his  license  without  the  ne- 
cessity for  further  notices.  In  R. 
V.  Rodds  and  Others,  Birkenhead 
licensing  J.  J.  [1905],  2  K.  B.  40; 
69  J.  P.  210;  74  L.  J.  K.  B.  599; 
53  W.  R.  559;  93  L.  T.  319;  21  T. 
T.  L.  R.  391,  where  the  licensing 
justices  had  attached  certain  con- 
ditions to  the  renewal  which  they 
had  no  power  to  attach,  and  had 
intimated  that  the  renewal  license 
would  remain  in  the  hands  of 
their  clerk,  to  be  delivered  over  to 
the  licensee  on  his  giving  an  un- 
dertaking to  carry  out  the  condi- 
tions, the  Court  of  Appeals  di- 
rected a  mandamus  to  go  to  com 
pel  them  to  deliver  a  renewal  li- 
cense without  suoh  conditions. 


§  401  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  656 

the  license,  and  to  hear  parties  on  the  merits,  as  if  they  had 
acted  regularly  on  the  first  occasion."-  The  general  rule  is  that 
the  court  will  not  by  mandamus  order  a  judicial  tribunal  to 
act  in  a  particular  way  unless  it  is  quite  plain  that  what  it 
has  to  do  is  purely  ministerial  and  not  judicial  According- 
ly, in  R.  V.  Kingston,  JJ.,  ex  parte  Davey,*'^  the  court  refused 
a  mandamus  to  justices  to  hold  a  further  adjournment  of  the 
general  annual  licensing  meeting,  and  at  such  further  adjourn- 
ment grant  a  renewal  of  a  license,  but  merely  ordered  the 
justices  to  hear  and  determine  according  to  law.  Where  a  per- 
son applies  for  the  renewal  of  a  license  that  is  refused,  and  he 
appeal  to  quarter  sessions,  but  gives  an  invalid  notice  of  ap- 
peal, he  is  not  entitled  to  a  mandamus  to  the  licensing  jus- 
tices to  rehear  the  application."*  At  the  general  annual  licens- 
ing meeting  the  hearing  of  an  application  for  a  renewal  was 
appointed  for  10  a.  m.  Notice  of  opposition  had  been  duly 
served,  but  on  the  case  being  called  neither  the  opponent  nor 
his  solicitor  was  present.  Justices,  after  sending  for  both, 
and  they  not  attending,  waited  five  minutes,  and  then  decided 
by  a  majority  of  five  to  four  to  renew  the  license.  The  oppo- 
nent and  his  solicitor  then  arrived  and  asked  to  be  heard,  but 
the  justices  refused  to  reopen  the  matter.  The  court  held  that 
it  was  entirely  a  matter  of  discretion  for  the  justices  to  treat 
the  case  as  determined  or  to  reopen  it.  The  court  held,  also, 
that  as  no  application  for  a  mandamus  had  been  made  until 
three  months  after  the  refusal  the  order  nisi  should  be  dis- 
ss R.  V.  Howard,  Congleton,  J.  J.,  house  and  others,  Leeds,  J.  J.,  Ex 
23  Q.  B.  D.  502;  5.3  J.  P.  454;  parte  Ryder  [190G],  2  K.  B.  501; 
60  L.  T.  960;  37  W.  R.  617;  R.  v.  70  J.  P.  485;  75  L.  J.  K.  B.  745; 
Farquhar,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  258;  39  95  L.  T.  367;  22  T.  L.  R.  603; 
J.  P.  166.  reversed  on  appeal,   the   House  of 

G3  [1902]  66  J.  P.  547;  86  L.  T.  Lords  holding,  on  the  facts,  that 
589;  R.  V.  Farquhar,  supra;  R.  v.  no  mandamus  should  issue.  (Leeds 
HoAvard,  supra;  R.  v.  Merthyr  Corporation  v.  Ryder  [1907],  A. 
Tydvil,  J.  J.,  14  Q.  B.  D.  584;  49  C.  420;  71  J.  P.  484;  76  L.  J. 
J.  P.  213;  54  L.  J.  M.  C.  78,  as  K.  B.  1032;  87  L.  T.  261). 
explained  in  K.  v.  Kingston,  J.  J.,  ^4  R.    v.    Gloucestershire,   J.   J. ; 

Ex  parte  Da-wej,  supra.    A  rule  in       E.  v.  Bristol,  J.  J.,  5  R.  276;   57 
similar  terms  was  granted  by  the       J.  P.  486;  68  L.  T.  335;  41  W.  R 
court    of   appeal    in    R.    v.    Wood-       379. 


65  <  ISSUANCE   t>F   LICENSES.  §  40i 

charged.*"'  The  justices,  likes  other  judges,  are  not  personally 
liable  for  making  a  mistake  in  exercising  their  jurisdiction.*'*' 
If  they  act  corruptly,  or  abuse  their  power,  or  misbehave 
themselves  in  the  execution  of  their  office,  they  are  answerable 
criminally  by  way  of  information.''^  Thus^  refusing  a  license 
hecause  the  applicant  would  not  vote  for  a  particular  candi- 
date for  Parliament  was  a  ground  of  criminal  information. *''' 
And  it  would  be  the  same  whether  they  granted  or  refused 
the  license  on  such  ground.*'''  If  one  set  of  justices  were  to 
grant  a  license  (not  at  an  adjourned  session)  which  another  set 
of  justices  had  refused,  this  would  be  indictable.'^*'  The  writ 
of  mandamus  will  be  issued  to  justices  who  decide  or  assume 
that  they  have  an  absolute  discretion  when  they  have  only  a 
limited  discretion."^  It  is  sometimes  refused  if  there  was  a 
better  remedy  by  appeal  to  quarter  sessions.'^-  Where  a  mo- 
tion for  an  order  nisi  for  mandamus  has  been  once  heard  and 
refused,  the  court  will  not  allow  a  second  motion  for  the  same 
thing  to  be  made  on  amended  affidavits."  When  the  justices 
make  their  return  to  the  writ,  this  is  treated  like  the  state- 
ment of  defense  to  an  action,  and  the  prosecutor  may  traverse 
the  fact  in  the  return  that  they  have  heard  the  case,  and  allege 
in  effect  that  they  merely  pretended  to  hear  it,  and  all  the  time 
intended  to  repeat  their  judgment."*  Or  the  prosecutor  may 
plead  to  the  return  that  it  is  bad  in  point  of  law.'"'    Should  the 

65  R.  V.  Robson,  57  J.  P.   133.  ^2  R.    v.     Smith;     R.    v.    Soutli- 

66  R.  V.  Barton,  14  J.  P.  738;  port,  J.  J.,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  146; 
Bassett  v.  Goodchild,  3  Wils.  121;  37  J.  P.  214;  28  L.  T.  129;  21  W. 
R.  V.  Holland,  1  T.  R.  692.  R.  382;  42  L.  J.  M.  C.  46;  R.  V. 

67  R.  V.  Holland,  1  T.  R.  692;  R.  Thomas  [1892]  1  Q.  B.  426;  56  J. 
V.  Young,  1  Burr.  556;  R.  v.  Har-  P.  151;  66  L.  T.  289;  61  L.  J.  M. 
ries,  13  East.  270;  R.  v.  Williams;  C.   141;   40  W.  R.  478. 

R.  V.  Davis,  3  Burr.  1317;  Bassett  "  R.  v.  Bodmin  [1892],  2  Q.  B. 

V.  Goodchild,  3  WiJj    121.  21;    56    J.    P.    504;    61    L.    J.    M. 

68  R.  V.  Williams,  3  Burr.  1317.  C.    151;    66   L.  T.   562;    40   W.    R. 

69  R.  V.  Holland,  ]  T.  R.  692.  006;  8  T.  L.  R.  553. 

70  R.  V.  Sainsburn  4  T.  R.  451.  "•*  R.  v.  Staffordsshire,  J.  J.;  R. 
-1  R.   V.   King,   2?   Q.   B.   D.   43;        v.    Pireliill,    J.    J.,    49    J.    P.    453, 

52  J.  P.   164;    57  L.  J.  M.  C.  20:        ante,  p.   103. 

58  L.  T.  607 ;  36  W.  R.  600 ;  R.  v.  '-  R.  v.  Howard ;  Congleton,  J. 

Scott  [1889],  22  Q.  B.  D.  481;  J.,  23  Q.  B.  D.  502;  53  J.  P.  454; 

53  J.  P.  119;  58  L.  J.  M.  C.  78;  60  L.  T.  960;  37  W.  K.  617. 
37  W.  R.  301;  00  L.  T.  231. 


§  402  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  658 

divisional  court  refuse  to  grant  a  rule  for  a  mandamus,  or  a 
judge  give  judgment  in  favor  of  the  prosecutor  on  a  manda- 
mus, there  is  an  appeal  to  the  Court  of  Appeal  and  the  House 
of  Lords."'  Where  a  person,  who  has  successfully  opposed  the 
granting  of  a  license  subsequently  successfully  shows  cause 
against  the  making  absolute  of  a  rule  nisi  for  a  mandamus  to 
the  licensing  justices  or  to  quarter  sessions,  the  court  has  a 
discretion  to  grant  him  the  costs  of  showing  cause  against  the 
rule,  although  licensing  justices  are  not  a  court  of  summary 
jurisdiction."  '^ 

Sec.  402.    Injunction  to  restrain  issuance  of  license. 

Since  relief  is  afforded  those  opposing  the  issuance  of  a 
license,  by  appeal  or  writ  of  certiorari,  a  court  of  equity  can- 
not be  invoked  to  restrain  the  issuance  of  a  license,  those  ap- 
plying for  it  having  another  remedy.'^^  This  is  true  even 
though  the  license  be  void;  for  if  it  be  void  it  will  not  pro- 
tect those  selling  under  it,  nor  authorize  sales  under  its  pro- 
tection." And  the  fact  that  the  applicant  falsely  stated  to  a 
signer  of  his  petition  that  some  other  person  intended  to  sign 
it,  or  that  the  applicant  promised  the  signer  to  withdraw  the 
petition,  is  no  ground  for  restraining  the  issuance  of  the  li- 
cense.*" Under  an  application  for  an  injunction,  proceedings 
for  the  issuance  of  a  license  cannot  be  reviewed.*^    Nor  will  an 

76  R.  V.  King,  20  Q.  B.  D.  43;  890;  Cooper  v.  Hunt,  103  Mo. 
52  J.  P.  164,  supra;  R.  v.  Crewk-  App.  9;  77  S.  W.  483;  Regina  v. 
erne,  J.  J.  [1888],  21  Q.  B.  D.  Local  Government  Board,  10  Q. 
85;  52  J.  P.  372;  57  L.  J.  M.  C.  B.  Div.  231;  In  re  Godson,  16  Onl. 
127;  58  L.  T.  450;  36  W.  R.  629;  App.  452;  In  re  Thomas,  26  Ont. 
R.  V.  Newcastle,  J.  J.,  51  J.  P.  Rep.  448;  Hawk's  Nest  v.  Fayette 
244;  R.  V.  Powell  [1891],  2  Q.  B.  Co.,  55  W.  Va.  689;  48  S.  E.  205; 
693;  50  J.  P.  52;  60  L.  J.  Q.  B.  Strickland  v.  Knight,  47  Fla.  327; 
594;  65  L.  T.  210;  39  W.  R.  630.  36  So.  363. 

77  R.  V.  West  Riding,  J.  J. :  Ex  79  Beckham  v.  Howard,  83  Ga. 
parte  Shaw  [1898],  1  Q.  B.  503;  89;  9  So.  784;  Cooper  v.  Hunt, 
62  J.  P.  197;   67  L.  J.  Q.   B.  279;  103  Mo.  App.  9;   77  S.  W.  483. 

78  L.  T.  47;  46  W.  R.  334;   14  T.  so  Cooper  v.  Hunt,  103  Mo.  App. 

L.  R.  89;  M.  and  W.  Dig.  74.  9;   77  S.  VV.  483. 

78  Leigh  V.  Westervelt,  2  Duer  si  Cooper  v.  Hunt,  supra;  Fooks 
618;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  v.  Purnell,  101  Md.  321;  61  Atl. 
Whalen,  3  Wash.  T.  452;   17  Pac.  582. 


659  ISSUANCE    OP    LICENSES.  §  403 

injunction  be  granted  to  restrain  the  enforcement  of  an  act 
where  the  effect  would  be  to  prevent  the  complainants  obtain- 
ing a  license ;  for  that  is  not  an  interference  with  either  his 
personal  or  property  rights.«^  Nor  has  the  court  the  power  to 
grant  a  stay  of  proceedings  to  revoke  a  license  where  an  appeal 
has  been  taken  from  an  order  refusing  a  temporary  injunc- 
tion.^2  But  an  injunction  will  be  issued  against  the  retention  of 
illegal  voters'  names  on  a  census  roll  where  an  applicant  must 
obtain  the  consent  of  a  certain  percentage  of  such  voters  thus 
enrolled,  and  that  percentage  must  be  determined  by  the  census 
roll  before  he  can  obtain  a  license.**  A  license  to  sell  liquor  be- 
ing neither  property  nor  a  contract  and  subject  to  revocation, 
an  officer  having  authority  to  do  so  cannot  be  restrained  from 
revoking  it.*'^  If  the  aggrieved  party  has  a  remedy  by  a  review 
of  void  proceedings  granting  a  license,  he  cannot  secure  an  in- 
junction to  prevent  its  issuance.*®  The  fact  that  the  license  if 
issued  will  be  void,  because  for  a  prohibition  locality  under  the 
local  option  law,  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  for  granting  an  in- 
junction ;  nor  the  fact  that  the  sales  under  it  would  become  a 
nuisance,  if  it  be  not  shown  that  the  applicant  for  the  injunc- 
tion would  suffer  special  injury.*" 

Sec.  403.    Liability  for  refusing  license. 

Where  the  granting  or  refusal  of  a  license  is  a  judicial  pro- 
ceeding, the  commissioners  or  judges  refusing  it  are  not  liable 
in  damages  because  of  such  refusal;**  but  where  a  license  is 
wrongfully  and  arbitrarily  refused  the  applicant  may  recover 
compensation  for  any  damages  he  may  have  sustained.*®     In 

82  Plumb    V.    Christie,     103     Ga.  87  Strickland  v.  Knight,  47  Fla. 

686;    30    S.    E.    759;    42    L.   R.   A.  327;   36  So.  363. 

181;    Deal   v.   Singletory,   103   Ga.  ss  Halloran    v.    McCullougli,    68 

466;   30  S.  E.  765.  Ind.  479;   Irion  v.  Lewis,  56  Ala. 

83McLellan     v.     Janesville,     99  190;   Kress  v.  State,  65  Ind.   106. 

Wis.  544;  75  N.  W.  308.  See   Leeds  v.   Ryder   [1907],  App. 

84Semones  v.  Needles,   137  Iowa  Gas.  420;  71  J.  P.  484;  76  L.  J.  K. 

177;   114  N.  W.  904.  B.    1032;    97   L.   T.   261,   reversing 

ssHiggins    v.    Talty,     157     Mo.  [1906]   2  K.  B.  501. 

280;  57  S.  W.  724.  «»  Montjjelier  v.  Mills,   171   Ind. 

86  Hayes  v.   Board,   6  Cal.  App.  175;   85  N.  B.  6. 
520;   92  Pac.  492. 


§  403  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  660 

this  respect  the  granting  or  refusing  of  a  license  does  not  dif- 
fer from  any  other  official  act.  Thus  in  an  Indiana  case,  speak- 
ing of  a  refusal  of  a  school  officer  to  issue  a  teacher's  license, 
the  court  said :  "  It  is  well  settled,  and  hence  conceded,  that 
a  judicial  officer  is  not  civilly  liable  for  an  erroneous  decision, 
however  gross  the  error  may  have  been,  or  however  bad  the 
motive  was  which  inspired  it.  Such  liability  would  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  proper  exercise  of  judicial  functions."®"  Af- 
ter deciding  that  a  county  school  superintendent  is  not  and 
cannot  be  endowed  with  judicial  powers,  the  court  continues: 
"But  we  regard  the  discretion  conferred  upon  the  county 
superintendent  on  the  subject  of  licensing  teachers  as  being 
so  far  analogous  to  a  judicial  discretion  that  he  is  protected 
from  any  claim  for  damages  on  account  of  any  mere  mistake 
in  his  discretion,  or  error  in  judgment,  whether  in  granting 
or  withholding  a  license  to  persons  desirous  of  becoming  qual- 
ified teachers  in  the  common  schools.  In  that  respect,  we  think, 
a  county  superintendent  of  schools  occupies  a  similar,  and  gen- 
erally analogous,  position  to  that  of  an  inspector  of  an  elec- 
tion, who  cannot  be  made  responsible  for  a  mere  error  of  judg- 
ment in  rejecting  a  ballot  offered  by  a  qualified  voter,  but 
who  may  be  required  to  answer  in  damages  for  maliciously  re- 
jecting such  ballot.  "^^  The  court  then  makes  the  following 
extract  from  Cooley  on  Torts i**^  ''But  it  is  an  interesting 
and  very  important  question  whether,  in  the  case  of  that  class 
of  officers  who  do  not  hold  courts,  but  exercise  what  may  be  and 
often  is  called  power  quasi  judicial  like  assessors  of  land  for 
taxation,  the  immunity  is  not,  after  all,  only  partial  and  lim- 
ited by  good  faith  and  honest  purpose.     There  are  certainly 

90  Elmore    v.    Overton,    104   Ind.  74;   37  Am.   Rep.   185;    Cooley   on 

548;     54    Am.    Rep.    343;     citing  Torts,  pp.  379,  403. 

Larr  v.  State,  45  Ind.  364;   Kress  9i  Citing  Gates  v.  Neal,  23  Pick. 

V.    State,    65    Ind.    106;    State    v.  308;  Jenkins  v.  Waldron,  11  John. 

Jackson,  68   Ind.   58;    Halloran  v.  114;  Goetcheus  v.  Matthewson,  61 

McCullough,  68  Ind.  179;  Stewart  N.  Y.  420;   Weckerly  v.  Geyer,  11 

V.   Cooley,   23  Minn.  347;    23  Am.  S.    &    R.    35;     Rail      v.    Potts,    8 

Rep.  C90;   Bristust  v.  Parsons,  54  Humph.   225;    State  v.  McDonald, 

Ala.  393;  25  Am.  Rep.  688;  Rains  4  Harr.  55.5. 

V.  Sampson,  50  Tex.  495;   32  Am.  02  Page  411. 
Rep.  609 ;  Jones  v.  Brown,  54  Iowa 


661  ISSUANCE  OF  LICENSES.  §404 

many  cases  which  hold,  and  more  which  assume,  that  the 
law  will  hold  such  officers  liable  if  they  act  maliciously  to 
the  prejudice  of  individuals.  Thus,  it  is  said  that  the  mem- 
bers of  a  school  board  may  be  held  responsible  for  the  dis- 
missal of  a  school-teacher,  if  they  act  maliciously  and  with- 
out cause;  and  a  county  clerk,  for  willfully  and  maliciously 
approving  an  insufficient  appeal  bond;  and  a  wharfmaster,  for 
the  removal  of  a  ship  from  a  certain  dock,  where  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  order  was  given  maliciously  and  with  the  pur- 
pose to  cause  injury."  And  then  the  court  adds:  "In  this 
connection  it  may  be  stated  that  where  a  public  officer  acts 
either  from  a  wilful  and  wicked,  or  from  corrupt  motives,  he 
is  held  to  act  maliciously.  While,  therefore,  the  non-liabil- 
ity of  a  county  superintendent  for  a  mere  error  in  judg- 
ment in  refusing  to  grant  a  license  to  an  applicant  who  de- 
sires to  become  a  teacher  is  fulh^  conceded,  we  are  of  the  opin- 
ion that  he  ought  to  be  held  liable  for  maliciously  withhold- 
ing a  license  from  an  applicant  lawfully  entitled  to  receive 
such  a  testimonial  to  his  qualifications  as  a  teacher  in  the  com- 
mon schools. ' '  ^" 

Sec.  404.     Appeal  from  order  granting  or  refusing  license. 
Perhaps  there  is  nothing  distinctive  concerning  an  appeal 
from  an  order  granting  or  refusing  a  license.     When  the  li- 
censing board  is  a  court  the  right  of  appeal  is  geaerally  held  to 

93  Elmore  v.  Overton,  supra.    "In  eral  paragraphs  of  the  complaint, 

coming    to    this    conclusion,"    says  now    before    us,    cannot     be     sus- 

the    court,    "we    feel    that    we    are  tained." 

supportied  by  the  Very  decisive  Where  the  clerk  wrongfully  re- 
weight  of  authority  in  analogous  fused  to  issue  a  license,  as  the 
cases,  and  are  in  harmony  with  council  had  directed,  the  appli- 
the  general  scope  and  spirit  of  cant  having  tendered  his  fee,  it 
Article  III  of  the  Constitution,  was  held  that  there  was  no  cause 
which  divides  our  State  govern-  of  action,  because  the  tender  of 
ment  into  three  separate  and  dis-  the  fee,  without  actual  payment, 
tinct  departments,  Gregory  V.  State,  was  not  enough  to  entitle  him 
94  Ind.  384;  48  Am.  Rep.  162.  to  the  license.  Claus  v.  Hardy, 
Consequently,  the  objections  urged  31  Neb.  35;  47  X.  W.  418. 
against  the  sufficiency  of  the  sev- 


§404 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


662 


be  given  by  a  statute  authorizing  appeals  on  matters  coming 
before  the  court.^*  A  provision  of  the  Constitution  forbidding 
the  Legislature  to  create  any  courts  other  than  those  named  in 
that  instrument  does  not  prohibit  the  enactment  of  a  statute 
authorizing  an  appeal  from  a  licensing  board  to  a  trial  court  or 
court  of  review.^^  In  nearly  all  instances  the  case  on  appeal  is 
tried  de  7iovo,^°  and  from  the  decision  of  that  court  an  appeal 


94  State  V.  Vierling,  33  Ind.  99 ; 
Ex  parte  Levy,  43  Ark.  42;  Blair 
V.    Kilpatrick,    40    Ind.    312;    Ap- 
peal of  Board,   64  Conn.   526;    30 
Atl.  775;   Blair  v.  Rutenfranz,  40 
Ind.  318;   Board  v.  Lease,  22  Ind. 
261;  Ex  parte  Dimn,  14  Ind.  122 
Blair    v.    Vierling,    33    Ind.    2G9 
State    V.    Board,    45      Ind.     501 
Brown   v.    Porter,     37     Ind.     206 
Groscap  v.  Rainier,   111  Ind.  361 
12  N.  E.  694;  Muller  v.  Mayo,  38 
Ind.  227 ;   Ex  parte  Lester,  77  Va. 
663;    Wilson   v.  Mathis,    145    Ind. 
493;     44    N.    E.    486;     Lester    v. 
Price,   83   Va.   648;    3   S.   E.   529; 
Lydick  v.  Korner,  13  Neb.  10;   12 
N.   W.   838;    Chandler  v.   Ruebelt, 
83  Ind.  139;  Miller  v.  DeArmond, 
93  Ind.   74;    State  v.  Alliance,  65 
Xeb.  524;   91  N.  W.  387;  State  v. 
Board  (Neb.),  108  X.  W.  122. 

That  no  appeal  lies,  see  Bean 
V.  Barton,  33  Mo.  App.  635 ;  Twin- 
ing V.  St.  Louis  Co.,  47  Mo.  App. 
647.  That  no  appeal  lies  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  see  Board  v. 
Lease,  22  Ind.  261;  Blair  v.  Vier- 
ling, 33  Ind.  269;  Brown  v.  Por- 
ter, 37  Ind.  206;  Mueller  v.  Mayo, 
38  Ind.  227;  Turner  v.  Rehm,  43 
Ind.  208;  State  v.  Gorman,  171 
Ind.  58;  85  N.  E.  763;  Appeal  of 
Borman,  81  Conn.  458;  71  Atl. 
502;  Ex  parte  Lester,  77  Va.  663. 
Appeal  and  mandamus  is  the 
proper  course  for  relief.     State  v. 


Durein,  70  Kan.  13;  78  Pac.  152, 
affirming  80  Pac.  987;  State  v. 
Sheasley,  71  Kan.  857;  78  Pac. 
997. 

Contra,  Bean  v.  Barton  Co.,  33 
Mo.  App.  635;  Myers  v.  Circuit 
Court  (W.  Va.),  63  S.  E.  201; 
Creekmore  v.  Commonwealtli,  11 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  813;  Board  v.  Church- 
ill, 21  Fla.  578. 

95  Thompson  v.  Koch,  98  Ky. 
400;  33  S.  W.  96. 

96  State  V.  Vierling,  33  Ind.  99; 
In  re  Moore  (Iowa),  118  X.  W. 
879  (tried  in  equity);  Blair  v. 
Kilpatrick,  40  Ind.  312;  Blair  v. 
Rutenfranz,  40  Ind.  318;  Sansack 
V.  Ader,  168  Ind.  559;  80  N.  E. 
151;  78  X.  E.  675;  79  X.  E.  457; 
Keiser  v.  Lewis,  57  Ind.  431;  Had- 
dox  V.  Clarke  County,  79  Va.  677 ; 
Hardesty  v.  Hine,  135  Ind.  72; 
34  X.  E.  701;  Leighton  v.  Maury, 
76  Va.  865;  State  v.  Bonsfield,  24 
Xeb.  517;  39  X.  W.  427;  Lester 
V.  Price,  83  Va.  648;  3  S.  E. 
529;  Head  v.  Doehlman,  148 
Ind.  145;  46  X.  E.  585;  Fer- 
guson V.  Brown,  75  Miss.  214;  21 
So.  603.  Xo  appeal  lies  from  a 
board  exercising  legislative  func- 
tions in  granting  a  license.  State 
V.  Franklin  Co.,  49  Wash.  268; 
94  Pac.  1086;  or  where  it  is  said 
the  license  may  be  issued  "in  the 
discretion"  of  the  court  or  judge, 
Martin  v.  Rooks  Co.,  32  Kan.  146; 


663  ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES.  §404 

may  lie  to  the  Supreme  Court.^"*  Unless  a  statute  especially 
specifies  how  the  appeal  must  be  takenj  then  the  general  law 
must  be  complied  with,  especially  with  respect  to  the  giving  of 
a  bond.^^  Change  of  venue  may  be  taken  as  in  ordinary  civil 
cases."^  The  trial,  when  de  novo,  must  be  upon  the  original 
papers,  and  new  papers  or  remonstrances  cannot  be  filed,^'^ 
though  they  may  be  amended/  If  a  petition  for  a  license  be 
dismissed  the  applicant  may  appeal ;  -  so  he  may  do  so  even  if  a 
remonstrance  shows  that  the  number  of  remonstrants  absolutely 
prevents  the  granting  of  a  license,  for  in  that  instance  the  trial 
is  upon  the  question  whether  a  sufficient  number  of  legal  re- 
monstrants who  are  entitled  to  remonstrate  have  signed  the 
remonstrance  as  an  issue  of  fact.^  Local  statutes  fix  the  time 
when  an  appeal  must  be  taken,  and  these  be  followed.*  In  a 
number  of  the  States  the  court  to  which  the  appeal  is  taken  is 
merely  a  court  of  review,  though  a  nisi  prius  court,  and  from 
its  decision  an  appeal  may  lie  to  the  highest  court  of  appeals 
for  the  State.  Where  such  is  the  case  the  court  will  examine 
the  record  to  see  if  there  be  error  in  it ;  and  if  it  be  not  shown 
there  was  error  or  an  abuse  of  discretion  the  finding  of  the 
licensing  court  or  board  will  be  either  affirmed  or  the  appeal 

4  Pac.  158;  Hein  v.  Smith,  13  W.  Ind.   145;    4(5  N.   E.  585;   Groscap 

Va.   358.      Sometimes   the   trial   is  v.  Rainier,  111  Ind.  361;   12  N.  E. 

heard  npon  the  evidence  given  be-  694;  In  re  Arszman,  40  Ind.  App. 

low.     Hensley  v.  Metcalfe  Co.,  115  218;    81    N.    E.    680;    In    re    Per- 

Ky.  810;    74  S.  W.   1054;   25  Ky.  singer   (Neb.),  90  N.  W.  242. 
L.  Rep.  204.    See /n  re  Henry,  124  i  Stockwell    v.    Brent,    97     Ind. 

Iowa  358;    100   N.   W.   43;    In  re  474;    Hardesty   v.   Hine,    135   Ind. 

Foylton   (Neb.),  118  N.  W.  119.  72;   34  N.  E.  701. 

sti*  In  re  Adamek,  82  Neb.  448;  2  Lanham    v.    Woods,    167    Ind. 

118  N.  W.  109.  398;     79    N.    E.    376;     Wilson    v. 

97  Blair    v.    Kilpatrick,    40    Ind.  Mathis,    145    Ind.    493;    44   N.    E. 
312;   Blair  v.  Rutenfranz,  40  Ind.  486. 

318;  Ex  parte  Lester,  77  Va.  663.  s  Lanham    v.    Woods,    167    Ind. 

98  State  v:  Vierling,  33  Ind.  99;       398;   79  N.  E.  376. 

Blair  v.   Kilpatrick,  40  Ind.  312;  But  a  city  cannot  apjjeal   from 

Blair  v.   Rutenfranz,  40  Ind.   318.  an  order  of  its.  own  excise  board. 

99  Miller   v.   Wade,   58   Ind.   91;  In  re  Klamm    (Neb.),   117  N.  W. 
Sansack    v.    Ader,    168    Ind.    559;  991. 

80  N.   E.   151;    79  N.   E.  457;    78  *  Lydick  v.  Koruer,  13  Neb.  lOj 

N.  E.  675 ;  Head  v.  Doehlman,  148       12  N.  W.  838. 


§404 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


664 


dismissed.'  Sucli  is  the  case  in  Pennsylvania  where  the  appeal 
is  regarded  as  a  substitute  for  a  certiorari;  *'  and  as  the  rea- 
sons assigned,  in  case  of  a  refusal,  form  no  part  of  the  record, 
they  will  not  be  considered.^  Of  course,  if  the  applicant  does 
not  possess  the  requisite  qualifications  the  refusal  of  the  licens- 
ing board  because  he  did  not  possess  the  necessary  qualifica- 
tions will  not  be  disturbed.*  In  Pennsylvania  the  Supreme 
Court  will  not  review  the  facts  of  the  case ;  ^  and  if  the  order 
recites  that  the  application  was  refused  "after  hearing,"  it 
will  not  hold  that  the  refusal  was  arbitrarily  done.^°  The 
fact  that  more  petitioners  favor  the  granting  of  the  license  than 
those  remonstrating  is  no  reason  why  the  refusal  of  the  appli- 
cation should  be  reversed ;  ^^  nor  the  fact  that  there  are  na 
remonstrants  nor  any  evidence  given  against  the  applicant, 


5  French  v.  Noel,  22  Gratt.  454 ; 
Toole's  Appeal,  00  Pa.  St.  376. 

6  Appeal  of  Brown,  2  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  63. 

In  re  Donovan,  9  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
647;    44  W.  N.  C.  34. 

7/>i  re  Berg,  139  Pa.  St.  854: 
21  Atl.  77;  Leister's  Appeal  (Pa.), 
11  Atl.  387;  In  re  Frae,  33  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  348;  In  re  Netter,  11 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  566;  In  re  Kilgore, 
13  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  543;  In  re 
Brown,  18  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  409;  In 
re  Weaver,  20  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  95; 
In  re  Donaghue,  5  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
1 ;  40  W.  N.  C.  440. 

8  7m,  re  Goldman,  138  Pa.  St. 
321;  22  Atl.  23;  Hoglan  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 3  Bush  147;  In  re 
Chaml)ers,  18  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  412; 
State  V.  Alliance,  65  Neb.  524; 
91  N.  W.  387;  Ferguson  v.  Brown, 
75  Miss.  214;  21  So.  603;  Malmo 
V.  Fairfield  Co.,  72  Conn.  1;  43 
Atl.  485. 

9  Leister's  Appeal,  11  Atl.  387; 
20  W.  N.  C.  224;  In  re  Branch, 
164  Pa.  427;  30  Atl.  296;  35  W. 
N.    C.    310;    In   re    Frae,    33    Pa. 


Super.  Ct.  348;  In  re  Chambers, 
18  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  412;  Common- 
wealth V.  Kerns,  2  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
59 ;  In  re  Snyder,  4  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  648;  In  re  Cohen,  5  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.    224. 

10 //t  re  Gross,  161  Pa.  344;  29 
Atl.  25;  34  W.  N.  C.  404;  In  re 
Quinton,  169  Pa.  115;  32  AtL 
101 :  Appeal  of  Doberneck,  1  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  637;  In  re  Black  Dia- 
mond Distilling  Co.,  33  Pa.  Super. 
Co.  649 ;  In  re  Reynoldsville  Dis- 
tilling Co.,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  269; 
Appeal  of  Hollender,  11  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  23;  In  re  Quinn,  11  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  554;  In  re  Sweeney,  11 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  569;  In  re  Chuya, 
20  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  410;  In  re  Di 
Nubile,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  571;  In 
re  Meenan,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  575; 
In  re  Foreman,  20  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
98 ;  In  re  Kilgore,  13  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  543;  In  re  McCi-ory,  31  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  192;  hi  re  De  Haven, 
31   Pa.   Super.  Ct.  335. 

11 /w.  re  Bowman,  167  Pa.  644; 
31  Atl.   932. 


665  ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES,  §  40-4 

for  the  board  may  have  acted  upon  its  own  knowledge  of  his 
fitness.^"  Tf  the  license  be  refused  because  nnnecessary  to  the 
neighborhood,  the  presumption  will  be  indulged  in  that  the 
court  acted  from  its  own  knowledge  and  had  due  regard 
to  the  number  and  character  of  the  petitioners.'^  Where  the 
license  could  be  issued  by  a  city  board  of  trustees  only  upon 
certain  facts  which  must  ])e  shown  before  it  was  issued,  acting 
upon  the  rule  that  where  the  jurisdiction  of  an  inferior 
court  depends  on  the  existence  of  certain  facts,  its  adjudication 
of  their  existence  will  be  conclusive,  unless  there  be  a  provision 
for  its  review,  the  Appellate  Court  of  California  refused  to  re- 
view the  proceedings  of  such  board.^*  If  the  record  recites  that 
a  hearing  on  the  application  was  heard,  that  is  conclusive  upon 
the  parties  and  the}"  cannot  show  there  was  no  hearing  in 
faet/^  Where  in  Connecticut  the  licensing  board  have  no  dis- 
cretion in  granting  a  license  if  certain  facts  be  proven,  its 
action  in  refusing  a  license  will  be  reversed  if  such  facts  be 
shown :  but  if  the  board  had  to  choose  an  applicant  out  of 
several,  the  number  of  licenses  in  the  district  being  limited, 
the  Appellate  Court  will  not  make  the  choice.^"  A  statute 
which  gives  a  licensee  a  right  of  appeal  when  his  license  shall 

12 /?i  re  Sendcroft,    1G8   Pa.   45;        Ct.    558;    In    re    tjuinn.     11     Pa. 

31  Atl.    948;     Appeal    of    Dober-        Super.   Ct.   554. 

neck,    1   Pa.   Super.    Ct.   637;    Ap-  In  Pennsylvania   an  appeal  does 

peal    of    Gross,    1    Pa.    Super.    Ct.  not  bring  up  tlie  evidence  nor  the 

640;    In    re   Curtus,    173    Pa.    27:  rulings   of  the  court  on   the  ques- 

34  Atl.  214;  T^igton  v.  Maiiry,  7G  tions    of    evidence.      The    investi- 

Va.  865.  gation   of    the    appellate   court    is 

13  7n    re   Dunhip,    171    Pa.    454-  confined     to     tlie     record.      In     re 

32  Atl.  1128;  37  W.  N.  C.  245.  Weaver,   20   Pa.    Super.    Ct.   95. 
1*  Hayes  v.   Board,   6   Cal.   App.  In    Nebraska     if    all    the    pro- 

520;   92  Pac.  492.  ceedings    have    not   been    sent    up 

In  Kentucky  the  statute,  at  one  to  the  appellate  court,  cither  in  a 

time,  made  the  decision  of  the  Cir-  bill    of    exceptions    or    the    tran- 

cuit    Court    final,    and    no    appeal  script,   the   court   may   order   that 

lay  from  its   decision.     Hainer   v.  to   be    done.      Persinger   v.    Miller 

Burton,  75  Kan.  281;  89  Pac.  697.  (Xeb.),   90  X.    W.    242;    State   v. 

So    in    West    Virginia,    Myers    v.  Board    (Neb.).   108  N.  W.   122. 

Circuit    Ct.     (W.    Va.),    63    S.    E.  ic  Appeal    of    Malmo,    73    Conn. 

201.  "32:    47   Atl.    163. 
15  Zn.   re   Welsh,    11    Pa.    Super. 


§404 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


666 


be  revoked  does  not  apply  to  an  instance  M'here  it  is  part  of 
the  penalty  inflicted  for  a  violation  of  the  liquor  law  that  the 
violator  of  the  law  shall  be  fined  and  have  his  license  revoked.^'' 
"When  the  evidence  goes  up  to  the  appellate  tribunal,  the  court 
must  act  upon  its  own  view  of  it,  and,  as  a  rule,  not  be  in- 
fluenced by  the  action  of  the  lower  court.^*  A  refusal  to  grant 
a  license  because  there  Avere  enough  saloons  in  the  neighbor- 
hood is  not  error  of  which  the  applicant  can  complain.^"     If 


1"  Appeal  of  Londry,  79  Conn. 
1;  63  Atl.  293;  Hedges  v.  Met- 
calfe Co.,  116  Ky.  524;  76  S.  W. 
381;  25  Ky.  L.  Eep.  772. 

That  the  applicant  has  the  bur- 
den to  show  a  right  to  a  license, 
see  In  re  Foreman,  20  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.   98. 

The  presumption  is  that  there 
Avere  sufficient  reasons  for  refusing 
a  license  when  one  is  refused.  In 
re  Miller,  8  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  223; 
In  re  Cohen,  5  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  224 ; 
Ferguson  v.  Brown.  75  Miss.  214; 
21  So.  603;  In  re  Donovan,  44  W. 
N.  C.  34;   9  Pa.  Sujier.  Ct.  647. 

If  there  be  evidence  tending  to 
sustain  the  finding  of  the  licens- 
ing board,  its  action  in  granting 
a  license  will  not  be  reviewed  by 
the  Supreme  Court.  In  re  Mac- 
Pvae,  75  Neb.  757;  106  N.  W.  1020; 
In  re  Moore  (Iowa),  118  X.  W. 
879. 

Where  the  requisite  number  of 
remonstrants  have  filed  a  remon- 
strance the  qualifications  of  the 
applicant  is  no  longer  an  issue, 
and  evidence  concerning  them 
cannot  be  received.  Shaflfer  v. 
Stern,  160  Ind.  375;  66  N.  E. 
1004. 

18  Bennett  v.  Otto,  68  Neb.  652; 
94  N.  W.  807. 

15  7m  re  .Torgensen,  75  Neb.  401; 
106  N.  W.  AO-2. 

In   Kentucky    the   trial    is    upon 


the  evidence  contained  in  the  bill 
of  exceptions;  and  if  the  evidence 
therein  shows  the  court  had  no 
discretion,  the  Circuit  Court 
should  remand  the  case  with  di- 
rections to  grant  the  license.  Mer- 
edith V.  Commonwealth,  116  Ky. 
524;  76  S.  W.  8;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
455;  Hodges  v.  Metcalfe  Co. 
Ky.),  76  S.  W.  381;  25  Ky.  L. 
Pvep.  772,  1706;  78  S.  W.  460; 
Holmes  v.  Robertson  Co.  (Ky.), 
89  S.  W.  106;  28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  283. 

In  Nebraska  it  is  sufficient  to 
file  a  certified  transcript  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  license  board. 
State  V.  McGuire,  74  Neb.  769;  105 
N.W.  471.  The  judgment  of  the 
district  court  in  that  State  is  not 
reviewable  by  the  Supremo  Court. 
Halverstadt  v.  Berger,  72  Neb. 
462;    100   N.   W.    934. 

In  Pennsylvania  the  judgment 
of  the  appellate  court  will  not  be 
reversed  because  the  names  of  the 
remonstrants  are  duplicated,  the 
presumption  being  that  the  court 
had  due  regard  for  the  number 
and  character  of  the  petitioners 
for  the  license.  In  re  Shearer,  26 
Pa.   Super.  Ct.  34. 

If  the  record  shows  the  court 
refused  the  license  for  a  reason 
the  law  does  not  recngni7e  as  valid, 
its  action  will  be  reversed.  In  re 
Knoblauch,  28  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  323. 


667  ISSUANCE    OF   LICENSES.  §  405 

the  discretion  of  the  licensing  boai-'l  has  been  unreasonably 
or  arbitrarily  used  in  refusing  a  license,  the  action  will  be 
reviewed.-"  If  a  statute  requires  the  appellant  to  give  a  bond 
when  he  takes  an  appeal,  then  a  copy  of  his  bond  must  appear 
in  the  record,  under  the  Kentucky  practice.-^ 

Sec.  405.    Writ  of  prohibition. 

A  writ  of  prohibitnon  may  be  issued  where  a  licensing  board 
undertakes  to  grant  a  license  for  a  territory  over  which  it 
has  no  jurisdiction.  Such  was  held  to  be  the  case  in  England 
where  the  justices  of  Warwickshire  purported  to  act  as  licens- 
ing justices  for  an  outlying  district  of  the  county  of  Worcester 
which  had  been  transferred  to  the  county  of  Warwick  for  po- 
lice purposes  only,  and  to  hear  and  determine  applications  for 
licensing  such  district,  over  which  tliey  had  no  jurisdiction.-- 
And  in  Missouri  it  was  held  that  the  holder  of  a  license  was 
entitled  to  a  writ  of  prohibition  on  refusal  of  the  court  to  give 
him  a  change  of  venue  in  certiorari  to  review  the  proceedings 
in  the  county  court  granting  him  a  license;  because  he  had 
no  adequate  remedy  by  appeal  from  a  judgment  refusing  him 
a  license.-^  But  where  the  act  of  issuing  a  license  is  non-judi- 
cial and  of  an  administrative  regulation,  the  writ  will  not  be  is- 
sued.-* If  the  license  will  be  void  if  issued,  a  writ  of  prohi- 
bition will  not  be  granted.-^ 

20  Louisville  V.  Gagen  (Ky.),llG  Appeal  of  Stavolo,  SI  Conn.  454; 
S.  W.  745;  118  S.  W.  947;  Berger       71  Atl.  549. 

V.  DeLoach,  121  S.  W.  591.  22  Regina    v.    Worcester,    J.    J. 

In   this    last   case    the    detenni-  [1899],  1  Q.  B.  59;  62  J.  P.  836; 

nation   of   the   city   council   which  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  109;  47  W.  R.  134; 

of    two    applicants    should   receive  79  L.   T.  393;   15  T.  L.  R.  45;   19 

the   license,   when   only   one   could  Cox  C.  C.  198.     See  also  IMyers  v. 

be  issued,  was  held  not  reviewable.  Circuit  Court   (W.  Va. ),  63  S.  E. 

21  Hamilton  v.  McKinney  (Ky.),  201. 

65  S.  W.  2;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1341.  23  State  v.  Denton,  128  Mo.  App. 

In  Connecticut  tlie  questions  on  304;    107   S.  W.  446. 

appeal    are    whether     the     county  24  Virginia  Pocahontas  Coal  Co. 

commissioners    acted    legally,    and  v.    McDt-well   Co.   Ct.,   58    W.   V:\. 

whether   they   exceeded   or   abused  86;   51   S.  E.   1. 

their    powers.      Appeal     of     Bor-  20  Beckham    v.   Howard,   83    Ga. 

mann,  81  Conn.  458;   71  Atl.  502;  89;  9  S.  E.  784. 


§§406,407        TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  668 

Sec,  406.     From  what  orders  an  appeal  may  be  taken. 

Appeals  lie  only  from  judgments  granting  or  refusing  li- 
censes, or  from  a  "final  judgment."  Thus  where  a  remon- 
strance was  filed  and  to  it  a  paper  was  filed  called  a  "demur- 
rer," and  this  demurrer  was  sustained,  and  the  record  then 
recited  that  "thereupon  the  remonstrators  failed  and  refused 
to  plead  further  and  the  court  rendered  judgment  on  the  de- 
murrer ;  and  it  is  therefore  considered  and  adjudged  by  the 
court  that  the  remonstrants  take  nothing  by  this  action  and 
that  defendant  recover  from  the  remonstrants  his  costs  and 
charges  in  this  case  laid  out  and  expended,"  followed  by  the 
usual  prayer  for  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court,  it  was  held 
that  there  was  no  final  judgment  from  which  to  appeal.-"  So  a 
remonstrant  cannot  appeal  from  an  order  merely  overruling 
his  protest;  -•  and  in  Alabama  it  has  been  held  that  an  order 
merely  refusing  the  license  Avas  not  a  "final  decree  of  the 
probate  court"  nor  a  "final  judgment  order  or  decree  of  the 
judge  of  probate. ' '  ~^  But  where  there  were  two  judges  of  the 
court  and  they  disagreed,  the  order  reciting,  "The  court  dis- 
agrees to  granting  this  license,  and  therefore  there  is  no  license 
granted,"  it  was  held  that  this  was  a  final  judgment  from 
which  an  appeal  lay.-^ 

Sec.  407.     Persons  entitled  to  appeal — Parties. 

Of  course,  an  applicant  denied  a  license  has  a  right  to  ap- 
peal where  appeals  lie  generally ;  ^**  and  if  the  license  be  grant- 
so  Barnes  v.   Wagener,   169   Ind.  2s  Eamagnano  v.  Crook,  88  Ala. 

511;   82  N.  E.  1037.     It  should  be  450;  7  So.  247. 

noted  that  although  this  case  had  29  in  re  Foreman,  20  Super.  Ct. 

been   appealed   from   the  board   of  Rep.  98. 

county  oommissioners   to   the  C'ir-  so  Ex  parte  Dumi,   14  Ind.    122; 

cuit  Court,  the  latter  court  tried  Lester  v.  Price,   S3  Va.  648;    3  S. 

the  case  de  novo,  and  granted  or  E.    529     (by    statute)  ;    Wilson    v. 

refused    the    license    as    the    facts  Mathis,    145    Ind.    493;    44   N.    E. 

proven     showed     should    be     done.  486;    Lanham   v.   Woods,   167   Ind. 

Anderson  v.  Weber,  39   Ind.   App.  398;    79    N.    E.    376;    Ludvvig    v. 

443;     79    N.    E.     1055;     State    v.  State,  18  Ind.  App.  518;   48  N.  E. 

Schneider,  47  Mo.  App.   669.  390;    Regina    v.    Deane,    2    Q.    B. 

27  Moores  v.  State,  58  Neb.  608 ;  96. 

79  N.  W.   163. 


669 


ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES. 


§407 


ed,  the  remonstrants  may  appeal.^^  And  where  a  nearby  land- 
owner may  object  to  the  granting  of  a  license,  he  may  appeal.''- 
But  a  person  who  has  no  interest  in  the  granting  or  refusal 
of  the  license,  Avho  is  not  a  party  to  the  record,  cannot  ap- 
peal.^^  Thus  the  attorney  of  the  remonstrants  cannot  appeal 
in  his  own  name  nor  without  their  consent. ^^  But  where  a 
statute  gave  an  appeal  to  ' '  any  taxpayer  *  *  *  who  shall 
be  aggrieved, ' '  it  was  held  not  necessary  for  an  appellant  tax- 
payer to  show  an  aggrievance  special  to  himself."^  In  New 
York  the  county  treasurer  to  whom  the  license  tax  must  be 
paid  is  a  "party  aggrieved"  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute 
giving  "aggrieved"  persons  a  right  of  appeal.-^"  A  per.son  who 
intervenes  in  the  quarter  sessions  of  Pennsylvania  after  the 
license  is  granted,  for  the  purpose  of  appealing,  cannot  main- 
tain an  appeal.^^  And  where  an  appellant  to  the  Appellate 
Court  appeared  in  the  Circuit  Court  fi-om  which  an  appeal  had 
been  taken  and  filed  an  answer  setting  up  a  remonstrance  by  a 
majority  of  the  legal  voters,  to  which  a  demurrer  was  sustained, 
he  not  having  the  right  to  file  a  new  remonstrance  at  that  stage 
of  the  case,  it  was  held  that  he  had  no  standing  to  appeal  from 
the  judgment  of  the   Circuit   Court.^'*     In   England  a  trade 


31  Collins  V.  Barrier,  64  Miss. 
21;  8  So.  164;  Ludwig  v.  State,  18 
Ind.  App.  518;  48  N.  E.  390;  Les- 
ter V.  Price,  83  Va.  648;  3  S.  E. 
29  (by  statute)  ;  State  v.  Atlantic 
City,  48  N.  J.  L.  118;  3  Atl.  65; 
Lanham  v.  Woods,  167  Ind.  398; 
79  N.  E.  376;  Whissen  v.  Furth, 
73  Ark.  366;  84  S.  W.  500;  68 
L.  R.  A.  161;  In  re  Smith,  126 
Iowa  128;  101  N.  W.  875.  Con- 
tra, Drapert  v.  State,  14  Ind.  123 ; 
Boulter  v.  Kent  [1897],  App. 
Cas.  569;  61  J.  P.  532;  66  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  787;  77  L.  T.  288;  46  W. 
R.    114;    13  T.  L.  R.  538. 

32  Dexter  v.  Cumberland,  17  R. 
I.  222;  21  Atl.  347;  Appeal  of  Gib- 
boney,  6  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  26. 


33  State  V.  Lamberton,  37  Minn. 
362;   34  N.  W.  336. 

31  Clark  V.  Pratt  (Miss.),  11 
So.  631;  Regina  v.  Keepers  of  the 
Peace,  25  Q.  B.  Div.  257;  39  L.  J. 
M.  C.  146;  63  L.  T.  243;  39  W. 
R.  11;  Regina  v.  London,  J.  J.,  55 
J.  P.  56;  Miller  v.  Givens,  35  Ind. 
App.  40;  78  N.  E.  1067. 

35  Appeal  of  Board,  64  Conn. 
526;  30  Atl.  775;  State  v.  Alli- 
ance, 65  Neb.  524;   91  N.  W.  387. 

36  People  V.  Sackett,  15  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  290;  44  N.  Y.  Supp. 
593,  reversing  17  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
405;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  413. 

37  Appeal  of  Gibboney,  6  Pa- 
Super.  Ct.  26. 

38  Miller  v.  Givens,  39  Ind.  App. 
40;  79  N.  E.  1067. 


§  407  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  670 

rival  has  sufficient  interest  to  entitle  him  to  appeal  under 
a  statute  giving  a  "person  aggrieved"  an  appeal,-''^  but  the 
owner  of  the  premises  licensed,  who  is  not  the  licensee,  is  the 
"person  aggrieved,"  and  cannot  appeal  from  a  decree  for- 
feiting the  license,  although  it  may  mean  much  to  him.*''  In 
New  South  Wales  any  person  residing  within  the  prohibited 
district  is  a  person  "aggrieved,"  and  may  appeal  from  a 
grant  of  a  license.*^  But  where,  in  Arkansas,  the  record  re- 
cited "Coner  K  ct  al,^^  when  K  filed  an  answer,  and  the  un- 
known parties  styled  "et  al,"  are  not  expressly  made  parties 
to  the  proceedings,  only  K  being  treated  as  a  party,  another 
than  K  cannot  appeal.'*-  In  loAva  "any  citizen  of  the  county" 
may  file  with  the  clerk  of  the  court  a  general  denial  to  the 
application  for  a  license;  and  on  an  adverse  decision  may  ap- 
peal, and  although  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  county  attorney 
to  appear  to  such  application,  yet  the  person  so  filing  a  general 
denial  has  also  the  right  to  appear  and  prosecute  an  appeal.*^ 
The  licensing  board  is  not  a  proper  party  to  the  appeal.**  An 
appeal  will  not  be  dismissed  on  the  ground  that  persons  not 
entitled  to  appeal  have  agreed  to  pay  a  part  of  the  expenses 
of  an  appeal  taken  by  others  entitled  to  take  appeal.*^  In 
England  where  the  question  is  one  of  renewal  of  a  license  the 
landlord  may  join  with  his  licensee  tenant  who  has  applied  for 
a  renewal  of  his  license  and  been  refused ;  *'"'  and  the  licensee 

39  Rex  V.  Groom,  70  L.  J.  K.  B.  W.  N.  (X.  S.  W.)  202;  Ex  parte 
636;    [1901]    2   K.   B.    157;    84   L.       Aitkin  [1901],  1  N.  S.  W.  214. 

T.    534;   49  W.  R.    484;    65  J.  P.  See    Rhode    Island,    etc.    Co.    v. 

452.  Evasion,  21  R.  I.  577;  44  Ail.  223. 

So    in    New    South   Wales.      Ex  42  Halford   v.    Kirkland    (Ark.), 

parte  Cann,  1  S.  R.  N.  S.  W.  262;  71  S.  W.  264. 

18  W.  N.  N.  S.  W.   186.      Contra,  *^  In    re    Intoxicating    Liquors, 

Regina  v.   Middlesex,  3  B.  &   Ad.  129   Iowa,   434:    105   N.    W.    702; 

938;    Regina   v.    Surry,    52    J.    P.  In  re  Smith,   126  Iowa,   128;    101 

423.  N.  W.  875. 

40  Regina  v.  Andover,  55  L.  J.  44  Murphy  v.  Board,  73  Ind.  483. 
M.  C.  143;  16  Q.  B.  Div.  711;  55  Contra,  Guinn  v.  Cumberland  Co., 
L.  T.  23;  34  W.  R.  456;  50  J.  P.  (Ky.),  90  S.  W.  274;  28  Ky. 
549.  L.  Rep.  759. 

41 7n.  re   Gleason,   7   W.    N.    C.  45  Ferguson  v.   Brown,   75   Miss. 

(N.  S.  W.)   140.     Contra,  Ex  parte       214;  21  So.  603. 
Rose,  2  S.  R.   (N.  S.  W.)   268;   19  40  Feist  v.  Tower,  J.  J.,  68  J.  P. 

264. 


671  ISSUANCE    OF    LICENSES.  §  408 

may  authorize  a  mortgagee  of  the  premises  to  appeal,  though 
he  himself  declines  to  do  so.^^  And  where  the  owner  of  the 
premises  is  expressly  authorized  b}^  statute  to  apply  for  a  trans- 
fer from  one  tenant  to  another  of  the  licensed  premises,  he 
may  appeal  on  refusal  of  the  court  to  make  the  transfer/'' 
Remonstrants  cannot  appeal  after  the  license  against  which 
they  remonstrated  has  expired/"  A  statute  which  gives  an 
applicant  a  right  of  appeal  does  not  thereby  give  the  remon- 
strators  the  right  of  appeal.''" 

Sec.  408.     Rights  of  licensee  pending  appeal. 

Where  a  case  is  tried  de  novo  on  appeal  m  the  Appellate 
Court,  the  effect  of  the  appeal  is  to  vacate  or  suspend  the  or- 
der or  judgment  granting  a  license,  and  any  license  isvSued 
thereon  before  the  appeal  is  taken  is  vacated,  and  if  issued 
thereafter  it  is  void.^^  In  Nebraska  it  is  held  that  the  licensing 
body  must  recall  the  license  when  an  appeal  is  taken ;  and  if 
it  do  not  mandamus  lies  to  compel  it  to  do  so;  ^-  and  the  right 

47  Garrett  V.  Middlesex,  J.  J.,  12  In  re  Klamni    (Neb.),   117  N.   W. 

Q.  B.  Div.  620;   48  J.  P.  358;    53  991. 

L.  J.   M.  C.   81;  32  W.  R.  G4C.  49  Ververka  v.  Fullmers   (Neb.), 

48Regina  v.  West  Riding,  J.  J.,  118  N.  W.  1097. 

11  Q.  B.  Div.  917;  48  J.  P.  149;  92  soAilstock  v.  Page,  77  Va.  386. 

L.  J.  M.  C.  99;   Stevens  v.  Shern-  si  Molihan  v.  State,  30  Ind.  266; 

brook,  J.  J.,  23  Q.  B.  Div.  142;  53  Young  v.  State,  34  Ind.  46;   Blair 

J.  P.  423;  58  L.  J.  M.  C.    167.  v.   Kilpatrick,   40   Ind.   312;    Mul- 

In  England  the  licensing  justices  ikin  v.  Davis,  53   Ind.  206;    State 

are    the   only    proper    respondents,  v.  Sopher,   157  Ind.  360;    61  N.  S. 

and  no  other  person  can  oppose  the  785;  Head  v.  Doehleman,  148  Ind. 

license    without    leave     of    court.  145;  46  N.  E.  585;  People  v.  Jud- 

Tynemouth    v.    Attorney    General  son,  59  N.  Y.  IVIisc.  Rep.  538;   112 

[1899]     App.     Gas.     293;     68     L.  N.    Y.    Supp.    408. 

J.  Q.   B.  752;  63  J.  P.  404;   15  T.  52  State    v.    Bonsfield,    24    Neb. 

L.    R.    340;    Nix    v.    Nottingham,  517;    39    N.    W.    427;    Byrum    v. 

J.  J.  [1899],  2  Q.  B.  300.  n.  Peterson,  34   Neb.  237;    51   N.  W. 

If  the   remonstrants  be  success-  829;   Swan  v.  Wilderson,  10  Okla. 

ful,    they    cannot    be    taxed    with  547;     62    Pac.    422;     Watkins    v. 

costs.      IVIiller    v.    DeArmond,    93  Grieser.    11    Okla.    302;    66    Pac. 

Ind.  74.  332;    Paden   v.    Carson,    15    Okla. 

A  citf  cannot  appeal   from   the  399;    82  Pac.   830. 

action    of    its    own    excise    board.  Jure  Foltyn   (Neb.),  118  N.  W. 


§  409  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  672 

to  the  -writ  is  not  necessarily  lost  by  delaj","^  though  it  may  be.'''* 
Wliere  the  trial  is  de  novo  the  appellate  court  in  which  such 
trial  is  had  awards  the  license,  and  the  applicant's  right  de- 
pends upon  the  license  issued  by  that  court,  and  not  upon  the 
license  issued  by  the  court  or  board  from  which  the  appeal  was 
taken.^^  Occasionally  a  statute  provides  that  the  license  issued 
by  the  licensing  court  or  board  may  continue  in  force  until 
the  c[uestion  is  determined  in  the  appellate  court  which  tries 
the  case  de  novo;  but  usually  there  is  a  limit  to  the  time 
it  may  continue,  as  for  instance,  until  the  close  of  the  first 
term  of  the  court  to  which  the  appeal  is  taken.^®  Mere  notice 
of  an  intention  to  appeal  does  not  prevent  the  issuance  of  the 
license,^^  though  it  should  be  withheld  during  the  time  an  ap- 
peal can  be  taken,  if  notice  of  appeal  has  been  given.^^  If  a 
license  has  been  granted  and  it  remains  in  force  pending  the 
appeal,  a  reversal  of  the  order  granting  the  license  has  the 
effect  to  revoke  the  license.^^ 

Sec.  409.     Sale  pending  appeal  to  Supreme  Court. 

In  Indiana  it  has  been  held  in  a  well-considered  case,  that  an 
appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  a  judgment  of  the  Circuit 
Court  granting  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  does  not 
suspend  the  right  of  the  applicant  to  sell  pending  the  appeal 
if  he  has  tendered  to  the  proper  officers  the  license  fee  and 

119;    State   v.   Rathsack,    82    Neb.  diction  over  the  case,  it  being  nec- 
386;   117  N.  W.  949.  essary    to    reconcile    several    stat- 
es State   V.    Bays,   31    Neb.    514;  utes  relating  to  appeals. 
48  N.  W.  270;  31  Neb.  516;  48  N.  r,7  Lydick  v.  Korner,  13  Neb.  10; 
W.  271.  12  N.  W.  838. 

54  State  V.  Elwood,  37  Neb.  473;  If  a  licensee  pay  the  license  fee, 
55  N.  W.  1074.  take  out  his  license,  and  then  an 

55  State  v.  Sopher,  157  Ind.  appeal  be  taken  and  his  license  be 
360;  61  N.  E.  785;  Keiser  v.  State,  denied,  he  cannot  recover  back  the 
78  Ind.  430;  Board  v.  Krenger,  88  fee.  Board  v.  Kreuger,  88  Ind. 
Ind.  231.  231. 

56  State  V.  Sopher,  157  Ind.  360;  ss  Swan  v.  Wilderson  10  Okla. 
61  N.  E.  785.     In  this  case  it  was  547;  62  Pac.  422. 

held   until    the   close   of    the   next  59  Bordwell    v.    State,    77    Ark. 

term    of    the   court   at   which    the       161;  91  S.  W.  555. 
<?ourt    on    appeal    acquired    juris- 


g73  ISSUANCE   OF    LICENSES.  §  410 

bond  required  by  law.  In  such  case  the  judgment  granting 
the  license  is  self-executing,  and  the  applicant  is  entitled  to 
the  license  without  any  other  proceedings  on  the  judgment. 
In  so  deciding  Justice  Elliott,  who  wrote  the  opinion,  said: 
"An  applicant  for  a  license,  who  has  obtained  a  judgment 
declaring  his  right  to  a  license,  and  has  properly  tendered  the 
requisite  fee  and  bond,  cannot  be  successfully  prosecuted  for 
violating  the  law,  for  he  has  done  all  that  it  was  in  his  power 
to  do,  and  all  that  the  law  required  of  him  The  violation 
of  the  law  is  on  the  part  of  the  ministerial  officer  who  with- 
holds the  license.  The  case  is  utterly  unlike  that  of  one  who 
sells  without  having  tendered  either  fee  or  bond,  and  after 
sale  makes  tender  of  both  bond  and  fee.  In  the  one  case  there 
is  a  wrong  on  the  part  of  the  applicant ;  in  the  other  there  is 
none ;  in  the  one  case  there  is  the  possibility  of  an  evasion  of 
the  law;  in  the  other  there  is  an  earnest  effort  to  obey  the 
law  before  undertaking  to  sell.  The  applicant  cannot  be  in 
the  wrong  where  he  has  done  all  that  it  was  in  his  power  to 
do.  A  man  cannot  be  denied  a  statutory  right  because  a  pub- 
lic officer  has  made  it  impossible  to  fully  comply  with  the 
statute;  to  hold  otherwise  would  be  equivalent  to  declaring 
that  a  maa  may  be  denied  the  benefit  of  a  statute  for  not 
doing  what  was  legally  impossible.  *  *  *  if  jt  should  be 
held  that  the  applicant  could  not  obtain  a  license  until  after 
the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  had  been  affirmed,  then  the 
question  of  his  fitness  and  of  the  sufficiency  of  his  bond  would 
be  postponed  far  beyond  the  time  contemplated  by  law,  and 
not  improbably  to  a  time  when  such  changes  had  taken  place 
as  would  make  it  improper  to  permit  him  to  take  out  a  license 
at  all.  Or,  if  this  would  not  be  the  result,  then  the  result 
would  be  a  complete  denial  of  a  right  conferred  by  an  express 
statute. "«" 

Sec.  410.     Certiorari. 

A  writ  of  certiorari  is  granted  more  frequently  to  review 
licensing  boards  of  a  non-judicial  character  than  the  acts  of 

60  Padgett  V.  State,  93  Ind.  396.       See  also  State  v.  Berton,  27  Neb. 

476;  43  N.  W.  249. 


§  410  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  674 

licensing  courts,  though  no  hard  and  fast  rule  can  be  here  laid 
down.  As  a  rule,  the  facts  will  not  be  reviewed  by  means  of  a 
writ  of  ccrtiora7'i,  but  only  for  errors  of  law  appearing  upon  the 
face  of  the  record.*^\  In  California  an  order  denying  a  license 
cannot  be  reviewed  by  a  certiorari.^-  In  Minnesota  the  action 
of  a  village  granting  a  license,  not  being  of  a  judicial  charac- 
ter, cannot  be  so  reviewed ;  ^'^  while  in  Mississippi  a  statute  ex- 
pressly authorizes  such  action.^*  In  Missouri  the  licensing 
body  acts  in  a  judicial  character,  and  the  writ  lies ;  "^^  but  not 
until  the  case  below  is  finally  disposed  of.^*^  If  a  license  be 
granted  without  authority,  the  writ  lies  to  review  the  pro- 
ceedings.''^ A  statute  authorizing  the  use  of  the  writ  to  re- 
view an  instance  of  a  refusal  to  grant  a  license  applies  to  a 
refusal  made  before  the  statute  was  enacted.®*  In  New  York 
by  statute  the  return  to  the  writ  must  "include  copies 
of  all  papers  on  which  its  [the  board's]  action  was 
based,  and  a  statement  of  its  reasons  for  refusing" 
the  license.  Under  this  statute  a  return  that  the  board  had 
refused  the  petitioner's  claim  and  "all  applications"  "after 
consideration  and  deliberation  on  the  merits"  was  held  not 
sufficient  and  not  authorized."®  Under  this  act  affidavits  of 
the  individual  members  of  the  licensing  board  cannot  be  filed 
with  their  return  nor  can  they  be  considered ;  ^"  but  supple- 

61  Jane  v.  Alley,  G4  Miss.  446;  App.  660.  In  North  Carolina  the 
1  So.  497 ;  Corbet  v.  Duncan,  63  writ  seems  to  lie  because  no  appeal 
Miss.  84;  Loeb  V.  Duncan,  63  Miss.  is  provided  for.  Hillsboro  v. 
89;  People  v.  Waters,  4  N.  Y.  Smith,  110  N.  C.  417;  14  S.  E. 
Misc.  Rep.  1;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  691;  972. 

People  V.   Bennett,   4  N.   Y.  Misc.  «7  DufTord   v.    Staats,    54    N.    J. 

10;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  695;  People  v.  L.    286;     23    Atl.    667;     Croot    v. 

Turner,   4   N.  Y.  Misc.   Rep.   247;  Board,  20  Colo.  App.  254;   78  Pac. 

23  N.  Y.  Supp.  913.  313;    State    v.    Tullock,    108    Mo. 

62  Knox  V.  Rainbow,  111  Cal.  App.  32;  82  S.  W.  645;  State  v. 
539;  44  Pac.  175.  McDavid,  84  Mo.  App.  47. 

63  State  V.  Lambcrton,  37  Minn.  es  People   v.    Symonds,   4   N.    Y. 
362;  34  N.  W.  336;  Dexter  v.  Cum-  Misc.  Rep.  6;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  089. 
berland,  17  R.  I.  222;  21  Atl.  347.  69  People   v.   Claverick,  4   N.   Y. 

64Deverry  v.  Holly  Springs,  35  Misc.   Rep.    330;    25   N.    Y.   Supp. 

Miss.   385.  322. 

6s  State  V.   Heege,   37   Mo.   App.  to  People  v.  Board,  91  Hun,  94; 

338.  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  678. 

86  State    V.    Schneider,    47    Mo. 


675  ISSUANCE  OP  LICENSES.  §  410 

mental  opinions  may  ])e  as  of  the  date  of  the  original  opinion." 
Under  the  New  York  statiites  the  facts  or  evidence  may  be 
reviewed  by  means  of  this  writ.'^-  Defects  in  the  application 
for  a  license  cannot  be  supplied  by  the  petition  for  the  writ  of 
certiorari.'^  Even  if  there  be  no  remonstrance  or  objection, 
under  a  local  Pennsylvania  statute,  the  proceedings  are  review- 
able by  the  Supreme  Court. ^*  Whether  persons  objecting  have 
the  right  to  object  to  the  location  of  a.  saloon  in  their  neigh- 
borhood are  persons  who  have  a  statutory  right  to  remonstrate 
is  a  judicial  question  and  is  reviewable  by  this  ^v^it."  In- 
junction cannot  be  substituted  for  the  writ  of  certiorari.'^ 
The  sufficiency  of  the  petition  to  confer  jurisdiction  to  gi-ant 
a  license  may  be  tested  by  this  writ,  although  the  licensing 
board  has  held  it  sufficient.'^'  The  refusal  of  a  county  treas- 
urer in  New  York  to  issue  a  license  may  be  reviewed,  but  his 
return  that  a  certifiel  copy  of  the  statement  of  the  local  option 
election  filed  with  the  county  clerk  showed  the  adoption  of 
local  option  preventing  the  issuance  of  a  license  is  a  complete 
defense  without  giving  a  copy  of  the  statement.^*  In  Iowa, 
in  case  of  a  revocation  of  a  license,  an  appeal  lies,  and  there- 
fore the  writ  will  be   denied.'"     If  the  licensing  officer  be 

71  Appeal  of  Leister,  20  W.  N.  ^e  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Wha- 
C.  224.  len,  3  Wash.  T.  452;   17  Pac.  890. 

72  People  V.  Murray,  14  N.  Y.  77  state  v.  Tullock,  108  Mo. 
Misc.  Rep.  177;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  App.  32;  82  S.  W.  645;  Cooper  v. 
463.  So  in  Rhode  Island,  where  Hunt,  103  Mo.  App.  9;  77  S.  W. 
the  board  did  not  find  the  facts  on  483. 

which  the  jurisdiction  rested.  78  in  re  Tinkcom,  50  N.  Y.  iMisc. 
Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Cumberland,  18  R.  Rep.  250;  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  467. 
I.  5;  25  Atl.  655;  and  in  New  Jer-  The  legality  of  the  election  cannot 
sey  on  the  facts  generally.  Hou-  be  inquired  into.  People  v.  Ham- 
man  V.  Schulster,  60  N.  J.  L.  35;  ilton,  29  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  465;  61 
36  Atl.  776.  N.    Y.    Supp.    979;    People    Has- 

73  People  V.  Board,  91  Hun,  94;  brouck,  21  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  188; 
36  N.  Y.  Supp.  678.  47  N.  Y.  Supp.   109.     The  validity 

74  7n  jc  Pollard,  127  Pa.  507;  17  of   a  local   option   election   cannot 
Atl.  1087;  In  re  Einstein,  17  Atl.  be    reviewed.      State    v.    Mitchell, 
1100;    24   W.  N.  C.   184.      Contra,  (Mo.);    110   S.   W.   498. 
Lexington    v.    Sargent,    64    Miss.  79  State    v.    Schmitz,    65    Iowa, 
621;    1   So.  903.  556;   22  N.  W.  673. 

75  Rhode  Island  Society  v.  Bud-  In  Missouri  the  application  for 
long,  21  R.  I.  577;  25  Atl.  657.  the  writ  need  not  be  verified.  State 


^410 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


676 


interested  in  the  matter  he  has  decided,  a  writ  of  certiorari 
lies  to  review  his  decision.^"  If  a  license  be  granted  without 
juris(^iction  over  the  application,  a  writ  of  certiorari  will  lie 
to  bring  it  up  to  be  quashed.^^  In  Iowa  any  citizen  may  ap- 
pear to  the  application  without  having  any  property  or  in- 
terests in  the  granting  of  the  license,  and  may  receive  a  writ 
to  review  the  grant  of  a  license,^"  and  in  Mississippi  any  per- 
son "aggrieved"  thereby;^"  in  Missouri  any  taxpayer;^*  in 
New  Jersey  any  remonstrant  ^^  or  resident  and  taxpayer  of 
the  place  of  the  license ;  ^'^  in  Rhode  Island  any  person  ap- 


-v.  Bennett,  101  Mo.  App.  224;  73 
6.  W.  737. 

Error  in  granting  a  continuance 
of  the  application  for  a  license 
will  not  be  presumed.  Cox  v. 
Burnham,  120  Iowa,  43  -.  94  X.  \V. 
265. 

The  Missouri  Appellate  Court 
will  not  grant  the  writ  when  it 
does  not  appear  the  applicant 
cannot  secure  it  from  the  circuit 
court.  State  v.  Wilson,  90  Mo. 
App.   154. 

As  for  costs  to  remonstrant, 
see  Backman  v.  Phillipsburg,  68 
X.  J.  L.  552 ;  53  Atl.  620. 

Where  a  court  purposely  so 
made  up  its  record  as  to  defeat 
an  application  for  a  writ  of  cer- 
tiorari, relief  was  given  in  equity. 
Burkarth  v.  Stephens,  117  Mo. 
App.  425 ;  94  S.  W.  720. 

soRegina  v.  Sherman  [1898],  1 
Q.  B.  578;  62  J.  P.  296;  67  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  460;  46  W.  R.  367;  78  L.  T. 
320;  14  L.  T.  R.  269;  Rex  v. 
Woodhouse  [1906],  2  K.  B.  501; 
75  L.  J.  K.  B.  745;  reversed 
[1907]  App.  Gas.  420;  71  J.  P. 
484;  76  L.  J.  K.  B.  1032;  97  L.  T. 
261,  on  the  ground  that  no  bias 
was  shown  by  the  facts.  See  Re- 
gina  V.  Thornton,  62  J,  P.  196. 


An  election  to  proceed  by  cer- 
tiorari  does  not  preclude  a  party 
dismissing  his  application  to  take 
an  appeal.  Moon  v.  Hartsuck, 
137  Iowa.  236;   114  X.  W.  1043. 

81  Regina  v.  Manchester  J.  J. 
[1899],  1  Q.  B.  571;  68  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  358;  63  J.  P.  360:  47  W.  R. 
410;  80  L.  T.  531;  affirmed  Rex 
V.  Sunderland  [1901],  2  K.  B. 
357;  70  L.  J.  K.  B.  946;  65  J.  P. 
.598;  85  L.  T.  183;  17  T.  L.  R. 
551. 

S2  Darling  v.  Boesch,  67  Iowa, 
702;   25  X.  W.  887. 

83  Deberry  v.  Holly  Springs,  35 
Miss.  385.  In  Xew  York  the 
county  treasurer  to  whom  the  fee 
is  paid  is  a  party  aggrieved.  Peo- 
ple v.  Seekitt,  15  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
290;  44  X.  Y.  Supp.  593;  revers- 
ing 40  X.  Y.  Supp.  414. 

84  State  V.  Heege,  37  Mo.  App. 
338. 

85  Austin  V.  Atlantic  City,  48 
X.  J.  L.  118;  3  Atl.  65. 

86  Dufford  V.  Staats,  54  N.  J.  L. 
286;  23  Atl.  667;  White  v.  At- 
lantic City,  62  X.  J.  L.  644;  42 
Atl.  170;  Houma  v.  Schulster,  60 
X.  J.  L.  132.  But  not  when  guilty 
of  laches.  State  v.  Patterson  (X. 
J.    L.),    25    Atl.    1098.      See   also 


677  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES.  §  -411 

pearing  before  the  common  council  and  objecting  to  the  license 
being  granted,"  or  any  property  holder  within  the  prohibited 
neighborhood,  as  to  whether  a  proper  notice  had  been  given/'*^ 
In  New  Jersey  any  remonstrant  may  have  the  writ  on  sufficient 
cause  shown. ^^  In  Georgia,  no  law  providing  for  a  remon- 
strance, a  citizen  and  taxpayer  of  the  neighborhood  cannot  sue 
out  the  writ ; ""  but  in  Missouri,  though  he  cannot  remonstrate, 
he  is  regarded  as  a  protestant,  and  is  permitted  to  sue  out  the 
writ.**^  Merely  because  a  resident  in  the  neighborhood  is  incon- 
venienced by  the  location  of  the  saloon  there,  which  is  common 
to  all,  he  is  not  a  ' '  person  aggrieved ' '  entitling  him  to  the  writ.'*- 
But  a  brewer  in  the  neighborhood  who  opposed  the  grant  of  a 
license,  has  been  held  to  be  such  a  person.'*''  The  applicant 
for  a  license  is  a  proper  party  to  a  proceeding  to  review  the 
order  granting  a  license.'** 

Sec.  411.     Renewal  of  license. 

In  this  country  the  question  of  renewal  of  license  has  seldom 
been  before  the  courts,  for  the  reason  that  renewals  here  are 
merely  new  licenses;  but  in  England  provisions  are  made 
for  renewals  which  are  of  great  important  to  licensees,  and 
many  of  her  colonies  have  adopted  these  provisions,  though 
usually  in  a  modified  form.  An  applicant  for  a  renewal  in 
England  need  not  attend  in  person  upon  the  licensing  jus- 

Eegina  v.  Nicholson   [1899],  2  Q.  oi  State  v.  Moore,  84  Mo.   App. 

B.   455;    68   L.  J.   Q.   B.    1034;    G4  11. 

J.  P.  388;   48  W.  R.  52;   81  L.  T.  02  Regina    v.    Nicholson    [1899], 

257;    15  L.  T.  R.  509.  2  Q.  B.  455;  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  1034; 

87  Rhode  Island  Society  v.  Bud-  64  J.  P.  388;  48  W.  R.  52;  81  L. 
long    (R.  I.),  25  Atl.  657;    Dexter  T.  257;    15  T.  L.  R.  509. 

V.   Cumberland,    17    R.   I.   222;    21  93  Rex  v.  Groom  [1901],  2  K.  B. 

Atl.    347.  157;   70  L.  J.  K.  B.  636;   65  J.  P. 

88  Dexter  v.  Cumberland,  17  R.  452;  49  W.  R.  484;  84  L.  T.  834; 
I.  222;  21  Atl.  347;  Rhode  Island  17  T.  L.  R.  433.  See  also  Rex  v. 
Society  v.  Cranston,  21  R.  I.  577;  Woodhouse  J.  J.  [1906],  2  K.  B. 
44  Atl.  223.  501;    75  L.  J.   K.   B.  745. 

80  State  V.  Atlantic  City,  48  N.  o-*  State  v.  Denton,  128  Mo.  App. 

J.  L.   118;   3  Atl.  65.  304;   107  S.  W.  446. 

90  Stokes  V.  Wall,  112  Ga.  349; 
37  S.  E.  383. 


^  411  TRAFFIf    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  678 

tices  unless  he  is  required  to  do  so  by  them  for  some  special 
cause  personal  to  himself ;  and  no  new  evidence  as  to  his  char- 
acter or  fitness  or  the  fitness  of  his  place  is  necessary,  unless 
objection  be  made  to  the  renewal,  of  which  he  must  be  given 
notice.''^  A  renewal  of  a  license  is  defined  as  a  "license  grant- 
ed a,t  a  general  annual  licensing  meethig  by  w^ay  of  renew- 
al. "^^  Under  these  statutes  an  application  for  a  renew^al 
implies  that  the  applicant  is  the  same  person  who  previously 
held  the  license  and  that  he  is  in  occupation  of  the  premises 
formerly  licensed;  that  the  premises  are  the  same  or  sub- 
stantially the  same ;  and  that  the  license  applied  for  shall  be 
similar  to  the  one  then  or  previously  in  force  for  the  premises  in 
question. ^^  The  applicant  must  either  attend  himself  or  send 
an  authorized  messenger,  or  apply  l\v  letter,  if  he  expects  a 
renewal,  otherwise  the  justices  are  not  bound  to  renew  his 
license.^*  A  second  application  can  be  made,  if  made  in  time.^* 
The  person  entitled  to  apply  for  a  renewal  is  the  person  in 
occupation  of  the  premises  at  the  time  of  the  general  licens- 
ing meeting  of  the  justices;^  which  may  be  the  person  in 
lawful  and  actual  possession,  even  though  he  be  not  the 
licensee.^  Of  course,  it  cannot  be  renewed  in  the  name  of  a 
dead  person,  and  if  so  attempted  the  renewal  will  be  void. 
Under  this  statute  only  the  licensee  seeking  a  renewal  is 
entitled  to  a  notice  of  an  objection  to  its  renewal,*  and  a 
service  of  notice  of  opposition  to  the  renewal  is  a  condition 

95  Licensing    Act    1872,    35    and  375;    SO   L.   T.    474;    19   T.  L.    R. 

36   Vict.    c.   94,    §42;    Patterson's  596. 

Licensing  Acts   (19th  Ed.),  p.  416.  i  Regina   v.   Liverpool,    11   Q.   B. 

90  Licensing    Act    1872,    35    and  Div.  644. 

36   Vict.   c.    94,    §74;    Patterson's  2  Lymans  v.  VVedmore  [1894],  1 

Licensing  Acts   (19th  Kd.),  480.  Q.  B.  401;   58  J.  P.  197;  63  L.  J. 

97  Sometimes  the  phrase  is  used  M.  C.  44;  69  L.  T.  801;  42  W.  R, 

with  reference  to  a  license  for  the  301;   Leeds  v.  Ryder   [1907],  App, 

same  house  which  some  other  per-  Cas.  420;   71   J.  P.  485;    76  L.  J. 

son   has   previously   leased    to   use  K.  B.  1032;   97  L.  T.  261. 

as  an  ale  house  or  beor  house.  3  Cowlcs  v.  Gale,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  12, 

'•'SRegina  v.  Newcastle  J.  J.,  51  4  Price  v.  Jones   [1892],  2  Q.  B. 

J.    P.    244;    Sharpe    v.    Wakefield,  428;   56  J.   P.  471;   57  J.  P.   148; 

22  Q.  B.  Div.  242;   Cornian  v.  St.  61  L.  J.  M.  C.  203;  67  L.  T.  543; 

Margaret's  J.  J.,  64  J.  P.  G48.  41  W.  R.  57. 

»9Rex  V.  Bristol  J.  J.,  07  J.  P. 


679  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES.  §  411 

precedent  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  justices  to  entertain  objec- 
tions to  the  renewal ;  and  proof  of  that  notice  must  first  be 
given.^  IMandamus  lies  to  compel  the  justices  to  hear  and 
determine  the  application  for  and  objection  to  the  renewal." 
The  justices  themselves  may  make  the  objection  in  open  court, 
and  then  adjourn  until  the  licensee  is  served  with  notice  of 
the  objection,  and  be  given  an  opportunity  to  meet  it.^  The 
burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  persons  making  the  objection  to 
a  renewal,  which  may  be  made  by  any  member  of  the  local 
community,^  and  the  evidence  must  be  under  oath,  unless  the 
facts  are  admitted."  If  there  be  no  objection  a  renewal  can- 
not be  refused.^**  The  objection  must  be  made  to  the  jus- 
tices" in  open  court  ^-  or  by  the  justices,^"  "through  the 
police  or  other  officials,"  and  they  may  by  those  officials  ''insti- 
tute preliminary  inquiries  to  obtain  information  of  a  gen- 
eral character  respecting  the  character  of  their  licensing  dis- 
trict, the  amount  of  public-house  accommodation  in  the  locality, 
and  all  matters  of  that  sort."^*  If  the  justices  raise  an  ob- 
jection they  must  give  the  applicant  an  opportunity  to  answer 

r.  Gascoyne   v.   Riley,    Sfi    W.    R.  App.   Cas.  569;    61  J.   P.  532;    66 

605 ;  Blencome  &  Co.  v.  Hathertou,  L.  J.  Q.  B.  787 ;  77  L.  T.  288 ;  46 

71    J.   P.   210;    96   L.   T.    817;    Ejo  W.  R.  114;   13  T.  L.  R.  538. 

-parte  Portingell,    [1892],   1   Q.   B.  »  Regina  v.  Kent  J.  J.,  41  J.  P. 

15;    65  L.  T.  603;  40  W.  R.   102;  263. 

56  J,  P.  276;   61   L.  J.  M.   C.   1;  lo  Evans  v.  Conway  J.  J.  [1900], 

Regina  v.  Deputies,  15  Q.  B.  671;  2  Q.   B.  224,  229;   69  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

Regina  v,  Anglesey  J.  J.,  59  J.  P.  636;  64  J.  P.  467;  48  W.  R.  577; 

743;  65  L.  J.  M.  C.  12;  15  R.  614;  82  L.  T.  704;    16  T.  L.  R.  425. 

Webber    v.    Birkenhead,    61    J.    P.  ii  Regina  v.  Anglesey,   59   J.  P. 

664;   Regina  v.   Denbigh  J.  J.,  59  744;   65  L.  J.  M.  C.  12. 

J.   P.   708m;   Baxter   v.   Leehe,   62  12  Regina  v.  Marthyr  Tydvil  J. 

J.  P.  630;   79  L.  T.  138;    14  T.  L.  J.,  14  Q.  B.  Div.  584;  49  J.  P.  213; 

R.  352.  54  L.  J.  M.  C.  78. 

«Rex  V.  Kingston  J.  J.,  86  L.  T.  i3  Rex  v.   Howard  J.  J.   [1902], 

589;    66  J.  P.  547.  2  K.  B.  363;   66  J.  P.  579;    71  L. 


rina   V.    Farquhar,   L.   R.    9  J.  K.  B.  754;  51  W.  R.  21;  86  L. 

Q,  B.  258;  39  J.  P.  166;  Regina  v.  T.  839;  18  T.  L.  R.  690;  Regina  v. 

Redditch,  50  J.  P.  246;  Regina  v.  Kingston  J.  J.,  66  J.  P.   547;    80 

Essex  J.  J.,  46  J.  P.  761;   Baxter  L.  T.  589:  18  T.  L.  R.  477. 
V.  Leche,   62  J.  P.   630;    79   L.   T.  i^  Ive.K  v.   Howard,  supra;   Rud- 

138;   14  T.  L.  R.  352.  dick  v.  Liverpool,  42  J.  P.  406. 
s  Boulter  v.  Kent  J.  J.   [1897], 


§  411  TR^VFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    IJQUORS.  680 

it,  and  must  have  the  evidence  on  oath.^''  The  justices  must 
require  the  holder  of  the  license  to  attend  on  objection  to  a 
renewal  being  made.^"  The  objection  need  not  be  stated  in 
WTiting  in  open  court,  but  it  must  be  inserted  in  the  notice 
given  the  applicant.^"  Thus  a  statement  in  court,  "1  object  to 
the  renewal  of  the  license  to  the  King's  Head,"  has  been  held 
sufficient,  although  the  specific  reasons  must  be  stated  in  the 
notice.^  ^  The  official  report  of  the  chief  constable  on  the  con- 
dition of  his  district  containing  an  objection  to  a  renewal  of  a 
named  license  has  been  held  a  sufficient  objection/"  Upon  ob- 
jection made,  the  application  is  continued  to  a  day  certain,  and 
if  by  that  time  the  applicant  "does  not  know  the  grounds 
of  the  objection,  he  may  apply  for  a  further  adjournment, 
quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  in  the  meantime  he  could  have 
applied  to  the  clerk  to  the  magistrates  or  the  chief  constable 
to  ascertain  the  grounds  of  the  objection." -°  The  notice  of 
the  objection  must  come  through  the  justices  and  not  through 
a  third  party.-^  An  objection  may  be  made  at  an  adjourned 
meeting.--  If  notice  be  not  served  in  time  the  objection  will 
be  disregarded  or  a  second  adjournment  be  granted.-^  If  no 
notice  be  given  and  a  renewal  refused,  and  then  the  appli- 
cant appeal,  no  notice  can  be  given  in  the  upper  court,  and  the 
license  must  be  granted.-*  Should  the  justices  refuse  a  re- 
newal, though  no  notice  of  objection  had  been  served  or  though 
none  stated  by  the  justices,  and  a  mandamus  issues  to  rehear 
the  application,  objections  may  then  be  made  and  heard  on 

15  Regina  v.  Eales,  44  J.  P.  553 ;  -"  Daykin  v.  Parker,  supra ;  Bax- 

42  L.  T.  735.  ter  v.  Leche,  supra. 

isRegina  v.   Marthyr   Tydvil   -J.  .    21  Whiffin  v.    Mailing    [1892],    1 

J.,  49  J.  P.  213.  Q.  B.  362;   56  J.  P.  325:   66  L.  T. 

iTRegina  v.   Redditch   J.   J.,   50  333:  40  W.  R.  292;   61  L.  J.  M.  C. 

J.  P.  246.  82. 

isDaykia    v.    Parker    [1894],    2  22  Rex    v.    Howard,    supra;    Re- 

Q.  B.  273,  556;    58  J.  P.  835;    67  gina  v.   Anglesey  J.   J.,  supra. 

L.  J.  M.  C.  246;   71  L.  T.  379;  42  23  Regina   v.    Altrincham,    11    T. 

W.  R.  625.  L.  R.  3;  Regina  v.  Farquhar,  L.  R. 

19  Hawkins        v.        Bridgewater  9  Q.  B.  261. 

[1900],  2  Q.  B.  382;  69  L.  J.  Q.  B.  24  Hockings  v.   Powell,  59  J.   P. 

.663;   64  J.  P.  631;  48  W.  R.  587;  358. 
82  L.  T.  847;  16  T.  L.  R.  404. 


681 


ISSUANCE    OP   LICENSES. 


§411 


the  merits  at  the  rehearing.-^  Appeals  lie  from  refusal  to 
renew  a  license,-^  but  the  only  respondents  to  the  appeal  are 
the  licensing  justices,  and  no  other  person  can  be  heard  except 
by  permission  of  the  appellate  court.-^  On  appeal  only  ques- 
tions stated  in  the  objection  can  be  considered  and  passed 
upon.-^  The  owner  of  the  licensed  premises  where  his  tenant 
holds  the  license  and  applies  for  a  renewal  may  appeal  along 
with  his  tenant^''  and  it  has  been  held  that  a  mortgagee  of 
the  premises  may  appeal  against  a  refusal  of  a  renewal  if 
the  license  expressly  authorizes  him  to  take  all  steps  to  pre- 
serve the  license,  even  though  the  licensee  declines  to  appeal 
himself.^*^  Where  a  statute  authorized  the  renewal  of  a  bot- 
tle license,  and  before  renewal  another  statute  was  enacted  pro- 
hibiting the  granting  of  such  a  license,  this  was  held  not  to 


20  Regina  v.  Howard,  23  Q.  B. 
Div.  302;  CO  L.  T.  9G0;  53  J.  P. 
454;   37  W.  R.  617. 

As  to  transfers  of  licenses  for 
which  no  application  for  a  re- 
newal has  been  made,  see  Mack- 
rell  V.  Brentford  J.  J.  [1900],  2 
Q.  B.  387 ;  64  J.  P.  003 ;  69  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  748;  48  W.  R.  648;  83  L.  T. 
31;  16  T.  L.  R.  439;  and  Murray 
V.  Freer  [1894],  App.  Cas.  576; 
58  J.  P.  508;  63  L.  J.  M.  C.  242; 
71  L.  T.  44;  affirming  [1893]  1  Q. 
B.  635;  57  J.  P.  101,  583;  07  L. 
T.  507;  62  L.  J.  M.  C.  33. 

20  Regina  v.  Market  Bosworth  J. 
J.,  51  J.  P.  438;  57  L.  T.  56;  35 
W.  R.  734;  56  L.  J.  M.  C.  96; 
Regina  v.  Newcastle  J.  J.,  51  J.  P. 
244;  Regina  v.  Lawrence  J.  J.,  H 
Q.  B.  Div.  638;  47  J.  P.  596;  52 
L.  J.  M.  C.  114;  49  L.  T.  244;  32 
W.  R.  20;  Regina  v.  Thomas 
[1892],  1  Q.  B.  426;  56  J.  P.  151; 
61  L.  J.  M.  C.  141;  66  L.  T.  289; 
40  W.  R.  478;  Symons  v.  Wed- 
more  [1894],  1  Q.  B.  401;  58  J.  P. 


197;   63  L.  J.  M.  C.  44;   69  L.  T. 
801;  41  W.  R.  301. 

2T  Tynemouth  v.  Attorney-Gen- 
eral [1899],  App.  Cas.  293;  63  J. 
P.  404;  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  752;  15  T. 
L.  R.  370;  Nix  v.  Nottingham  J. 
J.  [1899],  2  Q.  B.  300«;  Boulter 
V.  Kent  J.  J.  [1897],  App.  Cas. 
569;  61  J.  P.  532;  66  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
787;  77  L.  T.  288;  46  W.  R.  114; 
13  T.  L.  R.  538. 

28  Evans  v.  Conway  J.  J.  [1900], 
2  Q.  B.  224;  69  L.  J.  Q.  B.  636; 
64  J.  P.  467;  48  W.  R.  577;  82 
L.  T.  704;  16  T.  L.  R.  425;  Ex 
parte  Gorman  [1894],  App.  Cas. 
23;  58  J.  P.  316;  63  L.  J.  M.  C. 
84;  70  L.  T.  46;  Russell  v.  Black- 
heath  J.  J.,  61  J.  P.  696;  Foist  v. 
Tower  J.  J.,  68  J.  P.  264;  Whiffin 
V.  Mailing  [1892],  1  Q.  B.  362;  56 
J.  P.  325;  66  L.  T.  333;  40  W.  R. 
292;  61  L.  J.  M.  C.  82. 

29  Feist  V.  Tower  J.  J.,  68  J.  P. 
264. 

30  Garrett  v.  Middlesex  J.  J.,  12 
Q.  B.  Div.  620;  48  J.  P.  358;  53 
L.  J.  M.  C.  81;   32  W.  R.  646. 


§412 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS. 


682 


prevent  its  renewal.^^  A  renewal  cannot  be  made  against  the 
expressed  wish  of  the  licensee.'^-  One  cannot  be  had  where  a 
local  option  prohibitive  vote  has  been  taken.^^  A  new  license 
does  not  mean  a  renewal  license  for  an  already  licensed  house, 
but  a  license  for  a  house  previously  unlicensed,^* 


Sec.  412.     Collateral  attack  upon  a  license — Quo  warranto. 

If  the  proceedings  for  the  granting  of  a  license  be  abso- 
lutely void,  then  the  license  is  no  protection  to  the  holder 
of  it  when  he  makes  a  sale.^^  But  if  it  is  only  voidable,  then 
its  invalidity  can  only  be  attacked  by  appeal  or  certiorari  or  in 
some  other  direct  and    appropriate    proceedings.     In    other 


31  Allen  V.  Carew,  14  N.  Z.  L. 
R.  569. 

32  in  re  DeMery,  20  Vict.  L.  N. 
95;   15  Austr.  L.  T.  232. 

33  ^a?  parte  Pratt,  13  W.  N.  (N. 
S.  W.)   9. 

3*  Regina  v.  Aleliurst,  3  Vict.  L. 
R.  R.    (Austr.)    111. 

In  New  South  Wales  a  magis- 
trate cannot  grant  a  renewal  a  sec- 
ond time.  Ex  parte  Lucas,  2  S.  R. 
191;  19  W.  N.  (N.  S.  W.)  98; 
overruling  18  W.  N.  (N.  S.  W.) 
287. 

As  to  fees  there,  see  Keefe  v. 
Clarke,  10  N.  S.  W.  L.  R.  19. 

In  New  Jersey  only  one  re- 
newal without  a  new  application 
can  be  made.  Tross  v.  Board,  59 
N.  J.  L.  97 ;  35  Atl.  646. 

In  Connecticut  a  license  grant- 
ing the  same  privilege  to  the  same 
person  for  the  same  place  is  a  re- 
newal license  within  the  provis- 
ions of  a  statute  providing  that  no 
license  shall  be  granted  in  a  pure- 
ly residential  part  of  a  to^vn,  ex- 
cept a  renewal  of  a  license.  Appeal 
of  Stavolo,  81  Conn.  454;  71  Atl. 
649. 


As  to  renewal  in  Massachusetts, 
see  Tracy  v.  Ginzberg,  189  Mass. 
260;   75  N.  E.  637. 

A  New  York  statute  providing 
that  a  new  liquor  tax  certificate 
should  not  be  issued  for  one  year 
following  the  conviction  of  a  cer- 
tificate holder  of  any  crimes  com- 
mitted on  the  licensed  premises, 
has  no  reference  to  a  conviction 
of  an  employe  of  the  certificate 
holder  of  a  crime  committed  on 
the  licensed  premises.  People  v. 
McKee,  59  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  368; 
112  N.  Y.  Supp.  338. 

35  Flancher  v.  Camden,  56  N.  J. 
L.  244 ;  28  Atl.  82 ;  Regina  v.  Vine, 
L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  195;  39  J.  P.  213; 
44  L.  J.  M.  C.  60;  31  L.  T.  842; 
23  W.  R.  649;  Pearson  v.  Broad- 
bent,  36  J.  P.  485;  Rex  v.  Downs, 
3  T.  R.  560;  Russell  v.  State,  77 
Ala.  89;  Gurley  v.  State,  65  Ga. 
157;  Thorn  v.  Atlanta,  77  Ga.  661; 
Mayson  v.  Atlanta,  77  Ga.  662; 
People  v.  Davis,  45  Barb.  499; 
affirmed  36  N.  Y.  77;  Cronin  v. 
Stoddard,  99  N.  Y.  271;  Burch  v. 
Ocilla,  5  Ga.  App.  65;  62  S.  E. 
666. 


683  ISSUANCE   OF   LICENSES.  §  412 

words,  a  collateral  attack  upon  it  cannot  be  successfully 
made.^"  But  quo  warranto  brought  to  have  a  license  declared 
void  is  not  a  collateral,  but  a  direct  attack,  and  is  the  proper 
proceeding  for  that  purpose.^^  If  regular  on  its  face,  and 
issued  by  a  city  Avith  power  to  issue  a  license,  it  cannot  be 
shown  in  a  criminal  proceeding,  it  has  been  held,  that  local 
prohibition  option  had  been  adopted  in  such  city.^^  This  is 
especially  true  of  a  liquor  bond  when  sued  upon,  and  it  is 
claimed  it  is  void  because  the  application  was  insufficient.^''  As 
a  rule  if  the  State  or  city  issue  a  license  for  sale  of  liquors 
at  a  particular  place  it  cannot  be  heard  to  say  it  affords  no  au- 
thority in  the  licensee  to  make  the  sale.'"'  The  question  of 
notice  in  making  the  application  for  a  license  cannot  be  in- 
quired into  in  criminal  proceedings"*^  nor  the  insufficiency  in 
the  num])er  of  taxpa.yers  who  had  signed  the  consent  peti- 
tion.''- If  it  appears  that  no  license  could  be  issued  for  the 
building  described  in  it,  then  it  is  void  and  may  be  collat- 
erally attacked.^'  A  license  granted  to  a  non-resident  where 
the  statute  requires  a  licensee  to  be  a  resident  of  the  district 

3GGofi"  V.  Fowler,  3  Tick.  300;  41  So.  G3.  Contra,  State  v.  Press- 
State  V.  Leonard  (Mo.),  110  S.  W.  man,  103  Iowa  449;  72  N.  W.  600. 
14;  Hornaday  v.  State,  43  Ind.  sa  Castellano  v.  Marks,  37  Tex. 
306;  Commonwealth  v.  Packard,  Civ.  App.  273;  83  S.  W.  729; 
136  Mass.  50;  Stevens  A\  Emson,  1  Thomas  v.  Marks,  19  Neb.  324; 
Exch.  Div.  100;  40  J.  P.  4S4 ;  45  27  N.  W.  321. 
L.  J.  M.  C.  63;  33  L.  T.  821;  4o  Genoa  v.  Van  Alstine,  108  111. 
Thompson  V.  Harvej','23  J.  P.  150;  555;  Oskosh  v.  State,  59  Wis. 
4  H.  &  N.  254;  28  L.  J.  M.  C.  163;  425;  18  X.  W.  324.  r>ut  this 
Regina  v.  Minshall,  1  N.  &  M.  277 ;  statement  must  be  received  with 
Williams  v.  Louis,  14  Kan.  005;  caution;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
Commonwealth  v.  Graves,  18  B.  license  issued  in  a  proliibition 
Men.   33  district   is  absolutely   void. 

3T  Heidelberg  Garden  Co.  v.  Peo-  Contra,  Raleigh  v.  Cane,  47  N. 

pie,  124  111.  App.  331;  affirmed  233  C.  293. 

111.  290;  84  N.  E.  230;  Theurer  V.  4 1  Hornaday    v.    State,    43    Ind. 

People,    211    111.    290;     71    N.    E.  306. 

997;   affirming  113   111.  App.   028;  «  State  v.  Evans,  83  Mo.  319. 

Handy  v.  People,  29  111.  App.  99;  -13  Commonwealth  v.  Whelan,  134 

/n  re  OTonner,  Temp.  Wood  (^lai  Mass.  200;   Commonwealth  v.  Mc- 

itoba),  293.  Cormick,    150    Mass.    270;    22    N. 

38  State  V.  Lewis,   110  1a\.  762;  E.  911. 


§  413  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  684. 

where  granted  is  void.**  A  license  issued  by  the  wrong  officer 
is  void  and  not  voidable,*^  but  the  licensee  may  show  that  the 
officer  issuing  the  license  was  in  fact  duly  elected,  even  though 
such  officer  has  received  no  certificate  of  election.**^  If  a  license 
could  only  be  issued  by  a  board  when  in  actual  session,  one 
issued  out  of  session,  or  when  it  had  no  power  to  sit,  is  void.*'^ 
A  license  paper  in  proper  form  is  prima  facie  valid,  and  he 
who  asserts  it  is  not  has  the  burden  to  show  his  assertion  is 
true.** 

Sec.  413.     Void  license. 

A  void  license  is  no  protection  to  the  person  holding  it.** 
Thus,  in  case  of  a  license  granted  to  a  person  who  had  pre- 
viously been  convicted  of  a  felony,  a  statute  forbidding  the 
licensing  of  such  a  person,  though  no  one  but  himself  was  aware 
of  the  felony,  and  a  formal  transfer  had  been  obtained  regu- 
larly by  a  third  person,  it  was  held  that  the  license  was  void 
even  in  the  hands  of  such  third  person.^  And  of  course  a  for- 
feited license  is  void  from  the  moment  of  the  judgment  of  for- 
feiture, or  from  the  moment  of  conviction  where  the  statute 
provides  that  a  conviction  for  a  violation  of  the  license  law  shall 
work  a  forfeiture  of  the  license.^^  So  a  statute  issued  under  a 
repealed  statute  is  void,  though  everybody  believed  it  was  in 
force  and  acted  in  good  faith.-'-  So  where  justices  were  required 
to  grant  licenses  at  public  sittings,  the  grant  of  one  at  a  private 
sitting  was  held  void.^^       So  where  a  statute  required  a  cer- 

44  People  V.  Davis,  45  Barb.  494;  48  State     v.     Kuhuke,     26     Kan. 

affirmed  36  N.   Y.   77.  405:    Williams   v.    Louis,    14    Kan. 

4s  Cronin  v.  Stoddard,  97  N.  Y.  605. 

271.  4f)  state   v.   Moore,   1   Jones    (N. 

4«  Montgomery  V.  O'Dell,  07  Hun  C),   276;    State  v.  Moore,  84  Mo. 

169;   22  N.  Y.  Supp.  412.  App.    11. 

47  Raleigh  v.  Kane,  47  N.  C.  293.  so  Regina  v.  Vine,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B. 

As  to  presumption  board  was  in  195;  39  J.  P.  213;  44  L.  J.  M.  C. 

session,  see  Montgomery  v.  O'Dell,  60;    31   L.  T.  842;   23  W.  K.  649. 

67  Hun  169;   22  N.  Y.  Supp.  412.  si  Regina  v.  West  Riding,  J.  J., 

A  license  issued  by  the  author  21  Q.  B.  258;   52  J.  P.  455;  57  L. 

ities  of  a   Confederate   State   dur-  J.  M.  C.  103 ;  36  W.  R.  855. 

ing  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  was  52  Pearson  v.  Broadbent,  36  J.  P. 

held  valid.     Ward  v.  (State,  2  €old  485. 

605;  91  Am.  Dec.  270.  es  Rex  v.  Downes,   3   T.  R.  560. 


685  ISSUANCE  OF  LICENSES.       '  §§  414;  415 

tain  written  recommendation,  and  a  license  was  issued  with- 
out this  recommendation,  it  was  held  the  license  was' void.'** 
But  a  license  granted  without  the  overseer's  certificate,  as  a 
statute  required,  was  held  not  void,  although  it  would  have  been 
if  the  licensee  had  not  possessed  the  requisite  qualifications.'*^ 
And  where  a  license  was  produced,  but  one  of  the  signatures 
of  the  justices  was  suggested  to  be  forged,  though  not  by  the 
license  holder,  the  justices  refused  to  receive  evidence  of  the 
forgery,  and  this  was  held  a  proper  decision.^*'  Where  a  license 
could  only  be  issued  for  six  months,  the  grant  of  a  license 
for  a  year  was  held  void.^^ 

Sec.  414.  Members  of  licensing  board  prohibitionists — 
Interest. 
In  New  Zealand  prohibitionist  officers  are  not  competent 
to  pass  upon  the  question  whether  a  license  shall  be  granted,'*^ 
but  they  may  b^  compelled  by  proper  proceedings  to  do  their 
duty.-^^  A  licensing  officer  who  is  so  indiscreet  as  to  sign  a 
petition  for  a  license  does  not  thereby  disqualify  himself  from 
acting  although  a  constitutional  provision  disqualifies  judges 
having  an  interest  in  a  cause.**" 

Sec.  415.     Criminal  liability  of  licensing  officer. 

A  licensing  officer  who  knowingly  and  willfully  issues  a 
license  in  violation  of  law  lays  himself  liable  to  indictment 
if  he  be  not  a  judicial  officer,  though  not  liable  for  error  of 
judgment.*''     So  if  an  officer  perversely,  without  cause,  refuse 

54  State  V.  Moore,  1  Jones  (N.  L.  R.  583;  Quill  v.  Isitt,  10  N. 
C  )  276.  Z.  L.  E.  636;  Taylor  v.  Isitt,  9  N. 

55  Thompson  v.  Harvey,  23  J.  P.       Z.  L.  R.  678. 

150;    4  H.  &  N.  254;   28  L.  J.  M.  go  Ferguson  v.   Brown,   75  Miss. 

C.   163.  214;  21  So.  603. 

56  Regina  v.  Munshall,  1  N.  &  M.  "i  People  v.  Norton,  7  Barb.  477 ; 
277.  People  v.  Worsley,  1  N.  Y.  Supp. 

57  State  V.  Moore,  84  Mo.  App.  748;  17  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  610;  Com- 
jl  monwealth  v.  Wood,  116  Ky.  748; 

"58lslett    V.    Quill,    11    N.    Z.    L.  76  S.  W.  842;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  lOlt). 

j^   224.  ^^  parte  Blaine,  11  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 

59  Isitt   V.   Taylor,    10   N.   Z.   L.  193. 
R.  646;  In  re  Wanganni,  10  N.  Z. 


§  415  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  686 

a  license  he  likewise  lays  himself  liable  to  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion.^^ A  statute  provided  that  no  certificate  for  a  license  should 
issue  to  any  applicant  until  the  inspector  should  have  reported 
that  there  were  proper  accommodations  prepared  for  a  public 
house,  and  a  fine  was  imposed  for  issuing  a  license  contrary  to 
its  provisions.  An  application  was  m.ade  to  a  city  council  for  a 
license,  but  the  inspector  reported  that  his  premises  were  insuf- 
ficient, the  defect  being  the  lack  of  a  step  in  the  stairs.  A 
minute  was  entered  that  the  license  should  issue  as  soon  as 
the  applicant  produced  the  inspector's  certificate,  and  the 
issuing  officer  signed  a  certificate  and  gave  it  to  the  clerk, 
telling  him  not  to  hand  it  over  until  he  had  received  the  in- 
spector's certificate.  This  certificate  was  handed  over  two 
days  after  the  application  had  been  made  to  the  council,  when 
the  license  was  given  by  the  clerk  to  the  applicant.  It  was 
held  that  the  licensing  officer  had  committed  no  offense  under 
the  statute  prohibiting  the  illegal  issuance  of  .licenses.^^ 

«2  Attorney  General  v.  Justices,  ing.     Commonwealth  v.  Wood,  su- 

3  Ired.  315;  State  v.  Kite,  81  Mo.  pra. 
97.  G3  Regina    v.    Patton,    35    Upp. 

Indictment    for    unlawfully    us-  Can.  442. 


CHAPTER    IX. 
THE  FORM  OF  THE  LICENSE. 


SECTION.  SECTION. 

416.  The  form.  418.     The  place  licensed. 

417.  Conditions     inserted     in    li- 

cense. 


Sec.  416.    The  form. 

Statutes  require  licenses  to  be  put  in  writing.  A  parol 
license  from  the  officer  whose  duty  it  is  to  issue  it  is  no  pro- 
tection from  a  prosecution  for  selling  without  a  license.^  And 
a  certificate  of  the  county  commissioners'  clerk  that  a  certain 
person  had  been  licensed  was  held  not  a  license,  nor  even  con- 
clusive evidence  that  a  license  had  been  granted.-  The  license, 
to  be  a  protection,  must  be  signed  by  the  proper  officer,  law- 
fully authorized  to  do  so.^  The  order  directing  the  issuance 
of  a  license  is  not  the  license  itself,  and  hence  an  order  of 
the  licensing  board  correcting  an  error  in  a  license  already 
issued  is  not  admissible  to  protect  the  licensee  from  a  crim- 
inal prosecution  for  having  violated  the  liquor  laws.*  Just 
what  should  be  the  contents  of  a  license  must  depend  upon 

1  Laurence  v.  Gray,  11  Johns.  An  ordinance  cannot  take  the 
179;  State  v.  Moore,  14  N.  H.  451;  place  of  a  license,  though  so  in- 
Connecticut  Breweries  Co.  v.  tended.  In  re  Coyne,  9  Upp.  Can. 
Murphy,  81  Conn.  145;  70  Atl.  448.  But  see  Terry  v.  Haldi- 
450.  mand,  15  Upp.  Can.  380. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Spring,  19  *  Commonwealth  v.  Cauley,  150 
Pick.  396.  Mass.  272;  22  N.  E.  909. 

3Cronin  v.  Stoddard,  97  N.  Y. 
271, 

687 


§  416  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  688 

the  requirements  of  the  statute,  and  what  might  not  be  suffi- 
cient in  one  State  would  be  in  another.  Usually  the  license 
must  designate  the  place  where  the  liquors  are  to  be  sold, 
what  liquors  the  licensee  can  sell,  and  the  authority  granting 
it,  duly  signed.  "When  such  a  paper  is  produced  it  raises  the 
presumption  that  its  issuance  was  lawfully  authorized.^  A 
license,  however,  may  show  on  its  face  it  is  void,  as  wdiere  it 
shows  all  the  fee  for  it  had  not  been  paid,  when  that  was  a  pre- 
requisite.^ If  a  statute  authorizes  a  change  of  place,  then  the 
authorization  must  be  as  formally  signed  as  the  license  itself.'^ 
If  the  license  is  granted  for  a  particularly  designated  place, 
then  such  place  must  be  set  forth  in  the  license.  Thus  where 
the  statute  required  "the  building  in  which  the  business  is 
to  be  carried  on"  to  be  set  forth,  it  w^as  held  not  sufficient  to 
merely  name  the  street,  and  sales  made  under  it  were  held 
to  render  the  licensee  liable  to  a  fine.^  But  if  no  statute  re- 
quires it,  the  house  in  which  the  liquors  will  be  sold  need  not 
be  specified.^  The  license  need  not  specify,  that  it  will  ter- 
minate with  the  term  of  the  officers  who  authorized  its  issu- 
ance.^" If  the  one  issued  exceed  the  conditions  in  the  order 
granting  it,  to  the  extent  of  the  excess,  it  will  be  void,  as 
where  it  is  on  its  face  to  run  longer  than  the  granting  order 
allowed.'^  Usually,  however,  the  licensee  will  be  protected 
even  if  the  license  is  informal. '- 

5  state  V.  Brandon,  28  Ark.  410;        monwealth    v.    Kepp,     150    ^li&ss. 
Murphy  v.  Nolan,  126  Mass.  542;       272;  22  N.  E.  910. 

State  V.   Kuhuke,  26  Kan.   405.  9  Goforth  v.  State,  60  Miss.  756; 

6  Townsend   v.    State,   2    Blackf.  State  v.  Gerhardt,  48  N.  C.  178. 
151;     Commonwealth     v.     MeCor-  lo  Henderson  v.  Price,  96  N.   C. 
mick,    150    Mass.    270;    22    N.    E.  423;   2  S.  E.   155. 

911;  Spake  v.  People,  S9  111.  617;  In  Tennessee,  under   the  Act  of 

Handy  v.  People,  29  111.  App.  99;  1846   the   license  was   void   unless 

McWilliams   v.   Phillips,   51    Miss.  the   oath   of   the   licensee  was   en- 

196;  Zielke  v.  Stathe,  42  Neb.  750;  dorsed  upon  it.     Pope  v.  Swan,  2 

60  N.  W.  1010.  Swan  611. 

7  Commonwealth  V.  Merriam,  136  n  State  v.  Brown,    (Iowa);   109 
Mnss.   433.  N.  W.  1011. 

*<  Comnionwealth  v.  Merriam,  su-  12  Dubois  v.  Boivin,   14  L.  C.  J. 

pra.  203;    Williams   v.  Louis,    14   Kan. 

Commonwealth    v.    Cauley,     150  605. 
Mass.   272;    22   N.   E.   909;    Com- 


g89  THE  FORM   OP   THE  LICENSE.  §§417,418 


Sec.  417.     Conditions  inserted  in  license. 

The  licensing  board  or  conrt  has  no  power  to  insert  any 
conditions  in  the  license  beyond  what  the  statute  authorizes 
it  to  do.^^     Thus  in  England  it  is  held  that  the  licensing  justices 
cannot  annex  a  condition  to  a  license  that  the  licensee  shall  pay 
a  sum  of  money  into  their  hands,  to  be  applied  by  them  to- 
wards reduction   o£  notes  or  similar  public   purposes;^*   or 
to  pay  the  debt  he  owes  another.^''     So,  unless  the  statute 
expressly  authorizes  it,  a  condition  cannot  be  inserted  m  a 
license  that  sales  shall  not  be  made  on  a  day  named,  when 
the  statute  permits  W^    But  where  a  statute  made  a  difference 
in  the  amount  of  the  fee  charged  for  a  druggist's  license  and  a 
saloon  keeper's,  it  was  held  that  the  licensing  board  could  in- 
sert a  condition  in  the  druggist's  license,  who  paid  a  less  fee 
than  the  saloon  keeper,  that  neither  he  nor  his  agents  should 
sell  liquor  to  be  consumed  on  the  premises.^^    That  a  Legislature 
may  authorize  the  licensing  board  to  impose  and  insert  con- 
ditions in  a  license  will  not  be  seriously  controverted.^^    Thus, 
a  city  license  conditioned  that  the  licensee  will  pay  an  in- 
creased license  fee  if  the  fee  thereafter  be  increased  is  valid.^^ 
So  a  condition  as  to  the  granting  of  a  license  that  the  board 
may  revoke  it  if  the  license  violate  the  liquor  law  is  valid.^<> 

Sec.  418.     The  place  licensed. 

Almost  invariably,  under  recent  statutes,  the  license  must  not 
only  be  issued  for  a  certain  political  division  of  the  State,  but 
it  must  be  issued  for  a  designated  point  in  that  political  divi- 

13  Penney   v.   Weirau,    26   N.    Z.  the   licenses    they   grant.      Patter- 

234-    Queen  v.  Van  Zyle,   16  Juta  son's  Licensing  Acts    (19  ed.),   p. 

278'  674;  4  Edw.  7  C.  23,  §4. 

i4Regina  v.   Bowman,   67   L.   J.  ^« /«  re  Breslin,  45  Hun  210. 

Q.  B.  463  [1898] ;   1  Q.  B.  663;  78-  i^  Spake  v.  People,  89  111.  617. 

L.  T.  230;   62  J.  P.  374;   14  T.  L.  isSearle   v.   McArdle,    15   N.   Z. 

R    303  ^-  ^"  ^^^' 

■i5Rexv.  Athay,  2Burr.  653.  i«  Seattle    v.    Clark,    28    Wash. 

The     English      statutes     confer       717;   69  Pac.  407. 

great    powers    upon    the    licensing  ^o /^  re  Sarlo,  76  Ark.  33G;   88 

justices     to    insert    conditions    in       S.  W.  953. 


§  418  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  690 

sion.  "When  sueli  is  the  ease  a  sale  can  be  made  at  no  other 
place  than  at  the  one  licensed.  Thus  a  license  issued  for  the 
sale  of  liquors  in  a  room  situated  in  the  basement  of  a  hotel — 
not  being  a  hotel  license — will  not  authorize  a  sale  in  any- 
other  room  of  the  hotel  than  that  room.^^  And  a  license  to 
sell  at  a  particular  building  will  not  permit  the  peddling 
of  liquors  with  teams  from  house  to  house.--  In  some  of  the 
States  it  is  sufficient  if  the  petition  for  and  the  grant  of  the 
license  specify  the  place  where  the  liquors  are  to  be  sold ;  -^ 
while  in  others,  to  be  valid,  the  place  must  be  specifically 
and  particularly  set  forth  in  the  license.^*  Just  what  terri- 
tory is  covered  by  the  license  is  sometimes  a  difficult  ques- 
tion. Thus  a  license  was  to  sell  "in  and  upon  the  premises 
known  as  the  Palmer  House."  This  house  stood  upon  the 
front  part  of  a  deep  lot  owned  by  the  licensee,  the  rear  part 
of  which  had  been  for  many  years  enclosed  and  used  as  a 
fair  ground,  immediately  within  which  enclosure  the  licensee 
made  a  sale  of  liquor.  It  was  held  that  as  the  fair  ground, 
though  part  of  the  lot  upon  wiiich  the  hotel  stood,  was  not 
used  in  connection  with  or  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  hotel, 

21 /n  re  McCoy,   104  N.  Y.  App.  Hewitt    v.    Jervis,    68    J.    P.    54; 

Div.    215;    93    N.    Y.    Supp.    401;  Strickland  v.  Whittaker,  68  J.  P. 

State      V.      Prettyman,     3     Harr.  235 ;  52  W.  R.  538 ;  90  L.  T.  445 ; 

(Del.)      570;      Commonwealth     v.  20    T.    L.    R.    224;     Pasquier    v. 

Cauley,   150  Mass.  272;   22  N.  E.  Xeale  [1902],  2  K.  B.  287;   67  J. 

909;   Commonwealth  v.  Keefe,  150  P.  49;   71  L.  J.  K.  B.  835;   51  W. 

Mass.  272;  22  N.  E.  910.  R.  92;   87  L.  T.  230;    18  T.  L.  R. 

22Teoli  V.  Nardoli,  23  R.  I.  87;  704;  McLaughlin  v.  McCloy,  26  Ir. 

49    All.    489;    Pletts    v.    Campbell  L.  T.  131. 

[1895],  2  Q.  B.  229;.  59  J.  P.  502;  See  Davis  v.  Burnett,  71  L.  J.  K. 

64  L.  J.  M.  C.  225;  73  L.  T.  344;  B.   355    [1902],    1    K.   B.    666;    86 

43  W.  R.  634;   15  R.  493;   Cocker  L.   T.   565;   50  W.   R.  391;    66   J. 

V.  McMullen,  64  J.  P.  245;   81  L.  P.  406. 

T.   7S4;    Pletts  V.   Beattie    [19:],  23  Goforth  v.  State,  60  Miss.  756. 

1  Q.  B.  519;   60  J.  P.   185;   65  L.  24  Commonwealth      v.    Stratton, 

J.  M.  C.  86;  74  L.  T.   148;   Steph-  150  Mass.  188;  22  N.  E.  893;  Com- 

enson  v.  Rogers,  63  J.  P.  230;   80  monwealth     v.     McCormick,      150 


L.  T.  195;  15  T.  L.  R.  748 
Walker  v.  Walker,  67  J.  P.  452 
90  L.  T.  88;    20  Cox  C.   C,  694 


Mass.  270;  22  N.  E.  910;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Cauley,  150  Mass. 
272:  22  N.  E.  909. 


691  THE    I'^ORM    OF    THE    LICENSE.  §4]'' 

it  was  not  covered  by  the  license.-"'  Where  the  license  is  for 
a  particular  place,  by  no  process  of  reasoning  can  it  be  con- 
strued to  authorize  sales  at  two  places.^®  Under  a  license 
to  sell  liquors  in  a  dwelling  house  "and  the  apartments  and 
dependencies  thereof,"  a  sale  cannot  be  made  at  a  small 
house  forty-five  rods  away  from  the  dwelling,  on  the  same  lot, 
and  having  a  passageway  between  them.-^  But  a  license  for 
a  single  place  will  not  prevent  the  use  of  two  or  more  bars 
thereon,  although  screened  off  but  connected  by  doors  or 
passageways.-^  And  M'here  a  licensee  had  two  rooms,  con- 
nected by  an  archway,  and  a  bar  in  each  room,  one  for  whites 
and  the  other  for  negroes,  it  was  held  that  his  license,  though 
issued  for  a  place,  covered  sales  at  both  bars.-^  Yet  where  a 
licensee  had  a  stand  at  a  corner  of  a  certain  street,  and  also 
another  stand  adjoining,  with  an  inside  passageway  between 
them,  it  was  held  that  his  license  covered  sales  only  at  the 
first  stand.""  Where  a  license  is  granted  to  a  house,  without 
defining  the  metes  and  bounds,  the  house  includes  the  curtilage 
and  a  piece  of  ground  in  front  of  it.^'^  A  bench  placed  out- 
side the  door  of  the  licensed  premises  and  used  by  customers 

25  Regina  v.  Palmer,  46  Up.  Can.  a  house  require  only  one  license 
262;  Watson  v.  Severance,  2  N.  H.  or  requires  two  licenses,  will  be 
501;  State  v.  Moody,  95  N.  C.  upheld;  for  it  is  a  question  of 
656.  fact  for  it  to   decide.     Sanders  v. 

26  State  V.  Walker,  16  Me,  241;  Elberton,  50  Ga.  178, 

State  V.  Hughes,  24  Mo.  147;  Zin-  so  State    v.    Fredericks,    16    Mo. 

ner    v.    Commonwealth     (Pa.),    14  382;    Malken  v.   Chicago,    119   111. 

Atl.  431;   Chicago  v.  Malken,   119  App.  542;   affirming  217   111.   471; 

111.    App.    542;    affirmed    217    111.  75  N.  E.  548. 

471;  75  N.  E.  548;  Wood  v.  State  Under  a  general    license   to    re- 

(Tex.),  116  S.  W.  1154.  tail,  the  designation  of  a  place  be- 

27  Commonwealth  v.  Estabrook,  ing  unnecessary,  the  license  can- 
10  Pick.  293;  Johnson  v.  State,  not  sell  in  districts  of  the  coun- 
152  Ala.  61 ;   44  So.  555.  ty  which  has  adopted  local  prohi- 

28  St.  Louis  V.  Gerardi.  90  Mo.  bition.  Barnes  v.  State,  49  Ala. 
640;  3  S.  W.  408.  342. 

29  Hochstandler  v.  State,  73  Ala.  ^i  Manson  v.  London,  etc.  Ry. 
24.  Co.,    L.    R.   (5    Eq.    101;    Richards 

Usually  the  judgment  of  the  li-  v.  Swansea,  etc.  Co.,  9  Ch.  Div, 
censing  board,  when  it  is  a  ques-  425;  Commonwealth  v.  Esta- 
tion  of  fact  whether  two  rooms  in       brook,   10   Pick.  293. 


§418 


TR-VFFIC    IX   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


692 


to  sit  and  drink  beer  on  has  been  held  to  be  a  part  of  the 
licensed  premises ;  ^-  and  so  has  an  outhouse,  in  England,  al- 
though used  only  as  a  cellar.^^ 


32  Cross  V.  Watts,  32  L.  J.  M. 
C.  73. 

33  Regina  v.  Tott,  30  L.  ,J.  M.  C. 
177;  4L.  T.  306;  25  W.  R.  327; 
9  W.  R.  663. 

In  New  Jersey,  under  the  act  of 
1889,  p.  83,  §  112,  a  license  can- 
not be  granted  for  a  place  in 
which  a  grocery  or  other  mer- 
cantile business  is  carried  on.   Peer 


V.  Board,  70  N.  J.  L.  490;  57  Atl. 
153. 

To  make  a  place  used  for  sale 
of  liquors  a  "new  place"  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  forbid- 
ding the  granting  of  a  license  for 
a  "new  place,"  there  must  be  a 
Bubstantial  abandonment  of  the 
business  there.  Eckersly  v.  Ab- 
bott  (N.  J.  L.),  74  Atl.  314. 


CHAPTER   X. 
TRANSFER  OF  LICENSE. 

SECTION.  SECTION. 

419.  License    to    sell   intoxicating       424.     Mortgage    of    license — ^adi- 

liquors    not    transferable.  cial  sale. 

420.  Statute  permitting  transfer.  425.     Transfer  of  license  to  otiier 

421.  Assignment   not   a   transfer.  premises — Pennsylvania. 

422.  Death  of  licensee.  426.     Transfer  under  English  stat- 

423.  Bankruptcy  or   insolvency —  utes. 

Receiver.  427.     Transfer  under  English  and 

Colonial    statutes — Cases. 

Sec.  419.     License  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  not  transfer- 
Laws   regulating   the  granting   and   issuing   of  licenses  to 
vend   intoxicating  liquors  to  be   drunk  as   a   beverage,   as  a 
rule,     clothe    those     who    grant    them    with    the     authority 
to  determine  who  are  fit  persons  to  be  intrusted  with  such 
business,  and  this  rule  is  based  upon  sound  principle.     The 
purpose  of  such  laws  is  to  regulate  the  traffic  in  intoxicating 
liquors,  and  to  lessen  the  evils  resulting  from  the  unrestrained 
sale  and  use  thereof.     Observation  and  experience  have  dem- 
onstrated that  there  is  a  marked  difference  in  the  capacity 
of  men  to  restrain  and  control  others.     A  proper  person  to 
be  entrusted  with  a  permit  would  not  knowingly  sell  to  minors, 
or  men  intoxicated,  or  to  those  in  the  habit  of  being  intoxi- 
cated, or  permit  gambling,  fighting,  or  other  disorderly  con- 
duct in  or  about  his  place.     In  requiring  these  qualifications, 
much  reliance  is  placed  in  the  personal  fitness  and  capacity 
of  the  persons  who  are  to  be  entrusted  with  licenses  to  sell 
intoxicating  liquors  to  be  drunk  where  sold,  and  the  law  con- 
templates that  persons  thus  licensed  will  give  their  personal 
attention  to  such  business,  and  if  a  licensee  had  the  power 
693 


§419 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS 


694 


to  transfer  such  a  license  he  could  transfer  it  to  whom  he 
pleased,  regardless  of  the  fitness  of  the  transferee  to  engage 
in  such  perilous  and  hazardous  business,  and  thus  the  very 
object  of  the  law  Avould  be  defeated.  Accordingly  it  has 
been  uniformly  held  that  a  license  to  sell  or  traffic  in  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  is  personal  to  the  holder  and  cannot  be  dele- 
gated or  assigned  to  another  or  committed  by  a  court  to  the 
care  of  a  receiver.^  And  in  Nebraska  it  has  been  held  that 
a  license  was  no  defense  to  an  indictment  for  a  violation  of 
the  statute  against  the  vending  of  intoxicating  liquors  where 
it  M^as  shown  by  the  evidence  that  a  person  who  held  a  liquor 
license  issued  under  the  authority  of  a  mayor  and  council 
of  a  city,  sold  out  his  saloon  and  assigned  his  license  to  the 
defendant,  who  petitioned  the  mayor  and  council  to  transfer 
the  license  to  him,  and  the  council  thereupon  ordered  the 
license  to  be  so  transferred,  and  the  clerk  issued  an  original 
license,  in  form,  to  the  defendant,  who  proceeded  to  sell  in- 
toxicating liquors  under  it.-     In  Indiana  it  has  been  held  that 

iStat«  V.  Sumter  Co.,  22  Fla.  Flynn  (X.  J.  L.),  10  Atl.  177; 
8;  Godfrey  v.  State,  5  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  151;  Pickens  v.  State,  20 
Ind.  IIC;  Strahn  v.  Hamilton,  3S 
Ind.  57 ;  Riinyon  v.  State,  52  Ind. 
320;  Heath  v.  State,  105  Ind. 
342;  4  K  E.  901;  Pierce  v.  Pierce, 
17  Ind.  App.  107;  46  N.  E.  480; 
Lewis  V.  United  States,  1  Morris, 
(la.)  190;  Commonwealth  v. 
Bryan,  9  Dana  (Ky.)  310;  Alger 
V.  Weston,  14  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  231; 
State  V.  McXeeley,  1  Winst.  (N. 
C.  L.)  234;  In  re  Templeton  (Pa.), 
4  Lancast.  Law  Rev.  242 ;  In  re 
Blumenthal,  125  Pa.  St.  412;  18 
Atl.  395;  23  Wkly.  X.  C.  493; 
Gilday  v.  Warren,  69  Conn.  237; 
37  Atl.  494;  State  v.  Prettyman, 
3  Harr.  (Del.)  570;  Common- 
wealth V.  Brenaman,  8  B.  Mon. 
374;  Commonwealth  v.  Hadley,  11 
Met.  71;  Tracy  v.  Cxinberg,  189 
Mass.  260;  73  N.  E.  637;  Semple  v. 


Sanderson  v.  Goodrich,  46  Barb. 
616;  Matter  of  Place,  27  X.  Y. 
App.  Div.  561;  50  X.  Y.  Supp. 
640;  In  re  Grim,  181  Pa.  St.  233; 
Young  V.  Stevenson,  75  Ark. 
181;  86  S.  W.  1000;  Saw- 
yer V.  Sanderson,  113  Mo.  App. 
233;  88  S.  W.  151;  State  v. 
Bayne,  100  Wis.  35;  75  X.  W. 
403;  Kennedy  v.  Welsh,  196  Mass. 
592;  83  X.  E.  11;  Arnett  v. 
Wright,  18  Okla.  337;  89  Pac. 
1116  (note  given  for  transfer  is 
void)  ;  Jacobson  v.  Queen,  1  Juta 
33;  Mitchell  v.  Branham,  104  Mo. 
App.  480;  79  S.  W.  739  (a  con- 
tract to  transfer  a  license  is  void). 

If  one  of  two  licensed  partners 
die,  the  other  may  continue  the 
business.  Lynch  v.  State,  147  Ala. 
143;   39  So.  912. 

2  State  v.  Lydick,  11  Xeb.  3G0; 
9  X".  W.  560. 


695  TRANSFER   OF   LICENSE.  §  420 

a  promissory  note  given  for  the  transfer  of  a  liquor  license 
was  without  valid  consideration.^ 

Sec.  420.     Statute  permitting  transfer. 

In  some  States  licenses  may  be  transferred  bj^  the  licensee, 
but  always  under  restrictions.  This  is  pursuant  to  some 
statute  expressly  permitting  it.  Usually  the  licensing-  board 
must  approve  of  the  transfer;  and  this  is  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  liberty  of  the  license  being  used  by  an  improper 
person.  When  such  is  the  case  the  licensee  may  sell  the 
license  and  recover  the  price  agreed  to  be  paid.*  When  the 
board  has  acted  upon  the  application  for  a  transfer,  and  has 
granted  it,  nothing  remaining  to  be  done  except  the  issuance 
of  the  certificate  of  transfer  by  its  clerk,  it  has  fully  acted 
in  the  premises  and  cannot  rescind  its  action.^  If  the  appli- 
cation be  arbitrarily  denied,  the  action  of  the  board  may 
be  revised  by  a  writ  of  certiorari.^  But  if  the  transfer  is  a 
matter  of  discretion  with  the  board,  then  mandamus  does  not 
lie  to  revise  their  action  in  refusing  to  approve  the  transfer.'^ 
A  statute  authorizing  the  transfer  of  a  retail  license  will  not 
authorize  the  transfer  of  a  wholesale  license.*  In  Pennsyl- 
vania it  was  held  that  if  a  licensee  abandons  licensed  prem- 
ises the  court  might  transfer  it  to  a  new  party,  refunding  to 
the  original  licensee  the  proper  portion  of  the  fee,®  even  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  licensee.^"     Under  a  statute  allowing 

sStrahn    v.    Hamilton.    .38    Ind.  ers,   12  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.    29G;   34 

57.  N.  Y.  Siipp.  22. 

But   a    licensee    may    authorize  "^  In  re  Blumenthal,  125  Pa.  St. 

others  to  act  with  and  under  him  412;     18    Atl.    .395;    23    Wkly.    N. 

in   executing   the    powers    granted  C.  493. 

to  him  by   the  license.     Common-  ^  In    re    Rahn,    14    Pa.    Co.    Ct 

wealth  V.  Hadley,  11  Met.  66.  Rep.    202;    In    re    Gerke    Brewing 

4  Rubenstein   v.   Kahn,  5   N.   Y.  Co.,  23  Pittsb.  L.  Jr.  420. 
Misc.    Rep.    408 ;    25    N.   Y.    Supp.  » In  re  Doyle,  6  Kulp,  356. 

760;   In  re  Jack,   11   Australia  L.  io/„  re  Summa,   12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

R.  372;   2  €.  L.  Rep.  684;   Rex  v.  Rep.  6G7. 

Cohen,    21    Juta    676;    Norden    v.  The    right   of   transfer   was   dis- 

Bosman,   21    Juta   634;    Ex   parte  cretionary    under    an    early    stat- 

Heide,   18  Juta  479.  ute.      In    re    Breen,    2    Pa.    Dist. 

5  People  V.  Wells,  11  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  652;  but  now  it  is  not.  Laib 
Rep.  239;  32  N.  Y.  Rep.  !)73.  v.  Hare,   1C3  Pa.  St.  481-   30  Atl. 

<5  People   V.   Excise   Commission-       163. 


§  420  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  696 

a  transfer  the  license  cannot  be  transferred  to  another  house.^'- 
In  that  State  if  the  licensee  become  insolvent,  on  application 
of  the  owner  of  the  premises  the  license  may  be  transferred 
without  his  consent/-  especially  if  he  has  violated  the  stat- 
ute/^ Any  one  aggrieved  by  a  transfer  may  have  himself 
made  a  party  and  contest  its  validity."  The  owner  of  prem- 
ises, when  his  licensed  tenant  has  vacated  the  premises,  is 
not  entitled  to  have  the  license  transferred  as  a  matter  of 
right,  under  the  Pennsylvania  statute.  The  right  to  a  trans- 
fer is  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court;  and  if  the  court 
to  which  the  application  is  made  decides  there  is  no  longer 
any  necessity  for  the  maintenance  of  a  saloon  at  the  place 
licensed,  and  for  that  reason  refuse  the  transfer,  its  action 
is  not  reviewable.^^  The  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  order 
a  transfer  rests  upon  the  fact  that  a  valid  license  is  in  exist- 
ence at  the  time  the  application  is  made;  and  if  there  is  not, 
its  action  is  void.^^  A  petition  for  a  transfer  must  set  forth 
the  same  facts  as  were  necessary  in  the  original  application 
for  a  license,  and  in  addition  thereto  give  the  licensee's  name, 
its  date,  the  place  for  which  it  was  granted,  the  reasons  for 
the  transfer,  and  that  the  licensee  is  willing  for  the  transfer 
or  give  the  reason  why  he  is  not  willing.^^  If  the  applicant 
for  a  transfer,  pending  the  hearing,  transfers  all  his  rights^ 
the  transferee  may  file  a  petition  for  a  transfer  to  him,  but 
he  must  give  notice  of  his  application  for  the  transfer  in 
order  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction. ^^  The  transfer  is  not 
a  transfer  of  the  license,  nor  is  the  application  or  the  amend- 

11 7n   re  Burns,    14  Pa.   Co.   Ct.  Super.  Ct.  538;   In  re  McKibbins, 

Rep.  174;  3  Pa.  Dist.  Eep.  429.  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  421. 

12  In  re  Leibeknecht,  14  Pa.  Co.  i6  in  re  Umholtz's  License,  9  Pa. 

Ct.  Rep.  571;  3  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  474;  Super.  Ct.  450;   43  W.  N.  C.  405; 

In  re  Leaky,   14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  In  re    Danrel,   31    Pa.   Super.    Ct. 

430;    3  Pa.   Dist.  472.  15G. 

13 /n   re   Quirk,    17    Pa.   Co.    Ct.  i^ /n  re  Nacrelli,  8  Del.  Co.  Rep. 

Rep.  327.  20;     In    re    McKibbons,     11     Pa. 

14  Lester   v.   Price,   83   Va.   648;  Super.   Ct.  421. 

3  S.  E.  529;  In  re  McCabe,  11  Pa.  is /n  re  Keifer   License,  21   Pa-. 

Super.  Ct.  560.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  512. 

15  In  re  Stern's  License,  27  Pa. 


697  TRANSFER   OF    LICENSE.  §  420 

ment  of  the  original  petition  for  a  transfer."  An  application 
for  a  transfer  of  a.  license  applies  to  an  existing  license  and 
not  to  a  subsequent  one.^*'  A  license  may  be  revoked  after  its 
assignment  by  reason  of  acts  of  forfeiture  committed  before 
the  date  of  the  assignment.-^  If  an  assignee  of  a  license  dis- 
cover that  the  licensee  is  an  unfit  person  for  a  license  he  may 
and  should  refuse  to  further  proceed  in  the  matter  of  se- 
curing a  transfer  to  himself.--  An  agreement,  however,  to 
pay  a  licensee  for  the  ''use"  of  a  license  is  void,  being  against 
public  policy;  and  a  license  is  not  transferred  until  it  has 
been  sanctioned  by  the  State.^^  Where  a  county  treasurer 
was  the  officer  deputed  to  allow  the  transfer,  it  was  held  that 
he  could  not  refuse  to  do  so  on  the  ground  that  complaint 
had  been  made  that  the  licensee  had  carried  on  the  liquor 
traffic  in  a  forbidden  place,  that  not  impairing  the  right  to 
a  transfer.-*  Howsoever  an  assignee  may  act  in  good 
faith,  even  to  the  extent  of  filing  the  bond  required  by  stat- 
ute when  a  transfer  is  to  be  made,  yet  if  he  sells  before  the 
transfer  is  officially  made  he  is  guilty  of  selling  without  a 
license.-^"^     Where  a  statute  permitted  a  transfer  of  a  license, 

19 /m.   re   Keifer   License,   sxipra.  ing  32  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  210;    07 

Tlie  owner  of  tlie  premises  has  N.  Y.  Supp.  48. 

sufficient    interest   to   appeal    from  -^  Cronin  v.  Sharp,  IG  Pa.  Super, 

the   transfer.      In   re   McCabe,    11  Ct.  70. 

Pa.  Super.  Ct.  560.  23  David  Mayer   Brewing  Co.  v. 

A    remonstrance,    to    aid    in   the  Mack,    59    N.    Y.   Misc.    Rep.    202; 

collection    of    a    debt    by    delaying  110   N.    Y.    Supp.    245;    Gilday    v. 

the  transfer  will  be  ignored,    hire  Warren,    C9    Conn.    237;     37    Atl. 

Nacrelli,   8   Del.   Co.  Rep.   20.  494. 

The    court    has    no    jurisdiction  24  people    v.    jManzer,    IS    X.    Y. 

to  order   the  payment  of  the  pro-  Misc.    Rep.    292;    41    N.    Y.    Supp. 

ceeds    of    a    sale    of   a   hotel    as   a  1075. 

condition   to   the   approval   of   the  25  state  v.  Baync,  100  Wis.  35; 

transfer.     Appeal  of  Class,   6   Pa.  75  N.  W.  403. 

Super.  Co.   130.  In  New  York  the  commissioner 

20  Mj'dosli  v.  Bayonne,  72  N.  J.  of  excise  may  pay  the  original  li- 
L.  439;  60  Atl.  1111.  censee  a  rebate  of  the   portion  of 

21  In  re  Bradley  22  N.  Y.  Misc.  the  fee  covered  by  the  unexpired 
Rep.  301;  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  1100;  term,  unless  tlie  licensee  has  vio- 
In  re  Lyman,  59  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  lated  the  liquor  law  before  the 
217;    69   N.  Y.  Supp.  309;   affirm-  transfer  is  actually  made.     People 


§420 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


698 


a  resolution  of  a  board  of  excise  transferring  a  license  to  one 
of  its  members,  he  being-  present  and  voting  for  the  resolu- 
tion, was  held  voidable  on  a  writ  of  certiorari. -^  The  recogni- 
tion of  the  right  of  a  transfer  of  a  license  converts  it  into 
property,  and  makes  it  the  subject  of  barter  and  sale.^^ 


V.  Lyman,  156  N.  Y.  407:  50  N.  E. 
1112;  affirming  27  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
527;    50  N.  Y.  Supp.  497. 

One  transfer  does  not  exhaust 
the  power  of  court  to  grant  an- 
other. Ex  parte  Heide,  18  Juta 
47!). 

Tn  New  York,  although  the  tax 
certificate  has  been  assigned  and 
is  in  the  possession  of  the  assignee 
who  has  violated  the  law,  the 
principal  and  surety  in  the  bond 
of  the  assignor  or  licensee  are  lia- 
ble thereon  until  tlic  tax  certifi- 
cate is  presented  to  the  proper 
board  for  cancellation,  or  the  as- 
signment is  approved.  Cullinan 
V.  Kuch,  177  N.  Y.  303;  60  N.  E. 
597;  affirming  84  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
642;  82  N.  Y.  Supp.  1098;  People 
v.  Lyman,  156  N.  Y.  407;  50  N. 
E.  1112;  affirming  27  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  527;  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  497. 

Under  a  statute  permitting  a 
transfer  where  a  party  applies  for 
a  license,  but  removes  from  the 
State,  with  no  intent  to  return,  be- 
fore it  is  granted  and  the  fee  for 
it  paid,  he  is  "a  party  licensed"  un- 
der the  statute  permitting  a  trans- 
fer where  "a  party  licensed"  dies 
or  removes  from  the  State.  In  re 
Umholtz,  191  Pa.  St.  177:  43  Atl. 
75;  29  Pittsb.  Leg.  J.  (X.  S.) 
387 ;  44  W.  N.  C.  98. 

In  New  Jersey  a  license  may  be 
transferred  not  only  from  one  per- 
son to  another,  but  from  one  place 


to  another.  Hcnkel  v.  Hoy,  74  N. 
J.  L.,  56;   64  Atl.  960. 

No  appeal  lies  from  an  order 
granting  a  transfer  unless  a  stat- 
ute permits  it;  and  a  statute  au- 
thorizing an  appeal  on  granting  or 
revoking  a  license  does  not  apply 
to  a  transfer.  Appeal  of  Wake- 
man,  70  Conn.  7.33;  50  Atl.  733. 

26Treeftz  v.  Board,  73  N.  J.  L. 
278;   62  Atl.   1004 

27  Deggender  v.  Seattle,  etc.  Co., 
41  Wash.  385;   83  Pac.  898. 

Where  a  saloon  was  sold  under 
an  agreement  that  the  business 
was  to  be  run  by  the  vendee  in 
the  vendor's  name  until  paid  for, 
and  the  vendee  should  not  buy 
goods  in  the  vendor's  name  for  use 
in  the  saloon,  this  was  held  not  to 
protect  the  vendor  against  one 
selling  goods  to  be  used  in  the 
saloon  without  notice  of  the  agree- 
ment. Nappee  Valley  Wine  Co. 
v  Kassanave  ( Wis. ) ,  122  N.  W. 
812. 

In  a  proceeding  to  cancel  a  li- 
cense for  a  violation  of  the  law 
by  the  person  to  whom  it  was  is- 
sued, his  assignee  is  not  entitled 
to  be  made  a  party  thereto.  Clem- 
ent v.  Viscosi  (N.  Y.),  118  N.  Y. 
Supn.  613. 

An  applicant  for  a  transfer  must 
comply  with  all  the  formalities  re- 
quired by  the  statute.  Thompson 
V.  Ecllemore,  7  Low  Can.  .Tr.  74. 


699  TRANSFER   OF    LICENSE.  §§421,422 

Sec.  421.     Assignment  not  a  transfer. 

An  assio-nment  of  a  liquor  liceDse  is  not  a  transfer  of  it 
where  the  statute  requires  the  court  or  licensing  board  to 
make  a  transfer  upon  a  proper  application.  The  right  to  a 
liquor  license,  or  a  transfer  of  one  already  issued,  is  not  as- 
signable. It  is  nothing  more  than  the  expression  of  a  consent 
that  the  license  may  be  transferred  to  the  person  named 
therein ;  and  all  the  rights  it  gives  to  such  person  is  a  privilege 
to  apply  to  have  it  transferred  to  him.  An  assignment  has  no 
market  value.-^  In  New  York,  however,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  assignment  of  a  license  tax  certificate  is  valid,  even 
when  made  to  secure  the  payment  of  money  borrowed  to 
enable  the  applicant  to  pay  for  the  certificate,  as  against 
judgment  creditors  of  the  licensee.-''  The  assignee  takes  the 
assigned  license  subject  to  its  forfeiture  for  misconduct  of 
the  licensee  committed  after  its  assignment.^*^  An  agreement 
to  assign  and  an  assignment  made  pursuant  thereto,  includ- 
ing stock  and  fixtures,  in  case  of  a  failure  to  make  payments 
on  his  debt,  has  been  held  an  agreement  to  consent  to  a 
transfer  of  the  license,  and  therefore  valid.^^ 

Sec.  422.    Death  of  licensee. 

The  rule  is  a  general  one  that  on  the  death  of  the  licensee 
neither  the  Hcense  nor  any  rights  thereunder  pass  to  his  per- 
sonal representatives  or  to  his  heirs.  This  is  upon  the  ground 
that  the  license  is  peculiarly  personal  to  the  person  to  whom 

28  Cronin  v.  Sharp,  16  P».  Super.  Supp.  407.  See  People  v.  Manzer, 
Ct.  76.  See  Gilday  v.  Warren,  69  18  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  292;  41  N.  Y. 
Conn.  237;  37  Atl.  494.  Supp.  1075. 

29  Niles  V.  Mathusa,  19  N.  Y.  si  Germantown  Brewing  Co.  v. 
Misc.  Rep.  96;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  88.  Booth,  162  Pa.  St.  100;  29  Atl. 
A  more  recent  case  holds  the  as-  386;  34  W.  N.  C.  340;  reversing 
signment  under  such  instances  14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  189;  3  Pa. 
void.  David  Mayor  Brewing  Co.  Dist.  142.  See  Albany  Brewing 
V.  Mack,  59  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  202 ;  Co.  v.  Barckley,  42  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
no  N.  Y.   Supp.   245.  335;   59  N.  Y.  Supp.  65,  and  Deg- 

30  People  v.  Lyman,  156  X.  Y.  gender  v.  Seattle,  etc^  Co.,  41 
407;   50  N.  E.   1112;   affirming  27  Wash.  385;  85  Pac.  898. 

N.    Y.   App.    Div.    527;    50   N.    Y. 


§  422  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  700 

it  is  granted — the  privilege  to  sell  liquors  is  a  personal  one — 
because  of  his  ascertained  fitness  to  engage  in  the  liquor 
traffic  after  a  hearing  had  and  a  determination  of  that  fact 
by  the  licensing  board.  The  license  is  not  in  the  nature  of 
property.'-  There  are  statutes,  however,  which  permit  the 
transfer  with  the  consent  of  the  licensing  board.^^  Such  is 
the  case  in  England  where  a  licensee  dies  while  the  license 
is  still  in  force.  There  the  justices  may  "grant  to  the  heirs, 
executors,  or  administrators  of  the  person  so  dying,"  "a 
license  to  sell  excisable  liquors  by  retail,  t-o  be  drunk  or  con- 
sumed in  such  [licensed]  house  or  the  premises  thereto  be- 
longing. "  '*  So  the  heirs,  executors,  or  administrators  may 
continue  to  carry  on  the  business  until  the  next  special  trans- 
fer session  of  the  justices  without  incurring  a  penalty  for 
sales  without  a  license.'^  Under  this  statute  where  the  licensee 
dies  intestate  during  the  licensing  year,  the  person  who  has 
a  prima  facie  right  to  apply  for  letters  of  administration  does 
not  commit  the  offense  of  selling  without  a  license  for  con- 
tinuing the  sales  of  liquors  until  the  next  special  transfer 
session.^**  The  person  acting  under  this  statute  is  himself  a 
"licensed  person"  for  the  purpose  of  the  licensing  acts,  and  is 
therefore  liable  in  the  same  way  as  the  ordinary  licensed 
person  for  any  offense  committed  by  him."^ 

32  United  states  v.  Overton,  2  62  L.  J.  M.  C.  181;  5  Rep.  530: 
Craneh  C.  C.  42;  Fed.  Cas.  Xu  69  L.  T.  346;  !)  T.  L.  R.  466;  17 
15979;    People  v.   Sykes,  96  Mich.       Cox  C.  C.   685. 

452;   56  N.  W.  12;  In  re  Keating,  37  McDonald   v.   Hughes    [1902], 

25   Pittsb.    Leg.    J.     (N.    S.)    454;  1  K.  B.  94;   66  J.  P.  86;   71   L.  J. 

/n  reBlumenthal,  125  Pa.  St.  412;  K.   B.   43;    50   W.   R.   318;    85   L. 

18    Atl.    395.       See     Williams    v.  T.    727;   18  T.  L.  R.    79;   20  Cox 

Troop,    17    Wis.    463    on    sale    of  C.  C.  131. 

saloon  stock  and  fixtures  and  the  The   license    cannot   be    renewed 

right  of  the  purchaser.  in  the  name  of   the   deceased,   for 

33  In  re  McOmber,  3  Pa.  Dist.  "a  license  to  a  dead  man  is  a 
Rep.   431.  mere  nullity."     Cowles  v.  Gale,  L. 

34  Patterson's  Licensing  Acts  R.  7  Ch.  12;  41  L.  J.  Ch.  14;  25 
(19  ed.),   197,   198.     See   also  pp.       L.    T.    524;   20  W.    R.    70. 

167,  196,  249,  267,  325.  The  granting  of  the  transfer  is 

35  Patterson's  Licensing  Acts  ( 19  discretionary  with  the  justices, 
ed. ),  334.  the  same  as  in  granting  licenses. 

30  Rose  V.  Frogley,  57  J.  P.  376 ;        Regina   v.    Smith,    42    J.    P.    295 ; 


701 


TRANSFER    OF    LICENSE. 


§423 


Sec.  423.    Bankruptcy  or  insolvency — Receiver. 

Unless  some  statute  authorizes  it,  a  license  cannot  be  trans- 
ferred to  a  receiver  of  a  court,  and  he  cannot  continue  the 
business  thereunder;  ^^  and  it  cannot  be  vacated  in  a  creditor's 
action.^^  A  creditor  of  the  licensee  has  no  interest  in  the 
license.*"  In  New  South  Wales  by  statute  the  license  of  a 
bankrupt  passes  to  his  legal  representative;"*^  and  the  assignee 
may  carry  on  the  business,  but  cannot  secure  a  renewal  of  it.*- 
In  other  parts  of  Australia  the  license  does  not  pass  to  the 
licensee's  assignee  in  insolvency.*^  The  English  statute  ex- 
pressly makes  provision  for  a  transfer  of  a  license  of  a  licensee 
who  "shall  become  a  bankrupt"  to  his  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy.**   The  assignee  can  continue  the  business  until  the  next 

Boodle   V.    Birminoham,   J.   J.,   45       Vict.   L.   R.    6G;    14   Austr.   L.   R. 

185. 

ssSemple  v.  Flynn  (N.  J.  Eq.), 
10  Atl.  177. 

39Koehler  v.  Olseii,  68  Hun  63; 
22  N.  Y.  Supp.  677. 

40 /n  re  Breen,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
Rep.  141.  See  In  re  Summa,  3 
Pa.  Dist.  Rep.   651. 

41  Ex  parte  Empson,  3  N.  S.  W. 
L.  R.  206. 

42Dunlop  V.  Ulir,  14  N.  S.  W. 
L.  R.  430. 

43  Anthoness  v.  Anderson,  14 
Vict.  L.  R.  127;  9  Austr.  L.  T. 
175;  In  re  Jack,  11  Austr.  L.  T. 
372;  2  C.  L.  R.  684.  See  Whyt« 
V.  Williams,  29  Vict.  L.  R.  69; 
24  Austr.  L.  T.  222;  9  Austr.  L. 
R.  98. 

44  Patterson's  Licensing  Acts  ( 19 
ed. ),  p.  197.  Formerly  the  license 
could  be  assigned  when  tlie  licensee 
took  "the  benefit  of  any  act  for 
the  relief  of  insolvent  debtors," 
but  the  part  of  the  statute  quoted 
was  repealed  by  tlie  statute  law 
Revision  (No.  2),  Act  1888  (51 
and  52  Vict.,  c.  57),  schedule. 


J.  P.  p.  636 ;  Traynor  v.  Jones 
[1894],  1  Q.  B.  p.  86;  Simmons 
v.  Blackheath,  17  Q.  B.  Div.  765; 
30  J.  P.  742;  55  L.  J.  M.  C.  166; 
35  W.  R.  167;  Miskin  v.  Hughes 
[1893],  1  Q.  B.  Div.  275;  57  J.  P. 
263;  67  L.  T.  680. 

Under  the  Pennsylvania  statute 
a  "party  licensed"  is  not  one  who 
dies  aft«r  application  for  a  license 
and  before  it  is  granted  and  pay- 
ment of  the  license  fee.  In  re  Um- 
holtz,  191  Pa.  St.  177;  43  Atl. 
75;  29  Pittsb.  Leg.  J.  (N.  S.) 
387;  44  W.  N.  C.  98. 

In  Pennsylvania  a  license  of  a 
deceased  licensee  has  been  held  to 
be  an  asset  of  his  estate;  the  ex- 
ecutor cannot  use  it  for  his  own 
l)enefit.  Ashenbach  v.  Carey  (Pa.), 
73  Atl.  4,35.  And  if  he  succeeds 
in  securing  a  transfer  he  becomes 
liable  as  trustee  to  all  persons 
interested.  In  re  Reilly's  Estate, 
6  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  252. 

An  administrator  may  hold  and 
join  in  the  application  for  a  trans- 
fer, but  not  the  agent  of  the  ad- 
ministrator.    In  re  Ballhausen,  19 


§  423  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  702 

Special  session  of  the  justices,  when  he  must  secure  a  transfer 
to  himself  as  assignee.^^  But  where  a  licensee  became  a  bank- 
rupt, and  by  the  covenant  of  his  lease  he  was  bound  on  its  de- 
termination to  assign  the  license  to  the  lessor,  it  was  held  that 
the  license  was  not  "property"  of  the  lessee,  and  did  not  pass 
to  the  trustee,  but  ought  to  be  assigned  to  the  lessor.**^  In 
Kentucky  where  the  license  is  granted  to  an  applicant  be- 
cause of  his  fitness  to  conduct  the  liquor  traffic,  to  sell 
at  a  definite  place,  the  licensing  board  or  court,  in  case 
of  the  death  or  transfer  by  the  licensee  of  his  business  to 
his  personal  representative  or  to  the  purchaser,  may  trans- 
fer his  license;  and  it  was  held  that  the  attempt  of  an  in- 
solvent licensee  to  transfer  his  license  to  a  creditor  did  not 
render  him  liable  to  pay  the  licensee's  trustee  in  bankruptcy 
an>i;hing  for  the  license.''  AMiere  the  police  commissioner 
of  Boston  had  uniformly  permitted  sales  of  licenses  by 
trustees  in  bankruptcy,  for  the  benefit  of  the  licensee's  cred- 
itor, but  also  uniformly  refused  to  recognize  mortgages  of 
licenses,  by  allowing  the  trustee  to  name  the  licensee's  suc- 
cessor, it  was  held  that  a  court  of  bankruptcy  would  not 
recognize  the  claim  of  a  mortgagee  of  the  licensee,  because 
contrary  to  the  policy  of  such  commissioners,  without  whose 
consent  and  co-operation  it  would  be  impossible  to  realize 
anything  from  the  sale  of  the  license  for  the  benefit  of  the 
bankrupt's  creditors.*^  And  in  a  case  of  a  licensee  in  this 
same  city  it  was  held  that  the  commissioners  by  issuing  a 
license,  on  a  vacancy  created  by  bankruptcy,  to  the  nominee 
of  his  trustee  in  bankruptcy,  did  not  deprive  a  co-licensee 
of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law,  where  he  held 
the  original  license  as  security,  for  his  rights  were  subject  to 
the  police  commissioner's  rules. '*^ 

« Patterson's  Licensing  Acts,  p.  117   Ky.   459;    78   S.   W.   208;    25 

334,  348.  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1560. 

46  In  re  Britnor,  4G  L.  J.  Bk.  48  in  re  McArdle,  126  Fed.  442. 
85;  25  W.  R.  500.  Such  would  49  Tracy  v.  Giiizberg,  205  U.  S. 
not  be  the  cas«  where  the  law  does  170;  51  L.  Ed.  755;  27  Sup.  Ct. 
not  recognize  contracts  to  assign  461:  affirming  189  Mass.  200;  75 
a  license.  N.  E.  637. 

47  E.  S.  Bonnie  &  Co.  v.  Perry,  In  New  Yorlc  the  receiver  of  a 


703  TRANSFER   OF   LICENSE.  §  424 

Sec.  424.    Mortgage  of  license— Judicial  sale. 

As  a  general  rule  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  can- 
not be  mortgaged  or  pledged  to  secure  an  indebtedness,  and 
in  that  way  be  transferred  to  the  purchaser  under  the  mort- 
gage or  the  pledge.-'"  But  where  a  party  executed  a  chattel 
mortgage  covering  certain  furniture  and  bar  fixtures,  and  all 
his  interest  in  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors,  or  a 
renewal  of  it,  although  the  court  held  the  mortgagee  acquired 
no  title  to  the  license,  both  because  it  could  not  be  mort- 
gaged and  because  it  was  not  then  in  existence,  yet  it  was 
good  as  a  contract  to  assign  the  license  whenever  obtained.^^ 
And  in  another  case  where  a  saloon  owner  gave  a  bill  of  sale 
of  all  his  stock  and  saloon  fixtures,  and  also  all  "right,  title, 
and  interest  in  and  to  a  license  to  sell  licjuor,"  it  was  held 
that  he  was  not  required  under  his  contract  of  sale  to  pay 
for  the  license  for  which  he  had  made  an  application  at  the 
time  he  executed  the  bill  of  sale,  and  which  was  granted 
afterwards."  And  where  a  statute  treated  a  license  as  assign- 
able property,  but  subject  to  be  sold  on  legal  process,'  it  was 
held  that  it  could  be  mortgaged,  and  where  the  plaintiflP 
advanced  money  to  a  party  to  enable  him  to  secure  a  license, 
and  took  a  chattel  mortgage  upon  it,  and  the  licensee  sold 
it  to  a  third  person  who  secured  its  transfer  upon  the  proper 
records  of  the  city  to  his  firm  instead  of  to  himself,  it  was 
held  not  to  affect  the  mortgagee's  right  to  sue  him  alone; 

licensee  may  surrender  the  license  bankruptcy,    and    the    latter    can- 

and  receive  the  rebate  of  the  un-  not  sell   it  for  the  benefit  of  the 

earned  fee.    Albany  Brewing  Co.  v.  bankrupt's    estate.      In    re    Whit- 

Barckley,  42  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  335;  lock's  Estate,  39  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  34. 

59  N.  Y.  Supp.  65.  so  McNeeley  v.  Welz,   16(i  N.  Y. 

If  a  purchaser  of  a  license  from  124;    59   N.    E.    697,    affirming   20 

a    trustee    in    bankruptcy    is    not  N.   Y.    App.    Div.   566;    47    N.    Y. 

able  to  secure  its  transfer  to  him-  Supp.   310;    Arnett  v.   Wright,    18 

self,  he  is  entitled  to  a  return  of  Okla.    337;     89    Pac.    1116     (note 

his  money.     In  re  Miller,  171  Fed.  given  for  transfer  is  void)  ;  David 

263;  In  re  Conner  &  Co.,  171  Fed.  Meyer   Brewing  Co.   v.   Mack,   110 

261.  N.  Y.  Supp.  245. 

If  a  license  be  granted  to  a  per-  ci  McNeeley  v.   Welz,   supra. 

son  after  he  has  been  adjudged  a  ^2  Costello    v.    Keeler,    20   R.   I. 

bankrupt,    it   belongs    to   him    per-  298;    38    Atl.   927. 
sonally  and   not  to  his  trustee  in 


§  424  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  704 

and  the  debt  secured  by  the  mortgage  being  less  than  the 
market  value  of  the  license,  the  mortgagee  was  not  entitled 
to  recover  its  market  value,  but  only  the  amount  due  him.^* 
In  England  the  rights  of  mortgagees  are  somewhat  regulated 
by  statute.  There  a  mortgagee  of  licensed  premises  given  by 
the  owner,  not  the  lessee,  may,  on  payment  of  a  fee  of  one 
shilling,  be  registered  as  an  owner  of  the  premises ;  ■"'*  and  as 
such  owner  he  may,  under  certain  conditions,  apply  for  a 
renewal  of  the  license  granted  his  tenant,  a  renewal,  for  in- 
stance, of  a  license  for  the  premises  licensed,  to  be  operated 
by  himself  or  his  tenant."'''  As  a  consequence  of  those  statutes 
the  mortgagee  of  licensed  premises,  or  of  the  saloon  fixtures 
and  stock  of  goods,  has  an  interest  in  them  that  enables  him 
to  maintain  an  appeal,  where  the  mortgage  deed  makes  him 
attorney  for  the  license  holder  in  that  respect,  on  refusal  of 
the  licensing  board  to  renew  the  license  where  the  licensee 
has  applied  for  it.^^  In  New  York  the  tax  certificate  may  be 
assigned  as  collateral  security,^'^  and  if  surrendered  the  as- 
signee is  entitled  to  the  amount  of  the  fee  rebated.^^  An  in- 
strument reciting  "I  hereby  agree  to  assign  to"  A  liquor 
license  number  328,  "taken  in  my  name,"  for  one  hundred 
dollars  "loaned  to  me  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  said 
license,"  to  be  the  property  of  A,  and  until  the  sum  be  paid 
in  full  "the  license  is  the  property  of  the  said  A"  is  not  a 
chattel  mortgage  and  need  not  be  recorded  as  against  attach- 
ing creditors.^"  The  assignee  or  mortgagee  takes  the  license 
subject  to  the  right  of  the  State  to  cancel  it  for  misconduct 

ssNicolini  v.  Langermann   (Tex.  Misc.    Rep.    90;    44    N.    Y.    Supp. 

Civ.  App.),   104  S.  W.  501.  88. 

54  Patterson's  Licensing  Acts  ss  /,i  ye  Jenney,  19  X.  Y.  Misc. 
(19tli  ed.)    535,   §29.  Rep.  244;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  84.     He 

55  Regina  v.  Liverpool,  J.  J.,  11  may  carry  on  the  business  under 
Q.  B.  Div.  644;  Symons  v.  Wed-  it,  or  may  surrender  it  if  a  re- 
more  [1894],  1  Q.  B.  Div.  401;  58  ceiver  or  assignee  for  the  holder 
J.  P.  197;  63  L.  J.  M.  C.  44;  69  be  appointed.  In  re  Jenney,  su- 
L.  T.  801;  42  W.  R.  301.  pra. 

56  Garrett  v.  Middlesex,  J.  J..  59  Njies  v.  Mathusa,  20  N.  Y. 
12  Q.  B.  Div.  620;  53  L.  J.  M.  C.  App.  Div.  483;  47  N.  Y.  Supp. 
81 ;  48  J.  P.  357;  32  W.  R.  646.  38. 

57Niles   V.    Mathusa,    19    N.   Y. 


705  TRANSFER   OF    LICENSE.  §  425 

of  the  licensee  committed  either  before  or  after  the  assign- 
ment or  pledgement.*'" 

Sec.  425.     Transfer     of     license     to     other     premises- 
Pennsylvania. 

Statutes  also  go  so  far  occasionally  as  to  allow  a  transfer 
of  the  license  from  one  premise  to  another,  although  a  statute 
requires  the  license  to  be  issued  for  a  particular  site.  Such 
is  the  case  in  Pennsylvania,  where  the  landlord  refuses  to 
renew  the  licensee's  lease,**^  or  where  the  buildings  or  prem- 
ises are  destroyed  or  become  a  nuisance  and  unfit  for  occu- 
pancy."- If  the  license  has  been  revoked  or  abandoned  by 
failure  to  complete  the  application,  there  can  be  no  transfer, 
for  there  is  nothing  to  transfer.^''  There  can  be  no  transfer 
from  one  house  to  another  where  the  license  is  sold  at  sheriff's 
sale  or  the  licensed  premises  were  sold  at  such  sale,  at  the 
request  of  the  vendee,  the  sale  not  being  a  destruction  of 
the  premises,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute."  Where  an 
applicant  applied  for  a  license  for  one  place  and  afterwards 
filed  his  application  for  a  different  place,  and  marked  it 
"change  of  location,"  it  was  held  not  a  transfer  from  one 
place  to  another.*'''*  In  Connecticut  one  who  is  not  a  licensee 
cannot  apply  for  a  removal  permit.*'*'  In  this  same  State  a 
statute  forbade  a  second  application  for  a  license  for  the 
same  place  during  the  license  year  where  the  first  application 
had  been  refused  on  the  ground  that  the  place  was  an  un- 
suitable one.     It  was  held  that  when  a  license  had  been  re- 

60  People   V.   Lyman,   loG   N.   Y.  63 /n  re  Daniels,  31   Pa.  Super. 

407;   50  N.  E.   1112;   affirming  27  Ct.   156;  In  re  Umholtz's  License, 

N.    Y.    App.    Div.    527;    50   N.    Y.  9   Pa.   Super.  Ct.   450;    43   W.   N. 

Supp.  497.  C.  495. 

61/nre  McKibbin,  11  Pa.  Super.  64 /„    re    Hotel    Cambridge    Li- 

Ct.   421;    In   re   Kellar,    17    Lane.  cense,   20   Pa.   Co.    Ct.    Rep.   229; 

Law  Rev.  96;    16  Montg.  Co.  Law  Appeal  of  Class,  6  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

Rep.  24;  7  North  Co.  Rep.  129;  23  130. 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  251;   9  Pa.  Dist.  e^ /«■    re    Heubergcr    License,    8 

Rep.  340;    13  York  Leg.  Rec.  155.  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  625. 

02  Cellar   filled   with  water.     In  66  Appeal  of  D'Araato,  80  Conn. 

re  McCabe,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  500;  357;    68   Atl.   445. 
In  re  Keller,  supra. 


§  426  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  706 

fused  because  in  that  locality  there  were  enough  saloons,  an 
application  for  a  transfer  of  a  license,  held  by  another  per- 
son, to  the  same  place  could  not  be  granted  during  the  same 
license  year.^'^  If  the  lawfulness  of  a  sale  of  liquor  be  chal- 
lenged, the  transferee  has  the  burden  to  show  a  lawful  trans- 
fer of  the  license  to  himself,  in  order  to  protect  himself  from 
the  penalty  inflicted  for  a  violation  of  the  law.®^  This  cannot 
be  done  by  oral  evidence;  it  must  be  proven  by  the  record 
of  the  transfer.*'''  The  transferee  cannot  deny  the  authority 
of  the  person  making  the  transfer,  even  though  he  was  only 
an  agent  of  the  licensee,  when  he  executed  the  statutory  bond 
and  by  authority  of  the  license  pursued  the  occupation  of  a 
liquor  dealer."" 

Sec.  426.    Transfer  under  English  statute. 

The  English  statutes  provide  for  transfers  of  license  under 
certain  contingencies,  and  the  cases  under  them  are  worthy 
of  consideration.  Under  Section  14  of  the  English  Ale 
House  Act  of  lvS28'^  it  is  provided  that  if  a  licensee,  before 
the  expiration  of  his  license,  "die,  or  shall  be  by  sickness 
or  other  infirmity  rendered  incapable  of  keeping  an  inn,  or 
shall  become  a  bankrupt;"-  or  if  any  person  so  licensed,  or 
the  heirs,  executors,  administrators,  or  assigns  of  any  person 

67  Appeal  of  D'Amato,  80  Conn.  McKibbins,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  421. 
357 ;  68  Atl.  445.  An  application  to  have  a  license 

68  Hill  V.  Sheridan,  12S  Mo.  changed  from  one  place  to  another 
App.  415;   107  S.  W.  426.  is  in  effect  an  original  application 

69  Hill  V.  Sheridan,  supra.  for  a  license.  Lester  v.  Price,  83 
Where  there  is  no  statute  author-  Va.  648;  3  S.  E.  529. 

izing  a  record,  see  In  re  Clement,  ^i  9  Geo.  IV,  c.   61,   §    14;    Pat- 

55  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.   615;    105  N.  terson's    Licensing    Acts,    pp.    17J) 

Y.  Supp.   1085.  to   197. 

70  Faulkner  v.  Cassidy,  39  Tex  72  The  act  originally  had  these 
Civ.  App.  415;   87  S.  W.  904.  words:      "Or    shall   take    the    ben- 

If  the  licensee  refuse  to  consent  efit   of   any   act   for   the    relief   of 

to  the  transfer  from   one  place  to  insolvent    debtors;"    but   this    pro- 

another,    where    the    buildings    on  vision   was  repealed   by   the   Stat- 

the    licensxid     premises     are     de-  ute    Law    Pvcvision     (No.    2),    Act 

stroyed,  the  transfer  may  be  made  1881   (51  and  52  Vict.  c.  57). 
anyway,    in   Pennsylvania.     In  re 


707  TRANSFER   OP   LICENSE.  §  426 

licensed,  shall  remove  from  or  yield  up  the  possession  of  the 
house  specified  in  such  license;  or  if  the  occupier  of  any  such 
house,  being  about  to  cjuit  the  same,  shall  have  wilfully  com- 
mitted or  shall  have  neglected  to  apply  at  the  general  annual 
licensing  meeting,  or  at  any  adjournment  thereof,  for  a  license 
to  continue  to  sell  excisable  liquors  by  retail,  to  be  drank  or 
consumed  in  such  house;  or  if  any  house,  being  kept  as  an 
inn  by  any  person  duly  licensed  as  aforesaid,  shall  be  or  be 
about  to  be  pulled  down  or  occupied  under  the  provision  of 
any  Act  for  the  improvement  of  highways  or  for  any  other 
public  purpose ;  or  shall  be,  by  fire,  tempest,  or  other  unfore- 
seen and  unavoidable  calamity,  rendered  unfit  for  the  recep- 
tion of  travelers,  and  for  the  other  legal  purpose  of  an  inn," 
it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  justice  at  a  special  session  in  such 
case,  * '  and  in  such  case  only,  to  grant  to  the  heirs,  executors, 
or  assigns  of  the  person  so  dying;  or  to  the  assigns  of  such 
person  becoming  incapable  of  keeping  an  inn ;  or  to  the  as- 
signee or  assignees  of  such  bankrupt;  or  to  any  new  tenant 
or  occupier  of  any  house  having  so  become  unoccupied;  or 
to  any  person  to  whom  snch  heirs,  executors,  administrators, 
or  assigns  or  otherwise  have  bona  fide  conveyed  or  otherwise 
made  over  his  or  their  interest  in  the  occupation  and  keeping 
of  such  house,  a  license  to  sell  excisable  liquors  by  retail  to 
be  drank  or  consumed  in  such  house  or  the  premises  thereto 
belonging;  or  to  grant  to  the  person  whose  house  shall,  as 
aforesaid,  have  been  or  shall  be  about  to  be  pulled  down  or 
occupied  for  the  improvement  of  the  highways  or  for  any 
other  public  purpose,  or  have  become  unfit  for  the  reception 
of  travelers  or  for  the  other  legal  purpose  of  an  inn,  and 
who  shall  open  and  keep  as  an  inn  some  other  fit  and  con- 
venient house,  a  license  to  sell  excisable  liquors  by  retail,  to  be 
drank  or  consumed  therein."  "This  section,"  said  Justice 
Mathew,  "provides  for  the  transfer  of  a  license  to  a  different 
person  in  respect  of  the  same  premises,  and  for  the  transfer 
to  the  same  person  in  respect  of  different  premises.""     TJn- 

TsRegina    v.    Yorkshire,    J.    J.       47;   40  W.  R.  .334;   62  J.   P.  197; 
[1898],    1    Q.    B.    503;    62    J.    P.       M.  &  W.  Dig.  74. 
197;  07  L.  J.  Q.  B.   279;  78  L.  T. 


§  426  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  708 

der  this  statute  a  number  of  cases  have  been  decided.  Thus 
where  a  new  tenant  has  come  into  the  premises  and  has  failed 
to  obtain  a  transfer,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  a  second  new 
incoming  tenant  making  a  second  application  during  the  li- 
censing year,  for  the  justices  may  accept  one  person  though 
they  may  have  rejected  another,  and  the  license  once  granted 
continues  in  existence  until  the  end  ^*  of  the  licensing  year.'* 
But  if  the  license  has  been  forfeited  no  application  can  be 
made.^**  While  the  application  is  usually  made  before  the 
expiration  of  the  license,  the  object  being  to  provide  for 
some  contingency  happening  between  the  general  annual  li- 
censing meetings,  at  which  alone  a  license  or  a  renewal  can 
be  obtained,  and  which  license  positively  lapses  on  a  definite 
day  in  the  year;^^  yet  if  the  events  mentioned  in  this  statute 
have  all  happened  during  the  current  year,  as  the  death  or 
removal  of  one  tenant  or  the  entry  of  another  into  the  li- 
censed premises,  then  the  application  may  be  made  at  any 
time  after  the  expiration  of  the  current  license,  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  depending  on  the  happening  of  events, 
and  not  on  the  date  at  which  the  remedy  is  requested."*  Under 
this  statute  if  a  tenant  has  been  refused  a  renewal  he  may 
surrender  the  premises  at  any  time  before  the  end  of  the 
licensing  year,  and  then  a  new  tenant  may  enter  and  apply 
for  a  transfer,  and  the  justices  cannot  refuse  to  hear  his  ap- 
plication on  the  ground  that  they  had  already  refused  a  re- 
newal to  the  outgoing  tenant,  as  that  is  not  a   case  of  res 

74  April  5th.  77  Namely,  April  5tli. 

75j5a;  parte  Todd,  3  Q.   B.  Div.  78  Regina  v.  Lawrence,  11  Q.  B. 

407;   42  J.  P.  G62;  47  L.  J.  M.  C.  Div.  G38;   47  J.  P.  596;   52  L.  J. 

89.  M.  €.    114;   49  L.  T.  244;   32  W. 

70  Regina  V.  West  Riding,  J.  J.,  R.  20   (overruling  Ex  parte  Todd, 

21  Q.  B.  Div.  258;  52  J.  P.  455;  57  3  Q.  B.  Div.  407;   47   L.  J.  M.  C. 

L.  J.  M.   C.    103;  30  W.  R.  258.  89;    42    J.    P.    662,    and   Wliite    v. 

It    is,    however,    doubtful,    if    a  Coquetdale,   7   Q.   B.   Div.   238;    50 

succession    of    new    incoming    ten-  L.  J.  M.  C.  128;  44  L.  T.  715;  45 

ants  can  apply  one  after  the  oth-  J.  P.   539,  where  it  was  held  the 

er.     See  Stevens  v.  Shornbrook,  J.  application   must   be   made   before 

J.,  23  Q.  B.  Div.  143;   58  L.  J.  M.  the  license  expired). 
C.   107;    61   L.  T.   240;    37   W.   R. 
605;   53  J.  P.  423. 


709 


TRANSFER  OF   LICENSE. 


§427 


judicata.''^  The  general  rule  is  under  this  statute  that  the 
justices  have  the  same  discretion,  but  not  more,  concerning 
the  grants  of  transfers  from  one  person  to  another  as  they 
have  concerning  renewals.^"  A  husband  may  obtain  a  trans- 
fer of  his  wife's  license,  where  she  held  it  before  their  mar- 
riage.^^  On  an  application  for  a  transfer,  evidence  of  the  bad 
character  of  previous  tenants  may  be  showTi.^" 

Sec.  427.    Transfer  under  English  and   Colonial  statute — 
Cases. 

The  following  are  illustrative  cases  under  the  English  stat- 
utes, followed  by  a  few  Colonial  cases  under  statutes  very 
similar  to  the  English  statutes.  If  a  license  has  been  for- 
feited, there  can  be  no  application  successfully  made  there- 
after for  a  transfer.*^     And  the  same  is  true  if  it  has  been 


79  Eegina  v.  Upper  Osgoldcross, 
53  J.  P.  823;  62  L.  T.  112;  Ee- 
gina V.  Thomas  [1892],  1  Q.  B. 
426;  56  J.  P.  151;  66  L.  T.  289; 
66  L.  J.  M.  C.  141;  40  W.  R.  472. 

Where  a  tenant  lost  his  right 
to  a  renewal  by  neglect,  see  Re- 
gina  V.  Powell  [1891],  1  Q.  B.  718; 
2  Q.  B.  693;  55  J.  P.  422;  56  J. 
P.  52;  65  L.  T.  210;  60  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  594;  39  W.  R.  630.  See  also 
Eegina  v.  West  Riding,  J.  J.,  59 
J.  P.  278. 

soRegina  v.  Smith,  42  J.  P. 
295;  Traynor  v.  Jones  [1894],  1 
Q.  B.  p.  86;  Boodle  v.  Birming- 
ham, J.  J.,  45  J.  P.  p.  636;  Sim- 
mons V.  Blackheath,  17  Q.  B.  Div. 
765;  .50  J.  P.  742;  55  L:  J.  M.  C. 
166;   35  W.  R.  107. 

81  Hazell  V.  Middleton,  45  J.  P. 
548. 

82Misken  v.  Higher  [1893],  1 
Q.  B.  275;  57  J.  P.  263;  67  L.  T. 
680.  See  Regina  v.  Hull,  J.  J., 
47  J.  P.  820. 

Where  the  current  license  had 
come  to  an  end  before  any  applica- 


tion had  been  made  for  a  trans- 
fer or  grant  under  the  section 
quoted,  to  a  special  sessions 
transfer,  the  court  held  tliat 
the  justices  were  no  longer  re- 
stricted to  the  four  ground  men- 
tioned in  the  section  for  a  trans- 
fer. This  was  upon  the  ground 
that  it  was  really  an  application 
for  a  new  license.  Murray  v. 
Freer  [1893],  1  Q.  B.  635;  57  J.  P. 
101,  583;  67  L.  T.  507;  62  L.  J. 
M.  C.  100;  affirmed  [1894]  App. 
Cass.  570;  63  L.  J.  M.  C.  242;  71 
L.    T.    444;    58  J.   P.  508. 

Appeals  lie  from  a  refusal  to 
transfer.  Thornton  v.  Clegg,  24 
Q.  B.  Div.  132;  53  J.  P.  342;  58 
L.  J.  M.  C.  6;  61  L.  T.  562;  38  W. 
R.  100;  Regina  v.  \\'elby,  54  J.  P. 
183. 

83  Regina  v.  West  Riding,  J.  J., 
21  Q.  B.  Div.  258;  52  J.  P.  455; 
57  L.  J.  M.  C.  103;  36  W.  R. 
258;  Stevens  v.  Green,  23  Q.  B. 
Div.  142;  53  J.  P.  423;  58  L.  J.  M. 
C.  167;  61  L.  T.  240;  37  W.  E. 
606. 


§  427  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  710 

discontinued.  In  that  event  the  application  must  be  for  a 
new  license.^*  Where  K,  a  licensed  holder,  abandoned  posses- 
sion, and  at  the  next  general  meeting  of  the  justices  his  land- 
lord asked  for  a  renewal  in  K's  name  or  his  own,  which  was 
refused;  it  was  held  that  P,  a  new  tenant,  who  entered  after 
the  general  meeting,  could  not  apply  for  a  transfer  so  long 
as  the  refusal  formerly  entered  as  to  the  landlord  remained 
unappealed  from  and  unreversed. '''^  But  where  the  first  ap- 
plication was  made  by  a  new  tenant,  and  was  refused,  it  was 
held  that  a  second  new  tenant  could  successfully  apply  and 
was  not  barred  by  the  refusal  of  a  renewal  to  the  first.^^**  An 
off  beer  license  (a  license  to  sell  beer  to  be  consumed  off  the 
premises)  was  granted  in  1S94  to  the  occupier  of  a  grocer's 
shop  upon  condition  that  the  license  should  be  given  up  on 
his  leaving  or  letting  the  shop  to  carry  on  the  grocery  business 
there.  The  occupier  being  about  to  give  up  the  shop  and  to 
cease  to  carry  on  the  grocery  business,  G  applied  to  the  li- 
censing justices  for  the  transfer  of  the  license  to  him.  It 
was  held  that  the  condition  did  not  prevent  the  licensing  jus- 
tices from  entertaining  the  application  for  the  transfer.  "Al- 
though," said  Lord  Alverstone.  "the  condition  was  a  circum- 
stance which  could  be  taken  into  consideration  by  the  jus- 
tices, it  did  not  prevent  them  from  entertaining  the  matter  of 
the  transfer;  it  was  not  a  bar  preventing  the  licensing  jus- 
tices from  granting  the  transfer,  but  only  a  matter  to  be 
taken  into  consideration."^*'    Where  a  house  is  pulled  down 

84Regina  v.  Curzon,  L.  R.  8  Q.  Davis  v.  Evans,  62  J.  P.   120;   77 

B.  400;  42  L.  J.  M.   C.    155;  37  J.  L.  T.  688;  14  T.  L.  R.  163;  Thorn- 

P.    774;    29   L.    T.    32;    21    W.    Pv.  ton   v.   Clegg,  24   Q.   B.   Div.    132; 

886.  53  J.  P.  742;  59  L.  J.  M.  C.  6;, 61 

ssRegina  v.  Xowcastle,  J.  J.,  51  L.  T.  562;   38  W.  R.  160;   Regina 

J.  P.  244.  v.    Powell    [1891],    2    Q.    B.    693; 

85*  Baldwin    v.     Dover,     J.      J.  55  J.  P.  422;  00  L.  J.   Q.  B.  594; 

[1892),    2    Q.    B.    421;    56    J.    P.  05  L.  T.  210;   39  W.    R.    630;   56 

423;    61   L.  J.  M.   C.  215;    Regina  J.     P.     52;      Regina     v.      Thomas 

V.    Upper    Osgoldcross,    53    J.    P.  [1892],  1  Q.  B.  426;  56  J.  P.  151; 

823;    62   L.    T.    112.  66  L.  T.  289;   61  L.  J.  M.  C.  141; 

The      following      eases      involve  40  W.  R.  478. 
questions   of    practice    peculiar    to  86  Oldham,  J.  J.  v.  Gee,  66  J.  P. 

the  P^nglish   practice   in  obtaining  341;   18  T.  L.  R.  348, 
a  renewal   or  transfer  of  licenses. 


711  TRANSFER   OF    LICENSE.  §  427 

for  the  purpose  of  public  improvement,  and  an  application 
is  made  for  a  grant  to  the  person  whose  house  has  been  pulled 
down  of  a  license  in  respect  of  other  fit  and  convenient  prem- 
ises, the  application  must  be  made  by  a  licensed  person  who 
M'as  keeping  the  old  premises  as  an  inn  at  the  time  of  their 
demolition ;  ^^  and  the  house  to  which  it  is  proposed  to  make 
the  transfer  must  be  in  existence  at  the  time.^^  If  there  are 
sufficient  public  houses  in  the  vicinity  to  which  the  transfer 
is  requested,  the  justices,  in  their  discretion,  may  refuse  to 
grant  the  transfer.'*^  In  granting  a  transfer  of  a  license  to 
another  place  the  justices  are  not  bound  by  the  same  condi- 
tions that  they  would  be  if  the  application  was  for  an  original 
license.  In  such  an  instance  they  have  unlimited  jurisdic- 
tion."" A  grant  to  a  proposed  transferee  of  a  license  of  a 
temporary  authority  to  sell  does  not  cancel  the  existing  li- 
cense, and  while  the  license  holder  remains  in  possession  of 
the  premises  he  cannot  be  convicted  of  selling  without  a  li- 
cense.''^ No  transfer  can  be  made  in  instances  not  covered 
by  the  statute.^^  In  Australia  it  is  held  that  it  is  no  ground 
for  a  refusal  to  make  a  transfer  that  the  proposed  transferee 
is  bound  by  his  lease  to  buy  all  his  beer  and  spirituous  liquor 
from  his  landlord."'^  A  license  cannot  be  split  and  transfered 
in  part,  as  where  a  tenant  of  two  adjoining  persons  was 
evicted  and  the  two  separate  owners  sought  each  one-half 
the  license.^*    The  magistrate  in  determining  whether  a  trans- 

srRegina  v.  West  Riding,  J.  J.  C32;   78  L.  T.  468:  46  W.  R.  512, 

[1898],  1  Q.  B.  503;  62  J.  P.  197;  and  Wilson  v.  Crewe,  J.  J.  [1905], 

67  L.  J.  Q.  B.  279;    78  L.  T.  47;  1  K.  B.  491;  74  L.  J.  K.  B.  394;  69 

46  W.  R.  334;   14  T.  L.  R.  89;  M.  J.   P.   HI;    92   L.   T.    104;    53   W. 

&  W.  Dig.  74.  R.  382;  21  T.  L.  R.  233. 

88  James  v.  Nervington.  J.  J.,  64  oi  Andrews  v.  Denton   [1897],  2 
J.  p.  489.  Q.  B.  37;    66  L.  J.  Q.  B.  520;   76 

89  Boodle  V.  Birmingham,  J.  J.,  L.  T.  423;  45  W.  R.  500:  Gl  J.   P. 
45  J.  P.  635.    See  Regina  v.  North-  326. 

umberland,  J.  J.,  43  J.  P.  271.  "2  Regina  v.  Booth,  3  Ont.  144; 

soTraynor  v.  Jonos  [1894].  1  Q.  9   C.   P.   452.      (A   Canadian   stat- 

B.  83;  58  J.  P.  182:  63  L.  J.   M.  ute  involved.) 

C.  31:  o9  L.  T.  862:  42  W.  R.  ^^  Rpo-ipn  v.  Tomploton.  3  Vict. 
201.      See   also   Regina   v.   Oothan  L.  R.  24. 

[1898],  1  Q.  B.  802:  62  J.  P.  435;  ^^  Ex  parte  Slack,  8  Vict.  L.  R. 

14  T.  L.  R.  367;  67  L.   J.   O.  B.       144. 


§  427  TR.VFFIG    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  712 

feree  is  a  proper  person  may  proceed  upon  his  own  knowledge 
of  his  character  and  fitness.^"^  Permission  to  have  more  than 
one  bar  on  the  premises  does  not  pass  with  a  transfer  of  the 
license;  and  to  maintain  more  than  one  the  transferee  must 
obtain  permission  of  the  licensing  board. ^"^  In  New  Zealand 
a  statute  requires  a  conviction  to  be  recorded  on  the  defend- 
ant's license.  A  transferred  all  of  a  license;  and  afterwards 
the  first  holder  was  convicted  of  an  offense  occurring  while 
he  held  the  license ;  but  the  court  held  that  his  conviction  could 
not  be  noted  on  the  license  transferred.''^  In  South  Africa 
one  K,  who  had  a  licensed  hotel  in  Q,  covenanted  to  hand  over 
to  0  on  the  expiration  of  his  tenancy  the  liquor  license  for 
the  premises.  Thereafter  K  entered  into  an  agreement  with 
P  by  which  he  purported  to  sell  him  the  good  "W'ill  of  the 
hotel,  and  O  agreed  to  accept  P  as  a  tenant  in  place  of  K,  but 
was  not  a  party  to  the  sale  by  K  to  P.  Afterward  K  became 
insolvent  and  his  trustee  claimed  the  right  to  retain  the  li- 
cense until  P  had  paid  the  purchase  price,  and  refused  to 
hand  it  over  to  0.  It  was  held  that  he  was  bound  to  hand  the 
license  over  to  O.**^ 

95  Eoc  parte  Slack,  8  Vict.  L.  R.  transfer   of  the   license  before   su- 

144;  In  re  Logan,  22  Austr.  L.  T.  ing  for  the  purchase  money.    It  is 

109;  6  Austr.  L.  R.  253.  sufficient  if  he  is  ready  and  will- 

98  Oliver  v.  Connell,  29  Vict.  L.  ing    to    transfer    it.      Moloney    v. 

R.    329;    25    Austr.    L.    T.    76;    9  Rogers,  3  X.  S.  W.  L.  R.  351. 

Austr.  L.  R.   177.  97  Low   v.    Hutchison,    13   N.    Z. 

On   a    sale   of   a   hotel    and   the  L.  R.  54. 

license  to  retail  liquors,  the  ven-  98  Ohlsson  v.  Kuhi-,  18  Juta  205. 
dor    is    not    bound    to    procure    a 


CHAPTER   XL 
REVOCATION  OF  LICENSE. 


SECTION. 

427  a.  State   may    authorize   a   re- 
vocation. 

428.  Repeal  of  statute. 

429.  Causes      for       revocation  — 

Fraud     in     procuring    li- 
cense. 

430.  License    issued    for    a    pro- 

hibition territory. 

431.  Violation  of  the  law. 

432.  Violation   of    statute   by   li- 

censee's agent  or  servant. 

433.  Upon    conviction    of    an    of- 

fense   against    the    liquor 
laws. 

434.  Violation   of  terms  of  bond. 

435.  Conducting  place  disorderly. 

436.  House  used  as  a  brothel. 

437.  Ordinance    providing    for    a 

revocation. 

438.  New     York      statute— False 

statements. 

439.  False  statements  in  applica- 

tion    under     New     York 
statute. 

440.  Erroneous   statements  as  to 

place  in  application  for  a 
license. 

441.  License    issued    by    mistake. 

442.  The    license    to    be    revoked. 


SECTION. 

443.  Revocation  after  assignment 

for  prior  illegal  acts. 

444.  What   board  or   court    may 

revoke  a  license. 

445.  Mandamus  to  compel  a  revo- 

cation. 

446.  Who  may  commence  proceed- 

ings. 

447.  Who  to  be  made  defendant 

— Assignment    of    license. 

448.  The  petition  for  revocation. 

449.  Joint    proceeding   to    revoke 

several  licenses. 

450.  Notice  of  proceedings  for  re- 

vocation. 

451.  The  answer. 

452.  Trial. 

453.  Dismissal    of    proceedings — 

Expiration  of  license. 

454.  Estoppel  to  revoke. 

455.  Appeal — Certiorari. 

456.  Effect  of  revocation — Stay  of 

proceedings. 

457.  Costs. 

458.  Rebate  of  fees. 

459.  Liability    of    city    for    mis- 

takingly  revoking  license. 

460.  Action  on  bond  when  license 

forfeited. 


Sec.  427a.     State  may  authorize  a  revocation. 

Licenses,  as  we  have  seen,  are  not  contracts;  they  are  only 
permits.    Hence  the  State  may  authorize  their  revocation,  with 
713 


§427a 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


714 


or  without  cause  assigned/  And  a  city,  under  the  general 
licensing  power,  may  provide  by  ordinance  that  if  the  licensee 
violate  the  ordinances,  or  even  the  State  law,  with  reference 
to  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  perhaps  any  other  law, 
the  license  shall  be  forfeited.-  And  so  a  city  may  insert  in 
a  license  certain  conditions  the  violation  of  which  will  work 
its  forfeiture.^  If  a  city  may  revoke  a  license,  of  course  it 
may  revoke  an  order  g-rant^'^^  it  before  the  license  is  issued.* 
It  cannot  be  argued  that  thc^  lir-p^-^pp  has  a  v^nr^p^^v^  in  his 
license,  and  if  it  be  revoked  he  w^'ll  be  deprived  of  his  prop- 
erty and  not  be  able  to  use  p-^<\  cannot  put  his  bar  fixtures 
to  other  use.-"*  A  city  may  adont  an  ordinance  requiring  a 
licensee  before  receiving  his  license  to  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment that  if  he  be  convicted  of  a  violation  of  either  the  ordi- 
nance of  the  city  or  of  a  State  law  he  shall  forfeit  his  license ;  •* 
and  it  may  by  ordinance  revoke  a  license,  although  thereby 
it  creates  a  system  by  special  enactment  contrary  to  the  local 


1  In  re  Livingston,  24  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  51;  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  989; 
Hirn  v.  State,  1  Ohio  St.  15;  Bar- 
nett  V.  Pemiscot  Co.  Ct.,  Ill  Mo. 
App.  (393;  86  S.  W.  575;  Pleuler 
V.  State,  11  Neb.  547;  10  N.  W. 
481;  People  v.  McBride,  234  111. 
146;  84  N.  E.  865;  Commonwealth 
V.  Jones,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  611; 
Spraberry  v.  Atlanta,  87  Ga.  120; 
13  S.  E.  197;  Brown  v.  State,  82 
Ga.  224;  7  S.  E.  915;  Martin  v. 
State,  23  Neb.  371;  36  N.  W.  554; 
Fell  V.  State,  42  Md.  71;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Brennan,  103  Mass. 
70;  Calder  v.  Kurby,  5  Gray  597; 
People  V.  Brooklyn  Police.  59  N. 
Y.  92;  Borck  v.  State  (Ala.),  39 
So.  580;  Sarin  v.  Pulaski  Co.,  76 
Ark.  336;  88  S.  W.  953;  McCorkie 
V.  Remley.  119  Iowa  512;  93  N. 
W.  505:  CroiK  v.  Fairfield  Co.,  50 
Conn.  321;  47  Am.  Rep.  648; 
Krueger  v.  Colville,  49  Wash.  295 ; 
95  Pac.  81. 


2  Ottumwa  V.  Schaub,  52  Iowa 
515;  3  N.  W.  529;  Hoboken  v. 
Goodman,  68  N.  J.  L.  217;  51 
Atl.  1092;  Carbondale  v.  Wade, 
106  111.  App.  654;  Wallace  v. 
Reno,  27  Nev.  71;  73  Pac.  528; 
Anderson  v.  Galesburg,  118  III. 
App.  i525;  Campbell  v.  Thoms- 
ville   (Ga.),  64  'S.  E.  815. 

3  Huber  v.  Baugh,  43  Iowa  514; 
Cox  V.  Jackson,  152  Mich.  630; 
116  N.  W.  456;  Malken  v.  Chi- 
cago, 217  111.  471;  75  N.  E.  548; 
affirming  119  111.  App.  542. 

4  Sights  V.  Yarnells,  12  Gratt. 
292;  Hagan  v.  Boonton,  62  N.  J. 
L.  150;  40  Atl.  688;  Ex  parte 
Vaccarezza,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  311; 
106  S.  W.  392.  See  Varnaman  v. 
Adams,  74  N.  J.  L.  125;  65  Atl. 
204. 

^  Graziano  v.  New  Orleans,  121 
La.  440;   46  So.  566. 

6  Cox  V.  Jackson,  152  Mich.  630; 
116  N.  W.  456. 


715  REVOCATION  OF  LICENSE.  §  -128 

option  law.''  In  the  absence  of  charter  or  statutory  restric- 
tions, a  city  may  revoke  a  license  at  any  time  without  in- 
curring a  liability  for  damages,  even  though  there  be  no  cause 
for  the  revocation;^  and  an  authority  to  issue  a  license  is  a 
grant  of  power,  for  good  cause,  to  revoke  it.^  In  Ontario  it 
is  held  that  if  a  license  has  been  granted,  though  not  issued, 
the  grant  cannot  be  revoked  in  order  to  give  it  to  another.^" 
A  statute  may  provide  that  a  license  may  be  annulled  upon 
the  petition  of  a  certain  specified  number  of  hou^e  holders 
living  near  the  licensed  premises."  A  statute  is  not  invalid 
because  it  provides  for  a  revocation  without  a  return  of  the 
license  fee  or  any  part  of  it.^-  If  a  city  may  revoke  a  license 
at  its  pleasure,  yet  if  the  resolution  for  a  revocation  shows 
it  was  not  passed  in  pursuance  of  that  power,  but  under  an 
ordinance  declaring  a  given  act  to  be  a  sufficient  cause  for  a 
revocation,  its  action  will  be  erroneous.^^^  A  license  may  be 
revoked  because  of  an  offense  the  licensee  had  committed  be- 
fore it  was  issued ;  '^  and  the  fact  that  a  criminal  proceeding 
is  pending  against  a  licensee  for  a  violation  of  the  liquor 
laws  is  no  bar  to  a  proceeding  to  revoke  his  license.^"^ 

Sec.  428.     Repeal  of  statute. 

A  repeal  of  the  law  authorizing  the  grant  of  a  license  has 
the  effect  to  at  once  annul  all  licenses  issued  under  it,  unless 
it  have  a    saving  clause.^"     While  the  repeal  of  the  existing 

7  McGehee     .  State,  114  Ga.  833;  i3  Carr  v.  Augusta,  124  Ga.  116; 

40  S.  E.  1004.  52  S.  E.  300. 

sisan  V.  Griffin,  98  Ga.  623;  25  i*  Cherry  v.   Commonwealth,   78 

S.   E.   611.  Va.  375. 

sHevren  v.  Reed,  120  Cal.  210;  is  Lacroix    v.    Fairfield    County, 

58  Pac.  536.  50  Conn.  321;   47  Am.  Rep.  648. 

10  Haslem    v.    Schnarr,    30    Out.  An  individual  in  his  private  ca- 

89,  not  following  Leeson  v.  Board.  pacity  cannot  insist  on  a  forfeit- 

19   Ont.   67.  "i'^-     I>«f>"   Mercantile   Co.  v.   An- 

iiCrothers  V.  Monteith,  11  Man-  derson    (Tex.),   121    S.  W.  868. 

itoba  373;  Young  v.  Bhxisdell,  138  i6  Pleuler  v.  State,  11  Neb.  547; 

Mass.  344.  '^^  ^-   W.   481;    Commonwealth  v. 

i2Krue,?er  v.  Colville,  49  Wash.  Jones,    10   Pa.    Co.    Ct.   Rep.   611: 

295;    95   Pac.   81;    Ex  parte  Vac-  Menken  v.  Atlanta,  78  Ga.  60S;   2 

care'zza,  52  Tex.  Cr."  App.  105;   105  R.  E.  559.     See  Regina  v.  Stafford, 

S.  W.   1119.  22  C.  P.  177. 


§  429  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  716 

law  may  be  by  implication/'^  yet  the  courts  will  not  hold  that 
a  repeal  was  effected  unless  it  clearly  so  appears  in  the  en- 
actment of  the  later  actJ^  On  the  adoption  of  a  constitu- 
tional provision  prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquor,  all  existing 
licenses  are  at  once  revoked/^  And  the  same  is  true  on  the 
adoption  of  local  option  prohibition.-" 


Sec.  429.  Causes  for  revocation — Fraud  in  procuring'  license. 
The  right  to  revoke  a  license  can  only  be  done  for  the 
cause  and  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  statute.^^  But  if  a 
license  has  been  obtained  by  fraud,  or  the  consent  of  certain 
neighbors  had  been  procured  by  fraud,  then  a  statute  author- 
izing its  revocation  is  not  necessary;  and  it  is  not  necessary 
to  proceed  in  accordance  with  a  statute  providing  for  the 
revocation  of  a  license.--  Where  a  statute  provided  that  ap- 
plication for  a  license  might  be  refused  only  for  good  cause, 
in  the  discretion  of  the  city  council,  a  subsequent  statute 
providing  that  the  council  may  revoke  a  license  "whenever 
in  the  judgment  of  the  city  council  such  action  may  be  nec- 
essary" to  good  order  does  not  authorize  an  arbitrary  revo- 
cation.^^ If  it  is  sought  to  enjoin  a  city  council  from  revoking 
a  license  issued  under  an  ordinance,  it  must  be  shown  that  the 
council  had  no  power  to  revoke  it,  as  otherwise  it  will  be 
presumed  it  had.^"* 

i'' Commonwealth    v.    Jones,    10  affirming  40  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  46; 

Pa.   Co.  Ct.  Rep.  Gil.  57    N.    Y.    Supp.    634;    People    v. 

isHirn  v.  State,   1   Ohio  St.   15.  Woodman,    15   Daly   136;   3   N.   Y. 

19  Prohibitory      Amendment  Supp.  926. 

Cases,     24     Kan.     700;     State     v.  22  State  v.  Schroflf,  123  Wis.  98; 

Tonks,  15  R.  I.  385;  5  Atl.  636.  100    N.    W.    1030.      See    Lantz    v. 

20  Robertson  v.  State,  12  Tex.  Hightstown,  46  N.  J.  L.  102; 
App.  541;  State  v.  Cooke,  24  Decker  v.  Board,  57  N.  J.  L.  003 ; 
Minn.  247;   31  Am.  Rep.  344;   Ex  31  Atl.  235. 

parte  Lynn,  19  Tex.  App.  293;   Ex  23  Pehrson  v.  Ephraim,  14  Utah 

parte  Vaccarezza,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  147:   46  Pac.  657. 

3,'}2;   100  S.  W.  392.     See  §430.  24  Hevren  v.  Reed,  126  Cal.  219; 

21  Lvman    v.    Malcom    Brewing  58  Pac.  536. 
Co.,  160  N.  Y.  96;   55  N.  E.  577, 


717  REVOCATION    OF   LICENSE.  §§430,431 

Sec.  430.   License    issued  for  a  prohibition  territory. 

A  license  issued,  in  the  district  for  which  it  is  granted,  when 
by  local  option  the  sale  of  liquors  has  been  prohibited  may  be 
revoked.-^ 

Sec.  431.    Violation  of  the  law. 

Statutes  are  sometimes  so  broad  as  to  call  for  a  cancellation 
of  a  license  if  the  holder  shall  have  violated  any  criminal 
law  of  the  State  during  the  period  for  which  it  was  issued; 
but  this  is  rare,  the  right  to  cancel  being  limited  to  certain 
offenses.  But  usually  the  right  to  cancel  a  license  is  limited, 
under  this  head,  to  a  violation  of  the  liquor  laws ;  and  the 
cancellation  may  take  effect,  unless  the  statute  otherwise  pro- 
vides, whether  the  licensee  has  been  convicted  or  not.  The 
offence  authorizing  a  cancellation  must,  however,  be  one  of 
those  for  which  the  statute  authorizes  a  cancellation,  and  not 
one  against  the  liquor  law  generally,  unless  the  statute  is 
broad  enough  to  cover  the  instance.  This  is  very  well  illus- 
trated by  a  New  York  case.  In  that  State  a  liquor  tax  cer- 
tificate could  be  issued  for  the  sale  of  liquors  to  be  con- 
sumed on  the  premises,  and  another  for  sales  not  to  be  there 
consumed  under  subdivisions  one  and  two  of  section  II  of  the 
liquor  laws.  To  sell  liquors  without  a  certificate  was  illegal 
under  section  31  Subdivision  2  of  section  34,  provided  that 
anyone  selling  liquor  in  violation  of  sections  11  or  31  should 
be  punished  and  forfeit  his  license,  but  also  provided  that  its 
provisions  should  not  apply  to  violations  of  section  31,  which 
prescribed  a  punishment  for  its  violation  in  its  first  subdivision. 
The  first  subdivision  of  section  34  inflicted  a  fine  and  im- 
prisonment on  anyone  selling  without  first  procuring  a  proper 
tax  certificate.  Under  these  several  provisions  it  was  held 
that  a  tax  certificate  could  not  be  revoked  for  a  sale  of  liquors 
to  be  consumed  on  the  premises.^*'  Unless  the  evidence  be  clear 
that  the  licensee  has  violated  the  law,  a  revocation  of  his  li- 
cense for  that  cause  will  not  be  ordered."     Sales  to  minors 

25McIntyre  v.  Asheville  (S.  C),  27 /n  re  Matey,  0  Kulp  215;  Ap- 

59  S.  E.   1007.     See  cases  in  note       peal    of   Moyer,    8    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 
20.  Rep.  475;  43  W.  N.  C.  100. 

26 /n  re  Lyman,  27  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Eep.  327 ;  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  888. 


§431 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


718 


may  be  sufficient  to  authorize  a  revocation  of  the  license,-^ 
or  other  illegal  sales.-^  If  the  applicant  was  not  entitled  to 
receive  a  tax  certificate,  sales  by  him  are  illegal;  but  a  pre- 
vious conviction  of  a  violation  of  the  statute  is  not  necessary 
to  a  revocation  of  his  certificate.'"  A  statute  may  provide 
for  a  revocation  of  a  city  license  for  a  failure  of  the  licensee 
to  obey  an  ordinance  of  the  city.^^  A  statute  requiring  a 
license  to  be  revoked  upon  three  convictions  for  offenses  com- 
mitted, does  not  require  the  offenses  to  have  been  committed 
within  the  licensing  year."-  Provisions  in  one  section  of  a 
statute  providing  that  a  licensee  violating  the  liquor  law  may 
be  punished  by  having  his  license  forfeited  are  not  inconsis- 


28  Appeal  of  Mover,  svpra;  In 
re  Gordon,  16  Montg.  Co.  Law 
Rep.  25;  In  re  Tieriiey,  11  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  Rep.  406;  Lewis  v.  Common- 
wealth,    (Ky.).    121     S.    W.    643. 

29Voight  V.  Board,  59  N.  J.  L. 
358;  36  Atl.  686;  In  re  Lyman, 
62  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  616;  70  N.  Y. 
Supp.  822;  Clement  v.  Martin,  117 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  5;  102  N.  Y. 
Supp.  37;  In  re  McLaughlin,  24 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  92 ;  hi  re  Arnold. 
30  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  93;  In  re  Cul- 
linan,  45  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  497; 
92  N.  Y.  Sup.  802;  90  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  607;  86  N.  Y.  Supp.  1046; 
Parrent  v.  Little,  72  N.  H.  506; 
58  Atl.  510;  Lyman  v.  Young 
Men's,  etc.  Club,  28  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  127;  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  977; 
Board  V,  Mayr,  31  Colo.  173;  74 
Pac.  458;  State  v.  Corron,  73  N. 
H.  434;  62  Atl.  1094;  Carr  v.  Au- 
gusta, 124  Ga.  116;  52  S.  E.  300; 
State  V.  Seebokl,  192  Mo.  720;  91 
S.  W.  491;  Belt  v.  Paul,  77  Ark. 
211;  91  S.  W.  301;  State  v.  Os- 
kosh  (Wis.),  70  N.  W.  300;  Ap- 
peal of  Meenan,  11  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  579;  Anderson  v.  Galesburg, 
118  111.  App.  525. 


A  sale  on  Sunday  is  cause  suf- 
ficient for  the  revocation  of  the 
license,  /n  re  Clement,  59  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  367;  112  N.  Y.  Supp. 
r2{3. 

so  In  re  Halbran,  30  X.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  515;  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  1024; 
Lacroix  v.  Fairfield  County,  50 
Conn.  321;  47  Am.  Rep.  048. 

31  State  v.  Curtis,  136  Wis.  357; 
110  N.  W.  189.  In  this  case  sec- 
tion one  of  a  statute  authorized 
any  member  of  the  city  to  give  an 
order  forbidding  the  sale  of  liquor 
to  spendthrifts;  section  two  pro- 
vided for  a  revocation  of  a  license 
for  failure  to  observe  "any  order" 
of  tlie  aldermen  made  pursuant  to 
law;  section  three  required  a  bond 
of  a  licensee  conditioned  that  he 
would  "obey  all  orders  of  such  al- 
dermen or  any  of  them  made  pur- 
suant to  law."  It  was  held  that 
an  ordinance  requiring  saloons  to 
be  closed  during  certain  hours  of 
the  day  was  an  order  within  the 
meaning  of  section  two.  State  v. 
Curtis,  136  Wis.  357;  110  N.  W. 
189. 

?.2Rex  V.  Wexford,  J.  J.  [1904], 
2  Irish  Rep.  251. 


719  REVOCATION   OF   LICENSE.  §  431 

tent  with  a  provision  in  another  section  authorizing  the  li- 
censing board  to  revoke  the  license  for  the  same  violation  of 
the  statute,  since  the  licensee  may  be  brought  before  the  court 
and  punished  where  no  revocation  of  the  license  has  been 
made.^^  But  a  license  issued  after  a  conviction  of  a  sale  of 
liquors  without  a  license  cannot  be  revoked  because  of  such 
conviction.^*  A  failure  to  keep  the  bar  of  a  saloon  exposed, 
as  a  statute  requires,  is  sufficient  to  authorize  a  revocation 
of  the  proprietor's  license.-''^  Under  the  New  York  statute 
a  licensed  hotel  proprietor  may  serve  his  guests  with  drinks  at 
their  meals ;  and  if  he  does  so  in  good  faith  his  license  cannot 
be  revoked ;  for  he  has  committed  no  offense.^"  Permitting 
gambling  on  the  premises  is  a  sufficient  cause  for  a  revocation 
of  a  license,^^  but  the  gambling  must  take  place  with  the 
permission  or  connivance  of  the  licensee.  Thus,  a  licensee 
as  tenant  occupied  a  room  adjacent  to  a  billiard  hall,  with 
a  door  between  them,  usually  open;  and  at  times  billiard 
players  ordered  drinks  from  his  bar.  The  proprietor  of  the 
billiard  hall  installed  a  slot  machine  in  his  room,  concerning 
which  the  licensee  protested,  and  there  was  no  evidence  of 
fraud.  It  was  held  that  the  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to 
authorize  a  revocation  of  his  license,  on  the  charge  that  he 
permitted  gambling  to  be  carried  on  upon  his  premises.^* 
When  a  statute  requires  a  saloon  door  to  be  closed  on  Sun- 
day, and  no  one  shall  be  permitted  to  pass  through  the  door 
except  the  proprietor,  members  of  his  family  or  his  servants, 
the  licensee  cannot  justify  his  conduct  in  keeping  the  door 
open  so  that  customers  may  pass  through  the  door  and  reach 
his  restaurant  situated  in  the  barroom ;  and  for  such  con- 
duct his  license  may  be  revoked. '"^^  Where  a  license  could  be 
revoked  because  of  a  sale  or  gift  of  liquor  "to  a  person  of 

33  Parrent  v.  Little,  72  N.  H.  37  Brockway  v.  State,  36  Ark. 
566;   58  Atl.  510.  629. 

34  People  V.  Clement,  58  N.  Y.  38 /„  re  Clement,  190  N.  Y.  523; 
Misc.  Rep.  631;  111  N.  Y.  Supp.  83  N.  E.  1123;  affirming  119  N. 
1033.  Y.  Div.  622;    104  N.  Y.  Supp.  25. 

35  Cuirczak  v.  Keron  (N.  J.  L.),  ss  in  re  Cullinan,  68  N.  Y.  App. 
70  Atl.  366.  Div.   119;   74  N.  Y.  Supp.  182. 

36  In  re  Cullinan,  75  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  301;  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  118. 


§  431  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    IJQUORS.  720 

known  intemperate  habits,"  it  was  held  that  it  was  not  nec- 
essary to  show  that  the  licensee  knew  of  the  intemperate 
habits  of  the  person  to  whom  he  furnished  the  liquor.'*"  And 
the  same  was  held  true  of  a  sale  to  a  minor.'*^  So  under  a  pro- 
vision authorizing  a  revocation  if  certain  "disreputable  per- 
sons" visit  the  premises,  it  is  no  defense  that  they  behaved 
decently  when  they  made  their  visit.'*-  A  license  may  be  re- 
voked for  a  sale  off  the  premises,  in  violation  of  the  law."*^ 
"Where  a  statute  provides  for  a  revocation  in  case  the  licensee 
violates  its  provisions,  a  previous  conviction  of  such  violation 
is  not  necessary  to  authorize  a  revocation.^*  If  a  licensee  runs 
two  places  of  business  under  a  license  w^hich  is  for  only  one 
of  them,  his  license  may  be  revoked.*^  But  the  temporary 
closing  of  the  place  licensed  and  the  running  of  it  at  another 
place  without  transfer  of  the  license,  has  been  held  in  Texas 
not  to  furnish  sufficient  grounds  for  revocation  of  the  license.*® 
A  license  may  be  revoked  for  a  violation  of  the  law  even 
though  an  appeal  has  been  taken  from  the  judgment  of  con- 
viction.*^ If  one  of  two  licensed  partners  sell  liquors  to  a 
minor,  the  license  may  be  revoked  as  to  both  of  them.'*^  A 
violation  of  the  screen  law  is  sufficient  to  justify  a  revocation 
of  a  license.*®  An  agreement  between  a  non-resident  and  a 
resident  that  the  latter  should  get  the  license  in  his  name  but 
the  former  should  conduct  the  business,  is  sufficient  cause  for 
revoking  the  license  because  it  is  an  evasion  of  the  statute 
requiring  licensees  to  be  residents.*"* 

40  7n  re  Garey,   11  Pa.  Co.  Rep.  Fairfield    County,    50    Conn.    321; 

4-68.  47  Am.  Rep.  648. 

41 7n   re    Eick,    17    Pa.    Co.    Ct.  « Malkan    v.    Chicago,    217    111. 

Rep.  50;  4  Pa.  Dist.  R.  461.  471;   75  N.  E.  548;   affirming   119 

42  Commonwealth  v.  Simmons.  4  III.  App.  542. 

Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  35.  46  Mcleod  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Civ. 

43  Commonwealth     v.     Joseph       App.  170;  76  S.  W.  216. 

Kohlne  Brewing  Co.,  1  Pa.  Super.  47  Harrison    v.    People,    124    111. 

Ct.   627.  App.  519. 

44  Miles  V.   State,   53  Neb.   305;  48  Lewis      v.      Commonwealth 
73    N.    W.    678;    Krueger    v.    Col-  (Ky.),   121   S.  W.  643. 

ville,  49  Wash.   295;    95  Pac.  81;  49 /n  re  Chapman    (N.  Y.),   119 

State  V.  Seebold,  192  Mo.  720;   91  N.  Y.  Supp.  352. 

S.    W.    491;    Board    v.    Mayr,    31  49*  J^on   ^Mercantile   Co.   v.    An- 

C!olo.  173;  74  Pac.  458;  Lacroix  v.  derson   (Tex.),  121  S.  W.  868. 


721  REVOCATION   OF   LICENSE.  §§  432,  433 

Sec.  432.    Violation  of  statute  by  licensee 's  agent  or  servant. 

A  statute  requiring  a  revocation  of  a  license  for  a  violation 
of  the  liquor  law  by  the  licensee  applies  to  a  violation  by  his 
agent  or  servant.  Thus  a  holder  of  a  tax  certificate  assigned 
it  as  security  to  a  brewing  company,  which  the  law  permit- 
ted, to  secure  a.  debt ;  and  the  company  removed  it  from  the 
saloon  licensed.  A  statute  required  its  exposure  to  the  public 
view  in  the  place  licensed.  Thereafter  the  brother  of  the 
licensee,  who  was  his  general  manager,  sold  liquors  in  his 
absence.  It  was  held  that  the  liquor  tax  certificate  must  be 
cancelled.'^*'  It  is  no  defense  that  the  licensee's  bartender 
made  illegal  sales  contrary  to  his  orders  w^hen  the  statute  pro- 
vides that  he  must  see  that  his  bartender  or  agent  committed 
no  violations  of  its  provisions. ^^  And  so  where  a  licensee  per- 
mitted a  boy,  having  charge  of  a  lunch  room,  free  access  to 
his  bar  from  which  he  obtains  liquors  to  serve  customers  of 
the  lunch  room ;  and  he  serves  minors  with  liquors,  his  license 
may  be  revoked.^-  But  where  a  licensee's  agent,  or  one 
whom  a  licensee  permits  to  do  businees  under  his  license  at 
the  place  designated  therein,  engages  in  unlawful  sales  of  his 
own  elsewhere,  the  license  cannot  be  revoked;  for  his  act  is 
not  the  act  of  the  licensee.^^  If  one  of  two  partners  violates 
the  liquor  laws,  the  license  may  be  revoked  as  to  both  of 
them." 

Sec.  433.    Upon  conviction  of  an  offense  against  the  liquor 
laws. 

It  is  a  common  provision  of  the  statutes  relating  to  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  that  a  conviction  of  the  licensee 

50  In  re  Mitchell,  41  N.  Y.  App.  Montg.   Co.   Law  Rep.   25;    People 

Div.  271;   58  N.  Y.  Supp.  632;  In  v.  Woodman,  15  Daly  136;  3  N.  Y. 

re   CuUinan,    88   N.   Y.   App.   Div.  Supp.  926. 

6;  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  492;  In  re  Ly-  ^^  In  re  Moyer,   20   Pa.   Co.   Ct. 

man,  29  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  524;  61  Rep.  663. 

N.  Y.   Supp.  946 ;   People  v.  Mey-  ss  Lyman  v.  Malcom  Brewing  Co. 

ers,  95  N.  Y.  223.  160  N.   Y.   96;    54   N.   E.   577;   55 

51 /»  re  Cullinan,  85  N.  Y.  App.  N.  E.  408;  affirming  40  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  620,  621;   83  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  Div.  46;  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  634. 

643;  82  N.  Y.  Sup.  1098,  affirming  54  Lewis      v.      Commonwealth 

39   N.   Y.   Misc.   Rep.   636;    80  N.  (Ky.),  121  S.  W.  643. 
Y.  Supp.    607;    In  re   Gordon,    16 


§  433  TR.VFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  722 

of  having  violated  their  provisions,  or  the  provisions  of  any 
other  similar  statute,  shall  work  a  revocation  of  the  defend- 
ant's license.  Where  under  a  statute  providing  that  a 
conviction"  of  a  "violation"  of  the  liquor  laws  should 
"of  itself,  make  the  license  of  said  person  void,"  it  was 
held  that  a  final  judgment,  conclusively  establishing  the 
guilt  of  the  offender,  was  necessary  to  satisfy  the  provisions 
of  the  statute,  and  that  a  verdict  of  a  jury,  unsupported  by 
a  judgment  was  not  a  "eonvir'tion"  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute.^"  A  statute  providiTT^  th-^t  upon  a  conviction  of 
having  violated  the  liquor  laAvs  the  license  of  the  defendant 
shall  ipso  facto  be  revoked  and  annulled  does  not  supersede 
another  statute  providing  for  the  revocation  and  annulling 
of  a  license  when  a  conviction  has  beeu  obtained  for  a  pen- 
alty or  upon  a  bond  under  another  statute.^®  A  statute  pro- 
viding that  on  conviction  of  a  licensee  his  license  shall  be 
forfeited  applies  to  a  city  license  in  a  prosecution  for  having 
violated  a  State  tax  liquor  law.^'^  In  some  instances  statutes 
are  in  force  wdiich  provide  ipso  facto  for  a  revocation  of  a 
license  upon  conviction  of  the  liquor  laws,  and  when  that  is 
the  case  a  conviction  of  such  a  violation  works  a  forfeiture 
of  the  license  at  once.^^  In  cases  of  a  conviction  for  a  second 
offense  the  offenses  must  be  against  the  liquor  laws,  and  usually 
a  second  offense  against  the  act  providing  for  the  forfeiture, 
and  not  an  offense  against  another  liquor  law.^^ 

55  Commonwealth  v.  Kiley,  150  quired  number  of  persons  with  the 
Mass.  325;  23  N.  E.  55;  Sullivan  county  auditor  of  a  verified  peti- 
V.  Borden,  163  Mass.  470;  40  N.  tion  for  the  removal  of  the  saloon 
E.  859.  See  White  v.  Creamer,  id  a  bar  to  prosecution^;,  for  viola- 
175  Mass.  567 ;  56  N.  E.  832.  tion  of  the  liquor  law  ipso  facto  re- 

56  People  v.  Tighe,  5  Hun  25.  moved  the  bar.     McConkie  v.  Rem- 

57  State  V.  Horton,  21   Ore.   83;  ley    (Iowa),  93  N.  VV.  505. 

27  Pac.  165.  In  Missouri  under  a  statute  pre- 
ss People    V.    Meyers,    95    X.    Y.  viding  that  on  a  second  conviction 
223;   Ballentine  v.   State,   48  Ark.  a  judgment  must  be  entered  can- 
45;  2  S.  W.  340.  oellincr  t^^e  defendant's  license,  the 
69  In  re  Anthers,  22  Q.  B.  Div.  first  conviction  must  be  charged  in 
345;    53    J.    P.    116;    58   L.    J.   M.  the    indictment.      Stn[.     v.    Watts, 
C.  62;  37  W.  R.  320;  60  L.  T.  454.  101   Mo.  App.  f?fifir   74   S.  W.  376. 
In  Iowa  (in  1903)  under  §2451  A    finding    of    guilty,    not    fol- 
of  the  Code  the  filing  by  the  re-  lowed  by   a   judgment,   but  by  a 


723  REVOCATION    OF    LICENSE.  §§434,435 

Sec.  434.    Violation  of  terms  of  bond. 

Wliere  a  license  court  may  require  conditions  to  be  inserted 
in  the  bond  the  licensee  must  give,  his  license  may  be  revoked 
if  he  violates  any  of  the  conditions/'*'  But  a  statute  author- 
izing a  licensing  board  to  revoke  a  license  whenever  it  shall 
appear  to  its  s?itit;fap+ion  thot  any  conditions  of  the  bond 
have  been  violated"  does  not  give  it  arbitrary  power  to  re- 
voke the  license,  but  only  for  good  cause  sho\^^^.®^  If  the  li- 
censee agree  that  his  license  may  be  revoked  for  sales  on 
Sunday,  and  he  sells  liquor  on  that  day  in  violation  of  the 
agreement,  he  cannot  complain  if  it  be  revoked  for  that 
reason. *'- 

Sec.  435.     Conducting  place  disorderly. 

Statutes  are  in  force  providing  that  if  the  licensee  conduct 
his  business  at  the  licensed  place  in  a  disorderly  manner  his 
license  may  be  revoked.  Under  such  a  statute  where  a  licensed 
hotel  keeper  (who  could  sell  linuors)  maintained  a  concert 
garden  in  connection  with  his  hotel  in  a  disorderly  manner  by 
permitting  drunken  and  disorderlv  persons  to  there  congregate 
and  disturb  the  neighborhood,  his  license  may  be  revoked,  be- 
cause his  business  was  illegally  conducted.®^  Such  is  the  case 
where  a  proprietor  permits  women  of  bad  repute  to  visit  his 
place  of  business.®*  A  single  sale  to  two  minors  cannot  be 
construed  to  constitute  the  house  a  disorderly  one;*^  but  per- 
mitting soldiers  to  sing  and  dance  at  the  licensed  place,  thus 

suspension   of   sentence,   is   a   con-  C2  Belt  v.  Paul,  77  Ark.  211;  91 

viction  within  the  meaning  of  the  S.  W.  301. 

law    that    a    license    shall    not   be  63  in  re  Gordon,    10  Montg.  Co. 

issued  to  a  person  convicted  of  a  Law  Rep.   25;   In  re  Mcljaughlin, 

violation    of   the    liquor   law,   and  24  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  92;  State  v.  Kirk, 

such  a  person  is  a  person  not  "au-  112  Mo.  App.  447;   86  S.  W.  Rep. 

thorized  to   sell  liquors  under  the  1099. 

provisions"    of    the    statute.      H.  64  Jn  re  Gerver,  7  North  Co.  R. 

Koehler  &  Co.  V.  Clement  (N.  Y.),  (Pa.)    382;   State  v.   Barnett,   111 

111    N.    Y.   Supp.    151.  Mo.  App.  552;  86  S.  W.  460;  In  re 

^0  In  re  Gerstlauer,  5  Pa.  Dist.  •Clement,  58  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  257; 

Rep.  97.  110  N.  Y.   Supp.  893. 

81  State  v.  Dwyer,  21  Minn.  512.  cr,  state  v.  Lichta,  130  Mo.  App. 

284;    109  S.  W.  825. 


§  436  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  724 

attracting  a  crowd  which  fills  the  room  and  obstructs  the 
sidewalk,  resulting  in  sales  to  minors  and  intoxicated  per- 
sons, renders  a  place  a  disorderly  house.''" 

Sec.  436.    House  used  as  a  brothel. 

Some  statutes  require  a  forfeiture  of  a  license  where  the 
licensee  permits  or  uses  the  licensed  premises  as  a  brothel, 
either  with  or  without  a  conviction  for  that  offense.  Thus,  the 
English  statute  of  1872  provides  that  "if  any  licensed  per- 
son is  convicted  of  permitting  his  premises  to  be  a  brothel, 
he  shall  be  liable  to  a  penalty  not  exceeding  twenty  pounds, 
and  shall  forfeit  his  license,  and  he  shall  be  disqualified  for- 
ever from  holding  any  license  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors. "  ^'^  To  convict  a  licensee  of  keeping  a  brothel  it  is 
not  material  there  was  no  outward  sign  of  indecency,"^  or 
that  there  was  no  actual  disorderly  conduct.^^  A  brothel  is 
the  same  thing  as  a  "bawdy  house;"  and  is  a  house  or  place 
resorted  to  by  persons  of  both  sexes  for  the  purpose  of  pros- 
titution. But  where  a  woman  kept  a  house  to  which  men 
resorted  for  the  purposes  of  fornication  with  her,  it  was  held 
that  she  could  not  be  convicted  of  having  kept  a  brothel,  no 
other  woman  coming  there  for  the  purpose  of  prostitution.'^'' 
Permitting  the  licensed  premises  to  be  used  once  for  the 
purposes  of  prostitution  is  some  evidence  to  support  the  charge 
of  permitting  the  premises  to  be  used  as  a  brothel  ;^^  but  per- 
mitting them  to  be  used  on  the  26th,  28th,  29th  and  31st  of 

66  Commonwealth  v.  Elliott,  1  J.  P.  119;  72  L.  T.  236;  43  W.  R. 
Xack.  Leg.  N.  140;   16  Pa.  Co.  Ct.       426;    18  Cox  C.  C.  79. 

Rep.  122;   4  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  89.  The   landlord   of   the   tenant   li- 

67  35  and  36  Vict.  c.  94  §  15;  censee  cannot  be  convicted  of  keep- 
Patterson's  Licensing  Acts  ( 19th  ing  a  brothel  when  the  licensee  so 
Ed. ) ,  p.  372.  kept  the  place  rented.     Regina  v. 

68Regina  v.  Rice,  L.  R.   1  C.  C.  Stannard,  1  L.  &  C.  349;  33  L.  J, 

R.  21;  35  L.  J.  M.  C.  93;   13  L.  T.  M.  C.  61;   9  L.  T.  428;    12  W.  R. 

382;    14  W.  R.  56.  208;    28  J.  P.  20;    Regina  v.  Bar- 

69  Greig  v.  Bendeno,  E.  B.  &  E.  rett,  1  L.  &  C.  263 ;  32  L.  J.  M.  C. 
133;    27  L.  J.  M.  C.  294.  36;  7  L.  T.  435;   11  W.  R.  124. 

70  Singleton  v.  Ellison  [1895],  1  ^i  Regina    v.   Holland   J.    J.,    46 
Q.  B.  607;   64  L.  J,  M.  C.  123;   59  J.    P.    312.      See    Webb   v.    Catch- 
love,  50  J.  P.  795. 


725  REVOCATION   OP   LICENSE.  §  436 

one  month   and   on   the   1st,   4th,   5th   and   6th   of   the   fol- 
lowing month  is  only  one  continuing  offense,  notwithstanding 
the   days   are   not   consecutive."     It   is  sometimes   made   an 
offense  to  permit  prostitutes  to  visit  a  saloon  and  a  cause  for 
a  revocation  of  the  keeper's  license.     The  element  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  character  of  such  persons  is  essential,  as  a  rule, 
to  render  the  licensee  guilty  of  an  offense  and  consequently 
of  a  liability  to  have  his  license  revoked.     Thus,  where  it  was 
made  an  offense  for  ' '  any  licensed  person  knowingly ' '  to  per- 
mit his  premises  "to  be  the  habitual  resort  or  place  of  meeting 
of  reputed  prostitutes,"  and  he  should,  on  conviction,  be  fined, 
it  was  held  that  the  word  "knowingly"  applied  to  the  char- 
acter of  the  persons  who  were  permitted  to  resort  to  the  prem- 
ises; and  it  was  said  that  this  word  was  necessary,  because  if 
that,  or  some  similar  word,  were  not  used  it  mieht  be  con- 
tended that  if  women  were  knowingly  permitted  to  resort  to 
the  premises,  it  would  be  no  defense  that  it  was  not  knoA\Ti 
they  were  reputed  prostitutes.'^-^     Under  the  statute  just  re- 
ferred to,  "in  order  to  prove  the  offense  it  must  be  shown: 
(1)     That    the    licensed    person,    or    at    least    his    manager, 
knew   the   women    were   reputed    prostitutes,    and   the    court 
inquires  into  the  grounds  of  belief  of  witnesses  as  to  the  evil 
reputation;   (2)  that  he  allowed  them  to  remain  longer  than 
necessary  for  reasonable  refreshment,  which  is  partly  a  mat- 
ter of  arithmetic,  the  nature  of  the  meal  or  refroshment  being 
generally  the   best  materials   for   showing  whether  they  re- 
mained longer  than  was  necessary  for  its  consumption.     Ac- 
cordingly, where  a  woman  of  this  unfortunate  class  was  found 
on  licensed  premises  by  a  police  constable,   and   the  woman 
immediately  left  on  being  spoken  to  bv  the  publican  as  soon 
as  the  constable  entered,  it  M^as  held  that  this  was  not  enough 
to  sustain  a  conviction. '^^     Tn  this  case  there  was  no  evidence 
as  to  whether  the  woman  had  gone  to  the  house  for  the  pur- 

■r^  Ex  parte  Burnhy  [1901],  2  K.  M.  C.   126;    70  L.  T.   452:    42  W. 

B.    458;    70   L.    J.   K.    B.    730;    S.')  K.  .309. 
L.  T.   16S.  74  Citing  Miller  v.  Dudley  J.  J., 

73  Somerset   v.   Wade    [1894],    1  46  W.  R.  606. 
Q.  B.  574;  58  J.  P.  231;   63  L.  J, 


§  437         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  726 

pose  of  obtaining  refreshment  or  not,  nor  how  long  she  had 
been  upon  the  premises,  but  the  constable  stated  that  at  the 
time  when  he  saw  the  woman  she  was  not  partaking  of  any 
refreshments.  The  evidence  was  thus  consistent  with  the 
woman  having  finished  her  refreshment  and  being  on  the 
point  of  leaving  when  the  constable  entered,  and  w^as  there- 
fore insufficient  to  sustain  a  conviction. '^^  It  may  be  shown 
that  prostitutes  had  been  seen  previously  in  the  licensed  prem- 
ises, that  being  some  evidence  of  the  keeper's  knowledge  of 
their  character.''®  Under  this  statute  it  is  not  essential  that  the 
prostitutes  who  "meet"  on  the  premises  should  be  the  same 
persons;  it  is  enough  that  persons  of  their  class  frequently 
come  to  the  house,  and  that  one  is  there,  though  for  the  first 
time,  if  known  as  to  her  character.'^ 

Sec.  437.     Ordinance  providing  for  a  revocation. 

A  city  may  provide  by  ordinance  that  au  applicant  for  a 
license  must  agree  that  if  he  violate  the  liquor  ordinances 
of  the  city  or  of  the  State  it  shall  be  a  sufficient  cause  for 
a  revocation  of  his  license ;  and  such  an  ordinance  in  the 
provision  which  says  a  licensee  shall  agree  that  his  license 
may  be  revoked  if  he  violates  a  "State  law"  will  be  con- 


^5  Patterson's      Licensing      Acts  Where   a   statute   provided   that 

(19th  Ed.),  p.  368.  if  any  keeper  of  a  beer  or  public 


76  Belasco  v.  Hannant,  3  B.  &  S 
13;  26  J.  P.  823;  31  L.  J.  M.  C 
225;  6  L.  T.  577;  10  W.  R.  867 
Parker  v.  Green,  2  B.  &  S.  299 
26  J.  P.  247;  31  L.  J.  M.  C.  133; 


house  "knowingly  lodges  or  know- 
ingly harbors  thieves  or  reputed 
thieves,  or  knowingly  permits  or 
knowingly  suffers  them  to  meet  or 
assemble    tlierein"    shall    be    liable 


10  W.  R.  316;  Cole  v.  Coulton,  24  to  a  fine,  a  meeting  called  at  an 

J.  P.  596;  2  E.  &  E.  695;  29  L.  J.  ale  house  by  a  circular  to  get  up 

M.  C.  125;   2  L.  T.  216;   8  W.  R.  a    subscription    for    the    wife    and 

412.  children  of  a  convicted  thief,  sev- 

77  Wray  v.  Toke,   12  Q.  B.  492;  eral  thieves  being  in  the  company, 

17  L.  J.  M.  C.  183;    12  J.  P.  804.  was    held    to    render    the    keeper 

In    a    charge    of    allowing    prosti-  liable  to  punishment.     Marshall  v. 

tutes  to  meet  on  the  premises,  it  is  Fox,  L.  R.   6  Q.  B.  370;  24  L.  T. 

not   necessary   to    name   them    nor  751;    40  L.   J.   M.   C.   142;    19  W. 

allege  they  were  unknown.  R.  1108;  35  J.  J.  631. 


727  REVOCATION   OF   LICENSE.  §  438 

strued  to  mean  a  "State  liquor  law.""**  Under  a  power  to 
license  and  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  a  city 
may  provide  that  upon  violation  of  its  provisions  the  mayor 
may  revoke  the  license ;  for  in  doing  so  he  acts  as  the  agent 
or  arm  of  the  council.""  But  an  ordinance  providing  that 
upon  a  second  conviction  of  the  licensee  for  having  violated 
the  liquor  laws  he  shall  forfeit  his  license  and  the  fee  paid 
for  it,  notwithstanding  he  maj'-  appeal  and  secure  an  acquittal 
of  the  offense  charged  against  him,  is  so  oppressive  as  to  be 
void  and  cannot  be  enforced. ^°  And  a  statute  authorizing 
a  city  to  require  a  bond  of  the  licensee,  and  empowering  it  to 
revoke  his  license  "whenever  it  shall  appear  to  its  *  *  * 
satisfaction  *  *  *  that  any  conditions  of  the  bond  have 
been  violated"  does  not  empower  it  to  arbitrarily  revoke  the 
license,  but  only  upon  a  showing  that  a  condition  of  the  bond 
has  been  violated.^'  Having  once  granted  a  license,  the  coun- 
cil of  a  city  after  the  session  at  which  it  was  granted  cannot 
revoke  it,  except  oursuant  to  the  statute  or  ordinance  em- 
powering it  to  revoke  it  upon  grounds  therein  provided  for 
its  revocation.®-  ^-^nd  if  a  council  is  authorized  to  revoke  a 
license  upon  certain  conditions  found  to  exist,  it  cannot  by 
ordinance  delegate  the  power  to  the  police  justice  or  city 
judge,  but  must  itself  act  in  the  matter.®^ 

Sec.  438.     New  York  statute — False  statements. 

A  New  York  statute  provides  that  "at  any  time  after  a 
liquor  tax  certificate  has  been  issued"  it  "may  be  revoked  and 
cancelled  if  material  statements  in  the  application  of  the 
holder  of  such  certificate  were  false,"  or  if  the  proper  con- 
sents of  property  owners  to  the  granting   of  the   certificate 

78  Ck)x  V.  Jackson,  152  Mich.  si  State  v.  Dwyer,  21  Minn.  512. 
630;  116  N.  W.  450;  Hurber  v.  82  Lantz  v.  Hightstown,  46  K 
Baugli,  43  Iowa,  514;  Ottumwa  v.  J.  L.  102;  Decker  v.  Board,  57  N. 
Schaub,  52  Iowa,  515;  3  N.  W.  J.  L.  G03;  31  Atl.  235;  Vanaman 
529.  V.  Adams,  74  X.  J.  L.  125;  05  Atl. 

79  Harrison   v.    People,    124    III.  204. 

App.   519.  83  Lambert  v.  Railway,  58  N.  J. 

soMcInerey   v.    Denver,    17    Col.       L.  578;  34  Atl.  5. 
302;    29   Pac.   516. 


§  439  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  728 

to  sell  liquors  at  the  place  designated  in  the  application  were 
"not  properly  filed,"  "or  if  the  holder  of  said  certificate  was 
not  for  anj-  reason  entitled  to  receive  or  hold  the  same,  or 
to  traffic  in  liquors,  or  if  any  provision"  of  the  liquor  "act 
is  violated  at  the  place  designated  in  said  certificate  as  the 
place  where  such  traffic  is  to  be  carried  on  by  the  Iiolder  of 
said  certificate,  or  by  his  agent,  servant,  bartender  or  any 
person  whomsoever  in  charge  of  said  premises,  or  if  the 
holder  of  said  certificate  shall  violate  any  of  the  provisions" 
of  the  liquor  act  "at  any  place."  The  State  commissioner 
of  excise,  the  deputy  State  commissioner  of  excise,  "or  any 
taxpayer  of  the  city,  village  or  town  for  which  such  liquor 
tax  certificate  was  issued  may  present  a  verified  petition"  to 
the  judge  of  the  court  "of  the  county  in  Avhich  such  traffic 
in  liquor  is  designated  to  be  carried  on,  or  in  which  the 
holder  of  such  certificate  resides"  "for  an  order  revoking 
or  cancelling  such  certificate  upon  either  or  all  of  the  grounds" 
above  stated.  This  "petition  must  state  the  facts  upon  which 
such  application  is  based;"  and  when  the  application  is  by 
a  taxpayer  the  State  commissioner  of  excise  must  be  "made 
a  party  to  the  proceeding,  and  is  entitled  to  due  notice 
thereof.  Upon  the  presentation  of  the  petition  the  "justice, 
judge  or  court"  must  grant  an  order  requiring  the  holder 
of  the  certificate  to  show  cause  before  him,  on  a  day  specified 
therein,  not  more  than  ten  days  after  the  granting  thereof, 
"why  an  order  revoking  and  cancelling"  his  tax  certificate 
should  not  be  granted,  and  the  order  must  also  contain  an 
injunction  restraining  the  certificate  holder  from  transferring 
or  surrendering  his  certificate  for  rebate,  as  the  statute  al- 
lows.®* 

Sec.  .439.  False  statements  in  application  under  Nev^r  York 
statute. 
As  we  have  seen  a  liquor  tax  certificate  may  be  revoked 
and  cancelled  in  New  York  "if  material  statements  in  the 
application  of  the  holder  of  such  certificate  were  false."  One 
of  the  statements  required  of  an  applicant  under  the  statute 

84  Laws  1906,  ch.  272,  subdiv.  2. 


729  REVOCATION   OP    LICENSE.  §  439 

of  that  State  is  that  there  are  no  buildings  exclusively  oc- 
cupied as  dwellings  within  two  hundred  feet  of  the  place 
where  liquor  is  to  be  sold  under  the  certificate  to  be  issued 
to  the  applicant;  and  if  the  statement  in  this  respect  be 
false,  it  is  sufficient  to  call  for  a  revocation  and  cancellation 
of  the  certificate  issued  thereon,  although  the  statement  Avas 
made  in  good  faith.^"^  An  application  which  refers  to  and 
relies  upon  material  statements  made  in  a  previous  appli- 
cation which  are  false,  requires  the  tax  certificate  to  be  can- 
celled.^*^ A  saloon  may  be  located  within  the  two  hundred 
feet  limit,  if  the  owners  of  dwellings  therein  consent;  and 
a  false  statement  that  they  had  so  consented  is  sufficient  to 
authorize  a  cancellation  and  revocation  of  the  tax  certificate, 
though  it  is  made  in  good  faith,  in  reliance  upon  statements 
of  persons  expert  in  such  matters  employed  to  obtain  the 
necessary  consents ;  "  and  the  necessary  consents  given  after 
the  issuance  of  the  certificate  is  not  sufficient  to  prevent  its 
revocation.^^  An  entire  failure  to  answer  a  question  pro- 
pounded in  the  application  is  not  a  false  statement."''  A  false 
statement  that  the  applicant  had  complied  with  the  statute 

S3 /u  re  Harper,  30  N.  Y.  Misc.  costs  against  the  holder  of  the 
Eep.  663;  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  524;  In  certificate,  regarding  the  cancel- 
re  Clement,  116  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  lation  of  the  certificate  as  a 
148;  101  N.  Y.  Supp.  683;  af-  sufficient  punishment.  In  re  Eas- 
firmed  118  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  57.5;  quin.  37  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  693;  76 
103  N.  Y.  Supp.  157 ;  In  re  Haiglit,  X.  Y.  Supp.  404 ;  In  re  Derrel,  55 
33  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  544;  68  N.  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  618;  106  N.  Y. 
Y.  iSupp.  920;   In  re  Halbran,   30  Supp.  1030. 

N.  Y.  App.  515;    63   N.   Y.   Supp.  ss  Lyman  v.  IVlurphy,  supra;  In 

1024;    In  re   Auerbach,   31    N.   Y.  re   Haight,    33    N.    Y.    Misc.    Rep. 

Misc.  Rep.  44 ;  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  602 ;  544 ;    68   N.   Y.   Supp.   920 ;   In  re 

In  re  Lyman,  34  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  Halbran,  30  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  515; 

296;   69  N.  Y.  Supp.   781;   People  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  1024;  In  re  Wash- 

V.  Pettit  (X.  Y.),  113  N.  Y.  Supp.  burn,  32  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  303;  66 

243.  N.  Y.   Supp.   732;    In  re  Johnson, 

86 /n  re  Tonatio,  49  N.  Y.  App.  18  Misc.  Rep.  498;  42  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Div.  84;   63  N.  Y.  Supp.  560.  1074,   the   revocation  was   held   to 

87  Lyman   v.  Murphy,   33   X.   Y.  lie  discretionary  with  the  court. 

Misc.   Rep.   349;    68   X.   Y.    Supp.  89 /,j  re  Lyman,  163  X.  Y.  536; 

490.      In   this    case    the   court   re-  57  X.  E.  745;   reversing  51  X.  Y. 

fused     to     render     judgment     for  App.  Div.  52;  64  X.  Y.  Supp.  756. 


§  439  TRAi^PIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  730 

authorizing  the  issuance  of  a  liquor  tax  eertij&cate  to  a  hotel 
keeper  will  authorize  its  cancellation ;  and  a  compliance  after 
its  issuance  will  not  prevent  the  cancellation,  for  in  determ- 
ining the  truth  of  such  statements  the  court  is  restricted  to 
the  time  when  the  application  was  made.®"  But  a  statement 
that  the  building  had  been  used  as  a  hotel,  followed  by  a 
false  statement  that  it  had  ever  since  been  so  used,  is  no 
ground  for  the  cancellation  of  the  certificate.®^  Where  the 
consent  of  property  owners  within  the  two  hundred  feet  limit 
is  not  necessary,  a  false  statement  that  they  had  given  their 
consent  is  not  a  false  material  statement,  and  not  a  suflS- 
cient  cause  for  a  revocation  of  the  liquor  certificate.®-  The 
fact  that  a  protest  against  the  issuance  of  a  tax  certificate 
was  filed  with  the  treasurer,  whose  duty  it  was  to  issue  the 
certificate,  will  not  prevent  its  revocation,  where  he  had  no 
discretion  as  to  its  issTiance,  the  statute  authorizing  proceed- 
ings for  its  cancellation  to  be  brought  "at  any  time"  after 
its  issuance.^^  At  a  date  prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  stat- 
ute, cited  at  the  beginning  of  this  section,  the  consent  of  only 
two-thirds  of  the  owners  of  buildings  used  exclusively  for 
dwellings  was  required;  and  when  that  was  the  case  it  was 
held  that  the  application  need  not  contain  a  statement  how 
many  such  dwellings  there  were.  Consequently  a  false  state- 
so /«,  re  Smith,  48  N.  Y.  App.  ^"^  In  re  Moulton,  168  N.  Y. 
423;  63  K  Y.  Supp.  255;  In  re  645;  61  N.  Y.  1131;  affirming  59 
Cullinan,  39  N.  Y.  Misc.  Eep.  646;  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  25;  69  N.  Y.  Supp. 
80  N.  Y.  Supp.  626;  In  re  Ryon,  14;  In  re  Hawkins,  165  N.  Y.  188; 
85  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  621;  83  N.  Y.  58  X.  E.  884;  reversing  66  N.  Y. 
Supp.  123;  affirming  80  N.  Y.  Supp.  1132;  In  re  Pierson,  32  N, 
Supp.  1114;  In  re  Brewster,  85  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  293;  66  N.  Y.  Supp. 
Y.  App.  Div.  235 ;  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  546 ;  In  re  Kessler,  28  N.  Y.  Misc. 
235;  13  N.  Y.  Ann.  Cas.  250;  re-  Rep.  336;  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  888; 
versing  80  N.  Y.  Supp.  666;  In  re  affirmed  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  1141;  re- 
McMonagle,  41  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  versed  163  N.  Y.  205;  57  N.  E. 
407;  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  1068.  402.  But  see  In  re  Clement,  119 
oi/ji  re  Brewster,  39  N.  Y.  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  622;  104  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  689 ;  80  N.  Y.  Supp.  Supp.  25 ;  53  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  358 ; 
666;  In  re  Clement.  52  N.  Y.  104  N.  Y.  Sn])p.  905. 
Misc.  Rep.  325;  102  N.  Y.  Supp.  ^^  In  re  Lyman,  23  N.  Y.  Misc. 
178.                             ■                                   Rep.  710;  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  52. 


731  REVOCATION    OF    LICENSE.  §  439 

ment  of  the  number  of  dwellings  is  an  immaterial  statement 
when  it  is  alleged  two-thirds  thereof  had  given  their  con- 
sent.®* A  false  material  statement  made  unintentionally  re- 
quires a  caneellation  of  the  certificate  issued  thereon.^^  But 
■when,  according  to  the  statute,  a  hotel  must  have  ten  rooms, 
and  the  hotel  did  not  have  that  number  when  the  application 
was  made,  but  did  have  when  the  certificate  was  issued,  a 
revocation  was  refused.^"  A  denial  of  a  petition  to  cancel 
a  certificate  issued  for  a  certain  place,  because  within  two 
hundred  feet  of  a  church,  is  no  bar  to  the  cancellation  of 
another  certificate  issued  for  the  same  place  to  a  different 
person.®^  The  fact  that  a  church  was  built  within  the  two 
hundred  feet  limit  after  the  tax  certificate  was  issued  is  no 
reason  for  its  cancellation ;  ^**  but  it  is  on  an  application  for  a 
second  or  renewal  of  the  certificate.''^  A  statement  that  "the 
traffic  in  liquors  had  been  lawfully  carried  on  upon  the 
premises  on  and  since"  a  certain  date,  "and  that  since  that 
date  the  premises  had  been  occupied  continuously  for  such 
traffic"  is  not  false  where  the  premises  were  occupied  on  that 
date  with  a  saloon  which  was  accidentally  destroyed  by  fire 
three  years  later,  compelling  the  occupant  to  suspend  traffic 
therein  for  three  months,  when  he  resumed  business,  he  not 
having  abandoned  his  intention  to  continue  his  occupancy  of 
the  premises.  Such  an  interruption  was  held  not  to  consti- 
tute an  abandonment.^  The  forging  of  a  property  owner's 
signature  to  a  paper  purporting  to  give  his  consent  to  a  lo- 
cation of  the  saloon  within  two  hundred  feet  of  his  dwelling 
is  sufficient  ground  for  a  revocation  of  the  tax  certificate 
issued  pursuant  thereto;  but  the  burden  is  upon  the  party 
alleging  the  forgery  to  prove  it.-     Where  a  statute  forbade 

Q*In  re  Lyman,  23  X.  Y.  Misc.  affirmed  122  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  801; 

Rep.  710;  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  52.  106  N.  Y.  Supp.  1143. 

95 /n  re  Fall,  26  Misc.  Rep.  611;  ^^  In  re  Clement,  57  N.  Y.  Al)se. 

57  N".  Y.  Supp.  858.  Rep.  47;   107  N.  Y.  Supp.  205. 

96 /n   re  Purdy,   40   N.   Y.   App.  ^  In  re  Kessler,  163  N.  Y.  205: 

Div.   133;  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  C29.  57  N.  E.  402;   reversing  60  N.  Y. 

97  In  re  McCusker,  47  N.  Y.  App.  Supp.   1141. 

Div.  Ill;  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  201.  2 /«  re  Whittaker,  63  N.  Y.  App. 

98 /n  re   Rupp,   55   N.   Y.   Misc.  Div.  442;   71  N.  Y.  Supp.  497. 
Rep.   313;    106  N.   Y.   Supp.   483; 


§  §  440,  441   TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  732 

the  location  of  a  saloon  within  one-half  mile  of  any  State 
hospital  or  lands  occupied  by  such  a  hospital,  it  was  held 
that  a  saloon  located  within  seventy-five  feet  of  an  eight  hun- 
dred acre-tract  of  land  on  which  was  located  a  State  hospital 
more  than  one-half  mile  from  it  was  a  violation  of  law,  and  a 
liquor  tax  certificate  therefor  must  be  revoked.^  A  false  repre- 
sentation that  one  of  two  applicants  was  a  citizen  of  the  State 
and  that  he  and  other  applicants  were  equal  partners,  as 
the  statute  required,  is  sufficient  to  revoke  the  license  granted 
on  such  representation.* 

Sec.  440.     Erroneous  statements  as  to  place  in  application 
for  a  license. 

If  a  license  be  issued  upon  an  application  containing  such 
an  error  in  the  description  of  the  place  to  be  licensed  that 
there  is  no  such  place  as  that  described,  it  may  be  cancelled.^ 

Sec.  441.    License  issued  by  mistake. 

A  license  issued  under  a  mistake  of  facts  necessary  to 
authorize  its  issuance  may  be  revoked;  and  the  officer  issuing 
it  is  not  estopped  by  his  conduct  in  issuing  it  to  revoke  or 
cancel  it."  And  where  the  issuance  of  a  license  has  been  pro- 
cured by  fraud,  the  court  or  licensing  board,  on  notice  given, 
may  proceed  to  investigate  the  fraud,  and  if  found  true,  with- 
draw the  license.  Such  a  proceeding  does  not  come  under 
the  statute  authorizing  a  revocation  of  a  license  because  of 
misconduct  of  the  holder,  and  a  writ  of  certiorari  does  not 
lie  to  review  the  court  or  board's  action,  for  its  action  will 
be  entirely  ignored  in  a  subsequent  proceeding  to  determine 
the  validity  of  the  license.^ 


3  7n  re  Clement,  110  N.  Y.  Sii])?.  affirming     (N.     Y.),     101     K     y. 
57,  59;    125  N.   Y.  App.  Div.  670.  Supp.  447;    In  re  Cullinan,   87   N. 

4  People    V.    Hilliard,    81    N.    Y.  Y.  App.   Div.   47;    8.3  N    Y.   Supp. 
App.  Div.  71;  80  N.  Y.  Supp.  792.  ^025. 

5/w-  re  Hoyniak,  9  Kulp.  368.  ^  state  v.  SchrofT,  123  Wis.  98; 

6/n  re  Clement,  118  N.  Y.  App.  109  N.  W.   1030. 
Div.    575;    103   N.   Y.   Supp.    157; 


7;>:')  uEvocATioN  OF  LICENSE  §§  442-444 

Sec.  442    The  license  to  be  revoked. 

Where  a  statute  provides  that  a  license  may  be  revoked 
for  a  violation  of  the  liquor  laws  it  is  usually  understood  that 
the  violation  must  take  place  when  the  license  is  in  force ; 
but  that  is  not  always  the  case.  Thus  where  the  liquor  law 
was  violated  by  the  licensee's  bartender,  and  thereafter  the 
license  expired  and  at  the  date  of  the  expiration  another  li- 
cense w'as  issued  to  him,  and  he  was  thirteen  days  afterward 
convicted  of  the  offense  committed  while  the  first  license 
W'as  in  force,  it  was  held  that  his  second  license  could  be 
revoked  because  of  such  conviction.^ 

Sec.   443.     Revocation   after   assignment  for   prior   illegal 
acts. 

A  license  may  be  revoked  after  its  assignment  and  while 
in  the  assignee's  lawful  possession  and  ownership  for  illegal 
acts  of  the  licensee  committed  before  the  date  of  assignment,' 
although  the  assignee  knew  nothing  of  such  illegal  acts.^** 

Sec.  444.     What  board  or  court  may  revoke  a  license. 

As  a  rule  statutes  expressly  empower  certain  courts  or 
boards  to  revoke  licenses,  which  is  not  always  the  licensing 
board  or  court.  In  Pennsylvania  it  is  the  quarter  sessions 
that  are  thus  empowered;'^  in  New  Hampshire,  the  board 
of  commissioners;'-  in  Colorado,  the  board  of  county  com- 
missioners ; '"  in  Missouri,  the  county  court ;  ^*  and  in  Canada, 
the   recorder.'^     An   officer  may  be   empowered  to   revoke   a 

8  People   V.   Woodman    (X.   Y.),  423;   58  L.  J.  M.  C.  1G7;   61  L.  T. 

4  N.  Y.  Supp.  532.  240;   37  W.  R.  605. 

9/n  re  Clement,  55  N.  Y.  Misc.  n  Dolan's   Appeal,    108    Pa.    St. 

Rep.  615;  105  N.  Y.  Supp.  1085.  564. 

10 /n  re  Cullinan,  185  N.  Y.  546;  12  State  v.  Carron,  73  N.  H.  434; 

77  N.  B.  1184;  affirming  104  N.  Y.  62  Atl.  1044. 
App.  Div.  205;  93  N.  Y.  Supp.  492.  is  Board  v.  Mayr,  31  Colo.  173; 

If   a   license   has  been   forfeited,  74  Pac.  458. 
it  cannot  be  transferred.     Rex  v.  1*  Barnett  v.   Pemiscott  Co.   Ct. 

West  Riding  J.  J.,   21   Q.  B.  Div.  Ill  Mo.  App.  693;  86  S.  W.  575. 
258;  52  J.  P.  455;  57  L.  J.  M.  C.  i'^  Ex    parte    Ricbler,    1    L.    N. 

103;    36    W.    R.    258;    Stevens   v.  (Can.)    59. 
Green,  23  Q.  B.  Div.  142;  53  J.  P. 


§  445  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  734 

license/®  or  a  city  council/^  or  a  police  board,^^  But  where  a 
city  was  given  exclusive  authority  "to  license,  tax,  regulate, 
restrain,  suppress  and  prohibit  barrooms,  groceries  and  tipi^ling 
houses"  and  also  to  "impose  forfeitures"  it  was  held  that 
did  not  supersede  a  general  law  of  the  State  providing  that 
upon  conviction  of  a  licensee  for  certain  offenses  against  the 
liquor  law  the  court  must  revoke  his  license. ^'^  If  the  power 
to  revoke  a  license  be  vested  in  the  city  council  it  cannot  by 
ordinance  delegate  its  power,  as  to  a  police  justice  of  the 
eity,-°  nor  can  it  revoke  the  license  by  rescinding  the  order 
granting  it  after  it  has  been  issued,  at  least.-^  Where  one  of 
the  three  members  of  a  town  board  hired  minors  to  purchase 
liquor  from  a  licensee,  in  order  to  secure  evidence  against 
him  of  selling  to  minors,  it  was  held  that  he  was  incompetent 
to  sit  in  a  proceeding  for  the  revocation  of  such  license  be- 
cause of  such  sales,  and  his  sitting  on  the  board  at  the  tvial 
avoided  the  proceedings.-- 

Sec.  445.     Mandamus  to  compel  a  revocation. 

If  there  be  no  other  adequate  remedy,  mandamus  lies  to 
compel  a  revocation  after  the  proceedings  for  a  revocation 
has  been  instituted.  Thus  where  a  statute  required  a  city 
council  to  revoke  a  license  if  it  found  "the  complaint  to  be 
true,"  and  it  was  admitted  that  the  testimony  concerning 
illegal  sales  Avas  uncontradicted,  and  the  licensee  admitted 
them,  a  refusal  of  the  council  to  find  the  charge  true  was 
held  to  be  an  abuse  of  discretion  on  its  part,  and  accordingly 
mandamus  lay  to  compel  a  revocation,  there  being  no  other 
adequate  remedy.-'^     But  mandamus  does  not  lie  to  compel 

iG  Richler    v.    Judah,     1  .  L.    N.  20  Lambert  v.  Rahway,  58  N.  J. 

(Can.)   591;  Ex  parte  Molinari,  6  L.  578;  34  Atl.  5. 

L.  N.   (Can.)   395.  21  Dziok  v.  Board,  28  R.  I.  526; 

17  Carbondale  v.  Wade,   lOG  111.  68  Atl.  479. 

App.    654;    Carr   v.   Augusta,    124  22  State  v.  Bradish,  95  Wis.  205; 

Ga.  116;  52  S.  E.  300.  70  N.  W.   172. 

18  Sullivan  v.  Borden,  163  Mass.  23  State  v.   Oslikosh    (Wis.),   70 
470;  40  N.  E.  859.  N.  W.  300.     See  also  Cox  v.  Jack- 
in  State  V.   Horton,   21    Ore.   83;  son.  152  Micli.  630;  116  N.  W.  456; 

27  Pac.  165.     See  People  v.  Tighe,       People  v.  Meakin.  133  N.  Y,  214; 
5  Hun,  25.  30  X.  E.  S2S ;   affirming   15  N.  Y. 


735  KEVOCATION    OF    LICENSE.  §  446 

the  revocation  of  a  void  license ;  because  the  granting  of  it 
is  a  mere  idle  act,  fruitless  in  its  effect."*  If  a  license  be 
issued  after  an  appeal  has  been  taken,  or  during  the  time 
when  an  appeal  may  be  taken,  mandamus  lies  to  compel  the 
licensing  board  or  court  to  withdraw  or  revoke  the  license.^'^ 


Sec.  446.    Who  may  commence  proceedings. 

The  statute  almost  invariably  provides  who  may  institute 
proceedings  for  a  cancellation  of  a  license  or  liquor  tax  cer- 
tificate. Not  infrequently  some  officer  is  authorized  to  in- 
stitute the  proceedings.  A  citizen  or  taxpayer  of  the  vicinity 
or  district  for  which  the  license  is  granted  may  usually  insti- 
tute the  proceedings,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  some  officer 
is  also  authorized  to  bring  them.  In  New  York  the  State 
Commissioner  of  Excise,  the  Deputy  State  Commissioner  of 
Excise,  "or  any  taxpayer  of  the  city,  village  or  town  for 
which"  the  liquor  tax  certificate  was  issued  may  present  a 
verified  petition  to  the  .judge  of  the  court  of  the  county  "for 
an  order  revoking  or  cancelling"  the  tax  certificate.^"  Under 
this  statute  if  it  be  alleged  in  the  answer  that  the  action  for 
a  revocation  was  unauthori/edly  brought,  evidence  may  be 
taken  to  prove  the  allegation.^^  The  petition  for  a  revocation 
must  show  the  ri^ht  of  the  petitioner  to  institute  the  pro- 
ceedings.-** The  licensee  who  has  transferred  the  license  can- 
not bring  an  action  to  revoke  it  because  the  transferee  has 
failed,  or  has  become  unable,  to  pay  him  for  it.-^  Where  a 
statute  provided  that  any  taxpayer  of  the  district  for  whir-h 
the  license  was  granted  might  institute  proceedings  for  its 
revocation,  an  allegation  in  the  petition  that  the  petitioner 
was  the  owner  of  certain  described  property  in  the  district 

Supp.   917;    State   v.   Johnson,   37  2c  Laws  1906,  ch.  272,  subdiv.  2. 

Neb.  362 ;  55  N.  W.  874.  27  In  re  Halbian,  30  N.  Y.  Misc. 

24  State    V.    Hammel,    13+    Wis.  Rep.  515;   63  N.  Y.  Supp.   1024. 
61;    114  N.  W.  97.  2S  People  v.  IMcGowan,  44  N.  Y. 

25  Swan  V.  Wilderson,  10  Okla.  App.  Div.  30;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  407; 
547;  62  Pac.  422.  In  such  a  case  In  re  Schopp,  119  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
the  holder   is   neither   a   necessary  192;   104  N.  Y.  Supp.  307. 

or  proper  party  defendant.  29 /n  re  Flosser,  8  Kulp.  343. 


§  447  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  736 

was  held  to  presumptively  allege  he  was  a  taxpayer/"  Trus- 
tees under  a  will,  in  whom  the  legal  title  to  the  testator's 
real  estate  is  vested,  are  taxpayers,  and  under  the  statue 
referred  to  may  institute  the  proceedings.^^  A  statute  author- 
izing "any  citizen"  to  institute  the  proceedings  does  not  re- 
quire him  to  be  a  taxpayer.''-  Where  a  statute  required  that 
no  saloon  should  be  located  within  200  feet  of  a  dwelling 
house,  it  was  held  that  a  citizen  not  within  that  distance  might 
apply  for  the  revocation  of  its  license.^" 

Sec.  447.     Who    to    be    made    defendant — Assignment    of 
license. 

The  rule  is  invariable  that  the  holder*  of  the  license  at  the 
time  the  proceedings  are  instituted  must  be  made  the  de- 
fendant or  respondent.  If  the  license  be  assigned  (when 
that  is  permissible)  the  assignee  should  be  made  a  party  de- 
fendant or  the  respondent,  and  not  the  assignor;  and  if  he 
be  not  the  proceedings  will  be  void.^*  But  where  the  statute 
provides  that  the  proceedings  might  be  brought  against  "the 
holder  of  record,"  they  may  be  brought  against  "the  holder 
of  record,"  though  he  has  no  connection  with  the  place  desig- 
nated in  the  license  or  with  the  violation  of  the  law  at  that 
place  which  authorizes  its  revocation.^"  But  if  the  license 
or  tax  certificate  be  assigned  (as  may  be  sometimes  done)  as 
collateral  security,  the  assignee  need  not  be  made  a  party; 
for  he  is  not  a  holder  of  record.^"     Nor  can  the  wife  of  the 

307,1  re   Schopp.    lin   App.   Div.  Rep.  336;   59  X.  Y.  Siipp.  888. 

119;  104  N.  Y.  Supp.  307.                  .  Sometimes  the  judge   of   the   li- 

31  hi  re  Rupp,  54  N.  Y.  Misc.  censing  court  is  emi^wered  to  in- 
Rep.  1 ;    105  N.  Y.  Supp.  407.  stitute    proceedings.      Newman    v. 

Under     the     Pennsylvania     Act,  Lake,  70  Kan.  848;  79  Pac.  675. 

May   13,    1887    (P.   L.    108),   it  is  S4  Bertzel  v.    Court   of   Common 

not  necessary   that   the   petitioner  Pleas   (N.  J.  L. ),  48  Atl.  101?. 

be    a    resident    of    the    ward    for  35  Cullinan   v.    Kuch,    39    N.   Y. 

which  the  license  was  issued.     In  Misc.    Rep.    641;    80   X.   Y.    Supp. 

re   McGrinley,   32   Pa.    Super.    Ct.  186. 

324.  36  7n  re  Lyman,  20  N.  Y.  Misc. 

32  Zn  re  Halbron,  30  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  300;  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  1020; 
Rep.  515;   63  N.  Y.  Supp.  1024.  In  re  Clement,  55  N.  Y.  Misc.  615; 

33  Zn  re  Kessler,  28  N.  Y.  Misc.  105  N.  Y.  Supp.  1085. 


737  REVOCATION    OP    LICENSE.  §  448 

licensee,  to  whom  it  has  been  assigned  by  consent  of  the  excise 
commissioner,  be  brought  in  as  a  defendant.^^  When  A  loaned 
S  the  necessary  amount  to  obtain  a  license,  who  obtained  it 
and  assigned  it  to  A  as  collateral  security,  together  with  the 
right  to  receive  all  rebates  on  its  surrender ;  and  S  then  discon- 
tinued the  business,  and  A  surrendered  the  license  and  re- 
ceived a  certificate  for  the  amount  of  rebate;  and  thereafter 
B  took  up  the  traffic  of  liquor  at  the  place  licensed,  without 
authority,  and  a  proceeding  was  brought  to  cancel  S's  li- 
cense because  of  illegal  sales  by  B  (which  could  be  done), 
it  was  held  that  A  had  a  right  to  intervene  and  show  that  B 
had  not  violated  the  law,  in  order  to  protect  the  license  and 
secure  the  rebate.^'' 

Sec.  448.     The  pyetition  for  revocation. 

As  a  basis  for  the  proceedings,  it  is  necessary  to  aver 
that  the  defendant  or  respondent  holds  a  license  at  the  time 
of  beginning  of  the  proceedings."®  But  the  proceedings  usu- 
ally being  of  a  summary  character,  the  same  strictness  in 
the  petition  is  not  required  as  in  ordinary  proceedings  in 
the  court  in  civil  actions.*"  "Where  a  statute  provides  that 
an  application  shall  be  founded  or  a  complaint  made  to  the 
licensing  board,  it  is  not  sufficient  for  the  board  to  issue  a 
w^arrant  reciting  that  information  calling  for  its  revoca- 
tion has  come  to  its  knowledge.  There  must  be  a  formal 
written  complaint  placed  on  file  for  the  licensee's  in- 
formation.*^ Merely  alleging  that  the  licensee  had  vio- 
lated the  liquor  ordinance  or  statute  without  stating  in  what 
respect,  is  not  sufficient.*-  The  petition  for  a  revocation  must 
show  that  the  petitioner  is  one  authorized  to  bring  the  pro- 

37Nieland  v.  McGrath,  20  X.  Y.  Burns,  76  Conn.  395;  56  Atl.  611; 

Misc.  Rep.  682;  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  760,  Cherry   v.   Commonwealth,   78  Va. 

38  In  re  Cullinan,  94  N.  Y.  App.  375. 

Div.  445;  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  164.  41  State  v.  Lamos,  26  Me.  258. 

39Breubaker    v.    State,    89    Ind.  42  State  v.  Tomah,  80  Wis.  198; 

577.  49  X.  W.  753;   In  re  Halbran,  30 

40  People  V.  Houghton,  41   Hun,  N".   Y.   Misc.   Eep.   515;    63   K  Y. 

558;    People    v.    Wright,    3    Hun,  Supp.  1024. 
506;    5    T.    &    C.    518;    Appeal    of 


§  448  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  738 

ceedings;  as  for  instance,  that  he  is  a  taxpayer  where  a  stat- 
ute authorizes  a  taxpayer  to  institute  the  proceedings.'*"  If 
the  petition  must  be  verified  it  is  not  necessary  to  give  the 
petitioner's  grounds  of  belief  that  the  facts  alleged  are  true 
when  he  states  them  on  information  and  belief;**  but  where 
the  statute  requires  him  to  state  "the  facts  on  which  said 
application  is  based,"  it  is  not  sufficient  for  him  to  state 
that  he  believes  that  certain  facts  exist,  or  that  the  licensee 
has  committed  an  act  in  violation  of  law,  without  stating 
the  grounds  of  his  information.*^  An  insufficient  petition 
gives  the  court  jurisdiction  when  a  proper  notice  is  served.*" 
In  New  York  deficient  allegations  in  a  petition  may  be  sup- 
plemented by  affidavits  accompanying  it,  as  where  the  peti- 
tion stated  the  facts  on  information  and  belief — which  was 
an  insufficient  statement — and  the  accompanying  affidavits 
stated  the  facts  on  personal  knowledge  of  the  affiant.*'  If 
the  petition  proceeds  upon  the  theory  that  the  licensee  has 
violated  a  particular  provision  of  the  law,  but  fails  to  state 
facts  sufficient  to  show  a  violation,  it  is  deficient ;  thus  charg- 
ing a  sale  after  the  hour  of  12  o'clock  midnight  does  not 
charge  a  violation  of  a  statute  or  ordinance  providing  that 
saloons  shall  be  closed  between  the  hours  of  12  o'clock  mid- 
night and  5  o'clock  a.  m.*^  But  if  a  petition  be  defective, 
and  no  objection  be  taken  to  it;  and  the  proof  shows  that 

43  People  V.  McGowan,  44  N.  Y.  47  Jn  ,-e  Cullinan,  7G  N.  Y.  App. 
App.  Div.  30;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  407;  Div.  362;  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  466;  12 
In  re  Schopp,  119  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  Ann.  Cas.  68;  affirmed  173 
192;    104  N.  Y.  Supp.  307.  N".  Y.   610;    66  N.  E.   1106;   In  re 

44  People  V.  McGowan,  supra.  In  Cullinan,  89  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  613; 
such  an  instance  the  provisions  of  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  1129;  affirming  41 
the  Civil  Code  may  be  followed.  N.   Y.   Misc.   Eep.   392;    84   N.   Y. 

45 /n  re  Peck,  167  X.  Y.  391;  60  Supp.  1075;  In  re  Cullinan,  40  N. 

N.  E.   775;    53   L.   R.   A.   888;   re-  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  423;  82  N.  Y.  Supp. 

versing    68    N.    Y.     Supp.     114o;  337. 

Voight  V.  Board,  59  N.  J.  L.  358 ;  4S  state  v.  Curtis,  130  Wis.  3,17 ; 

36  Atl.  686;  37  L.  R.  A.  292.  110  N.  W.  189. 

40  In  re  Cullinan,  39  N.  Y.  Misc.  But  in  this  case  it  was  held  that 

Rep.    354;    79    N.   Y.    Supp.    840;  the  city  council   was  not  justified 

McConkie    v.    Remley,    119    Iowa,  in     dismissing     the     petition.       It 

512;  93  N.  W.  505.  should  have  been  amended. 


739  REVOCATION    OF    LICENSE.  §  449 

the  license  ought  to  be  revoked,  it  may  be  amended  to  corre- 
spond to  the  proof.*"  In  New  York  the  State  Excise  Com- 
missioner is  not  required  to  state  the  facts  of  his  own  knowl- 
edge which  justify  a  revocation,  but  he  may  allege  such  facts 
upon  his  information  and  belief,  based  upon  the  public  rec- 
ords and  statements  of  his  deputy  commissioner  or  subordi- 
nates.^"  Reasonable  certainty  is  required  in  the  petition."^  But 
where  the  illeiial  sales  are  charged  to  have  been  made  by  the 
respondent,  "the  holder  of  said  license,"  it  will  be  presumed 
they  were  made  after  the  license  was  issued."  If  it  is  sought 
to  revoke  a  license  issued  for  a  hotel  because  it  does  not 
comply  with  the  statute  in  its  structure  and  number  of  spare 
rooms  and  beds  required  by  the  statute  for  the  accommo- 
dation of  travelers,  the  petition  must  sufficiently  set  forth  that 
such  hotel  did  not  have  such  accommodations  to  bring  it  with- 
in the  exemptions  of  the  statute.^^ 

Sec.  449.    Joint  proceeding  to  revoke  several  licenses. 

A  petition  to  revoke  two  or  more  licenses  held  by  the  re- 
spondent, even  if  they  be  of  different  classes,  is  not  fatally 
defective  because  the  allegations  charge  the  commission  of 
the  acts  of  forfeiture  to  have  been  committed  at  the  same 
time.^*  If  a  statute  do  not  forbid  it,  no  objection  can  be  made 
to  a  joinder  of  licenses  for  several  places  granted  to  the 
same  person. '^^ 

40 /n  re  Stedler,  52  X.  Y.  Misc.  59    N.    J.    L.    358;    36    Atl.    686; 

Rep.   322;    102   N.   Y.   Supp.    147;  Cuirczak  v.  Keron    (N.  J.  L.),  70 

Plass  V.  Clark,  71  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  Atl.  366. 

488;  76  N.  Y.  Supp.  2.    See  Croth-  62 /n  re  McCinley,  32  Pa.  Super, 

ers  V.  Monteith,  11  Manitoba,  373.  Ct.  324. 

50  7n  re  Cullinan,  89  N.  Y.  App.  53  Cuirczak  v.  Keron  (N.  J.  L.), 
Div.    613;    85   N.  Y.    Supp.   1129;  70  Atl.  366. 

affirming  41   N.  Y.  Misc.   392;    84  54  Commonwealth  v.  Bearce,  150 

N.  Y.  Supp.  1075;   In  re  Clement,  Mass.  389;  23  N.  E.  99. 

116  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  148;    101  X.  55 /n  re  Lyman,  59  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Y.  Supp.  683.  Div.  217;  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  309;   af- 

51  Appeal  of  Mecnan,  11  Pa.  firming  32  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  309; 
Super.   Ct.  579 ;   Voight  v.  Board,  67  N.  Y.  Supp.  48. 


§  450  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  740 

Sec.  450.     Notice  of  proceeding's  for  revocation. 

As  a  general  rule  a  license  cannot  be  revoked  without  notice 
of  the  proceedings  to  revoke  it  being  first  given  to  the  licensee 
or  holder  and  an  opportunity  given  him  to  show  cause  why 
it  should  not  be  rev^oked.  The  proceedings  without  notice 
are  void  and  the  revocation  a  nullity.^*'  A  statute,  however, 
is  not  void  because  it  does  not  provide  for  a  notice;  it  being 
implied  that  the  licensee  is  to  be  notified."  If  the  license  be 
issued  to  two  or  to  a  partnership,  notice  to  one  of  the  two 
or  to  one  member  of  the  partnership,  is  a  sufficient  notice.^* 
Where  a  statute  provided  that  "after  ten  days'  notice  to  any 
person  *  *  *  the  court  maye  revoke"  his  license,  it  was 
held  that  an  order  served  on  the  licensee  to  show  cause  why 
his  license  should  not  be  revoked  "for  selling  and  causing  to 
be  sold  to  minors  whisky"  was  sufficiently  definite  to  render 
the  proceedings  valid.''-'  But  where  a  statute  provides  that 
for  a  conviction  of  an  offense  against  the  liquor  laws  the  li- 
cense of  the  defendant  may  be  revoked,  notice  of  the  proposed 
revocation  is  not  necessary ;  *'"  and  this  is  especially  so  where 
the  license  itself  contains  the  conditions  of  forfeiture  as  pre- 
scribed by  the  statute  or  ordinance  under  which  it  is  issued.®^ 
Where  notice  is  required  to  be  given  to  a  licensee  that  his  li- 
cense has  been  revoked,  it  is  held  sufficient  to  give  him  a 
verbal  notice.*'-  An  order  to  show  cause  why  the  license  should 
not  be  cancelled,  directed  to  be  personally  served  on  the  part- 
ners who  hold  the  license,  or  by  leaving  it  at  their  place  of 
business  as  designated  in  the  license  with  a  person  in  charge, 

56  Plunimer  v.  Commonwealth,  1  •'"'S  ■Commonwealth  v.  Bearce,  150 
Bush,  26;  Lambert  v.  Rahway,  58       Mass.  389;   23  N.  E.  99. 

IST.  J.  L.  578;  34  Atl.  5;  Common-  so  Lillenfeld    v.    Commonwealth, 

wealth   V.    Wall,    145    Mass.    216;  92  Va.  118;  23  S.  E.  882. 

13   N.   E.   486;    Crothers   v.   Mon-  co  Martin  v.  State,  23  Neb.  371; 

teith,    11   Manitoba,   373;    Balling  36  N.   W.   554;    Carr  v.   Augusta, 

V.  Board    (N.  J.  L.),  74  Atl.  277.  124  Ga.  IIG;  52  S.  E.  300;  Appeal 

57  Young  V.  Blaisdell,  138  Mass.  of  Londry,  79  Conn.  1 ;  63  Atl.  293. 
344;  Oshkosh  v.  State,  59  Wis.  ci  Sprayborry  v.  Atlanta,  87  Ga. 
425;    18   N.   W.   324;    Gaertner   v.  120;   13  S.  E.  197. 

Fond  du  Lac,  34  Wis.  497.  ^-  Commonwealth  v.  Hamer,  128 

Mass.  76. 


741  REVOCATION    OF    LICENSE.  §  450 

is  sufficient  if  served  in  either  of  the  specified  ways.®^  The 
notice  should  specify  definitely  Avhen  and  where  the  pro- 
ceedings for  a  revocation  will  be  heard;  but  an  irregularity 
or  indefiniteness  that  does  not  mislead  the  respondent  is  not 
sufficient  to  avoid  the  proceedings  or  call  for  a  reversal  on 
appeal.''*  The  notice  should  be  served  on  the  holder  of  the 
license  at  the  time  the  proceedings  are  commenced ;  and  if  the 
licensee  has  assigned  the  license  (as  may  sometimes  be  done), 
notice  to  him  is  not  necessary."'^  If  a  statute  or  ordinance 
under  which  the  license  is  issued  provides  that  it  may  be  re- 
voked for  a  violation  of  its  terms  without  notice,  a  revocation 
without  notice  is  valid.*"*  But  the  general  rule  is  that  a  stat- 
ute authorizing  a  revocation  of  a  license  without  notice  and 
a  hearing  is  unconstitutional."^  If  on  the  return  day  the 
notice  be  not  served  on  all  interested,  a  new  order  for  a 
notice  may  be  entered  in  New  York  on  the  original  papers, 
and  a  second  notice  be  issued  and  served  on  those  not  served."* 
Notice  in  this  State  need  not  be  served  on  one  who  holds  the 
liquor  tax  certificate  as  collateral  for  a  loan."^ 

63  In  re  Cullinan,  68  N.  Y.  App.  «» In  re  Lyman,  20  N.  Y.  Misc. 

Div.   119;    74  N.  Y.  Supp.   182.  Rep.    300;    56   N.   Y.    Supp.    1020: 

6*  In  re  Judkins,  126  N.  Y.  App.  In  re  Clement,  55  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

Div.  524;   110  N.  Y.  Supp.  587.  615;   105  N.  Y.  Supp.  1085. 

«5  In  re  Lyman,   53  N.  Y.  App.  Under    the    New    York    statute 

Div.  330;  65  N.  Y.  Supp.  673.  authorizing   the    Board   of    Excise 

6G  Anderson  V.  Galesburg,  118  III.  to   "summon   before   it"   a   person 

App.  525.  charged   with   violating  the  excise 

67  People    V.    Flynn,    110    N.    Y.  law    and     revoke     his     license     if 
App.    Div.    279;    96    N.    Y.    Supp.  guilty,    a    summons    signed    "The 
655;  reversing  48  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  Board    of   Excise    of    the    City    of 
159;    96  N.   Y.   Supp.   653.  Utica.   by   Benjamin   Brady,   Corn- 
Lender  the  Nevada  Act,  May  16.  missioner  of  Excise  and  Chairman 

1903,    incorporating    the    town    of  of  said  Board,"  is  sufficient.    Peo- 

Eeno,    a    license    may    be    revoked  pie  v.  Board,  17  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

without     notice     for     a     sufficient  98;   40  N.  Y.  Supp.  741. 
cause.     Wallace   v.   Reno,   27  Nev.  In    New   Jersey   a  conviction    nf 

71;  73  Pac.  528.  tlie  o/Tcupe  for  which  a  revocation 

68  In  re  Lyman,  28  N.  Y.  Misc.  is   sought   does   not   dispense   with 
Rep.  385;   59  N.  Y.  Supp.  971.  the  right  to  a  notice.     Tindall   v. 

Monmouth  (N.  J.  L.),  68  Atl.  799. 


§  451  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  742 

Sec.  451.     The  answer. 

An  answer  positively  denying  the  charges  in  the  petition 
requires  a  hearing  and  trial  on  the  merits ; ''°  but  a  failure 
to  controvert  a  fact  if  true  requires  a  revocation  without  a 
hearing  or  reference."^  An  answer  that  the  respondent  had 
been  tried  and  acquitted  in  a  criminal  prosecution  on  the  same 
facts  alleged  in  the  petition  for  a  revocation  does  not  state 
a  defense.'^-  Nor  is  an  answer  sufficient  which  avers  that 
the  license  sought  to  be  revoked  has  exj^ired  since  the  pro- 
ceedings began  by  its  own  limitations.^^  Where  the  charge 
is  that  the  licensee  kept  his  saloon  open  on  certain  prohibited 
hours,  and  in  his  answer  he  admits  it  was  open  during  those 
hours,  the  burden  is  on  him  to  .show  a  valid  excuse  for  hav- 
ing it  open  at  that  time;'^*  and  the  snme  is  true  because  of 
sales  on  Sunday  when  the  answer  alleges  the  sales  were  made 
to  guests  on  Sunday  by  the  licensee,  as  the  occupant  of 
a  hotel,  at  their  meals.'^^  An  answer  in  such  a  case 
admitting  the  issuance  of  the  license  but  not  averring 
it  was  issued  to  respondent  as  a  hotel  keeper,  or  that  he  was 
a  hotel  keeper,  will  not  entitle  him  to  show  he  conducted  a 
hotel  and  that  the  sales  were  within  the  exception  of  the 
statute  permitting  him  to  furnish  liquors  to  his  guests  at 
their  meals.""  If  the  answer  denies  only  a  part  of  the  charges, 
the  evidence  will  not  be  limited  to  the  denials,  for  the  defend- 
ant may  succeed  on  the  charges  denied  and  yet  forfeit  his 


To/„,  re  McGinley.  32  Pa.  Super.  ^i  state  v.  Curtis,  130  Wis.  357; 

Ct.  324.  110  N.  W.   189. 

"1  In  re  Bridge,  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  "«•  In  re  Cullinan,  45  N.  Y.  Misc. 

1105;   36  N.  Y.  Ajip.  Div.  533;   55  Rep.  497;  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  802.   But 

N.  Y.  Supp.  54;  ai'iiriT.ing  25  N.  Y.  it    sliould    be    noted    that    this    is 

Misc.   Rep.   213.  because      tlie      right      to      furnish 

72 /n  re  Schuyler,  32  N.  Y.  Misc.  liquors   by   a    hotel    keeper   to   his 

Rep.  221;   66  N.  Y.  Supp.  251.  guests  is  given  by  an  exceotion  in 

'^  In  re  Schuyler,   supra;  In  re  the  statiitc. 

Clement,  62  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  512;  '« /n  re  Schuyler,  63  N.  Y.  App. 

116  N.  Y.  Supp.  1070;  In  re  Clem-  Div.  200;   71  N.  Y.  Supp.  437. 
ent,    59    N.    Y.   Misc.    Supp.    367; 
112  N.  Y.  Supp.  337. 


743 


REVOCATION    OF   LICENSE, 


§452 


license  on  those  charges  undenied."  But  the  Legislature  can- 
not provide  that  if  the  defendant  fails  to  deny  under  oath  a 
material  allegation  in  the  petition  his  license  shall  be  revoked ; 
for  it  cannot  raise  a  presumption  of  guilt  from  an  omission 
of  the  accused  to  testify,  by  a  provision  that  proof  shall  not 
be  necessary  if  the  defendant  does  not  deny  the  charges 
under  oath." 


Sec.  452.     Trial. 

If  a  license  has  been  once  granted,  it  cannot  be  revoked, 
even  by  the  court  granting  it,  without  a  hearing  or  trial.^' 
The  trial  may  be,  and  usually  is,  without  a  jury ;  and  a  stat- 
ute providing  for  a  trial  without  a  jury  is  constitutional.^" 


"  In  re  Cullinan,  39  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  354;  79  N.  Y.  Supp.  840; 
In  re  Cullinan,  39  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
046;   80  N.  Y.  Supp.  62(5. 

16  In  re  Peck,  107  N.  Y.  391;  CO 
N.  E.  775;  53  L.  R.  A.  888;  re- 
versing 57  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  635 
68  N.  Y.  Supp.  1145;  In  re  Cul 
linan,  40  N.  Y.  Misc.  583;  83  N. 
Y.  Supp.  9;  In  re  Cullinan,  41  N. 
Y.  Misc.  Rep.  392;  84  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1075;  affirmed  89  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
613;    85  N.  Y.  Supp.    1129. 

"9Vanaman  v.  Adams,  74  N.  J. 
L.  125;  65  Atl.  204;  Lantz  v. 
Hightstown,  46  N.  J.  L.  102; 
Decker  v.  Board,  57  N.  J.  L.  603; 
31  Atl.  235;  Dziok  v.  Board,  28 
R.  I.  526;  68  Atl.  479;  Ferron  v. 
Board,  28  R.  I.  529;  68  Atl.  480. 
80  state  V.  Schmidtz,  65  Iowa, 
556;  22  N.  W.  673;  LaCroix  v. 
Fairfield  Co.,  49  Conn.  591;  Peo- 
ple V.  Brooklyn  Police,  59  Conn. 
92;  LaCroix  v.  Fairfield  Co.,  50 
Conn.  321;  47  Am.  Rep.  648; 
riiorry  v.  Commonwoa''tli.  78  Va. 
375;  Low  v.  Pilotage  Commission- 
ers,   1    R.   M.   Charlt.   302;    In  re 


Livingston,  24  N.  Y.  Div.  51;  48 
X.  Y.  Supp.  989;  Lyman  v.  Erie 
Co.,  46  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  387;  61 
N.  Y.  Supp.  884;  affirmed  161  N. 
Y.   641;   57   N.  E.    1115. 

[Citing  Board  v.  Barrie,  34  N. 
Y.  657;  People  v.  Wright,  3  Hun 
306;  People  v.  Meakim,  56  Hun 
631;    10  N.  Y.   S.    163;   People  v. 

Board  of  Commissioners  of  Police 

and   Excise,   59   N.   Y.  92;    People 

V.  Murray,   149  N.  Y.  367;   44  N. 

E.  146;   32  L.  R.  A.  344;  Colon  v. 

Lisk,  153  N.  Y.  188;  47  N.  E.  302; 

Beer  Co.   v.  Massachusetts,  97   U. 

S.   25;    24   L.    Ed.   989;    Stone   v. 

Mississippi,   101  U.  S.  814;   25  L. 

Ed.  1079;  In  re  Bradley,  22  Misc. 

Rep.  301;  49  N.  Y.  S.  1100;  In  re 

Livington,  24  App.  Div.  51 ;  48  N. 

Y.    989;    In    re    Lyman,    25    Misc. 

Rep.  638;  56  N.  Y.  S.  359;   Id.  26 

Misc.  Rep.  300;   56  N.  Y.  S.  1020; 

In  re   Bridge,   36   Apn.   Div.   533; 

25   Misc.   Rep.   213;    55   N.   Y.   S. 

54;  In  re  Place,  27  App.  Div.  561; 

50  X.  ^'.  S'.  '''0:    Tn  rr.  Lymiin.  20 

App.  Div.   391;    49  N.   Y.   S.   559; 

52   N.   Y.   S.    1145;    Id.   28   Misc. 


§  452  TRAPFIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  744 

But  where  the  forfeiture  takes  place  upon  a  conviction  of 
the  licensee  of  having  violated  the  law — the  judgment  of 
forfeiture  is  a  part  of  the  judgment  of  conviction — the  de- 
fendant is  entitled  to  a  jury  upon  the  question  of  his  guilt.*^ 
Under  the  New  York  statute,  where  the  charge  is  that  the 
licensee  has  violated  the  liquor  law%  the  proof  must  show 
that  he  has  been  regularly  convicted  of  the  offense  before 
the  proceedings  for  a  revocation  were  begun.''-  Of  course, 
showing  a  prior  conviction  of  the  offense  charged  in  the  peti- 
tion is  no  bar  to  the  proceedings  for  a  revocation.^^  "When 
witnesses  are  called,  they  must  be  sworn;**  and  usually  wit- 
nesses must  be  called  to  prove  the  facts  alleged  in  the  peti- 
tion ;  *^  unless  the  petition  alleges  as  the  basis  of  the  pro- 
ceeding a  prior  conviction,  then  a  proper  certificate  of  such 
conviction  is  all  the  e\adence  necessary,  unless  evidence  of 
identification  be  necessary.^''  If  the  conviction  was  in  the 
same  court  it  may  be  proved  by  the  judgment  docket  or  reg- 
ister of  conviction. ^'^  If  the  proceedings  for  a  revocation  is 
based  upon  the  fact  that  the  licensee  had  failed  to  answer  a 
material  question  in  his  application,  he  cannot  defeat  the 
proceedings  by  asking  leave  to  amend  his  application  in  that 
particular.*^  If  the  petition  be  sufficient,  the  petitioner  is 
entitled  to  a  hearing  and  to  introduce  proof;  and  it  is  error 

Rep.   385;    59   X.    Y.    S.   971;    Id.  s-t  License  Comrs.  v.  O'Comier,  17 

28  Misc.  Rep.  278;  59  X.  Y.  S.  828;  R.  I.  40;    19  Atl.  1080. 

In  re  Kinze,  28  Misc.  Rep.  622;  59  ss  Deignan  v.  License  Comrs.,  10 

N.  Y.  682.]  R.  L  727;   19  Atl.  332. 

siRegina   v.    Cockshott    [1898],  se  Martin  v.  State,  23  Xeb.  371 ; 

1  Q.  B.   582;    62  J.  P.  325;    67  L.  36  X.  W.   554.     Usually  this   cei- 

J.  Q.  B.  407;  78  L.  T,  168;  14  T.  L.  tificate    is    conclusive.      People    v. 

R.  264.  Lyman,  53  X.   Y.  App.  Div.   470; 

82  7,1  re  Lj'man,  44  X.  Y.  App.  65  X.  Y.  Supp.   1062. 

Div.    507;    60    X.    Y.    Supp.    805,  87  Commissioner     of     Police     v. 

affirming  27  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  327;  Donovan   [1903],   1  K.  B.  895;    67 

65   X.    Y.    Supp.    888;    Lyman    v.  J.  P.  147;   72  L.  J.  K.  B.  545;  52 

Malcom    Brewing    Co.,    160   X.    Y.  W.  R.   14;   88  L.  T.  555;    19  T.  L. 

96;    54  X.  E.   577;   55   X.  E.   408,  R.  392. 

affirming  40  X.  Y.  App.  Div.   46;  88  7,^  re   Deuel,    55    X.   Y.   Misc. 

57  X.  Y.  Supp.  634.  Rep.  618;  106  X.  Y.  Supp.  1030. 

83  Cherry  v.  Commonwealth,  78 
Va.  375. 


745  REVOCATION   OF   LICENSE.  §  452 

to  deny  him  that  right. '^^  Under  the  former  New  York  stat- 
ute the  case  could  be  referred  to  a  referee  to  take  and  report 
the  evidence  and  his  conclusions  thereon ;  ^^  but  not  under 
the  present  statute.^"*  The  trial  must  be  upon  the  facts  alleged ; 
and  there  can  be  no  revocation  upon  facts  not  alleged,^^  even 
though  the  respondent  avers  he  is  entitled  to  hold  his  li- 
cense.^- But  where  the  application  was  for  the  revocation  of 
five  liquor  tax  certificates  for  five  different  places,  and  the 
evidence  showed  a  violation  at  only  four  of  the  places,  it  was 
held  that  there  must  be  a  judgment  of  forfeiture  for  the  fifth 
place."^  "Where  an  order  was  issued  for  the  licensee  to  show 
cause  why  his  license  should  not  be  revoked,  and  he  appeared 
before  the  city  council  by  attorney  as  ordered  and  confessed 
that  such  council  had  authority  to  revoke  the  license,  and  a 
warrant  for  the  rebate  of  the  unexpired  part  of  the  license  fee 
was  ordered  drawn,  it  was  held  that  it  sufficiently  appeared 
that  he  consented  to  the  revocation."*  If  the  licensee  agreed 
in  writing  when  the  license  was  granted  that  he  would  not 
sell  liquors  on  Sunday,  he  cannot  complain  of  a  judgment 
revoking  his  license  because  of  his  violation  of  the   agree- 

89  7n  re  Clement,  IIG  N.  Y.  App.  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  751;  order  [1904], 

Div.    148;    101    N.    Y.    Supp.    683;  89  N.  Y.  S.  683;  97  App.  Div.  122, 

In  re  Campbell,   8  Pa.   Super.   Ct.  630,   affirmed;   In   re  Cullinan,   73 

524;    In  re  Arnold,  30  Pa.   Super  N.  E.  1122,  181  N.  Y.  527-530;  Ap- 

Ct.  93.  peal  of  Kray,  Id. ;  Appeal  of  Jacobs, 

90 /n  re  Bridge,  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  73   N.    E.    1122;    181    N.    Y.    529; 

1105;  36  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  533;   55  Appeal  of  Johnson,  73  N.  E.  1122; 

N.   Y.   Supp.   54,   affirming   25   N.  181  N.  Y.  528;   Appeal  of  Kojan, 

Y.  Misc.  Rep.  213;  Plass  v.  Clark,  Id.;    Appeal   of   Koster,   73   N.   E. 

71     N.     Y.     App.     Div.     488;     76  1122;    181    N.    Y.   529;    Appeal   of 

N.  Y.  iSupp.  2;   In  re  Halbraii,  30  Arkenau,   73   N.   E.    1122;    181    K 

N.   Y.   Misc.   Rep.   515;    63   N.   Y.  Y.   527;   Appeal   of  Straus,   73  N. 

Supp.  1024;  Cullinan  v.  Babating,  E.   1122;    181  N.  Y.  530.              '^ 

49  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  442;   99  KY.  ^i  pjass  v.  Clark,  71  N.  Y.  App, 

Supp.  977.  Div.  488;   76  N.  Y.  Supp.  2. 

90* /ii    re    Clement,    187    N".    Y.  92  piass  v.  Clark,  supra. 

274;     79    N.     E.     1003;      (see    In  os  in  re  Lyman,  59  N.  Y.  App. 

re  Lawson,    109   N.    Y.   App.   Div.  Div.  217;   69  N.  Y.  Supp.  309;  67 

195;   98  N.   Y.   Supp.   33)  ;    In  re  N.  Y.  Supp.  48. 

Cullinan,  109  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  816;  94  Hoi  pa  v.  Aberdeen,  34  Wash. 

554;    76   Pac.   79. 


§§453,454       TRAFFIC  IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  746 

ment.^^     The  board,  council  or  court  may  grant  continuances 
of  the  trial,  as  in  other  matters.^*' 

Sec.  453.    Dismissal  of  proceedings — Expiration  of  license. 

A  proceeding  to  revoke  a  license  cannot  be  dismissed  merely 
because  the  license  to  be  revoked  has  expired  by  its  own  lim- 
itation, unless  the  petitioner  consent  thereto;  for  the  peti- 
tioner has  a  right  to  have  the  question  involved  determined 
upon  its  merits,  in  order  to  recover  his  eosts.^^  But  the 
petitioner  may  apply  for  a  discontinuance  of  the  proceed- 
ings.''^ Under  the  New  York  statute  proceedings  may  be 
maintained  after  an  abatement  of  prior  proceedings  hy  rea- 
son of  the  petitioner's  death.®" 

Sec.  454.    Estoppel  to  revoke. 

As  a  rule  a  licensing  officer  or  board  cannot  estop  itself 
so  as  to  prevent  a  revocation  of  a  license  for  a  proper  cause, 
even  where  an  innocent  person  may  suffer  by  the  revocation. 
Thus,  where  a  statute  forbade  a  transfer  of  a  license  after  the 
holder  had  violated  any  provision  of  the  liquor  law,  an  approval 
of  a  transfer  by  a  deputy  excise  commissioner  without  any 
know'ledge  of  a  violation  of  the  law  by  the  holder,  was  held 
not  to  estop  or  preclude  the  excise  commissioner  from  pro- 
ceeding against  the  assignee  for  the  revocation  of  the  license, 

95  Belt  V.  Paul,  (Ark.),  91  S.  408;  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  968;  48  N. 
W.  301.  Y.  App.  Div.  275;   62  N.  Y.  Supp. 

96  State  V.  JCommon  Council,  41  846;  In  re  Schuyler,  32  Misc.  Rep. 
Minn.  211;   42  N.  W.   1058;   In  re  221;    66   N.    Y.    Supp.   251;    In  re 
Lyman,  53   N.   Y.   App.   Div.  330;  Faber,   115   N.   Y.  App.  Div.  451; 
65  N.  Y.  Supp.  673.  101  N.  Y.  Supp.  429;  In  re  Clem- 
It  is  no  defense  that  the  license  ent,    59    N.    Y.    Misc.    Rep.    367; 

was    surrendered    before    the    pro-  112  N.  Y.  Supp.  337;  In  re  Clem- 

ceedings  were  begun.     In  re  Clem-  ent,  62  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  512;   116 

ent,  62  N  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  512;    116  N.  Y.  Sup.  1076. 

N.  Y.  Supp.  1070;  In  re  Clement,  ^»  In  re  Cullinan.  39  N.  Y.  Misc. 

59  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  307;    112  N.  Rep.  558;  79  X.  Y.  Supp.  582. 

Y.  STipp.  337.  99  In  re  Halbran,  30  N.  Y.  Misc. 

97  In  re  Lyman,   28  Misc.   Rep.  Rep.  517;  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  1026. 


747  REVOCATION   OP   LICENSE,  §  455 

although  he  knew  of  the  violation  of  tlu;  law  at  the  time  of 
the   transfer.^ 

Sec.  455.     Appeal — Certiorari. 

Unless  some  statute  provides  for  an  appeal  from  an  order 
or  judgment  of  the  licensing  board  or  court  revoking  a  license, 
none  can  be  taken.-  But  where  no  appeal  can  be  taken, 
a  writ  of  certiorari  lies  to  review  the  legality  of  the  proceed- 
ings ;  *  yet  not  to  review  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence,* 
unless  it  be  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  board  or  court 
were  authorized  to  draw  the  inference  it  did  and  not  that 
they  rightly  found  the  facts.'^  Certiorari  cannot  be  used  as  a 
substitute  for  an  appeal ;  but  may  be  used  to  determine  whether 
the  court  or  board  revoking  the  license  acted  without  juris- 
diction or  in  excess  of  its  jurisdiction."  In  Pennsylvania 
where  the  affidavit  filed  with  the  petition  specifically  alleges 
the  ground  for  the  revocation  and  the  order  of  revocation 
specifies  no  other  ground,  the  Appellate  Court  will  examine 
the  petition  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  alleged  act 
was  a  violation  of  the  law.'^  In  determining  the  qualifica- 
tions of  the  applicant  and  the  suitableness  of  his  place  for 
the  liquor  traffic,  a  court  acts  judicially;  and  an  objection 
cannot  be  made  that  the  order  granting  or  refusing  the  li- 
cense cannot  be  appealed  from  because  it  is  not  a  judicial 

1  In  re  Cullinan,  87  N.  Y.  App.  ^  Gaertner  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  34 
Div.  47;  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  102.5.  Wis.  497;  State  v.  Lichta,  130 
Simpson  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky),  Mo.  App.  204;  109  S.  W.  S25. 
104  S.  W.  269;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  •* /u  re  Carlson,  127  Pa.  St.  330; 
821;  104  S.  W.  270;  31  Ky.  L.  18  Atl.  8;  24  W.  N.  C.  184;  Ap- 
Eep.  851.  peal  of  Meenan,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

2  Appeal  of  Wakenian,  70  Conn.  579;  People  v.  Board,  24  Him  195; 
313;  50  Atl.  733;  Regina  v.  Croth-  In  re  McGinley,  32  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
ers,    11    :\lanitoba    567;    State    v.  324. 

Superior  Court    (Wash.),   87  Pac.  s  Rodden    v.    License    Commis- 

818;   Barnett  v.  Pemiscot  Co.  Ct.,  sioners   (R.  I.),  21  Atl.  1020. 

Ill   Mo.  Ann.   GO:    86   S.   W.  .575;  estate  v.  Lichta,  130  Mo.  App. 

State  V.  Kivk.   112  Mo.  App.  447;  294;     109    S.    W.    825;    People    v. 

86    S.    W.    1099;    Dolan's   Appeal,  Board,  24  Hun   195. 

108  Pa.  St.  564.  '^  Appeal     of     Meenan,     11     Pa. 

Super.   Ct.  579. 


§  455         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  748 

aet.^  But  it  has  also  been  held  that  in  such  a  ease  the  court 
acts  in  an  administrative  and  ministerial  capacity,  and  there- 
fore no  appeal  lies  from  its  order  of  revocation.''  A  writ  of 
certiorari  does  not  lie  to  review  the  resolution  of  a  city 
council  revoking  a  license  on  the  ground  that  the  applicant 
was  not  qualified  to  receive  it  and  was  guilty  of  a  fraud  in 
securing  it ;  because  the  resolution  will  be  entirely  disregarded 
in  a  subsequent  proceeding  to  determine  the  validity  of  the 
license.^"  But  where  an  ordinance  of  a  city  provided  for  a 
revocation  of  a  license  issued  under  its  provision  on  the 
holder's  conviction  of  a  violation  of  its  provisions,  and  that 
the  council's  clerk  should  submit  to  the  council  each  convic- 
tion; it  was  held  that  the  ordinance  contemplated  that  the 
clerk  should  submit  the  evidence  of  the  conviction  before 
any  action  Avas  taken  revoking  the  license,  and  if  a  revoca- 
tion was  made  without  the  evidence  being  so  submitted,  the 
action  of  the  council  might  be  reviewed  by  certiorari}'^  A 
statute  giving  an  appeal  in  instances  of  granting  and  revok- 
ing licenses  does  not  give  one  from  the  decision  of  a  licensing 
board  approving  a  transfer  of  a  license  previously  granted.^' 
So  one  cannot  appeal  from  a  revocation  of  a  license  after  the 
time  has  expired  for  which  it  was  granted ;  because  he  has  no 
beneficial  interest  in  its  revocation  after  that  time.^^  On  appeal 
matter  not  presented  in  the  petition  for  revocation  of  the  license 
cannot  be  considered.^*  For  acts  of  a  court  done  after  the 
revocation — as  the  criminal  prosecution  and  conviction  of  the 
licensee  for  the   violation   of  law  for   which   his  license  had 

8  Appeal    of    Burns,     7G     Conn.  n  Carr  v.  Augusta,  124  Ga.  116; 

395;   50  Atl.  611;    Carr  v.  Augus-  52   S.   E.   300;    People   v.   McGlyn, 

ta,    124    Ga.    116;    52    S.    E.    300  131  X.  Y.  602;   30  N.  E.  804,  af- 

( action  of  city  council  reviewed  on  firming    62    Hun    237;     16    N.    Y. 

certiorari)  ;    Barry    v.    Little     (X.  Supp.  736. 

H.),   68   Atl.   40    (State   Board  of  12  Appeal  of  Wakeman,  70  Conn. 

License  Commissioners).  313;    50   Atl.    733. 

estate   v.   Kirk,    112   Mo.   App.  is  Holpa  v.  Alx'rdeen,  34  Wash. 

447;    86   S.   W.    1099;    Barnett   v.  554:   76  Pac.  79. 

Pemiscot    Co.    Ct.,    Ill    Mo.   App.  1^ /»  re  Purdy,  40  X.   Y.   App. 

693;  86  S.  W.  575.  Div.   133;    57  N.   Y.   Supp.   629. 

10  State    V.     SchrofT,     123    Wis. 
98;    100   X.   W.    1030. 


749  REVOCATION   OP    LICENSE.  §  455 

been  previously  revoked — a  review  does  not  lie  in  reviewing 
its  action  in  revoking  the  license.^'"'  In  order  to  appeal  from 
the  action  of  a  court  or  board  revoking  a  license,  the  order 
or  resolution  of  revocation  need  not  be  delivered  to  the  li- 
censee.^® If  the  revocation  has  been  made  on  the  ground 
that  the  licensee  had  been  convicted  of  a  violation  of  the 
liquor  laws,  then  a  review  of  the  proceedings  for  the  con- 
viction cannot  be  had  in  a  review  of  the  proceedings  for  a 
revocation ;  as,  for  instance,  the  sufficiency  of  the  indictment 
on  which  he  was  convicted.' '^  Where  the  petition  for  a  writ 
of  certiorari  alleges  that  the  licensing  board  revoked  his  li- 
cense without  informing  the  petitioner  for  the  writ  of  the 
nature  of  the  accusation  against  him,  or  hearing  any  wit- 
nesses, the  writ  will  be  granted.'^  A  failure  to  swear  the  wit- 
nesses is  sufficient  to  quash  the  proceedings  under  a  statute 
providing  that  "witnesses  for  and  against"  the  licensee  "may 
be  heard. "'^  A  resolution  of  a  city  council  that  "in  view 
of  the  evidence  presented,  the  license  of  the  respondent  be, 
and  the  same  is  hereby  revoked,"  is  not  subject  to  be  set  aside 
on  a  writ  of  certiorari  because  there  are  no  express  findings 
that  the  allegations  of  the  petition  are  true.^°  A  statute  pro- 
viding for  an  appeal  from  an  order  of  court  revoking  a 
city  license  entitles  the  city  to  a  notice  of  the  appeal,  and  in 
the  absence  of  such  a  notice,  an  order  restoring  the  license 
revoked  is  irregular.-'  But  until  set  aside,  an  order  of  re- 
vocation is  valid,  if  notice  of  the  proceedings  has  been  given. -^ 

15  Commonwealth    v.    Wall,    145  of  an  unsworn  witness  is  a  waiver 
Mass.  216;   13  N.  E.  486.  of   the   right   to   have  him   sworn. 

16  People  V.  Forbes,  52  Hun  30;  Stroup    v.    State,     70     Iml.    495; 
4  N.  Y.   Supp.  757;   22  N.  Y.  St.  Strange  v.  Prince,  17  Ind.  524. 
Rep.    278;    State   v.    Schmidtz,   65  20  State  v.  Beloit,  74  Wis.  267; 
Iowa  556;  22  N.  W.  673.  42  N.  W.  110. 

1"  Conner       v.       Commonwealth  21  Commonwealth     v.     Campbell 
(Ky.),    16    S.    W.    454;     13    Ky.  (Ky.),  107  S.  W.  797;   32  Ky.  L. 
L.  Rep.  403.  Rep.     1131.       See    also    Common- 
is  Deignan  v.  Providence  License  wealth  v.  Wall,  145  Mass.  216;   13 
Comrs.,  16  R.  I.  727;   19  Atl.  332.  N.   E.   486,  and   Carr  v.   Augusta, 

19  License    Comrs.    v.    O'Conner,  124  Ga.   116;  52  N.  E.  300. 

17  R.  L  40;   10  Atl.   1080.     But  a  22  Barry   v.   Little    (N.   H.),   68 

failure  to  object  to  the  testimony  Atl.    40.      In    this   case   the   State 


§456  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  750 

Statutes  sometimes  give  to  any  person — as  a  taxpayer  or 
citizen  of  the  community — feeling  aggrieved  by  the  decision 
of  the  licensing  board  or  court,  the  right  to  appeal.-"'  If  the 
record  or  appeal  show  that  the  court  acted  wholly  upon  the 
evidence  given  in  a  criminal  prosecution  wherein  the  licensee 
was  acquitted,  the  judgment  of  revocation  will  be  reversed.^* 
On  a  certiorari  to  review  the  action  of  a  city  council,  the 
court  should  reciuire  the  council  to  file  an  answer.-^ 

Sec.  456.    Effect  of  revocation — Stay  of  proceedings. 

The  act  of  revocation  avoids  the  license,  and  renders  all 
sales  thereunder  thereafter  illegal,  even  though  a  writ  of 
certiorate  has  been  sued  out.-"  The  order  of  revocation  is  not 
a  bar  to  a  criminal  proceeding  because  of  sales  made  by  the 
licensee  on  Sundiiy.-''  A  judgment  or  order  of  revocation 
is  valid  until  reversed  or  set  askle; -^  and  binds  the  servants 
and  agents  of  the  licensee.-^  AVhere  a  prohibition  order  was 
set  aside,  and  then  an  order  entered  setting  aside  the  order 
of  revocation  of  such  prohibition  order,  wherebv  a  licensee's 
license  was  revoked,  and  thereafter  the  prohibition  order 
was  revoked,  it  was  held  that  a  second  license  could  not  be 
issued  without  the  payment  of  a  new  license  fee.^"     A  stat- 

Board  of  License  Commissioners  Lyman,  32  N".  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  210; 
heard  ex  parte  evidence  prior  to  07  N.  Y.  Supp.  502;  hi  re  Auer- 
the  regular  hearing,  and  it  did  not  beck,  31  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  46;  64 
appear  that  at  the  subsequent  N.  Y.  Supp.  003;  Clement  v.  Vis- 
hearing  the  licensee  was  ignorant  cosi,  63  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  514;  118 
of  the  board's  act,  or  that  an  ob-  N.  Y.  Supp.  613.  In  some  juris- 
jection  was  made  to  the  act  of  dictions  the  appeal  keeps  the 
the  board.  license  in  force.     Simonton  v.  Col- 

23  Appeal  of  Cole,  79  Conn.  679 ;  bourne,    3    Terr.    L.    R.    372.      See 

66  Atl.  508.  Cullinan    v.    Devito     (N.    Y.),    99 

24 /n  re  McGinlcy,  32  Pa.  Super.  N.  Y.  Supp.  976. 

Ct.  324.  27  State   v.    O'Connor,    58   Minn. 

25  0arr  v.  Augusta,  124  Ga.  1.16;  193;   59  N.  W.  999. 

52  N.  E.  300.  28  State  v.  Corron,  73  N.  H.  434; 

26Neumanv.  State,  76  Wis.  112;  62    Atl.    1044;    State    v.    Barnett, 

45  N.  W.  30;  Melton  v.  Moultrie,  111  Mo.  App.  552;  86  S.  W.  460. 

114  Ga.  462;   40  S.  E.  302    {In  re  29  state  v.  Barnett,  supra. 

Washburn,    32    N.    Y.    Misc.    Rep.  3o  Alexander    v.    State,    77    Ark. 

303;    66  N.  Y.   Supp.   732;    In  re  294;  91  S.  W.  181. 


751  REVOCATION   OF   LICENSE.  §  457 

nte  requiring  the  licensed  premises  to  be  closed  by  a  police 
officer  when  the  license  is  revoked  will  not  justify  the  officer 
in  forcibly  ousting  the  licensee  from  the  premises  and 
thereby  depriving  him  of  the  use  of  his  property.^^  A 
statute  empowering  a  board  to  enter  and  take  possession  of  a 
license  and  cancel  it,  where  necessary,  requires  no  formal 
revocation,  and  it  is  sufficient  to  write  the  licensee  his  license 
is  revoked  and  they  will  call  on  him  for  it.  On  the  dav  such 
a  notice  is  given  the  license  may  be  taken  away.^-  An  appeal 
from  a  judgment  or  order  cancelling  a  license  does  not  re- 
instate such  judgment  or  order,  and  no  stay  of  proceedings 
will  be  granted."^ 

Sec.  457.    Costs. 

If  the  license  be  cancelled  upon  the  charges  set  forth  in  the 
petition,  the  petitioner  recovers  his  costs;  and  although  the 
license  expires  by  efflux  of  time  before  the  proceedings  are 
carried  to  a  final  determination,  the  petitioner  is  entitled  to 
have  the  charges  set  forth  in  his  petition  tried  in  order  to 
recover  h^!s  costs.-"**  But  a  judgment  cannot  be  rendered 
against  an  officer  personally  whose  duty  it  is  to  institute  and 
prosecute  the  proceedings  for  cancellation.^^  Where  an  appli- 
cant acted  in  good  faith  and  was  awarded  a  license  when 
he  was  not  entitled  to  it,  on  application  of  the  commissioner 

31  Baldwin  v.  Smith,  82  111.  1G2;  a  violation  of  law,  a  judgment  for 
See  also  Born  v.  Hopper,  110  N.  the  defendant  is  a  bar  to  an  action 
Y.  App.  Div.  218;  96  N.  Y.  Supp.  for  a  penalty  based  on  the  same 
671;  48  N.  Y.  Mies.  Rep.  177;  violation,  the  issue  being  the  same 
96  N.  Y.  Supp.  671.  in  both  actions.     Clement  v.  Moore 

32  People  V.  Woodman,  4  N.  Y.  (N.  Y.  App.  Div.),  119  N.  Y.  Supp. 
Supp.    532;     22    N.    Y.     St.    Rep.  883. 

435.  34  In  re  Lyman,  28  N.  Y.  Misc. 

33 /»    re    Auberbach,    31    N.    Y.  Rep.    408;    59    N.    Y.    Supp.    968; 

Misc.    Rep.    46 ;    64    N.    Y.    Supp.  In  re  Clement,  59  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

603;  In  re  Lyman,  32  N.  Y.  Misc.  367;    112  N.  Y.  Sunp.  337;   In  re 

Rep.    210;    67    N.    Y.    Supp.   502;  Clement,  62  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  512; 

Goldman     v.     Goodrum,    77     Ark.  116  N.  Y.   Supp.   1070. 

580;   92  S.  W.  865.     In  an  action  35 /n  re  Seymour,  47  N.  Y.  App. 

to    revoke    his    license    because    of  Div.  320;   62  N.  Y.  Supp.  25. 


§  §  458,  459        TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  752 

of  excise  to  cancel  it,  judgment  for  costs  in  his  favor  was 
refused.^® 


Sec.  458.    Rebate  of  fees. 

As  a  holder  of  a  license  has  only  a  permit  and  not  a  prop- 
erty or  vested  right  therein,^''  a  statute  providing  for  a  revoca- 
tion of  a  license  need  not  provide  for  a  return  of  the  unearned 
part  of  the  fee  f^  and  the  authorities  cannot  be  enjoined  from 
ordering  a  revocation  on  that  ground.^®  The  public  authori- 
ties may  retain  so  much  of  the  license  fee  as  covers  that  por- 
tion of  the  period  for  which  the  license  is  revoked.*"  "Where 
a  license  was  granted  and  the  license  fee  paid,  an  appeal  taken 
and  the  license  suspended,  but  an  appeal  was  finally  deter- 
mined in  favor  of  the  grant  of  the  license,  it  was  held  that 
the  licensee  was  entitled  to  a  repayment  of  .such  proportion 
of  the  fee  as  the  time  when  the  license  was  suspended  bore  to 
the  period  for  which  the  license  should  have  run.*^ 

Sec.  459.    Liability  of  city  for  mistakenly  revoking  license. 

A  municipality  cannot  be  held  liable  for  the  mistaken  action 

of  its  council  in  attempting  to  revoke  or  in  revoking  a  license.*^ 

sa /n  re  Clement,  57  N.  Y.  Misc.  295;    95    Pac.    81;    Alexander    v. 

Kep.  47;   107  N.  Y.  Supp.  205.  State,  77  Ark.  294;  91  S.  W.  181; 

In    Massachusetts,    under    Pub.  In  re  Lyman,  28  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

St.  c.  100,  sec.  7,  the  court  cannot  278;    59   N.   Y.   Supp.   828;    In  re 

render  a  judgment  against  the  li-  CuUinan,  87  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  47; 

censee   for   costs   on   revocation   of  83  N.  Y.  Supp.   1025;   H.  Koehler 

his    license.      Young    v.    Blaisdell,  &  Co.  v.  Clement,  111  X.  Y.  Supp. 

138  Mass.  344.  151;   In  re  Falx-r,   115  X.  Y.  App. 

37  People  V.  Wright,  3  Hun  306;  Div.  451;  101  X.  Y.  Supp.  429; 
5  T.  &  C.  518;  People  v.  McBride,  People  v.  Lyman,  168  X.  Y.  669; 
234  111.   146;   84  X.  E.  865.  61  X.  E.  1133,  affirming  53  N.  Y. 

38  Melton  v.  Moultrie,  114  Ga,  App.  Div.  470;  65  X.  Y.  Supp. 
462;   40  S.  E.  302;  Ex  parte  Vac-  1062. 

carezza,    52    Tex.    Cr.    App.    105;  ^i  Auburn    v.    Mayer,    58    Xeb. 

105  S.  W.  1119.  101;    7«  X.  W.  462. 

39  Melton     V.     Moultrie,     supra  42  Claussen  v.  Luverne,  103  Minn. 
40Kreuger  v.  Colville,  49  Wash.  491;   115  X.  W.  643. 


753  REVOCATION    OF    LICENSE.  §  460 

Sec.  460.     Action  on  bond  when  license  forfeited. 

Statutes  sometimes  provide  for  an  action  on  the  licensee's 
bond  when  his  license  is  forfeited.  Where  the  court  could 
certify  that  in  its  opinion,  on  conviction,  the  bond  ought  not 
to  be  forfeited  and  no  action  could  then  be  maintained,  bvit 
upon  a  forfeiture  the  clerk  of  the  court  should  mail  a  copy 
of  the  .iudsrment  to  the  county  treasurer  who  should  bring 
suit  thereon,  and  on  the  conviction  of  a  licensee  no  forfeiture 
was  decreed,  the  court  postponing  its  determination  of  that 
question  for  its  final  determination,  yet  the  clerk  by  mistake 
issued  a  copy  of  the  judgment  of  forfeiture,  and  suit  was 
brought  upon  the  bond,  and  subseouent  to  this  the  court 
issued,  upon  the  licensee  complying  with  the  provisions  of  the 
statute  with  reference  to  the  arrangement  of  his  premises,  a 
certificate  that  the  bond  should  not  be  forfeited,  it  was  held 
that  the  action  of  the  court  was  a  good  defense  to  the  action 
on  the  bond.** 

« Jacobs    V.    Reilly,    80    Conn.   275;    68  Ail.  251. 


CHAPTER  XIL 
BOND  OF  LICENSEE. 


SECTION. 

461.     Power  to  require  a  bond. 

No  statute  requiring  a  bond. 

Statute  unconstitutional  — 
Local   option. 

Giving  bond  a  condition 
precedent  to  granting  a 
license. 

Retroactive  efTect. 

Form. 

Who  may  be  sureties  there- 
on. 

Approving  and  filing — Man- 
damus. 

Void  license. 

Cancellation  of  bond. 

Breach  of  conditions  of 
bond. 

Breach  of  conditions — Of- 
fenses as  to  minors. 


462. 
463. 


464. 


465. 
466. 
467. 

468. 

469. 
470. 
471. 

472. 


SECTION. 

473.     Liability    of    sureties. 

Transfer  of  license. 

Persons  entitled  to  sue  on 
bond. 

A  civil  action — Agent. 

Judgment  of  forfeiture  on 
conviction,  a  prerequisite 
to  suit. 

Effect  of  judgment  against 
principal  upon  surety  — 
Evidence. 

Attacking  validity  of  license 
and   proceedings  therefor. 

Pleading. 

Evidence. 

Amount  of  damages  recov- 
erable on  bond. 

Compromise  of  liability. 


474. 
475. 

476. 

477. 


478. 


479. 

480. 
481. 

482. 

483. 


Sec.  461.    Power  to  require  a  bond. 

As  a  condition  precedent  to  engaging  in  the  liquor  traffic, 
and  as  one  of  the  conditions  on  which  a  license  can  be  claimed, 
the  Legislature  has  full  power  to  require  that  a  bond  be  given 
by  the  licensee  with  sureties  obligating  himself  to  pay  penal- 
ties and  liabilities  incurred  by  his  violation  of  the  liquor  laws. 
Such  statutes  are  constitutional.^ 


1  Cullinan  v.  Burkhard,  93  N. 
Y.  App.  Div.  31;  86  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1003,  reversing  41  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
.321;   84  N.  Y.   Supp.   825. 

There  is  nothing  unreasonable 
in  an  ordinance  requiring  a  licensee 
to  sell  "near  beer"  to  give  a  bond 


conditioned  to  keep  an  orderly 
house,  to  comply  with  the  regula- 
tions governing  it,  not  to  violate 
the  State  law,  and  to  pay  all  fines 
assessed  against  him  for  violation 
of  its  provisions.  Campbell  v. 
Thomasville  (Ga.),  64  S.  E.  815. 
754 


755  BOND   OF   LICENSEE.  §  §  462,  463 

Sec.  462.     No  statute  requiring  a  bond. 

In  order  to  render  a  bond  valid  some  statute  must  require  it. 
If  no  statute  require  it,  then  the  licensing  board  cannot,  and  if 
one  pursuant  to  a  demand  of  an  officer  be  executed  and  filed, 
it  will  be  void.  Even  as  a  voluntary  bond  it  is  not  valid." 
A  subsequent  law  making  the  law  under  which  the  bond  was 
supposed  to  be  required  applicable  to  the  principal  in  the 
bond  will  not  render  it  valid.'  Until  filed  and  approved  there 
is  no  liability  on  a  bond.*  A  bond  imposing  res'^raints  upon 
a  licensee  in  addition  to  those  required  by  statute  has  been 
held  void,'"*  but  the  better  rule  is  that  it  is  not.''  A  second  bond 
given  under  the  belief  that  the  first  was  invalid,  on  request 
of  the  licensing  officer,  when  it  was  not,  is  invalid.''  But 
where  the  licensing  board,  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
issuance  of  a  license,  demanded  the  execution  of  a  boud 
running  to  the  State,  it  was  held  to  be  a  good  common  law 
bond.^ 

Sec.  463.     Statute  unconstitutional — Local  option. 

If  a  statute  under  which  a  bond  is  given  be  unconstitutional 
the  bond  is  void ;  ^  but  one  who  has  never  executed  a  bond 
when  a  license  was  granted,  and  has  been  arrested  for  sales 
without  a  license,  is  not  in  a  position,  on  an  application  for 
his  release  from  arrest,  to  be  heard  upon  the  validity  of  the 
conditions  of  the  bond  as  required  by  the  statute.^"  If  local 
option  be  adopted  a  right  of  action  to  recover  a  penalty 
ceases.^  ^ 

2  Commonwealth       v.       Ledford  7  Howes   v.   Maxwell   157   Mass. 
(Ky.),  110  S.  W.  &S9;   33  Ky.  L.       333;  32  N.  E.  152. 

Eep.  p     624  ®  People  v.  Eckman,  63  Hun  209 ; 

3  Gorman  v.  Williams,  117  Iowa  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  654.  See  also 
560;   91  N.  W.  819.  O'Brien   Co.   v.   Mahon,    126    Iowa 

4  Allen     V.     Houck     (Tex.     Civ.  539;  102  N.  W.  446. 

App.),  92  S.  W.  993.  9  Cassel    v.   Scott,    17   Ind.   514; 

5  Crosby  v.  Snow,  16  Me.  121.  Dunham  v.  Hough,  80  Mich.  648; 

6  Lyman  v.   Brucker,  26  N.   Y.       45  N.  W.  497. 

Misc.   Rep.   594;    56   N.   Y.    Supp.  ^o  Ex  parte  Bell,   24   Tex.   App, 

767;    Walker   v.   Holtsclaw,   57   S.  428;    6  S.  W.   197. 

C.  459;    35   S.   E.  754:    Dowiat  v.  n  Long   v.    A.    L.    Green    &    Co. 

People,  92  111.  App.  433;   affirmed  (Te.x.  Civ.  App.),  95  S.  W.  79. 
193  111.  264;  61  N.  E.  1059, 


§  464  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  756 

Sec.  464.     Giving  bond  a  condition  precedent  to  granting  a 
license. 

In  many  of  the  States,  if  not  all,  applicants  are  required  to 
give  a  bond  before  the  license  is  issued.  The  conditions  of 
these  bonds  vary,  but  usually  they  are  conditioned  to  pay 
all  fines  and  penalties  assessed  against  the  principal  or  licensee 
and  to  pay  all  civil  damages  occasioned  by  illegal  sales  of 
liquors.  It  is  an  invariable  rule  that  a  license  is^ed — not 
granted — without  a  bond  being  filed  with  the  proper  officer  is 
invalid.^"  A  statute  requiring  a  licensed  saloon  keeper  to 
give  a  bond  does  not  require  a  druggist  to  give  one,  though 
selling  liquors  for  medical  or  mechanical  purposes ;  ^^  nor  does 
it  apply  to  physicians;  ^^  nor  to  a  city  or  town  license  unless 
specifically  designated.''^  But  a  statute  requiring  "whole- 
salers" to  take  out  licenses  "in  such  manner  as  is  provided 
by  existing  laws"  requires  them  to  give  a  bond.'*^  If  a  bond 
after  its  approval  be  withdrawn,  no  license  can  be  issued 
though  the  application  has  been  granted.^^  The  State  has  the 
right  to  require  a  bond  to  be  given  before  a  license  be  granted, 
conditioned  for  the  observance  of  the  liquor  law ;  '*  and  so  has 
a  municipality."*  Statutes  sometimes  authorize  a  court 
to  require  a  bond  of  a  person  whom  it  has  reasonable  cause 
to  suspect  has  sold  liquor  without  a  license.     In  such  a  case 

12  State  V.  Fisher,  33  Wis.  154;  i*  State  v.  Ferguson,  72  Mo. 
State    V.    Bennett,    101    Mo.    App.       297. 

224;  73  S.  W.  737;  State  v.  Shaw,  is  State  v.  Willard,  39  Mo.  App, 

32  Me.  570;  State  v.  Schreiner,  86  251. 

Minn,  253;   90  N.  W.  401;  People  le  Commonwealth  v.  Deibert,   12 

V,  Berdenstein,  65  Mich,  65;  31  N.  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  504;   2  Pa.  Dist. 

W.  623.     See  People  v.  Utley,  129  Rep.    446;    People   v.    Eckman,    63 

Mich.  628 ;    89   N.   W.  349 ;    8   De-  Hun  209 ;   18  N.  Y.  Supp.  654. 

troit  L.  N,  1077.  i7  State   v.   Schreiner,   86   Minn. 

13  Moore  v.  People,  109  111.  499;  253;   90  N.  W.  401. 

State  V.   Courtney,   73   Iowa   619;  is  Cullinan   v.   Burkhard,  93   N. 

35  N.  W.  685;   State  v.  Ferguson,  Y.  App.  Div.  31;   86  N.  Y.   Supp. 

72  Mo,  297,  1003;    reversing    41    N,    Y,    Misc, 

But    a    statute    may    require    a  Rep.   321;    84  N.  Y.  Supp.   825. 

druggist   to   give   a   bond.     People  i8*//i   re    Greystock,    12    U.    C. 

V.    Utley,    129    Mich.    628;    89    N.  458. 
W.  349;  8  Det.  Leg.  N.  1077. 


757  BOND   OF    LICENSEE.  §§465,466 

an  mdictment  found,  of  a  sale  without  a  license,  is  a  suffi- 
cient cause  for  the  requiring  of  the  bond/''  While  the  general 
rule  is  that  a  license  issued  before  the  license  fee  is  paid  is 
void,  yet  a  bond  given  in  such  an  instance  cannot  be  avoided 
if  it  was  subsequently  paid.-"  It  is  no  excuse  for  a  failure  to 
give  a  bond  that  the  licensing  officer  would  not  issue  a  license 
until  he  received  certain  blanks  from* the  State  excise  commis- 
sioners.-^ 

Sec.  465.     Retroactive  effect. 

A  bond  does  not  have  a  retroactive  effect  so  as  to  render  the 
sureties  liable  for  past  acts  of  the  principal.  Thus,  where  the 
sureties  at  first  only  signed  the  bond,  and  the  principal  did 
not  sign  it  until  after  it  had  been  filed  and  approved  and  the 
acts  complained  of  committed,  it  was  held  that  the  bond  was 
invalid  and  an  action  could  not  be  maintained  thereon  by 
reason  of  the  commission  of  such  acts."  But  it  has  been  held 
that  where,  pursuant  to  a  statute,  a  bond  must  be  executed 
every  year,  the  execution  relates  back  to  the  date  it  bears  and 
covers  the  period  of  time  between  that  date  and  the  date  of 
filing  it.-^ 

Sec.  466.     Form. 

A  bond  should  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  statute, 
and  if  it  adds  restraints  in  addition  to  those  required  by  the 
statute,  it  is  void  in  that  respect.-*  One  condition  that  the  li- 
censee shall  "duly  observe  all  laws  relating  to  intoxicating 
liquors"  is  valid  and  not  void  for  uncertainty.-^  Where  a  stat- 
ute required  the  bond  to  be  given  to  the  county  treasurer  and 

19  Anderson  v.  Commonwealth,  Houck  &  Dieter  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 
105  Va.  533;    54  S.  E.  305.  App.),  92  S.  W.  993. 

20  State  V.  Harper,  (Tex.  Civ.  23  Brockway  v.  Petted,  79  Mich. 
App.)    87   S.  W.  878.  G20;  45  N.  W.  Gl. 

21  Clement   v.    Smith,    60   N.    Y.  24  Crosby  v.  Snow,  10  ISIe.  121. 
Misc.  Rep.  595;    112  N.   Y.  Supp.  25  Quinterd  v.  Corcoran,  50  Conn. 
955.  34;    Plucknett  v.  Tippey,   45   Neb. 

22  State  V.  Teague  (Tex.  Civ.  343;  63  N.  W.  845;  Providence  v. 
App.),    Ill    S.    W.    234;    Allen   v.  Bligh,   10  E.  I.  208. 


§  466  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  75S 

his  successors  in  office,  one  made  payable  to  the  county  treas- 
urer without  giving  his  name  and  without  the  words  "and  his 
successors  in  office"  was  held  valid,  because  it  was  considered 
payable  to  whomsoever  was  treasurer  when  the  suit  was  brought 
thereon.^^  The  bond  should  usually  be  made  payable  to  the 
State  and  not  to  the  county,  nor  to  a  municipality  when  it  is  a 
State  bond.^^  But  the  statute  may  require  it  to  be  made  pay- 
able to  the  county,  even  though  a  city  therein  grant  the 
license.-*  A  bond  payable  to  the  "city  treasurer"  of  a  city 
is  valid  without  inserting  the  name  of  the  person  holding  the 
office  of  treasurer  when  it  was  executed.-"  Failure  to 
insert  the  name  of  the  county  in  which  the  liquor  traffic  is 
to  be  carried  on  Mnll  not  invalidate  the  bond.^*'  Where  a 
statute  required  the  bond  to  be  conditioned  to  "pay  all  fines 
and  forfeitures,"  one  conditioned  to  "pay  all  damages,  fines, 
costs  and  penalties"  is  a  sufficient  one.'^  Where  it  required 
a  dealer  to  give  a  general  bond  in  a  named  amount  and  a 
second  bond  in  a  named  amount  not  to  sell  adulterated  liquors, 
a  single  bond  in  an  amount  equal  to  both  such  amounts  was 
held  valid.^-  And  where  the  amount  of  the  penalty  was  left 
blank,  and  the  sureties  justified  in  the  lowest  penalty  allowed 
by  statute,  the  bond  was  held  valid  for  that  amount.^^  If 
signed  by  one  of  the  sureties  only  and  yet  be  approved  by  the 
proper  officer,  it  will  be  valid,  and  sales  thereunder  will  be 
lawful.^*  A  resolution  of  a  city  council  fixing  the  amount  of 
liquor  bonds  remains  in  force  until  repealed,  and  all  bonds 

26  Redpath     v.     Nottingham,     5  si  Crowley     v.      Commonwealth, 
Blackf.  267.                                                    123   Pa.  275;    16  Atl.  416;    23  W. 

27  St.    James    v.    Hingtgen,    47       N.   C.    148. 

Minn.  521;  SON.  W.  700;  Thomas  32  Green   Covmty   v.   Wilhite,   29 

V.  Hinkley,  19  Neb.  324;  27  N.  W.  Mo.  App.  459. 

231    (bond  valid);   Minneapolis  v.  33  Garrison  v.    Steele,  46  Mich. 

Olson,  76  Minn.  1;  78  N.  W.  877.  98;   8   N.  W.  696.     Held  valid  in 

28  Sexson  v.  Kelley,  3  Neb.  104.  the  lowest  statutory  amount. 

20  Tripp    V.    Norton,     10    R.    I.  Conira,       Louisville      v.       Cain 

125;     Redpath    v.    Nottingham,    5        (Ky.),  119  S.  \V.  763. 
Blackf.  267.  ^*  North   v.   Barringer,    147  Ind. 

30  State    V.    Sitterle     (Tex.    Civ.       224;  46  N.  E.  531.     But  see  State 
App.),  26  S.  W.  764.  v.  Teague  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  Ill  S. 

W.  234. 


759  BOND   OP   LICENSEE.  §466 

until  then  should  comply  therewith.'''  AVhere  a  statute  con- 
cerning State  dispensaries  required  the  dispenser  to  give  a 
bond  conditioned  to  obey  the  laws  of  the  State  in  relation  to 
the  sale  of  liquors  and  not  to  sell  at  a  price  other  than  that 
fixed  by  the  board  of  control,  and  a  liquor  dispenser  gave  a 
bond  conditioned  to  obey  the  laws  in  relation  to  the  sale  of 
liquors  and  not  to  sell  liquors  at  a  charge  exceeding  fifty  per 
cent,  above  their  cost  to  him,  it  was  held  that  it  was  valid  as 
to  the  first  provision  but  not  as  to  the  latter.^^  Mere  clerical 
errors  will  not  avoid  a  bond,  even  though  the  error  be  the  in- 
sertion of  an  unauthorized  condition.''^  A  bond  conditioned 
to  comply  with  a  certain  designated  act  of  the  Legislature — 
the  liquor  statute  of  the  State— is  valid  though  superseded  by 
a  later  act.'^  The  bond  need  not  contain  a  description  of  the 
principal 's  place  of  business.^^  A  city  cannot  exact  a  greater 
number  of  sureties  than  the  statute  requires."*"  If  a  bond 
must  accompany  the  application  for  a  license,  the  fact  that 
the  space  for  the  names  of  the  proposed  sureties  is  not  filled  in 
will  not  defeat  the  application,  for  it  is  not  a  substantial  de- 
fect."^ A  bond  signed  after  a  liability  under  the  liquor  law 
h,as  been  incurred  does  not  cover  such  liability.*-  Giving  a 
bond  in  a  penalty  in  a  greater  amount  than  the  statute  requires 
does  not  avoid  it,  and  it  is  valid  to  the  extent  of  the  statutory 
penalty.*^  Where  a  bond  on  its  face  showed  that  two  persons 
desired  to  engage  in  the  liquor  traffic,  and  were  the  principals 
therein,  and  was  conditioned  one  of  them  should  perform  the 

35  Hawkins     v.     Litchfield,     120  -lo  Power  v.  Litchfield,  141  Mich. 

Mich.  390;  79  N.  W.  570.  350;    104   N.   W.   664;    12  Detroit 

3G  Walker  v.  Holtzclaw,  57  S.  €.  Leg.   N.   484. 

459;   35  S.  E.  754.  ^^  In  re  Matthew,  213  Pa.  269; 

37Dowiat  V.  People,  92  111.  App.  62  Atl.  837;  In  re  Regan,  213  Pa. 

433;   affirmed   193    111.   264;    01   N.  279;    62  Atl.   841. 

E    1059.  *-  Cullinan  v.  Bowker,  88  N.  Y. 

88  O'Brien    Co.    v.    Mahon,     13G  App.    Div.    170;    84    N.    Y.    Supp. 

Iowa,  539 ;   102  N.  W.  446.  696,  reversing  40  Misc.  Rep.  439 ; 

S9  O'Brien    Co.    v.    Mahon,     126  82  N.  Y.  Supp.  707. 

Iowa  539;  102  N.  W.  440;  Douthit  43  Meador    v.     Adams,    33    Tex. 

V.   State,   36  Tex.   Civ.   App.   396;  Civ.  App.  167;  76  S.  W.  238.    Nor 

82  S.  W.  352;  83  S.  W.  795;  Mor-  does  it  if  made  in  a  less  amount, 

ris  V    Mills    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  82  Jones   v.    State    (Tex.   Civ.   App.), 

S.  W.  334.  81   S.  W.   1010. 


§  466  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  700 

things  required  of  them  by  the  statute,  it  was  held  insufficient, 
though  signed  by  both ;  and  as  the  conditions  were  limited  to 
one  of  them  only  by  the  repeated  use  of  the  pronouns  "he" 
and  "his"  following  their  names,  it  was  held  that  the  omission 
of  the  other  persons  must  be  deemed  intentional  and  could  not 
be  treated  as  a  mere  clerical  error.**  After  receiving  the 
benefits  of  a  bond  the  principal  is  estopped  to  question  its 
validity;**"'  and  a  principal  and  his  sureties  cannot  object  to 
its  validity  that  it  was  his  intention  before  and  at  the  time  he 
received  his  license  to  permit  another  to  conduct  the  business 
who  was  incompetent  to  receive  a  license.*^  A  statute  re- 
quiring a  bond  to  be  conditioned  that  the  licensee  would  not 
sell  intoxicating  liquors  in  any  quantity  except  upon  the  pre- 
scription is  not  rendered  invalid  by  a  failure  to  recite  that 
the  thing  not  to  be  sold  was  intoxicating  liquor.*^  Where 
liquors  could  be  sold  only  on  the  premises  licensed,  a  failure 
to  insert  in  the  bond  a  clause  that  the  liquors  were  to  be 
drunk  on  the  premises  was  held  not  to  render  the  bond  void, 
although  bonds  were  only  required  when  the  liquors  were  sold 
on  the  premises.*^  A  statute  required  the  licensee  to  give  a 
bond  containing  a  provision  that  he  would  not  use  any  screen 
which  would  obstruct  the  view  "through"  doors  opening  into 
the  saloon  from  the  street.  The  bond  given  provided  that  no 
screen  should  be  used  which  would  obstruct  the  view  "to" 
such  doors,  and  it  was  held  not  invalid  as  imposing  a  more 
onerous  condition  than  the  statute  required.*^  A  statute  re- 
quired saloon  keepers  to  give  a  bond  that  he  or  they  would 
not  permit  gambling  on  the  premises.  Under  it  a  bond  was 
given  wherein  the  words  "or  they"  were  used  after  "he," 
and    it    was   held    that    this    did    not    invalidate    the    bond.^" 

•Instate  V.  Harper,  99  Tex.   19:  47  Edgar    v.    State     (Tex.     Civ. 

86  S.  W.   920,  reversing  85  S.  W.  App.),    102   S.   W.   439. 

294.  48Monigal   v.    State    (Tex.    Civ. 

«  Point  Pleasant  v.  Greenlee,  r■^  App.).  45  S.  W.  1038. 

W.  Va.  207;   60  S.   E.  6C1:    State  49  State    v.    Whorton.    22     Tex. 

v.  Golding,  28   Ind.  App.   233;   02  Civ.  App.  202;    63  S.  W.  915. 

N.  E.  502.  no  State  v.  Whorton,  26  Tex.  Civ. 

restate    v.    English,    74    N.    H.  App.  262;   63  S.  W.  915. 
328;    68  Atl.    129;    Jones  v.   State 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  81  S.  W.  1010. 


761  BOND    OF    LICENSEE.  §  467 

A  wrong  description  of  the  place  to  be  licensed  inserted  in  the 
application  will  not  avoid  the  bond.'^^  A  bond  conditioned 
that  H  will  conform  to  the  provisions  of  a  liquor  statute  is 
valid  though  it  recite  that  H  and  G  desire  to  engage  in  the 
liquor  tratBc  and  that  they  are  principals.^-  A  bond  purport- 
ing to  bind  the  heirs  and  legal  representatives  of  the  obligors 
is  not  void.^'^  But  a  bond  with  only  one  surety  when  two  are 
required  is  not  a  valid  statutory  bond.^*  Where  a  statute 
required  a  bond  to  be  given  conditioned  that  the  licensee  "will 
not  violate  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  act,  and  that  he  will 
pay  all  damages,  fines,  penalties  and  forfeitures"  adjudged 
against  him,  a  bond  conditioned  that  he  would  "comply  with 
chapter  50  of  the  Compiled  Statutes"  of  the  State,  entitled 
"Liquors,  *  *  *  and,  moreover,  pay  promptl}^  all  fines, 
penalties  and  forFeitures"  adjudged  against  him,  was  held 
not  to  bind  the  sureties,  though  it  did  the  principal.^^ 
If  a  bond  be  not  properly  conditioned,  and  it  be  accepted,  on 
appeal  from  the  proceedings  an  amended  bond  cannot  be  filed 
in  the  court  to  which  the  appeal  has  been  taken.^**  It  is  error 
for  a  licensing  board  to  approve  an  improper  or  defective 
bond."'^ 

Sec.  467.     Who  may  be  sureties  thereon. 

A  bond  requiring  sureties  to  be  freeholdei's  of  a  county 
Joes  not  require  them  to  be  residents  of  the  county.''^    Where 

51  Cullinan  v.  Fidelity,  etc.  Co.  R^'  Uldrich  v.  Gilmore,  35  Neb. 
41   N.   Y.   Misc.   Rep.    119;    83   N.       288;  53  N.  W.  135. 

Y.  Supp.  969;  Castellano  v.  Marks,  A  statute  of  Michigan  required 

37   Tex.  Civ.   App.   273;    83   S.  W.  a    description    of    the    place   where 

729.  tlie  I)usiness  was  to  be  carried  on 

52  State  V.  Harper,  99  Tex.  19;  to  be  inserted.  Courtwright  v. 
86  S.  W.  920;  reversing  85  S.  W.  Newaygo,  96  Mich.  290;  55  N.  W. 
294.  808. 

ssMcLaury  v.  Watelsky,  39  Tex.  so  7,^  re  Clyde,  82  Neb.  537;    118 

Civ.  App.  394;  87  S.  W.  1045.  N.  W.  90. 

54Hillman   v.   Mayher,    38    Tex.  s- /n  re  Clyde,  82  Neb.  537 ;   118 

Civ.  App.  377;  85  S.  W.  818.    But  N.  W.  90;  In.  re  Johnson    (Neb.), 

if  one  of  the  sureties  be  disquali-  118  N.  W.  91. 

fied,    it    is    sufficient.      Wolcott    v.  58  Mathews    v.    People,    159    111. 

Burlingame    112  Mich.  311;  70  N.  399;    42   N.   E.   864;    reversing  53 

W.  831.  III.  App.  305. 


§  468         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  762 

a  statute  required  bonds  to  have  two  freehold  sureties,  and  a 
subsequent  statute  provided  that  all  bonds  required  by  law 
might  be  executed  by  surety  companies,  and  still  later  the 
first  statute  was  re-enacted,  still  containing  the  provisions  con- 
cerning two  freehold  sureties,  it  was  held  that  a  bond  executed 
by  a  surety  company  was  valid.^^  A  statute  required  the 
applicant  for  a  license  to  give  the  names  of  tw^o  freeholders 
as  sureties  and  state  that  they  were  such  bona  fide  owners  of 
real  estate,  and  that  "he  is  not  engaged  in  the  manufacture 
of  spirituous,  vinous,  or  brewed  liquors."  It  was  held  that 
this  did  not  prohiliit  a  brewer  becoming  surety  on  a  bond 
because  the  clause  quoted  applied  only  to  the  applicant. ""  If 
a  person  can  only  be  accepted  on  one  bond,  yet  if  he  became 
surety  on  a  second  one,  he  cannot  for  that  reason  defend 
against  an  action  on  the  second  bond.*'^ 


Sec.  468.    Approval  and  filing — Mandamus. 

Approval  of  the  bond  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the 
license  for  that  is  its  acceptance,  and  until  accepted  it  is  not 
in  force.'"'-  But  the  approval  of  the  bond  may  be  implied,  as 
the  issuance  or  receipt  for  the  license  money  on  presentation 
of  a  bond  are  a  direction  to  the  licensing  clerk  to  issue  the 
license  ;^^  and  the  filing  of  it  is  presumptive  evidence  of  its 
approval.*'*    But  a  report  by  a  committee  of  a  council  to  which 

59Taggart   v.   Hillman,   42   Tex.  6=  Curtz   v.    State,    4    Ind.    385; 

Civ.  App.  71;   93  S.  W.  245;   Tag-  State    v.    Bennett,    101    Mo.    App. 

gart  V.  Graham   (Te.x.  Civ.  App.),  224;  73  S.  W.  737. 

93  S.  W.  246;   Hicks  v.  Trustees,  Contra,  Harper  v.  Calder    (Tex. 

151  Mich.  88;    114  N.  W.  682;   14  Civ.  App.),  39  S.  W.  623. 

Detroit  L.   N.   812.  63  Prather  v.  People,  85  HI.  36; 

An  ordinance  requiring  the  sure-  Thomas   v.  Hinkley,    19   Neb.  324; 

ty  to  be  a  guaranty  or  surety  com-  27  N.   W.  231;   Meinoz  v.  Brassel 

pany  is  void.     Campbell  v.  Thom-  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  108  S.  W.  417; 

asville    (Ga.),  64  S.  E.  815.  Deckard  v.  Drewrey,  64  Ark.  599; 

60  7n   re   Schuylkill   Co.,   24  Pa.  44  S.  W.  351;   Coggeshall  v.  Pal- 
Co.    Ct.    Rep.    571.      See    Attorney  lett,  15  E.  I.  168;   1  Atl.  413. 
Ceneml  v.  Pall,  66  J.  P.  553.  g4  Howes  v.  Maxwell,   157  Mass. 

61  Thomas  v.  Hinkley,  19  Neb.  333;  32  N.  E.  152.  See  Graves 
324;  27  N.  W.  231.  v.  McHugh,  58  Mo.  499. 


763  BOND   OF    LICENSEE.  §  468 

it  has  been  referred  for  examination,  in  favor  of  its  accept- 
ance and  approval,  is  not  an  approval  by  the  council.®^ 
Approval  by  a  majority  vote  of  a  council  is  all  that  is  neces- 
sary, and  the  resolution  of  approval  need  not  be  approved 
by  the  mayor.""  For  a  refusal  to  approve  a  bond  a  member 
of  a  city  council  is  not  liable,  even  though  he  assigns  no  reason 
for  his  refusal."'  If  one  of  the  sureties  of  a  bond  has  ap- 
parently been  erased  since  it  was  executed,  an  officer  or  court 
need  not  approve  it,  but  may  decline  to  do  so ;  "^  but  he  cannot 
arbitrarily  refuse  to  approve  a  bond  in  proper  form  where 
the  evidence  shows  the  sureties  are  sufficient,""  nor  because  he 
thinks  the  principal  will  conduct  his  place  of  business 
illegally.^''  If  a  married  woman  take  out  a  license,  her  bond 
cannot  be  rejected  because  of  her  coverture.'^^  If  no  statute 
requires  it,  a  bond  need  not  be  recorded ; ''"  but  it  has  been 
held  that  the  filing-  of  it  is  essential  to  its  validity.^^  By 
refusing  to  approve  a  bond,  a  common  council  cannot  exercise 
its  power,  when  it  has  that  power  by  adopting  an  ordinance, 
to  suppress  saloons.'*  If  a  bond  is  insufficient  a  new  one  may 
be  presented  for  approval  and  the  license  granted."  If  a 
proper  bond  be  presented  to  the  board  or  officer  who  is  to 
approve  it  for  approval  and  he  refuses,  he  may  be  compelled 

6.-- Garrison   v.    Steele,   46   Mich.  26  Pac.   1061;   Post  v.   Sparta,  83 

S>8;  8  N.  W.  696;  Contra,  Drewrey  Mich.  323;  29  N.  W.  721. 

V.  Drewrey,  64  Ark.  599 ;  44  S.  W.  ''o  Courtright    v.     Newaygo,     96 

351.  Mich.  290;  55  N.  W.  808. 

Occasionally    the    license    fee   or  '^i  Amperse     v.     Kalamazoo,     59 

ta.x   cannot   be    received   until    the  Midi.  78;  26  N.  W.  222. 

bond  is  approved.     Attorney  Gen-  '-Harper   v.   Golden    (Tex.   Civ. 

eral  v.  Huebner,  91  Mich.  436;  51  App.),  39  S.  W.  623. 

N.  W.   1072.  73  Allen   v.  Houck  &  Dieter   Co. 

ooO'Halloran    v.     Jackson,     107  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  92  S.  W.  993. 

Mich.  138;   64  N.  W.   1046.  Contra,  Brockway  v.  Petted,  79 

6i  Amperse  v.  Winslow,  75  Mich.  Mich.  620;   45  X.  W.  61;    7  L.  R. 

234;  42  N.  W.  823.  A.  740. 

68  Commonwealth  v.  Wilson,  127  •?*  Hawkins    v.     Litchfield,      120 

Pa.  542;   18  Atl.  601 ;  25  W.  N.  C.  Mich.  390;  79  N.  W.  570. 

148.  75 /„    re    Branch,    164    Pa.    427; 

fioMcLeod  v.   Scott,  21    Or.   94;  30  Atl.  296;    35   W.   N.  C.  310. 


§  468  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  764 

to  approve  it  by  a  writ  of  mandamus;  "*'  but  if  the  refusal  was 
based  upon  the  insuffieienc}^  of  the  sureties,  and  there  is  evi- 
dence from  which  that  conclusion  may  be  drawn,  mandamus 
will  not  issue  to  compel  its  approval.'^^  A  return  by  the  officer 
or  board  that  in  his  judgment  the  sureties  on  the  bond  are  in- 
sufficient, is  sufficient  under  a  statute  providing  that  "if,  in 
the  judgment"  of  the  officer  or  board  the  sureties  were  in- 
sufficient they  might  reject  the  bond/^  In  a  petition  for  a 
writ  of  mandamus  the  reasons  given  by  the  officer  or  the  board 
for  the  refusal  should  be  given  or  stated/*^  If  the  officer  or 
board  has  a  discretion  in  the  matter  it  must  be  shown  he  ex- 
ercised it  unreasonably  or  arbitrarily,  or  that  he  was  actuated 
by  illegal  or  improper  motives.**''  Whether  or  not  a  board 
acted  in  good  faith  or  arbitrarily  in  refusing  to  approve  a 
bond  may  be  reviewed  by  the  court. ^^  A  bond  approved  before 
an  application  for  a  license  is  filed  is  not  void  if  an  application 
was  filed  thereafter ;  *-  nor  is  it  if  no  application  be  filed.^^  A 
failure  of  a  transferee  to  have  the  transfer  of  the  license  re- 
corded, as  the  statute  requires,  will  not  avoid  the  bond  he  is 
required  to  give  when  the  transfer  is  made.*'*  Whether  or 
not  a  bond  was  filed  on  the  date  of  its  execution  is  one  of  fact 

76  Potter    V.    Homer,    59    ]Mi<:'li.  "o  Goss  v.  Vermontville,  44  Mich. 

8;     26    N.    W.    208;     Amperse    v.  319;   G  X.  W.   684. 

Kalamazoo,    59    Mich.    78;    20    X.  so  McHenry     v.     Chippewa.     65 

W.  222;   Warner   v.  Lawrence,  62  Mich.    9;    31    N.    W.    602;    Com- 

Mich.  251;   28  N.  W.  844;    Court-  monwealtli  v.  Wilson,  127  Pa.  542 

right  V.   Newaygo,   96   Mich.    290;  18    Atl.    601;    25    W.    N.    C.    148 

55  N.  W.  808;  Keefer  v.  Hillsdale,  Post  v.  Sparta  Tp.,  64  Mich.  597 

70  Mich.  413;   38  N.  W.  277.  31  N.  W.  535. 

Contra,   Parker  v.   Portland,   54  si  Farr   v.   Anderson,   135   Mich. 

Mich.  308;  20  X.  W.  55.  485;   98  N.  W.  6;    10  Detroit  Leg. 

See  Hicks  V.  Trustees,  151  Midi.  X.   843;    Power    v.   Litchfield,    141 

88;    114    X.    W.    682;    14    Detroit  Mich.    350;     104    X.    W.    664;     12 

L.  X.  812.  Detroit  Leg.  X.  484;  Briggs  v.  Mc- 

VTWolfson    V.    Rubicon    Tp.,    63  Kinley,   131  ilich.   154;   91  X.  W. 

Mich.  49;    29  X.  W.  486;   Post  v.  156;    9   Detroit  Leg.  N.   273. 

Sparta  Tp.,   63  :\Iicli.   323;    29  X.  s^  State    v.    Harper     (Tex.    Civ. 

W.  721;   Briggs  v.   McKinley,   131  App.),  87  S.  W.  878. 

Mich.   154;    91   X.  W.   156;   9  De-  83  Faulkner  v.   Cassidy,  39   Tex. 

troit  T^g.  X.  273.  Civ.  Ann.  415 1    87  S.  W.  904. 

78  Palmer  v.  Hartford,  73  Mich.  84  Faulkner   v.    Cassidv.  39   Tex. 

96;   40  X.  W.  850.  Civ.  App.  415;   87   S.  W.  904. 


765  BOND   OF   LICENSEE.  §§469,470 

and  not  a  presumption  of  law.**'  A  failure  of  a  city  council 
to  require  the  statutory  affidavits  of  the  sureties  to  accom- 
pany the  bond  does  not  avoid  it,  even  though  it  may  render 
the  members  of  the  council  liable  for  a  neglect  of  duty.^**  A 
liquor  dealer  is  entitled  to  prompt  approval  of  his  bond  when 
presented;""  and  until  acceptance  and  approval  there  is  no 
liabilit}^  upon  it.®^  The  licensing  officer  or  board  should  act 
fairly  with  the  licensee  in  refusing  to  approve  his  bond  and 
distinctly  inform  him  of  the  reasons  for  its  refusal ;  and  in  case 
of  a  city  council  its  reasons  should  be  entered  on  record."'' 
The  sureties  must  have  the  requisite  qualifications.^** 

Sec.  469.     Void  license. 

If  the  license  be  void,  the  bond  is  void.  Such  was  held  to 
be  the  case  where  the  license  was  void  because  it  did  not  suffi- 
ciently designate  the  place  where  the  liquor  might  be  sold.^^ 
But  where  a  license  could  not  be  legally  issued  to  two  persons, 
yet  one  was  so  issued  which  was  for  that  reason  void,  it  was 
held  that  the  bond  given  on  its  issuance  was  valid.**-  An  in- 
tention to  engage  in  an  illegal  traffic  in  liquors  will  not  avoid 
the  bond.^^  Sureties  cannot  urge  for  the  first  time  on  appeal 
that  the  bond  was  void  because  of  false  statements  made  in  the 
application  for  a  license.^* 

Sec.  470.     Cancellation  of  bond. 

Statutes  sometimes  provide  for  a  cancellation  of  a  bond  and 
the  substitution   of   another,   and   give   sureties   the   right  to 

85  Allen    V.    Houck     (Tex.    Civ.  m  Green  v.  Southard    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.),  92  S.   W.  993.  App.),  61  S.  W.  705,  reversing  59 

S6  People    V.    Laning,    73    Mich.  S.  W.  839. 

284;  41  N.  W.  424.  92  state  v.  Golding,  28  Ind.  App. 

87  Amperse  v.  Kalamazoo,  59  233 ;  62  N.  E.  502.  See  also  State 
Mieh.  78;  26  X.  W.  222.  v.    Harper     (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    87 

88  Garrison   v.    Steele,    46    Mich.  S.  W.  878. 

98;8N.  W.  606.  P3  Jones     v.     State      (Tex.     Civ. 

89  Amperse    v.    Kalamazoo,    su-       App.),  81  S.  W.  1010. 

pra.  94Cullinan  v.   O'Connor,   100  N. 

»o  Camp  bell     v.    Thomasville  Y.  App.  Div,  142;  91  N.  Y.  Supp. 

(Ga.),  64  N.  E.  815;  Post  v.  Spar-  628. 
ta,  63  Mich.  323;  29  N.  W.  721. 


§  471  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  766 

apply  for  the  cancellation  and  be  relieved  of  their  liability 
on  the  bond  for  future  conduct  of  the  principal.  The  mere 
giving  of  the  requisite  notice  to  the  licensing  board  or  officer 
may  have  the  effect  to  cancel  the  bond  at  the  end  of  the  time 
for  which  the  notice  is  to  run.^"'  But  a  notice  to  the  principal 
that  he  must  give  a  new  bond  does  not  release  the  sureties 
until  a  new  bond  be  given.^*^  A  statute  providing  that  a 
surety  on  the  bond  of  a  public  officer  may  apply  for  its  can- 
cellation and  his  release  from  future  liability  thereon  has  no 
application  to  the  bond  of  a  licensed  liquor  dealer.^^ 

Sec.  471.     Breach  of  conditions  of  bond. 

Usually  clauses  are  inserted  in  bonds  of  this  character  pro- 
viding that  if  the  liquor  laws  of  the  State  be  violated  the 
principal  in  the  bond  and  his  sureties  shall  be  liable  thereon, 
and  occasionally  the  bond  is  broad  enough  to  cover  the  viola- 
tion of  other  laws  committed  in  connection  with  the  liquor 
traffic  authorized  by  the  license  to  be  conducted  by  the  licen- 
see. Thus  where  a  bond  was  conditioned  to  "duly  observe 
all  laws  relating  to  intoxicating  liquors,"  a  sale  on  Sunday, 
though  not  forbidden  in  the  general  liquor  licensing  statute, 
was  held  to  be  a  violation  of  the  obligation  of  the  bond.®*  And 
so  where  bond  was  given  to  observe  "all  the  provisions  of  the 
Revised  Code  of  1880,"  it  covered  an  amendment  of  the  code 
made  before  the  bond  was  executed.®"  But  the  provisions  of 
this  character  will  not  be  extended  by  construction  so  as  to 
apply  to  violations  of  other  statutes,  unless  they  plainly  re- 

05  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Jenness,  Schenek    (X.  Y),   55  X.   Y.  Supp. 

138  Iowa,  725;   116  N.  W.  709.  770. 

96  Wright  V.  Treat,  83  ^lich.  The  bond  is  given  as  an  indem- 
110;  47  X.  W.  243.  nity  to   protect    the   State  as  well 

97  Fidelity,  etc.  Co.  v.  Jenness,  as  private  parties  autliorized  to 
138  Iowa  725;    116  X.  W.  709.  maintain    actions    thereon.      State 

osQuintard      v.      Corcoran,      50  v.  Larson,  83  Minn.  124;  8G  X\  W. 

Conn.    34;     O'Flinn    v.    State,    6G  3;  54  L.  H.  A.  487. 
Miss.  7;  5  So.  390;  Lyman  v.  City  ^  O'Flinn  v.  State,  66  Miss.  7; 

Trust,  etc.,  Co.,  166  X.  Y.  274;  59  5  So.  390.     But  not  separate  and 

N.    E.    903 ;     affirming    62    X^.    Y.  distinct   statutes.     Jacobs  v.   Hol- 

Supp.   1141;   Lightner  v.  Common-  genson.   70  Conn.  68;   38  Atl. 
wealth,  31  Pa.  St.  341;   Lyman  v. 


767  BOND   OF   LICENSEE.  §  471 

quire  it.^  A  bond  given  not  to  "permit  any  game  or  games 
to  be  played  in  his  house,  whether  licensed  or  not,"  known 
as  ' '  lioran  's  groeerj',  situated  on  Congress  Avenue  in  the  City 
of  Austin,  on  lot  No.  3,"  is  broken  by  the  principal  letting 
games  be  played  in  a  house  in  the  rear  of  but  connected 
with  the  grocery,  and  opening  from  it,  as  a  billiard  saloon.- 
If  the  principal  permit  another  to  do  business  under  his  name 
on  the  premises,  and  that  other  permits  gambling  there,  the 
principal  is  liable  on  his  bond.^  Sales  of  liquor  made  by  the 
principal's  agent  or  barkeeper  to  a  minor,  or  by  one  behind 
the  bar  not  shown  to  be  an  interloper,  renders  the  principal 
liable  under  a  condition  not  to  sell  to  minors.*  A  condition 
not  to  sell  to  a  stndent  is  broken,  even  though  he  does  not 
drink  the  liquor  sold  him.^  A  bond  "conditioned  upon  the 
faithful  observance  of  all  the  provisions"  of  an  act  covers  a 
tax  assessed  under  the  act  which  it  is  the  principal's  duty 
to  pay ;  ^  but  not  to  obligations  created  by  a  city  ordinance.' 
Where  an  application  for  a  license  to  sell  in  quantities  over 
a  gallon  at  a  time  was  followed  by  a  tax  receipt  to  the  same 
effect  and  a  like  recital  in  the  preamble  of  the  bond,  and  the 
ond  contained  the  usual  statutory  conditions  not  to  sell  to 
minors,  it  was  held  that  the  sureties  were  liable  for  a  sale  of 
less  than   a  gallon  to  a  minor. ^     Under  a  statute  providing 

1  Crawley  v.  Commonwealth,  123  N.  E.  041;   Boos  v.  State,  11  Ind. 

Pa.  275;   IC  Atl.  416;  23  W.  N.  C.  App.  257;   39  N.  E.  197;   State  v. 

148;  Jacobs  V.  Holgenson,  70  Conn.  Terheide,    166   Ind.   689;    78  N.  E. 

68;    38  Atl.   914;    Crouse  v.   Com-  195;   Meinoz  v.  Brassel   (Tex.  Civ. 

nionwealtli,   87  Pa.   168.  App.),    108    S.    W.   417.      See   Pa- 

2Horan   v.   Travis   Co.,   27    Tex.  ducah  v.  Jones,  126  Ky.  809;   104 

226;    McPherson   v.    Simmons,    63  S.  W.  971;  31  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1203. 

Ark.  593 ;  40  S.  W.  78.  e  Daniels  v.  Grayson  College,  20 

3  Grady  v.  Ragan,  2  Willson  Civ.  Tex.  Civ.  App.  562 ;  50  S.  W.  205. 
Cas.  Ct.  App.,  §259;  Cullinan  v.  6  Marshall  Co.  v.  Knoll  (Iowa), 
Burkhard,  93  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  31;  69  N.  W.  1146;  Bingham  Co.  v. 
86  N.  Y.  Supp.  1003;  reversing  41  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.,  34  Idaho,  13; 
N.   Y.   Misc.    Rep.    321;    84    N.   Y.  88  Pac.  829. 

Supp.   825.  7  Ottumwa  v.   Hodge,    112  Iowa, 

4  0'Flinn   v.   State,   66   Miss.    7;        430;   84  N.  W.  533. 

5   So.   390;    Edgar  v.   State    (Tex.  » Harper    v.    Golden    (Tex.    Civ. 

Civ.  App.),   102  S.  W.  439;   State       App.),  39  S.  W.  623. 
v.   EJiotts,   24   Ind.  App.   477;    50 


§  471         TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  768 

that  a  bond  shall  stand  good  for  ' '  fines  and  costs  recovered  for 
any  offense,"  a  bond  conditioned  that  the  principal  "shall 
pay  all  damages  and  costs  recovered  against  him  by  any  person 
under  the  Code, ' '  covers  a  liability  for  fines  assessed  for  unlaw- 
ful sales.^  A  condition  not  to  sell  on  any  prescription  having 
the  same  number  of  another  prescription  given  by  the  same 
person  and  dated  during  the  year  is  violated  by  a  sale  on  a 
prescription  having  the  same  number  of  another  prescription 
given  by  the  same  person,  and  dated  during  the  same  year 
whether  the  prescription  was  given  to  the  same  or  different 
persons.^"  A  condition  not  to  exhibit  "vulgar"  pictures  on 
the  premises  is  broken  by  an  exhibition  of  "obscene"  pic- 
tures.^ ^  So  one  not  to  permit  gambling  is  violated  by  keeping 
a  slot  machine  wherein  one  ma.y  drop  a  coin  and  press  a  trig- 
ger and  either  lose  his  coin  or  obtain  a  certain  number  of  like 
coins  as  the  machine  may  turn.^-  A  condition  not  to  keep  a 
disorderly  house,  or  to  keep  a  "quiet  house"  is  broken  by  per- 
mitting music  in  the  saloon  licensed  where  a  statute  defines  a 
quiet  house  as  one  in  which  "no  music,  loud  and  boisterous 
talking"  "or  any  other  noise  calculated  to  disturb  or  annoy 
persons  residing  in  the  vicinity"  is  allowed.^^  A  condition 
to  keep  an  orderly  "house  or  place  of  business"  includes  an 
arbor  across  an  alley  where  customers  are  served  with  liquors 
from  the  house  licensed ;  and  if  boisterous  talking,  music  and 
indecent  and  vulgar  language  be  permitted  therein,  the  con- 
dition is  broken.^*  So  a  condition  not  to  permit  disorderly 
conduct  on  the  premises  is  broken  by  such  conduct  on  the 
premises  carried  on  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the 

9  State  V.  Xutter,  44  W.  Va.  is  State  v.  Curtis,  8  Tex.  Civ. 
385;  30  S.  E.  67;  State  v.  Corran,       App.  506;  28  S.  W.  134. 

73  K  H.  434;   62  Atl.  1044.  i*  Whitcomb    v.    State,    2    Tex. 

10  Edgar  v.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  Civ.  App.  301 ;  21  S.  W.  976;  Cun- 
App.),  102  S.  W.  439.  ningham  v.  Porchet,  23   Tex.  Civ. 

iiRaley  v.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  80;  56  S.  W.  574  (in  an- 
App. ),  105  S.  W.  342.  other   room  separated  by   a  board 

12  Lyman  v.  Brucker,  26  N.  Y.  partition  not  reaching  the  ceil- 
Misc.  Rep.  594;  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  ing)  ;  McPherson  v.  Simmons,  63 
767.  Ark.   593;   40  S.  W.   78    (question 

for  jury). 


769  BOND   OP    LICENSEE.  §  471 

principal.^"  A  bond  issued  for  a  hotel  conditioned  not  to  per- 
mit the  premises  to  become  disorderly  includes  the  rooms  of  the 
hotel  in  which  the  liquor  business  is  carried  on.^''  The  licen- 
see's bond  does  not  cover  illegal  sales  made  by  his  agent,  though 
in  the  general  scope  of  his  duty,  made  in  direct  violation  of 
the  licensee's  orders.^ ^  Nor  does  it  cover  sales  made  by  his 
agent  for  his  own  benefit.^*  Under  a  bond  conditioned  for 
the  payment  of  any  money  lost  at  gambling  in  a  saloon,  "or 
any  room  or  building  attached  thereto,  under  the  [licensee's] 
control"  it  is  essential  to  his.l'iability  that  the  money  was  lost 
by  gambling  in  the  saloon  or  in  a  room  or  building  attached 
thereto  under  his  control ;  and  if  there  be  doubt  as  to  whether 
the  room  or  building  where  i-t  was  lost  was  under  his  control, 
the  jury  must  be  instructed  that  the  room  or  building  must 
have  been  under  his  control  at  the  time  the  money  was  lost 
by  gambling  therein  to  render  him  liable.  There  may  be  a  lia- 
bility, however,  if  he  collusively  rented  out  the  room  to  persons 
who  conducted  therein  gambling  games  for  the  purpose  of 
escaping  a  liability.^^  A  condition  that  the  licensee  would  not 
"suffer  or  permit"  any  gambling  on  the  premises  covers  gamb- 
ling by  persons  other  than  the  licensee ;  and  is  not  limited  by 
another  clause  to  the  effect  that  he  wall  not  violate  the  liquor 
tax  law  himself.-*'  But  under  a  bond  that  the  principal  will  pay 
all  fines  and  costs  that  may  be  assessed  against  him  for  violation 
of  the  liquor  laws,  he  is  not  liable  thereon  for  fines  and  costs 
assessed  against  his  bartender  for  an  unlawful  sale  made  by 
such  bartender  without  his  knowledge  or  consent.-^  A  bond 
conditioned  to  pay  all  damages  by  reason  of  the  licensee  ob- 
is Clement  v.  Federal  Union  is  Paducah  v.  Jones,  126  Ky. 
Surety  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  809;  104  S.  W.  971;  31  Ky.  Law 
18;    106  N.  Y.  Supp.   1061.                      Eep.  1203. 

16  Cullinan  v.  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.,  is  McPherson     v.     Simmons,     63 
84  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  292;   82  N.  Y.       Ark.  593;   40  S.  W.  78. 

Supp.  695;  affirmed  177  N.  Y.  574;  20  Cullinan  v.    Burkhard,   93   N. 

69  N.  E.  1122.  Y.  App.  Div.  31;   86  N.  Y.   Supp. 

17  Cullinan   v.   Burkhard,   93   N.  1003;    reversing    41    N.    Y.    Misc. 
Y.  App.  Div.  31;    86  N.  Y.  Supp.  Eep.  321;   84  N.  Y.  Supp.  825. 
1003;    reversing    41    N.    Y.    Misc.  21  State  v.  Leach,   17   Ind.  App. 
Rep.  321;    84  N.  Y.  Supp.   825.  174;   46  N,  E.  549. 


§  472  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  770 

taining  a  license,  under  a  statute  requiring  him  to  give  a  bond 
to  pay  all  damages  occasioned  by  his  selling  liquors,  covers 
damages  for  the  selling  of  liquors,  and  is  not  merely  an  in- 
demnity for  damages  occasioned  by  the  issuance  of  the  license.^^ 
A  surety  on  a  bond,  however,  given  where  a  license  has  been 
issued  upon  a  false  statement  made  in  the  application  is  not 
liable  thereon  by  reason  of  such  false  statement.     Such  was 
held  to  be  the  case  where  the  applicant  falsely  stated  he  had 
obtained  the  consent  of  certain  resident  householders  neces- 
sary for  him  to  obtain  before  the  license  could  be  issued,  and 
this  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  entire  traffic  of  the 
licensee  was  a  violation  of  the  law;  for  the  bond  was  intended 
to  protect  the  public  against  violations  of  the  law  under  a 
license  lawfully  issued,  and  had  no  application  to  an  instance 
of  fraud  in  securing  a  license.-^     A  bond  conditioned  to  pay 
all  "civil  damages"  does  not  render  the  sureties  liable  to  pay 
a  fine  assessed  against  the  principal  for  a  sale  to  a  minor.^* 
Sureties  are  not  liable  for  sales  off  the  licensed  premises.-^    A 
covenant  in  a  bond  not  to  '  *  rent  or  let ' '  any  part  of  the  licensed 
premises   to    any   person   for   the    purpose    of    run ni nor    any 
game  prohibited  by  law  does  not  cover  the  independent  acts 
of  a  vendee  of  the  principal  committed  after  a  sale  of  the 
premises.'^    A  sale  to  a  police  officer  of  a  city  is  not  a  waiver 
of  the  right  of  the  city  to  bring  an  action  for  a  breach  of  the 
bond,   unless,   possibly,   the   sale   was   induced   by   what  the 
officer  said  or  did.-" 

Sec.  472.    Breach  of  conditions — Offenses  as  to  minors. 

Intoxicating  liquor  sold  by  an  agent  or  barkeeper  of  the 
licensee,  in  his  line  of  duty,  renders  such  licensee  liable  on 
his  bond  conditioned  not  to  sell  to  minors;  and  proof  of  a  sale 
by  a  person  behind  defendant's  bar,  not  shown  to  be  an  inter- 

22  Dowiat  V.  People,  193  111.  264 ;  23  Carter  v.  Nicol,  116  Iowa, 
61    N.   E.    1059;    affirming   92   111.       519;  90  N.  W.  352. 

App.  433.  20  Allen  v.   Houck  &   Dieter   Co. 

23  Lyman  v.  Kane,  57  N.  Y.  App.        (Tex.  Civ.  App.) ,  92  S.  W.  993. 
Div.  549;   67  N.  Y.  Supp.   1065.  27  Tripp    v.    Flanigan,    10   R.    I. 

24Headingtfln     v.     Smith,      113       128. 
Iowa,  107;   84  N.  W.  982. 


'J'71  BOND   OP   LICENSEE.  §  472 

loper,  is  sufficient  proof  of  a  sale  by  Hk^  licensee.-^  But  if  a  sale 
is  made  to  a  minor  in  good  faith,  the  salesman  believing  that  he 
is  of  age,  he  is  not  liable  on  his  bond. '•'  Statutes  sometimes 
provide  that  in  such  instances  the  licensee  shall  not  be  liable 
if  he  or  his  salesman  acted  in  good  faith,  believing  the  minor 
to  be  of  age;  in  which  event  the  burden  is  on  him  to  plead 
and  prove  that  fact.""  A  sale  of  liquor  to  an  adult  who 
"treats"  a  minor  with  it  is  not  a  sale  to  such  minor  nor  a 
gift  by  the  salesman  to  him/''^  But  a  statute  providing  that  a 
liquor  dealer  shall  neither  "give  nor  permit  to  be  given"  any 
liquor  to  a  minor  obligates  him  not  to  knowingly  permit  the 
gift  to  be  made  to  a  minor  on  his  premises,  but  goes  further 
and  requires  him  to  prevent  the  gift  there.^-  Where  a  bond 
is  conditioned  that  the  licensee  will  not  permit  a  minor  to 
"enter  and  remain"  in  his  saloon,  there  can  be  no  recovery 
for  an  entry  "or"  for  remaining  there;  but  both  the  entry 
and  remaining  must  concur  to  create  a  liability. ^^  If  the 
licensee  permitted  the  minor  to  enter  and  remain,  believing 
in  good  faith  he  was  of  age,  he  is  still  liable;  anl  a  statute 
relieving  him  from  liability  where  he  sold  liquor  to  a  minor, 
believing  in  good  faith  he  was  of  age,  has  no  application  and 

28  0'Flinn  v.   State,  G6  Miss.  7;  3o  Farr  v.  Waterman   (Tex.  Civ. 

5  So.  390;   State  v.  Terheide,   166  App.),    95    S.    W.    65;    Tinkle    v. 

Ind.  689;  78  N.  E.  195;  Brooks  v.  Sweeney    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),   78   S. 

Ellis    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  98   S.  W.  W.  248;   Holly  v.  Simmons    (Tex. 

936;  George  Scalfi  &  Co.  v.  State,  Civ.   App.),  89   S.   W.   776;    State 

31   Tex.  Civ.  App.   671;    73  S.  W.  v.   Dittfurt    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),   79 

441;     74     S.     W.     754;     State     v.  S.  W.  52;  Holly  &  Co.  v.  Simmons, 

Knotts,   24   Ind.   App.  477;   56   N.  38  Tex.  Civ.  App.   124;   85   S.  W. 

E.  941 ;  Boos  v.  State,  11  Ind.  App.  325. 

257;   39  N.  E.   197;   State  v.  Ter-  si  Holly  &   Co.   v.   Simmons,   38 

heide,  166  Ind.  689;  78  N.  E.  417;  Tex.  Civ.  App.  124;  85  S.  W.  325; 

Munoz  V.  Brassel  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  Page  v.  State,  84  Ala.  446;   4  So. 

108  S.  W.  417.  697;  Ward  v.  State,  45  Ark.  351; 

29Gilbreath  v.  State    (Tex.  Civ.  Topper  v.  State,  118  Ind.  110;   20 

App.),    82     S.    W.    807;     Cox    v.  N.  E.  699;  People  v.  Neumann,  85 

Thompson   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  73  S.  Mich.  98;  48  N.  W.  290. 

W.  950;   Holly  &  Co.  v.  Simmons,  32  Holly   &   Co.   v.    Simmons,   38 

38  Tex.   Civ.  App.   124;    85   S.   W.  Tex.  Civ.  App.  124;  85  S.  W.  325. 

325.  33  Minter  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Civ. 

App.   182;   76  S.  W.  312. 


§  472  TRAFFIC  IN  INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  772 

affords  no  defense.'^  Permitting  a  minor  to  enter  and  re- 
main long  enough  to  purchase,  pay  for  and  drink  a  glass  of 
beer,  though  several  times  repeated,  is  not  a  breach  of  a  con- 
dition against  permitting  him  to  "enter  and  remain. "^^ 
But  in  such  an  instance  the  condition  is  broken  if,  after  he 
has  drunk  his  liquor,  the  licensee  permit  him  to  remain  in  the 
saloon  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  merely  "loitering  and  hanging 
around."  ^"  It  is  error  for  the  court  to  charge  the  jury  that 
the  length  of  time  the  minor  remained  is  immaterial;  for  it 
is  a  question  for  the  jurj^  whether  he  "remained"  in  the 
defendant 's  place  of  business.^'  It  is  error  in  such  an  instance 
in  the  charge  to  the  jury  to  use  the  word  "knowingly"  in 
connection  Avith  the  word  "permit,"  ^^  for  it  is  not  necessary 
to  create  a  liability  that  the  licensee  knew  the  minor  had 
entered  the  saloon.^^  The  emancipation  of  the  minor  by  the 
parent  is  no  defense.*"  The  parent  may  recover  damages  for 
such  infraction  of  the  statute — for  a  sale  to  his  minor  son  and 
also  for  permitting  him  t«  "enter  and  remain"  in  the  sa- 
loon.*^ Evidence  that  the  minor  was  a  gambler  is  inadmissi- 
ble.'*' Evidence  that  signs  were  up  in  the  saloon  stating  that 
minors  were  not  allowed  therein  is  immaterial.*^  If  the 
parent  consent  to  the  minor  entering  and  remaining  in  the 
saloon  he  waives  his  cause  of  action ;  but  his  non-consent  may 

siMinter   v.   State,   supra;    Cox  Holt,   30   Tex.   Civ.   App.   297;    70 

V.  Thompson   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  73  S.  W.  342. 

S.    W.    950 ;     State    v.    Dittfurth  3-  Cox  v.  Thompson,  32  Tex.  Civ. 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.),   79    S.   W.    52;  App.  572;   75  S.  W.  819. 

Krick  V.  Dow  ( Tex.  Civ.  App. ) ,  84  ss  Wakeman  v.  Price   ( Tex.  Civ. 

S.  W.  245.  App.),  89  S.  W.  1093. 

35  Tinkle  v.  Sweeney    ( Tex.  Civ.  39  Munoz   v.   Brassel    ( Tex.   Civ. 

App.),    78    S.    W.    248;    Ghio    v.  App.),  108  S.  W.  417. 

Stephens    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  78   S.  40  Cok   v.   Thompson    (Tex.   Civ. 

VV.    1084;    Tinkle   v.    Sweeney,   97  App.),  73  S.  W.  950. 

Tex.   190;    77   S.   W.   609;    Cox  v.  4i  Coburn     v.     Gill      (Tex.     Civ. 

Thompson,  32  Tex.  Civ.  App.  572;  App.),  60  S.  W.  974. 

75  S.  W.  819.  42Paynor   v.   Holzgraf,    35   Tex. 

3c  White    V.    Manning,    46    Tex.  Civ.  App.  233 ;  79  S.  W.  829. 

Civ.  App.  29'8;    102  S.  W.    1160;  43  Krick     v.     Dow      (Tex.     Civ. 

Quails  V.  Sayler,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  App.),  84  S.  W.  245. 
400;    45    S.    W.    839;    Dickson   v. 


773  BOND  OF   LICENSEE,  §  473 

be  inferred  by  evidence  showing  that  he  was  absent  in  a  distant 
State  and  that  the  minor  had  been  in  the  city  where  the 
saloon  was  but  a  few  days.**  A  complaint  is  not  defective 
nor  subject  to  a  special  exception  which  alleges  that  the  vio- 
lations of  the  law  took  place  "on  or  about"  a  certain  date, 
"and  on  divers  days  before  and  after  said  date  during"  the 
same  month.*^  In  such  an  instance  the  evidence  need  not  be 
confined  to  the  exact  date  given,  but  a  recovery  may  be 
had  on  any  of  the  "divers  days  before  and  after"  the  date.*« 
A  statute  giving  a  cause  of  action  to  the  parents  of  the  minor 
authorizes  the  father  and  mother  to  join  in  one  action;  and 
if  either  die  the  other  may  file  an  amended  complaint  and 
prosecute  the  cause  .of  action  in  his  name  alone.*^  Proof  that 
the  plaintiff  minor  "entered  and  remained"  in  the  defend- 
ant's saloon  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  was  "ag- 
grieved" thereby,  and  entitles  him  to  recover.*^  The  taking 
effect  of  local  option  prohibition  is  no  defense.*"  Under  the 
Texas  statute  the  State  may  recover  on  the  bond,  although 
the  father  hired  out  his  son  to  work  in  the  saloon.^** 

Sec.  473.     Liability  of  sureties. 

A  repeal  of  the  statute  under  which  the  bond  was  given  is 
a  cancellation  of  the  bond  as  to  all  future  liability  thereun- 
der." The  liability  of  the  surety  is  coextensive  with  that  of 
his  principal's  liability  thereon.^^  Liability  incurred  under 
an  old  act  is  not  cancelled  by  a  repeal  of  the  act  and  the  sub- 
stitution of  another.^'    Mere  irregularities  in  the  justification 

44Krick     V.     Dow      (Tex.     Civ.  48  Wliite    v.    Manning    46    Tex. 

App.),    84    S.    W.    245.      But    per-  Civ.  App.  298;   102  S.  W.  1160. 

mitting  him  to  occasionally  enter  49  White  v.  Manning,  supra. 

and  drink  beer  is  not  a  consent  to  so  McMonigal  v.  State  ( Tex.  Civ. 

all  sales  made  to  him.     White  v.  App.),  45  S.  W.  1038. 

Manning,  46  Tex.  Civ.   App.   298 ;  si  Thompson   v.   Bassett,   5   Ind. 

102  S.  W.   1160.  535. 

45  Patton  V.  Williams,  35  Tex.  S2  Qran  v.  Houston,  45  Neb.  813; 
Civ.  App.   129;    79   S.  W.   357.  64  N.  W.  245.     But  see  Uldrich  v. 

46  Munoz  V.  Brassel  ( Tex.  "Civ.  Gilmore,  35  Neb.  288 ;  53  N.  W. 
Ato-),  108  S.  W.  417.  135. 

47  Munoz   V.   Brassel,   supra.  53  GuHickson  v.  Gjorud,  89  Mich. 

8;   50  N.  W.  751. 


§  473  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  774 

of  the  sureties  attached  to  the  bond  or  the  entire  omission 
of  such  justification  will  not  render  a  bond  void  which  is 
correct  in  form ;  ^*  and  if  the  bond  is  complete,  a  mere  failure 
to  file  it  with  the  proper  officers  after  it  has  been  delivered 
to  the  board,  accepted  and  approved,  is  no  defense.^^  If  a  law 
be  re-enacted  the  liability  on  the  bond  continues  under  the  act 
as  re-enacted ;  for  the  provisions  of  the  act  as  it  stood  before  its 
re-enactment  is  not  repealed  by  the  re-enactment,  but  simply 
continued  in  force.'"  A  surety  cannot  defend  on. the  ground 
that  he  has  removed  from  the  county  or  State  where  the  stat- 
ute, in  that  event,  required  the  principal  to  give  a  new  bond, 
but  no  new  bond  was  given,  although  he  was  properly  noti- 
fied by  the  proper  officer  to  give  one/'*'  A  law  enacted  reduc- 
ing the  liability  of  the  sureties  has  no  application  to  a  liabil- 
ity incurred  thereon  before  its  enactment. ^^  Notice  of  the 
approval  and  acceptance  of  the  bond  need  not  be  given  the 
sureties;  for  they  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  that  fact.^"  If  a 
bond  be  conditioned  to  pay  whatever  fine  may  be  assessed 
against  the  principal,  and  in  default  of  its  payment  he  shall 
serve  a  day  in  prison  for  each  dollar  of  the  amount  of  the 
fine;  his  service  in  a  prison  because  of  his  failure  to  pay  does 
not  release  the  sureties.^"  Where  the  license  is  for  a  partic- 
ular place,  the  bond  only  applies  to  sales  on  the  premises, 
though  sales  by  the  licensee  oft'  the  premises  be  illegal.*'^  Where 
the  place  could  be  changed  on  application  to  the  proper  officer, 

5-1  people    V.    Laning,    73    I\Tich.  •'o  People    v.    Laning,    73    Mich. 

284;  41  N.  W.  424.  284;  41  N.  W.  424;  Stehle  v.  Com- 

55  Brockway  v.  Petted,  79  Mich,  monwealth,     ( Pa. ) ,    7    Atl.     1-69 ; 

620;  45  N.  VV.  61;  7  L,  R.  A.  740.  Brown  v.  Commonwealth,  114  Pa. 

so  Gullickson  v.  Gjorud,  89  Mich.  335;  6  Atl.  152.     Otherwise  if  the 

8;  50  N.  W.  751.     See  O'Brien  Co.  principal  has  paid  the  fine.    Aiken 

V.  Mahon   (Iowa).  102  N.  W.  446.  v.  Harbers,  6  Pvich.  L.  96. 

57  Wright    V.    Trost,     83     Mich.  ci  Saffroi  v.  Cobun,  32  Tex.  Civ. 

110;  47  N.  W.  243.  App.  79;    73  S.  VV,  828;   O'Banion 

ssLightner     v,     Ca.sey,     31     Pa,  v.    DeGarmo,    121    Iowa,    139;    96 

341;  Commonwealth  v,  Johnson,  8  N,   W,   739;    Adams  v.   Miller,   81 

Pa.  Co.  Ct,  Rep,  378.  Miss.  613;   33  So.   489;    Carter  v. 

59  People    V.    Inning,    73    Mich.  Nicol,    116    Iowa,   519;    90   N.   W. 

284;   41  X.  W.  424.  352;    :Moniteau   Co.    v.   Lewis,    123 

Mo,  App,  073;   100  S.  W,  1107. 


775  BOND   OF   LICENSEE.  §  473 

and  a  licensee  by  false  statements  induced  the  officer  to  change 
the  place  named  in  the  license,  and  he  engaged  in  business 
on  the  new  location,  his  sales  then  being  illegal  by  reason  of 
such  false  statements,  it  was  held  that  his  sureties  were  not 
liable  for  the  penalties  he  incurred  by  reason  of  makmg 
them.*'-  If  the  bond  covers  the  licensee's  taxes,  the  sureties 
cannot  escape  paying  them,  if  the  principal  fail  to  pay,  on 
the  ground  that  after  his  failure  he  is  no  longer  operating 
under  the  liquor  law,  where  the  failure  to  pay  has  that  effecf^ 
A  surety  is  not  liable  for  a  false  statement  unknown  to  him 
made  by  the  licensee  in  his  application  for  a  license,  although 
the  license  issued  thereon  is  void  ah  initio  at  the  election  of 
the  State."*  The  death  of  a  surety  does  not  avoid  the  bond.''' 
If  the  bond  be  irregul*ar,  yet  under  it  the  principal  enjoy  all 
the  rights  of  a  licensee,  the  sureties  are  estopped  to  deny  its 
legality;""  and  if  the  licensee  is  a  club  or  a  corporation  they 
are  estopped  to  deny  its  incorporation.""  As  a  rule  the  liabil- 
ity of  the  surety  is  secondary  and  that  of  the  principal  pri- 
mary; and  usually  if  the  surety  is  compelled  to  pay  a  judg- 
ment rendered  against  them  jointly  it  remains  in  force  against 
the  principal  for  his,  the  surety's  benefit."^  In  some  States 
the  principal  need  not  be  first  exhausted."^  Where  a  surety 
was  given  a  sum  of  money  by  his  principal  as  an  indemnity, 
to  be  held  during  the  term  of  the  bond  and  until  his  liability 
Ibereon  ceased,  it  was  held  that  the  principal  could  recover 
back  the  amount  so  paid  the  surety  without  waiting  to  have 
the  bond  cancelled,  there  being  no  statute  providing  for  its 
cancellation,  and  also  without  waiting  until  the  statute  of  Jim- 

02  Saffroi  v.  Cobun,  supra.  66  Lyman  v.  Brucker,   26   N.  Y. 

03  O'Brien  Co.  V.  Mahon  (Iowa),  Misc.  Rep.  594;  56  N.  Y.  Supp. 
102  N.  W.^46.  767. 

04  Lyman  v.  Schermcrhorn,  167  gt  Lyman  v.  Gramercy  Club,  39 
N.  Y.  113;  60  N.  E.  324;  affirm-  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  459;  57  N.  Y. 
ing  53  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  32;   65  N.  Supp.  376. 

Y.  Supp.  538.  68  Jenkins    v.    Danville,    79    111. 

osMcMonigal  v.  State  (Tex.  Civ.       App.  339. 
App.),  45  S.  W.  1038.  ««  O'Brion  ro.  v.  Mahon   (Iowa), 

102  N.  VV.  446. 


§§474,475        TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  776 

itations  had  run  against  the  bond.^°  The  recovery  and  pay- 
ment of  a  penalty  given  under  an  independent  statute  against 
and  by  the  principal  is  no  defense  for  the  surety  to  an  action 
on  the  bond.'^  Occasionally  statutes  provide  in  addition  to 
the  fine  a  penalty  may  be  recovered  on  the  bond  When  that 
is  the  case  a  payment  of  the  fine  is  no  defense  for  the  surety 
in  an  action  on  the  bond  to  recover  the  penalty.'^-  A  bond 
complete  in  form,  but  not  to  be  delivered  until  another  surety 
be  added  to  it  is  binding  if  delivered  and  approved,  though  in 
violation  of  the  surety's  instructions  and  understanding.'^^ 
"Where  the  bond  is  a  several  one,  the  surety  may  be  sued 
alone.'^* 

Sec.  474.     Transfer  of  license. 

If  a  license  may  be  transferred,  the  licensee  is  liable  for 
the  acts  of  the  transferee  until  the  assignment  has  been  pre- 
sented to  the  proper  authorities  and  consent  to  the  transfer 
obtained.'^''  But  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  transfer  of  the 
license  has  not  been  approved  by  the  licensing  board  or  officer, 
the  sureties  on  the  bond  are  not  liable  for  the  illegal  conduct 
of  the  transferee. ■^^ 

Sec.  475.     Eersons  entitled  to  sue  on  bond. 

As  the  action  on  the  bond  is  purely  statutory,  only  a  per- 
son or  officer  designated  in  the  statute  as  the  one  who  may 

70  Shea  v.  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.,  83  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  296;  82  N.  Y. 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  305;  82  N.  Y.  Supp.  827;  affirming  39  K  Y. 
Supp.  39.  Misc.    Rep.    446;    80  N.    Y.    187; 

71  People  V.  Eckman,  63  Hun,  Lyman  v.  City  Trust  Co.,  166  K 
209;   18  N.  Y.  Supp.  654.  Y.   274;    59   N.   E.   903;    affirming 

72Paducah    v.    Jones,    126    Ky.  02  N.  Y.  Supp.  1141. 

809;    104   S.   W.    971;    31    Ky.   L.  7 o  Lyman  v.  Cheever,  168  N.  Y. 

Eep.  1203.  43;    60   N.    E.    1047;    reversing  54 

73  Jacobs    V.    Hogan,    73    Conn.  N.   Y.    App.    Div.    618;    66   N.    Y. 

740;  49  Atl.  202.  Supp.  1136. 

7*  Knott  V.  Peterson,   125  Iowa,  As   to  what   is   sufficient  allega- 

404;   101  N.  W.  173.  tion  to  show  that   a  transfer  had 

75  Cullinan  v.   Kuch,   177   N.   Y.  been  made,  in  a  suit  on  the  trans- 

303;  69  N.  E.  597;  84  N.  Y.  App.  feree's  bond,  see  Faulkner  v.  Cas- 

Div.   642;    82   N.   Y.    Supp.    1098;  sidy,    30    Tex.    Civ.   App.    415;    87 

Cullinan    v.    Parker,     177    N.    Y.  S.  W.  904. 
573;    69  N.  E.   1122;   affirming  84 


777  BOND   OF   LICENSEE.  §§474,475 

sue  thereon  can  bring  the  suit.  No  other  person  or  officer 
can  sue.  But  a  bond  given  to  an  officer  in  his  official  char- 
acter can  be  sued  upon  by  his  successor  in  office.'^''  To  col- 
lect fines  and  forfeitures  the  right  of  action  is  usually  given 
to  the  State,  and  the  State  must  bring  it.'*  A  general  provi- 
sion of  a  code  providing  that  "where  any  bond  shall  be  exe- 
cuted in  a  legal  proceeding,  it  shall  inure  to  the  person  to 
whom  it  is  designed  by  law  as  a  security,  and  be  subject  to 
judgment  in  his  favor,  no  matter  how  it  is  conditioned,"  ap- 
plies to  a  bond  given  by  a  liquor  licensee.^®  Under  a  pro- 
vision of  the  statute  giving  a  right  of  action  to  any  person 
"aggrieved  by  the  violation  of"  the  liquor  statute,  a  father 
may  maintain  an  action  thereon  where  the  principal  has  given 
liquor  to  his  minor  son,  even  with  the  father's  consent,  it 
being  a  question  for  the  jurv^  to  determine  whether  the  father 
had  been  "aggrieved"  by  the  action  of  the  principal.*"  In 
such  an  instance  the  father  may  bring  the  action  in  his  own 
name,  though  the  bond  is  payable  to  the  State.*^  Where 
a  statute  provides  that  any  person  "aggrieved"  by  a  sale  of 
liquor  to  a  student  of  any  college,  the  college  is  the  person 
"aggrieved,"  and  may  bring  the  suit.*-  A  statute  may  change 
the  right  of  action  from  one  officer  to  another;  and  the  lat- 
ter may  recover  for  a  breach  of  the  bond  before  such  statute 
was  enacted. ^^ 

'7  Granger  v.  Hayden,   17  R.  I.  laid  down.     For  cases  in  different 

179;   20  Atl.  833.  States,   see  People   v.   Eckman,   63 

78  State  V.  Whitener,  23  Ind.  Hun,  209;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  654; 
124;  State  v.  Pierce,  26  Kan.  777;  State  v.  Mortland,  71  Iowa,  543; 
McGrimes  v.  State,  30  Ind.  140;  32  N.  W.  485;  State  v.  DeKruif, 
State  V.   Estabrook,  29  Kan.   739.  72  Iowa,  488;  34  N.  W.  607;  State 

79  State  V.  Depeder,  65  Miss.  26 ;  v.  Humber,  73  Iowa,  707 ;  34  N. 
3  So.  80.  W.  829;  Lyman  v.  Perimutter,  166 

soEdgett    V.     Finn     (Tex.    Civ.  N.  Y.  410;   60  N.  E.  21;   affirming 

App.),  36  S.  W.  830.  66  N.  Y.  App.  866. 

siMcGuire  v.  Glass,    (Tex.   Civ.  82  Daniels  v.  College    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.);    15   S.  W.   127.     This  is  a  App.),  50  S.  W.  205. 
question    of    local    practice,    how-  83  Lyman  v.  Schenck  ( N.  Y. ) ,  55 

ever,   upon   which    no    rule    appli-  N".  Y.  Supp.  770. 
cable    to   all    jurisdictions   can   be 


§§476,477        TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  778 

Sec.  476.    A  civil  action — Agent. 

An  action  to  recover  on  a  bond  is  a  civil  action  on  a  con- 
tract ^^*  and  not  a  criminal  one.  Thus,  while  it  might  possibly 
be  a  defense  in  a  criminal  action  if  an  agent  of  the  principal 
sold  liquor  to  a  minor  against  the  direct  orders  of  his  prin- 
cipal, yet  it  is  not  in  an  action  on  his  bond,  for  the  liability 
being  a  civil  one  the  principal  is  bound  by  the  act  of  his 
agent  within  the  scope  of  his  employment,  though  in  direct 
violation  of  his  express  orders.^*  An  action  of  debt  is  a 
proper  form  of  action  on  a  licensee's  bond  to  recover  dam- 
ages.*^ But  if  the  statute  provide  a  specific  remedy,  that 
remedy  must  be  follow^ed.**  In  an  action  on  the  bond  the 
State  may  appeal,  though  if  it  were  to  criminally  prosecute 
the  principal  for  the  same  act  it  could  not.*^  A  right  of 
action  on  the  bond  to  recover  a  penalty  terminates  with  the 
taking  effect  of  a  local  option  law.**^ 

Sec.  477.  Judgment  of  forfeiture  or  conviction  as  a  pre- 
requisite to  suit. 
The  general  rule  is  that  neither  a  judgment  of  forfeiture  nor 
a  conviction  of  the  principal,  where  the  action  is  for  the  benefit 
of  the  State  or  municipality,  need  be  had  or  entered 
before  an  action  can  be  brought  on  the  bond.**°  And  this  is 
true  where  the  action  is  by  a  private  individual  to  recover 
damages  the  statute  awards  him.^''  If  the  principal  be  sued 
on  his  bond  and  defeat  the  action,  that  is  a  bar  to  an  action 
against  him  individually."^ 

83*  Cullinan  v.  Burkhard,  93  N.  88  Long    v.    A.    L.    Gren    &    Co. 

Y.  App.  Div.  31;   86  N.  Y.  Supp.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  95  S.  W.  79. 

1003;    reversing   41    N.    Y.    Misc.  89  Coggeshall  v.  Pollitt,  15  R.  I. 

Rep.  321;   84  X.  Y.  Supp.  825.  168;   1  Atl.  413;   Granger  v.  Hay- 

84  Greene  Co.  v.  Wilhite,  29  Mo.  den,  17  R.  I.  179;  20  Atl.  833; 
App.  459;  State  v.  Terheide,  166  State  v.  Corron,  73  N.  H.  434;  62 
Ind.  689;   78  N.  E.   195.  Atl.  1044;  Knott  v.  Peterson,  125 

85  State  v.  Walker,  56  N.  H.  176.  Iowa,   404;    101    N.   W.    173;    Ly- 

86  Commonwealth  v.  Thompson,  man  v.  Schenck  (N.  Y.),  55  N.  Y. 
2  Gray,  82.     See  also  Anthony  v.  Supp.  770. 

Krey,  70  Mich.  629 ;  38  N.  W.  603.  so  Quintard      v.      Knocdler,      53 

87  State    v.    Nutter,    44    W.    Va.       Conn.  485;  2  Atl.  762. 

385;  30  S.  E.  67.  »i  Carter    v.    Nicol,     116    Iowa, 

519;  90  N.  W.  352. 


779  BOND   OP  LICENSEE.  §§478,479 

Sec.  478.    Effect    of    judgment    against    principal    upon 
his  surety — Evidence. 

If  judgment  is  to  be  given  both  against  a  principal  and  his 
surety,  then  the  surety  is  not  bound  thereby  unless  he  has 
regular  notice  of  the  proceedings.""  But  where  a  statute  pro- 
vides that  upon  conviction  of  having  violated  the  liquor  law 
the  bond  of  the  licensee  shall  become  forfeited,  the  record  of 
the  conviction  may  be  put  in  evklence,  and  is  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  the  breach  of  the  bond."^  If  the  condition  is  that 
there  shall  be  a  liability  upon  the  bond  if  the  licensee  vio- 
lates the  liquor  law,  then  a  judgment  of  conviction  for  the 
same  offense  charged  in  the  complaint  is  prima  facie  evidence 
of  such  violation,  but  not  conclusive.^*  But  if  the  statute 
provides  that  the  sureties  shall  be  liable  for  the  amount  of 
any  judgment  recovered  against  the  licensee  for  having  vio- 
lated the  liquor  law,  then  a  jud<?mpnt  against  him  is  conclusive 
on  them  and  they  are  not  entitled  to  retry  the  alleged  fact 
of  violation.®^  Where  the  cause  of  action  arises  by  reason  of 
the  recovery  of  a  judgment  against  the  principal,  a  plea  of 
mil  tiel  record  is  a  proper  plea  to  test  the  existence  of  the 
judgment."®  If  the  cause  of  action  be  given  because  of  a 
violation  of  the  statute  by  the  principal,  his  sureties  may 
show  he  had  not  violated  it,  even  though  he  has  been  con- 
victed of  its  violation."" 

Sec.  479.    Attacking  validity   of  license   and   proceedings 
therefor. 

In  an  action  on  his  bond  neither  the  principal  nor  his  surety 
can  attack  the  validity  of  the  proceedings  for  a  license  nor  the 

92  Margoley  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Point  Pleasant  v.  Greenlee,  C3  VV. 
Met.  (Ky.)  405;  Webbs  v.  State,  Va.  207;  60  S.  E.  601;  State  v. 
4  Coldw.  199.  Nutter,  44  W.  Va.  385;  30  S.  E. 

93  Welch    V.    McKane,    55    Conn.  67. 

25;   10  Atl.  168.  9g  Point  Pleasant  v.  Greenlee,  63 

»4Albr€cht    V.    State,    62    Miss.  W.  Va.  207 ;  60  S.  E.  601. 

516;  Webbs  V.  State,  4  Coldw.  199.  97  Padncah    v.    Jones,    126    Ky. 

sr- People    v.    Laniiig,    73    Mich.  809;    104    S.   W.   971;    31   Ky.   L. 

284;  41  N.  W.  424;  Jacobs  v.  Hoi-  Eep.  1203. 

gensen,  70  Conn.  68;   38  Atl.  914; 


§  480  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  780 

validity  of  the  license.    The  giving  of  the  bond  precludes  them 
from  thus  making  a  collateral  attack  upon  them.®^ 

Sec.  480.    Pleading. 

If  the  action  is  brought  to  recover  a  penalty  because  of  the 
commission  of  a  public  offense,  facts  must  be  stated  with  suf- 
ficient precision  to  show  its  commission.  Thus  where  a  statute 
forbade  the  sale  of  liquors  "between  11  o'clock  p.  m.  and  5 
o'clock  A.  M.  of  each  and  every  day,"  a  recovery  cannot  be 
had  on  a  complaint  charging  a  sale  between  11  o'clock  p.  m, 
and  5  o'clock  a.  m.  of  the  "following"  day."^  Where  the  con- 
dition of  the  bond  is  to  prevent  disorderly  conduct  in  the 
place  licensed,  a  charge  that  the  licensee  permitted  such  eon- 
duct  in  his  saloon,  and  permitted  A,  B  and  C  to  there  con- 
duct themselves  in  a  disorderly  manner,  by  then  and  there 
fighting  and  quarreling  together,  is  a  sufficient  allegation  of 
a  breach  of  the  bond.^  An  omission  to  state  the  day  and  year 
of  the  breach  does  not  render  the  complaint  defective  on  gen- 
eral demurrer.^  Under  a  condition  not  to  allow  rioting,  gam- 
bling, disorderly  conduct  or  unlawful  assemblies  in  his  sa- 
loon an  allegation  that  he  permitted  unlawful  assemblies 
in  and  about  his  house  is  not  sufficient,  being  too  general.^ 
Several  offenses  cannot  be  charged  in  the  same  paragraph  of 
complaint,  for  if  it  be  so  done  the  paragraph  will  be  bad  for 
duplicity.*  As  a  rule  technical  defects  in  a  pleading  must  be 
raised  by  a  demurrer,  such  as  a  failure  to  allege  the  approval 
of  the  bond  or  that  the  judgment  against  the  principal  sued 
on  was  rendered  during  the  lifetime  of  the  bond,  or  it  will  be 
waived;^  and  this  is  especially  true  after  the  evidence  is  all 

98  Schullherr  v.   State,  68  Miss.  2  Redpath      v.      Nottingham,      5 

227;   8  So.  .328;   Ludwig  v.  State,  Blackf.  267. 

18  Ind.  App.  518;   48  N.  E.  390;  s  Boles    v.    McCarty,    6    Blackf. 

Hendersonville   v.   Price,  96  N.  C.  427. 

423;  2  S.  E.  155;  Bechtle  V.  Lewis,  4  Boles    v.    McCarty,    6    Blackf. 

123  Mo.  App.  673;  100  S.  W.  1107.  427.     But  see  Jones  Co.  v.  Sales,  25 

09  Eureka  v.  Diaz,  89  Cal.  467 ;  Ind.  25. 

26  Pac.  961.  5  Qullickson  v.  Gjorud,  89  Mich. 

1  Boles    V.    McCarty,    6    Blackf.  8;  50  N.  W.  751;  Maier  v.  State, 

427 ;  State  V.  Golding,  28  Ind.  App.  2   Tex.   Civ.   App.   296;    21    S.   W. 

233;    62  K   E.  502.  974;  Cullinan  v.  O'Connor,  100  N. 


781  BOND    OF   LICENSEE.  §§  480 

heard.®  It  is  sufficient  to  charge  the  execution  of  the  bond 
and  that  the  principal  knowingly  committed  the  breaches 
which  are  fully  described.^  If  the  pleading  show  that  the 
breach  was  committed  after  the  bond  was  executed,  it  need 
not  allege  the  date  of  execution.**  A  complaint  reciting  that 
the  licensee  sold  or  gave  or  permitted  liquors  to  be  given  to  a 
minor  is  sufficient  on  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  where 
the  condition  in  the  bond  is  that  the  licensee  will  not  sell  or 
permit  to  be  sold,  nor  give  nor  permit  to  be  given,  in  his 
premises,  liquor  to  a  minor.''  So  a  complaint  is  sufficient  to 
■withstand  such  a  motion  which  alleges  that  the  licensee  did  not 
keep  an  orderly  place  of  business,  allowing  therein  boisterous 
talking  and  the  use  of  vulgar  and  indecent  language  where 
the  condition  in  his  bond  was  that  he  should  keep  an  orderly 
place  of  business.^"  It  is  sufficient  to  set  out  the  substance  of 
the  condition  charged  to  have  been  violated.^^  To  allege  that 
the  offense  occurred  on  a  specified  date  "and  on  divers  other 
days  thereafter  during"  certain  named  consecutive  months  is 
sufficiently  definite  as  to  the  time  of  the  offense. ^^  Upon  a 
charge  that  the  license  permitted  a  minor  to  enter  and  remain 
in  his  saloon,  an  allegation  that  he  was  employed  in  the  saloon 
as  a  bartender  is  surplusage  and  need  not  be  proven.^^  The 
pleading  should  allege  that  the  violation  of  law  occurred  while 
the  license  was  in  force. ^^  An  allegation  that  the  bond  was 
duly  executed  is  an  allegation  that  it  was  delivered.^^  If  it  is 
sought  to  recover  damages  for  an  injury  occasioned  by  the  in- 
toxication of  the  person  purchasing  liquor,  a  connection  must 

Y.  App.  Div.  142;   91  N.  Y.  Supp.  n  Drake     v.     State     (Tex.     Civ. 

628.  App.),  23  S.  W.  398. 

6  Wright  V.  Treat,  83  Mich.  110;  12  Drake  v.  State,  supra;  Patton 
47  N.  W.  243.  V.    Williams,    35    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

7  Grady  v.  Ragan,  2  Wilson,  Tex.  129;  79  S.  W.  357;  Munoz  v.  Bras- 
Civ.  Cas.  Ct.,  §259.  sel    (Tex.    Civ.   App.),    108   S.   W. 

8  Maier  v.  State,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  417. 

296;   21   S.  W.  974.  instate    v.    Curtis.    8    Tex.    Civ. 

9  Maier  v.   State,  supra;  Jacobs       App.  506;  28  S.  W.  134. 

V.  Holgenson,  70  Conn.  68 ;  38  Atl.  i*  Lyman   v.    Sieliert,   31    N.    Y. 

914.  Misc.   Rep.   285;    65    N.   Y.   Supp. 

10  Whitcomb  v.  State,  2  Tex.  Civ,       367, 

App.  301;  21  S.  W,  37G.  is  Jacobs    v.    Hogan,    73    Conn, 

740;  49  Atl.  202 


§  481  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  782 

be  shown  by  the  pleading  between  the  unlawful  sale  and  the 
injury.^''  It  is  not  necessary  to  mention  the  statute  under 
which  the  action  is  brought/^  If  the  complaint  does  not  allege 
the  granting  or  issuance  of  a  license  it  is  fatally  defective.^' 
If  several  breaches  be  alleged,  proof  of  any  one  of  them  entitles 
the  plaintiff  to  recover."  A  complaint  by  an  individual 
alleging  a  violation  of  the  statute  and  condition  of  the  bond 
and  then  alleging  that  for  that  reason  the  defendant  became 
indebted  to  the  people  of  the  State  in  a  certain  named  sum  con- 
tains a  sufficient  allegation  of  indebtedness  and  non-payment.^° 

Sec.  481.    Evidence. 

The  recitals  in  the  bond  that  the  principal  was  duly  licensed 
establishes  the  granting  of  the  license  prima  facie,  and  the 
license  need  not  be  i>ut  in  evidence.  In  such  an  instance  while 
the  license  is  the  best  evidence  of  its  issuance  and  existence, 
yet  it  is  not  error  to  admit  proof  of  the  license  by  the  records 
of  the  board  or  court  issuing  it.-^  Where  it  is  a  matter  of 
identification  of  prescriptions  for  liquors  that  have  been 
issued,  the  affidavit  of  the  druggist  made  pursuant  to  a  liquor 
statute  is  admissible  for  that  purpose.--  The  affidavit  stating 
that  no  other  liquors  were  sold  except  those  stated  in  the  pre- 
scriptions is  prima  facie  evidence  of  that  fact.-'^  Putting  the 
license  in  evidence  raises  a  presumption  that  an  application 

10  State    V.    Terheide,    166    Ind.  have   concluded    the   plaintiff  was 

689;  78  N.  E.  195.  required  to  prove  all  the  breaches 

i'^  Lucas   V.  Johnson    ( Tex.   Civ.  alleged  in  his  complaint. 

App.),  64  S.  W.  823.  -'«  Cullinan  v.  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co., 

isQuist    V.    American    Bonding,  41  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  119;  83  N.  Y. 

etc.,  Co.,  74  Neb.  692;    105  N.  W.  Supp.   969. 

255.      But    see   Earl    v.   State,    33  -'i  Moniteau    Co.    v.    Lewis,    123 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  161;  76  S.  W.  207.  Mo.   673;    100  S.  W.    1107;   Lucas 

i^Wakeham  v.  Price    (Tex.  Civ.  v.  Johnson   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  64  S. 

App.),  89  S.  W.  1093.    In  this  case  W.     823.       Proof     of     license     by 

the  court  instructed  the  jury  that  copy   produced   by   witness.     King 

if  they  failed  to  find  there  was  any  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  101 ;  109 

violation  of  the  conditions  of  the  S.  W.  182. 

bond  "on  said  dates,"  they  should  "-  Edgar   v.   State,  46  Tex.  Civ. 

find   for    the    defendant,   and    this  App.  171;   102  S.  W.  439. 

was  held  error,  because  they  might  ^s  Edgar  v.  State,  supra. 


783  BOND   OP    LICENSEE.  §§481 

for  it  had  been  duly  made.-'*  If  the  charge  is  illegal  sales  on 
Sunday,  and  the  evidence  shows  the  sale  was  made  by  a  clerk 
of  the  defendant,  evidence  is  also  admissible  to  show  that  such 
clerk  made  sales  on  other  Sundays,  to  show  he  acted  with  the 
consent  of  his  employer  in  making  the  sale  charged.-^  If  the 
alleged  breach  is  the  keeping  of  a  disorderly  house,  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff  rented  his  adjoin'ng  house  to  obiectionable 
characters  is  inadmissible  as  a  defense,  such  proof  showing 
neither  consent  nor  contributory  neerl^ence  on  the  plaintiff's 
part.-*'  If  the  complaint  allege  illegal  sales  off  the  licensed 
premises  it  is  demurrable.-''  The  breach  need  not  be  proven 
of  the  exact  time  laid,  and  evidence,  therefore,  of  a  breach  at 
another  time  is  admissible.-^  Evidence  of  the  exhibition  of 
the  license  in  the  place  licensed  is  admissible,  and  with  this 
may  be  coupled  the  testimony  of  the  licensing  officer  that  the 
licensee  obtained  no  other 'license  covering  any  of  the  period 
the  license  was  in  force.-^  In  a  suit  on  the  bond  the  applica- 
tion for  a  license  is  admissible  in  evidence.^"  Unless  the  proof 
show  a  violation  of  the  law  as  alleged  the  plaintiff  must  fail 
in  his  action.''  Evidence  that  the  law  was  violated  by  a  sale 
to  an  officer  of  the  State  who  purchased  for  the  purpose  of 
entrapping  the  defendant  is  admissible,  especially  if  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  officer  to  investigate  to  ascertain  if  breaches  of 
the  liquor  laws  were  being  committed.'"    Proof  of  the  issuance 

24  White    V.    Manning,    46    Tex.  Div.  582;  67  N.  Y.  Supp.  254;  Cul- 

Civ,  App.  298;    102  S.  W.  1160.  linan   v.   Parker,    177   N.   Y.   573; 

zsPaducah    v.    Jones,    126    Ky.  69  N.  E.  1122;  affirming  84  N.  Y. 

809;    104   S.   W.   971;    31    Ky,   L.  App.  Div.  296;  82  N.  Y.  Supp.  827 ; 

Rep.   1203.  39  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  446;  80  N.  Y. 

26  Cunningham  v.  Porchet,  23  Supp.  187;  Quist  v.  American 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  80;  56  S.  W.  574.  Bonding,   etc.,   Co.,   74   Neb.    692; 

27  Adams  v.  Miller,  81  Miss.  613;  105  N.  W.  255;  Cullinan  v.  Quinn, 
33  So.  489.  95  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  429;   88  N.  Y. 

28  Hawthorne   v.    State,   39   Tex.  Supp.   963. 

Civ.  App.  122 ;  87  S.  W.  839.  3^  Lyman  v.   Oussani,   33   N.   Y. 

29  Cullinan  v.  Horan,  116  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  409;  68  N.  Y.  Supp. 
App.  Div.  711;  102  N.  Y.  Supp.  450;  citing  Commissioners  v. 
132.  Backus,  29  How.  Prac.  33;  People 

3»  Lucas  V.  Johnson  (Tex.  Civ.  v.  Smith,  28  Hun,  626;  Tripp  v. 
App.),  64  S.  W.  823.  Flanigan,   10  R.  I.   128;   Mayor  v. 

31  Lyman  v.  Mead,  56  N.  Y.  App.       Dickerson,  45  N.  J.  L.  38. 


§  482  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS,  784 

of  the  license  need  not  be  expressly  made  where  the  testimony 
affords  strong  presumptive  evidence  of  the  issuance. ^^  If  the 
accused  be  notified  to  produce  his  license  at  the  trial  and  does 
not  do  so,  parol  evidence  of  its  contents  may  be  given.^* 

Sec.  482.    Amount  of  damages  recoverable  on  bond. 

If  the  bond  be  given  in  a  certain  named  amount — as  the 
statute  requires — the  surety  is  not  bound  beyond  that  amount 
though  the  principal  may  be  personally  liable  for  a  much 
greater  sum.^^  He  is  liable,  as  a  rule,  for  actual  and  not  for 
exemplary  damages."*^  In  Kansas,  at  an  early  day,  if  the 
licensee  forfeited  his  bond  and  paid  the  judgment  and  costs 
rendered  because  of  such  forfeiture,  though  it  was  less  than 
the  penalty  named,  the  bond  was  extinguished.-'*^  Occasionlly 
statutes  provide  the  giving  of  bonds  with  no  limit  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  liability.'*^  If  the  bond  provide  for  the  recovery 
of  a  certain  penalty,  the  amount  of  damages  occasioned  by  the 
violation  of  the  law  has  no  place  in  the  case.^^  If  the  State  sue 
on  more  than  one  breach  of  the  bond,  it  may  recover  more  than 
one  penalty,*"  up  to  the  limit  of  the  bond.'*^  The  sum  named  in 
the  bond,  where  it  is  the  amount  of  recovery  for  any  breach  of 
its  conditions  is  treated  as  liquidated  damages.*"  Under  a  stat- 
ute giving  a  parent  an  action  for  a  sale  to  his  minor  child  and 

33Munoz   V.    Brassel    (Tex.    Civ.  39  Paducah    v.    Jones,     126    Ky. 

App.),  108  S.  W.  417  (license  stub  809;    104    S.    W.   971;    31    Ky.   L. ' 

put  in  evidence).  Rep.    1203;    State    v.    Lawson,    83 

34  State  V.  Walker,  129  Mo.  App.  Minn.  124;  86  N.  W.  3:  54  L.  R. 
371;    108    S.  W.    615;    Oldham   v.  A.  487. 

State   (Mo.  App.),  108  S.  W.  667.  ^"  Douthitt  v.    State    (Tex.   Civ. 

35  People  v.  United  Surety  Co.,  App.),  87  S.  W.  190;  Wakeman  v. 
120  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  655;  105  N.  Price  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  89  S.  W. 
Y.  Supp.  72;  Lyman  v.  Fidelity,  1093;  Douthitt  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
etc.,  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  459;  Civ.  App.  396;  82  S.  W.  352;  83 
57    X.   Y.    Supp.    372;    Douthit   v.  S.  W.   795. 

State,  36  Tex.   Civ.   App.  396;    82  4i  Hawthorne    v.   State,   39   Tex. 

S.  W.  352;   83  S.  W.  795.  Civ.  App.  122;   87  S.  W.  839. 

36  Cobb  V.  People,  84  111.  511.  42  Cullinan  v.   Burkhard,  93   N. 

37  State  V.  Estabrook,  29  Kan.  Y.  App.  Div.  31;  86  N.  Y.  Supp. 
739,  1003;     reversing    41    K    Y.    Misc. 

38  Day  V.  Frank,  127  Mass.  497.  Rep.  321;   84  N,  Y,  Supp,  825. 


785  BOND   OP   LICENSEE.  §  §  483 

also  for  allowing  him  "to  enter  and  remain"  in  a  saloon,  and 
the  child  enters  the  saloon  and  purchases  liquor  and  then 
remains  there,  the  parent  may  recover  one  penalty  for  the  sale 
and  another  for  the  entry  and  remaining  in  the  saloon.*^  If 
the  bond  be  exhausted  a  new  one  may  usually  be  required." 

Sec.  483.     Compromise  of  liability. 

While  the  liability  is  due  an  individual,  there  may  be  a 
compromise  of  the  claim  or  amount  due.  Such  is  not  the  case 
when  the  amount  is  due  the  public.  Thus,  where  a  State 
revenue  agent  had  power  to  bring  suit  to  recover  damages 
growing  out  of  the  violation  of  any  contract  with  the  State, 
county  or  municipality  where  he  might  sue,  it  was  held  that 
the  county  supervisors  could  not  relinquish  a  judgment  on  a 
liquor  bond  due  the  county.*'^ 

«Cbburn  V.  Gill  (Tex.  jCiv.  Civ.  App.  396;  82  S.  W.  352;  83 
App.),  60  S.  W.  974.  S.  W.  795. 

«4Douthitt    V.    State,    36    Tex.  45  Adams  v.  Cox,  80  Miss.  561; 

32   So.    117. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 
LICENSE  FEES  AND  TAXES. 


484.  Definition  of  license  fee.  495.     Disposition  of  fees  and  taxes 

485.  License  fee — Police  power —  collected. 

Restraint  of  trade.  496.     Refunding  fees  or  taxes  paid 

486.  License  fee,  wlien  not  a  tax  under  void  or  illegal  ordi- 

— Police  regulation.  nance  or  statute. 

487.  Uniformity  of  taxation.  497.     Refunding  fees  or  ti.xes,  con- 

488.  Liability  for  fee  or  tax.  tinned — No  statute  requir- 

489.  Amount  of  fee  or  tax.  ing  it. 

490.  Payable  in  money.  498.     Refunding     fees     or     taxes, 
49 L     Payment  in  advance.  continued — Cases  allowing. 

492.  To   what  officer   payable.  499.     Refunding  fees  or  taxes,  con- 

493.  Suit  to  collect.  tinued  —  Payment    under 

494.  Tax    lien — Landlord's    prop-  mistake  of  fact. 

erty — Prospective  statute.  500.     Rebate  of  fees  or  taxes  un- 
der statute. 

Sec.  484.    Definition  of  license  fee. 

A  license  fee  is  the  price  paid  for  the  license.  It  is  usually 
such  a  sum  as  will  compensate  those  issuing  it  for  the  expense 
of  such  issuance  and  the  recording  of  it ;  and  when  it  is  issued 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  public  control  over  the  business 
licensed,  then  such  further  sum  as  will  probably  be  expended 
in  the  regulating  and  inspecting  the  business  and  enforcing  the 
law  regulating  such  business.  If  the  license  may  be  issued 
the  fee  may  be  exacted.^ 

Sec.  485.    License  fee — Police  power — Restraint  of  trade. 

A  Legislature  may  pass  any  law  not  inhibited  by  the  Con- 
stitution, and  a  law  requiring  an  amount  or  sum  of  money  to 

1  People  v.  Jarvis,  19  N.  Y.  22  Fed.  201;  Ulterminova  v.  Ze- 
App.  Div.  466;  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  kind,  95  Iowa,  622;  64  N.  W. 
596;  Wiggins  v.  Ferry  Co.,  102  646;  29  L.  R.  A.  734;  58  Am.  St. 
111.   5'60;    Laundry    License    Case,       447. 

7&6 


787  LICENSE    FEES   AND   TAXES.  §  486 

be  paid  for  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors,  is  not  a  tax 
in  the  sense  of  the  constitutional  provision  that  "no  tax  shall 
be  levied  except  in  pursuance  of  law,"  etc.-  A  State  law, 
taxing  by  way  of  a  license  fee,  those  who  sell,  in  small  quan- 
tities intoxicating  liquors  manufactured  by  themselves  within 
the  State,  is  constitutional ;  it  is  a  law  which  the  State  has  the 
power  to  pass,  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  regulate  its  in- 
ternal police,  and  everything  that  relates  to  the  morals  and 
health  of  the  community  is  within  that  power.  Pursuits  that 
are  pernicious  and  detrimental  to  the  public  morals  may  be 
prohibited  altogether,  or  licensed  for  a  compensation  to  the 
public.^    Nor  is  such  a  law  void  as  being  in  restraint  of  trade.* 

Sec.  486.    License  fee,  when  not  a  tax — Police  regulation. 

A  license  fee  for  retailing  intoxicating  liquors  is  in  no 
proper  sense  a  tax  for  revenue.  Its  object  is  not  to  raise 
revenue.  From  time  almost  immemorial  it  has  been  thought 
that  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  was  dangerous  to  the 
public  peace  and  morals,  and  it  has  been  the  uniform  practice 
in  this  country  to  subject  it  to  regulation,  to  require  a  license 
from  some  public  officer  before  it  is  engaged  in,  and  to  pre- 
scribe as  a  crime  the  pursuit  of  it  without  a  license.  Such  a 
license  is  a  part  of  the  police  regulation  of  a  State,  and  the 
fee  is  intended  rather  to  prevent  the  indiscriminate  opening 
of  such  establishments  than  to  raise  revenue  by  taxation.  Tax- 
ation is  not  the  object  of  imposing  such  a  license  fee  and  the 
Legislature  is  not  bound  to  appropriate  the  proceeds  for  any 
object  for  which  the  State  may  raise  money  by  local 
or  special  taxation.  It  is  imposed  in  the  exercise  of  the 
rightful  police  power  of  the  State,  and  is  an  incident  of 
legitimate  police  regulation.  Such  being  the  nature  of  the 
business,  under  the  law,  it  is  the  province  of  the  Legislature 

2  Henry  v.  State,  26  Ark.  523.  Md.    571;     Culver    v.    People,    11 

3Bureh    v.    May,    etc.,    42    Ga.  Mich.     43;     City    of     Winona     v. 

598;    Bolder  v.   Schneider,   49   Ga.  Whipple,    24    Minn.    61;    State    v. 

195;    People    v.    Thurber,    13    111.  Hudson,  78  Mo.  302. 

554;    East  St.   Louis   v.   Trustees,  •*  City   of   Rochester   v.    Upham, 

etc.,  102  111.  489;   Keller  v.  State,  19  Minn.  78. 

11  Md.  525;  Cahen  v.  Jarrett,  42 


§  486  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  788 

to  regntate  it  and  to  fix  the  price  of  the  license  fee  at  such 
sum  as  that  body  may  deem  best  calculated  to  restrain  the 
dangerous  consequences  of  the  traffic  to  the  public  peace  and 
morals.^  In  determining  what  such  a  fee  shall  be,  it  is  proper 
and  reasonable  for  the  Legislature  to  consider,  not  only  the 
expense  merely  of  direct  regulation,  but  of  the  incidental  con- 
sequences that  may  be  likely  to  subject  the  public  to  cost  in 
consequence  of  the  business  licensed.  The  business  is  one  that 
affects  the  public  interest  in  manj^  ways  and  leads  to  many 
disorders.  It  has  a  powerful  tendency  to  increase  pauperism 
and  crime.  It  renders  a  large  force  of  officers  essential  and  it 
adds  to  the  expense  of  the  courts  and  nearly  all  of  the  branches 
of  civil  administration.  It  cannot  be  questioned,  therefore,  if 
it  is  to  be  licensed  by  the  public  authorities,  that  it  is  legitimate 
and  proper  to  take  into  consideration  the  question  of  the 
probable  consequences,  or  that  the  payment  to  be  exacted 
should  be  sufficient  to  cover  all  the  incidental  expenses  to 
which  the  public  are  likely  to  be  put  on  account  of  the  business 
being  carried  on.  All  reasonable  intendments  must  favor  the 
fairness  and  justice  of  the  fee  thus  fixed.  It  will  not  be  held 
excessive  unless  it  is  manifestly  something  more  than  a  mere 
fee  for  regulation.®  We  have  already  said  that  such  a  fee 
was  not  in  anj*  sense  a  tax  for  revenue.  It  is,  however,  an 
indirect  tax  which  may  be  made  effectual  as  a  police  regula- 
tion.   A  license  upon  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  is  an 

GStraub     v.     Gordon,     27     Ark.  son,  78  Mo.  302;  State  v.  Hardy, 

625;    Burch   v.    Savannah,   42   Ga.  7   Neb.   377;    Pleuler  v.   State,   11 

596;    Home    Ins.   Co.   v.   Augusta,  Neb.   547;    11    N.   W.   481;    Adler 

50    Ga.    530;    People   v.    Thurber,  v.  Whitbeck,  44  0.  St.  539;   9  N. 

13  111.  554;   St.  Louis  v.  Wehring,  E.    672;    Aulanier    v.    Governor,    1 

46  111.   393;    Lovingston  v.   Board,  Tex.       653;       'Commonwealth       v. 

etc.,    99    111.    564;    Thomasson    v.  Byrnne,     20     Grat.      (Va.)      165; 

State,    15    Ind.     449;    Mitchell    v.  State  v.   French,    17  Mont.  54;    14 

Williams,    27    Ind.    62;    State    v.  Pac.   1078;   30  L.  R.  A.  415;   Ter- 

Doe,  79  Ind.  9;   Falmouth  v.  Wat-  ritory    v.     Farnsworth,     5     Mont, 

son,  5   Bush.    (Ky.)    560;    Levi  v.  303;   5  Pac.  869. 
Louisville,  97  Ky.   394;    30  S.  W.  e  Cooley    on    Taxation,    p.    409; 

973;  28  L.  R.  A.  480;  Ash  v.  Peo-  Claussen    v.    Luverne,    103    Minn, 

pie,  11  Mich.  347;  Chivers  v.  Peo-  491;    115  N.  W.  643. 
pie,    11    Mich.    43;   State   v.   Hud- 


789  LICENSE    FEES    AND    TAXES.  §  486 

excise,  and  an  excise  is  an  indirect  tax.  Indirect  taxation  by 
way  of  tariffs,  etc.,  has  ever  been  regarded  as  a  legitimate 
exercise  of  the  taxing  power.  Such  a  fee  or  tax  is  imposed 
in  the  exercise  of  the  rightful  police  power  of  the  State  and 
is  an  incident  of  legitimate  police  regulation."  Hence,  it  is 
not  within  a  constitutional  prohibition  against  "local  and 
special  taxation  for  State  purposes."  Such  a  constitutional 
provision  refers  mainly  to  the  general  tax  levied  by  the  State. 
It  is  a  restraint  upon  the  otherwise  discretionarj^  powers  of 
the  Legislature  and  prescribes  a  rule  for  its  enforcement  in 
authorizing  the  levy  of  taxes.  It  must  be  governed  by  that 
rule  whether  the  levy  is  for  the  State  at  large  or  for  a  munic- 
ipal subdivision.  Indirect  taxation  imposed  not  merely  for 
the  purpose  of  revenue  but  in  the  restraint  of  a  particular 
business  or  calling,  or  as  a  license  upon  particular  pursuits, 
or  as  mere  police  regulations,  does  not  come  within  the  spirit 
and  meaning  of  such  constitutional  provisions.^  A  license  fee 
does  not  lose  its  character  as  such  because  it  is  called  a  "tax" 
in  the  statute  authorizing  its  exaction."  But  if  it  be  imposed 
merely  for  revenue  then  it  becomes  a  tax.^^ 

7  Anderson  v.  Kenns,  etc.,  Co.,  "The  power  to  license,  as  the 
14  Ind.   199.  means      of      regulating      business, 

8  Bright  V.  MeCullough,  27  Ind.  means  the  power  to  charge  a  fee 
223;  Pleuler  v.  State,  11  Neb.  therefor  sufficient  to  defray  the 
i547;    11  N.  W.  481.  expense    of    issuing    the    license." 

9  Levy  \.  State,  161  Ind.  251;  Laundry  License  Case,  22  Fed. 
68  N.  E.   172.  201;     Uterminova    v.    Zekind,    95 

10  Ward  v.  Maryland,  12  Wall.  Iowa,  622;  64  N.  W.  646;  29 
418;  20  L.  Ed.  449;  Glasgow  v.  L.  R.  A.  734;  58  Am.  St.  447. 
Rowse,  43  Mo.  479;  St.  Louis  v.  The  Missouri  law  exacting  a 
Spiegel,  75  Mo.  145;  iState  v.  fee  for  inspection  of  beer  imposes 
Bengschs,  170  Mo.  81;  70  S.  W.  a  tax,  no  right  of  sale  being  given 
710;  Hancock  v.  Singer  Mg.  Co.,  under  it.  State  v.  Bixman,  162 
62  N.  J.  L.  289;  41  Atl.  846;  42  Mo.  1 ;  62  S.  W.  828;  Parsons  v. 
L.  R.  A.  852;  Rohr  v.  Gray,  80  People,  32  Colo.  221;  76  Pac.  666; 
Md.  274;  30  Atl.  632;  see  Over-  Ex  parte  Braun,  141  Cal.  204;  74 
by  v.  State,  18  Fla.  178;  Ex  parte  Pac.  780. 

Pfirrmann,   134  Cal.   143;    66  Pac.  The   "mulct"   tax   of   Iowa   is  a 

205;    St.   Louis   v.   Western  U.   T.  tax,   and   not  a  license;    and   it   is 

Co.,  148  U.  S.  92;   37  L.  Ed.  380;  collectible    by    summary    proceed- 

13  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  485.  ings.     Newton  v.  McKay    (Iowa), 


§  48  / 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


790 


Sec.  487.     Uniformity  of  taxation. 

It  is  within  the  power  of  a  State  Legislature  to  tax  the 
liquor  traffic,'^  wholesale  as  well  as  retail;^-  and  a  law  pro- 
viding for  the  taxing  of  such  traffic  is  not  one  to  raise  revenue, 
but  simply  one  enacted  in  the  exercise  of  the  police  power.^-' 
The  power  to  impose  such  a  tax  exists  independently  and 
concurrently  in  the  State  and  Federal  Government,  subject  to 
constitutional  restrictions;  in  the  State  government,  subject  to 
the  exclusive  right  conferred  on  Congress  to  regulate  inter- 
state comerce;''*  and  in  the  Federal  Government,  subject  to 
the  prohibition  of  any  interference  with  the  internal  regula- 
tions of  the  States.^''     Such  a  tax  is  not  a  tax  upon  property 


102  N.  W.  827;  Bolton  v.  McKay 
(Iowa),   102   N.W.   1131. 

It  is  presumed  a  liquor  tax  was 
properly  levied,  and  levied  at  the 
time  the  law  requires  it  to  be  lev- 
ied. Hubbell  V.  Polk  Co.,  lOG 
Iowa,  618;    76  N.  W.  854. 

Whisky  refined  by  age  into 
drinkable  and  marketable  whisky 
is  not  "raw  material"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Dow  Liquor  Law 
of  Ohio  exempting  "raw  mate- 
rial" of  a  distiller  from  taxation 
thereunder.  Wash  v.  Lewis,  5 
Ohio  N.  P.  391. 

Under  the  Bates  Law  of  Ohio 
a  brewing  company  selling  liquors 
away  from  its  brewery  is  engaged 
in  trafficking  in  liquor,  and  liable 
to  the  tax  imposed  by  that  law, 
the  law  defining  trafficking  as 
"buying  or  procuring  and  selling 
of  intoxicating  liquors."  Jung 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Talbot,  59  Ohio 
St.  511;   53  N.  E.  51. 

In  Georgia  State  dispensary 
agents  are  not  taxable;  for  they 
are  governmental  agents.  Dispen- 
sary Com'rs  v.  Thornton,  106  Ga. 
106;    31   S.  E.  733. 


11  Ex  parte  Marshall,  64  Ala. 
266;  Thomasson  v.  State,  15  Ind. 
449 ;  Westinghausen  v.  People,  44 
Mich.  265;  6  N.  W.  641;  Pveith- 
miller  v.  People,  4  Mich.  280;  6 
N.  W.  667;  Portwood  v.  Ba-skett, 
64  Miss.  213;  1  South.  105;  Ad- 
ler  v.  Whitbeck,  44  Ohio  St.  539; 
9  N.  E.  '59;  Durach's  Appeal,  «2 
Pa.  St.  491;  Kurth  v.  State,  86 
Tenn.  134;  5  S.  W.  593;  Albrecht 
V.  State,   S   Tex.  App.   216. 

1-  Senior  v.  Rattcman,  44  Ohio 
St.  661;   11  N.  E.  321. 

13  Thomasson  v.  State,  15  Ind. 
449;  State  v.  Wright,  14  Ore. 
365;    12  Pac.  708. 

14  Providence  Bank  v.  Billings, 
4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  514;  Dobbins  v. 
Erie  County,  16  Pet.  (U.  S.)  435; 
License  Tax  Cases,  5  How.  (U. 
S.)  504;  Nathan  v.  Louisiana,  8 
How.  (U.  'S.)  73;  Pervear  v. 
Massachusetts,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
475;  Ward  v.  Maryland,  12  Wall. 
(U.  S.)    4 IS. 

ij  Brown  v.  Maryland,  12 
Wheat.  (U.  S.)  419;  Nathan  v. 
Ix)uisiana,  8  How.  (U.  S.)  182; 
Woodruir  v.  Parham,  8  Wall.  (U. 
S.)    123. 


791  LICENSE   PEES   AND   T.SJXES,  §  487 

but  an  indirect  or  excise  tax,  imposed  not  merely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  revenue,  but  in  restraint  of  a  particular  business  or 
calling,  or  as  a  license  on  a  particular  pursuit,  or  as  a  mere 
police  regulation,  and,  consequently,  is  not  subject  to  constitu- 
tional restrictions  upon  the  power  to  tax  property;  such,  for 
example,  as  that  taxes  shall  be  uniform  and  equal.^*'  Ac- 
cordingly, it  has  been  held  that  a  statute  imposing  a  special 
tax  on  a  dealer  in  intoxicating  liquors  was  not  in  violation 
of  a  constitutional  provision  that  "taxation  on  property  shall 
be  ad  valorem  only,  and  uniform  in  all  species  of  property 
taxed,"  the  court  holding  that  the  tax  was  on  the  business  of 
selling  such  liquor  and  not  on  the  liquors  sold.^^  It  has  also 
been  held  that  a  tax  upon  an  occupation  is  not  a  tax  upon 
property,  although  the  amount  and  value  of  the  stock  in  trade 
of  the  dealer  is  adopted  as  a  standard ;  ^^  or  upon  the  value  of 
the  property;"  or  in  any  case  when  the  tax  is  measured  by 
the  amount  of  the  net  earnings  or  income.-"  Such  taxes,  how- 
ever, must  be  uniform  and  not  discriminating  in  their  opera- 
tion. "While  this  is  true,  it  must  be  remembered  that  perfect 
accuracy  cannot  be  had  in  apportioning  such  taxes.  It  has 
been  said,  and  rightfully,  that  "perfectly  equal  and  uniform 
taxation  will  remain  an  unattainable  good  as  long  as  laws  and 
governments  and  men  are  imperfect."  Approximation  to 
uniformity  is  all  that  can  be  had  and  this  must  be  left  to  the 
judgment  of  the  lawmaking  power.-^    Whether  such  a  tax  is 


iG  Henry  v.  State,  26  Ark.  523 ;  ern  U.   T.  Co.   v.   Mayer,  28   Ohio 

Straub   v.   Oordon,    27    Ark.   625;  St.    521;     Texas    Banking    Co.    v. 

Ex     parte     Hurl,     49     Cal.     557;  State,  42  Tex.  fia6. 

Rome  V.  McWilliam,  52  Ga.  251;  i7  Burch    v.    Savannah,    42    Ga. 

Walker     v.     Springfield,     94     111.  596. 

364;   Thomasson  v.  State,  15  Ind.  is  Corson  v.  State,  57  Md.   251. 

449;     Leavenworth    v.     Booth,     15  i«  Stat«    v.    Western   U.    T.    Co., 

Kan.  628;   New   Orleans  v.   Kauf-  73   Me.   518. 

man,   29    La.    Ann.    283;    29    Am.  20  Philadelphia    Contributorship 

Rep.    283;    Wintz    v.    Girardy,    31  v.    Commonwealth,   98   Pa.    St.   48. 

La.  Ann.  381;   St.  Louis  v.  Grwn,  21  Cooley    on    Taxation,   p.    127; 

7  Mo.  App.  468;  Ex  parte  Robin  Commonwealth    v.    Savings    Bank, 

son,   12   Neb.  263;  State  v.  U.  S.,  5    Allen     (Mass.)     428;    Lowell    v. 

etc.,     Ex.     Co.,    60     N.     H.     219;  Oliver,  8  Allen    (Mass.)    247;   Al- 

Standard,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Attorney  len  v.  Drew,  44  Vt.   174;    Ould  v. 

General,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  270;   West-  Richmond,   23   Gratt.    (Va.)    464. 


§  487  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  792 

just  and  equal  or  not  is  not  a  question  of  law  for  the  eourts.-- 
If  it  were,  the  courts,  by  adopting  a  standard  of  rigid  con- 
struction, might  altogether  put  a  stop  to  such  taxation.  The 
uniformity  required  in  the  operation  of  such  a  law  is  that 
which  simply  requires  that  the  law  shall  bear  equally  in  its 
burdens  upon  all  persons  standing  in  the  same  category.  A 
law  is  uniform  in  its  operation  where  every  person  who  is 
brought  within  the  regulation  provided  for  is  alike  affected 
by  the  law.  It  must  have  uniform  oneration  upon  all  of  those 
included  within  the  class  upon  which  it  purports  to  operate.^' 
Therefore,  a  law  which  declares  that  all  who  sell  liquors  within 
five  miles  of  a  town  or  city  shall  pay  one  tax,  and  the  keeper 
of  a  wayside  inn  or  station  another,  is  a  uniform  law  within 
this  meaning.  Such  a  law  is  uniform  as  to  each  class  and  the 
classification  is  a  reasonable  one  and  within  the  power  of  a 
Legislature  to  make.-*  Nor  is  a  statute  unconstitutional  be- 
cause it  levies  a  tax  of  eighty-five  dollars  on  persons  dealing 
in  intoxicating  liquors  on  lands,  while  fifty  dollars  is  levied 
on  persons  following  a  like  occupation  on  steamboats,  although 
they  may  ply  within  the  limits  oF  the  same  jurisdiction ;  ^^ 
nor  a  law  which  makes  a  distinction  between  breweries  and 
distilleries  on  the  one  hand,  and  saloons  on  the  other;  -®  nor  a 
law  that  distinguishes  between  malt  liquors  and  those  which, 
in  their  effect,  are  more  intoxicating ;  -^  nor  a  law  which  re- 
quires retail  liquor  dealers  to  pay  a  tax  a  year  in  advance, 
but  permits  the  tax  on  other  occupations  to  be  paid  quarterly 
and  requires  a  license  to  pursue  such  occupations  but  permits 
others  to  be  pursued  without  license :  ^®  nor  is  such  a  law  un- 
constitutional because  of  the  fact  that  other  subjects  or  occu- 

22  Cooley  on  Taxation,  p.    126.  23  Kaliska     v.     Grady,     25     La. 

23  Territory   v.   Connell,   2   Ariz.       Ann.   576 ;    State  v.   Rolle,   30  La. 
339;    Hack   v.   State,   44   Ohio   St.       Ann.   99  L 

536;   9  N.  E.  305;   Senior  v.  Rat-  2g  Anderson   v.   Brewster,   44    0, 

termann,  44   Ohio   St.  661;    11   X.  St.  576;    9  X.  E.   682. 

E.    321;    Cleveland    v.    Tripp,    13  27  Timm    v.    Harrison,    109    111. 

R.   I.   50;    Bishop  v.   Tripp,   15  R.  593. 

L  466 ;   8  Atl.  C92.  28  Faher  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App. 

24  Territory   v.   Connell,   2    Ariz.  146;   11  S.  W.  108. 
339;    16  Pac.   209. 


793  LICENSE   FEES   AND  TAXES.  §  488 

pations  are  not  taxed.-''  "An  excise  tax  on  one  kind  of  busi- 
ness only  is  not  illegal  for  the  discrimination;  it  is  always 
to  be  conclusively  presumed  that  the  Legislature  found  good 
and  controlling  reasons  impelling  the  action  it  has  taken  and 
that  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances  which  were  known  to  its 
members,  the  tax  which  has  been  provided  for  is  reasonable. ' '  ^^ 

Sec.  488.    Liability  for  fee  or  tax. 

A  license  fee  or  tax  cannot  be  collected  from  a  person 
engaging  in  the  liquor  traffic  without  a  license,  where  a  license 
is  necessary  in  order  to  engage  in  such  traffic  or  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  although  he  may  be  liable  to  punishment  be- 
cause of  having  violated  the  statute.^^  A  statute  authorizing 
a  city  to  collect  a  tax  on  all  kinds  of  ' '  business ' '  not  prohibited 
by  law,  followed  by  an  ordinance  levying  a  tax  on  all  persons 
who  "sell"  intoxicating  liquors  and  declaring  the  tax  a  debt 
payable  from  anyone  who  may  engage  in  any  "business"  on 
which  the  tax  is  imposed,  does  not  require  the  payment  of  a 
tax  merely  for  the  sale  of  liquor,  but  does  require  it  for  a 
person  engaging  in  the  "business"  of  selling  liquors.^-     In 

-9  Singer    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Wright,  so  Cooley   on   Taxation,   p.    125; 

33  Fed.   Rep.   121;   Heny  v.  State,  Northern  Ind.  R.  Co.  v.  Connelly, 

26  Ark.    523;    Straub   v.    Gordon,  10    0.    S.    159;    People    v.    Brook- 

27  Ark.  625;  Goodwin  v.  Savan-  lyn,  4  X.  Y.  410;  Decamp  v.  Eve- 
nah,  53  Ga.  414;  Savannah  v.  land,  19  Barn.  81;  Lusher  v. 
Weed,  84  Ga.  683;    11   S.  E.   235;  Scites,  4  W.  Va.  11. 

Weaver  v.   State,  89   Ga.   G39;    15  si  Chicago    v.    Enright,    27    111. 

S.  E.  840;    Bright  v.  McCullough,  App.     559;     O'Harra    v.    Cox,     42 

27    Ind.    223;     Fretvi^ell    v.    Troy,  Miss.     496;     State     v.    Adler,    ©8 

18    Kan.   271;    State   v.   Valkmar,  Miss.    487;    9    So.    645;    State    v. 

20   La.   Ann.    585;    Yoiingblood  v.  Piezzo,   66   Miss.   426;    6   So.  316; 

Sexton,  37   Mich.  406;   Holberg  v.  Druggist   Cases,    89   Tenn.   449;    3 

Macon,    55    Miss.    112;    Pleuler   v.  S.  W.  490;  Cominonwealth  v.  Tay- 

iState,    11    Neb.    547;     10    N.    W.  lor   (Ky.)  ;   116  S.  W'.  682. 

481;     Gattin    v.    Tarboro,    78    X.  But  in  Idaho  a  sale  of  liquors 

Car.    119;    Darrach's    Appeal,    62  renders   the   vendor   liable   to    the 

Pa.    St.    491;    State   v.    Columbia,  county     for     the     tax.       Bingham 

<3    S.    C.    8;    Pullman,    etc.,    Co.   v.  County  v.   Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co., 

State,  64   Tex.   274;    Slaughter   v.  13   Idaho,  34;   88  Pac.  829. 

Commonwealth,    13    Gratt.     (Va.)  32  Merced  €o.  v.  Helm,   102  Cal. 

776.  159;   36  Pac.  39D. 


§488 


TRAFB^IC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


794 


order  to  exact  a  liquor  tax  some  law  must  be  in  force  author- 
izing its  exaction/'^  A  statute  may  levy  a  tax  for  the  State 
and  authorize  a  county  to  levy  a  tax  on  the  same  business  or 
person  for  the  county."*  The  license  fee  or  tax  cannot  be 
exacted  for  a  period  of  time  before  the  statute  providing  for 
it  went  into  force.^''  A  social  club,  selling  only  to  its  members, 
that  takes  out  a  United  States  revenue  license,  is  liable  to  a 
liquor  tax  under  a  law  imposing  a  privilege  tax  on  a  social 
club,  incorporated  or  otherwise,  selling  intoxicating  liquors  and 
making  the  procurement  of  such  revenue  license  prima  facie 
evidence  of  liabilitv  to  the  tax.^" 


"3  McCowan  v.  Davidson,  43 
Ga.  480;  Miller  v.  Minney,  31 
Kan.  522;  3  Pac.  427;  Parker  v. 
Wayne  Co.,  104  N.  C.  166;  10 
S.  E.   137. 

34  Baker  v.  Panola  Co.,  30  Tex. 
86;  Parker  v.  Wayne  Co.,  104 
X.  C.  166;  10  S.  E.  137.  In 
Texas  it  has  been  held  that  a 
person  selling  liquor  under  the 
local  option  law  is  not  liable  for 
an  occupation  tax  imposed  by  the 
statute  on  liquor  dealers.  Rath- 
burn  V.  State,  88  Tex.  281;  31  S. 
W.  189  (Texas  Civ.  App.);  32 
S.  W.  45. 

Exemption  in  North  Carolina 
under  Acts  1877,  c.  156,  §  12.  Al- 
bertson  v.  Wallace,  81  K  C.   479. 

35  Tliibodeaux  v.  State,  69 
Miss.   683;    13   So.   352. 

But  it  is  permissible  for  a  stat- 
ute to  provide  that  licenses  shall 
be  annual  ones  and  all  bear  a 
certain  date,  and  require  an  ap- 
plicant to  pay  a  full  yearly  li- 
cense fee;  thereby  requiring  him 
to  pay  for  a  period  of  time  ante- 
dating the  actual  issuance  of  his 
license. 

3c  Nashville  Hermitage  Club  v. 
Shelton,  104  Tenn.  101;  56  S.  W. 
838. 

A  solicitor  of  sales  for  the  per- 


son owning  the  liquors  is  not  lia- 
ble for  license  fees  or  taxes, 
though  he  might  be  fined  for  sell- 
ing liquor  without  his  employer 
being  licensed.  Swords  v.  Le 
Blanc,  111  La.  416;  35  So.  622; 
Owensboro  v.  Fulds  ( Ky. )  ;  102 
S.   W.   1184;    31   Ky.  L.   Rep.   627. 

Under  U.  S.  Rev.  St.  §  3244  ( U. 
S.  Comp.,  1901,  p.  2098),  any  per- 
son who  "sells  or  offers  for  sale" 
malt  liquors  is  subject  to  the  spe- 
cial tax  imposed  on  dealers,  re- 
gardless of  the  fact  of  ownership. 
Western  Express  Co.  v.  United 
States,  141  Fed.  28;  76  C.  C.  A. 
516. 

Under  Ohio  Rev.  St.,  §§4364-9, 
the  assessment  of  the  tax  should 
be  made  on  the  traffic,  although 
carried  on  in  violation  of  a  city 
ordinance.  Conwell  v.  Sears,  65 
Ohio  St.  49;  61  N.  E.  155;  and 
omitted  taxes  may  be  put  on  the 
tax  duplicate.  Markle  v.  New- 
ton, 64  Ohio  St.  493;  60  N.  E. 
619.  So  in  Iowa  under  Code 
§  1374.  hi  re  Des  Moines  Union 
Ry.  Co..  137  Iowa,  730;  115  N. 
W.  740,  743;  National,  etc.,  Co. 
V.  Board,  138  Iowa.  11;  115  N. 
W.  480;  National,  etc.,  Co.  v. 
Board,  134  Iowa,  527;  111  N.  W. 
1009. 


795  LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES.  §  489 

Sec.  489.    Amount  of  fee  or  tax. 

Usually  the  statute  fixes  the  amount  of  the  fee  or  tax,  and 
when  that  is  clone  a  city  cannot  by  ordinance  increase  the 
amount ;  ^'  but  where  a  statute  provided  that  after  a  certain 
date  in  the  future  the  amount  of  the  fee  should  not  be  less 
than  a  certain  amount,  it  was  held  that  the  city  might  by  ordi- 
nance provide  for  the  issuance  of  a  license  before  that  date 
for  less  amount,  and  that  it  could  not  be  successfully  con- 
tended that  it  was  the  intent  of  the  city  to  ev^de  the  law, 
and  for  that  reason  the  ordinance  was  void.^^  If  the  amount 
be  not  fixed  which  a  city  may  charere,  it  is  said  that  it  must 
be  reasonable ;  ^^  and  whether  the  rate  fixed  amounts  to  pro- 
hibition is  a  question  of  fact  ■*"  to  be  determined  by  the  court 
upon  the  face  of  the  ordinance,  and  evidence  on  the  question 
is  not  admissible/^  In  one  instance  it  was  said  that  the 
court  could  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  adjudge  it  prohibitive  or 
unreasonable,  for  the  common  council  is  the  better  judge  of 
that  fact,  and  the  court  will  not  revise  its  action  by  a  mere 
examination  of  the  ordinance.*-  If  the  amoimt  is  within  the 
limits  allowed  by  the  statute  no  question  can  be  raised  as  to 
its  validity  on  that  point."  AVhere  statutes  did  not  restrict 
the  amount  of  fees  or  taxes  a  city  might  impose  or  exact 
it  has  been  held  that  the  court  would  not  assume  that  $50  per 
month  was  oppressive  or  unreasonable;*^  nor  $30,  but  if  a 
female  be  employed  in  the  saloon  $150 ;  ■'''  nor  $500  per  year ;  *^ 

Assessing    a    cold    storage    com-  4 1  Merced    Co.    v.    Fleming,    111 

pany    storing    beer.       In    re    Des  Cal.    46;    43    Pac.    392;    Berry   v. 

Moines  Union  Ry.,  137  Iowa,  730;  Cramer,  58  N.  J.  L.  278;   39  Atl. 

115   N.  W.  740,  743.  201. 

37  Drew  Co.  v.  Bennett,  43  Ark.  42  Wiley  v.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429; 

364;  In  re  Pittston,  7  Kulp.  527;  Ex  parte  Hurl,  49  Cal.  557. 

Crestin  v.  Viroqua,   67   Wis.   314;  43  Dennehy  v.   Chicago,   120    111. 

30  N.  W.  515;  see  Jones  v.  Cxrady,  627;   12  N.  W.  227. 

25   La.  Ann.  586.  **  E-"'    parte    Guerrero,    69    Cal. 

ssSwarth    v.     People,     109     111.  88;     10    Pac.    261;    Queen    v.    Sa- 

621.  terio,  1  Terr.  L.  R.  301    ($100  per 

33  Cherry  v.  Shelbyville,  19  Ind.  annum). 

84.     A  fee  of  $1,000  to  sell  "near-  45  ^;c     parte     Felchin,     96     Cal. 

beer"  was  held  reasonable.     State  360;  31  Pac.  224;  31  Am.  St.  223. 

V.   Donnenberg    (N.  C),   66   S.   E.  Nor    $700.      Gaml)ill    v.    Erdrieli, 

301.  143  Ala.  506;  39  So.  297. 

40  Sweet  V.   Wabash,   41   Ind.  7.  4g  Wiley  v.  Owens,  39  Ind.  429. 


§489 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


796 


nor  $2,500  per  anuum  where  theatrical  performances  are  at- 
tached;*^ nor  $1,000  per  annum  i'or  a  brewery's  agency ;*** 
nor  $1,000  per  annum  for  a  small  city ;  *^  nor  $20,000  when 
the  amount  was  fixed  by  statute.'^"  The  amount  may  be  graded 
by  statute  according  to  the  population  of  the  city  wherein  the 
license  is  issued.'"'  A  city  charter  fixing  the  amount  that  may 
be  exacted  within  its  boundaries  is  not  changed  by  a  general 
law  fixing  another  amount  for  the  State  generally.^-  The 
addition  of  a  small  fee  for  the  actual  manual  issuance  of  the 
license  does  not  render  the  ordinance  providing  for  it  void.^' 
Wholesalers  ot  brewers  cannot  be  charged  retail  license  fees;  "'* 
but  whether  or  not  the  individual  or  corporation  sought  to  be 


47  Goldsmith  v.  New  Orleans,  31 
La.  Ann.   646. 

48  Indianapolis  v.  Bieler,  138 
Ind.  30;  36  N.  E.  857;  Schmidt 
V.  Indianapolis,  168  Ind.  631;  80 
N.  E.  632. 

49  Ex  parte  Hinkle,  104  Mo. 
App.  104;  78  S.  A.  317;  State  v. 
Dannenberg  (N.  C),  66  S.  E. 
301    (for  near-beer). 

50  Glover  v.  State,  126  Ga.  594; 
55  S.  E.  592. 

51  Foster  v.  Burt,  76  Ala.  229; 
People  V.  Medberrj',  17  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  8 ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  207 : 
Commonwealth  v.  'Smoulter,  120 
Pa.  137;  17  Atl.  532;  24  W.  N. 
C.  48;  Commonwealth  v.  Miller, 
126  Pa.  157;  17  Atl.  623;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Shoup,  9  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  Rep.  289;  State  v.  Keaough, 
68  Wis.  135;  31  N.  W.  723; 
People  V.  Hilliard,  40  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  589;  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  21;  af- 
firmed 85  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  507; 
83  N.  Y.  Supp.  204;  Hilliard  v. 
Giese,  25  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  222; 
49  N.  Y.  Supp.  286;  Lyman  v. 
McGreivey,  159  N.  Y.  561;  54  N. 
E.  1093;  affirming  25  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  68;  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  1035; 
People  v.  Lyman,  48   N.  Y.   App. 


Div.  484;  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  902; 
People  V.  Hilliard,  176  N.  Y.  604; 
68  N.  E.  1122;  Lyman  v.  McGrei- 
vey, 25  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  68;  48 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1035;  37  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  66;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  599;  In 
re  McGreivey,  161  N.  Y.  645;  57 
N.  E.  1116;  37  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
'66;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  599;  Baker 
V.  Bucklin,  22  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
560;  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  739;  In  re 
Sleenburgh,  24  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
1;  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  197;  Lyman  v. 
Bradsted,  20  X.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
629;  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  869;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Robinson,  9  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  569;  Petitfils  v.  Jean- 
erette,  52  La.  Ann.  1005;  27  So. 
358. 

52  State  V.  Howe,  95  Wis.  530; 
70  N.  W.  670;  Territory  v.  Mc- 
Pherson,  6  Dak.  27;  50  N.  W. 
351;  In  re  Pittson,  7  Kulp.  527; 
Spann  v.  Lowndes  Co.,  141  Ala, 
314;  34  So.  369.  But  see  Fulton 
V.  Blythe    (Ky.),  30   S.  W.   1018. 

53  Moore  v.  Indianapolis,  120 
Ind.   483;    22   N.   E.   424. 

54  Boliler  V.  Schneider,  49  Ga. 
195;  State  v.  Wecklering,  38  La. 
Ann.  36;  New  Orleans  v.  Clark, 
42  La.  Ann.  9;   7  So.  58. 


797 


LICENSE    B'EES   AND   TAXES, 


§489 


subjected  to  the  fee  or  tax  is  a  wholesale  or  retail  dealer  is  a 
question  of  fact/"'  A  statute  may  provide  a  certain  fee  for  a 
license  to  sell  malt  liquors,  and  provide  that  if  the  licensee 
sell  alcoholic  liquors  he  must  pay  a  larger  fee,  and  where  such 
is  the  case  "a  single  sale"  of  alcoholic  liquor  renders  him 
liable  to  pay  the  larger  fee/"  The  annual  license  may  be 
reduced  for  a  part  of  a  year,  if  a  statute  so  provides;  but  if 
not  it  is  the  same  for  a  part  of  a  year  as  for  the  entire  year 
where  all  licenses  expire  on  a  fixed  date."  If  other  business 
be  combined  with  the  sale  of  liquors,  a  larger  fee  may  be 
charged.''^  One  amount  may  be  charged  by  a  town  and  another 
by  a  city/°  A  tax  may  be  imposed  upon  distillers  operating  a 
rectifying  plant  in  addition  to  the  tax  on  distillers  generally 
not  operating  such  a  plant/"  Statutes  sometimes  permit  the 
amount  of  the  fee  to  be  fixed  by  a  popular  vote ; "  but  under 
them  the  fee  cannot  be  fixed  so  high  as  to  prohibit  the  issuance 
of  a  license/-  In  case  of  a  brewery,  the  amount  of  the  tax 
may  be  made  to  depend  upon  the  amount  of  beer  brewed/^ 

V.  Janesville,  90  Wis.  157;  62  N. 
W.  933;  State  v.  Robbins,  54  N. 
J.  L.  566;  25  Atl.  471;  reversing 
Middleton  v.  Robbins,  53  N.  J.  L. 
555;  22  Atl.  481;  Sargent  v.  Lit- 
tle, 72«N.  H.  555;  58  Atl.  44; 
Xormoyle  v.  Latah  Co.,  5  Idaho, 
19;   46  Pac.  831. 

62  Berry  v.  Cramer,  58  N.  J.  L. 
278;   33  Atl.  201. 

A  levy  of  "a  tax  of  one-half  of 
the  State  occupation  tax,  as  lev- 
ied by  the  hiws  of  the  State^"  is 
a  sufficiently  definite  levy  by  a 
board  authorized  to  make  the 
levy.  Wade  v.  State,  22  Tex. 
App.  629;  3  S.  W.  786;  Parker 
V.  Wayne  Co.,  104  N.  C.  106;  10 
S.  E.  137. 

fis  In  re  Pittsburg  Brewing  Co., 
16   Pa.   Super.    Ct.   215. 

As  to  rental  value  of  a  house  as 
fixing  the  amount  of  the  liquor 
fee,  see  Foster  v.  Lambe,  3  Que- 


55Bohler  v.  Schneider,  49  Ga. 
195. 

56  Simpson  v.  Seuriss,  2  Ohio 
C.  D.  246;  Gambill  v.  Erdrich, 
143  Ala.  506;   39  So.  297. 

57  Foster  v.  Burt,  76  Ala.  229; 
Kusta  V.  Kimberly,  10  Ohio  Dec. 
789;  2  Wkly.  L.  Bull.,  379;  Shif- 
lett  V.  Grimsley,  104  Va.  424;  51 
S.  E.  838;  Engelthaler  v.  Linn 
Co.,  104  Iowa,  293;  73  X.  W. 
578;  O'Brien  Co.  v.  Mahon,  120 
Iowa,  539;  102  N.  W.  446;  David 
V.  Hardin  Co.,  104  Iowa,  204;  73 
N.  W.  576. 

58  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  42 
La.  Ann.  9;  7  So.  58;  Goldsmith 
V.  New  Orleans,  31   La.  Ann.  646. 

59  Commonwealth  v.  McGroerty, 
148  Pa.  600;    24  Atl.  91. 

60  Arey  v.  Rowan  Co.,  138  N. 
C.   500;   51   S.   E.   41. 

61  McGingan  v.  Belmount,  89 
Wis.   637;    62   N.    W.   421;    State 


§490 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


798 


Sec.  490.    Payable  in  money. 

A  license  fee  or  tax  is  payable  in  money;  it  cannot  be 
otherwise  paid,  as  by  taking  the  note  of  the  licensee ;  '^*  but  a 
city  may  provide  that  the  note  of  the  applicant  may  be  taken 
instead  of  money."'  Unless  payment  by  note  be  authorized  by 
statute,    one    taken    for   the    fee    is    void;""    and    the    officer 


bee,  S.  C.  328,  and  Marcotte  v. 
Lambe,  4  Quebec,  S.  C.  2. 

A  tax  may  be  based  upon  the 
total  amount  of  the  dealer's  pur- 
chase; and  for  that  amount  there 
cannot  be  deducted  the  United 
States  Internal  Revenue  tax. 
Williams  v.  Iredell  Co.,  132  N.  C. 
300;   43  S.  E.  8D6. 

In  Georgia  under  Laws  1905,  p. 
30,  sec.  2,  par.  28,  a  brewery 
company  paying  the  special  tax 
imposed  by  that  statute  is  not 
liable  to  pay  an  additional  tax 
for  an  agency  for  storing  beer 
located  in  another  county.  Whit- 
tlesey V.  Acme  Brewing  Co.,  127 
Ga.   208;    5G   S.   E.   299. 

Where  a  statute  provides  that 
the  amount  of  tax  shall  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  amount  of  liquors 
sold,  the  amount  of  sales  of  other 
articles  at  the  same  time  cannot 
be  considered.  State  v.  New  Or- 
leans, etc..  Club,  116  La.  46;  40 
So.  526. 

A  statute  fixing  a  State  license 
at  one-half  of  the  yearly  amount 
for  six  months  or  less  does  not 
require  a  municipality  to  pursue 
the  same  rule  in  fixing  the 
amount  to  be  paid  for  a  city  li- 
cense. Fuselier  v.  St.  Laundry 
Parish,    107   La.  221:    31   So.   678. 

The  amount  of  licensee  fees 
does  not  have  to  be  fixed  annually 
by  a  municipality,  although  only 
one  annual  license  can  be  issued. 


People  V.  Mount,  186  111.  560;  58 
X.  E.  300;  afiirming  87  111.  App. 
194. 

The  South  Carolina  Dispensary 
Law  of  1907  imposed  a  license 
fee  on  a  manufacturer  or  bottler 
of  beer  of  $3,000  where  he  made 
or  bottled  from  twenty  to  forty 
barrels  per  day;  if  he  made  over 
fort}'  barrels  a  day,  then  $5,000. 
A  biewery  paid  a  fee  of  $3,000, 
but  one  day  in  the  year  it  exceeded 
forty  barrels.  It  was  held  liable 
for  $5,000,  though  its  daily  aver- 
age was  less  than  forty  barrels. 
German  Bre\\  ing  Co.  v.  Rutledge 
(S.   C),   65   S.   E.   230. 

6-iZielke  v.  State,  42  Neb.  750; 
60  X.  W.  1010;  Richards  v.  Stogs- 
dell,  21  Ind.  74;  Doran  v.  Phill- 
ips, 47  Mich.  228;  10  N.  W.  350; 
Dickson  v.  Gamble,  16  Fla.  687; 
Lee  v.  Roberts,  3  Okla.  106;  41 
Pac.  595;  McLanahan  v.  Syra- 
cuse, 18  Hun,  259.  Contra,  App- 
ling V.  McWilliams,  69  Ga.  840; 
Staley  v.  Columbus,  36  Mich.  38; 
Hencke  v.  Standiford,  66  Ark. 
535 ;  52  S.  A.  1 ;  Newson  v.  Tahi- 
gahen,  30  Miss,  414. 

65  Powers  V.  Decatur,  54  Ala. 
214;  Fulton  v.  Blythe,  17  Ky. 
341;  30  S.  W.  1018;  Searcy  v. 
Lawrenceburg,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1920;  50  S.  W.  534. 

ii«  Doran  v.  Phillips,  47  Mich. 
228;  10  X.  W.  350;  Ristine  v. 
Clements,    31    Ind.    App.    338;    66 


799 


LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES. 


§491 


taking  it  and  issuing  the  license  is  liable  for  the  fee."'  But 
in  Alabama  and  Georgia  such  a  note  has  been  held  valid  and 
collectible."^  A  statute  providing  that  taxes  may  be  paid  with 
city  orders  does  not  authorize  their  use  in  payment  of  license 
fees,  for  license  fees  are  not  taxes.'''* 


Sec.  491.    Pajrment  in  advance. 

Where  a  statute  requires  the  fee  for  a  license  to  be  paid 
before  it  is  issued,  it  must  be  paid  for  the  entire  period  of 
the  license  and  be  paid  in  advance,  or  the  license  will  be  void.^** 
No  officer  can  waive  such  a  provision  of  the  statute.''^  Pay- 
ment in  part  is  not  sufficient,  even  pro  tanto.''-  Not  infre- 
quently statutes  require  a  license  fee  to  be  tendered  with  the 
application,  and  when  that  is  the  ease  a  license  may  be  denied 
unless  the  fee  for  it  accompanies  the  application."  If,  for 
reason  of  defects  in  the  proceedings,  a  license  be  not  issued, 
but  the  money  retained  by  the  State,  on  perfecting  the  pro- 
ceedings the  applicant  is  entitled  to  a  license  for  the  remainder 
of  the  term  without  further  payment.^*     The  mere  fact  that 


^^.  E.  924;  McWilliams  v.  Phill- 
ips, 51  Miss.  1S>6;  Craig  v.  Smith, 
31   Mo.   App.   286. 

6"  McWilliams  v.  Phillips,  51 
Miss.  196. 

68  Appling  V.  McWilliams,  09 
Ga.  840;  Powers  v.  Decatur,  54 
Ala.  214. 

69  East  St.  Louis  v.  Wehring, 
46   III.   392. 

70  Handy  v.  People,  29  111.  App. 
99;  Binghan  Co.  v.  Fidelity,  etc., 
Co.,  13  Idaho,  34;  88  Pac.  829; 
Fry  V.  Kaessner,  48  Neb.  133;  66 
N.  W.  1126;  Backhaus  v.  Penple, 
87  111.  App.  173;  Munsel  v.  Tem- 
ple, 3  Gil.  (111.)  93;  Hencke  v. 
iStandiford,  66  Ark.  535;  52  S. 
W.  1 ;  Regina  v.  Stechan,  20  C.  P. 
(Can.)  182;  In  re  Phillips,  82 
Neb.  45;  116  N.  W.  681;  Doran 
V.   Phillips,   47   Mich.   228;    10   N. 


W.  350;  Alexander  v.  State,  77 
Ark.  294;  91  S.  W.  181;  State  v. 
Lincoln,   6  Neb.   12. 

■71  McWilliams  v.  Phillips,  51 
Miss.  196;  Zielke  v.  State,  42 
Neb.  750;  60  N.  W.  1010;  Ristine 
V.  Clements,  31  Ind.  App.  338;  66 
N.   E.  924. 

"Spake  V.  People,  89  111.  017. 

In  a  case  of  a  city  violating 
its  own  ordinance  by  its  officers 
issuing  the  license  when  a  part  only 
of  the  fee  was  paid,  it  was  held 
estopped  to  seize  the  stock  of  the 
licensee  in  the  hands  of  a  pur- 
chaser for  the  remainder  due. 
Wicker  v.  Siesel,  80  Ga.  724;  6 
S.  E.  817. 

"3  Evans  v.  Commonwealth,  95 
Ky.  231;  24  S.  W.  632. 

74  State  V.  Cornwell,  12  Neb. 
470;    11  N.  W.  72D. 


H92 


TRAP^PIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


800 


a  license  fee  is  paid  does  not  authorize  the  issuance  of  a  license 
where  the  law  forbids  its  issuance,  nor  does  the  license  issued 
protect  the  holder.'^^  Where  a  statute  provided  that  the  fee 
should  be  paid  wathin  fifteen  days  after  the  license  was 
granted,  a  failure  to  pay  it  within  that  time  was  held  to  be 
a  revocation  of  the  grant.'^"  If  a  statute  does  not  prohibit 
the  granting  of  a  license  before  the  fee  is  paid,  the  licensing 
board  may  grant  it  and  provide  that  it  shall  not  be  issued  until 
such  fee  be  paid.'^  It  is  no  excuse  in  the  licensee  that  he  had 
arranged  with  another  to  pay,  when  he  is  on  trial  for  a  sale 
without  a  license  or  having  made  a  sale  "without  having  first 
paid  the  fee/^ 

Sec.  492.    To  what  officer  payable. 

Fees  and  taxes  must  be  paid  to  the  officer  designated  by 
law  to  receive  them.''^  A  municipality  may  provide,  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  on  the  subject,  to  whom  the  fee  shall  be 
paid.^°     Where  a  statute  expressly  authorized  the  sheriff  of 


75  Hodges  V.  Metcalfe  Co.,  117 
Ky.  619;  78  S.  W.  177,  460;  25 
Ky.  Law  Rep.   1706. 

76  In  re  Umholtz,  9  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  450;   43  W.  N.   C.  495. 

77 /»  re  Phelps,  82  Neb.  45;  116 
N.   W.  681. 

If  an  officer  by  mistake  accepts 
a  license  fee  he  may  notify  the 
person  paying  it  of  that  fact ; 
and  the  payment  confers  no  right 
to  a  license.  Chicago  v.  O'Hare, 
124  111.  App.   290. 

78  Meroney  v.  State  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  92   S.  W.  844. 

A  community  cannot  determine 
for  itself  wlietlier  a  liquor  tax 
shall  be  collected.  Doran  v.  Phill- 
ips, 47  Mich.  228;    10  X.  W.  350. 

Where  a  license  fee  must  be 
paid  within  fifteen  days  after  the 
application  has  been  granted  or 
the  grant  will  be  revoked  and  no 


license  issued,  the  court  has  no 
power  to  relieve  him  from  his  de- 
fault to  pay  by  extending  the 
time  beyond  that  fixed  by  the 
statute.     In  re  Umholtz's  License, 

9  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  450;  43  W.  N. 
C.   495. 

79  Williams  v.  Commonwealth, 
13  Bush.  304;  Youngblood  v.  Sex- 
ton, 32  Mich.  406;  20  Am.  Rep. 
654;  Hight  v.  Fleming,  74  Ga. 
592;  Severance  v.  Kelly,  86  Ky. 
522;  6  S.  W.  386;  Thibodeaux  v. 
State,  69  Miss.  683;  13  So.  352; 
Doran   v.   Phillips,   47    Mich.   228; 

10  N.  W.  350;  Stevenson  v.  Deal, 
2  Pars.  Eq.  Cas.  212. 

80  Amador  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  70 
Cal.  458;  11  Pac.  757;  Amador 
Co.  v.  Isaacs,  11  Pac.  758;  In  re 
Lawrence,  69  Cal.  608;  11  Pac. 
217. 


801 


LICENSE    FEES   AND   TAXES. 


§492 


the  county  to  collect  the  tax,  and  another  one  provided  for  a 
revenue  agent  to  collect  delinquent  revenues  of  the  State,  it 
was  held  that  the  latter  could  not,  in  the  first  instance,  collect 
the  tax  and  could  not  proceed  against  the  tax  debtor  for  viola- 
tion of  the  law  until  the  sheriff  negligently  failed  or  refused 
to  collect  it.^^  A  statute  requiring  a  saloon  keeper  to  procure 
a  license  "from  the  county  treasurer  of  the  proper  city  or 
county"  and  to  pay  a  tax  "to  the  treasurer  of  the  proper 
county  for  the  use  of  the  Commonwealth"  requires  the  pay- 
ment to  be  made  to  the  county  treasurer  and  not  to  the  city 
treasurer,  and  he  must  also  issue  the  license.*- 


81  State  V.  Thibodeaux,  C9  Miss. 
92;    10  So.  58. 

82  Stevenson  v.  Deal,  2  Pars. 
Eq.  Cas.  212. 

Under  an  authprity  given  a 
court  of  chancery  to  enjoin  the 
collector  of  an  illegal  tax,  it  may 
ei.join  the  collection  of  an  illegal 
license  tax.  Portwood;  v.  Basket, 
64   Miss.   213;    1    So.    105. 

Mere  failure  of  an  officer  to  col- 
lect the  license  fee  does  not  re- 
lease the  surety  on  the  licensee's 
bond  of  his  liability  to  pay  the 
fee.  O'Brien  Co.  v.  Mahon,  12G 
Iowa,   539;    102   X.    W.   440. 

The  officer  collecting  the  fee  is 
liable  on  his  bond  for  it.  Bing- 
ham Co.  V.  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.,  13 
Idaho,    34;    88   Pac.   829. 

Liability  of  city  for  fees  of  coun- 
ty treasurer  under  Iowa  "mulct" 
law.  Waverly  Bremer  Co.  ( Iowa ) , 
101  N.  W.  874. 

Unless  the  law  provides  that  the 
collecting  officer  shall  receive 
fees  for  collecting  liquor  license 
fees,  he  is  entitled  to  none.  Pitts- 
burgh V.  Anderson,  7  Pa.  Dist. 
Rep.  714;  Sandoval  v.  Meyers,  8 
N.  M.  636;  45  Pac.  1128. 

The  court   cannot   impose   upon 


a  collecting  officer  the  duty  of 
holding  a  fee  pending  litigation 
over  it.  Davis  v.  Patterson,  12 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  479. 

If  a  collecting  officer  have  the 
poAver  to  arrest  a  licensee  for  fail- 
ure to  pay  his  license  tax;  and 
he  levy  on  property  to  satisfy 
such  tax,  but  a  United  States  rev- 
enue officer  likewise  seizes  such 
property  for  taxes  due  the  United 
States,  the  collecting  officer  may 
then  arrest  the  licensee  for  his 
failure  to  pay  the  tax,  if  he  can 
find  no  other  property.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Byrne,  20  Gratt. 
165. 

A  community  cannot  direct  the 
tax  officer  not  to  collect  the  tax. 
Doran  v.  Phillips,  47  Mich.  228; 
10  X.  W.  350. 

Some  times  there  is  no  penalty 
for  sales  without  a  license,  but 
merely  one  for  sales  without  hav- 
ing paid  the  ta.x.  Gorman  v. 
State,   38  Tex.   165. 

A  power  given  to  trustees  to  is- 
sue a  license  by  implication  gives 
them  power  to  receive  the  tax, 
and  it  may  be  paid  to  the  clerk 
of  the  board.  Williams  v.  Com- 
monwealth,   13    Bush.    304;    Love- 


§§493,494        TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  802 

Sec.  493.     Suit  to  collect. 

In  the  case  of  a  city  a  suit  may  be  maintained  by  it  to 
collect  a  license  fee  due  it  according  to  the  provisions  of  an 
ordinance.^^  But  it  cannot  impose  by  ordinance  an  attorney's 
fee  for  its  collection  unless  expressly  authorized  so  to  do  by 
statute.**  If  it  is  made  the  duty  of  au  officer  to  collect  a 
license  tax,  he  cannot  maintain  an  action  to  recover  the  amount 
due  unless  some  statute  authorizes  it.*^  If  the  fee  is  due  the 
State  it  is  said  that  the  State  may  sue  for  it.*®  In  all  in- 
stances if  the  tax  impose  a  personal  liability,  suit  may  be 
maintained  to  collect  it.*^ 

Sec.  494.     Tax      lien — Landlord's      property — Prospective 
statute. 

What  was  known  as  the  "Dow  Law"  provided  for  the 
assessment  of  an  annual  tax  upon  the  liquor  traffic,  and  that 
the  assessment,  together  with  any  increase  thereof,  should 
attach  as  a  lien  upon  the  real  property  on  which  the  business 
was  conducted  and  should  be  paid  at  the  times  for  the  pay- 
joy  V.  Commonwealth,  13  Ky.  L.  v.  Xutt,  118  Ga.  257;  45  S.  E. 
Rep.    (abstract)    976;   Caldwell  v.       269. 

Grimes,  7  Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)  So  in  Michigan,  Wood  v.  Thom- 

601.  as,  38  Mich.  680;   and  in  Virginia 

83  Hall  V.  Bastrop,  11  La.  Ann.  Commonwealth  v.  Byrne,  20 
603;    Sacramento  v.   Dillman,   102       Gratt.   165. 

Cal.    107;    36    Pac.    385.       (How-  84  Hunter  v.  Lisso,  35  La.  Ann. 

ever,  in  this  case  the  statute  ex-       230. 

pressly   avithorized   the   suit.)     Ex  ss  state      v.      Fragiercomo,      70 

parte  Benjamin,  65  Cal.  310;  40  Miss.  799;  14  So.  21;  O'Brien  Co. 
Pac.  23;  Amite  City  v.  Clements,  v.  Mahon,  126  Iowa,  539;  102  N. 
24  La.  Ann.  27;  State  v.  Flem-  W.  446;  Hencke  v.  Standiford,  66 
ing,  112  Ala.  179;  20  So.  840.  Ark.  535;  52  S.  W.  1;  Bingham 
Contra,  Chicago  v.  Enright,  27  Co.  v.  Fidelity,  etc.,  Co.,  13  Idaho, 
111.  App.  559;  State  v.  Adler,  68  34;  88  Pac.  829;  see  Thibodeaux 
Miss.  487;  9  So.  645;  State  v.  v.  State,  69  Miss.  683;  13  So.  352. 
Piazza,  66  Miss.  426;  6  So.  316.  86  Auglanier  v.  Governor,  1  Tex. 

Under    the    Georgia    Code     (in       653;  Carroll  Co.  v.  Lee,  127  Iowa, 
1885),      §886,      a      tax      collector       230;     103    X.    W.     101;     State    v. 
could  issue  an  execution  for  a  liq-       White,   115  La.  779;   40  So.  44. 
uor  tax  that  was  unpaid.     Hight  s7  Marshall        Co.        v.        Knoll 

v.   Fleming,    74   Ga.    592;    Brewer        (Iowa),   69  X.   W.   1146. 


803  LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES.  §  494 

meiit  of  other  taxes.  The  act  made  no  provision  as  to  when 
it  should  become  operative.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio  held 
that  the  statute  was  prospective.  In  so  deciding  the  court 
said :  "  It  is  presumed  that  the  Legislature  designed  these 
sections  to  be  prospective  in  their  operation  so  as  not  to  impair 
existing  rights.  The  settled  rule  is  that  whenever  an  act  of 
the  Legislature  can  be  so  construed  and  applied  as  to  avoid 
conflict  with  the  Constitution,  and  give  it  the  force  of  law, 
such  construction  will  bo  adopted  by  the  courts.  In  deter- 
mining whether  the  assessment  in  question  would  operate  as 
a  valid  lien  upon  the  owner's  premises,  it  is  material  to  inquire 
as  to  the  conditions  under  which  the  tenant  is  in  possession. 
If  the  real  property  on  or  in  which  the  business  is  conducted 
is  held  by  the  tenant  under  a  lease  for  a  term  made  prior  to 
the  passage  of  the  statute,  the  provisions  for  a  lien  in  the 
second  section  would  not  operate.  It  might  well  be  considered 
an  unauthorized  interference  with  private  property,  and  con- 
trary to  the  legislative  intent,  to  subject  the  freehold  of  a 
lessor  for  assessments  against  the  business  of  a  lessee,  over 
which  the  lessor  could  exercise  no  control,  during  the  term 
granted  under  a  pre-existing  lease.  But,  in  the  case  at  bar, 
the  occupant  had  no  written  lease  and  occupied  the  premises 
only  as  a  monthly  tenant.  After  the  passage  of  the  statute 
and  before  the  commencement  of  the  original  action,  his  term 
had  expired,  and  he  had  become  a  tenant  at  sufferance.  At 
common  law  he  had  only  a  naked  possession,  and  no  estate 
which  he  could  transfer  or  transmit,  or  which  was  capable  of 
enlargement  by  release,  nor  was  he  entitled  to  notice  to  quit. 
He  held  by  the  laches  of  the  landlord,  who  miffht  enter  and 
put  an  end  to  the  tenancy  when  he  pleased.  Holding  over,  as 
the  tenant  did,  after  the  month  of  May,  the  plaintiff  in  error 
could  have  resorted,  at  her  option,  to  the  statutory  remedy  of 
forcible  entry  and  detainer.  She  was  not,  therefore,  in  the 
position  of  a  lessor  whose  premises  are  placed  beyond  his 
control  by  a  lease  executed  before  the  passage  of  the  statute, 
but  she  had  it  in  her  power  to  terminate  the  tenancy  and  thus 
prevent  the  assessment  from  becoming  a  charge  upon  her 
property.    If  she  elected  to  allow  her  tenant  to  hold  over  after 


§  494  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   IJQUORS.  804 

his  interest  was  determined,  and  to  permit  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  to  be  renewed,  and  the  premises  were 
thereafter  used  by  the  tenant  in  the  business  of  trafficking  in. 
intoxicating  liquors,  it  w^ould  be  presumed  that  she  so  acted 
in  full  view  of  the  statutory  lien  that  would  thereby  be 
fastened  upon  the  premises."*^  A  like  construction  was 
placed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Michigan  upon  an  act  of  the 
Legislature  postponing  all  liens,  mortgages,  conveyances  and 
incumbrances  to  the  lien  of  a  liquor  tax,  created  by  the  act, 
and  in  so  deciding  the  court  said:  "It  is  true  the  language  is 
general,  but  it  is  still  subject  to  the  rule  of  interpretation 
which  imputes  an  intention  against  retrospective  action  unless 
the  terms  clearly  indicate  an  intention  in  favor  of  it.  And 
surely,  before  venturing  to  assume  the  existence  of  any  such 
purpose,  it  would  be  necessary  to  find  the  will  of  the  Legis- 
lature very  distinctly  expressed  in  favor  of  making  new  tax 
levies  have  preference  over  law'ful  securities  given  before  the 
statute.  The  provision,  then,  giving  superiority  to  the  tax 
process  over  'liens,  mortgages,  conveyances  and  incumbrances' 
cannot  be  held  to  apply  to  'liens,  mortgages,  conveyances  or 
incumbrances'  created  before  the  act  was  passed."**^  Under 
the  Ohio  Dow  Law  if  the  lessee  sell  any  other  intoxicating 
liquor  than  malt  liquor  he  is  liable  to  an  increased  amount 
of  taxes,  and  these  increased  taxes  become  a  lien  on  the  prem- 
ises ; "°  and  this  is  true  of  sales  made  in  violation  of  the  terms 
of  the  lease  forbidding  all  sales,  even  though  the  sales  be  made 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  lessor  or  owner  of  the  premises.®^ 
Where  an  ordinance  provided  payment  of  the  fee  in  advance, 
but  the  mayor  and  council  issued  the  license  on  part  payment 
in  advance,  it  was  held  that  the  city  could  not  subject  the 
licensee's  stock  in  trade  to  the  payment  of  the  remainder  of 
the  fee  after  it  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  hona  fide  pur- 
chaser  without   notice    of   such   unpaid    remainder.^-      Liens 

8s  Anderson    v.    Brewster,    44    0.  '-'i  Simpson  v.  Serviss,  2  Ohio  C. 

St.  576;  9  N.  E.  683.  D.  240. 

80  Finn  v.  Haynes,  37  :Micli.  03.  "2  Wicker  v.  Siesel,  80  Ga.  724; 

!'('  Simpson  v.  Serviss,  2  Ohio  i\  G  S.  E.  817. 
D.   246. 


805  LICENSE    FEES   AND   TAXES.  §  494 

created  by  a  sale  of  liquor  by  a  lessee  does  not  affect  the 
rights  of  a  prior  lessee."'^  If  the  premises  are  liable  to  a  tax 
lien  and  by  an  unlawful  sale  the  lessee  has  forfeited  his  lease, 
and  he  is  insolvent,  the  lessor  may  bring  an  action  to  enjoin 
him  from  continuing  the  saloon  and  to  have  the  lease  declared 
forfeited."^  A  statute  may  make  a  liquor  tax  a  prior  lien, 
though  subsequent  in  date,  to  the  lien  of  a  mortgage  previously 
executed  thereon,  and  it  Avill  be  so  even  though  the  premises, 
at  the  time  the  mortgage  was  executed,  had  never  been  used 
for  the  sale  of  liquor,  were  not  adapted  to  that  end,  and  the 
mortgagee  did  not  know  it  was  the  intention  of  the  owner  to 
use  or  lease  them  for  that  purpose."^  But  it  has  been  held 
that  a  law  cannot  provide  for  a  tax  lien  superior  to  a  lien 
on  the  premises  placed  there  before  its  enactment.""  The 
amount  x)f  the  tax  is  not  determined  by  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty, and  no  rebate  of  it  can  be  had  because  of  its  small  valua- 
tion."' If  a  surety  on  the  licensee's  bond  in  Iowa  cause  the 
premises  to  be  sold  under  the  supposed  lien,  and  he  become  the 
purchaser,  he  cannot  recover  back  the  payment  when  it  is  dis- 
covered afterwards  that  the  lien  is  void,  because  his  obliga- 
tion to  pay  the  tax  is  a  personal  one  and  he  is  liable  regardless 
of  the  validity  of  the  lien.  In  such  an  instance  a  statute  pro- 
viding that  when  by  the  wrongful  act  of  the  county  treasurer 


93Moser  v.  .Stebel,  29  Ohio  Cir.  premises    leased    before    its    enact- 

Ct.   Eep.   487.  ment,   where  sales   were   made   af- 

04Moser  v.  Stebel,  29  Ohio  Cir.  ter   such   enactment.) 

Ct.  Rep.  487.  yo  Peoples,    etc.,    Ass'n    v.    Ilaii- 

93  Pioneer    Trust    Co.    v.    Stich,  son,   7   Ohio   Dec.    179;    5   Ohio   N. 

71    Ohio  St.   459;    73    N.   E.    520.  P.    162.      See   Burfiend   v.   Hamil- 

Kee     David     v.     Hardin     Co.,     104  ton,    20   Mont.    343;    51    Pac.    161, 

Iowa,  204;  73  N.  W.  576.  and    Ferry   v.    Deneen,    110    Iowa, 

What     is     sufficient     "notice    to  290;    82   N.   W.   424. 

the    owner"     that     his     lessee     is  97  Ferry    v.    Deneen,    110    Iowa, 

selling    liquor    thereon,    so    as    to  290;    82    X.   W.   424. 

render   the   leased   premises   liable  Under   the   Iowa  Code,    §§  2432, 

to  the  liquor  tax  because  of  such  2448,  the  liquor  tax  is  a  personal 

unlawful  sale,   see  David  v.  Hardin  obligation  of  the  licensee  and  the 

Co.,  104  Iowa,  204;  73  X.  W.  576;  lien  operates  merely  as  an  aid  to 

/«  re  Smith,  104  Iowa,  199;  73  X.  collection.        Guedort     v.      Emmet 

W.     605.        (Statute     applies     to  Co.,  116  Iowa,  40 j   89  X.  W.  85. 


§  495  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  806 

land  is  sold  on  wliich  no  tax  is  due  the  county  shall  hold  the 
purchaser  harmless  has  no  application."*  But  the  lessee's  tax 
is  not  the  personal  obligation  of  the  lessor,  though  his  leased 
property  is  liable  to  the  lien.""  The  lien  may  not  be  foreclosed 
by  a  proceeding  in  equity/  unless  such  a  remedy  is  given  by 
statute. - 

Sec.  495.    Disposition  of  fees  and  taxes  collected. 

The  disposition  of  the  money  paid  as  fees  or  taxes  for 
licenses  is  entirely  controlled  by  local  statutes,  and  no  general 
principles  of  much  value  can  be  deduced  from  the  cases  on 
the  subject.  Sometimes  statutes  divide  the  monies  received 
between  two  overlapping  municipalities — as  between  a  county 
and  a  city  or  town  within  it — or  as  between  a  city,  town  or 
county  and  the  State.  Whenever  that  is  the  case  the  munic- 
ipality collecting  the  money  is  liable  to  the  other  municipality, 
or  to  the  State,  as  the  case  may  be,  for  its  proportion  of  it, 
and  suit  may  be  maintained  therefor.''  Mandamus  lies  where 
there  is  no  dispute  as  to  the  amount  to  compel  the  officer  or 
municipality  receiving  money  to  pay  over  the  proper  share  to 
the  municipality  entitled  to  it.*  If  by  mistake  more  be  paid 
over  than  should  have  been,  the  municipality  thus  overpaying 
may  reimburse  itself  out  of  the  next  monies  received  which  is 
payable  over  to  the  payee  municipality."'  But  if  a  county 
treasurer  is  the  agent  of  a  city  within  the  county  to  collect 
its  license  fees,  and  he  fails  to  account  to  the  city  for  all  he 
collects,  the  city  cannot  withhold  funds  of  the  county  coming 
into  its  hands  in  an  amount  equal  to  the  fees  it  has  not  received. 
It  must  look  to  the  county  treasurer  and  his  sureties  for  the 

ssGuedert    v.    llnimet    Co.,    116  "Brown    v.     Aberdeen,    4    Dak. 

Iowa,  40;    89   X.  W.  85.  402;    31  X.  W.  735;    Fox  Lake  v. 

99  Carroll  Co.  v.  Ley,  127  Iowa,  Village  of  Fox  Lake,  62  Wis.  486; 

230;    103  X.  W.   101.  22    X.    W.    584. 

1  Crawford     Co.     v.     Laub,     110  4  People     v.     Decatur     Tp.,     33 
Iowa,  355;   81   X.  W.   500.  Mich.  335;   East  Saginaw  v.  Sagi- 

2  People,   etc.,   Ass'n  v.   Hanson,  naw   Co.,  44  Mich.  273 ;    6   X.   W. 
7    Ohio    Dec.    179;    5    Ohio   X.    P.  684. 

162.  5  Gros.se      v.      Wayne     Co.,     85 

Mich.  44;   48  X.  W.   153. 


807 


LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES. 


§495 


delinquent  amount.*'  A  city  is  not  compelled  to  pay  over 
license  fees  it  has  received  under  void  licenses,  and  if 
an  officer  having  no  authority  so  to  do  has  issued  the  license 
and  received  the  fees  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  account  for 
them.'^  An  order  of  the  council  is  not  necessary  to  authorize 
the  city  treasurer  to  pay  over  to  the  county  or  State  the 
amount  due  it  where  a  statute  provides  he  shall  pay  it  to  the 
county.^  Under  a  constitutional  provision  that  all  license 
monies  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  county  and  be  by  it  appro- 
priated to  the  support  of  the  schools  of  its  respective  school 
districts,  the  monies  belong  to  the  county  and  not  to  the  school 
districts.''  When  it  is  made  the  duty  of  a  county  treasurer  to 
collect  all  fees  for  licenses  issued  by  a  city  or  in  a  city,  and 
pay  over  a  certain  portion  or  all  of  them  to  such  city,  the 
county  has  no  interest  in  the  proportion  to  be  paid  over.^° 


sMarquett  Co.  v.  Ishpeming,  49 
Mich.   244;    13   N.   W.   009. 

7  Hennepin  Co.  v.  Robinson,  16 
Minn.   381. 

8  Winona  v.  Whipple,  24  Minn. 
Gl;  Commonwealth  v.  Martin,  170 
Pa.  St.  118;   32  Atl.  624. 

A  general  law  directing  that 
all  license  fees  collected  by  cities 
he  paid  over  to  the  county  has 
no  application  to  a  city  acting 
under  a  special  charter  and  pro- 
viding that  the  fees  it  shall  col- 
lect sliall  be  devoted  by  it  to  a 
particular  purpose.  Aberdeen  v. 
Sanderson,  8  S.  &  M.  663;  unless 
the  express  language  of  the  gen- 
eral law  requires  it,  or  unless  the 
tenor  of  the  act  is  such  as  to  show 
that  was  the  intent  of  the  Legis- 
lature. State  Board  v.  Aberdeen, 
56  Miss.  518;  Deposit  v.  Deve- 
reux,  8  Hun,  317;  State  v.  Spo- 
kane, 2  Wash.  St.  40;  25  Pac. 
903:  People  V.  Williams,  29  N. 
Y.    Misc.    Rep.    463;    61    N.    Y. 


Supp.  983;  Hunt  v.  New  York,  47 
N.  Y.  App.  295;  62  N.  Y.  Supp. 
184;  People  v.  Williams,  162  N. 
Y.  240;  56  N.  E.  625,  reversing 
47  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  88;  62  N.  Y. 
Supp.  130;  Trustees  v.  Lewis  Co. 
(Ky.),  46  S.  W.  1;  20  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  369;  State  v.  Bailer,  91 
Minn.  186;  97  N.  W.  670;  State 
V.    Seattle    (Wash.),    71    Pac.   712. 

a  State  v.  Fonton,  29  Neb.  348; 
45  N.  W.  464. 

10  Commonwealth  v.  Martin, 
170  Pa.  St.  118;  32  Atl.  624; 
South  Bethlehem  v.  Hemingway, 
16  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.   103. 

Usually  the  payment  over  of  the 
fees  by  the  collecting  officer  will 
not  be  enjoined,  being  a  revenue 
law.  Balogh  v.  Lyman,  6  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  271;  3^  N.  Y.  Supp. 
780. 

As  between  town  and  township 
occupying  the  same  territory,  see 
State  V.  Slack,  .-)2  N.  J.  L.  113; 
18  Atl.  687. 


§  495  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  808 

Whether  or  not  the  officer  receiving  the  fee  should  at  once 
pay  it  over  to  the  treasurer  or  officer  entitled  to  receive  it 
depends  upon  the  statute.  Thus,  if  the  fee  is  payable  when 
the  application  is  made  for  a  license,  then  it  should  be  paid 
into  the  treasury ;  ^^  but  if  the  money  remains  the  property 
of  the  applicant  until  the  license  is  issued,  then  the  money 
cannot  be  used  until  that  event. ^-^  If  an  officer  receiving  the 
fees  paj'  it  to  the  wrong  officer  of  a  municipality — as  to  the 
township  road  supervisor  when  he  should  have  paid  it  to  the 
township  treasurer — he  may  be  compelled  to  pay  it  over,  even 
though  it  has  been  applied  by  the  officer  receiving  it  to  the 
actual  purposes  of  the  municipality  as  required  by  statute.' '  A 
statute  requiring  a  division  of  fees  collected  by  a  county  be- 
tween it  and  the  State  is  not  invalid  on  the  ground  that  the 
latter  is  at  no  expense  incident  to  the  enforcement  of  the  liquor 
statute."  Unless  some  statute  devotes  the  license  fees  and 
taxes  to  a  particular  object  they  fall  into  the  general  fund 
of  the  municipality  or  State,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  may  be 
used  to  pay  its  obligations  generally ;  '^  and  the  State  Legis- 
lature has  absolute  control  over  it  in  the  absence  of  a  consti- 
tutional prohibitive  provision.' °  But  if  the  Constitution 
devotes  the  fees  to  a  particular  purpose  the  Legislature  cannot 

11  Trainor  v.  Multuoma,  2  Or.  able  to  a  school  district  therein 
214.  whose    territory    extends     beyond 

12  State  V.  Lincoln,  6  Xeb.   12.  the    city    limits.      School    District 

13  Krzykeva  v.  Croninger,  200  v.  Twin  Falls,  13  Idaho,  471;  90 
Pa.  359;    49  Atl.  979.  Pac.   735. 

Instate  V.  Buechler    (S.  D.),  72  i^Hawesville   v.   Board,   99    Ky. 

X.   W.    114.  292;    35   S.   W.   1034;    Mt.    Carmel 

In  Iowa,  under  Laws  1894,  c.  v.  Wabash  Co.,  50  111.  69;  Trainor 
62,  §  14,  license  fees  are  payable  v.  Multnomah,  2  Or.  214;  State 
to  the  municipality  in  which  the  v.  Seattle  (Wash.),  71  Pac.  712. 
saloon  is  located,  but  a  school-  i6  Rock  Co.  v.  Edgerton,  90 
district  township  is  not  such  a  Wis.  288;  63  N.  W.  291;  Church- 
municipality.  District  Tp.  v.  ill  v.  Herrick,  32  Wis.  357  (used 
Frahm,  102  Iowa,  5;  70  N.  W.  to  pay  expense  of  keeping  pau- 
721.  pers)  ;    Flannigan   v.   Wilkesbarre, 

Money  collected   in   a   city  pay-  10    Kulp.    100    (keeping   roads    of 

able   to   the   trustees   of   a   school  township   in  repair), 
district  within  its  limits   is  pay- 


809  LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES.  §  496 

divert  them  from  it; '"  nor  can  a  city  divert  the  fund  from  an 
object  designated  by  a  statute/^ 

Sec.  496.     Refunding  fees  or  taxes  paid  under  void  or  illegal 
ordinance  or  statute. 

Every  person  is  chargeable  with  a  knowledge  of  what  is  the 
law  and  he  cannot  plead  his  ignorance  of  it  in  order  to  escape 
an  engagement  into  which  he  has  entered  or  the  liability  for 
an  act  he  has  performed.  Money  paid  in  pursuance  to  a  void 
ordinance  or  statute  is  money  voluntarily  paid,  and  it  cannot 
be  recovered  back.  This  is  true  of  money  paid  under  such  a 
statute  or  ordinance  to  secure  a  license,  and  the  licensee  does 
not  pay  it  involuntarily.  "It  cannot  be  maintained,"  said 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  '  *  either  on  reason  or  authority, 
that  an  individual  who  pays  a  demand,  with  a  full  knowledge 
of  all  the  facts,  in  the  belief  that  it  is  a  legal  duty  for  him 
to  do  so,  pays  it  involuntarily.  Nor  will  an  individual  be 
heard  to  say  that  he  was  coerced  to  do  that  which  he  believed 
the  law  required  of  him.  The  law  Avill  presume  that  every 
citizen  freely  and  voluntarily  does  every  duty  which  he  be- 

17  Murphy  v.  Landron,  7G  S.  C.       ers,   8  N.  M.   573;    45   Pac.    1128. 
21-  56  S.  E.  850.  See  also   Stroutsburg  v.  Sliick,  24 

18  Eminence  v.  Wilson,   103  Ky.       Pa.  Super.  Ct.  442. 

326;  45  S.  W.  81;  20  Ky.  L.  Other  cases  construing  local 
Rep.  29 ;  Trustees  v.  Lewis  Co.  statutes  are  Frame  v.  State,  53 
(Ky.  ),  40  N.  W.  1;  20  Ky.  L.  Ohio  St.  311;  45  N.  E.  5;  Mar- 
Rep.  369;  Winnecone  v.  Winne-  quett  County  v.  Ishpeming,  49 
conne,  122  Wis.  348;  99  N.  W.  Mich.  244;  13  N.  W.  609;  Essex 
1055.  County  v.  Barber,  2  Halst.  (N. 
Under  a  general  statute  provid-  J. )  G4 ;  Kilgore  v.  Commonwealth, 
ing  that  the  county  treasurer  94  Pa.  495;  State  v.  Brattlelx)ro, 
"shall  collect  all  taxes  and  li-  68  Vt.  520;  35  Atl.  472;  Plain- 
censes,  and  shall  receive  four  per  field  v.  Plainfield,  67  Wis.  526; 
centum  of  the  amount  collected"  30  N.  W.  672. 
"remaining  unpaid,"  it  was  held  If  a  county  treasurer  illegally 
that  he  could  not  retain  four  per-  deduct  fees  for  collecting  a  tax 
centum  on  license  fees  that  had  due  a  city,  the  county  is  not  lia- 
to  be  paid  before  the  license  was  ble  to  such  city.  Zoo  City  v. 
issued,  because  they  did  not  "re-  Woodbury  County  (Iowa),  122 
main  unpaid."     Sandoval  v.   Mey-  Pac.  940. 


§496  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  810 

lieves  it  imposes  upon  him,  and,  when  it  is  admitted  that 
there  was  no  fraud,  no  personal  exaction,  nothing  but  the 
passage  and  publication  of  the  ordinance — which  was  done  in 
good  faith,  and  which  both  parties  recognized  as  valid — then 
it  follows,  au  a  conclusion  of  law,  that  the  payment  was  volun- 
tary." *'If  the  appellee  [the  licensee]  believed  the  ordinance 
valid,"  continued  the  court,  "he  recognized  it  as  imposing  on 
him  a  just  obligation,  and  concurring  in  the  wholesome  doc- 
trine of  the  law,  that  everyone  is  under  a  moral  obliga- 
tion to  comply  with  the  law  of  the  community  in  w^hich 
he  lives,  he  made  his  application,  received  his  license, 
paid  the  price  stipulated,  under  a  conviction  of  legal  duty, 
freely,  and  with  an  unconstrained  will.  When,  therefore,  the 
premise  is  admitted  that  the  appellee  believed  the  ordinance 
to  be  a  valid  enactment,  the  conclusion  unavoidably  follows 
that  he  did  not  pay  under  an  apprehension  of  legal  proceed- 
ings, but  from  a  con\action  of  legal  duty. "  "  It  is  well  settled, ' ' 
the  court  still  continuing,  "that  the  mere  existence  of  the 
ordinance  would  not  render  the  payment  compulsory.  The 
money  must  have  been  exacted  by  the  appellee  under  a  threat 
of  prosecution,  and  the  money  must  have  been  unwillingly 
paid,  under  protest.  It  is  well  settled  that  a  mere  apprehen- 
sion of  legal  proceedings  is  not  sufficient  to  make  a  payment 
compulsor\%  and  that  where  there  is  a  threatened  prosecution 
the  payment  must  be  made  under  protest."  "If,  then,  after 
the  passage  of  the  ordinance,  the  parties  had  arrived  at  dif- 
ferent conclusions  as  to  its  validity,  neither  one  could  have 
reached  or  affected  the  other  without  first  appealing  to  the 
court,  and  whenever  persons  are  in  that  situation  they  are  on 
an  equal  footing."  "If  the  ordinance  in  question  had  been 
valid,  as  both  the  parties  believed,  then  the  money  would  have 
been  la^^'fully  paid  upon  a  legal  demand.  If,  however,  the 
ordinance  was  invalid,  as  it  was  held  to  be,  then  the  appellee, 
when  sued  for  failure  to  comply  with  the  provisions,  could 
have  defeated  the  action  by  showing  the  invalidity  of  the  ordi- 
nance. There  was  no  pressing  and  controlling  necessity  for 
prompt  and  immediate  payment  on  the  part  of  the  appellee, 
for  he  could  have  waited  the  decisions  of  the  court  without 


811 


LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES. 


§496 


sustaining  loss  or  suffering  inconvenience."^^  In  a  subse- 
quent case,  in  the  same  State,  it  was  alleged  in  the  complaint 
to  recover  back  the  money  paid  for  a  license  that  it  was  paid 
"for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  the  fines,  penalties  and  for- 
feitures provided  in  the  [license]  ordinance  for  the  violation 
of  its  provisions,  and  to  save"  the  plaintiff  from  "arrest  and 
imprisonment  for  the  violation  of  the  ordinance,  as  provided 
by  the  statute  laws  of  the  State  of  Indiana  [he]  was  com- 
pelled to  pay  and  did  pay  to  the  treasurer  of"  the  town,  "as 
provided  for  in  the  ordinance,  the  sum  of  fifty  dollars  for  a 
license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors."  This  allegation  was  held 
not  to  show  an  involuntary  payment,  and  that  the  fee  could 
not  be  recovered  back.-° 


19  Ligonier  v.  Ackerman,  46 
Ind.  652;  15  Am.  Rep.  323.  This 
case  has  a  very  .thorough  discus- 
sion of  tlie  affect  of  a  voluntary 
payment  of  money  and  the  riglit 
to  recover  it  back;  and  many 
cases  are  reviewed  and  cited, 
among  which  are  the  following  of 
the  many:  Cohaba  v.  Burnett,  34 
Ala.  400;  Riclimoud  v.  Judali,  5 
Leigh.  305;  Harvey  v.  Olney,  42 
111.  336;  Elston  v.  Cliicago,  40 
111.  514;  Baltimore  v.  Leffer- 
man,  4  Gill.  (Md.),  425;  Mays  v. 
Cincinnati,  1  Ohio  St.  268 ;  Baker 
V.  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio  St.  534; 
Taylor  v.  Board,  31  Pa.  St.  73; 
Allentown  v.  Saeger,  20  Pa.  St. 
421;  Cook  V.  Boston,  9  Allen, 
393;  Jenks  v.  Lima  Tp.,  17  Ind. 
326;  Morris  v.  Baltimore,  5  Gill. 
(Md.),  244;  Robinson  v.  Charles- 
ton, 2  Rich.  317;  Phillips  v.  Jef- 
ferson Co.,  5  Kan.  412;  Preston  v. 
Boston,  12  Pick.  7;  Joyner  v.  Cush, 
567.  The  court  distinguishes  the 
case  from  a  payment  to  secure  a 
release  of  property:  "Where  one 
person  has  in  his  own  hands  the 
property  of  another,  wliich  he  re- 
fuses   to    surrender,    except    upon 


the  condition  of  the  payment  of 
an  illegal  or  exorbitant  demand, 
it  can  be  well  said  that  he  has 
an  undue  advantage.  The  pos- 
session of  the  property  may  be  a 
matter  of  such  moment  to  him 
that  to  await  the  law's  delay 
would  be  ruinous;  but  where  an 
individual  is  in  the  possession  of 
his  projjerty,  and  asserts  the  right 
to  control  his  use  of  it,  if  that 
claim  can  only  be  enforced  by 
legal  proceedings,  no  case  can  be 
found  whicli  holds  that  the  party 
may  tamely  surrender  his  right, 
with  a  full  knowledge  of  all  the 
facts,  and  without  fraud  or  impo- 
sition, and  then  say  that  he  was 
not  on  an  'unequal  footing'  with 
the  other." 

20  Sullivan  v.  MeCammon,  51 
Ind.  264;  Edinburg  v.  Hackney, 
64  Ind  83;  Colglazier  v.  Salem, 
61  Ind.  445;  Kroft  v.  Keokuk,  14 
Iowa,  86;  Baker  v.  Bucklin,  43 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  336;  60  N.  Y. 
Supp.  294;  affirming  22  N.  Y. 
Supp.  560;  50  N.  Y.  .Supp.  739: 
Eslow  v.  Albion,  153  Mich.  729; 
117  N.  W.  328;  15  Detroit  Leg. 
N.  008. 


^  497  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  812 

Sec.  497.    Refunding  fees  or  taxes,  continued — No  statute 
requiring  it. 

Money  paid  under  protest  to  obtain  a  license  which  it  is 
claimed  is  void  cannot  be  recovered  back,  though  paid  under  a 
threat  that  if  not  taken  out  the  applicant  would  be  prosecuted 
if  he  sold  liquor.-'  If  local  option  be  adopted  shortly  after  a 
license  goes  into  force,  thus  at  once  annulling  it,  no  part  of  the 
fee  can  be  recovered  back,  if  no  statute  authorizes  a  re- 
covery ;  --  and  a  licensee  voluntarily  paying  more  for  his 
license  than  the  law  requires  cannot  recover  back  the  excess ;  '^ 
nor  can  he  recover  back  any  part  of  the  amount  paid  on  the 
ground  that  the  amount  required  for  his  license  was  a  day  or 
so  after  his  application  and  its  issuance  reduced.^*  And  money 
voluntaril}^  paid  to  a  board  bavin sf  no  authority  to  issue  the 
license  cannot  be  recovered  back."'  And  where  a  licensing 
board  granted  a  license,  the  fee  was  pa^d  and  the  license  issued, 
and  then  an  appeal  was  taken  and  the  license  refused  because 
the  statute  was  void,  it  was  held  that  there  could  be  no  re- 
covery back  of  the  fee  paid.-"  Where  the  license  was  granted, 
the  fee  tendered  but  the  license  not  issued  because  not  ready, 
and  on  the  same  day  the  council  increased  the  amount  of  the 
fee,  which  the  licensee  afterwards  paid  under  protest  in  order 
to  secure  his  license,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  recover  back 
the  amount  of  the  increase.-^  Anyone  applying  for  a  license, 
paying  his  fee,  securing  its  grant,  and  then  abandoning  it  be- 

21  Welch  T.  Marion,  48  Ala.  25  Tatum  v.  Trenton,  85  Ga. 
291;    Chaba   v.    Burnett,    34    Ala.       468;   11   S.  E.  705. 

400;  Trainor  v.  Multnomah  Co.,  20  Monroe  Co.  v.  Kreuger,  88 
•2  Or.  214;  Custin  v.  Viragua,  1)7  Ind.  2.31;  Toman  v.  Westfield,  70 
Wis.  314;  30  N.  W.  515;  see  New  N.  J.  L.  610;  57  Atl.  125.  Cow- 
Iberia  V.  Moss  Hotel  Co.,  112  La.  tra.  Where  order  granting  license 
525;  36  So.  552.  is  reversed.     People  v.  Sackett,  15 

22  Peyton  v.  Hot  Springs  Co.,  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  290;  44  X.  Y. 
53  Ark.  236;  13  S.  W.  764.  Con-  Supp.  593;  reversing  40  N.  Y. 
tra,  Allsman  v."  Oklahoma  City  Supp.  414.  But  see  Thomas  v. 
(Okl.),  95  Pac.  468.  Westfield   (K  J.  L.)  ;  57  Atl.  125. 

23  Thomson  v.  Norris.  63  Ga.  27  Emery  v.  Lowell,  127  Mass. 
638.  138. 

24  Williams    v.    West    Point,    68 
Ga.  816. 


813  LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES.  §  497 

cause  unwilling  to  furnish  the  bond,  cannot  recover  back  the 
amount  paid.-'*  If  by  mistake  of  law  a  licensee  receives  a  license 
for  a  less  fee  than  the  law  requires,  he  cannot  recover  back  the 
fee  on  the  theory  that  his  license  is  void,  because  a  proper 
fee  had  not  been  paid.-''  A  fee  paid  under  a  statute  which 
had  been  declared  unconstitutional  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  State,  though  paid  under  protest  and  to  avoid  litigation, 
cannot  be  recovered  back.^°  A  statute  providing  for  a  refund- 
ing tax  generally  has  no  application  to  a  liquor  fee  or  tax.-''^ 
If  the  money  paid  as  a  fee  immediately  goes  into  the  public 
treasury,  and  is  not  a  deposit,  it  cannot  be  recovered  back.^^ 
So  much  so  is  this  true  that  if  the  court  refuse  the  license  the 
fee  cannot  be  recovered  back.^"'  Where  the  money  paid  is  a 
liquor  tax,  and  the  money  is  voluntarily  paid  under  a  mistake 
of  law,  it  cannot  be  recovered  back.'*  If  a  license  fee  can  be 
recovered  back,  yet  it  cannot  be  recovered  from  the  officer 
receiving  it ;  it  can  only  be  recovered  from  the  municipality 
receiving  it;  and  if  the  State  receives  it,  of  course  there  must 
be  a  statute  authorizing  a  suit  for  its  recovery."^'  If  the  fee 
be  paid  and  then  on  appeal  the  license  be  refused,  the  amount 
of  the  fee  cannot  be  recovered  back ;  "*'  nor  is  he  entitled  to  a 
refund  if  for  any  cause  his  license  be  revoked;"^  nor  can  he 
recover  back  the  fee  he  has  paid  even  though  his  license  be 
revoked  because  of  his  failure  to  give  the  proper  notice  of  his 
application  for  a  license ;  ^^  or  even  where  his  application  is 

2S  Curry     v.      Tarvas     Tp.,      81  33  McLeod   v.    Seott,   21    Or.    94; 

Mich.   365;    45   N.   W.   831;    John-  26  Pac.    1061;    Hague  v.  Ashland, 

son    V.    Atkins,    44    Fla.    185;    32  91    Wis.  629;    65    N.   W.   508. 

So.  879.  34  Ahlers  v.  Estherville    (Iowa),, 

23  Tupelo    V.     Beard,    '56     Miss.  104  N.   W.  453. 

532.  35  Sargent    v.    Little,    72    N.    H. 

soHornberger    v.    Case,    9    Ohio  555;   58  Atl.  44. 
Dec.  434;    13  Wkly.  L.  Bull.  437.  38  Toman  v.  Westfield, -70 -'X.  J. 
V.    Wilson,    9    Ohio  L.  610;  57  Atl.  125.     But  see  Peo- 


Dec.  432;    13   Wkly.  L.  Bull.   437.  pie  v.  Sackett,  supra. 

31  State  V.  Rauch,  47  Ohio  478;  37  Anderson    v.    Galesburg,    118 

25  N.  E.  59.  Ill-   App.  525. 

32Trainor  v.  Multnomah,   2  Or.  38  McGinnis     v.     Medway,      170 

214.  Mass,  67;    57  N.  E.  210. 


§  498  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  814 

refased  because  of  a  failure  to  file  a  proper  application.^'*  An 
attempt  on  the  part  of  a  city  to  illegally  refund  a  license  fee 
may  be  enjoined  on  the  suit  of  a  taxpayer  or  citizen  of  the 
city.^°  Where  a  fee  was  paid  and  a  license  granted  by  a  city 
for  the  remainder  of  the  year,  and  during-  such  remainder  the 
Legislature  enacted  a  law  requiring  a  higher  license  fee  for 
the  county  in  which  the  city  was  situated,  it  was  held  that 
the  licensee  could  not  discontinue  his  business  and  recover 
back  a  proportionate  amount  of  the  fee  paid.*^  If  a  license 
be  revoked  because  of  the  alleged  illegal  act  of  the  holder,  and 
then  he  be  indicted  upon  the  same  alleged  violation  of  the 
statute  and  acquitted,  he  cannot  recover  back  the  unearned 
part  of  his  license  fee.*- 

Sec.  498.  Refunding  fees  or  taxes,  continued — Cases  allow- 
ing. 
It  has  been  held,  notwithstanding  the  almost  universal  rule, 
that  if  a  municipality  without  authority  collect  a  license  fee 
the  person  paying  it  may  recover  it  baek,*^  especially  if  paid 
under  threats  of  municipal  officers  of  fines  and  imprisonment 
if  sales  be  made  without  the  license.**  So  it  has  been  held  if 
the  license  be  granted,  the  fee  paid,  the  license  taken  out.  and 
then  on  appeal  thereafter  the  license  be  canceled,  the  licensee  is 
entitled  to  have  his  fee  returned ;  *^'  at  least  a  ratable  portion 
of  it.*^     So  it  has  been  held  that  a  tax  paid  under  protest  in 

39ScaIzo   V.   Sackett,    30   N.   Y.  Ga.   309.     Modified  in  Thomas  v. 

Misc.    Rep.   543;   63   N.   Y.   Supp.  Norris,    62   Ga.   538;    Marshall   v. 

820.       The    officer     receiving     the  Snediker,    25    Tex.    460;    7'8    Am. 

money   cannot   make   a   valid   con-  Dec.     534;     see    Douglassville    V. 

tract   to   return    it   if    the    license  Johns,  62  Ga.  423. 
be  refused.     Heinrich  Bros.  Brew-  **  Princeton  v.  Vierling,  40  Ind. 

ing  Co.  V.   Kitsap   Co.,   45   Wash.  340.      (This  decision  is  hardly  in 

454;  >88  Pac.  833.  line   with   the   Indiana   cases   pre- 

40  Fitzgerald    v.    Witchard,    130  viously  cited.) 

Ga.  552;   61   S.   E.   227.  45  Chamberlain  v.   Tecumseh,  43 

41  Fitzgerald    v.    Witchard,    130       Neb.  221;   61  N.  W.  632. 

Ga.  552;  61  S.  E.  227.  4g  Lydick    v.    Korner,     15    Neb. 

42Parrent    v.    Little,    72    N.  H.       600;    20   X.   W.    26.      But   it   was 

566;    58   Atl.   510.  held  that  the  treasurer  could  not 

43  Calloway  v.   Milledgeville,  48       be  compelled  to  refund  it. 


815  LICENSE   FEES    AND   TAXES.  §  498 

accordance  \Wth  an  unconstitutional  statute  may  be  recovered 
back.*^  Where  the  applicant  contended  the  fee  should  be  $150 
and  the  treasurer  contended  it  should  be  $350  because  letters 
patent  had  been  issued  for  the  incorporation  as  a  city  of  the 
locality  where  the  premises  were  located,  and  he  paid  the  fee 
of  $350  under  protest,  because  if  he  did  not  pay  within  fifteen 
days  his  license,  already  issued,  would  be  revoked,  and  after- 
wards it  was  judicially  determined  that  the  fee  should  have 
been  $150,  it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  recover  back 
the  excess.^®  Money  paid  under  a  void  license  ordinance,  it 
has  been  held,  could  be  recovered  back,  on  the  ground  that 
the  applicant  did  not  stand  on  an  equal  footing  with  the 
officers  of  the  municipality,  and  for  that  reason  was  entitled  to 
recover  back  his  money  thus  involuntarily  paid.*^  Where  an 
applicant  paid  a  fee  for  a  year's  license,  when  it  should  only 
have  been  one-half  that  amount  and  six  month's  fee,  and  the 
city  council  promised  to  return  one-half  the  amount  paid  if 
they  could  only  issue  a  six  month's  license,  it  was  held  that 
one-half  of  the  fee  could  be  recovered  back.^°  So  it  has  been 
held  that  if  a  municipal  officer  takes  a  fee  for  a  license  the 
city  cannot  repudiate  his  action,  retain  the  money  and  not 
grant  the  license.'^^  And  if  an  application  be  made  and  the 
fee  be  paid  with  it,  as  the  law  requires,  and  a  license  be  not 
granted  for  the  time  specified  in  the  application — and  the 
same  would  be  true  if  not  granted  for  the  place  specified  in 
the  application— but  is  post  dated  the  application,  the  appli- 
cant can  refuse  to  accept  the  license,  even  though  tendered 


*7  Catoir   v.   Waterson,   38   Ohio  prima  facie  evidence  of  every  fact 

St.   319;    Baker   v.   Cincinnati,    11  necessary     to     make     the     assess- 

Ohio  St.  534.  ment;    and  also   includes   the  fact 

48Doolittle    V.    Lucerne    Co.,    6  that  the  plaintiff  was  engaged   in 

Kulp.  495;   Hazeltine  v.  McGroor-  selling      liquors.         Stevenson      v. 

ty,  6  Kulp.  533.  Hunter,  2  Ohio  N.  P.  300;  5  Ohio 

'49  Marshall  v.  Suediker,  25  Tex.  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  27. 

460 ;   7S  Am.  Dec.  534.  ^i  Martel  v.   East  St.  Louis,  94 

soNurnberger    v.    Bornwell,    42  111.    67;    Owensboro    v.    EUter,    3 

S.  C.   158;   20  S.  E.   14.  Ky.     L.     Rep.      (abstract)      255; 

In    an    action    to    recover    back  State  v,  Lincoln,  6  Neb.   12. 
taxes   paid,   the    tax    duplicate   is 


§  499  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  816 

to  him,  and  recover  back  the  fee  paid.^-  Statutes  sometimes 
provide  for  a  return  of  the  money  if  the  application  for  a 
license  be  denied.^" 

Sec.  499.  Refunding  fees  or  taxes,  continued — Payment 
under  mistake  of  fact. 
Money  paid  under  a  mistake  of  fact  may  usually  be  re- 
covered back,  especially  if  there  was  no  negligence  in  an 
attempt  to  ascertain  the  facts.^^  But  where  a  person  engaged 
in  selling  liquor  in  which  all  the  requirements  of  a  prior  law 
had  been  complied  with  by  him  except  securing  the  general 
consent  of  the  property  owners  to  the  location  of  the  saloon,  or 
a  finding  of  its  sufficiency  by  the  licensing  board,  as  required  by 
a  subsequent  law,  and  without  resorting  to  the  public  records 
for  information  as  to  whether  the  law  then  in  force  had  been 
complied  with,  he  paid  the  tax,  relying  upon  the  fact  that  other 
saloons  were  being  operated  in  the  city,  but  his  saloon  Avas  soon 
after  closed,  it  was  held  that  he  had  not  paid  the  tax  under  a 
mistake  of  fact,  and  was  without  a  remedy.^"*  So  where  by  an 
examination  of  the  records  the  plaintiff  could  have  ascertained 
that  liquors  were  being  illegally  sold  on  his  premises,  the  fact 
that  he  did  not  have  actual  knowledge  until  after  the  time 
when  he  might  have  applied  under  a  statute  for  a  remission  of 
the  tax,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  recover  them  back.^** 
And  where  the  State  commissioners  of  excise  certified  without 
authority  that  the  population  of  a  certain  city  was  so  much 
and  that  the  license  fee,  based  on  the  population  was  a  certain 
amount,  increased  over  the  amount  it  was  previously,  and  a 

52  Zeglin  V.  Carver  Co.,  72  to  recover  where  the  licensee  has 
Minn.  17;   74  N.  W.  901.  died  and   the   term   of   the   license 

53  State  V.  Buechler,  10  S.  D.  has  not  expired.  Wood  v.  School 
156;  72  N.  W.  114;  School  Dis-  District,  SO  Neb.  722;  115  N.  W. 
trict   V.   Thompson,   51    Xeb.    857;  308. 

71   X.   W.   728.     In   this   case   the  54  Ligonier     v.      Ackerman,     46 

money    was    paid    to    the    village  Ind.   552;    15  Am.  Rep.   323. 

treasurer,    who     paid     it    to     the  55  Ahlers  v.  Estherville    (Iowa), 

school    district;    and    it    was    held  104  X.  W.   453. 

that  the  school  district  was  liable  56  Xewton    v.    McKay     ( Iowa ) , 

to  return  it.  102  X.  W.  827. 
Right    of    legal    representatives 


817  LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES.  §  500 

licensee  paid  the  excess  over  protest,  it  was  held  that  he  had 
not  paid  it  under  a  mistake  of  fact,  and  could  not  recover  back 
the  excess."  Where  a  fee  was  paid  to  a  city  of  the  fifth  class, 
and  the  fee  was  less  for  a  city  of  the  sixth  class,  it  was  held  that 
the  applicant  for  the  license  could  not  maintain  an  action  for 
the  difference  between  the  amounts  of  the  two  fees  on  the 
ground  that  the  act  for  the  formation  of  the  cities  of  the  fifth 
class  was  invalid.  Only  the  State  could  raise  that  question,'^® 
Money  paid  because  of  mistake  of  the  requirements  of  the  law 
cannot  be  treated  as  a  payment  under  a  mistake  of  fact.^'* 

Sec.  500.    Rebate  of  fees  or  taxes  under  statute. 

Statutes  at  times  provide  for  rebate  of  part  of  the  amount 
of  fees  or  taxes  where  the  license  or  permit  is  cancelled  or 
surrendered  before  the  end  of  the  term  for  which  it  was 
issued;  but  unless  some  statute  provides  for  the  rebate  none 
can  be  made.*'"  Usually  the  statutes  provide  that  if  the 
licensee  has  obtained  his  license  illegally  or  has  been  guilty  of 
a  violation  of  the  liquor  law  he  shall  not  be  entitled  to  a 
rebate.  And  where  a  statute  provided  that  the  certificate 
should  have  one  month  to  run  after  the  surrender  of  the 
license  it  was  held  that  if  the  licensee  continued  to  do  business 
during  the  month  he  was  not  entitled  to  have  the  rebate, 
although  he  held  a  certificate  for  its  rebate."^     If  a  statute 

57  People  V.  Cullinan,  111  N.  Y.  a  license  will  be  ordered  returned 
App.  Div.  32;  97  N.  Y.  Supp.  194.  where   the  order   directing  the   li- 
es Providence      V.      Shackelford,  censing   officer   to    issue    a   license 
106   Ky.   378;    50    S.   W.   542;    20  is  reversed.     People  v.  Sackett,  15 
Ky.  L.  Rep.   1921.  N.   Y.   App.    Div.    290;    44   K    Y. 

59  Baker  v.  Bucklin,  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  593;  reversing  17  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  336;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  Misc.  Rep.  406;  40  N.  Y.  Supp. 
294;  affirming  22  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  414. 

560;   50  N".  Y.  Supp.  739.  oi  Lyman   v.   Cheever.   31    N.  Y. 

60  Anderson  v.  Galesburg,  118  Misc.  Rep.  100;  63  N.  Y.  Supp. 
111.  App.  525;  Bailey  v.  Raleigh,  809;  People  v.  Cullinan,  168  N. 
130  N.  C.  269;  41  S.  E.  281.  Y.  258;  61  N.  Y.  243;  affirming 
(Legislature  without  power  to  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  1142;  People  v. 
enact  a  statute  requiring  a  re-  Cullinan,  173  N.  Y.  604;  66  N.  E. 
l>ate.)  111-t;  affirming  67  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

Under    the    Xew    York    statute        446;  73  N.  Y.  Supp.  987. 
money  paid  on  an  application  for 


§500 


TRiVPFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


818 


provide  that  no  rebate  shall  be  made  where  the  licensee  ob- 
tained his  license  on  an  application  containing  a  material  false 
statement,  such  a  false  statement  will  defeat  his  right  to  a 
rebate.*'-  If  the  licensee  be  indicted  for  a  violation  of  the 
liquor  law,  under  the  New  York  statute  no  rebate  can  be 
awarded  him  so  long  as  the  indictment  remains  pending,  even  if 
indicted  after  the  surrender.'''^  If  a  licensee  be  arrested  for  a 
violation  of  the  statute  and  be  acquitted  on  the  ''merits,"  he  is 
entitled  to  the  rebate.*'*  The  New  York  statute  provides  that  if 
the  licensee  be  twice  convicted  of  having  violated  its  provisions, 
he  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  rebate  of  the  tax  paid  if  he 
cease  the  liquor  business.  Under  it  a  rebate  cannot  be  denied 
where  only  one  conviction  has  been  had.®^  Under  this  statute 
a  conviction  is  not  necessary  to  defeat  the  application  for  a 
rebate;  it  is  sufficient  that  the  applicant  has  merely  violated 
its  provisions.*'*'  But  the  statute  does  not  apply  to  violations 
of  the  law  committed  before  the  license  certificate  was  issued."^ 


62 /n  re  Lyman,  163  N.  Y.  536; 
57  N.  E.  745;  reversing  51  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  52;  64  N.  Y.  Supp. 
756;  People  v.  Lyman,  33  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  243;  68  N.  Y.  Supp. 
331;  People  v.  Hilliard,  178  N.  Y. 
582;  70  N.  E.  1106;  affirming  81 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  71;  80  N.  Y. 
Supp.  792. 

63  In  re  Johnson,  78  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Pvep.  498;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  1074; 
People  V.  Cullinan,  168  N.  Y. 
258;  61  N.  E.  243;  affirmed  69 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1142;  People  v. 
Layman,  59  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
172;  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  Ill;  af- 
firming 65  N.  Y.  Supp.  462;  In 
re  Seitz,  32  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
108;  65  N.  Y.  Supp.  462;  People 
V,  Clement  (N.  Y.),  112  N.  Y. 
Supp.  951 ;  People  v.  Clemcit 
(N.  Y.),  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  1098; 
Clement  v.  Viscosi  (X.  Y.),  118 
N.  Y.  Supp.  613. 

64  People  V.  Lyman,   168  N.  Y. 


669;  61  N.  E.  113,  affirming  53 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  470;  65  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1062;  People  v.  Lyman,  69 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  406;  74  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1104;  People  v.  Cullinan, 
173  N.  Y.  604;  66  N.  E.  1114; 
69  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  406;  74  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1104. 

65  People  V  Cullinan,  90  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  606;  85  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1142,  affirming  41  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
404;   84  N.  Y.  Supp.  1018. 

66  People  v.  Cullinan,  95  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  598;  88  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1022. 

But  see  People  v.  Cullinan,  90 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  606;  85  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1142,  affirming  41  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  404;  84  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1018. 

67  People  V.  Leyman.  25  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  217;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  76. 

In  New  Hampshire  where  the 
State  excise  board  revoked  a  li- 
cense because  its  holder  had  vio- 


819 


LICENSE   FEES   AND   TAXES. 


§500 


The  assignee  of  the  license  or  liquor  tax  certificate,  where  that 
is  allowed,  takes  it  subject  to  all  the  illegalities  it  carried  in 
the  hands  of  the  licensee;  and  if  the  latter  cannot  secure  a 
rebate,  neither  can  the  assignee ;  ''^  and  if  proceedings  be  pend- 
ing against  the  licensee  for  a  violation  of  the  law  he  is  not 
entitled  to  the  rebate  until  they  are  determined  favorably  to 
the  assignor.*'"  If  the  licensee  has  obtained  his  license  on  false 
statements,  the  assignee  takes  the  assignment  of  the  license 
affected  by  these  statements.''*'  Mandamus  lies  in  New  York 
against  the  excise  commissioner  to  compel  the  payment  of  the 
rebate,  but  the  applicant  must  show  that  he  has  ceased  selling 
liquor,  and  he  is  not  relieved  from  so  doing  by  showing  that 
the  deputy  excise  commissioner  had  issued  him  receipts  for 
the  unearned  portion  of  his  license  when  his  cessation  of  sales 
is  denied,  the  determination  of  that  fact  by  the  deputy  not 
being  an  adjudication  of  the  truth  of  the  fact  of  cessation.^^ 
It  is  no  defense  to  such  proceedings  that  charges  had  been 
preferred  against  the  licensee,  when  he  is  tried  and  discharged 
bv  the  magistrate  for  want  of  sufficient  evidence  to  believe 


lated  the  law,  and  subsequently  he 
was  indicted  on  the  charge  and 
acquitted,  it  was  held  that  he  was 
not  entitled  to  a  retuin  of  any  of 
the  license  fee.  Parent  v.  Little, 
72  N.  H.  566;  58  Atl.  510. 

A  surrender  in  New  York  of  the 
license  does  not  release  the  sure- 
ties on  the  licensee's  bond  for  the 
licensee'^  illegal  acts  committed 
within  a  month  after  the  sur- 
render and  before  the  rebate  money 
is  paid.  Lyman  v.  Cheever,  31  N. 
Y.  Misc.  Rep.  100;  63  N.  Y.  Supp. 
809. 

As  to  surrender  and  grant  of 
new  licenses  in  Massachusetts,  see 
Tracy  v.  Ginzberg,  189  Mass.  260; 
75  N.  E.  637. 

The  right  to  surrender  a  liquor 
tax  certificate  and  have  its  sur- 
render value  returned  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  chose  in  actio*.    Niles 


V.  Mathusa,  20  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
483;  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  38. 

6«  People  v.  Lyman,  33  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  243;  68  N.  Y.  Supp. 
331;  People  v.  Lyman,  27  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  527 ;  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  527. 

C9  People  V.  Lyman,  59  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  172;  09  N.  Y.  Supp. 
Ill,  affirming  05  N.  Y.  Supp.  462. 

TO  People  v.  Hilliard,  178  N.  Y. 
582;  70  N.  E.  1106,  affirming  81 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  71;  80  N.  Y.  Supp. 
792. 

See,  generally,  People  v.  Flynn, 
110  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  279;  96  N. 
Y.  Supp.  655,  reversing  48  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  159;  96  N.  Y.  Supp. 
653. 

71  People  V.  Cullinan,  173  N.  Y. 
604;  66  N.  E.  1114,  affirming  67 
X.  Y.  App.  Div.  446;  73  N.  Y, 
Supp.  987;  People  v.  Lyman,  ■67 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  446;  73  N,  Y. 
Supp.  987. 


§500 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


820 


him  ^ilty.'-  The  petition  must  show  the  issuance  of  the 
rebate  certificate  and  that  it  is  still  in  force,  but  it  need  not 
recite  any  of  the  facts  necessary  to  obtain  the  certificate  when 
application  for  it  had  been  made/^  Under  the  New  York 
statute,  if  the  petitioner  for  a  writ  of  mandamus  has  been 
arrested  or  indicted  for  a  violation  of  the  liquor  law,  he  must 
show  he  had  been  acquitted  on  the  merits/*  The  judgment 
should  be  that  the  State  excise  commissioner  issue  an  order 
for  the  rebate  and  not  that  he  pay  it,  for  only  the  State 
treasurer  can  pay  it.'^^'  In  order  to  secure  a  writ  of  mandamus 
all  the  necessary  steps  entitling  the  licensee  to  a  rebate  cer- 
tificate must  first  be  taken."''  If  the  answer  to  a  petition  for 
a  mandamus  allege  that  the  petitioner  had  not  voluntarily 
ceased  to  traffic  in  liquor,  the  petitioner  is  entitled  to  a  trial 
of  the  issue  of  fact  so  raised,  and  a  peremptory  \\Tit  should 
be  refused,  even  though  no  prosecution  against  him  has  been 
commenced  on  account  of  the  violations  charged  in  the 
answer." 


72  People  V.  Cullinan,  173  N.  Y. 
604;  66  N.  E.  1114,  affirming  69 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  406;  74  N.  Y. 
Supp.    1104. 

73  People  V.  Lyman,  168  X.  Y. 
669;  61  N.  E.  1133,  affirming  53 
N.  Y.  Supp.  470;  05  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1062. 

'.  Lyman,  168  X.  Y. 
E.  1133,  affirmed  53 
Div.    470;    66    X.    Y. 


V.    Scanlin,    36   X.   Y. 
756;    74   X.    Y.    Supp. 


74  People 
669;  61  X, 
N.  Y.  App 
Supp.   1002 

75  Knapp 
Misc.  Rep. 
458. 

76  People  V.  Lyman,  25  X.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  217;  55  X.  Y.  Supp.  76. 

The  law  in  force  at  the  time  a 
rebate  is  applied  for  governs,  and 
not  the  law  as  it  was  when  the 
license  was  issued.  Ging  v.  Sherry, 
32  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  354;  52  X.  Y. 
Supp.  1003. 

77  People  V.  Cullinan,  173  X.  Y. 
604;    66  X.   E.    1114,   affirming  69 


X.  Y.  App.  Div.  406;  74  X.  Y. 
Supp.  1104. 

If  the  agents  and  servants  of 
the  petitioner  has  violated  the 
liquor  laws  in  the  conducting  of 
his  business,  he  cannot  secure  the 
rebate,  for  he  is  responsible  for 
their  acts.  Duncan  v.  Clement 
(X.  Y.),   119  X.  Y.  Supp.  375. 

In  Kentucky  if  the  license  be 
revoked  for  a  violation  of  law,  the 
unearned  part  of  the  fee  cannot  be 
recovered  back.  Louisville  v.  Cain 
(Ky.),  119  S.  W.  763. 

Where  a  statute  validates  any 
refunding  made  by  officers  of  a 
city  theretofore  made  out  of  public 
funds  in  good  faitli,  it  is  the  good 
faith  of  the  officers  alone  who  paid 
out  the  money  and  not  of  the  city 
council  which  appropriated  the 
money  or  ordered  it  paid  out. 
Calderwood  v.  Jos.  Schlitz  Brewing 
Co.   (Minn.),  121  X.  W.  221, 


CHAPTER    XIV. 
DRUGGISTS  AND  PHYSICIANS. 


SEC. 

SEC. 

501. 

Druggists'    exemption    from 
liability. 

507. 

502. 

No  druggist  or  other  person 
licensed. 

508. 

503. 

Statutes      requiring      drug- 
gists to  have  licenses. 

509. 

504. 

iSales   by   employe    of    drug- 

510. 

gist. 

511. 

505. 

Gk»od  faith  in  making  sales. 

506. 

Druggists    making    unlawful 

512. 

sales. 

513. 

Druggists'  sales  in  prohibi- 
tion States. 

Sales  by  druggists  upon 
prescriptions. 

Prescriptions  for  Sunday 
and   holiday  sales. 

Kind   of   prescriptions. 

Registration  and  reports  of 
sales. 

Sales  by  physicians. 

Physicians  illegally  giving 
a  prescription. 

Sec.  501.     Druggist's  exemption  from  liability. 

There  are  some  cases  which  hold  that  a  druggist  who  sells 
.spirituous  and  vinous  liqours  upon  a  proper  occasion  hona  fide, 
and  with  due  caution,  to  be  used  for  medical  purposes  only, 
is  not  to  be  regarded  as  having  violated  the  laws,  although  he 
has  no  license  to  sell  and  although  the  law  does  not  except 
him  from  its  terms.^  In  arriving  at  this  conclusion,  the  court, 
in  one  of  the  earliest  cases  said:  ''In  construing  a  statute  it 
is  proper  to  look  to  its  effect.  Statutes  certainly  are  not 
always,  nor  ought  they  to  be,  construed  literally.     The  Bolog- 


1  United  States  v.  Calhoun,  39 
Fed.  Rep.  604;  Thomasson  v. 
State,  15  Ind.  449;  Jakes  v.  State, 
43  Ind.  473;  Ball  v.  State,  50 
Ind.  595;  Hooper  v.  State,  56 
Ind.  153;  Nixon  v.  State,  76  Ind. 
524;  Hottendorf  v.  State,  89  Ind. 
282;  State  v.  Wray,  72  N.  C. 
821 


253;  Hamline  v.  Commonwealth, 
13  Bush  (Ky.),  350;  State  v. 
Larrimore,  19  Mo.  391;  State  v. 
Mitchell,  28  Mo.  562;  State  v. 
Wells,  28  Mo.  565;  Rhoades  v. 
Commonwealth,  6  Atl.  245;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Rhoades,  1  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  Rep.  639. 


§501.  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  822 

nian  Law  which  enacted  'that  whoever  drew  blood  in  the 
streets  should  be  punished  with  the  utmost  severity,'  was  held 
after  long  debate,  not  to  extend  to  a  surgeon  who  opened  the 
vein  of  a  person  who  fell  down  in  the  street  with  a  fit.'  "^ 
It  will  be  noticed  that  the  Bolognian  Law  was  not  decided  in 
favor  of  the  surgeon  until  "after  long  debate."  Confessedly, 
then,  this  was  not  a  strong  precedent  uj)on  which  to  hang  the 
Indiana  decision  from  which  we  have  quoted.  The  North 
Carolina  case  upon  this  point  has  been  limited  if  not  over- 
ruled, by  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State.''  In  the  last  case 
cited,  it  was  said,  "this  court  will  not  go,  by  construction  or 
interpretation,  beyond  the  ruling  in  State  v.  AVray.  To  do  so 
would  tend  to  impair  the  face  of  the  statute,  weaken  its  re- 
straining power,  and  often  to  defeat  the  legislative  will  by 
rendering  evasions  and  violations  of  the  law  easy."  In  accord 
with  the  thought  last  expressed  are  many  well  considered 
cases  which  hold  that  such  a  sale  is  a  violation  of  the  law, 
even  though  it  is  made  upon  the  prescription  of  a  physician,* 
and  there  was  no  one  authorized  to  issue  a  druggist's  license,' 
and  this  we  regard  as  the  better  holding.*'     A  leading  case 

2Donncll  v.   State,   2   Ind.   658;  IGl;    IG  X.  E.  705;  King  v.  State. 

Elrod  V.  State,  72  Ind.  292;  Park-  66   Miss.   502;    6   So.    188;    Brown 

er  V.  State,  31  Ind.  App.  650;   68  v.    State,    9    Neb.    189;    2    N.    W. 

X.  E.  912.  214;    People   v.    Saflord,    5    Denio 

3  State    V.    McBryer,    98    X.    C.  (X.    Y. ) ,    112;    Commonwealth   v. 

619;    State   v.   Dalton,    101   X.    C.  Porter,    10    Phila.    217;    State    v. 

680;   8  S.  E.   154.  Cox,    23    W.    Va.    797;    Gault    v. 

*  Carson  v.   State,  69   Ala.  235;  State,   34   Ga.   533;    State  v.  Dal- 

Carl  V.  State,  89   Ala.  93;    Woods  ton,   101   X.   C.   680;   8  S.  E.   154; 

V.  State,  36  Ark.  36;  38  Am.  Rep.  Druggists'    Cases,    85    Tenn.    449; 

22;  Flower  v.  State,  39  Ark.  209;  3  S.  W.  490;    State  v.  Thompson, 

Chew  V.  State,  43  Ark.  361;   State  20   W.   Va.   674. 

V.    Gray,    61    Conn.    39;     22    Atl.  s  Rossenhamm        v.        Common- 

675;     Noecker    v.    People,    91    111.  wealth,   9   Ky.   L.   519. 

494;     State    v.    Knowles,    57     la.  c  Wright  v.  People,  101  111.  126. 

669;   State  v.  Bissell,   67  la.  616;  Under     a     statute     authorizing 

25  X\   W.   831;   City  of  Salina  v.  druggists    to    keep    all    medicines 

Seitz,     16     Kan.     143;      State     v.  authorized    by    the    United    States 

Brown,  31  Me.  522;   State  v.  Hall,  Dispensary    as    of    recognized    mc- 

39    Mo.     107;     Commonwealth     v.  dicinal   utility,  they  may  keep  in- 

Ramsdell,     130     Mass.     68;     Com-  toxicating  liquors.     Pollard  v.  Al- 

monwealth    v.    Pierce,    147    Mass.  len,  96  Me.   455;   52  Atl.  524. 


823  DRUGGISTS    AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  502 

upon  this  point,  to  our  mind,  gives  a  good  and  sufficient  reason 
for  so  holding.  "But  let  it  be  once  understood,"  the  court 
said,  "that  the  druggist  or  other  tradesman,  merely  because 
his  chief  business  is  confined  to  traffic  in  other  classes  of  mer- 
chandise, may  retail  intoxicating  liquors  ad  libitum,  so  long 
as  he  in  good  faith  sells  for  some  legitimate  purpose  other 
than  as  a  mere  beverage,  the  chief  safeguards  which  the  law, 
as  now  understood,  throws  around  the  subject,  will  soon  be 
frittered  away  and  the  doors  will  be  thrown  wide  open  to  all 
manner  of  frauds  and  evasions  of  law  which  would  bid  defi- 
ance to  the  highest  degree  of  watchfulness  and  diligence  the 
officers  of  the  law  could  possibly  bring  to  the  official  discharge 
of  their  duties  in  endeavoring  to  enforce  the  law  on  the  sub- 
ject. If  the  druggist  may  sell  for  sickness,  the  family  grocer 
may,  on  the  same  principle,  sell  for  culinarj^  purposes,  and 
there  is  no  telling  where  the  thing  would  stop.  The  only  safe 
course  is  to  enforce  the  law  as  the  Legislature  has  made  it 
and  not  defeat  its  execution  upon  some  hypothetical  theory  of 
public  policy  that  finds  no  place  or  recognition  in  the  act  itself. 
If  the  legitimate  business  of  druggists  or  other  tradesmen 
necessarily  involves  the  retail  of  liquors  in  small  quantities; 
we  see  no  reasons,  founded  upon  public  policies  or  otherwise, 
why  they  should  not  like  other  dealers  pay  for  the  privilege 
of  doing  so.  This  construction,  moreover,  compels  all  persons 
who  engage  in  the  traffic  to  equally  contribute  to  the  support 
of  local  municipal  government.  The  contrary  construction 
would  be  discriminating  between  individuals  engaged  in  the 
same  business,  with  respect  to  the  burdens  of  local  government, 
without  any  sufficient  reason  for  doing  so." 

Sec.  502.     No  druggist  or  other  person  licensed. 

To  an  indictment  for  selling  intoxicating  liquors  without  a 
license  and  in  contravention  of  a  statute  upon  that  subject,  it 
is  no  defense  that,  at  the  time  of  making  such  a  sale  there 
was  no  druggist  or  other  person  licensed  to  sell  such  liquors 
within  the  county,  that  the  sale  was  made  upon  the  order  or 
prescription  of  a  physician,  and  that  the  liquor  thus  obtained 
was  necessary  for  the  buyer's  use,  either  as  a  medicine  or  for 


§  503  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  824 

the  preservation  of  his  health.  If  it  were  sufficient  in  such  a 
case  to  avoid  the  prohibition  of  a  statute,  for  the  purchaser 
to  say  that  the  liquor  was  intended  for  medicine,  it  would,  in 
effect,  repeal  the  statute.^ 

Sec.  503.     Statute  requiring  druggists  to  have  license. 

In  many  of  the  statutes  druggists  are  required  to  take  out 
a  license  or  permit  and  even  to  execute  a  licensee 's  bond ;  but 
a  statute  merely  regulating  their  liquor  traffic  does  not  require 
of  them  a  license,  although  dealers  in  general  must  have 
licenses.^  "Whether  or  not  a  druggist  must  give  a  liquor 
dealer's  usual  bond,  of  course  depends  upon  each  particular 
statute,  and  no  general  rr.le  can  be  stated  on  that  question.^ 
But  a  statute  requiring  all  liquor  dealers  not  to  adulterate 
their  liquor  applies  not  only  to  liquor  dealers  strictly  so,  but 
also  to  druggists  or  pharmacists."  In  some  States  only  regis- 
tered pharmacists  can  sell  liquors."  A  statute  permitting 
druggists  to  sell  liquors  does  not  require  that  he  must  manu- 


7  Commonwealth  v.  Sloan,  .58  316;  85  N.  W.  589;  Stormes  v. 
Mass.  (4  Cush.)  52;  Common-  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  47  S.  W. 
wealth  V.  Kimball,  24  Pick.  366.  262;     State    v.    Randall,    73    Mo. 

8  Moore  v.  People,  109  111.  499 ;  App.  463,  465 ;  Watson  v.  State, 
State  V.  Witty,  74  Mo.  App.  550;  42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  13;  57  S.  W. 
Hurdland  v.  Hardy,   74   Mo.   App.  101, 

614.  This     is     so     in     Nova     Scotia. 

In    lennessee    a    druggist    hold-  Gardner  v.   Parr,  2  R.  &  G.  255; 

ing     a     merchant's     license     must  S.    C.    1    Can.   L.    T.   710;    and   in 

also    pay    liquor    dealer's    occupa-  Manitoba.     Cathcart  v.   Hardy,   2 

tion    tax.       Druggists'    Cases,    85  M.   &  S.   534;    Regina  v.   Harrell. 

Tenn.   449;    3   S.    W.   490.  12   Manitoba,   198,  522;   Common- 

0  Moore  v.   People,    109   111.   499  wealth  v.  Powell    (Ky.),  62  S.  W. 

(no     bond     required);      State     v.  19;    22   Ky.   L.   Rep.    1932;    State 

Ferguson,  72  Mo.  297    (a  bond  re-  v.   Collins,  28   R.   I.  439;   67   Atl. 

quired);  S+^te  v.  Pierce,  26  Kan.  796;    Liggett   v.   People,   26    Colo. 

777     (bond    required);    People    v.  364;    58   Pac.   144. 

Beach,   D3    Mich.    25;    52    X.    W.  TIh;  license  is  a  defense.     State 

1035.  V.   Morgan,  96  Mo.   App.   343;    70 

10  Newman  v.  State,  7  Lea.  617.  S.    W.    267. 

"State   V.    Dunning,    14    S.    D. 


825 


DRUGGISTS   AND   PHYSICIANS. 


§503 


faetnre  or  compound  medicines  to  be  such  a  person,  or  to  be 
an  apothecary ;  '-  and  a  statute  requiring  druggists  to  have  a 
license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquor  does  not  require  him  to  have 
a  license  to  compound  and  sell  a  medicine  containing  alcohol 
on  a  physician's  prescription,  or  even  on  his  own  formula.^'' 
But  under  a  right  to  sell  proprietary  medicines  he  cannot  sell 
alcoholic  bitters  that  are  composed  chiefly  of  alcohol/*  If 
only  a  druggist  can  malVe  a  sale  of  liquor,  then  on  proper 
proof  that  he  holds  a  druggist's  license  the  burden  is  cast 
upon  the  prosecution  to  show  that  in  fact  he  is  not  a  druggist, 


12  Haimline  v.  Commonwealth, 
13  Bush,  350. 

The  Iowa  statute  of  1&86,  c.  83, 
on  permits  for  druggists  to  sell 
liquors  was  complete  within  it- 
self so  far  as  druggists  were  con- 
cerned. State  V.  Courtney,  73 
Iowa,  010;  35  N.  W.  685;  see  also 
State  V.  Mercer,  58  Iowa,  182;  12 
N.  W.  269;  State  v.  Aulman,  76 
Iowa,  624;  41  N.  W.  379. 

The  act  of  Colorado  Laws  1889, 
p.  228,  regulating  the  licensing  of 
"tippling  houses"  did  not  repeal 
the  statute  -f  +l,at  State.  (Mills 
Ann.  St.,  §4403,  subdiv.  18),  em- 
powering cities  and  towns  to 
grant  permits  to  drujTfrists  to  sell 
liquors  for  "medicinal,  mechani- 
cal, sacramental  and  chemical 
purposes  only."  Canfield  v.  Lead- 
ville,  7  Colo.  Apn.  453:  43  Pac. 
910. 

The  meaning  of  the  word  "drug- 
gist" cannot  be  so  strp+ci^ed  as  to 
cover  sales  by  commi^si'>n  me^-- 
chants  dealing  prinr^innTlv  in  al- 
cohol. VUls  V.  PerVins,  120 
Mass.   41. 

13  Commonwealth  v.  Fowler,  98 
Ky.  648;  34  S.  W.  21:  Parker  v. 
State,    31    Ind.    App.    650;    68   K 


E.  912;  DeTarr  v.  State,  37  Ind. 
App.  323;  76  N.  E.  897;  Pearce 
V.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  88 
S.  W.  234;  State  v.  Roller,  77 
Mo.  120;  Haimline  v.  Common- 
wealth,  13  Bush,  350. 

14  State  V.  Wright,  20  Mo.  App. 
412. 

In  Missouri  it  was  held  that 
the  proprietor  of  a  drug  store 
could  not  escape  liability  by  the 
employment  of  a  non-resident 
pharmacist  who  was  present  only 
two  or  three  times  a  week.  State 
V.  Jordan,  87  Mo.  App.  420;  State 
V.  Workman,  75  Mo.  App.  454; 
State  V.  Chipp,  121  Mo.  App. 
556:   97   S.  W.  230. 

Although  he  have  a  permit,  yet 
a  druo-ffist  may  be  convicted  of 
maintaining  a  liquor  nuisance. 
State  V.  Engborg,  63  Kan.  853: 
66   P.   1007. 

It  is  not  error  to  allow  a  de- 
fendant to  testify  that  he  is  a 
drujrgist  before  producing  his  li- 
cense. His  license  is  prima  facie 
evidence  that  he  is  in  fact  a  li- 
censee. Commonwealth  v.  By- 
ers  (Ky.),  109  S.  W.  895;  33  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  252. 


§504 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


826 


and,  therefore,  does  not  come  within  the  provisions  of  the 
statute  allowing  druggists  to  sell  liquors.^^ 

Sec.  504.     Sales  by  employe  of  druggist. 

As  in  all  other  instances  of  sales  by  an  agent,  the  employe 
or  clerk  of  a  druggist  or  pharmacist  is  not  subject  to  prosecu- 


15  Commonwealth  v.  Byers 
(Ky.),  109  S.  W.  895;  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  See  State  v.  Shanke,  98  Mo. 
App.  138;  71  S.  VV.  1065. 

Under  a  Canadian  statute  for- 
bidding a  licensed  chemist  to  sell 
liquors  to  be  drunk  on  the  prem- 
ises, a  sale  by  an  unlicensed  chem- 
ist for  that  purpose  is  also  an 
offense.  Regina  v.  McCoy,  23 
Ont.   Rep.   442. 

It  has  been  held  that  if  a  drug- 
gist has  in  good  faith  olfered  to 
pay  for  his  license,  which  offer 
was  declined,  he  cannot  be  con- 
victed of  selling  without  a  li- 
cense. Storms  V.  Commonwealth, 
105  Ky.  619;  49  S.  W.  451;  re- 
versing 47  S.  W.  262.  See  also 
Commonwealth  v.  McGrorty,  5 
Ky.   L.   Rep.    (abstract),   605. 

Indictment  of  merchant  selling 
in  drugs  and  compounding  pre- 
scriptions occasionally.  State  v. 
Shanks,  98  Mo.  App.  138;  71  S. 
VV.  1065. 

Sales  at  wholesale  by  druggists 
when  allowed.  People  v.  Long- 
well,  136  Mich.  302;  99  X.  W.  1; 
10  Detroit  L.  N.   1049. 

Under  a  power  to  license,  regu- 
late and  prohibit  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors,  a  city  may 
adopt  a  licensing  ordinance  and 
exempt  a  druggist  from  its  pro- 
visions. Carthage  v.  Carlton,  99 
111.   App.   33S. 

So  it  may  prohibit  the  sale. 
Jacobs  Pharmacy  Co.  v.  Atlanta, 
89  Fed.  244. 


If  a  druggist  desires  to  sell  liq- 
uor in  any  other  way  than  that 
prescribed  for  druggists,  he  must 
take  out  a  license  to  sell  liquors; 
and  if  he  sells  liquors  without  he 
is  liable  tlie  same  as  any  other 
person.  Luton  v.  Palmer,  69 
Mich.  610;  37  N.  W.  701;  In  re 
Moore  (Iowa),  118  N.  W.  879; 
Rosenham  v.  Commonwealth,  7 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  602;  Bag- 
by  V.  Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  (abstract)  53  (not  a  mer- 
chant, within  the  moaning  of  the 
Kentucky  statute)  ;  Mason  v. 
State  (Okla.),  103  Pac.  369; 
Stewart  v.  Calhoun  Co.  (Mich.), 
121  N.  W.  279;  State  v.  Moore, 
107  Mo.   78;    16  S.  W.  937. 

In  Missouri,  if  a  druggist  be 
properly  registered,  he  cannot  be 
indicted  under  dramshop  law  for 
a  sale  he  has  made.  State  v. 
McAnally,  6'6  Mo.  App.  329;  and 
in  that  same  State  he  must  file 
an  affidavit  and  give  a  bond  not 
to  adulterate  his  liquors.  State 
V.  Summers,  142  Mo.  586;  44  S. 
W.  797;  State  v.  Goff,  66  Mo. 
App.   491. 

In  Michigan  a  druggist  cannot 
sell  liquors  to  be  drunk  on  the 
premises  as  a  beverage.  Stewart 
V.  Calhoun  Co.  (Mich),  124  N. 
W.   39. 

Qualifications  for  license  in 
Iowa.  /;;,  re  Sniitli,  ]-G  Iowa, 
128;    101   N.  W.   875. 


827  DRl'GGISTS    AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  505 

tion  if  his  employer  could  have  legally  made  the  sale.^''  If 
the  druggist  was  not  licensed  or  registered,  when  that  is  neces- 
sary, then  his  clerk  in  making  a  sale  for  him  violates  the  law/'^ 
If  he  sells  off  the  licensed  premises  he  becomes  thereby  liable 
to  the  penalty  of  the  statute. ^^  If  the  statute  authorizes  a 
druggist  to  sell  for  medical,  mechanical  or  sacramental  pur- 
poses only,  then  a  sale  by  the  clerk  for  some  other  purpose 
renders  him  liable. ^^  If  the  license  or  permit  of  the  druggist 
be  revoked,  as  it  may,-"  of  course,  a  sale  by  his  clerk  there- 
after is  an  unlawful  act  in  such  clerk. 

Sec.  505.     Good  faith  in  making  sales. 

The  element  of  "good  faith"  in  making  sales  is  always  in- 
volved in  sales  by  a  druggist  if  he  desires  to  escape  the  pen- 
alty of  the  statute.  This  is  especially  true  where  no  statute 
provides  that  he  may  sell,  but  by  construction  of  the  statutes 
by  the  courts  he  is  permitted  to  sell  for  medicinal  and  like 
purposes.  If,  under  his  right  to  sell,  he  uses  his  right,  or 
even  statutory  permit,  as  a  cloak  to  sell  liquor  unlawfully, 
he  will  be  liable  to  the  statute  forbidding-  sales  without  license 
or  permits,  or  to  the  .statutes  permitting  him  to  sell  for  only 
certain  purposes  upon  certain  conditions.-^  "Whether  or  not 
he  acted  in  good  faith  is  a  question  for  the  jury;  but  if 
the  jury  disregard  the  uncontradicted  evidence  showing  good 
faith  a  conviction  will  be  set  aside  on  appeal.--    This  rule  ex- 

iG  State  V.  MullenliofT,  74  Iowa,  tillery,  72  Iowa,  348;  34  N.  W.  1. 

271;  37  N.  W.  329;  State  v.  Copp,  22  Kixoii  v.  State,  76   Ind.  524; 

34  Kan.  522;   9  Pac.  233.  Hottendorf  v.  State,  89  Ind.  282; 

Instate  V.  Gibson,  Gl  Mo.  App.  State   v.    Oeder,    80    Iowa,   72;    45 

768;    1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  656;   Gault  N.    W.    543;    State    v.    Shank,    79 

V.  State,   34  Ga.  533.  Iowa,    47;    44    N.    W.    241;    State 

18  State  V.   Copp,  34   Kan.   522;  v.  Blair,  72  Iowa,  591;  Haynie  v. 

9   Pac.   233;    Spake   v.   People,   89  State,     32     Miss.     400;     State    v. 

111.   617.  Thompson,    74    Iowa,    118;    37    N. 

laProvo    City    v.    Shurtlid,     4  W.  104;  Brooks  v.  State,  65  Miss. 

Utah,    15;    5   Pac.   302.  445;    4    So.    343;    State   v.    Hoag- 

2oHildreth      v.      Crawford,      65  land,    77    Iowa,    135;    41    N.    W. 

Iowa,  33fl;   21  N.  W.  667.  595;    State   v.    Flusehe,    79    Iowa, 

21  Pearson  v.  International  Dis-  765;    44  X..  W.   698. 


§  505  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  828 

tends  to  sales  upon  physician 's  prescriptions ;  for  if  the  drug- 
gist knows  that  the  prescription  is  a  mere  subterfuge  to  evade 
the  law  he  will  be  as  liable  as  if  he  sold  without  it.^^ 
The  defendant  has  the  burden  to  show  a  justification  for  the 
sale;  for  when  the  prosecution  has  showTi  a  sale  the  presump- 
tion is  raised  that  it  was  an  illegal  transaction.-*  "The  fact 
that  the  defendant's  place  of  business  was  a  drug  store  does 
not  raise  any  presumptions  in  his  favor,  and  if  the  State  has 
proven  to  satisfaction  of  the  jury  that  any  single  sale  of  spirit- 
uous liquors  was  made  by  the  defendant,  and  the  defendant  has 
not  then  shown  that  such  sale  was  justified  under  the  privileges 
of  a  druggist,  which  he  claims,  they  should  convict.  Such 
w^as  an  instruction  given  by  the  trial  court  in  one  case,  and 
it  was  approved  on  appeal.-"'  It  is  admissible  to  show,  on  the 
part  of  the  prosecution,  in  rebuttal  of  the  claim  of  good  faith 
sales,  that  the  drug  store  was  a  rendezvous  for  men  who  drank, 
and  their  personal  appearances  may  be  inquired  into,  as  to 
whether  they  were  men  who  apparently  needed  intoxicating 
liquors  for  medicinal  purposes  and  the  like.-^  Thus  in  one 
ease  the  reports  of  the  defendant,  made  in  pursuance  to  a 
statute,  showing  over  three  thousand  sales,  but  not  in  all  in- 
stances specifying  to  whom  the  sale  was  made  nor  what  kind 
of  liquors  had  been  sold,  was  admitted  in  evidence;  and 
notwithstanding  the  accused  bnd  tpst'^pd  the  sales  were  legal, 
he  was  convicted.-''  It  is  not  a  sufficient  justification  in  the  de- 
fendant that  he  sold  the  liouor  unon  the  purchaser's  statement 
that  he  desired  it  for  medicine;  for  that  is  not  that  degree  of 
caution  and  circumspection  which  the  law  requires.^^    It  is  not 

23  Commonwealth  -.   Joslin,   158  25  Baeumel  v.  State,  26  Fla.  71; 
Mass.  482;    33   N.   E.   653;    21    L.       7   So.  371. 

K.-    A.     449;     Commonwealth     v.  26  State  v.   Huff,   76  Iowa,  200; 

Gould,    158   Mass.   499;    33   X.    E.  40   N.    W.    720;    State   v.   Thomp- 

656;   State  v.  Wray,  72  N.  C.  253  Thornton   Intoxicants   WEK      173 

(sales   in   good   faith   on   prescrip-  son,  74  Iowa,  119;   37  N.  W.  104. 

tions   are   protected).  27  State   v.    Cummins,    76    Iowa, 

24  Commonwealth   v.   Perry.    148  333;  40  N.  W.  124. 

Mass.    160;    19   N.    E.   212;    State  28  State    v.    Knowles,    57    Iowa, 

V.  Cloughly,  73  Iowa,  626;   35  N.        669;     11     N.    W.    620;     State    v. 
W.  652.      "  Blair,    72    Iowa,    591;    34   N.    W. 

432. 


829 


DRUGGISTS    AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  506 


a,  sufficient  showing  that  the  liquors  were  purchased  for  medic- 
inal purposes,  by  proof  that  they  were  sold  at  wholesale.-" 
The  reports  of  sales  made  by  a  druggist,  under  the  statute, 
may  be  put  in  evidence  by  the  State  in  a  prosecution  against 
him;  and  he  cannot  claim  that  the  statute,  by  allowing  their 
use  in  evidence,  compelled  him  to  incriminate  himself  .•"■"  It  is 
no  defense  that  the  defendant  had  no  intention  to  violate  the 
statute,  and  that  the  sale  was  made  in  the  belief  that  the  liquor 
sold  was  not  intoxicating/'^ 

Sec.  506.    Druggists  making  unlawful  sales. 

Druggists  can  sell  only  for  the  purposes  designated  in  their 
permits  or  in  the  statutes  where  permits  are  required  or  stat- 
utes regulate  their  sales.  Under  the  guise  of  selling  for  a 
purpose  permitted  by  a  statute,  they  cannot  sell  for  another 
purpose.^-  If  he  may  sell  for  medical,  mechanical  or  culinary 
purposes,  he  may  not  sell  by  the  keg  or  barrel  for  the  pur- 
pose of  manufacturing  other  liquors  to  be  consumed  as 
beverages.'''^  If  he  knows  that  the  purchaser  does  not 
buy  it  for  one  of  the  purposes  for  which  he  may  sell  it, 
he  cannot  shut  his  eyes  to  the  intention  of  the  purchaser, 
whatever  he  may  say,  and  thus  escape  punishment,  if  in  fact 
it  be  used  for  another  purpose.^'*  These  permits  do  not  extend, 
as  a  rule,  so  far  as  to  enable  the  holders  of  them  to  sell  to 
others  to  be  used  in  compounding  medicines ;  "  nor  may  he 
compound  medicine  with  them  and  sell  them  except  as  he  may 
sell  liquors  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  statute.^** 

20  Mills  V.  Perkins,  120  Mass.  41.  «3  State     v.     Yager.     72     Iowa, 

30  State    V.    Elliott    (Kan.),    20  421 ;  34  N.  W.  188.      (In  this  case 
■pg^Q    55  to   make   a   kind   of   soda   water.) 

31  King  V.  State,  06  Miss.   502;  34  McGuire    v.    'State,    37    Miss. 
6    So.    188;     Snead    v.    State,    40  369. 

Tex.    Civ.    App.    202 ;     40    iS.    W.  35  State  v.  Brown,  60  N.  H.  205. 

597;    Bradley    v.    State,    121    Ga.  30  State   v.   Gray,   61    Conn.   39; 

201;    40   S.  E.   981.  22   Atl.   675. 

32  State  V.  Salts,  77  Iowa,   193;  But  the  contrary  of  this  propo- 

39   N.   W.    167;    State  v.   Cox,  23  sition  has  been  held  in  Kentucky, 

W.  Va.  797;   State  v.  Hamil,  127  Commonwealth  v.   Fowler,   98  Ky. 

Mo.    App.    661;    106    S.    W.    1103.  648;    34    S.    W.   21. 


§  507  TR.VFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS,  830 

A  statute  permitting  di'Uggists  to  "keep  spirituous  liquors 
for  compounding  their  medicines ' '  does  not  authorize  them  to 
sell  them  uncompounded.-'""  If  his  violation  of  the  liquor 
law  has  the  effect  to  revoke  or  cancel  his  certificate  or  per- 
mit to  sell,  he  may  then  be  indicted  for  unlawfully  keeping 
such  liquors;  and  it  is  no  defense  for  him  that  when  the  liquor 
was  seized  he  did  not  have  actual  possession  of  it.^^  An 
occasional  statute  requires  druggists  to  report  all  sales  made, 
but  his  failure  to  make  such  reports  does  not  render  the  sales 
illegal ;  it  is  his  failure  to  make  the  reports  that  is  the  offense 
and  not  the  sale.  -'^ 

Sec.  507.    Druggists'  sales  in  prohibition  States. 

"When  prohibition  was  first  agitated  in  several  States  the 
question  was  at  once  presented  whether  or  not  liquors  should 
not  be  sold  for  certain  specified  purposes,  as  for  medical,  sci- 
entific and  mechanical  purposes.  To  prevent  the  absolute  use 
of  alcohol  in  all  instances  would  be  so  disastrous  to  the  inhab- 
itants of  a  State  that  it  was  not  to  be  contemplated  for  an 
instant.  So  that,  in  all  .such  States,  whether  the  prohibition 
enactment  is  statutory  or  constitutional,  exceptions  are  made 
as  to  alcohol,  or  other  like  liquids  for  these  purposes  as  well 
as  wine  for  sacramental  use.  Invariably  sales  of  alcohol  and 
wine  for  these  purposes  are  regulated  by  statute,  and  drug- 
gists or  pharmacists  are  the  persons  designated  as  those  who 
may  sell  such  liquors,  and  heavy  penalties  are  provided  if  they 
violate  the  statutes  permitting  them  to  sell.  They  must,  in  all 
such  States,  have  a  "permit"  to  sell,^**  and  without  this  they 
cannot  sell  liquor  under  any  circumstances.^^   Whether  he  must 

STiState   V.   Shaw,   58   N.   H.   72.  so  state  v.  Von  Haltzschuber,  72 

Upon    a    charge    of    unlawfully  Iowa,   541;    34  N.   VV.   323. 

keeping  liquors  he  may  show  that  ^o  The   term   "license"   seems    to 

he    had    applied    for    a    druggists'  be    obnoxious    to    Legislatures    in 

license;  and  that  shortly  after  the  this   connection, 

time    laid    as    to    the    keeping   he  -ii  State     v.     Bissell,     67     Iowa, 

may    also   show    that    he    received  616;     25    X.    W.    831;     State    v. 

a    license    upon    such    application.  Courtney,  73  Iowa,  <)19;   35  X.  W. 

Commonwealtli  v.  Wellington,   140  6S5 ;    State  v.   Douglass,   73   Iowa, 

Mass.    5G0;    IG    X.    E.    446.  270:    34   X.    \V.    856. 

38  State  V.  \Vard,  75  Iowa,  637; 
36   X.   W.   7<35. 


831 


DRUGGISTS  AND   PHYSICIANS. 


§508 


give  a  bond  of  course  depends  upon  the  requirements  of  each 
particular  statute.*-  Of  course,  these  permits  do  not  author- 
ize a  pharmacist  to  sell  or  give  away  liquor  for  an  unlawful 
purpose."  The  amount  of  liquor  he  may  keep  on  hand  is 
usually  regulated  by  statute;"  but  if  not,  then  he  can  exer- 
cise his  own  desires  in  that  respect.  Usually  he  must  be  pun- 
ished under  the  pharmacist's  act,  but  it  may  be  so  drawn  as 
to  subject  him  to  a  penalty  not  only  inflicted  by  that  statute, 
but  also  under  one  inflicting  a  penalty  upon  any  one  making 
sales  of  liquor.     Such  a  statute  is  constitutional.'*^ 


Sec.  508.     Sales  by  druggists  upon  prescriptions. 

Sales  by  druggists  are  permitted  in  a  number  of  States  upon 
physicians'  prescriptions.  Not  infrequently  these  druggists 
must  have  a  permit  or  license  even  to  fill  such  prescrip- 
tions or  make  sales  thereon.^"    These  statutes  have  a  twofold 


42  state  V.  Courtney,  73  Iowa, 
619;    35   N.    W.   685. 

43  State  V.  Harris,  64  Iowa, 
287;    20  K  W.   439. 

44  State  V.  Shank,  79  Iowa,  47; 
44  N.  W.  241. 

45  State  V.  Duggan,  15  R.  I. 
403;  6  Atl.  787.  See  State  v. 
Hoagland,  77  Iowa,  135;  41  N. 
W.    595. 

If  a  druggist  may  sell  liquors, 
it  is  not  unlawful  for  him  to  keep 
them  for  sale.  Sal  ma  v.  Brewer 
(Col.  App.),  98  Pac.  61. 

Under  Kentucky  local  option 
law,  see  Board  v.  Forman,  102 
Ky.  496;  43  S.  W.  682;  19  Ky. 
L.  Rep.   1553. 

If  there  be  no  evidence  the  de- 
fendant was  a  registered  pharma- 
cist, he  cannot  escape  on  the  plea 
that  he  should  have  been  indicted 
as  a  pharmacist;  but  may  be  pun- 
ished under  the  general  statute 
for  illegal  sales.  State  v.  Paul. 
87  Mo.  App.  47.     See  also   State 


V.  Bock,  99  Mo.  App.  34;  72  S. 
W.  466. 

40  As  to  who  are  and  who  are 
not  druggists  under  these  acts  is 
a  matter  of  purely  local  import- 
ance. In  Massachusetts  a  mer- 
chant dealing  principally  in  alco- 
hol was  not  a  druggist,  or  did  not 
come  within  the  druggist  statute 
of  1869,  c.  415.  Mills  v.  Perkins, 
120  Mass.  41. 

The  Act  of  Missouri  of  May  19, 
1879,  was  repealed  by  the  Act  of 
March  26,  1881.  State  v.  Roller, 
77  Mo.  120;  State  v.  Johnson,  17 
Mo.  App.  156;  State  v.  Brown,  18 
Mo.  App.  620. 

As  to  what  statute  a  druggist 
making  an  illegal  sale  must  be 
prosecuted  under  in  Missouri,  see 
State  V.  Randall,  73  Mo.  App. 
463;  State  v.  Alexander,  73  Mo. 
App.  605;  State  v.  Witty,  74  Mo. 
App.  550;  State  v.  Davis,  76  Mo. 
App.  586;  State  v.  Steele,  84  Mo. 
App.  316;    State  v.  Goff,   66  Mo. 


§508 


TKAPFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


832 


object  in  view:  The  one  is  to  prevent  the  indiscriminate  sale 
of  intoxicating  li(iuors  by  druggists,  especially  for  improper 
purposes,  and  the  other  is  to  enable  honest  druggists  to 
I)rotect  themselves  from  prosecutions  where  they  have  made 
honest  sales.*'  As  these  statutes  are  for  the  protection  of  the 
druggist,  and  the  statute  specifically  declares  that  he  must 
have  a  prescription  in  order  to  make  the  sale,  a  sale  without 
it  cannot  be  in  any  way  justified  on  the  ground  of  necessity ;  *^ 
but  if  the  sale  is  made  upon  the  prescription  in  good  faith,  and 
not  as  a  subterfuge  to  enable  one  to  obtain  the  liquor  as  a  bev- 
erage,*" the  prescription  is  a  full  protection  to  him  and  a  com- 
plete justification  in  making  it/°  "There  is  a  reason,  and  a 
solid  one,  for  requiring  a  'written  prescription,'  for  it  is  evi- 


App.  491 ;  State  v.  Coday.  00  Mo. 
App.  70;  State  v.  Williams,  G!) 
Mo.  App.  284,  286;  State  v.  Mc- 
Anally,  66  Mo.  App.  329;  State 
V.  GolT,  70  Mo.  App.  295.  These 
Missouri  cases  hold  that  a  li- 
censed druggist  cannot  be  prose- 
cuted under  the  dramshop  act. 
Knox  City  v.  Whiteaker,  87  Mo. 
App.  468. 

As  to  prosecutions  in  ^Michigan, 
see  Anderson  v.  Van  Buren  Cir- 
cuit Judge,  130  Mich.  695;  90  N. 
W.    692;    9    Detroit   Leg.    N.    222. 

Only  druggists  are  protected 
by  these  prescriptions.  State  v. 
Shanks,  98  Mo.  App.  138;  71  S. 
W.    1065. 

4T  Kyle  V.  State,  18  Ind.  App. 
136;   47  N.  E.  647. 

48  Barton  v.  State,  99  Ind.  89; 
State  V.  Searcy,  4-6  Mo.  421; 
State  V.  Hendrix,  98  Mo.  374;  11 
S.  W.  728;  Tilford  v.  State,  109 
Ind.  359;  10  N.  E.  107;  Snead  v. 
State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  262;  49 
S.  W.  597;  Powell  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  66  S.  W.  818:  23 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  2167;   State  v.  Hens- 


ley,  94  Mo.  App.  151;  67  S.  W. 
■964 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Pierce, 
147  Mass.  161;  16  X.  E.  705; 
State  V.  Wright,  20  Mo.  App. 
412;  Nichols  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  80;  40  S.  W.  268;  Williams 
V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  156; 
109  S.  W.  189;  Watson  v.  State, 
42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  13;  57  S.  W. 
101. 

4'->  Commonwealth  v.  Joslin,  158 
Mass.  482;  33  X.  E.  653;  21  L. 
R.  A.  449;  Commonwealth  v. 
Reynolds,  89  Ky.  147;  12  S.  W. 
132;  20  S.  W.  167;  Common- 
wealth V.  Gould,  158  Mass.  499; 
33  X.  E.  656;  Snead  v.  State.  40 
Tex.  'Cr.  App.  262;  49  S.  W.  595; 
State  V.  Terry,  72  X.  J.  L.  375; 
61  Atl.  148;  State  v.  May,  33  S. 
C.  39;  11  S.  E.  440  (one  .sale  and 
three  deliveries  i . 

50  De  Tarr  v.  State.  37  Ind. 
App.  323;  76  X.  E.  897;  Kyle  v. 
State,  18  Ind.  App.  136;  47  X. 
E.  647;  Snead  v.  State,  40  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  262 ;  49  S.  W.  595 ;  State 
V.  Gregory,  110  Iowa,  624;  82  X. 
W.  335. 


833  DRUGGISTS   AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  508 

denee  of  a  tangible  and  lasting  form,  and  it  puts  a  profes- 
sional man  upon  record  as  having  deliberately  advised  a 
patient  to  buy  and  a  druggist  to  sell  liquor  on  Sunday.^^ 
It  is  an  effective  means  of  preventing  abuse,  and  is  quite  as 
important  in  a  case  where  the  druggist  is  himself  a  physician 
as  any  other.  But  we  need  not  pursue  the  discussion  further, 
for  the  statute  says  there  must  be  a  '  written  prescription, '  and 
it  is  the  duly  of  everybody,  physicians  as  well  as  any  one  else, 
to  obey  the  law.'"'-  It  was  therefore  held  that  a  physician 
cannot  sell  without  a  prescription,  although  he  was  a  drug- 
gist."^'  In  other  States  it  is  held  that  a  physician  cannot  give  a 
prescription  for  the  sale  of  his  own  liquors ;  ^*  while  in  others  it 
is  held  that  he  may.^'"'  But  a  prescription  is  not  required  for 
the  sale  of  medicine  containing  whisky,  or  a  compound  consist- 
ing of  whisky  and  herbs  so  that  it  cannot  be  consumed  as  a 
beverage,  and  which  the  purchaser  intends  to  use  as  a  medicine, 
as  the  druggist  is  informed  or  knows.^'*'  The  statute  some- 
times designates  what  physicians  may  give  the  prescription. 
Where  it  is  said  that  it  should  be  given  by  "a  reputable  prac- 
ticing physician,"  the  court  refused  to  say  that  a  physician 

51  The  statute  under  review  for-  418;  38  S.  W.  641;  State  v.  Pol- 
bade  sales  on  Sunday  without  a  lard,  72  Mo.  App.  230;  State  v. 
physician's    prescription.  Manning,    107    Mo.    App.    51;    81 

52  "It  is  possible  that  there  iS.  W.  223;  State  v.  Furney,  178 
may  be  cases  of  urgent  necessity  Mo.  385;  77  S.  W.  992;  see  State 
demanding  immediate  action  where  v.   Bailey,   73  Mo.  App.  576. 

a  druggist  would  be  held  excused  5g  Parker  v.  State,  31  Ind.  App. 

from    selling    without    a    'written  650;   68  N.  E.  912;  Good  v.  State, 

prescription,'"    says    the    court.  '87  Miss.  495;  40  So.  12;  De  Tarr 

53Tilford     V.     State,     109     Ind.  v.  State,  37  Ind.  App.  323;    76  N. 

359;    10  N.  E.   107.  E.    897;    State    v.    Williams,    (S. 

54  State  V.  'Carnahan,  63  Mo.  D.),  104  N.  W.  546;  State  v. 
App.  244;  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  766;  Costa,  78  Vt.  198;  62  Atl.  38; 
State  V.  Anderson,  81  Mo.  78;  Queen  v.  Armstrong,  13  Junta, 
Holt  V.  State,  62  Neb.  134;  86  408;  Pearce  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
N.  W.  1073;  Commonwealth  v.  App.  352;  88  S.  W.  234;  State 
Matthews,  3  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (ab-  v.  Roller,  77  Mo.  120;  Common- 
stract)  473;  McCroy  v.  Common-  wealth  v.  Fowler,  98  Ky.  648;  34 
wealth,  8  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  S.  W.  21.  A  dentist  is  not  a 
437_  physician.      State  v.   McNinn,   118 

55  Boone  v.   State,   10  Tex.  App.  X.  C.  1259 ;  24  iS.  E.  523. 


§508 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


834 


without  a  license  to  practice  could  give  one.^'  But  where  the 
statute  required  the  prescription  to  be  given  by  a  "regularly 
registered  and  practicing  physician,"  to  be  admitted  in  evi- 
dence, it  was  held  that  it  must  be  sho^vn  that  the  physician 
was  such  a  physician  as  the  statute  required  should  give  a 
prescription.^^  In  Missouri  druggists  residing  in  local  option 
counties  may  make  sales  upon  a  physician 's  prescription ;  ^^ 
and  so  they  may  in  a  local  option  county  in  Texas  ^'^ 
and  in  Kentucky.*^  The  prescription  must  be  issued  at  the 
request  of  the  purchaser  of  the  liquor  or  some  one  acting  for 
him ;  and  a  prescription  issued'for  a  person  not  the  purchaser 
is  no  defense  for  the  druggist.*'-  So  the  prescription  must  be 
in  actual  existence  when  the  sale  is  made ;  and  it  cannot  be 
issued  thereafter  so  as  to  protect  the  seller.''^  Only  such  drug- 
gists can  sell  under  a  prescription  as  the  statute  specifies.  If  it 
specifies  "registered  pharmacist,"  then  only  a  registered  phar- 
macist can  sell  under  it.®*    But  where  a  statute  prohibited  any 


57  DeTarr  v.  State,  37  Ind.  App. 
323;    78  N.   E.   &97. 

58  State  V.  Millikan,  24  Mo. 
App.   462. 

A  statute  requiring  the  pre- 
scription to  be  given  by  a  licensed 
physician  "or  other  person"  pre- 
vents an  unlicensed  person  prac- 
ticing medicine  to  give  it.  Mc- 
Allister V.  State  (Ala.),  47  So. 
161. 

The  fact  that  the  applicant  ob- 
tained the  prescription  by  an  im- 
position upon  the  physician  will 
not  make  the  pharmacist  liable  to 
the  penalty  of  the  statute.  Walk- 
er V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  64  S. 
W.   1052. 

59  state  V.  Eussell,  99  Mo.  App. 
373;    73   S.   W.   297. 

80  Gordon  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  73  S.  W.  398;  Greiner- 
Kelley  Drug  Co.  v.  Truett  (Tex 
Civ.  App.),  75  S.  W.  536. 


ci  Powell  V.  'Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  66  S.  W.  818;  23  Ky.  L. 
Rep.   2167. 

62  State  V.  Hensley,  94  Mo.  App. 
151;  67  S.  W.  964;  State  v.  Bail- 
ey, 73  Mo.  App.  576;  Miller  v. 
State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  35;  38 
S.  W.  772. 

But  this  rule  does  not  apply 
where  the  sale  is  to  a  husband 
for  his  wife  (and  perhaps  for  his 
child).  Commonwealth  v.  Byers 
(Ky.),  109  S.  W.  895;  33  Ky.  L. 
Eep.  252. 

63  State  V.  Hensley,  94  Mo.  App. 
151;  67  S.  W.  9'64;  State  v.  Hale, 
72  Mo.  App.   78. 

64  State  V.  Kampman,  81  Mo. 
App.  205;  State  v.  Feagan,  70 
Mo.  App.  406;  State  v.  Dunning, 
14  6.  D.  316;  85  N.  W.  589; 
Woods  V.  State,  36  Ark.  36;  38 
Am.  Rep.  22;  Chew  v.  State,  43 
Ark.  361;  State  v.  Gray,  61  Conn. 
39;   22  Atl.   675;    Gault  v.   State, 


835 


DRUGGISTS   AND   PHYSICIANS. 


§508 


person  selling  liquor  in  any  quantity,  except  upon  a  physician 
prescribing  it  in  good  faith  for  his  patients,  it  was  held  lawful 
for  any  druggist  to  fill  the  prescription  and  sell  the  liquor 
therein  called  for/'^  The  fact  that  the  statute  requires  the 
prescription  to  be  cancelled,  and  provides  a  penalty  for  the 
druggist  if  he  do  not  do  so,  does  not  render  the  sale  invalid 
or  an  offense.^®  Where  a  druggist  can  sell  liquors  to  an 
applicant  upon  his  written  request,  which  must  contain  cer- 
tain statements,  a  sale  upon  an  application  not  having  such 
statements  is  illegal.''^  If  the  statute  requires  the  purchaser 
to  make  an  affidavit  concerning  the  object  of  the  purchase,  a 
sale  without  the  affidavit  is  illegal.*'^  A  statute  prohibitng 
a  druggist  from  allowing  the  liquor  he  sells  to  be  consumed 
on  his  premises  is  valid,  even  as  to  a  physician  also  running 
the  drug  store  and  prescribing  for  his  own  patients.*^ 


34  Ga.  533;  State  v.  Bissell,  67 
Iowa,  616;  25  N.  W.  831;  Salina 
V.   Seitz,   IG  Kan.   163. 

An  ordinance  requiring  a  li- 
cense but  providing  that  it  shall 
not  apply  to  sales  by  druggists 
"upon  the  prescription  of  a  re- 
putable physician  and  for  medi- 
cal purposes,"  does  not  require 
the  druggist  to  have  a  prescrip- 
tion in  order  to  sell  liquor. 
Prowitt  V.  Denver  (Colo.  App.), 
52  Pac.  286. 

65  Parker  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  12  S.  W.  276;  Common- 
wealth v.  Reynolds,  89  Ky.  147; 
12  S.  W.  132;  20  S.  W.  167. 
Contra,  Bottle  v.  State,  51  Ark. 
07;    10   S.   VV.   12. 

6«Snead  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  262;   49  S.   W.  595. 

In  New  York  it  has  been  held 
that  it  must  be  shown  that  the 
sale  was  for  medical  purposes, 
even  when  made  upon  a  prescrip- 
tion; but  that  was  when  no  stat- 
ute   had   been   enacted   concerning 


prescriptions.      People   v.   SaflFord, 
5  Denio,  112. 

67  Long  V.  Joder,  139  Iowa, 
471;  116  N.  VV.  1063;  State  v. 
Gregory,  110  Iowa,  624;  82  N, 
W.  335.  See  State  v.  Huff,  76 
Iowa,  200;    46  N.  W.  720. 

68  State  V.  Gregory,  74  Kan. 
467;    87   Pac.   370. 

sa  State  v.  Finney,  178  Mo. 
385;    77   S.    W.   992. 

Where  a  druggist  sought  to  re- 
strain the  collection  of  a  liquor 
tax,  claiming  that  all  sales  of 
liquors  he  had  made  were  on  pre- 
scriptions issued  by  reputable 
physicians,  such  as  the  statute  re- 
quired, it  was  lield  that  he  had 
the  burden  to  show  that  fact. 
Hubbell  v.  Ebrit,  8  Ohio  Com.  PL 
116. 

A  compound  in  half-pint  bottle 
of  rock  candy,  ginger,  glycerine, 
and  whisky  in  equal  parts  with- 
out a  prescription  is  an  offense 
under  a  statute  requiring  a  pre- 
scription for  a   sale  of  intoxicat- 


§  509  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  836 

Sec.  509.    Prescription  for  Sunday  and  holiday  sales. 

In  Indiana  a  statute  requires  a  prescription  from  a  reputable 
practicing  jjliysician  to  protect  the  seller  selling  on  Sundays 
and  holidays.  The  purpose  of  this  statute  "is  to  protect  the 
Sabbath,  and  the  other  days  therein  named,  from  the  evils 
that  might  result  from  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors. 
The  section  is  an  absolute  inhibition  upon  the  sale  of  such 
liquors  on  the  days  named,  to  he  drunk  as  a  beverage.  It 
seems  to  recognize  the  right  of  druggists  to  sell  such  liquors 
for  medicinal  purposes,  but  imposes  a  condition  on  such  sales 
on  Sunday  *  *  *  that  is,  that  the  sale  shall  be  made 
only  to  those  who  have  procured  a  written  prescription  there- 
for. The  intention  is  to  prohibit  the  sale  on  those  days  except 
in  case  of  sickness.  And  in  order  that  this  intention  may 
not  be  thwarted  by  feigned  sickness  the  prescription  is  re- 
quired." '^  "There  is  a  reason,  and  a  solid  one,  for  requiring 
a  'written  prescription,'  for  it  is  evidence  of  a  tangible  and 
lasting  form,  and  it  puts  a  professional  man  upon  record  as 
having  deliberately  advised  a  patient  to  buy,  and  a  druggist 
to  sell,  liquor  on  Sunday.  It  is  an  effective  means  of  pre- 
venting abuses  and  is  quite  as  important  in  a  case  where  the 


ing  liquors.     State  v.  Sharpe,   119  without    one.      State    v.    Hendrix, 

Mo.    App.    386;    95    S.    W.    298.  98  Mo.  374;    11   S.  W.   728;   Mays 

A    statute    autliorizing   a    drug-  v.   Commonwealth,   3   Ky.  L.   Kep. 

gist    to    sell    upon    a    physician's  (abstract)     250;    State   v.    Moore, 

prescription   does   not  authorize  a  107  Mo.  78;    16  S.  W.  937;   Mau- 

distiller  or  grocer  to  sell  upon  it.  pin    v.    Commonwealth,    1    Ky.    L. 

•Commonwealth    v.    Day,    95     Ky.  Rep.    (abstract)    281. 
120;    23    S.    W.    952;    15    Ky.    L.  Where    a    person    secured    of    a 

Rep.  466.  doctor   a   prescription   for   whisky 

Unless    the   statute    requires    it,  for  his  own  use,  but  procured  the 

the  druggist  need   not   have   a   li-  whisky  thereon  for  another,  with 

cense.        Commonwealth      v.      Mc-  such   other's    money,    it   was    held 

Grorty,  5  Ky.  L.  Rep.  674;   Com-  that   he   sold    the    liquor    to    such 

monwealth  v.   Reynolds,   6   Ky.   L.  other,    and    had    made    an    illegal 

Rep.    (abstract)    520.  sale.     Hawkins  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr. 

Where  a  statute ' requires  a  pre-  App.),  114   S.  W.   813. 
scription  to  sell   liquors,   it  is   an  7o  Benton   v.    State,   99  Ind.    89. 

offense    to    sell    it    as    a   medicine 


837  DRUGGISTS   AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  510 

druggist  is  himself  a  physician  as  in  any  other. "  "  ' '  It  may 
be  remarked,  prima  facie,  every  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor  on 
Sunday,  and  the  other  days  named  in  the  statute,  is  unlawful. 
The  burden  of  showing  such  sale  to  be  lawful  rests  upon  the 
person  making  the  sale,  and  the  statute  contemplates  that 
such  proof  shall  be  in  writing.  To  permit  it  to  be  made  in 
any  other  way  would  throw  open  the  door  to  evasions  of  the 
plain  provisions  of  the  statute.  It  will  be  observed  that  the 
prescription  offered  in  evidence  was  given  six  days  before  the 
sale  for  which  appellant  was  prosecuted.  If  this  were  a 
prosecution  for  selling  without  a  license,  on  a  week  day,  and 
the  question  involved  was  one  of  a  sale  in  good  faith  for 
medicinal  purposes,  this  prescription  would,  perhaps,  be  strong 
evidence  in  the  appellant's  favor;  but,  in  our  opinion,  it  was 
no  justification  of  a  sale  made  on  Sunday,  six  days  after 
its  date."  ^- 

Sec.  510.    Kind  of  prescriptions. 

Unless  a  statute  requires  it  the  prescription  need  not  be 
a  written  one,  at  least  where  the  words  "requisition  of  a 
physician  for  medical  purposes"  are  used  in  the  statute.'^'' 
But  where  the  statutes  used  the  words  "written  prescription" 
nothing  else  will  do.  The^-e  must  be  a  separate  prescription 
for  each  sale,  and  there  cannot  be  a  general  or  "continuing" 
prescription.^*  Thus,  where  a  prescription  was  as  follows, 
"John  W.  Edwards:  Let  Benj.  Howard  have  one-half  pint 
of  whisky  and  glycerine  for  medicinal  purposes.     Repeat  as 

71  Tilford  V.  State,  109  Ind.  written  instrument.  Caldwell  v. 
759;  10  N.  E.  107;  Edwards  v.  State,  18  Ind.  App.  48;  46  N.  E. 
State,    121    Ind.    450;     23    N.    E.       697. 

277.  74  Carrington  v.  Commonwealth, 

72  The  prescription  was  itseli  78  Ky.  83;  Kyle  v.  State,  18  Ind. 
Tery  defective  in  form.  Edwards  App.  136;  47  N.  E.  647;  Common- 
V.  State,  121  Ind.  450;  23  N.  E.  wealth  v.  Day,  95  Ky.  120;  23  S. 
277;  Caldwell  v.  State,  18  Ind.  W.  952;  15  Ky.  L.  Pvep.  466;  State 
App.  48;  46  N.  E.  697;  Walker  v.  Cox,  23  W.  Va.  797.  See  also 
V,  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App),  64  S.  Edwards  v.  State,  121  Ind.  450; 
W.    1052.  23  N.  E.  277;  Irish  v.  State   (Tex. 

73  Bain    v.    State.    61    Ala.    75.  Cr.  App.),  25  S.  W.   634, 
The    word    prescription    means    a 


§  510  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  838 

needed,"  and  duly  signed  by  a  physician,  it  was  held  that  it 
was  not  sufficient  in  form.  "The  prescription  offered  in  evi- 
dence is  somewhat  vague  and  uncertain  in  its  terms,"  said 
the  court.  "It  prescribes  whisky  and  glycerine,  but  gives  no 
directions  as  to  the  proportions  in  which  they  are  to  be  mixed. 
*  *  *  There  is  no  direction  as  to  how  frequently  or  in 
what  quantities  it  shall  be  taken,  but  all  is  left  to  the  judg-ment 
of  the  patient.  But  whatever  else  may  be  said  of  this  pre- 
scription, it  cannot  be  said  that  it  advises  the  patient  to  buy, 
or  the  druggist  to  sell,  on  Sunday. "  "^  So  a  writing  purport- 
ing to  be  signed  by  a  physician,  which  read,  "R,  whisky,  one 
quart,  for  medical  use,"  not  addressed  to  anyone,  and 
not  containing  the  name  of  the  patient  to  whom  the  liquor  was 
to  be  sold,  nor  the  manner  of  its  use,  nor  a  request  that  the 
sale  be  made  on  Sundaj^^"  was  held  not  to  be  such  a  pre- 
scription as  a  statute  which  required  one  from  a  regularly 
practicing  physician  to  render  the  sale  a  legal  transaction." 
So  a  prescription  addressed  to  no  one,  and  made  for  a 
"sufficient  quantity"  is  not  a  compliance  with  the  statute.'^* 
Where  a  statute  re(piired  that  the  prescription  should  contain 
a  statement  that  the  liquor  was  "absolutely"  necessary  as  a 
medicine,  the  omission  of  the  word  "absolutely"  was  held  to 
render  the  prescription  insufficient."^  Where  a  statute  requires 
the  prescription  to  be  dated,  a  dating  with  numerals  only  is 
sufficient.*"  A  signing  with  the  initials  alone  is  a  sufficient 
signature.*'     Where  a  statute  requires  the  physician  to  certify 

75  Edwards    v.    State,    121    lud.  7S  Kyle   v.    State,    18    Ind.    App. 
450;  23  N.  E.  277;   Kyle  v.  State,       136;   47   N.   E.   647. 

1«  Ind.  App.   136;    47   N.   E.  -647.  79  State   v.    Titrieh,    34    W.    Va. 

76  The  sale  was  made  on  Sun-  137;  11  S.  E.  1002;  State  v.  Nix- 
day  in  both  of  the  last  two  cases  ford,  46  Mo.  App.  494;  State  v. 
above,  but  the  statute  requiring  a  Davis,  76  Mo.  App.  586;  Prowitt 
prescription  tor  sales  on  Sunday  v.  Denver,  11  Colo.  App.  70;  52 
had  no  provision  in  it  that  the  Pac.  286;  State  v.  Manning,  107 
prescription  should  contain  a  re-  Mo.  App.  51;  81  S.  W.  223. 
quest  for  sales  on  that  day.  so  In  this  case  as  follows:    "12, 

77  Caldwell     v.     State,     18     Ind.  16,    84."      State   v.    Clevenger,    25 
App.     48;     46    N.    E.     697.       See  Mo.  App.  653. 

State    V.    Anthony.    52    ]\Io.    App.  si  state    v.    Clevenger,    25    Mo. 

■507;  State  v.  Davis.  129  Mo.  App.       App.  653. 
129;  108  S.  W.  127. 


839 


DRUGGISTS    AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  510 


upon  the  honor  of  a  physician  that  he  has  personally  examined 
the  person  to  whom  the  prescription  is  given,  an  omission  of 
that  statement  avoids  the  prescription  so  far  as  it  is  a  de- 
fense.^'   Where  a  statute  required  a  prescription  to  name  the 
person  for  whom  it  was  issued  and  that  the  liquor  prescribed 
is  a  necessary  remedy,  a  prescription  is  a  sufficient  compliance 
with  its  provisions  which  states  that  it  is  prepared  for  a  cer- 
tain person,  is  a  necessary  remedy,  and  is  for  medical  pur- 
poses.^^     But  where  a  statute  required  the  prescription  to  be 
dated,  state  the  quantity  of  liquor  to  be  sold,  as  well  as  the 
quantity  prescribed,  and  the  name  of  the  person  to  whom  it  is 
prescribed,  a  prescription  is  not  sufficient  and  is  no  protection 
to  the  druggist  that  has  no  date,  nor  the  name  of  the  person 
to  whom  it  is  prescribed,  and  on  which  eight  ounces  of  whisky 
is  sold  instead  of  two,  as  prescribed,  although  otherwise  suffi- 
cient.^*    The  eases  cited  in  this  section  show  that  unless  the 
prescription  is  such  as  the  statute  requires,  it  is  no  protection 
to  the  druggist  filling  it.-'"      "S\Tiere  the  statute  required  the  pre- 
scription to  be  a  "written"  one,  it  was  held  that  it  need  not 
be  in  the  form  of  an  order  on  the  druggist  requesting  him  to 
furnish  the  liquor,   but   it  was  sufficient   if  the  liquor  was 
prescribed  for  the  patient.^"    If  the  statute  requires  that  the 
name  of  the  person  to  whom  the  prescription  is  given  be  speci- 
fied, a  designation  as  "Mr.  Gibson"  is  sufficient  if  the  Gibson 
referred  to  obtained  the  liquor."     Designating  the  liquor  to 
be  sold  by  Latin  abbreviations,  as  "  E.  Spts.  Frumenti  ojj.," 
which  means  two  pints  of  spirits  frumenti,  is  a  compliance 
with  a  statute  requiring  "the  kind  and  quantity  of  liquor" 
to  be  furnished.'^    It  is  a  question  for  the  court  to  determine 
whether  the  paper  in  evidence  is  a  prescription  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute.^^     In  Iowa,  if  the  applicant  for  the 

S2  McLean  v.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr.  se  state    v.    Blufield    Drug    Co., 

App.  213;   64  S.  W.  S6o.  43  W.  Va.   144;   27   S.  E.  350. 

83  State    V.    Hammack,    93    Mo.  87  State    v.    Blufield    Drug    Co., 

App.  521.  43  W.  Va.  144;  27  S.  E.  350. 

s4Hutson       V.       Commonwealth  88  state    v.    Blufield    Drug    Co., 

(Ky.).   105  S.  W.  055;   32  Ky.  L.  43  \V.  Va.  144;   27  S.  E.  350. 

Rep.   392.  soHubbell     v.     Ebrite,     8     Ohio 

85  State  V.  Bowers,  65  Mo.  App.  Com.   PI.   116. 
G39;    2  Mo.   App.   Rep.   1181. 


§  511  trjvpfic  in  intoxicating  liquors.  840 

liquor  lives  in  a  city  or  town  where  the  streets  are  named  and 
the  residences  numbered,  the  prescription  must  contain  the 
residence  number  of  the  person  for  whom  the  prescription  was 
prepared,  and  if  not  for  a  person  residing  in  such  a  city  or 
town,  then  it  must  contain  his  address;  and  a  prescription 
short  of  this  is  no  protection  to  the  druggist  filling  it.''"  Where 
the  prescription  was  one-half  pint  of  whisky  with  a  little 
"gadine"  cordial  and  about  ten  drops  of  creosote  in  it,  given 
to  an  applicant  who  said  he  had  a  deep  cold  and  wanted 
"some  whisky  or  something  for  it,"  it  was  held  to  be  a  ques- 
tion for  the  jury  whether  the  sale  upon  such  a  prescription 
(the  druggist  himself  having  written  it)  was  made  in  good 
faith."^ 


Sec.  511.    Registration  and  reports  of  sales. 

In  Illinois,  an  ordinance  requiring  druggists  to  keep  a 
registry  of  sales  made,  showing  when  and  to  whom  made,  and 
the  amount  sold,  and  also  requiring  a  report  of  them  to  the 
clerk  of  the  city,  was  held  void  as  being  unduly  oppressive.^- 
But  statutes  of  a  like  import  have  not  met  such  a  fate.  A  stat- 
ute requiring  reports  of  all  sales  made  covers  a  sale  by  pre- 
scription.''^ The  reports  are  public  records  when  made  and 
filed  with  the  proper  official  and  may  be  used  in  a  prosecution 
against  the  person  making  them,  and  the  statute  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional on  the  ground  that  the  accused  is  thereby  made  to 
incriminate  himself.''*  A  statute  requiring  the  reports  to  be 
made  on  a  particular  day  of  each  month  is  satisfied  if  made 

90  State  V.  Harris,  122  Iowa,  borne,  19  Ont.  App.  439;  revers- 
78;   97  N.  W.  1093.  ing     21      Ont.     504;      Regina     v 

91  Rowe        V.        Commonwealth       Denham,   35    Up.    Can.    Rep.    503 
(Ky.),  70  S.   W.   407;   24  Ky.  L.       Regina    v.    McCoy,    23    Ont.    Rep 

Rep.  974.  442. 

92  Clinton    v.    Phillips,    58    111.  94  state  v.  Smith,  74  Iowa,  580 
102.  38    N.    W.    492;     State    v.    Cum 

93  State  V.  Chamberlin,  74  mins,  76  Iowa,  133;  40  N.  W 
Iowa,  266;  37  N.  W.  326;  Chase  124;  People  v.  Shuler,  136  Mich 
V.  Van  Buren  Circuit  Judge,  148  161;  98  N.  W.  986;  10  Detroit 
Mich.    149;     111    N.    W.    750;    14  L.  N.   1004. 

Detroit  L.   N.   73;   Regina  v.   El- 


841  DRUGGISTS   AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  511 

on  any  day  of  that  month,  the  statute  not  being  mandatory ;  ®' 
but  one  requiring  the  report  to  be  made  on  a  certain  day  of 
each  month,  "or  within  five  days  thereafter,"  requires  the 
report  to  be  made  within  that  time,  and  if  not  so  made  sub- 
jects the  druggist  to  the  penalty  of  the  statute  for  not  having 
complied  with  its  terms.^^  As  these  reports  are  official  docu- 
ments their  execution  need  not  be  proven  before  admitting 
them  in  evidence,  the  question  of  identification  being  all  that 
is  necessary.^^  Statutes  inflicting  penalties  for  false  reports 
cover  false  reports  made  through  mistakes  or  inadvertence.®^ 
Of  course,  these  statutes  have  no  retrospective  effect.'^®  Where 
a  statute  requires  the  purchaser  to  sign  a  registry  of  the  sale, 
if  there  be  a  conflJct  whether  the  sale  was  actually  made,  the 
registry  may  be  put  in  evidence.^  An  indictment  which 
charges  that  the  defendant  neither  made  a  record  of  his  sales 
nor  a  report  to  the  proper  authority,  charges  two  separate 
offenses,  and  is  bad  for  duplicity.-  Statutes  requiring  regis- 
tration and  weekly  reports  of  sales  are  constitutional.^  A 
failure  to  report  a  sale  does  not  make  the  sale  illegal,  but 
simply  lays  the  delinquent  liable  for  a  failure  to  report.*  The 
use  of  ditto  marks  indicating  dates  of  sales  and  residences  of 
purchasers  does  not  render  the  reports  an  insufficient  com- 
pliance with  a  statute  requiring  the  dates  of  sales  and  resi- 
st Abbott  V.  Sartori,  57  Iowa,  quired  by  statute  incurs  a  liabil- 
656;    11   N.  W.   626.  ity  to  a  penalty  even  though  the 

96  State    V.    McEntee,    6S    Iowa,       prescriptions   were    properly    filed. 
381;   27   N.   W.   265.  Holland  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

97  State  V.  Thompson,   74   Iowa,        103  S.  W.  631. 

119;    37   N.   W.   104.  1  State    v.    Shelton,     16    Wash. 

98  .State      V.      Chamberlin,       74       590;  48  Pac.  258. 

Iowa,   266;    37   N.   W.   320.      This  2  Chase    v.    Van    Buren    Circuit 

seems    to    be    a    very    harsh    rule.  Judge,   148  Mich.   149;    111  N.  W. 

and    probably    owes    its    origin    to  750;    14  Detroit  Leg.  IST.  73. 

the  fact  of  actual  necessity  in  or-  ■"  People    v.    Shuler,    136    Mich, 

der  to  prevent  evasion  of  the  pen-  101;    98    N.    W.    986;    10    Detroit 

alty   of  the   statute.  Leg.  X.   1004. 

99  State    V.     Haltzschullerr,     72  4  People      v.      Thompson,       147 
Iowa,  541;    34  N.  W.  323.  Mich.  444;   111  N.  W.  »6;    13  De- 

In   Texas   a   druggist   not   mak-       troit  Leg.  N.    1122. 
ing    report    within    tlie    time    re- 


§  512  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  842 

dences  of  purchasers  to  be  given. ^  In  stating  the  object  of 
the  purchaser  it  is  sufficient  to  use  the  word  ' '  medical. ' '  ^ 
But  an  affidavit  containing  nothing  but  the  signature  of  the 
officer  is  not  a  compliance  with  a  statute  requiring  the  drug- 
gist making  the  sales  to  "make  and  swear  to"  his  report  of 
liquor  sold.^ 

Sec.  512.     Sales  by  physicians. 

The  law  permits  a  physician  to  administer  intoxicating 
liquors  to  his  patients,,  and  the  numerous  statutes  on  the 
subject  of  intoxicating  liquors  have  seldom  attempted  to  pre- 
vent him  from  doing  so,  even  in  prohibition  States.^  If  the 
physician  buys  the  liquor  for  his  patient  and  turns  it  over  to 
him,  in  pursuance  of  a  prescription  he  has  given  him,  he 
commits  no  offense.^  Yet  in  Kansas  and  Iowa  it  has  been  held 
that  he  cannot  sell  liquor  to  his  patient  nor  put  it  up  in  pre- 
scriptions unless  he  has  a  permit  to  sell  liquor,  such  as  is 
required  of  druggists,  the  statute  forbidding  druggists  and 
all  other  persons  to  sell  liquor  without  a  permit.^"  And  in 
Alabama,  where  the  statute  made  no  exception  as  to  physicians, 
it  was  held  that  a  physician  could  not  furnish  liquor  to  his 
patient  as  a  medicine,  though  he  acted  in  the  utmost  good 
faith."  Where  a  physician  may  administer  liquor  to  a  patient 

5  People  V.  Henner,  135  Mich.  »  Key  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
629;  9S  N.  W.  397;  101  X.  W.  77;  38  S.  W.  773.  For  cases 
403;    10  Det.  L.  N.  907.                          where  the  seller  is  both  physician 

6  People  V.  Renner,  supra.  and  druggist,  see  previous  section. 
"  People  V.  Renner,  supra.  lo  State  v.  I*reming,  32  Kan. 
Where  the   purpose  of  the   sale       588;    5    Pac.    19;    State   v.    Bena- 

must  be  given,  a  failure  to  do  so  done,  79  Iowa,  90;   44  N.  W.  218. 

is  an  offense.     Barver  v.   Brenner  So  in  Colorado.     Braisted  v.  Peo- 

(lowa),   119  N.   W.    142.  pie,    3S    Colo.    49;     88    Pac.    150, 

8  State  v.  Wilson,  71  Kan.  263;  151;    and    in    Nebraska,    Holt    v. 

80    Pac.     565;     Walker    v.    State  State,    62    Neb.     134;    «6    N.    W. 

(Tex.  Cr.   App.),   64   S.   W.    1052;  1073. 

McCrory  v.  Commonwealth,  8  Ky.  n  Carson  v.  State,  69  Ala.  235; 

L.  Rep.    (abstract)    437;   Sarris  v.  Thomason   v.    State,    70    Ala.    20; 

Commonwealth,      83       Ky.      3'27 ;  tState   v.    Benadom,    79    Iowa,    90; 

State   V.    Larimore,    19    Mo.    391;  44  N.  W.  218. 
King  V.  Chicoyne,  8  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 
507. 


843  DRUGGISTS    AND   PHYSICIANS.  §  512 

lie  must  act  in  the  utmost  good  faith.  He  cannot  use  his 
professional  power  as  a  means  of  furnishing  liquors  as  a 
beverage,  or  to  one  who  does  not  need  it.  In  one  case  where  a 
physician  gave  a  prescription  for  a  quart  of  whisky,  which  was 
filled  at  a  drug  store  owned  by  a  partnership  of  which  he 
w^as  a  member,  the  sale  was  held  illegal.  "The  statute  con- 
templates," said  the  court,  "the  bona  fide  administering  of 
such  liquors  as  a  medicine  in  cases  of  necessity,  not  otherwise. 
We  are  all  of  opinion  that  the  giving  by  a  physician  of  an 
order  for  a  quart  of  whisky,  on  a  drug  store  in  which  he 
himself  was  a  partner,  without  more,  is  not  the  administering 
of  medicine  within  the  meaning  of  the  law,  but  an 
illegal  sale  of  spirituous  liquors,  contrary  to  the  terms 
of  the  statute."^-  A  statute  is  valid  that  casts  upon 
the  physician  the  burden  to  show  that  the  condition  of  the 
patient  reasonably  demanded  the  use  of  intoxicating  liquors.^^ 
He  must  make  the  sale  as  a  physician,  and  reasonably  believe 
that  the  patient  needs  it,  and  not  upon  the  suggestion  of  the 
patient  that  he  needs  it,^*  or  that  his  wife  or  a  member  of  his 
family  needs  it.^^  But  where  a  statute  permitted  a  druggist 
to  sell  liquor  for  sacramental,  medicinal  and  mechanical  pur- 
poses, and  required  him  to  keep  a  registry  of  the  sale,  stating 
the  time  it  was  made,  the  amount  and  kind  of  liquor  sold, 
and  the  name  of  the  purchaser,  it  was  held  that  if  the  pur- 
chaser stated  to  him  that  the  liquor  was  for  one  of  the  three 
objects  named,  and  he  believed  him  and  acted  in  good  faith 
in  making  the  sale,  he  was  not  required  to  investigate  the 
truthfulness  of  the  purchaser's  statement;  but  if  that  state- 
ment was  a  mere  pretense  and  the  druggist  knew  it,  or  did 
not  act  in  good  faith  in  making  the  sale,  he  violated  the 
statute.^*^ 

12  Brinson     v.     State,     89     Ala  ^^  People      v.      Hinchman,       75 
105;   8  So.  527.                                         Mich.   587;   42  N.   W.   1006;   4  L. 

13  Commonweal  til    v.    ;Minor,    88        R.    A.    707. 

Ky.  422;    11   S.  \s'.  472.  In  Iowa  it  has  been  held  that  a 

14  State    V.    C'louglily,    73    Iowa,  physician   must  have  a  permit  or 
626;   35  N.  W.   G52.  license    to    furnish    liquor    to    his 

15  Thomason    v.    State,    70    Ala.  patients  upon  prescriptions.  State 
20.  V.   Benadom,   79   Iowa,   90;    44  N. 


§513 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


844 


Sec.  513.     Physicians  illegally  giving  a  prescription. 

In  an  occasional  State  statutes  forbid  a  physician  giving 
a  prescription  for  liquor  when  the  person  to  whom  it  is  given 
does  not  actually  need  the  liquor.  If  the  physician  believes 
in  good  faith  that  the  patient  needs  the  liquor  he  may  pre- 
scribe it  for  him,'^  though  it  turn  out  he  was  purposely 
deceived  by  the  patient  in  order  to  obtain  the  liquor.^^  To 
show  that  he  did  not  act  in  good  faith,  evidence  of  the  number 
of  prescriptions  he  has  given  to  other  persons  within  a  reason- 
ably limited  period  of  time  when  the  particular  prescription 
was  illegally  given  may  be  introduced  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  an  intent  on  his  part  to  violate  the  law.^^  A 
statute  casting  upon  the  physician  the  burden  to  show  that 
the  patient  actually  needed  the  liquor  is  constitutional.^"  A 
statute  prohibiting  a  physician  giving  a  prescription  in  a 
prohibition  county  to  one  not  actually  ill  has  no  reference  to 
a  physician  writing  a  prescription  for  himself.-^     It  has  been 


W.  218.  So  in  Arkansas.  Battle 
V.  State,  51  Ark.  97;  10  'S.  W. 
12.  But  in  Canada  if  he  acts  in 
good  faith  he  need  not  have  it. 
King  V.  'Chicoyne,  8  Can.  Cr.  Cas. 
507. 

Under  a  power  to  license,  regu- 
late and  prohibit  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors,  a  city  may 
adopt  an  ordinance  requiring  all 
persons  selling  them  to  have  a 
license,  and  may  exempt  physi- 
cians from  its  provisions.  Carth- 
age V.   Carlton,  99   111.    App.    338. 

The  administering  of  medicine 
by  a  physician  to  his  patient  is 
not  a  sale.  Schaffner  v.  State,  8 
Ohio  St.  642. 

Where  accused  sold  straight 
whisky  and  a  physician  thereaf- 
ter put  medicine  in  it  for  the 
prosecuting  witness,  it  was  held 
that  an  offense  had  been  commit- 
ted. Cotton  v.  State  (Tex.),  120 
S.  W.  432. 

17  Commonwealth    v.    Minor,    88 


Ky.  422;  11  S.  W.  472.  As  to 
indictment,  see  West  v.  State,  40 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  575;  51  S.  W,  247. 
See  also  State  v.  Drug  Co.,  43  W. 
Va.  144;  27  S.  E.  350;  Mullins  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  68  S.  W. 
272;  State  v.  Breaux  (La.),  47 
So.  876. 

Tliere  is  no  such  an  offense  at 
common  law  as  that  of  "unlaw- 
fully prescribing."  Common- 
wealth v.  Neal,  11  Ky.  L.  Eep. 
(abstract)    678. 

IS  Walker  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  64  S.  W.  1052;  People  v. 
Hinehman,  75  Mich.  587;  42  N. 
W.  1006;  4  L.  R.  A.  707;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Williams,  120  Ky. 
314:  86  S.  W.  553;  27  Ky.  L. 
Rep.   695. 

m  State  v.  Atkinson,  33  S.  C. 
100;    11  S.  E.  93. 

20  Commonwealth  v.  Minor,  88 
Ky.   422:    11    S.   W.   472. 

21  Hawk  V.  People,  44  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  560;   72  S.  W.  842. 


845  DRUGGISTS    AND    PHYSICIANS,  §  513 

held  that  an  ordinance  forbidding  a  physician  to  give  a  patient 
a  prescription  for  liquor  when  he  really  did  not  need  it  was 
authorized,  and  neither  unreasonable,  oppressive  nor  an 
unjust  discrimination  against  the  physicians  as  a  class.'^  Of 
course,  a  sale  is  not  illegal  merely  because  the  druggist  does 
not  keep  a  record  of  nor  report  it.-^  A  physician  illegally 
giving  a  prescription  need  not  be  licensed  or  registered  in 
order  to  commit  an  offense  against  a  statute  prohibiting  the 
giving  of  a  prescription  contrary  to  its  terms.-*  A  physician 
who  gives  a  prescription  to  a  person  so  he  can  obtain  the 
liquor  for  another  violates  the  statute,-'^  and  may  be  con- 
victed of  making  an  illegal  sale,  for  he  is  an  accomplice  of  or 
assistant  to  the  seller ;  -^  but  it  must  be  shown  that  he  knew^ 
when  he  gave  the  prescription  that  the  patient  was  not  sick, 
or  gave  it  without  making  a  personal  examination  of  him, 
where  the  statute  requires  a  personal  examination  before 
giving  it.-^  The  mere  giving  of  the  prescription  in  an 
improper  instance  is  no  offense  unless  there  is  a  sale  upon  it.'^ 
"Where  a  statute  required  a  physician  to  file  an  affidavit  to 
enable  him  to  prescribe,  it  was  held  that  this  did  not  prevent 
the  State  from  showing  that  the  sale,  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
physician,  was  an  improper  one.-^  Whether  or  not  a  pre- 
scription was  given  in  good  faith  is  a  question  for  the  jury.^° 

22  Carthage    v.    Buckner,    4    III.  State,  7  Tex.  Cr.  Eep.  970;   73  S. 

App.  317.  W.  1056. 

23Snead    v.    State,    40   Tex.    Cr.  23  Blakeley    v.    State,     73    Ark. 

App.  262;   49  S.  W.  595.  218;    83    S.    W.    948.      Sufficiency 

2-t  State     V.     Anthony,     52     Mo.  of  affidavit,  People  v.  Renner,  135 

App.  S07.  Mich.    €29;    98    N.    W.    397;    100 

25  State  V.  Berkeley,  41   W.  Va.  N.  W.  403;    10  Detroit  L.  N.  907. 

455 ;   23  S.  E.  608.  3o  Rowe        v.        Commonwealth 

26McLain  v.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr.  (Ky.),  70   S.   W.   407;    24  Ky.  L. 

App.  213;   64  S.   W.   865.  Rep.   974. 

27  Williams  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  Statutes  go  so  far  as  to  re- 
App.),  81  S.  W.  1209;  Stovall  v.  quire  a  physician  giving  a  pre- 
State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  337;  39  scription  to  personally  examine 
S.  W.  934;  McQuerry  v.  State  the  applicant  for  it  before  giving 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  40  S.  W.  990.  it;   and  makes  him  liable  if  it  is 

28  Williams  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  not  given  in  good  faith.  Mullina 
App.),  77  S.  W.  783;  Stephens  v.  v.  State    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),   68   S. 

VV.  272. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

LOCAL  OPTION. 

Art.     I.     Adoption  of  IjOcal  Option. 
Art.  II.     Violation  of  Local  Option  Law. 


SECTION. 

ol4.  Distinctive  feature  of  local 
option    statutes. 

515.  Sufficiency  of  petition  for 
<in  election. 

5H}.  Attorney  in  fact  under  In- 
diana statute. 

517.  Separate    petitions    and    re- 

monstrances. 

518.  Withdrawal    of    name    from 

petition  or  remonstrance. 
619.     Qualifications  of  petitioners. 

520.  Territory   embraced   in   peti- 

tion— Description  of  ter- 
ritory. 

521.  Including     "dry"      territory 

in  petition  or  order. 

522.  To    whom    and    the    manner 

in  which  the  petition 
must  be  presented — Fil- 
ing. 

523.  Notice   of   hearing. 

524.  Order   for   election. 

525.  Board     of     Supervisors     in 

Michigan. 

626.     Signing   record. 

527.  Appeal  from  order  for  elec- 
tion. 

628.  Petition    and    order    for    re- 

submission. 

629.  Time   and   place   of   holding 

an  election. 


SECTION. 

630.     Notice  of  time  and  place  of 
holding   an    election. 

531.  Time    of    holding    an    elec- 

tion. 

532.  Conduct  of   the   election. 

533.  Qualifications      of      election 

officers. 

534.  Ballots. 

535.  Wlio  may  vote. 

536.  Canvass   of   ballots    and    re- 

turn of  result. 

537.  Majority     vote,     what     is — 

When    not    defeated. 

538.  Vote  necessary  to   adopt  lo- 

cal  option. 

539.  Declaration   of   the   result  ot 

the   election. 

540.  The   order   of   prohibition. 

541.  Order   for   publications   con- 

cerning     prohibition     or- 
der. 

542.  Publishing     notices     of     or- 
der  and   result   of   election. 

543.  When  local  option  takes  ef- 

fect. 

544.  Contesting   validity   of   elec- 

tion. 

545.  Mandamus,   when   not   a   lo- 

cal  option    remedy. 

546.  Prior  laws,  how  affected  by 

local   option. 


847  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  514 

SECTION.  SECTION. 

547.     Former   laws,   when   not   re-  551.     Eminent    domain,    power    of 

pealed.  not    involved. 

648.     Changing   boundary    of    dis-  552.     Cost  of  election. 

trict.  553.     Consent     of     local     authori- 

549.  Repeal    of    local    option    by  ties. 

vote.  554.     Juror's    qualification    in    lo- 

550.  Local       option       ordinance,  cal  option  case. 

when   not   invalid.  555.     Local    prohibitory    or    local 

option   statutes, 

ARTICLE  I.     ADOPTION  OF  LOCAL  OPTION. 

Sec.  514.    Distinctive  features  of  local  option  statutes. 

Local  option  laws  are  familiar  to  all,  and  in  the  last  few 
years  have  been  adopted  in  many  States  of  the  Union.  They 
differ  from  each  other  as  suits  the  genius  of  the  Legislatures 
enacting  them;  but  there  are  two  characteristics  that  run 
through  nearly  all  of  them.  In  the  one,  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  throughout  the  State  is  absolutely  prohibited  (usually 
sales  for  medicinal  and  mechanical  purposes  are  excepted), 
unless  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  electors  of  a  designated 
political  district  it  is  decided  that  there  may  be  sales  under  a 
license.^  In  the  other,  sales  under  a  license  are  permitted, 
unless  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  electors  of  a  like  political 
district  it  is  decided  that  there  shall  be  no  sales  made  therein, 
usually  excepting  sales  for  medicinal  and  mechanical  pur- 
poses. It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the  former  method 
meets  with  the  approval  of  those  M-ho  believe  in  the  prohibi- 
tion of  the  sales  of  intoxicating  liquors,  for  at  one  fell  sweep 
of  the  legislative  pen  the  State  is  placed  upon  a  prohibition 
basis.  And  it  goes  without  saying  that  the  second  method  is 
favored  by  those  engaged  in  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors, 
or  who  desire  to  sell  them,  if  there  must  be  local  option. 
Local  option  laws  aim  to  give  the  people  of  a  district  power  to 
control  their  own  affairs  with  reference  to  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors.  They  are  the  most  democratic  of  all  laws. 
What  the  political  unit  shall  be  differs  in  the  several  States, 
but  the  most  usual  one  is  the  county.     But  there  are  many 

iSee  Gallagher  v.  Meek,  5  Ky.    L.   Rep.    (abstract)    424. 


§  514  TK^VFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  848 

laws  that  permit  a  single  township,  or  a  town,  or  a  city,  and, 
in  rare  instances,  a  ward  in  a  city  or  town,  to  declare  its 
desire  for  license  or  for  prohibition.  The  theor}^  is,  and  that 
is  the  ground  upon  which  their  constitutionality  is  sustained, 
that  the  local  option  law  is  univereal  throughout  the  State, 
but  produces  different  results  in  different  localities  as  the 
electors  shall  decide  under  its  provisions.  The  results  are 
always  that  in  some  of  the  political  units  it  is  a  crime  to  sell 
intoxicating  lic^uors  as  a  beverage,  while  in  others  it  is  not. 
The  same  act  in  one  county  is  a  crime,  while  in  another  it  is 
not  if  the  vendor  possess  a  license  to  make  the  sale.  Usually 
druggists  under  permits,  in  other  States  under  certain  re- 
strictions, are  allowed  to  sell  liquors  for  medicinal  or  even 
mechanical  purposes,  where  prohibition  is  adopted.  If  the 
electors  decided  against  the  granting  of  licenses,  the  effect  is 
the  same,  as  to  that  political  unit,  as  if  the  entire  State  had 
adopted  prohibition.  Concerning  the  benefits  resulting  from 
the  adoption  of  local  prohibition  differences  of  opinion  are 
entertained,  but  its  adoption  does  not  necessarily  result  in  the 
inhabitants  of  the  political  unit  adopting  it  becoming  entirely 
temperate,  especially  when  an  adjoining  political  unit  per- 
mits sales  under  licenses.  These  laws  are  regarded  as  mere 
makeshifts  by  those  who  believe  in  absolute  prohibition  as 
the  salient  remedy  to  prevent  the  use  of  intoxicating  liquors. 
The  usual  method  of  procedure  is  a  petition  signed  by  a 
designated  number  of  electors  of  the  district  addressed  to  a 
local  board,  praying  that  an  election  be  ordered  to  determine 
whether  sales  under  a  license  shall  be  permitted  or  whether 
no  sales  shall  be  allowed.  If  an  election  be  ordered,  then  it  is 
conducted  as  general  elections  are  usually  conducted  and  the 
returns  made  to  the  proper  officials.  Usually  such  elections 
can  only  be  held  within  certain  periods  of  time,  as  one  a  year, 
or  one  in  every  two  or  three  years.  Possibly  the  expenses  of 
the  election  are  occasionally  borne  by  the  petitioners,  but 
almost,  if  not  quite,  universally  the  elections  are  held  at  the 
public  expense.  In  some  few  States  the  right  to  sell  liquors, 
or  whether  sales  shall  be  permitted  or  prohibited,  is  deter- 
mined by  written  petitions  or  remonstrances  against  the  sale; 
and  while  these  laws  are  in  effect  local  option  laws,  they  are 


849 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§515 


not  popularly  known  as  such.  Unless  there  be  a  statute 
authorizing  the  submission  of  the  question  of  license  or  no 
license  to  the  voters  of  the  district,  there  is  no  power  to  do  so 
in  any  officer  or  board,  and  if  it  is  so  done  the  result  will  be 
of  no  force  w^hatever.^* 

Sec.  515.     Sufficiency  of  petition  for  an  election 

Proceedings  under  a  local  option  law  are  strictly  statutory, 
and  the  records  must  affirmatively  show  every  fact  necessary 
to  sustain  them;  no  presumptions  can  be  indulged  in  their 
favor.  Therefore,  a  petition  by  which  such  a  proceeding  is 
instituted,  must  contain  all  of  the  averments  necessary  to  give 
jurisdiction  to  the  court  or  board  before  whom  it  is  in- 
stituted :  and  where  a  statute  provides  that  the  petition  shall 


i*Galindo  v.  Walter,  8  Cal. 
App.  234;    96  Pac.   505. 

A  statute  cannot  be  objected  to 
which  provides  that  if  a  county 
as  a  unit  shall  vote  for  prohibi- 
tion, liquors  cannot  be  sold  in 
cities  therein;  but  if  it  votes  for 
license  yet  the  cities  give  majori- 
ties for  prohibition,  prohibition 
shall  prevail  in  them,  on  the 
ground  that  more  force  is  given 
in  favor  of  a  vote  for  prohibition 
than  one  against  it.  Board  v. 
Scott,  12'5  Ky.  545;  101  S.  W. 
944;   30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  894. 

A  constitutional  provision  that 
the  General  Assembly  shall  pass 
a  law  to  take  the  sense  of  any 
city,  town,  district  or  precinct  of 
the  State  whether  liquors  shall  be 
sold  therein  or  the  sale  regulated 
requires  a  statute  giving  to  these 
local  units  the  power  to  declare 
for  prohibition  and  that  each 
should  have  the  privilege  of  say- 
ing conclusively  that  no  liquors 
should  be  sold  in  it,  but  not  con- 
clusively that  prohibition  should 
not    prevent   it.      Board   v.    Scott 


(Ky.),  101  S.  W.  944;  30  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  894.  See  Reusch  v.  Lin- 
coln, 78  Neb.  828;  112  N.  W.  377; 
Wilber  v.  Ress,  78  Neb.  835;  112 
N.  W.  379;  Griffin  v.  Tucker, 
(Tex.)    118  S.  W.  635. 

A  change  in  the  law  imposing 
on  druggists  the  duty  to  report 
sales  of  liquor  within  prohibitory 
territory  does  not  require  an  elec- 
tion to  adopt  its  provisions.  Peo- 
ple V.  Henwood,  123  Mich.  317; 
>82  N.  W.  70. 

A  city  cannot  adopt  by  indirec- 
tion a  measure  required  to  be 
submitted  to  the  electors.  In  re 
Barclay,   12  Up.  Can.  86. 

When  a  sale  actually  took 
place,  the  fact  that  it  was  made 
to  test  the  validity  of  the  local 
option  law  is  immaterial;  for  the 
suit  is  not  a  fictitious  one.  Lam- 
bert V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
232;    39   S.  W.   299. 

A  statute  giving  the  right  of 
local  option  to  "towns  and  incor- 
porated villages"  has  no  applica- 
tion to  cities.  Kleppe  v.  Gard 
(Minn.),  123  N.  W.  665. 


§  515  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  850 

aver  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  petitioners  the  public  good 
will  be  promoted  by  a  prohibition  of  the  sale  or  giving  away 
of  intoxicating  liquors  within  the  limits  described,  a  failure 
to  make  such  averment  in  the  petition  will  render  the  entire 
proceedings  void ;  -  and  if  a  statute  requires  that  a  certain 
number  of  qualified  voters  shall  sign  it,  it  will  not  be  sufficient 
to  confer  jurisdiction  upon  a  court,  where  the  order  of  the 
court  issued  under  it  shows  that  a  designated  person  and 
"many  other  citizens  of  the  county"  signed  it,^  or  that  the 
"election  was  ordered  upon  the  petition  of  C  and  twenty-nine 
others. ' '  *  But  in  later  cases  by  the  same  court  it  was  held 
that  where  the  petition  stated  that  "the  undersigned  citizens 
of  said  county"  prayed  for  the  holding  of  such  an  election,  it 
was  sufficient,  the  court  holding  that  the  commonly  accepted 
meaning  of  the  word  "citizen"  conveys  the  idea  of  a  qualified 
voter,  and  that,  therefore,  the  petition  was  sufficient.^  And  in 
other  cases  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  not  essential  to  the 
sufficiency  of  such  a  petition  that  it  should  show  the  qualifica- 
tion of  the  petitioners  by  direct  or  indirect  averment.  Such 
holding  was  upon  the  reasonable  theory  that  the  qualification 
of  such  petitioners  was  a  jurisdictional  fact  to  be  ascertained 
by  the  court  independent  of  any  allegation  in  the  petition.* 
In  other  words,  such  a  petition  will  not  be  defective  for  want 
of  an  allegation  in  it  that  it  is  signed  by  the  requisite  number 
of  qualified  petitioners,  if  in  fact  it  was  signed  by  such 
number,  and  the  official  body  with  whom  it  was  filed  ascer- 
tains that  fact.^  If  the  statute  providing  for  such  a  petition 
does  not  stipulate  what  particular  allegations  or  statements 
shall  be  made  in  it,  it  will  be  sufficient  if  it  expresses  in  an 

2  Tally  V.   Grider,  66  Ala.   119;  4  Aiken  v.   State,    14   Tex.  App. 
Aiken     v.     State,     14     Tex.     App.       142. 

142;   Bartel  v.  Hobson,  107  Iowa,  ^  Ex  parte  Lynn,   19   Tex.  App. 

644;    78    N.    W.    689;  People    v.  293;   Steele  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App. 

Board,   32  N.  Y.   Misc.  Rep.   123;  425. 

66    N.    Y.    Supp.    199;  Wyatt    v.  e  Steele  v.   State,    19   Tex.   App. 

Ryan,     113    Ky.    306;  68    S.    W.  425. 

134;  24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  228.  7  state   v.   Weeks,  38   Mo.   App. 

3  Prather     v.     State,  12     Tex.  566 ;  State  v.  Smith,  38  Mo.  App. 
App.  401.  618. 


851  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  515 

intelligible  manner  the  desire  of  the  petitioners  that  an  elec- 
tion under  the  provisions  of  the  statute  shall  be  held  within 
the  limits  defined  in  the  petition.*  While  it  is  better  that 
such  a  petition  should,  at  least,  substantially  follow  the  words 
of  the  statute,  if  it,  nevertheless,  appears  from  its  face  that 
it  could  mean  and  have  for  its  object  but  one  thing,  that  of 
voting  on  the  question  whether  an  order  for  such  an  election 
should  be  made — for  instance,  an  order  of  "elections  to  take 
the  sense  of  the  voters  upon  what  is  known  as  the  Wood's 
Local  Option  Law" — the  petition  will  be  regarded  as  suffi- 
cient.^ It  is  not  essential,  however,  that  a  petition  should 
refer  to  and  designate  the  statute  under  which  the  election 
must  be  ordered,  and  if  it  does  so  incorrectly  the  erroneous 
reference  may  be  disregarded  as  surplusage.^"  And  the  same 
construction  has  been  placed  upon  a  petition  under  a  statute 
Avhich  made  no  mention  of  wine  or  beer,  but  where  it  appeared 
from  other  provisions  of  the  statute  that  the  words  ''intoxi- 
cating liquors"  were  used  therein  as  including  wine  and  beer 
and  the  petition  prayed  for  an  election  *'to  determine  whether 
or  not  spirituous  and  intoxicating  liquors,  including  wine  and 
beer,  should  be  sold.""  Statutes  sometimes  require  the 
petition  to  be  accompanied  by  written  proof  concerning  the 
signatures  of  the  petitioners  being  genuine.  Thus,  in  Mich- 
igan, a  statute  required  the  petition  to  be  accompanied  by  a 
copy  of  the  poll  list  of  the  last  preceding  general  election,  and 
by  an  affidavit  of  one  of  the  resident  electors  to  the  effect 
that  he  personally  knew  the  petitioners  and  that  they  resided 
within  the  district;  or,  if  the  poll  list  could  not  be  procured, 
then  that  the  petitioners  were  qualified  electors,  and  accompany 
the  affidavit  by  the  returns  or  canvass  of  the  last  election. 

8  State  V.   Weeks,   38   Mo.   App.  » State   v.    Smith,   38   Mo.   App. 

566;   State  v.  Smith,  38  Mo.  App.  618. 

618;     Ex    parte    Lynn,     19     Tex.  lo  State     v.     Schmitz,     36     Mo. 

App.    293;     Dillard    v.    State,    31  App.  550;  Steele  v.  State,   19  Tex, 

Tex.    Cr.     Rep.    470;     20     S.     VV.  App.  426. 

1106;    State   v.   McCord,   207   Mo.  n  State     v.     iSchmitz,     36     Mo- 

519;     106    S.    W.    27;     Ezzell    v.  App.  550. 
State,    29    Tex.    App.    521;    16    S. 
W.   782. 


§  515  TR.VFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  852 

Under  such  a  statute  it  was  only  necessary  to  allege  tbe  resi- 
dence of  the  petitioners  when  a  copy  of  the  poll  list  was 
filed.'-  If  the  petition  purports  to  be  signed  by  the  requisite 
number  of  petitioners,  and  the  order  is  based  thereon,  the 
election  cannot  be  regarded  as  void  if  in  fact  it  did  not  have 
sufficient  genuine  signatures.'^  The  metes  and  bounds  of  the 
district  need  not  be  set  out  in  the  petition,  it  being  sufficient 
to  designate  a  political  division  of  the  State,  unless  the  district 
is  a  subdivision  of  some  political  division.'*  Where  a  statute 
requires  a  petition  to  be  signed  by  a  certain  per  cent,  of  the 
voters  of  a  city,  it  is  not  necessary  that  that  per  cent,  of  the 
voters  in  each  ward  should  sign  it.'^  Where  a  statute  re- 
quired ten  per  cent,  of  the  voters  casting  a  ballot  at  the  last 
preceding  election  to  sign  the  petition,  and  their  acknowledg- 
ments of  signing  the  petition  to  be  taken  by  a  notary  public, 
and  fifty-five  electors  signed  it,  but  only  seventeen  acknowl- 
edged their  signatures,  and  there  was  no  proof  that  such 
signers  constituted  ten  per  cent,  of  those  who  had  so  voted, 
the  proceedings  based  thereon  were  held  void.'®  Where  a 
statute  required  four  questions  to  be  submitted  to  the  voters 
it  was  held  that  all  of  them  must  be  submitted  and  not  a 

12  Friesner  v.   Common   Council,  is  People    v.    Board,    32    N.    Y. 

91   Mich.  504;    52   N.   W.   18.  Misc.    Rep.    123;    66   N.   Y.    Supp. 

isEzzell  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  199;     Wyatt    v.    Ryan,     113    Ky. 

521;     16    S.    W.    782;    Ex    parte  306;    68    N.    W.    134;    24    Ky.    L. 

Segars,   32  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  553;   25  Rep.  228. 

lis.    W.    26;     People    v.    Hamilton,  Members  of  the  board  ordering 

143  Mich.   1;    106  N.   W.   275;    12  the  electors  who  sign  the  petition 

Detroit  Leg.  N.  897.  may  be  counted.     Hunter  v.  Senn, 

^*Ex  parte  Perkins,  34  Tex.  Cr.  61  S.  C.  44;   39  S.  E.  235. 

Rep.  429;    31   S.  W.   175.  If  there  be  a  full  expression  of 

Those  who  sign  both  petitions  the  will  of  the  voters,  an  irregu- 
for  and  remonstrances  against  an  larity  in  the  petition  will  not 
election  cannot  be  counted  on  avoid  the  election.  In  re  Clem- 
either  petition.  Raubenheimer  v.  ent,  29  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  29;  60 
Parsons,  12  Juta,  326.  N.  Y.  Supp.  328. 

15  Mahan       v.       Commonwealth  The  signatures   may  be  on  sev- 

(Ky.),  56   S.  W.   529;    21   Ky.  L.  eral  pages  or  papers.     In  re  Cip- 

Rep.    1807;    Brantly   v.    State,   42  perley,  50  N.  Y.  Misc.   Rep.  266; 

Tex.  Cr.  App.  293;   59  S.  W.  S92;  100   N.   Y.   Supp.   473;    Richter   v. 

Nail  V.  Tinslej',   107  Ky.  441;   54  State    (Ala.),  47  So.   163. 
6.  W.  187;   21   Ky.  L.  Rep.  1167. 


853  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  515 

part  of  them,  and  that  a  petition  attempting  to  submit  less 
than  four  was  insufficient."  "Where  a  statute  requires  the 
signers  of  the  petition  to  acknowledge  theii*  signatures  before 
a  notary  public,  the  certificate  of  the  officer  that  "the  above 
named  persons"  appeared  before  him  and  signed  the  petition 
in  his  presence  is  not  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the 
statute;^*  nor  is  it  sufficient  for  the  officer  to  certify  that 
they  subscribed  and  were  sworn  to  the  petition  before  him.^® 
If  several  political  petitions  be  combined,  then  the  requisite 
percentage  of  voters  in  each  division  must  sign  the  petition, 
and  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  requisite  percentage  of  voters 
of  the  combined  districts  signed  it.-"  A  statute  which  requires 
a  majority  of  the  voters  at  the  last  general  election  to  sign  it 
does  not  require  a  majority  of  the  voters  to  sign  it  in  the 
district  at  the  time  it  is  presented,  even  if  there  then  be  many 
more  voters  than  there  were  at  the  last  general  election.-^  In 
Michigan,  if  the  court  accepts  the  petition,  regular  in  form 
and  having  a  sufficient  number  of  signatures  to  it,  its  action; 
is  conclusive  so  far  as  the  genuineness  of  such  signatures  is 
concerned.-- 

17  Kennedy  v.  Warner,  51  N.  Y.  record   in   the   proceedings   for   an 

Misc.   Rep.   362;    100  N.  Y.   Supp.  election.      State    v.    McCord,    207 

616;     In    re    Getman,    28    N.    Y.  Mo.   519;    106   S.   W.    27. 

Misc.    Rep.    451;    59    N.   S.    Supp.  The    term     last    "general     elec- 

1013.  tion"  means  the  last  general  elec- 

is  Jackson   v.   Seeber,   50    N.   Y.  tion    at    whicli    State    or    county 

Misc.  Rep.  479;    100  N.  Y.   Supp.  officers   were  elected,  and   not  the 

563;   In  re  Livingston,   115   N.  Y.  last   Congressional   election.  Davis 

Supp.  269.  V.    Henderson,    127    Ky.    13;     104 

19  Kennedy  v.  Warner,  51  N.  Y.  N.  W.  1009;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1252. 
Misc.  Rep.  362;  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  The  petition  need  not  fix  a  date 
616.  Under  this  statute  there  for  the  election.  Puckett  v.  Sni- 
must  be  both  a  signing  and  ac-  der,  110  Ky.  261;  61  S.  W.  277; 
knowledgment     to     constitute    the  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1718. 

petition  valid.  22  Attorney  General  v.  Van  Bu- 

20  Davis  V.  Henderson,  127  Ky.  ren  Circuit  Court,  143  Mich. 
13;  104  S.  W  1009;  31  Ky.  L.  366;  106  N.  W^  1113;  12  Detroit 
Rep.    1252;    Smith  v.  Patton,    103  Leg.    N.    1016. 

Ky.  444;  45  S.  W.  459;  20  Ky.  L.  In    New    York    a    statute    pro- 
Rep.  165.  vided    that,    except    for    a    failure 

21  Otte  v.  State,  29  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  to  file  a  petition,  if  certain  ques- 
203.  tions    concerning  the    sale   of   liq- 

The   petition   is    a   part   of    tlie       uors  had  been  improperly  submit- 


§516 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


854 


Sec.  516.    Attorney  in  fact  under  Indiana  statute. 

Under  the  Indiana  statute  regulating  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  it  has  been  held  that  the  proceeding  before  the 
board  of  commissioners  of  the  county,  that  being  the  desig- 
nated body  to  grant  licenses  for  that  purpose,  is  a  judicial 
One,^^  in  the  nature  of  a  civil  action,  and  that  the  proceeding 
may  be  prosecuted  or  defended  by  a  party  in  person  or  by 
an  agent,  an  attorney,  or  an  attorney  in  fact.^*  The  fact  that 
the  statute  permits  a  remonstrance  to  be  signed  by  an  attorney 
in  fact  does  not  render  it  obnoxious  to  the  Constitution  of 


ted  to  a  vote  at  a  regular  town 
meeting,  they  should  be  submit- 
ted at  a  special  town  meeting.  A 
petition  for  an  election  was  not 
signed  and  acknowledged  by  tlie 
requisite  number  of  electors;  and 
it  was  held  that  there  was  no  au- 
thority for  a  resubmission,  the 
statute  not  providing  for  it  in 
that  contingency.  In  re  Rogers, 
4  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  3«9;  84  X. 
Y.  Supp.  1024.  In  this  State  a 
petition  praying  for  the  submis- 
sion to  vote  "the  several  ques- 
tions relating  to  the  sale  of  liq- 
uors, as  provided  by  section  16  of 
the  liquor  tax  law,"  sufficiently 
states  the  questions  for  submis- 
sion. In  re  Rice,  95  X.  Y.  App. 
Div.    28;    88   N.    Y.    Supp.    512. 

Where  the  board  has  the  power 
to  order  an  election  independent 
of  a  petition,  it  is  immaterial 
that  the  petition  is  insufficient. 
Lambert  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  232;  39  S.  W.  299;  Wil- 
liams v.  Davidson  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),   70   S.   W.  987. 

In  Alabama  a  failure  of  the  pe 
tition  to  state  that  "in  the  opiu 
ion  of  the  petitioner  the  public 
good  will  be  promoted  by  a  pro- 
hibition   of    the    sale    or    giving 


away  of  vinous  or  spirituous  liq- 
uor within"  the  limits  of  the  ter- 
ritory described  therein  was  held 
so  limited  as  to  confer  no  juris- 
diction on  the  board.  Tally  v. 
Grider,   60  Ala.    119. 

Unless  a  board  or  court  has  the 
inherent  power  to  order  an  elec- 
tion without  a  petition,  an  order 
without  it  is  void.  Aikin  v. 
State,   14  Tex.   App.   142. 

In  Ohio  the  petition  is  not 
prima  facie  evidence  of  its  suffi- 
ciency, except  upon  failure  of  the 
electors  to  contest  it.  The  bur- 
den of  proof  lies  upon  the  peti- 
tioner to  prove  the  facts  stated 
in  it.  But  if  an  elector  seeks  to 
withdraw  his  signature  he  must 
show  it  was  procured  by  fraud  or 
misrepresentation.  In  re  James 
Law  Petition,  30  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 
Rep.   697. 

When  can  be  filed  in  Arkansas. 
Wilmans  v.  Bordwell,  73  Ark. 
418;  84  S.  W.  474. 

23Halloran  v.  McCullough,  68 
Ind.  179;  List  v.  Padget,  96  Ind. 
126. 

24  Castle  V.  Bell,  145  Ind.  8;  14 
N.  E.  2;  Fried  v.  Xelson.  30  App. 
1;   65  X.  E.  216. 


855  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  516 

Indiana  on  the  ground  that  an  applicant  for  a  license  who  is 
confronted  by  a  remonstrance  signed  by  an  omnibus  power 
of  attorney  has  not  an  equal  chance  with  an  applicant  eon- 
fronted  by  a  personally  signed  remonstrance."^  Under  such 
statute,  however,  the  leg:al  voters  of  a  township  or  city  have 
no  authority,  by  a  power  of  attorney,  to  authorize  an  at- 
torney in  fact  to  sign  their  names  to  "any  remonstrance 
against  the  granting  of  a  license  to  any  person  he  may  see 
fit  to  remonstrate  against."  This  is  so  because  the  regulation 
and  restraint  of  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  an  exercise 
of  the  police  power  of  the  State,  and  that  power,  as  an  orig- 
inal power,  is  lodged  in  the  Legislature.  The  Legislature 
having  delegated  a  portion  of  the  power  to  the  voters  of  the 
townships  and  city  wards,  and  having  made  no  provision  by 
which  they  may  redelegate  it  to  an  agent  or  attorney  in  fact, 
they  are  without  power  to  do  so.  It  is  an  elementary  prin- 
ciple that  a  delegated  right  cannot  be  redelegated  in  the 
absence  of  express  authority  to  that  end  from  the  principal.-'' 
But  a  power  of  attorney  to  remonstrate  against  the  granting 
of  a  license  to  "any  applicant"  is  not  invalid  as  conferring  a 
discretion  on  the  attorney  as  to  what  applicants  to  remon- 
strate against.  In  such  case  the  word  "any"  is  the  equivalent 
of  the  word  "all"  or  "every.""  The  word  "any"  is 
frequently  and  appropriately  used  to  express  the  same  mean- 
ing as  "all"  or  "every. ""^  Such  a  power  of  attorney  is  not 
invalid  because  it  does  not  contain  any  applicant,  but  is 
general  and  directed  against  all  applicants.-^  If  it  is  executed 
by  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  township  or  of  a  ward  in 
a  city,  it  will  not  be  revoked  by  the  death  of  one  or  more 
persons  executing  it,  provided  it  still  contains  a  majority  of 


25  Hoop     V.     Affleck,     162     Ind.  513;    White   v.   Fargeson,  29   App. 
564;    70   N.  E.   978.  145;    64  X.    E.   409. 

26  Cochell  V.  Reynolds,   156  Ind.  2s  2     Am.     and    En<?.    Ency.    of 
14;   58  N.   E.   1029.  Law     (2d    Ed.),     414     and     cases 

27  Ludwig    V.     Cory,     158     Ind.  there  cited. 

582;    64    N.    E.    14;    Boomershine  29  Ragle    v.    Mattox,     159     Ind. 

V.   Uline,   159   Ind.  500;    65  N.  E.  594;    65  N.  E.   743. 


§  517  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  856 

such  voters.     This  is  so  because  such  a  power  of  attorney  is 
not  joint  but  several  as  to  each  person  who  executed  it.^° 

Sec.  517.    Separate  petitions  and  remonstrances. 

Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  when  a  majority  of 
the  adult  inhabitants  residing  within  three  miles  of  any  school- 
house  or  church  shall  petition  the  county  court  for  an  order 
prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquors  within  that  area,  an  order  to 
that  effect  may  be  made,  a  petition  which  designates  two 
points  within  three  miles  of  a  given  area  cannot  be  sustained. 
Such  a  statutory  proceeding  cannot  be  extended  beyond  its 
prescribed  limits.  Two  points,  as  centers  of  circular  areas, 
cannot  be  designated  in  the  same  petition,  signed  without  dis- 
tinction, by  a  majority  of  the  adult  inhabitants  living  within 
three  miles  of  both  points,  or  of  either  one  or  the  other  point. 
In  the  first  case  the  area  would  be  less  than  one  with  a  radius 
of  two  miles,  and  on  the  second  it  would  be  greater.  Such  a 
statute  confers  no  authority  to  make  such  an  order  as  would 
prohibit  in  either  case.  Every  adult  inhabitant  residing  within 
three  miles  of  any  particular  schoolhouse  or  'church  should 
be  counted  in  determining  the  majority,  that  is,  in  theory,  and 
as  nearly  practically  as  possible,  and  no  one  living  more  than 
three  miles  from  that  particular  hou«e.  This  cannot  be 
effected  by  designating  two  or  more  distinct  buildings  more 
or  less  widely  separated,  without  any  indication  of  one  as  the 
center  of  all.  The  only  way  to  meet  such  a  condition  is  to 
present  a  separate  petition  for  each  separate  building  or 
point.^^  On  the  other  hand,  separate  petitions  may  be  sub- 

30  Shaffer     v.     Stern,     r60    Ind.  sent    a    written    petition,    contain- 

375;  '66  N.   E.   1004.  ing  one-third  of  the  names  of  the 

Where   a   statute   provided   that  electors,    "signed    by    themselves," 

'"in  all  cases  where   the  signature  it   was    held   that   names   of   peti- 

of  any  person  is  required  by  law,  tioners    not   signed    by   themselves 

it  shall   always   be   in   the   proper  but    signed     by     their     authority, 

handwriting    of    such    person,    or,  could   not   be    considered.      Fergu- 

in  case  he  be  unable  to  write,  his  son    v.    Monroe    County,    71    Miss, 

proper  mark,"  and  under  another  524;    14  So.   81. 
statute  the  applicant  had  to  pre-  3i  Williams  v.  Citizens,  40  Ark. 

230. 


857  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  517 

mitted  as  one  petition  for  the  adoption  of  a  local  option  law. 
In  Missouri  it  was  contended  that  this  could  not  be  done 
where  the  petition  to  the  county  court  asking  that  an  election 
be  ordered  was  not  on  one  paper,  but  consisted  of  several 
papers  or  petitions,  which,  after  being  signed  by  petitioners 
residing  in  different  parts  of  the  county,  were  tacked  together 
and  presented  to  the  county  court  as  the  petition  for  an  order 
of  election.  In  passing  upon  this  contention  the  Court  of 
Appeals  of  that  State  said:  "When  proceedings  under  the 
local  option  statute  of  the  State  are  drawn  in  question  as  for 
sufficiency  we  are  not  disposed  to  invoke  the  application  of 
the  strict  rules  of  construction  by  which  are  usually  tested 
proceedings  for  the  condemnation  of  private  property  for 
public  use.  We  are  disposed  to  think  the  petitions  should  be 
considered  as  'the  petition,'  and  when  thus  taken  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  are  sufficiently  complied  with  to 
justify  the  making  of  the  order  for  the  election. "  ^-  In  Indiana 
local  option  is  provided  for  by  means  of  a  remonstrance  by  a 
majority  of  the  legal  voters  of  any  township  or  ward  situated 
in  a  county.  In  construing  the  statute  making  provision  for 
such  a  remonstrance  it  has  been  held  that  several  copies  of  a 
remonstrance  to  the  granting  of  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating 
liquor,  each  of  which  is  signed  by  different  voters  and  filed  as 
a  remonstrance,  must  be  considered  as  only  one  remonstrance. 
The  court  said:  "If  each  voter  signed  a  separate  remon- 
strance *  *  *  against  granting  a  license  to  any  appli- 
cant, and  they  were  all  filed  within  the  time  required,  they 
would  constitute  one  remonstrance  under  the  statute,  and  if 
signed  by  a  majoritj^  of  the  township  or  ward  the  board  of 
commissioners  would  have  no  jurisdiction  to  act  in  said  case 
or  grant  a  license  to  such  applicant. ' '  ^^ 

3?  state  V.  Weeks,   38  Mo.  App.  State,  51   Tex.  Cr.  App.  441;    102 

566;   State  v.  Smith,  38  Mo.  App.  S.  VV.  1144. 

618;    Irish  V.   State    (Tex.),  25   S.  33  Flynn     v.     Taylor,     145     Ind. 

W.  633;   In  re  Carswell,  15  Mani-  533;   44  N.  E.  546;   Sutherland  v. 

toba,  620;   State  v.  Hitchcock,  124  McKinney,    146    Ind.    613;    45    N. 

Mo.    App.    101;    101    S.    W.    117;  E.   1048;    Head  v.   Doehlman,    148 

Neal   V.    State,   51    Tex.    Cr.   App.  Ind.   145;    46  N.   E.   585. 
613;    10*2    S.    W.    1139;    Huff    v.  Where    petitions    for    separate 


§  518  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  858 

Sec.  518.  Withdrawal  of  name  from  petition  or  remon- 
strance. 
A  proceeding  contemplated  by  a  local  option  or  for  a  license 
to  retail  intoxicating  liquors  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a 
suit  between  parties.  In  each  instance  it  is  a  police  proceed- 
ing for  the  better  regulation  of  the  internal  affairs  of  counties 
for  the  preservation  of  morals  and  protection  of  the  peace  of 
the  citizens.  The  petition  in  the  one  instance  and  the  remon- 
strance in  the  other  relate  only  to  the  jursdictional  conditions 
upon  which  the  court  acts,  and  when  the  petition  in  the  one 
instance  and  the  remonstrance  in  the  other  contains  the  re- 
quired number  of  names  the  court  acquires  jurisdiction  and 
may  proceed  with  the  matter  in  hand,  and  grant  the  prayer 
of  the  petition  in  the  one  instance  or  refuse  to  grant  it  in  the 
other.  If  the  signatures  are  genuine  or  properly  authorized 
(which  facts  are  to  be  taken  as  true,  prima  facie),  then,  unless 
the  court  shall  for  good  reason  permit  them  to  be  withdrawn, 
the  only  thing  left  for  the  court  is  to  satisfy  itself  that  the 
petition  or  remonstrance  has  attached  to  it  the  required 
number  of  names.  This  it  must  do  by  the  best  modes  fairly 
practical.  It  is  not  expected  of  the  court  to  order  a  local 
census.  Much,  in  the  nature  of  things,  must  be  left  to  the 
discretion  and  judgment  of  the  court.  If  the  original  signa- 
tures were  obtained  intelligently  and  without  fraud,  and  have 
not  been  erased  before  presentation,  or  afterwards  as  provided 
hy  law,  they  fulfill  the  requirements  of  the  statute  and  confer 
jurisdiction  in  the  one  instance  and  defeat  it  in  the  other.^* 
Where  such  a  petition  or  remonstrance  has  been  acted  upon 
by  a  county  court  or  board  of  commissioners,  and  an  appeal 

voting     precincts     prayed     for    an  Where   a   pending    petition   was 

election,    each    having    the    requi-  dismissed,    a    new    one    filed    and 

site    number    of    signers,    it    was  also  a  part  of  the  old  one  refiled, 

held    not   error   for    the    court    to  this    was    held    proper.      State    v. 

combine    the    petitions    and   order  Kellogg,    133    Mo.    App.    431;    113 

an  election  in  all  of  the  precincts  S.  W.  660. 

as   one   district;    and   the   election  34  Williams  v.  Citizens,  40  Ark. 

having  carried   in   favor   of   prohi-  200;    Stato   v.    Gorhardt,    145    Ind. 

bition,     the     election     was     valid.  439;  44  N.  E.  469. 
Tousey  v.  DeHuy  ( Ky. ) ,  62  S.  W. 
1118;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  458. 


859 


LOCAL.   OPTION. 


§518 


from  its  judgment  has  been  taken,  a  petitioner  in  the  one 
instance  or  a  remonstrator  in  the  other  will  not  be  allowed 
to  withdraw  his  name  in  the  Appellate  Court  except  for  cause. 
The  presentation  of  the  petition  or  remonstrance  in  such  case 
is  in  the  nature  of  an  election.  When  the  county  court  or 
board  of  commissioners  has  acted,  the  votes  have  been  cast 
and  the  election  returns  made,  an  appeal  does  not  in- 
vest the  petitioner  or  remonstrator  with  the  power  to  change 
his  vote  or  withdraw  it  except  for  good  cause  shown,^^  such 
a  case  is  not  at  all  like  that  of  an  ordinary  civil  action,  for, 
in  such  a  proceeding  as  is  here  being  considered  the  public 
and  many  persons  have  a  common  interest,  and  he  who  sets 
on  foot  such  a  petition  or  a  remonstrance  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  defeat  the  proceeding  to  the  injury  of  the  public  or 
others  by  withdrawing  from  the  petition  or  remonstrance.^" 


35McCullough  V.  Blackwell,  51 
Ark.  159;  10  So.  259;  Orcutt  v. 
Renigardt,  46  N.  J.  L.  337;  State 
V.  Webb,  49  Mo.  App.  407;  Col- 
vin  V.  Finch,  75  Ark.  154;  87  S. 
W.  443. 

3>5  State  V.  Gerhardt,  145  Ind. 
439;  44  N.  E.  469;  White  v.  Pri- 
fogle,  146  Ind.  64;  44  N.  E.  926; 
Ludwig  V.  Cory,  158  Ind.  594;  64 
N.  E.  14. 

Those  signing  the  petition  for 
a  local  option  election  may  with- 
draw their  names  before  it  is  act- 
ed iipon.  jDavia  v.  Henderson, 
127  Ky.  13;  104  S.  W.  1009;  31 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1252;  O'Neal  v.  Mi- 
nary,  101  S.  W.  951;  30  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  888;  125  Ky.  571;  Green  v. 
Smith,  111  Iowa,  183;  82  N.  W. 
448. 

Signers  of  a  petition  to  have  a 
district  declared  "dry"  cannot 
withdraw  their  names  on  the 
ground  that  boys  and  old  men 
would  buy  whisky  in  the  adjoin- 
ing   State.      Clark    v.    Daniel,    77 


Ark.  122;  91  S.  W.  9.  But  ap- 
plications to  withdraw  filed  two 
days  after  the  petition  was  filed 
and  five  days  before  the  date  of 
hearing  was  held  to  be  in  time. 
In  this  case  the  reasons  assigned 
for  withdrawing  was  that  "after 
mature  deliberation"  they  desired 
to  take  their  names  off  the  peti- 
tion; that  they  had  been  "mis- 
led," that  "unjust  means  were 
used  to  secure  signers,"  and  that 
they  were  "inclined  to  the  belief 
that  the  matter  was  not  fairly 
presented"  to  them.  It  was  held 
that  these  were  not  sufficient  rea- 
sons for  a  withdrawal,  no  spe- 
cific reasons  nor  proof  of  facts  be- 
ing presented.  Colvin  v.  Finch, 
75   Ark.    154;    87   S.   W.   443. 

In  Arkansas  it  is  held  that  a 
petitioner  cannot  withdraw  his 
name  witliout  the  consent  of  the 
court.  Bordwell  v.  Dills,  70  Ark. 
175;  66  S.  W.  646;  (citing  Wil- 
liams V.  Citizens,  40  Ark.  290; 
McCullough  V.  Blackwell,  51  Ark. 


§  519  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  860 

Sec.  519.     Qualifications  of  petitioners. 

With  respect  to  a  petition  for  an  election  under  a  local 
option  law  it  is  only  necessary  that  the  requisite  number  of 
qualified  persons  shall,  by  a  petition  in  writing,  indicate  to 
the  proper  court  or  board  their  desire  that  such  an  election 
shall  be  held  in  a  particular  locality  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining whether  or  not  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  shall 
be  prohibited  in  that  locality.'^  In  such  case  the  qualification 
of  the  petitioner  is  a  fact  to  be  inquired  into  and  determined 
by  the  court  or  board  before  acting  upon  the  petition.  It  is 
an  in(iuiry  as  to  a  jurisdictional  fact  which  is  not  dependent 
upon  or  atlected  by  any  allegation,  or  the  absence  of  any 
allegation,  in  the  petition. ^^  And  a  petition  which  states 
that,  "the  undersigned,  citizens  of  said  county,"  sufficiently 
shows  that  the  petitioners  are  qualified  voters  of  the  county, 
where  the  local  option  law  under  which  it  is  filed  provides  that 
they  shall  be  such.  One  of  the  meanings  of  the  word  "citizen" 
as  given  by  Webster,  is  "a  person,  native  or  naturalized,  who 
has  the  privilege  of  voting  for  public  officers,  and  who  is 
qualified  to  fill  offices  in  the  gift  of  the  people."  ^^  But  in  the 
determining  whether  a  petition  for  a  local  option  election  is 
signed  by  the  requisite  qualified  electors  in  the  county,  the 
registration  book  of  the  county  is  not  conclusive  or  even 
prima  facie  evidence  that  the  persons  registered  are  qualified 

164;     10    iS.    W.    261;    Wilson    v.  The     petitioners     may    .dismiss 

Thompson,  56  Ark.  110;    19  S.  W.  their  petition  and  combine  it  with 

321 ;      State     v.     Gerhardt      ( Ind.  a  new  petition.     State  v.  Kellogg. 

Kup.),  44  N.  E.  469;   33  L.  R.  A.  133  Mo.  App.  431;   113  S.  W.  660. 

325;  Can-  v.  Boone,  108  Ind.  241;  If  an  elector  seeks  to  withdraw 

'9   N.    E.    110;    Sutherland   v.   Mc-  his  name  from   a  petition  he   has 

Kinney,    146    Ind.    611;    15    N.   E.  the    burden    to    show    a    sufficient 

1048;    Orcutt  v.  Reingardt,   46   N.  cause  for   the  withdrawal.     In  re 

J.  L.  337;   Grinnell  v.  Adams,  34  Jones  Law  Petition,  30  Ohio  Cir. 

Ohio  St.    44).  Ct.   Rep.   697. 

In  Iowa   the  written  withdraw-  37  Steele  v.   State,    19   Tex.   425. 

al  of  a  consent  for  sale  of  liquors  ss  Eoo  parte  Lynn,   19  Tex.  App. 

need  not  show  the  voting  precinct  294. 

of  the  signer,  as  in  case  of  signa-  39  Ex  parte  Lynn,  19  Tex.  App. 

tures   to  the   statement.     Dyer  v.  294;     Steele     v.     State,     19     Tex. 

Augur  (Iowa),  110  N.  W.  323.  App.  425. 


861 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§519 


voters.  Such  a  registration  is  evidence  of  nothing  except  of 
the  list  of  persons  registered  and  who  have  complied  with 
that  requisite  to  vote.  It  is  that  without  which  one  cannot  be 
a  qualified  elector,  an  essential  prerequisite,  and  yet  not  con- 
ferring the  right.  In  such  case  there  cannot  be  any  qualified 
elector  not  registered,  but  there  may  be  many  registered  and 
not  qualified  electors.  It  may  be  determined  from  the  regis- 
tration boolv  that  the  number  of  qualified  electors  does  not 
exceed  those  shown  by  it.  It  may  be  seen  by  an  inspection 
of  it  that  certain  persons  are  not  qualified  electors  because 
not  registered;  but  it  cannot  be  determined  from  a  registra- 
tion book  that  there  is  a  single  qualified  elector  in  the  county. 
The  right  to  register,  and  being  registered,  and  the  right  to 
vote  are  distinct  and  different  things.  One  may  be  registered 
and  not  be  entitled  to  vote.*"     A  statute  which  authorizes  an 


4oBew  V.  State,  71  Miss.  1;  13 
So.  SGS;  Fergason  v.  State,  71 
Miss.  524;  14  So.  81;  Roesch  v. 
Henry   (Or.),  103  Pac.  439. 

Where   a   statute   provided   that 
a  statement  of  general  consent  to 
the     sale    of     liquors     should     be 
signed   by   sixty-five    per   cent,    of 
the  legal  voters  who  voted  at  the 
last   preceding   election    as    shown 
by    the   poll    lists,    parol    evidence 
was  held   inadmissible  to  identify 
those     signing    the    consent    with 
persons  who  voted  at  the  election 
as  shown  by  the  poll  lists.     Wil- 
son  V.    Bohstedt,    135    Iowa,    451; 
110  N.  W.  898.     In  this  case  the 
court  refused  to  hold  that  "G.  H. 
Meyer"   was   the   same   person    as 
"George  Meyer;"  or  "Henry  Wag- 
ner" as  "H.  C.  Wagner;"  or  "Wil- 
liam Wall"  as  "W.  M.  Wall,"  or 
"William     Border"     as     "W.     H. 
Border." 

A  recital  of  the  order  of  sub- 
mission that  the  required  num- 
ber of  voters  had  signed  the  pe- 
tition    shows    that    the    requisite 


number  of  qualified  voters  had 
signed  it.  State  v.  Foreman,  121 
Mo.   App.   502 ;    97    S.   W.  269. 

In  Mississippi  it  is  held  that 
the  supervisors  should  not  regard 
the  registration  book  of  the  coun- 
ty as  even  prima  facie  evidence 
as  to  who  are  qualified  electors, 
because  persons  may  be  regis- 
tered who  are  not  entitled  to  vote, 
registration  not  conferring  the 
right.  Ferguson  v.  Monroe 
County,  71  Miss.  524;  14  So. 
81. 

Where  a  statute  required  "one- 
tenth  of  the  total  vote  cast  for 
governor  at  the  last  general  elec- 
tion" in  the  town  or  city,  all 
qualified  voters  residing  in  the 
town  or  city  who  voted  at  the 
last  general  election  for  governor 
are  qualified  to  sign  the  petition. 
Ex  parte  Perkins.  34  Tex.  Cr. 
Rep.    429;    31    S.    W.    175. 

"Registered"  voters  in  North 
Carolina,  Pace  v.  Raleigli,  140  N. 
C.  65;   52  S.  E.  277. 

jMembers  of  the  board  may  sign 


§  520  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  862 

order  for  an  election  to  be  made  upon  the  petition  of  a  majority 
of  the  "adult  residents"  of  a  township,  does  not  require  the 
petitioners  to  be  males  or  electors.  Acting  under  the  police; 
power  of  the  State,  a  Legislature  can  pass  an  act  to  prohibit 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  in  specially  designated  terri- 
tories, as,  for  instance,  within  three  miles  of  an  institution  of 
learning,  without  an}'  provision  for  a  petition  from  any 
number  of  inhabitants,  or  order  of  a  county  court.  This  being 
so  there  is  no  good  reason  why  women  and  girls,  if  adults, 
should  not  join  in  such  petitions;.  Thov  are  as  deeply  inter- 
ested in  removing  temptation  to  dissipation  and  vice  and 
preserving  good  morals  in  communities  as  men  are.*^  And 
where  a  statute  provides  "thfif  unon  application,  signed  by 
one-tenth  of  the  voters,"  it  shall  be  the  dutv  of  the  board  of 
supervisors  to  order  an  election  to  determine  whether  or  not 
spirituous  liquors  shall  be  sold  within  the  limits  of  a  county, 
members  of  such  board  mav  sicn  such  application  and  canvass 
for  signers  to  it  without  disqualifying  them  to  act  upon  the 
petition  as  members  of  the  board.  One  does  not  cease  to  be  a 
citizen  by  becoming  a  judge  and  he  may  vote  as  his  judgment 
dictates  or  petition  for  an  opportunity  to  vote,  and  does  not 
thereby  disqualify  himself  as  a  judge  in  the  matter  which 
may  come  before  him.  The  interest  which  disqualifies  a  judge 
is  pecuniary  and  not  political.^- 

Sec.  520.     Territory  embraced  in  petition — Description   of 
territory. 

Usually  there  is  little  trouble  or  doubt  in  the  ascertainment 
of  the  district  in  M-hich  the  election  is  to  be  held,  for  the 
statutes  almost  invariablj'  so  name  the  districts  that  there  is 
no  room  for  construction.  But  one  thing  must  always  be 
borne  in  mind,  and  that  is  that  the  statute  in  this  regard  must 
be  explicitly  followed.  Two  or  more  political  units,  as  desig- 
nated by  the  statute,  cannot  be  combined  unless  the  statute 

the  petition,  and   are  not   thereby  4i  Blackwoll    v.    State,    36    Ark. 

disqualified  to  act.     Lemon  v.  Pey-        178. 

ton,  64  Miss.  161;   8   So.  235.  42  Lemon    v.    Peyton,    64    Miss. 

161:    8   South   235. 


863  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  520 

clearly  provides  for  a  combination.  Thus,  if  the  election  is 
to  be  by  townships,  it  must  be  by  townships  and  not  by 
counties,  and  each  township  must  vote  separately,  unless  the 
statute  authorizes  two  or  more  to  combine  and  hold  a  single 
joint  election  for  their  combined  territory.^^  Where  a  Con- 
stitution provided  that  the  Legislature  should  enact  a  law  by 
which  the  electors  in  any  county,  justice  precinct,  t■o\^^l.  city, 
or  such  subdivision  of  the  county  as  may  be  designated  by  the 
commissioners'  court  may  determine  from  "time  to  time" 
whether  the  sale  of  liquors  shall  be  prohibited,  it  was  held  that 
the  Legislature  could  not  authorize  the  commissioners'  court 
to  combine  two  or  more  justices'  precincts,  but  an  election 
must  be  ordered  separately  for  each  precinct.**  And  it  was 
further  held  that  as  election  precincts  were  subject  to  annual 
changes  they  were  not  such  political  subdivisions  of  a  county 
as  was  contemplated  by  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution, 
and,  therefore,  the  commissioners'  court  could  not  be  author- 
ized to  order  an  election  in  such  precincts.*^  The  Legislature 
in  Canada  has  the  power  to  authorize  a  township  in  another 
county  to  be  included  within  the  district  voting  on  the  ques- 
tion of  local  option. *°  Somewhat  at  variance  with  the  Texas 
decisions  is  one  in  Kentucky.  There  the  Constitution  author- 
ized the  General  Assembly  to  provide  for  local  option  elections 


43  Commissioners    v.    Beall,     98  4.-,  Efird    v.    State,    46    Tex.    Cr. 

Tex.  104;   81  S.  W.  520;  Ex  parte  App.  582;  80  S.  W.  529;  Ex  parte 

Mitchell    (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    79    S.  Pollard,    51    Tex.    Cr.    App.    488; 

W.    558;     Sweeney    v.    Webb,    97  103  S.  W.  878. 

Tex.  250;  Ex  parte  YL&ymiin   (Tex.  *«  Regina  v.   Sbavelear,   11    Ont. 

Cr.  App.),  78  S.  W.  349.  727;    Regina  v.   Monteth,   15    Ont. 

**Ex  parte  Heyman    (Tex.   Cr.  290. 

App.),    78    S.    W.    349;    Ex   parte  In   Texas  it  is  held  that  if  the 

Elliott,  44  Tex.  Cr.  App.  57-5;   72  field  notes   contained  in   the   peti- 

S.  W.  837;  Ex  parte  Mills,  46  Tex.  tion  for  an  election   are  sufficient 

Cr.     App.     224;     79    S.     W.     555;  to  enable   one  to  accurately   trace 

Board  v.   Buchanan,   36   Tex.   Civ.  the  boundaries  of   the   district,   it 

App.   411;    82   S.   W.    194;    Ander-  is   sufficient,    variance    in    the   call 

son    V.    .State,    49    Tex.    Cr.    App.  being  immaterial.     Goble  v.  State, 

195;   92  S.  W.  39.     See  Griffin  v.  42   Te.x.   Cr.   App.   501;    60  S.   W. 

Tucker    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),    119   S.  966. 
W.  338. 


§521 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


864 


in  "any  county,  city,  town,  district,  or  precinct;"  but  this 
was  held  not  to  prevent  the  enactment  of  a  statute  providing 
for  such  an  election  in  a  magisterial  district  of  a  county.'*'" 
Where  part  of  the  district  was  detached  aiter  the  election 
was  ordered  it  was  held  that  those  electors  residing  in  the 
detached  portion  were  still  entitled  to  vote,  and  the  result 
being  for  prohibition,  liquors  could  not  be  sold  in  such  de- 
tached portion.*** 

Sec.  521.     Including  "dry"  territory  in  petition  or  order. 

The  cases  are  not  of  one  result  whether  territory  that  i« 
"dry"  can  be  included  with  territory  that  is  "wet"  in  the 
petition  and  order  for  an  election.  This  is  due  largely  to  the 
provisions  of  the  various  statutes.  Thus,  in  Louisiana  wards 
that  are  already  "dry"  may  be  included  in  the  petition  with 


47  Eggen  V.  Offutt,  128  Ky.  314; 
108  S.  W.  333;  32  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1350. 

48  Hill  V.  Howth  (Tex.),  Ill 
S.  W.  649. 

In  Texas  the  fact  that  the  Leg- 
islature has  autliorized  a  city  to 
issue  a  license  to  sell  liquor  does 
not  prevent  the  county  at  large 
prohibiting  by  election  the  issu- 
ance of  such  license.  Ex  parte 
Elliott,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  108;  91 
S.  W.  570. 

In  Ohio  it  was  held  that  a 
"hamlet"  was  one  of  the  politi- 
cal divisions  for  holding  a  local 
option  election.  Carey  v.  State, 
70  Ohio  St.   121;   70  N.  E.  955. 

In  Texas  an  election  cannot  be 
ordered  in  a  "school  distriat.'" 
Ex  parte  Banks  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
103  S.  W.  1156;  Ex  parte  Haney, 
51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  634;  103  S.  W. 
1155. 

The  fact  that  part  of  the  ter- 
ritory   described    lies    in    another 


State  will  not  make  the  proceed- 
ing invalid  as  to  so  much  as  lies 
in  the  State  where  the  proceedings 
are  had.  Clark  v.  Tower,  104  Md. 
178;    65    Atl.    3. 

The  court  declaring  the  result 
of  the  election  and  declaring  the 
law  to  be  in  force,  cannot  be 
compelled  to  except  from  the  or- 
der a  certain  city  within  the  ter- 
ritory which  is  not  affected  by 
the  election,  unless  the  statute 
makes  it  its  duty  to  do  so.  State 
V.  Mahneler  County  (Ore.),  103 
Pac.    446. 

A  second  petition  overlapping  a 
part  of  the  territory  described  in 
the  first  petition  is  erroneous  and 
void.  Kilcoyne  v.  Hitchins,  30 
Ohio    Cir.    Ct.    Rep.    545. 

See  where  the  change  of  the 
description  of  the  territory  after 
petition  filed  and  election  ordered 
did  not  avoid  the  proceedings. 
Hill  V.  Howth  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
112  S.  W.  707. 


865  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  522 

those  that  are  "wet."  *^  So  where  the  Constitution  authorized 
a  commissioners'  court  to  order  an  election  in  a  justice's  pre- 
cinct and  also  in  a  commissioners'  precinct,  and  a  commis- 
sioners' precinct,  by  a  previous  order  of  such  court,  embraced 
two  justices'  precincts,  one  of  which  was  then  dry,  it  was  held 
that  this  did  not  prevent  the  ordering  of  an  election  for  the 
entire  commissioners'  precinct,  which,  of  course,  would  cover 
the  "dry"  precinct.'"'"  And  where  the  statute  on  local  option 
provided  for  an  election  by  a  county,  and  also  provided  that  the 
result  of  the  election  should  not  affect  any  city  or  town  in  the 
county  where  by  law  the  sale  of  liquors  was  prohibited,  either 
by  high  license  or  local  option,  or  other  legislation,  so  long  as 
such  local  laws  remain  in  force,  it  was  held  that  the  electors 
in  such  city  or  town  had  the  right  to  vote  at  a  county  local 
option  election,  and  necessarily  the  territory  of  such  city  or 
town  must  be  included  in  the  petition  for  an  election. ^^  "Where, 
in  Texas,  a  justice's  precinct  voted  "dry,"  and  no  election 
could  be  held  therein  on  the  question  until  two  years  had 
expired,  and  within  the  two  years  an  election  was  ordered  for 
a  commissioners'  precinct,  which  included  this  justice's  pre- 
cinct and  another  justice's  precinct  that  was  "wet,"  it  was 
held  that  the  election  was  void.^'^ 

Sec.  522.     To  whom  and  the  manner  in  which  the  petition 
must  be  presented — Filing. 
The  petition  must  be  presented  to  the  person,  court,  tri- 
bunal or  board  designated  by  law  for  its  reception,  and  in  the 
manner  therein  prescribed.^^    Thus,  under  a  statute  providing 

49  Hagens  v.  Police  Jury   (La.),  Kilcoyne     v.     Kitchens,     30     Ohio 

46  So.  676.  Cir.  €t.   Rep.   545. 

50'Cofield  V.   Britton    (Tex.   Civ.  An  election  is  not  void  because 

App.),   109   S.   W.  493.  one  of  the  precincts  of  the  district 

A    like    decision    was    made    in  refused   or    omitted    to    vote.      Ex 

Kentucky.     Smith  v.   Patton,    103  parte   Shilling,   38   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

Ky.   444;    45   S.   W.   459;    20   Ky.  287;    42  S.   VV.    553. 

L.  Rep.  165 ;  Cantwell  v.  State,  47  53  /«,  re  Huntsville,  25  Ohio  Cir. 

Tex.  Cr.  App.   521;    85   S.  W.   18.  Ct.  Rep.  535;  People  v.  Decker,  28 

5iCk)le   V.    McClendler,    109    La.  X.   Y.   Misc.   Rep.   699;    60  N.   Y. 

183;   34  S.  E.   384.  Supp.  60;  order  affirmed,  03  N.  Y. 

^2  Ex  parte  Randall,  50  Tex.  Cr.  Supp.  1113. 
App.  519;  98  S.  W.  870.    See  also 


§  522  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUOKS.  866 

that  the  county  jud'ge,  at  the  "next  regular  term"  of  a  count}' 
court,  after  receiving  a  petition  for  an  election,  must  make  an 
order  therefor  on  some  day  not  earlier  than  sixty  days  after 
the  petition  is  lodged  with  him,  it  was  held  that  the  petition 
must  be  received  in  court  and  a  record  made  of  it,  and  that 
an  election  held  on  a  petition  received  by  the  county  judge  out 
of  court  on  one  day,  and  the  election  ordered  the  next,  which 
was  the  first  day  of  the  term,  was  void.^*  Where  the  statute 
required  the  judge  to  direct  an  election  "at  the  next  regular 
term"  of  his  court  "after  receiving"  the  petition,  an  order 
entered  on  the  same  day  the  petition  was  noted  as  filed  on 
the  records  of  the  court  was  held  void,  though  such  day  was 
the  first  day  of  the  term,  the  petition  under  the  law  not  being 
"received"  until  filed.^'^  In  Texas  the  petition  need  not  be 
filed  prior  to  the  convening  of  court.-'"  Where  a  statute  re- 
quired the  petition  to  be  filed  with  the  town  clerk  at  least 
twenty  days  before  the  town  election,  and  another  statute 
declared  the  proposition  relating  to  sales  should  again  be  sub- 
mitted at  the  annual  elections  held  every  second  year  after 
their  first  submission,  upon  written  petition  of  ten  per  cent, 
of  the  electors  at  the  next  preceding  general  election,  "duly 
filed"  with  the  officer  charged  with  furnishing  ballots  for  the 
election,  it  was  held  that  the  last  petition  must  be  filed  at 
least  twenty  days  before  the  town  election/"  In  New  York  a 
statute  required  the  county  clerk  to  furnish  the  ballots  for  the 
election,  and  also  required  a  certified  copy  of  the  petition  to 
be  filed  within  five  days  of  its  receipt  by  the  town  clerk  if 
the  question  was  to  be  submitted  at  a  general  election.  The 
law  was  changed  making  it  the  duty  of  the  town  clerk  to 
furnish  the  ballots.  A  certified  copy  of  a  petition  was  not 
filed  with  the  county  clerk  within  five  days  after  its  receipt 
by  the  tovra  clerk,  but  was  filed  more  than  twenty  days  prior 

54  Wilson  V.  Hine?,  99  Ky.  221;  ss  Loveless    v.    State     (Tex.    Cr. 
33  S.  W.   627.  App.),  49   S.   W.   98. 

55  C  r  e  s  8      V.       Commonwealth  57  People  v.   Town   Clerk,   26  N. 
(Ky.),    37    S.    W.    493;    Ex   parte  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  220;  56  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Sublett,  23  Tex.  App.  309;  4  S.  64;  McMullen  v.  Berean,  29  N. 
W.  894.  Y.  Mis.  Rep.  443;  60  N.  Y.  Supp. 

578. 


867  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  522 

to  the  date  of  the  election,  and  it  was  held  that  the  delay  in 
filing  the  certified  copy  did  not  require  a  resubmission.^^  If 
the  petition  is  filed  by  the  electors  of  a  town  lying  in  two 
counties,  it  must  be  filed  in  the  court  of  that  county  in  which 
the  greater  part  of  the  town  lies.'""  The  clerk  of  the  court 
cannot  order  the  election  where  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  do  SO;  and  if  he  do,  the  election  will  be  invalid.''*'  A  peti- 
tion once  filed  cannot  be  withdrawn  in  order  to  include  other 
territory  in  it  and  then  refile  it.**^  As  the  court  must  deter- 
mine whether  the  petition  is  sufficient,  whether  it  has  the 
requisite  number  of  signatures  and  whether  such  signatures 
are  genuine,  this  calls  for  the  exercise  of  judicial  power,  and 
the  statute,  therefore,  cannot  be  held  unconstitutional  on  the 
ground  that  it  imposes  upon  the  court  administrative  duties."^- 
In  Ohio  where  the  petition  had  to  be  presented  to  the  city 
council,  it  Avas  held  that  the  presentation  was  a  necessity, 
and  could  not  be  dispensed  with — a  jurisdictional  fact — and 
its  presentation  could  not  be  presumed  from  the  fact  that  an 
election  was  ordered;  but  if  it  appears  in  the  record  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  election  was  properly  ordered  unless  the 
proceedings  are  so  irregular  as  to  invalidate  the  order. ''^ 


r-s/n    re    Rice,    95    N.    Y.    App.  407.     See   State   v.   Kellogg    (Mo. 

Div.    28;     88    N.    Y.    Supp.    512;  App.),  113  S.  W.  &60. 

Eggleston  v.  Board,  51  N.  Y.  App,  82  state  v. 'Circuit  Court,  50  X. 

Div.   38;    64  N.  Y.  Supp.   471;   In  J.   L.  585;    15   Atl.   272;   State  v. 

re   Sullivan,   30  N.  Y.   Misc.   Rep.  McElrath,   49    Ore.    294;    89    Pac. 

682;   64  N.  Y.  Supp.   303.     A  pe-  803;    Champion   v.  Board,   5  Dak. 

tion  for   a   resubmission  need   not  416;   41  N.  W.  379. 

be  filed  in  New  York.     In  re  Ber-  63  in  re  Huntsville,  25  Ohio  Cir. 

trand,   40   N.   Y.   Misc.   Rep.   536;  Ct.   Rep.   535. 

82  N.  Y.   Supp.  940.  A   petition   once   presented   can- 

For  computing  tlie  five  days,  see  not   be   withdrawn   and    presented 

In    re    Sullivan,    30    N.    Y.    Misc.  again.      State    v.    Webb,    49    Mo. 

Rep.  682;   64   N.  Y.   Supp.   303.  App.   407.      But   State  v.   Kellogg 

50  Early  v.  Rains    (Ky.),  89   S.  (Mo.  App.),  113  S.  W.  600. 

W.  289;   28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  415.  No    board    or    court    can    order 

60  Marsden     v.     Harlocker,      48  the     election     except     the     board 

Ore.   90;    85    Pac.    328;    Ex  parte  or    court    to    wliich    the    petition 

Haney,  48  Ore.  621;   85  Pac.  332.  must  be  addressed  or  with  which 

ai  State  v.   Webb,   48   Mo.   App.  it    must    be    filed.      Olmstead    v. 


§§523,524        TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  868 

Sec.  523.     Notice  of  hearing. 

If  the  statute  requires  a  hearing  on  the  petition  and  that 
notice  be  given  of  such  hearing,  then  such  notice  of  the 
hearing  must  be  given  as  the  statute  requires;  and  if  the 
notice  fails  to  make  mention  of  the  subject  matter  of  the 
petition  or  proceedings,  an  order  for  the  election  will  be  in- 
valid."* 

Sec.  524.     Order  for  an  election. 

If  a  proper  petition  be  presented  to  the  local  board  or 
court  having  jurisdiction  over  its  subject  matter  it  must  act 
and  grant  the  praj'er  of  the  petition  by  ordering  an  election."^ 
If  the  court  or  board  refuses  to  act,  or  to  act  within  time,  it 
may  be  compelled  to  do  so  by  mandamiLs:""  So  if  the  court 
fails  to  make  the  order  at  the  first  term  after  receipt  of  the 
petition,  it  may  do  so  at  the  next  term;  and  if  it  makes  a 
mistake  in  its  order  it  may  enter  a  new  order,  even  at  the 
next  term."^  If  several  petitions  be  presented  at  the  same 
time  for  separate  precincts,  or  before  the  order  is  made,  each 
sufficient  in  itself,  and  the  court  combine  them  and  order  one 
election  for  the  entire  district  covered  by  them,  the  election 
will  be  valid  if  it  be  carried  with  the  requisite  vote  in  each 

€roacli,   89   Ala.   228;    7    So.   776;  The    ordering   of   an   election    is 

State  V.  Circuit  Court,  50  N.  J.  L.  county      business.      Chapman      v. 

585;    15  Atl.  272.  State,   37   Tex.   Cr.    App.    137;    39 

A  petition  for  local  option  may  S.  W.   113;   Champion  v.  Board,  5 

be  marked  "filed"  at  any  time  of  Dak.  416;   41  X.  W.  739. 

the   proceedings,   and  need  not  be  oe  Attorney      General      v.      Van 

so  marked  when  presented  for  fll-  Buren    Circuit    Judge,    143    Mich, 

ing.     O'Connor  v.  Board    (Idaho),  366;    106  N.  W.   1113;    12  Detroit 

105  Pac.  560.  Leg.  N.  1006;  State  v.  Richardson, 

«*  Middleton      v.      Kobbins,      54  ( Ore. ) ,    85    Pac.    225 ;    Keefer    v. 

]Sr.  J.  L.  see;   25  Atl.   471.  Hlllsdale   County,   109   Mich.  645; 

65  State    V.    Richardson     (Ore.),  67  N.  W.  981. 

85  Pac.  22i5;   Attorney  General  v.  «7  Tousey    v.     De    Huy     (Ky.), 

Van    Buren    Circuit     Judge,     143  62   S.   W.    1118;    23    Ky.   L.   Rep. 

Mich.    366;    106    N.    W.    1113;    12  458.      See    Commonwealth    v.    Mc- 

Detroit   Leg.   N.    1006.  Carty    (Ky.),    76    S..  W.    173;    25 

It   is   a   preliminary   and   not   a  Ky.    L.   Rep.    585. 
final  order.     Haynos  v.  Cass  Coun- 
ty  (Mo.),  115  S.  VV.  1084. 


869 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§524 


precinct."'^  The  order  should  fix  the  day  for  the  election,*'* 
unless  the  law  fixes  the  date  *'^*  and  designate  the  district 
within  which  it  is  to  be  held.'"  If  the  board  have  the  power 
to  order  an  election  whenever  it  deems  it  expedient,  then  it 
is  immaterial  that  the  petition  is  not  sufficient.^'  The  petition 
must  be  recorded  in  the  records  of  the  court  or  board ;  "  but 
if  the  statute  does  not  specify  when  it  shall  be  recorded,  the 
recording-  may  be  made  at  any  time  after  the  order  is  made, 
and  it  will  be  presumed  in  the  absence  of  a  contrary 
showing  that  it  was  duly  recorded.'^^  In  some  States  it  is 
held  that  the  order  must  show  affirmatively  that  the  requisite 
number  of  persons  signed  the  petition,'^*  and  in  others  it 
need  not,^^  while  in  some  of  the  States  it  is  held  that,  in  a 
prosecution  for  the  violation  of  the  local  option  law,  the  pro- 
ceedings cannot  be  collaterally  attacked.^**  In  Canada  it  is 
held  not  necessary  for  the  order  to  name  the  polling  places 


68Tousey  v.  De  Hiiy  (Ky.), 
62  S.  W.  1118;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
458;  Nail  v.  Tinsley,  107  Ky.  441; 
54  S.  W.  187;  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1167. 

69  Puckett  V.  Snider,  22  Ky. 
1718;  61  S.  W.  277;  22  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  1718. 

69*  Attornej^  General  v.  Van 
Buren  Circuit  Judge,  143  Midi. 
366;  106  N.  W.  1113;  12  Detroit 
Leg.  N.  1000. 

70  Kelly  V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  220;  38  S.  W.  779;  39  S.  VV. 
Ill;  Jordan  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  224;  38  S.  W.  780;  39  S. 
W.   110. 

In  two  of  these  cases  the  dis- 
trict was  definitely  described,  but 
referred  to  as  school  districts  for 
which  no  election  could  be  held; 
yet  the  description  was  held  valid. 

An  election  held  without  an 
order  for  it  is  void.  Marsden  v. 
Harlocker,  48  Ore.  90;  85  Pae. 
328 ;  Ex  parte  Hussey,  48  Ore. 
621;  85  Pac.  332. 


71  Lamliert  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  232;  39  S.  VV.  299. 

72  Covert  v.  Munson,  93  Mich. 
603;    53    N.    W.    733. 

73Pitner  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  268;  39  S.  W.  662.  But  see 
Ex  parte  Williams,  35  Tex.  Cr. 
Rep.  75;  31  S.  W.  653. 

If  the  order  bears  a  date  the 
court  will  take  judicial  knowledge 
wlietlier  it  was  made  at  a  reg- 
ular term.  Loveless  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.   App.),   49   S.  W.   601. 

74  Lester  v.  Miller,  76  Miss. 
309;   24  So.   193. 

75  In  re  Rice,  95  X.  Y.  App.  Div. 
28;  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  512;  Dalrym- 
ple  V.  State,  26  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep. 
562. 

76  People  V.  Hamilton,  27  N. 
Y.  Misc.  Rep.  360;  58  N.  Y.  Supp. 
959;  Anderson  v.  State,  39  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  34;  44  S.  W.  824;  State 
V.  Mackin,   51   Mo.  App.   299. 


§  524  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  870 

in  small  villages."'  Where  a  statute  required  the  question  of 
local  option  to  be  submitted  whenever  it  "has  been  prayed 
for  by  the  requisite  number  of  electors"  ''by  resolution" 
declaring  that  fact,  an  order  is  suflficient  in  which  it  is  recited 
that  the  petition  was  signed  by  a  certain  number  of  electors, 
the  number  stated  being  suificient  to  require  the  holding  of 
an  election,  without  a  distinct  previous  resolution  determining 
that  the  submission  had  been  requested  by  the  requisite 
number  of  electors.'*^  And  where  there  were  several  petitions 
for  elections  in  as  many  election  precincts,  but  which  con- 
stituted one  masiistorial  district,  an  order  on  all  these  peti- 
tions reciting  that  a  sufficient  number  of  voters  of  the  district 
had  signed  the  petitions  and  directing  an  election  be  called, 
was  held  sufficient  without  a  recital  that  a  sufficient  number 
in  each  precinct  had  signed  the  petitions.'^  The  order  may 
be  amended  by  a  nunc  pro  tunc  entry  if  there  be  sufficient 
data  from  which  to  amend  it,  as  where  the  clerk  wrongly 
copied  the  order  into  the  records  and  the  original  order  was 
still  in  existence.^"  But  where  it  was  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  designate  the  newspapers  in  which  notice  of  the  election 
should  be  published,  it  was  held  that  the  omission  in  this 
respect  could  not  be  -^ -applied,  even  though  notices  had  actually 
been  published  in  the  requisite  number  of  newspapers.^^ 
Where  a  statute  provided  for  calling  an  election  to  determine 

-T  In  re  Salter  [1902],  4  Ont.  L.  Contra,  State  v.   Bird,    108   Mo. 

R.  — ;  In  re  Mace,  42  Up.  Can,  p.  App.   163;   83  S.  W.  284. 

76;    In   re    Huson,    19    Ont.   App.  ''o  Commonwealth        v.         Jones 

343.      So    also    held      in     Texas,  (Ky.),  84  S.   W.   305;    27   Ky.  L. 

wliere    electors    not    misled.      Ex  Rep.  16;  In  re  Rice,  95  X.  Y.  App. 

parte  Mayer,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  36;  Div.  28;   88  N.  Y.  Supp.  512. 

44  S.  W.  831.  so  state  v.   Bird,    108   Mo.   App. 

-s  People  V.  Hamilton,  143  Mich.  163;  82  S.  \V.  284.  See  later 
1;  106  N.  W.  275;  12  Detroit  Missouri  decisions  cited  below. 
Leg.  N.  897 ;  Attorney  General  v.  Where  tlie  clerk  used  the  word 
Van  Buren  'Circuit  Judge,  143  "same"  instead  of  "sale,"  in  a 
Mich.  366;  106  N.  W.  1113;  12  criminal  prosecution  he  was  al- 
Detroit  Leg.  N".  1006;  Common-  lowed  to  correct  the  record.  Cant- 
wealth  V.  Jones  (Ky.),  84  S.  W.  well  v.  'State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
305;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  Ifi;  In  re  521;  85  S.  W.  19. 
Rice,  95  K  Y.  App.  Div.  28;  88  si  state  v.  Baldwin,  109  Mo. 
N.  Y.  Supp.  512.  App.  573;  83  S.  W.  266. 


871 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§524 


whether  sales  of  liquor  should  be  prohibited  "except  for 
medicinal  and  sacramental  purposes,"  and  the  order  calling 
an  election  concluded  with  the  words  "except  for  the  pur- 
poses and  under  the  regulations  prescribed  by  law,"  and  pro- 
vided that  those  who  favored  prohibition  should  vote  a  printed 
ticket  with  the  words  "for  prohibition"  on  it,  and  those  who 
opposed  it  one  with  the  words  "against  prohibition"  on  it, 
it  was  held  that  the  order  was  not  defective  because  of  the 
words  quoted,  it  being  apparent  from  the  remainder  of  the 
order  that  these  words  referred  to  the  local  option  law.^-  It 
is  not  necessary  that  the  order  show  who  were  appointed  to 
hold  the  election  where  the  presiding  officers  of  the  general 
election  theretofore  acted  in  the  premises.^^  The  order  may 
be  recorded  at  a  subsequent  term  of  the  court  ordering  the 
election.^*  The  order  for  an  election  need  not  contain  the 
statutory   exceptions   in   favor   of   wines   for  medicinal    and 


82  Sweeney  v.  Webb,  33  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  324;  76  S.  W.  ('66 
(Tex.),  77  S.  W.  135. 

See  also  Racer  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  73  S.  W.  968. 

83  Nelson  v.  State,  44  Xex.  Cr. 
App.  595;   75  S.  W.  502. 

»*  Ex  parte  Walton,  45  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  74;   74  S.  W.  314. 

In  Texas  it  is  held  that  a  local 
option  election  is  not  invalid  be- 
cause the  county  judge  was  not 
present  at  the  opening  day  of  the 
term,  there  being  a  quorum  of  the 
judges  present.  Racer  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  73  S.  W.  968. 
If  a  statute  or  the  Consti- 
tution provide  that  if  the  judge 
of  the  county  be  not  present,  the 
judge  of  an  adjoining  county  shall 
have  jurisdiction,  and  on  the  open- 
ing of  the  court  the  judge  of  a 
county  be  not  present,  whereupon 
tlic  petitioners  pri'sent  it  tu  the 
judge  of  an  adjoining  county,  they 
waive    their    right   to    present    to 


the  judge  of  their  own  county. 
In  re  Munson,  95  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
23;   88  N.  Y.  Supp.  509. 

The  original  minutes  of  tlie 
court  containing  the  order  of  sub- 
mission may  be  used  to  prove  the 
law  is  in  force.  Holley  v.  State, 
46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  324;  81  S.  VV. 
957. 

In  Kentucky  a  statute  authoriz- 
ing the  entrance  of  the  order  at 
the  next  term  after  a  petition  is 
filed,  one  entered  at  the  same  term 
it  was  filed  is  invalid.  Common- 
wealth v.  McCarty  (Ky. ),  76  S. 
W.  173;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  5»5;  Ex 
parte  Sublett,  23  Tex.  App.  309; 
4  S.  W.  894. 

Where  the  order  for  an  elec- 
tion was  made,  to  be  held  on  a  cer- 
tain day,  and  nothing  more  was  en- 
tered, the  president  of  the  board, 
it  was  held,  could  not  provide  the 
inaehim-yy  (f  r.iv  flection  I'V  a 
proclamation  for  he  had  no  more 
authority  in  the  premises  than  an 


§524 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


872 


sacramtntal  purposes, ^^  but  it  must  provide  for  the  submis- 
sion of  the  propositions  prayed  for  in  the   petition.     Thus, 


individual.  The  election  was  void. 
Police  jury  v.  Ponchatoula,  1 18 
La.  138;  42  So.  725. 

If  the  board  of  its  own  accord 
can  order  an  election,  it  need  not 
record  the  petition.  McGovern  v. 
State  (Tex,  Civ.  App.),  90  S.  W. 
502. 

A  recital  in  an  order  that  a 
"petition  had  been  signed"  sliows 
that  it  was  a  "written  petition." 
Nail  V.  Tinsley,  107  Ky.  441; 
64  S.  W.  1«7;  21  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1167;  In  re  Huntsville,  25  Ohio 
<]r.  Ct.  Rep.  535. 

A  petition  was  addressed  to 
"Robert  I.  Burke,  judge  of  the 
probate  court,"  etc.  The  order  for 
the  election  was  headed  "State  of 
Alabama,  Cullman  County,  Pro- 
bate Court."  It  recited  the  filing 
of  the  petition,  and  that  it  was 
therefore  "ordered,  adjudged  and 
decreed  by  his  court  that  the  9th 
day  of  December,  1907,  be  set  as 
the  day  for  holding  said  elec- 
tion." The  order  was  signed  by 
"Robert  I.  Burke,  judge  of  pro- 
bate." This  was  held  to  be  an 
order  of  the  probate  court  and  not 
of  the  probate  judge,  and  was 
valid.  Richter  v.  State  ( Ala. ) , 
47  So.  163;  Olmstead  v.  Crook, 
89  Ala.  228;   7  S.  E.   776. 

To  render  an  election  void  be- 
cause there  is  a  variance  in  the 
description  of  the  territory  in  the 
order  for  the  election  and  the  one 
declaring  its  result,  it  must  be  a 
material  variance,  and  mere  dis- 
crepancfes  in  tTie  field  notes  in  the 
petition  ancT  two  orders  is  imma- 
terial, if  the  exact  boundaries  at- 


tempted to  be  designated  can  be 
ascertained  with  legal  certainty. 
(Joble  V.  State,  42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
501;  (50  S.  VV.  966. 

If  the  election  covers  the  whole 
of  a  political  division  of  a  State, 
it  need  not  be  described  by  metes 
and  bounds.  Nicliols  v.  State,  37 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  546;  40  S.  W.  268; 
Fitze  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
85  S.  VV.  1156.  See  Bowman  v. 
State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  14;  40  S. 
W.  796;  41  S.  W.  635. 

A  statute  requiring  an  order  to 
be  made  at  the  "next  regular 
term"  after  a  petition  is  filed, 
does  not  prevent  the  filing  at  a 
special  term  of  the  court  called 
for  tlie  reception  and  filing  of  such 
petitions;  and  the  election  may 
be  ordered  at  the  next  regular 
term.  Smith  v.  Patton,  103  Ky. 
444 ;  45  S.  W.  459 ;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
165;  on  the  ordering  of  an  election 
at  a  special  session,  see  Ex  parte 
Snblett,  23  Tex.  App.  309;  4  S. 
W.  894. 

85  Shields  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  252;  42  S.  W.  398;  Frickie 
V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  254; 
45  S.  W.  810. 

An  order  for  an  election  car- 
ries a  presumption  tliat  a  proper 
petition  was  filed,  and  that  it  was 
signed  by  the  requisite  number  of 
electors.  Dalrymple  v.  State,  2'6 
Ohio   Cir.    Ct.    Rep.    562. 

The  order  need  not  show  the 
name  of  the  presiding  officer. 
Fitze  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
•85  S.   W.    1156. 

The  order  may  be  made  at  a 
special  term  of  the  board  of  com- 


873 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§524 


where  the  petition  prayed  that  the  question  whether  druggists 
should  be  allowed  to  sell  liquors  should  be  submitted  to  a 
vote  in  addition  to  the  submission  of  the  general  question 
of  sales,  it  was  held  that  the  order  must  submit  both  ques- 
tions for  the  consideration  of  the  electors;  the  petition  must 
be  submitted  as  a  whole,  and  so  adopted  or  rejected.^^    Unless 


missioners.  Hanna  v.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  269;  87  S.  W.  702; 
Koch  V.  Stat<>,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
346;  88  S.  W.  809. 

Where  a  board  of  its  own  mo- 
tion may  order  an  election,  after 
ordering  one  on  petition,  it  may 
on  its  own  motion  order  one.  Ilan- 
na  V.  State,  supra. 

An  order  for  resubmission  con- 
taining a  recital  that  it  was  made 
at  a  special  term  of  court  shows  it 
is  the  order  of  the  court  and  not 
of  the  judge.  In  re  Munson,  95 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  23;  88  N.  Y. 
Supp.  509. 

If  the  statute  requires  four 
propositions  to  be  submitted  to  the 
voters,  and  one  is  omitted,  the  or- 
der of  submission  is  improper.  In 
re  Munson,  95  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  23 ; 
88  N.  Y.  Supp.  509. 

When  the  statute  required  the 
question  to  be  submitted  "wheth- 
er" local  option  should  be  adopted, 
an  order  submitting  the  qviestion 
"whether  or  not"  it  should  be 
adopted,  is  valid.  Thurmond  v. 
State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  162;  79 
S.  W.  316;  Wade  v.  State,  53 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  184;  109  S.  W.  191; 
nor  is  it  necessary  to  recite  tha*' 
it  is  submitted  at  an  election  t 
be  held  by  the  "qualified  voters' 
of  the  district.  Thurmond  v. 
State,  svpra.  Xor  is  it  objec- 
tionable that  it  designate  a  day 
different  from  that  named  in  the 


petition.  Thurmond  v.  State,  su- 
pra. 

86  Erwin  v.  Benton,  120  Ky.  536; 
87  S.  W.  291;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
909.  In  this  case  the  submis- 
sion was  "whether  or  not  spiritu- 
ous," etc.,  "liquors  shall  be  sold," 
etc.,  "within  the  town  of,"  etc., 
"and  that  the  provisions  of  this 
law  and  prohibition  shall  apply 
to  druggists,"  and  it  was  held 
properly  worded,  neither  mislead- 
ing nor  contradictory.  See  In  re 
Rice,  95  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  28;  88 
N.  Y.   Supp.   512. 

Where  a  statute  requires  the 
local  board  to  determine  that  a 
petition  was  signed  by  the  requi- 
site number  of  voters,  it  will  be 
presumed,  in  a  prosecution  for 
selling  liquor  illegally  that  the 
law  was  complied  with  in  that  re- 
spect. People  V.  Hamilton,  143 
Mich.  1;  106  N.  W.  275;  12  De- 
troit Leg.   N.   897. 

If  the  description  of  the  boun- 
daries of  the  district  be  uncer- 
tain as  set  out  in  the  order,  the 
election  is  invalid.  Ex  parte 
Waits  (Te.x.  Cr.  App.).  64  S.  W. 
254. 

In  Texas  the  commissioners' 
court  may  name  any  person  to 
hold  the  election.  Kelly  v.  State, 
37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  220;  38  S.  W. 
779;  39  S.  W  111.  So  in  Ken- 
tucky. Puckett  V.  Snider,  110  Ky. 
261;  61  S.  W,  277;  22  Ky.  L. 
Rep.   1718. 


§524 


TRiVFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


874 


a  statute  provide  for  it,  no  appeal  lies  from  an  order  for  an 
election.^"  Where  the  statute  required  the  local  board  to 
order  notice  of  the  election  to  be  published  for  four  ' '  consecu- 
tive" weeks,  and  the  order  was  for  four  ''successive"  weeks, 
it  was  held  that  the  variance  was  not  fatal.^^^  The  fact  that 
the  board  ordered  notices  not  provided  for  in  the  statute  to 
be  given  does  not  vitiate  the  election.^®  A  provision  that  the 
election  be  held  at  "boxes"  instead  of  "places"  as  the  statute 
provides  is  net  so  misleading  as  to  prevent  a  fair  vote,  and  the 
election  is  not  void  for  that  reason.***^  Where  a  statute  re- 
quires notices  to  be  posted  at  five  public  places  in  a  county, 
an  order  requiring  them  to  be  posted  in  five  places,  not  saying 
these  places  should  be  public  places,  and  not  designating  how 
long  they  should  be  posted,  is  a  sufficient  compliance  with  its 
provisions."^  If  the  statute  provides  for  an  election  to  deter- 
mine   whether    liquor    shall    be    "sold,"    the    court    cannot 


87  O'Neal  V.  Minary,  125  Ky. 
571;  101  S.  W.  951;  30  Ky.  L. 
Rep.   888. 

In  Missouri  the  statute  requires 
the  local  board  to  specifically  set 
forth  that  the  requisite  petition 
had  been  filed,  and  this  is  juris- 
dictional. State  V.  McCord.  124 
Mo.  App.  €3;  100  S.  W.  1129. 
(In  this  case  the  order  recited 
that  one-tenth  of  tlie  voters  and 
taxpayers  of  the  district  signed 
the  petition,  when  the  statute  re- 
quired one-tenth  of  the  voters, 
and  the  election  was  held  void. 
State  V.  McCord,  207  :\ro.  519; 
106  S.  W.  27.  But  if  the  proper 
recitals  are  in  the  order,  it  is  con- 
clusive on  the  question  of  juris- 
diction. State  V.  Hitchcock,  124 
Mo.  App.  101;  101  S.  W.  117.  See 
State  V.  McCord,  supra. 

88  State  V.  Hitchcocii,  124  Mo. 
App.    101;    101   S.    W.    117. 


89Neal  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  101  S.  W.  1139;  Huff  V. 
iState  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  101  S.  W" . 
1144. 

ooXeal  V.  State,  supra;  Huff  v. 
State,  supra. 

oiMagill  V.  State.  51  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  357;    103  S.  W.  397. 

Where  new  territory  was  added 
to  the  voting  district  on  election 
day,  and  it  appeared  that  the  re- 
sult would  have  been  the  same 
if  it  had  not  been  added,  the  elec- 
tion was  held  valid  as  to  the  pre- 
vious district.  Ex  parte  Curlee, 
51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  614;  103  S.  W. 
896. 

In  Michigan  it  is  held  that 
where  tlie  law  fixes  the  time  wlien 
the  different  proceedings  under  it 
shall  be  made  matter  of  record, 
and  signed  by  the  proper  official, 
it  is  mandatory,  and  a  •failure  to 
comply  with  the  law  will  vitiate 
the  proceedings.  Covert  v.  Mun- 
son,  93  Mich.  603;   53  N.  W.  783. 


875 


LOCAL   OPTION 


§524 


extend  the  terms  of  the  statute  by  enlarging  the  question 
.vhether  it  should  be  "bartered  or  exchanged."  ^-  The  order  of 
election  must  be  addressed  to  the  officer  authorized  to  hold 
elections.  Where  the  local  option  law  provided  that  the  order 
for  election  should  be  addressed  "to  the  sheriff  or  other 
officer  of  said  county  who  may  be  appointed  to  hold  said 
election,"  and  another  section  of  the  same  act  provided  that 
all  elections  should  "be  held  by  such  officers  as  would  be  qual- 
ified to  hold  elections  for  county  officers,"  it  was  held  that  an 
order  for  a  city  local  option  election  was  properly  addressed 
to  the  sheriff  of  the  county,  and  not  to  the  city  officers.**^ 
Where  the  order  recited  that  the  election  "should  be  con- 
ducted, the  returns  thereof  made,  and  the  result  ascertained 
and  determined,  in  accordance  in  all  respects  with  the  laws 
and  ordinances  governing  municipalities  in  the  city,"  and 
that  was  a  literal  copy  of  the  words  of  the  statute,  it  was 
held  sufficient. ***    If  the  statute  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  clerk 


92  Ex  parte  Beaty,  21  Tex.  App. 
426;  1  S.  W.  451;  Hubbard  v. 
CommonAvealth,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)    683. 

A  statute  required  an  airidavit 
of  some  reputable  person  show- 
ing that  he  personally  witnessed 
the  signing  of  each  name  appear- 
ing on  the  petition.  On  a  trial  of 
the  contest  of  an  election  it  was 
stipulated  that  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  signatures  was  attached  to 
the  petition,  and  that  they  were 
genuine  signatures  of  qualified 
persons.  It  was  held  that  evi- 
dence that  the  persons  making  the 
affidavits  were  not  reputable  per- 
sons was  inadmissible.  In  re  Can- 
vass  (Iowa),  95  N.  W.  194. 

If  objections  be  made  that  the 
signatures  to  a  petition  are  not 
genuine,  the  board  hearing  the 
application  or  contest  must  give 
opportunity,  by  adjournment  if 
necessary,    for    the    production    of 


evidence  concerning  them.  Mad- 
ison Co.  V.  Powell.  75  Miss.  7G2; 
23   So.    425. 

Number  of  signatures  for  coun- 
ty petition  when  a  city  within  the 
county  is  excluded.  Roper  v. 
Scurlock,  29  Tex.  €iv.  App.  464; 
69    S.   W.   456. 

Members  of  the  board  signing 
the  petition  are  not  disqualified 
thereby  to  act  thereon.  Lemon  v. 
Peyton,  64  Miss.  161;  8  So.  235. 

03  Commonwealth  v.  Green.  98 
Ky.  21;  32  S.  W.  169. 

0^  State  V.  Dugan,  110  Mo.  138; 
19  S.  W.  195. 

A  statute  required  the  ques- 
tion submitted  to  be  whether 
or  not  the  sale  of  "intoxicat- 
ing liquors  and  medicated  liquors 
producing  intoxication"  should  be 
prohibited,  and  the  statute  was 
changed  so  the  question  was 
whether  the  sale  only  of  "intox- 
icating   liquors"    should    be    pro- 


§  525  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  876 

to  post   elet'tion  notices,  the   order  need   not  direct  him   to 
do  so.^' 

Sec.  525.     Board  of  supervisors  in  Michigan — Conclusive- 
ness of  orders. 

The  Legislature  of  Michigan  in  1889  enacted  a  "local-option 
law,"  which  among  other  things  provided  that  a  board  of 
supervisors  might  by  resolution  determine  and  declare  whether 
the  necessary  preliminaries  had  been  taken  to  warrant  them 
in  issuing  an  order  directing  that  an  election  should  be  held 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the  local  option  law 
should  be  applied  and  enforced  in  a  given  locality.  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  that  State  held  that  where  a  board  of  super- 
visors had  obtained  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  in 
such  case  by  the  call  of  the  county  clerk,  and  by  petitions  the 
validity  of  which  appeared  signed  by  a  sufficient  number  to 
authorize  the  county  clerk  to  act,  the  determination  of  the 
board  was  final,  and  that  the  statute  wisely  made  it  so,  and 
that  the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  confer  upon  the  boards 
of  supervisors  to  so  determine  was  amply  provided  for  by  the 
Constitution  of  the  State  which  declares  that  the  Legislature 
may  confer  upon  organized  townships,  incorporated  cities  and 
villages,  and  upon  the  board  of  supervisors  of  the  several 
counties  such  powers  of  a  local  legislative  and  administrative 

hibited;     but    the    order    was    for  ess.     Gilbert  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 

an  election  to   determine  whether  Rep.  596;  25  S.  W.  632. 
or    not   the   sale    of    "intoxicating  ^^  Aaron   v.   State,    34   Tex.   Cr. 

liquors  and  medicated  liquors  pro-  Rep.  103;   29  S.  W.  267. 
ducing     intoxication"     shovild     be  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  hear- 

prohibited.     It  was  held  that  the  ing  the  petition  to  compel  the  at- 

order  was  not  so  misleading  as  to  tendance  of  witnesses.    In  re  Jones 

invalidate  the  election.     Dillard  v.  LaAV    Petition.    30    Ohio    Cir.    Ct. 

State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  470;  20  S.  Rep.  705. 

W.  1106.  The  board  hearing  the  petition 
If  the  statute  requires  a  copy  may  collect  and  collate  the  re- 
ef the  order  to  be  posted  as  a  no-  quired  statutory  facts,  to  enable 
tice,  the  seal  of  the  court  need  it  to  order  tlie  election,  through 
not  be  attached;  for  it  is  not  a  committee  appointed  for  that 
"process"  within  the  meaning  of  purpose.  Giddings  v.  Wells,  99 
a  statute  on  the  subject  of  proc-  Mich.  221;  58  N.  W.  64. 


877  LOCAL  OPTION.  §526 

character  as  they  maj'  deem  proper."*'  Under  that  statute 
it  was  also  held  that  it  was  competent  for  the  board  of  su- 
pervisors, when  convened  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
whether  or  not  under  an  election  under  the  local  option  law 
had  been  prayed  for  by  the  requisite  number  of  electors, 
to  appoint  a  committee  to  collect  and  collate  the  required 
statutory  facts,  and  that  the  adoption  of  the  report  of 
such  a  committee,  and  of  a  resolution  enacted  thereunder 
declaring  and  determining  that  such  election  had  been  prayed 
for  by  the  requisite  number  of  electors  was,  in  legal  effect,  a 
declaration  and  determination  of  the  board  of  supervisors  of 
that  fact,  and  it  could  not  be  presumed  that  the  fact  that  the 
report  was  made  excluded  from  their  inquiry  as  to  the  requisite 
number  of  signers  or  that  the  members  of  the  board  did  not 
verify  the  facts  set  forth  in  the  report,  or  did  not  avail  them- 
selves of  any  other  means  of  information."^  It  has  also  been 
held  in  that  State  that  it  was  not  within  the  discretion  of  a 
board  of  supervisors  to  refuse  to  call  an  election  for  a  resub- 
mission of  the  question  upon  the  presentation  of  a  petition 
answering  the  requirements  of  the  statutes,'''* 

Sec.  526.     Signing  record. 

Under  a  local  option  law  which  provides  that  the  board  of 
supervisors  of  a  county  shall  determine  whether  a  sufficient 
number  of  electors  have  petitioned  for  an  election,  the  board 
shall  so  declare  and  make  an  order  calling  the  election  and 
fixing  the  date  when  it  shall  be  held,  and  that  "such  order 
shall  be  entered  in  full  upon  the  journal  of  the  proceedings  of 
the  board  for  that  day,  and  the  same  shall  be  signed  by  the 
acting  chairman  and  clerk  of  the  board  before  the  final  ad- 
journment,'' the   unsigned   and  unauthenticated  proceedings 

90  Friesner   v.   Common  Council,  visors,   109   Mich.   G+S;    67   N.   VV. 

'91    Mich.    504;      52     N.     W.     18;  981.      See    also   People  v.    Hamil- 

Tliomas  v.  Abbott,  105  Mich.  687;  ton,  143  Mich.  1;   106  N.  W.  275; 

63    N.    W.    984;    Michigan   Const.  12    Detroit   Leg.    N.    897;    Attor- 

art.  iv,  sec.  38.  ney    General    v.    Van    Buren    Cir- 

97  Backus  V.  County  Supervisors,  cuit  Judge,  143  Mich.  366;  106 
99  Mich.  221;  58  N.  W.  62.  X.    W.    1113;    12   Detroit   Leg.   N. 

98  Keefer  v.  Hillsdale  Co.  Super-  1006. 


§  527  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  878 

of  such  board  of  supervisors  cannot  be  said  to  be  such  a 
record  as  the  law  requires  to  be  made  in  order  to  give  effect 
to  its  provisions.  The  statute  in  such  cases  is  mandatory."" 
It  requires  a  record  duly  authenticated,  noi:  only  that  the 
result  may  be  evidenced  in  an  enduring  form,  but  that  it  may 
be  seen  and  known  whether  the  board  has  acted  within 
the  limits  of  the  power  conferred  or  not/  It  is  sufficient, 
however,  in  such  eases  if  the  proceedings  are  signed  after 
the  close  of  the  session  of  the  board.  This  accords  with  the 
usual  practice  of  such  boards  in  the  signing  of  records,  the 
journal  of  each  daily  session  being  signed  after  its  close.  In 
many  instances  such  records  are  signed  after  final  adjourn- 
ment.- And  where,  in  the  record  of  a  day's  proceedings  of 
such  board,  other  matters  appear  besides  the  resolution  or 
order  of  the  board  directing  the  holding  of  a  local  election,  it 
is  proper  to  omit  such  irrelevant  matter  from  the  notices 
served  and  posted  and  to  append  thereto  the  signatures  of  the 
clerk  and  chairman  found  at  the  close  of  the  day's  proceed- 
ings as  recorded.^  But  a  statute  may  dispense  with  a  sign- 
ing, and  none  is  required  unless  the  statute  specifically  so 
provides.* 

Sec.  527.    Appeal  from  order  for  election. 

Unless  a  statute  provides  for  it,  no  appeal  lies  from  an  order 
providing  for  an  election ;  but  in  some  jurisdictions  a  writ 
of  certiorari  may  be  issued  to  revise  the  action  of  the  board 
or  lower  court  making  the  order.'"'     But  a  statute  providing 

99  Covert    V.    Munson,    9.3    Mich.  ■*  Davidson  v.  State,  44  Tex.  Cr. 

603;   53   N.   W.   733.     See  Richter  App.   586;    73   S.   W.    808;    Roper 

V.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  163.  v.     Scurlock,    29    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

1  Pearsall  v.  Supervisors,  71  464;  69  S.  W.  456,  interlineations 
Mich.  438;  39  N.  W.  578;  Wes-  before  the  signin<(  does  not  ren- 
ton  V.  Monroe,  84  Mich.  341 ;  4t>  der  the  order  void.  Bruce  v. 
N.  W.   446.  State    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  35   S.  W. 

2  Covert    V.    Munson,    93    Mich.  383. 

603;    53   N.   W.    733;    Thomas   v.  5  Champion    v.    Board,    5    Dak. 

Abbott,   105  Mich.  687;    63  N.   W.  416;    41    X.    W.     739;     Miller   v. 

084.  Jones,  80  Ala.   89;    State  v.   Rob- 

3  Thomas  v.  Abbott,  105  Mich.  bins,  54  N.  J.  L.  568;  25  Atl. 
687;  63  X.  W.  984.  471. 


879  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  528 

generally  for  appeals  from  orders  of  a  board  of  super- 
visors authorizes  an  appeal  from  their  order  upon  a  petition 
for  a  local  option  election.*'  In  the  case  just  cited  the  stat- 
ute gave  the  right  of  appeal  to  any  citizen  of  the  county. 
In  New  Jersey  it  was  held  that  a  citizen  who  appears  before 
the  board  of  supervisors,  in  pursuance  of  a  notice  published 
of  the  hearing  on  the  petition,  and  objects  to  the  ordering 
of  an  election,  gains  such  a  standing  as  entitles  him  to  sue  out 
a  writ  of  certiorari  to  test  the  proceedings,  and  that  an  inn- 
keeper who  held  a  license  to  sell  liquors  was  entitled  to  the 
writ.^  If  the  order  of  the  board  for  the  election  is  con- 
clusive that  all  necessary  steps  have  been  taken,  then  no  ap- 
peal lies  from  it.* 

Sec.  528.    Petition  and  order  for  resubmission. 

Statutes  in  some  States  provide  for  a  resubmission  of  local 
option  questions,  usually  after  a  certain  period  of  time  has 
expired.  This  may  be  done,  where  the  statute  authorizes  it, 
without  an  additional  petition.'*  In  New  York  an  order  for 
resubmission  will  not  be  granted  for  errors  of  the  town  clerk 

6  Ferguson  v.  Monroe  Co.,  71  lips  v.  Goe,  85  Ark.  304;  108  S. 
Miss.   524;    14  So.   81;    Spencer  v.        W.  207. 

Washington    Co.     (Miss.),    45    So.  A  licensee  has  sufficient  interest 

863.  to  entitle  him  to  appeal   from  an 

7  State  V.  Robbins,  54  N.  J.  L.  order  of  prohibition.  Miller  v. 
566;    25   Atl.   471,   reversing   Mid-  Jones,  80  Ala.  89. 

dleton  V.  Robbins,  53  N.  J.  L.  555 ;  Where  an  appeal  lies  certiorari 

22  Atl.  481.  will  not  lie.     State  v.  Schmitz,  65 

8  Thomas   v.   Abbott,    105   Mich.       Iowa  556;  22  N.  W.  673. 

687;    63   N.  W.   984.  ^  In  re  Bertrand,  40  N.  Y.  Misc. 

In    Arkansas    a     person,     four  Rep.    536;    82    N.    Y.    Supp.    940. 

months  after  granting  an  order  for  See  In  re  Krieger,  59  N.  Y.  App. 

prohibition,  who   files  an  affidavit  346;   69  N.   Y.  Supp.  851. 

for  an  appeal  does  not  make  him-  Objectors  to   tlie  ordering  of   a 

self   a    party   to   tlie    proceedings,  resubmission  must  make  a  formal 

and    cannot     appeal       Holmes     v.  application   therefor,   and    usually 

Morgan,    52    Ark.    99;    12    S.    W.  give    notice;    at   least    this    is    so 

201.       And    persons    not    signing  in  New  York.      In  re  Munson,  95 

to  a  petition  for  revocation  of  an  N.    Y.    App.    Div.    23;    S>8    N.    Y. 

order  of  prohibition   are  not  "ag-  Supp.  509. 
grieved"  and  cannot  appeal.    Phil- 


§  528  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  880 

in  printing  in  his  notice  of  the  election  the  caption  of  the 
questions  only  once,  and  in  printing  them  on  the  ballot  with- 
out printing  the  caption,  the  notice  and  ballots  being  in  other 
respects  sufficient.^'*  But  where  the  clerk  added,  imauthor- 
izedly,  a  question  to  the  four  statutory  questions,  this  was  held 
to  call  for  a  resubmission.^^  So  in  that  State  an  application 
for  resubmission  was  denied  where,  through  the  laches  of  the 
applicant  the  result  of  the  order  would  be  to  authorize  hotel 
keepers  to  sell  liquor,  regardless  of  the  result  of  the  vote  on 
resubmission,  from  the  date  of  the  order  until  the  date  the 
result  of  the  election  would  take  effect.^-  If  the  first  pro- 
ceedings Avere  void,  then  there  can  be  no  resubmission.^^ 
Where  a  statute  enacted  in  1896  provided  for  a  resubmission 
on  petition  of  the  question  of  prohibition  every  two  years, 
and  an  election  was  held  the  next  year,  resulting  in  a  prohi- 
bition majority,  and  the  next  year  (1897)  and  after  the  an- 
nual election  at  which  the  question  had  been  submitted,  the 
laws  were  changed  so  as  to  make  the  annual  election  in  No- 
vember, 1898,  instead  of  March,  1899,  and  in  1898,  a  statute 
was  enacted  providing  that  the  questions  of  sale  or  no  sale 
should  be  voted  upon  at  the  general  election  of  that  year,  but 
might  be  resubmitted  (without  saying  anything  about  the 
necessity  of  a  petition)  at  the  general  election  of  1901,  and 
biennially  thereafter,  it  was  held  that  there  could  be  no  re- 
submission without  a  petition ;  and  if  there  was,  the  election 
was  void,^*  Statutes  occasionally,  however,  require  an  an- 
nual submission  of  the  local  option  question.  Usually  it  is 
in   those    States    where    prohibition    prevails    throughout   the 

10  People  V.   Edwards,  42  X.  Y.  n  In  re  Smith,  44  X.  Y.   Misc. 

Misc.   Rep.   567;    87   X.   Y.   Supp.  Eep.  384;  89  X.  Y.  Supp.   1006. 

618;  In  re  Merow,  112  X.  Y.  App.  ^^  In  re  Town  of  Lafayette,   45 

Div.  562;   99  X.  Y.  State  9;  In  re  X.   Y.  Misc.   141;    91   X.   Y.   Supp. 

Clipperly,    50    X.    Y.    Misc.    Rep.  970 ;  order  affirmed  93  X.  Y.  Supp. 

266;   100  X.  Y.  Supp.  473;   People  534;   105  X'.  Y.  App.  Div.  25. 

V.   Chandler,   41   X.   Y.   App.   Div.  is/,,,  re  Getmar,  28  X.  Y.  Misc. 

178;    58    X.    Y.    Supp.    794.      See  Rep.    451;    59    X.    Y.    Supp.    1013. 

Raymond   v.    Clement,    118    X.   Y.  i4  People    v.    Decker,    28    X.    Y. 

App.   Div.   528;    102   X.   Y.  iSupp.  Misc.    Rep.    699;    60   X.   Y.   Supp. 

1070.  GO;  order  affirmed  63  X.  Y.  Supp. 

1113. 


881 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§528 


State  unless  a  vote  of  a  district  permits  sales.  Such  was  the 
case  in  South  Dakota.  There  the  question  of  granting  permits 
to  sell  at  retail  was  submitted  on  petition  at  the  annual 
municipal  elections  held  in  townships,  towns  and  cities,  and  if 
in  favor  of  sales,  the  corporate  authorities  were  required  to 
issue  permits  to  sell  "for  the  ensuing  year,"  it  was  held 
that  there  must  be  an  annual  submission  of  the  question  of 
granting  permits,  and  the  power  to  grant  such  permits  was 
limited  to  the  ensuing  year  after  an  election  favoring  the 
granting  of  them,  unless  the  granting  was  authorized  by  an 
election^ of  the  following  year.^-'  If  a  statute  provides  that 
an  election  may  be  held  two  years  after  prohibition  be 
adopted,  it  cannot  be  held  before  that  period  has  expired.^" 


15  state  V.  Barber    (S.  D.),   101 
N.  W.  1078. 

10  Adams   v.    Kelley    {Tex.   Civ. 
App.),  44  S.  W.  529. 

In  New  York  the  board  of  su- 
pervisors may  exercise  a  reason- 
able discretion  in  calling  a  meet- 
ing, and  should  not  call  a  second 
election  if  the  true  result  of  the 
election  has  been  ascertained  and 
there  be  no  reasonable  gi-ound  for 
believing  that  any  irregularity  af- 
fected the  result.  A  failure  to 
give  a  voter  an  opportunity  to 
vote,  or  error  in  counting  the 
votes  or  in  reading  the  returns, 
is  no  ground  for  resubmission,  if 
the  irregularities  did  not  affect 
the  result.  In  re  Clancy,  58  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  258;  109  N.  Y.  Supp. 
644. 

But  in  Texas,  where  the  stat- 
ute provides  for  a  resubmission 
where  the  question  shall  "not  have 
been  properly  submitted,"  resub- 
mission must  be  made  where  the 
counting  and  certifying  of  the 
vote  and  the  declaration  of  the 
result  are  insufficient  to  ascertain 
the    result   or    show   a    fair    elec- 


tion; and  it  is  held  that  a  sub- 
mission is  not  completed  until  the 
vote  is  canvassed  and  the  result 
ascertained.  In  re  Clancy,  58  N. 
Y.  Misc.  Rep.  258;  109  N.  Y. 
Supp.  644. 

If  the  first  election  is  void  for 
want  of  notice,  there  can  be  no 
resubmission  on  the  old  petition. 
In  re  Sullivan,  34  K  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  598;  70  N.  Y.  Supp.  374;  In 
re  Town  of  Lafayette,  45  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  141;  91  N.  Y.  Supp. 
970;  affirmed  105  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
25;  93  N.  Y.  Supp.  534;  In  re 
Clipperley,  50  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
266;  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  473;  In  re 
Krieger,  59  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  346; 
09  N.  Y.  Supp.  851. 

In  New  York  a  statute  provided 
that  an  election  could  be  held  on 
each  even  numbered  year,  if  that 
year  be  the  second  succeeding  the 
year  when  tlie  question  of  local 
option  was  lost  or  might  have 
been  lawfully  submitted  to  a  vote. 
In  1899  an  election  was  held  on 
the  question  which  was  judicially 
declared  void  for  irregulari- 
ties.    It  was  held  that  the  hold- 


§  529  TRAPPIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  882 

Sec.  529.     Time  and  place  of  holding  an  election. 

The  general  rule  is  that  the  time  and  place  of  holding  an 
election  and  the  legal  qualifications  of  the  electors,  are  of  the 
substance  of  an  election,  and  a  failure  to  observe  the  law, 
in  respect  to  such  matter,  will  invalidate  an  election,  and  that 
statutes  governing'  those  matters  must  be  construed  as  manda- 
tory and  not  directory.  The  intention  of  a  legislature  to  make 
such  provisions  essential  may  appear  as  well  by  the  general 
scope  and  policy  of  the  statute  as  by  direct  averment.  In  or- 
der that  a  ballot  in  any  election  shall  have  force,  it  must  be 
east  at  an  election  held  at  a  time  and  place  either  fixed  by  law 
or  by  the  order  of  some  one  having  authority.^^  Accordingly, 
if  a  local  option  law  requires  that  a  local  option  election  shall 
be  ordered  at  a  particular  time,  for  instance  at  the  first  ses- 
sion of  a  court  after  the  filing  of  the  petition  asking  for  such 
election,  the  law  must  be  strictly  complied  with,  and  an  order 
for  the  holding  of  such  election  made  at  any  other  time  will 
be  void.  While  the  law  clothes  the  acts  of  public  officers  with 
every  presumption  of  verity  and  fairness,  such  presumption 

ing    of    this    invalid    election    did  Where  a  statute  provided    that 

not  preclude  the  holding  of  a  spe-  the   local    option    "election    herein 

cial     election     within     two     years  provided  for  shall  not  be  held  of- 

thereafter.     In  re  Sullivan,  30  N.  tener   than  every   two  years,"   the 

Y.  Misc.  Rep.  682 ;  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  question   whether   liquor   shall    be 

303.     See  People  v.  Mosso,  30  N.  permitted    sold    may    be    submit- 

Y.  Misc.  Rep.  164;  (53  N.  Y.  Supp.  ted    every    two    years.      Common- 

588.  wealth  v.  Hoke  &  Yocum,  14  Busli 

The    fact    that    the    interests   of  668. 
the   town    will    be   injured    if    the  A  void  election  cannot  be  count- 
question    is   not    submitted    is    no  ed    in    determining     whether     an 
ground     for     ordering     a     resub-  election  has  been  held  within  two 
mission.      In  re   Clipperly,   50    X.  years.        State    v.    Rinke     (Mo.), 
Y.    Misc.    Rep.    266;     100    N.    Y.  121    S.   W.    159. 
Supp.   473;    nor   that  voters  were  i7  McCreary     on     Elections      (3 
misled   as   shown   by  affidavits   by  ed.),    sees.    192,    193;    Dickey     v. 
the    defects    in    the    ballots    used,  Hurlburt,    5    Cal.    343;    Jones    v. 
when    an    examination   of    the    re-  iState,     1     Kan.    273;     Pradat    v. 
turns   shows   that  no   considerable  Ramsay,    47    Miss.    29;     Fullwood 
number  were  misled.     In  re  Clip-  v.  State,   67    Miss.   554;    State   v. 
perley,  50  N.   Y.   Misc.  Rep.  266;  Webb,  49  Mo.  App.  407. 
99  N.  Y.  Stat.  473. 


883  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  529 

will  not  authorize  an  officer  to  defeat  the  popular  will  or  to 
postpone  to  an  indefinite  future  its  expression.'^  And  if  the 
law  provides  an  election  shall  be  held  after  a  petition  therefor 
has  been  filed,  the  statiite  is  mandatory  and  must  be  complied 
with,  and  an  election  held  beyond  the  period  fixed  by  the 
statute  will  be  unauthorized  and  void.^**  It  has  also  been  de- 
cided that  if  a  statute  does  not  fix  the  time  for  holding  an 
election,  but  leaves  it  to  be  determined  by  an  officer,  who  is 
disqualified  under  the  Constitution  from  acting,  that  an  elec- 
tion held,  under  the  direction  and  authority  of  the  person 
named,  will  be  null  and  void.-"  It  has  also  been  held  that 
an  election  held  under  a  local  option  law  is  a  special  election, 
and  only  to  be  held  at  the  time  to  be  fixed  by  the  authority 
designated  by  the  statute,  after  the  happening  of  the  condi- 
tions precedent  prescribed.-'  The  order  should  fix  the  day 
for  the  election  --  unless  the  law  fixes  the  date.-^  Whether 
or  not  the  order  must  designate  the  polling  places  depends 
upon  the  wording  of  the  statute ;  if  the  statute  be  silent,  then 
it  will  be  sufficient  to  designate  them  in  the  election  notice.^* 

18  J5a;  parfe  Sublett,  23  Tex.  App.  106  N.  W.  1113;  12  Detroit  Leg. 
309;  4  S.  W.  894;  Wells  v.  State,        N.    1006. 

24  Tex.  App.  230;  5  S.  W.  -830.  24  in  Canada  it  is  held  not  nec- 

19  State  V.  Ruark,  34  Mo.  App.  essary  to  designate  in  the  order 
325;  State  v.  Webb,  49  Mo.  App.  the  polling  places  if  the  village 
407;  Boone  v.  State,  10  Tex.  be  small.  In  re  Salter  [1902],  4 
App.  418;  Parker  v.  State,  12  Ont.  L.  R.  — ;  In  re  Mace,  42  Up. 
Tex.  App.  401;  Aiken  v.  State,  Can.  p.  76;  /»  re  Hudson,  19  Ont. 
14  Tex.  App.  142;  Ex  parte  Sub-  App.  343.  In  Texas  the  omission 
lett,  23  Tex.  App.  309;  4  S.  W.  to  designate  the  place  is  not  fa- 
894;  Carey  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  tal,  if  the  electors  be  not  misled. 
475;  13  S.  W.  752;  State  v.  Kel-  Ex  parte  Meyers  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
logg,    133    Mo.    App.    431;     113    S.  44  S.  W.   831. 

W.   &60.  A  statute  required  the  question 

20  Dickey  v.  Hurlburt,  5  Cal.  of  local  option  to  be  submitted 
343.  at  "every  towrn  meeting  to  be  held 

2iiState  V.  Tucker,  32  Mo.  App.  on    the    first   Tuesday    of    March, 

620;   Leonard  v.  Saline  Co.  Court,  1903,  and  annually  thereafter;"  a 

32  Mo.  App.  633.  subsequent   statute    provided    that 

22  Prichett  v.  Snider  (Ky.),  61  the  words  "annual  meeting"  mean 
S.  W.  277;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1718.  the      annual      town      meeting     in 

23  Attorney  General  v.  Van  Bu-  March,  or  an  adjournment  there- 
ren  Circuit  Judge,  143  Mich.  396;  of.       Another    section    designated 


§530 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


884 


Sec.  530.     Notice  of  time  and  place  of  holding  an  election. 

Local  option  laws  generally  provide  that  notice  of  the  time 
and  place  for  holding  a  local  option  election  shall  be  given 
either  by  posting  notices  thereof  or  publishing  the  same  in  a 
newspaper,  and  the  manner  of  doing  it,  and  in  such  cases  if 
the  provisions  of  the  statute  are  not  complied  with  no  valid 
election  can  be  held.-^  If  the  statute  provides  that  the  notice 
must  be  made  by  publishing  it  for  a  given  number  of 
weeks  in  a  newspaper,  prior  to  a  given  number  of  days 
before  the  election,  the  notice  must  be  published  a  number  of 
days  equal  to  seven  days  to  each  week,  the  computation  to  be 
made  by  excluding  the  first  day  and  including  the  last  day 
prior  to  the  number  of  days  named  preceding  the  day  of 


the  same  date  for  holding  the  an- 
nual   meeting,    provided    for    ad- 
journments, but  a  failure  to  hold 
the    meeting    should    not    prevent 
the   election   of   officers   at  a   sub- 
sequent meeting,  and  another  sec- 
tion required   the  town  officers  to 
warn  the  voters  as  to  the  business 
to    be    transacted,    and    still    an- 
other   section    said    one    of    these 
warnings    should    contain    the    lo- 
cal   option    question.      The    town 
officers  failed  to  warn  the  annual 
town  meeting  at  the  proper  time, 
and   a   special    town   meeting  was 
given  for  a  later  date  which  con- 
tained  an  article  on  the  question 
of    license.      It    was    held    that   a 
vote  on   the   question   at   the   spe- 
cial  meeting  was   not   authorized, 
for  the  reason  that  a  vote  on  the 
question  could  be  held  only  at  the 
annual  meeting.     State  v.  Sargent 
(Vt.),  m  Atl.  825.     See  also  Peo- 
ple   V.    Sackett,    15    N.    Y.    App. 
Div.    290;    44    X.    Y.    Supp.    593; 
reversing   40   N.   Y.   Supp.    414. 

Where  a  statute  provided  that  a 
local  option  election  should  not 
be  held  within  sixty  days  of  any 


municipal  election  within  the  city, 
a  local  option  election  held  on 
February  7th  in  a  city  whose  gen- 
eral election  must  occur  on  April 
7th  following,  was  held  in  time. 
Becker  v.  Lafayette  County  Ct. 
(Mo.),    119   S.   W.   985. 

A  statute  providing  that  a  local 
option  election  may  be  held  "at 
any  regular  town,  city  or  coun- 
ty election"  does  not  refer  alone 
to  elections  fixed  by  the  Con- 
stiution,  but  includes  statutory 
elections.  McCreary  v.  Common- 
wealth, 8  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract), 
437 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  10 
Ky.   L.    Rep.    (abstract)    407. 

25  Ex  parte  Kennedy,  23  Tex. 
App.  77;  3  S.  W.  114;  Haddox 
V.  Clarke  Co.,  79  Va.  677;  In  re 
Sullivan,  34  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  598 ; 
70  N.  Y.  Supp.  374 ;  In  re  Powers, 
334  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  636;  70  N. 
Y.  Supp.  590;  In  re  O'Hara,  63 
N.  Y.  App.  512;  71  N.  Y.  Supp. 
613;  In  re  Town  of  Lafayette,  45 
Misc.  Rep.  141;  91  N.  Y.  Supp. 
070;  affirmed  105  N.  Y.  App,  Div. 
25;    93   N.   Y.    Supp.  534. 


885 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§530 


holding  the  election,-*'  And  if  a  statute  provides  that  the 
clerk  shall  post,  or  cause  the  notices  to  be  posted,  and  it  ap- 
pears that  he  did  not  post  them,  but  issued  them  and  placed 
them  in  the  hands  of  men  to  be  posted,  the  law  will  not  be  com- 
plied with,  since  it  will  not  be  presumed  that  the  men  did  in 
fact  post  the  notices.-^  A  notice  in  such  case  need  not  state 
that  the  petition  for  the  election  was  signed  by  the  requisite 
number  of  voters.-**  The  omission  of  a  local  option  law  to 
provide  for  giving  notice  of  an  election  thereunder  within 
an  election  district  will  not  vitiate  the  law.  In  such  case  it 
will  be  assumed  either  that  the  obligation  to  direct  a 
proper  notice  is  implied  in  the  authority  to  order  an  election, 
or  that  notice  must  be  given  as  required  in  the  general  elec- 
tion law.-**  And  if  the  law  fails  to  prescribe  the  manner  in 
which  the  giving  of  such  notice  shall  be  proved,  oral  testimony 
is  admissible  to  prove  that  fact,  or  that  any  other  plain  and 
express  provision  of  the  statute  providing  for  such  an  elec- 
tion, has  or  has  not  been  complied  with.-"*     The  notice  provided 


26  III  re  Wooldridge,  30  Mo. 
App.  635 ;  State  v.  Tucker,  32  Mo. 
App.  620;  Leonard  v.  Saline  Co. 
Court,  32  Mo.  App.  633;  Bean  v. 
County  Court,  33  Mo.  App.  635; 
State  V.  Kaufman,  45  Mo.  App. 
656. 

27  James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
17  S.  W.  422. 

28  State  V.  Weeks,  38  Mo.  App. 
566;  State  v.  Smith,  32  Mo.  App. 
618. 

29McPike  V.  Penn,  51  Mo.  63; 
State  V.  Dugan,  110  Mo.  138;  19 
S.  W.   195. 

30  State  V.  Baker,  36  Mo.  App. 
«3;  State  v.  Hutton,  39  Mo.  App. 
417;  State  v.  Dugan,  110  Mo.  139; 
19  S.  W.  196;  Chalmers  v.  Fak, 
7'6  V.i.  717;  Haddox  v.  County 
of  Clark,   79   Va.  677. 

If  the  statute  make  no  provi- 
sions for  recording  the  notice  of 
an   election  or   the  order   of  pub- 


lication, tlie  record  of  such  no- 
tice and  order  is  not  admissible 
in  evidence  where  it  is  necessary 
to  prove  them.  Toole  v.  State,  8S 
Ala.  158;  7  So.  42;  State  v.  Ru- 
ark,  34  Mo.  App.  325;  State  v. 
Tucker,  32  Mo.  App.  628;  Leon- 
ard v.  Saline  Co.  Court,  32  Mo. 
App.  633;  In  re  Woodbridge,  30 
Mo.  App.  612;  State  v.  Baker,  30 
Mo.    App.    38. 

Proof  that  a  less  number  than 
those  provided  for  by  law  were 
posted  within  the  proposed  terri- 
tory to  be  embraced  in  the  or- 
der of  prohibition  will  make  the 
election  and  all  proceedings  under 
it  invalid.  But  if  a  statute  pi'O- 
vides  that  an  officer  shall  post 
such  notices,  in  tlie  absence  of 
])roof  to  the  contrarj^  tlie  pre- 
siunption  will  obtain  that  such  of- 
ficer completely  discharged  the 
duty    imposed    upon    him.      Such 


§  530  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  886 

for  by  such  a  law  is  absolutely  essential  to  the  validity  of  sueli 
an  election.^^  If  a  statute  provides  that  notice  of  such  an 
election  shall  be  by  publication  in  some  newspaper  published 
in  the  county  for  a  given  length  of  time,  and  such  "other 
notice"  may  be  given  as  the  county  court  or  municipal  body 
ordering  the  election  may  think  proper  in  order  to  give  gen- 
eral publicity  of  the  election,  if  the  notice  complies  with  the 
requirements  of  newspaper  publication,  it  will  be  sufficient, 
even  though  the  county  court  or  municipal  body  ordering  the 
election  fail  to  give  other  notice,  as  "other  notice"  is  by 
the  statute  in  such  case  discretionary.^-  If  a  local  option  law 
provides  that  an  election  under  it  shall  be  held  on  a  day  with- 
in a  given  number  of  days  of  any  municipal  or  State  elec- 
tion, the  word  "within"  must  be  construed  as  referring  to 
elections  held  before  and  after  the  time  of  holding  an  election 
under  such  local  option  law.^^  Such  an  election,  however, 
will  not  be  declared  null  and  void  because  of  the  fact  that 
it  was  held  within  the  number  of  days  prescribed  by  the  stat- 
ute previous  to  a  special  municipal  election  Avhich  could  not 
have  been  anticipated  until  after  the  date  of  the  local  option 
election.  If  the  statute  in  such  case  provides  that  "notice  of 
such  election  shall  be  given  by  publication  in  some  newspaper 
for  four  consecutive  weeks,  and  the  last  insertion  shall  be 
within  ten  days  next  before  such  election,"  it  must  be  con- 
strued as  meaning  that  there  must  be  four  weeks'  notice 
(twenty-eight  days)  of  the  election,  the  computation  being 
made  by  excluding  the  first  day  of  the  notice  and  including 

presumption,     however,      will      be  253;   James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 

overcome  by  proof  that  he  placed  189;  James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 

the  notices  "in  the  hands  of  good  353. 

men   to    be   posted."      Delivery   of  si  Stephens    v.     People,    iSO    111. 

the  notices  to  "good  men"  is  not  337;  George  v.  Township,  16  Kan. 

a  posting  of  the  same  within  the  72;    McPike  v.   Penn,  51   Mo.   63; 

meaning  of  the  law,  nor  will  the  State  v.  Tucker,  32  Mo.  App.  620. 

courts   presume   that   "good   men"  32  State  v.  Weeks,  38  Mo.  App. 

posted  notices  when  they  were  un-  566. 

der  no  legal   obligation   to   do  so.  ss  in    re    Woodbridge,     30     Mo. 

Ex   parte    Kramer,    19    Tex.    App.  App.  612;   State  v.  Bowerman,  40 

233;  Smith  v.  State,  19"  Tex.  App.  Mo.   App.    576. 
444;  James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 


887  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  530 

the  day  of  election,  and  that  the  last  insertion  shall  be  one 
or  more  days,  not  exceeding  ten,  next  before  such  election. 
Such  a  notice  is  satisfied  if  twenty-eight  days  intervenes  be- 
tween the  first  one  of  consecutive  weekly  publications  and 
the  day  of  election  without  a  daily  insertion  of  the  whole.^* 
If  the  statute  does  not  provide  the  manner  of  making  proof 
of  such  publication,  it  may  be  made  by  the  oral  testimony  of 
a  witness  Mdio  has  personal  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  it 
was  made.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  statutory  requirement, 
it  must  be  held  that  it  is  the  fact  of  publication  in  the  mode 
prescribed  by  the  statute,  and  not  any  particular  method  of 
provmg  the  fact  is  what  puts  the  statute  in  force."^  When  the 
notice  to  be  given  consists  of  a  copy  of  the  order,  and  other 
matters  of  the  board  ordering  the  election  is  inserted  between 
the  order  and  the  signatures  of  its  members  appended  to  the 
day's  proceedings,  such  other  matters  need  not  be  inserted 
in  the  notice.='*^  It  is  not  necessary  for  the  notice  to  contain 
a  statement  that  the  petition  had  appended  to  it  the  required 
number  of  signatures."'  Where  the  district  for  the  election 
was  described  by  metes  and  bounds,  but  in  the  notice  it  was 
described  as  a  certain  justice's  precinct,  yet  the  two  descrip- 
tions were  identical,  the  supposed  variance  was  held  imma- 
terial.^«  So  where  the  notice  had  to  be  published  in  a  news- 
paper selected  by  the  governor  and  comptroller  of  the  State, 
but  they  had  made  no  selection,  yet  it  was  published  in  all  the 
newspapers,  one  of  which  these  officials  would  have  been  com- 
pelled, under  the  law,  to  select,  it  was  held  immaterial  that 

34  state  V.  Tucker,  32  Mo.  App.  tration  of  the  extent  to  which 
620;  Leonard  V.  Saline  Co.,  32  Mo.  contests  of  tlie  validity  of  local 
App.  633;  Bean  v.  Barton  Co.,  33  option  elections  have  been  pushed 
Mo.  App.  635;  State  v.  Kaufman,  — every  straw  has  been  seized  up- 
45  Mo.  App.  656;  State  v.  Dob-  on  in  order  to  overturn  their  re- 
bins,   116  Mo.  App.  29;   92  S.  VV.  suits. 

13^-  37  Church  V.  Weeks,  38  Mo.  App. 

35  Toole  V.  State,  88  Ala.  158;  566;  State  v.  Smith,  38  Mo.  App. 
7  So.  42;  Williams  v.  State   (Tex.        618. 

Or.   App.),    109   S.   W.   189.  zs  Ex  parte  Speogle,  34  Tex.  Cr. 

36  Thomas  v.  Abbott,  105  Mich.  Rep.  465;  31  S.  W.  171;  Williams 
687;  63  N.  W.  984.  The  decision  v.  Davidson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  70 
of  this  point  is  a  very  fair  illus-  S.  W.  987. 


§  530  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  888 

they  had  failed  to  make  the  selection.^"  If  the  statute  requires 
five  notices  of  the  election  to  be  given  and  only  three  be  posted, 
the  election  will  be  void,  it  has  been  held.*"  Where  the  statute 
required  all  elections  to  be  held  according  to  its  provisions, 
and  provided  that  where  "any  election"  is  ordered,  at  least 
twenty  days '  notice  of  it  should  be  given ;  but  the  statute  also 
provided  that  its  provisions  should  apply  to  all  elections 
"when  not  otherwise  provided  by  law;''  and  the  local  option 
law  required  the  clerk  to  post  five  notices  of  the  election  for  at 
least  twelve  days  prior  to  the  day  of  election,  and  provided 
that  an  election  under  such  law  should  be  held  in  comform- 
ity  with  the  general  election  law ;  it  was  held,  inasmuch  as  the 
local  option  law  was  a  special  law  and  the  local  option  elec- 
tion a  special  election,  twelve  days'  notice  was  all  that  was 
required.*^  In  Texas  it  is  presumed,  in  prosecutions  for  viola- 
tion of  the  local  option  law,  that  notices  were  posted  the  re- 
quisite time ;  *-  but  the  evidence  and  inference  to  be  drawm 
therefrom  may  overcome  this  presumption.  Thus  where  the 
evidence  showed  that  the  clerk  whose  duty  it  was  to  post  the 
notices  did  not  do  so,  but  placed  them  in  the  hands  of  "good 
men"  to  be  posted,  there  was  no  presumption  that  they  were 
posted.*^     In   New  York   Avhere   four  propositions   could  be 

39  Paiil  V.  Gloucester  Co.,  50  N.  42  Segars  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr. 
J.  L.  585;  15  Atl.  272;  1  L.  R.  Rep.  45;  31  S.  W.  370.  See  also 
A.  86.  in     Kentucky,     Bennett    v.     Coni- 

40  Smith  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  monwealth,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (ab- 
444.      Contra,  Xornian  v.   Thomp-  stract)    370. 

son,   96   Tex.   250;    72    S.   W.   62;  43  James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 

affirming  30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  537 ;  72  189;    17  S.  W.   143;   21  Tex.  App. 

S.  W.  64.  353;     17    S.     W.     422.       But    see 

41  Voss  V.  Terrell,  12  Tex.  Civ.  Frickie  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
App.  439;  34  S.  W.  170;  Ex  parte  254;   45  S.  W.  810. 

Keith,   47  Tex.  Cr.   App.   283;   83  In  this  State  a   failure  to  post 

S.  W.  683;  Ex  parte  Xeal,  47  Tex.  all  the  notices  is  not  a  subject  of 

Cr.  App..  441;   83  S.  W.  831;   Eg-  contest  of   the   election.     Norman 

gleston  V.   Board,   51   N.   Y.   App.  v.  Thompson,  96  Tex.   250;    72  S. 

Div.    38;     64    X.    Y.    Supp.    471;  W.  62;  affirming  30  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

McHam  v.  Love,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  537;   72  S.  W.  64.      (In  this  case 

512;  87  S.  W.  875;  Byrd  v.  State,  one  of  the  notices  was  not  posted 

63  Tex.  Cr.  App.  507;    111   S.  \V.  the  full  time,  but  the  voters  had 

149.  actual   notice.      The    election   was 


889 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§530 


voted  upon  at  once,  and  the  clerk's  notice  of  election  was  under 
the  heading,  ''Local  option  to  determine  whether  liquors  shall 
be  sold  under  the  provisions  of  section  16,  c.  367,  laws  of  1900, 
known  as  the  'Liquor  Tax  Law,'  "  and  that  a  vote  would  be 
taken  at  the  next  election  "on  said  proposed  questions,"  it 
was  held  that  the  notice  was  sufficient  in  its  statements  of  the 
questions  to  be  voted  upon ;  that  the  notice  need  not  state 
that  all  of  the  four  questions  would  then  be  voted  upon,  nor 
need  they  be  set  out  in  full."     If  the  question  of  local  option 


•lield  valid.)  Contra,  Ex  parte 
Conley  (Tex.  Cr.  App. ),  75  S. 
VV.  301. 

Other  cases  that  notice  of  tlie 
election  must  be  given  or  the  elec- 
tion will  be  void  are  In  re  Mace, 
42  Up.  Can.  70;  In  re  Malone,  41 
Up.  Can.  159,  253;  In  re  Hamil- 
ton, 41  Up.  Can.  253;  In  re  Lake, 
26  C.  P.  (Can.)  173;  In  re 
Brophy,  26  C.  P.  (Can.)  290;  In 
re  Pickey  [1907],  14  App.  Ont. 
L.  E.  587;  In  re  Duncan  [1909], 
16  App.  Ont.  L.  R.  132;  Rowland 
V.  CoUingwood  [1909],  16  Out.  L. 
R.  272;  In  re  Saltfleet  [1909],  16 
App.  Ont.  L.  R.  293 ;  In  re  Joyce 
[1909],  16  App.  Ont.  L.  R.  380; 
Brooks  v.  Ellis  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
98  S.  W.  936;  Ex  -parte  Conley 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  75  S.  W.  301. 

**  In  re  Woolston,  35  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  735;  72  N.  Y.  Supp.  406. 
See  In  re  Foster,  57  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  676;    108  K  Y.  Supp.  788. 

In  this  State,  where  the  elec- 
tion is  held  at  a  "town  meeting," 
the  election  is  held  valid,  though 
no  notice  of  it  be  given,  where  the 
electors  knew  the  propositions  to 
be  voted  upon  at  the  meeting,  and 
there  was  a  full  vote.  In  re  France, 
36  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  693;  74  N. 
Y.  iSupp.  379;  In  re  Town  of  La- 
fayette, 45  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  141; 
01    N.    Y.    Supp.    970;    order    af- 


firmed, 105  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  25; 
93  N.  Y.  Supp.  534;  In  re  Smith, 
44  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  384;  89  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1006;  In  re  O'Hara,  40  N. 
Y.  Misc.  Rep.  355 :  82  X.  Y.  Supp. 
293. 

In  South  Carolina  a  law  re- 
quired twenty  days'  notice  to  be 
given  for  the  location  of  a  dis- 
pensary, and  a  designation  of  the 
locality  where  it  was  to  be  lo- 
cated. A  failure  to  designate  the 
particular  locality  was  held  fatal. 
Trustees  v.  Board,  62  Miss.  68; 
39  S.  E.  793. 

In  Alabama  every  local  law 
passed  by  the  Legislature  without 
notice  is  void  under  a  Constitu- 
tion requiring  it.  Larkin  v.  Sim- 
mons   (Ala),   46   So.   451. 

If  a  judge's  certificate  be  oth- 
erwise regular,  the  fact  that  he 
states  that  the  notice  was  pub- 
lished four  weeks  on  the  date  of 
the  fourth  issue  of  the  newspaper 
containing  the  notice,  where  four 
consecutive  weeks  or  twenty-eight 
days  from  the  day  of  its  publi- 
cation was  required,  will  not  viti- 
ate such  certificate,  although  the 
four  weeks  did  not  expire  until 
the  end  of  the  M'eek  in  which  the 
last  publication  was  made.  Wil- 
liams V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
156;    109  S.  W.  189. 


^530 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


890 


can  only  be  voted  on  at  the  annual  "town  meeting,"  then 
a  notice  that  the  question  would  be  submitted  at  a  special 
"town  meeting"  cannot  empower  it  to  pass  upon  the  ques- 
tion.*^ Slight  variations  in  the  notice,  stating  the  statutory 
propositions  to  be  voted  on  will  not  vitiate  it.'*^  Where  the 
statute  requires  notices  to  be  posted  it  means  an  actual  post- 
ing of  the  requisite  number;  but  if  they  be  posted  and  then  be 
torn  or  blown  down,  the  election,  in  that  respect,  will  be 
valid."*^  If  the  statute  requires  the  elerjc  of  the  board  to  give 
the  notice  of  election,  it  is  not  necessary  that  such  board 
order  him  to  give  it.*^ 


•3- State  V.  Sargent  (Vt.),  09 
Atl.   825. 

In  Missouri  if  notice  for  the 
full  time  be  not  given  the  elec- 
tion is  void.  State  v.  Kemp- 
man,  75  Mo.  App.  188.  Contra  in 
Louisiana,  Hagens  \.  Police  Jury 
(La.),  46  So.  676.  In  Texas  no- 
tices given  in  each  precinct  by 
posting  is  sufficient.  Keller  v. 
State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  588;  81 
iS.  W.  1214. 

46/,!.  re  Rice,  95  X.  Y.  App. 
Div.  28;  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  512. 

47  Nelson  v.  State,  44  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  595;  75  S.  W.  502;  Bow- 
man V.  State,  14  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
38;  40  S.  W.  796;   41   S.  W.  635. 

Where  the  clerk  is  required  to 
record  the  affidavit  of  publica- 
tion of  the  order  of  the  adoption 
of  local  option,  it  need  not  im- 
mediately follow  the  order,  it  not 
being  nullified  by  the  insertion  of 
several  pages  of  other  matters. 
People  V.  Hamilton,  143  Mich.  1 ; 
106  N.  W.  275;  12  Detroit  Leg. 
N.  897. 

Notices  posted  December  29th 
for  ;ni  election  January  17th  are 
posted  twelve  days  jjrior  to  the 
date    of    the    election.      Hayes    v. 


State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  39  S.  W. 
106.  For  Texas  statute,  see  Roper 
V.  Scurlock,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
464;   69  S.  W.  456. 

48  Hayes  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.,),  39  S.  W.  10'6;  Eggleston 
v.  Board,  51  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  38; 
04  X.   Y.   Supp.   471. 

Publication  of  the  notice  may 
be  shown  by  oral  evidence,  even 
to  the  contradiction  of  the 
printer's  affidavit.  State  v.  Swear- 
ingen,  128  Mo.  App.  005;  107  S. 
W.   1. 

The  certificate  of  publication 
made  by  the  judge  need  not  show 
the  particular  issues  of  tlie  pa- 
per in  which  the  publication  was 
made.  Magill  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.   App.   357;    103    S.   W.   397. 

Where  the  court  selected  the 
newspaper  for  the  notice,  and  pub- 
lication was  required  for  four 
consecutive  weeks,  the  last  inser- 
tion to  be  within  ten  days  before 
the  date  of  the  election,  insertions 
for  four  consecutive  weeks  in  a 
weekly  newspaper  the  last  eight 
days  before  the  election  was  held 
sufficient.  State  v.  Brawn,  130  Mo. 
App.  214;  109  S.  W.  99. 
Sample    ballots    of    an    election 


891 


LOCAL    OPTION. 


§531 


Sec.  531.     Time  of  holding  an  election. 

The  election  must  be  held  at  the  time  the  law  requires  it  to 
be  held.     If  the  statute  requires  the  court  or  board  hearing 


were  mailed  to  every  voter  in  the 
town,  stating  the  questions  to  be 
submitted.  Several  general  public 
meetings  were  held,  at  which  these 
questions  were  discussed,  of  which 
accounts  were  given  in  the  news- 
papers, and  these  newspapers  dis- 
cussed the  questions  from  time  to 
time  at  length.  More  votes  were 
cast  on  these  questions  than  for 
any  office  voted  for  at  the  same 
time.  The  town  clerk  failed  to 
post  four  notices  in  public  places 
and  to  give  notice  of  the  election 
in  a  newspaper.  Tlie  court  re- 
fused to  declare  tlie  election  void. 
In  re  Rowley,  34  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
662;   70  X.  Y.   Supp.  208. 

Any  one  posting  the  notices  may 
testify  to  that  fact.  Watkins  v. 
State  (Tex.  €r.  App.),  62  S.  W. 
911. 

The  notice,  where  it  consists  of 
a  copy  of  the  order  of  election, 
need  not  have  the  seal  of  the 
court  attached  to  it.  Roper  v. 
Scurlock,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App.  4G4; 
09  S.  W.  456. 

Where  a  statute  provides  that 
the  clerk  of  the  court  shall  post 
or  provide  to  be  posted  the  elec- 
tion notice,  it  is  sufficient  that 
they  were  posted  with  his  con- 
sent. McCarty  v.  Justus  ( Tex. ) , 
115  S.  W.  278. 

The  notice  must  be  published 
as  the  court  orders  it,  or  the 
election  will  be  void;  partial  com- 
pliance with  the  order  is  not 
sufficient.  State  v.  Reid,  134  Mo. 
App.  5-82;    114  S.  W.   1116. 

An  affidavit  of  publication  may 


be  substituted  for  a  lost  one.  State 
v.  Campbell,  214  Mo.  362;  113  S. 
W.    1081;    119   S.   W.   494. 

A  notice  that  a  petition  has  been 
filed  with  the  clerk  for  the  sub- 
mission of  local  option  questions 
under  the  liquor  statute  (desig- 
nating the  particular  section  of 
the  statute),  and  that  all  local 
option  questions  provided  for 
therein  will  be  submitted  to  the 
freeholders  on  a  specified  day,  is 
sufficient,  and  it  is  not  necessary 
to  state  the  questions  will  be  voted 
on  the  day  named  for  tlie  elec- 
tion. In  re  Livingston,  62  N.  Y. 
Misc.  Rep.  334;  115  N.  Y.  Supp. 
269. 

Where  a  statute  requires  no- 
tice to  be  published  for  four  con- 
secutive weeks,  the  last  insertion 
to  be  ten  days  before  the  election, 
a  publication  of  the  first  notice 
on  February  8th,  the  fourth  on 
March  1st,  and  a  fifth  within  ten 
days  prior  to  the  date  of  the 
election  on  March  13th,  is  suffi- 
cient. State  V.  Campbell,  214  Mo. 
362;  113  S.  W.  1081;  110  S.  W. 
494. 

Where  the  first  notice  was  pub- 
lished four  days  short  of  the  pe- 
riod prescribed  by  the  statute, 
and  few  if  any  of  the  electors 
did  not  vote,  it  was  held  that  the 
election  was  valid.  Bauer  v. 
Board    (Mich.),   122  N".  W.   121. 

A  statute  requiring  the  sherifl" 
to  post  up  notices  is  complied 
with  by  a  posting  of  such  notices 
by  private  persons.  Roesch  v. 
Henry   (Ore.),  103  Pac.  439. 


§531 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


892 


the  application  to  fix  the  date  of  the  election,  it  must  do  so 
and  the  election  must  be  hehl  on  that  daj' ;  but  if  the  law  fixes 
the  date,  then  on  the  daj^  thus  fixed/"  If  the  law  requires 
the  petitioners  to  fix  the  date  in  their  petition,  then  the  elec- 


The  printing  of  the  clerk's 
name  to  the  notice  is  a  sufficient 
subscription  thereto  of  his  signa- 
ture, and  the  seal  of  the  court 
need  not  be  attached.  Roesch  v. 
Henry    (Ore.),    103   Pac.   439. 

Where  the  court's  order  for  sub- 
mission found  tliat  the  county 
contained  no  city  or  town  of  2,500 
inhabitants,  and  directed  the  clerk 
to  give  notice  of  the  election,  and 
he  gave  a  notice  reciting  that  it 
was  ordered  by  the  judge  of  tlie 
county  court  that  '"the  qualified 
voters"  of  the  county  are  notified 
that  an  election  would  be  held  on 
a  specified  date  to  determine 
whether  liquors  would  be  sold 
within  the  city  limits  of  the  coun- 
ty and  the  "outside  limits  of  all 
cities  and  towns  having  2,5(t0 
inhabitants  or  more,"  it  was  held 
that  the  notice  was  void,  because 
it  attempted  to  limit  the  sale  of 
liquors  to  the  countj^  outside  tlie 
limits  of  any  town  or  2,500  in- 
habitants or  more,  thereby  being 
a  departure  from  the  order  for  an 
election.  State  v.  Rinke  (Mo.), 
121  N.  W.   159. 

In  Michigan  it  is  sufficient  to 
embody  the  order  of  the  court  for 
an  election  in  the  notice,  without 
posting  a  certified  copy  of  such 
order.  Thomas  v.  Abbott,  105 
Mich.  687;   63  N.  W.  984. 

Where  five  notices  had  to  be 
posted  in  each  precinct  of  tlie 
county  twelve  days  before  the  elec- 
tion, and  in  one  nrecinct  none  were 


posted,  in  another  for  only 
eleven  days,  in  another  for  only  ten 
days  and  in  another  three  for 
only  eight  days,  tlie  election  was 
held  void,  and  tlie  commissioners 
were  enjoined  from  entering  an 
order  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
liquors  in  the  county.  Guesnsey 
v.  McHaley  (Ore.),  98  Pac.  158; 
Hill  V.  Hawth  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
112  S.  W.  707;  Roesch  v.  Henry 
(Ore.),   103   Pac.   439. 

Where  the  provisions  for  notice 
inserted  in  the  liquor  statute  were 
void,  it  was  held  that  notice  could 
be  given  under  the  general  elec- 
tion law.  Ruhland  v.  Water- 
man  (R.  I.),  71  Atl.  450. 

Failure  of  the  court  to  desig- 
nate the  paper  is  not  fatal,  if 
the  clerk  cause  the  notice  to  be 
published  in  another  proper  paper. 
State  v.  Kellogg  (Tex.),  113  S. 
W.    660. 

A  failure  to  state  when  tlie 
polls  would  be  open  is  not  fatal, 
when  the  statute  specifies  the 
hours.  State  v.  Bassett,  133  Mo. 
App.   366;    112    S.   W.    764. 

A  notice  that  an  election  had 
been  "ordered  to  be  holden"  on  a 
certain  date  is  not  insufficient  be- 
cause of  a  failure  to  state  specifi- 
cally that  on  that  day  an  election 
"would  be  held."  State  v.  Bassett, 
133  Mo.  App.  366;    112  S.  W.  764. 

■tsYates  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  59  S.  W.  275;  Paul  v. 
Gloucester  Co.,  50  N.  J.  L.  585 ; 
15  Atl.  275;    1  L.  R.  A.  86. 


893  LOCAL    OPTION.  §  531 

tion  must  be  held  on  the  date  thus  selected ;  but  if  the  law 
does  not  require  them  to  fix  the  date,  and  yet  they  do,  the 
court  may  disregard  the  prayer  of  the  petition  in  this  re- 
spect and  select  another  date/'"  The  election  must  be  held 
upon  the  date  stated  in  the  election  notice/^  Some  of  the 
statutes  require  the  election  to  be  held  within  a  certain  time 
after  the  date  of  the  reception  of  the  petition,  and  others  with- 
in a  similar  date  of  the  entry  of  an  order  for  an  election. 
When  such  is  the  case  its  provisions  must  be  observed  or 
the  election  will  be  invalid.^'-  And  where  the  statute  pro- 
hibited the  holding  of  a  local  option  election  "within"  sixty 
days  of  a  State  or  municipal  election  held  in  the  district,  it 
was  held  that  this  meant  both  before  and  after  such  State 
or  municipal  election ;  and  if  its  provisions  were  violated  the 
election  would  be  void;^^  but  not  so  if  the  election  was  a 
"special"  municipal  election  where  the  date  of  the  local  op- 
tion election  was  firet  set.^*  A  statute  concerning  elections  in 
general,  requiring  special  elections  to  be  held  on  "Tuesday" 
has  no  reference  to  a  local  option  election ;  ^'^  nor  has  it  any 
reference  to  a  general  school  election,  the  term  "general  elec- 
tion" meaning  the  biennial  State  election. ="'"  Where  the  elec- 
tion is  held  within  the  prohibited  zone  of  time,  the  fact  that 
the  prior  election  was  irregular  for  want  of  a  sufficient  notice 
will  not  render  the  local  option  election  valid."  Where  a 
statute  provides  that  a  local  option  election  shall  be  held  on  a 
day  not  less  than  fifteen  nor  more  than  thirty  days  from  the 
date  of  the  order,  an  election  ordered  on  the  fifteenth  of  a 

50  O'JSTeal    v.    Minary,    1-25    Ky.  53  Jn  re  Woodridge,  30  Mo.  App. 

571;    101    S.    \V.    951;    30   Ky.    L.  Q\2. 

Eep.  888.  54  state  v.   Ruark,  34   Mo.   App. 

5iRichter    v.    State     (Ala.),    47  325. 

So.  163;  Winston  v.  State,  32  Tex.  ss  state  v.  Circuit  Court,  50  N. 

Cr.  Rep.  59;   22  S.  W.   138;    King  J.  L.  585;   15  Atl.  272;   1  L.  R.  A. 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  547;  28  m. 

S.  W.  201.  56  state  v.  Searcy,  39  Mo.  App. 

52  State  V.   Ruark,   34   Mo.  App.  393;   State  v.  Watts,  39  Mo.  App. 

325;  Curry  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  409. 

475;   13  S.  W.  752.  57  State    v.    Bowerman,    40    Mo. 

App.  57'6. 


§  532  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  894 

month  and  held  on  the  twenty-fifth  is  valid ;  "*  but  one  or- 
dered November  16th  and  held  December  17th  is  void.^* 

Sec.  532,     Conduct  of  the  election. 

If  the  local  option  statute  provides  how  the  election  shall 
be  held,  then  its  provisions  must  be  followed,  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  general  election  law^;  but  if  its  provisions  are  wanting  in 
detail  the  general  election  law  will  supply  them.  Not  infre- 
quently it  is  provided  that  the  election  shall  be  held  in  pur- 
suance to  the  general  election  law,"^*  omitting  all  details,  in 
which  event  no  question  can  arise  on  the  subject;  and  even 
though  there  was  no  declaration  how  the  election  should  be 
conducted,  the  provisions  of  the  general  election  law  would 
be  held  to  control,  rather  than  there  should  be  an  entire  fail- 
ure to  carry  out  the  will  of  the  Legislature  as  expressed  in  the 
local  option  law.*^"  So  the  election  must  be  held  at  the  place 
fixed  in  the  order,  or  substantially  at  the  place  so  fixed ;  ^^  but 
if  the  order  does  not  designate  the  polling  place,  then  sub- 
stantially at  the  places  designated  in  the  notice.  But  a  fail- 
ure to  fix  the  polling  place  in  a  small  village  or  hamlet  has 
been  held  in  Canada  not  fatal  to  the  election.*'-  If  the  election 
is  conducted  under  the  general  election  law,  and  an  order  is 

5S  Winston  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  80;    In  re  Hartley,  25  Upp.   Can. 

Rep.  59;  22  S.  W.  138.  12;   In  re  McLean,   25   Upp.   Can. 

salving    v.    State,    33    Tex.    Cr.  619;  In  re  Mills,  28  Up.  Can.  333; 

Rep.  547;  28  S.  W.  201.  In  re  Malonne,  41  Upp.  Can.  159; 

59*  The    election    is    valid,    even  In  re  Leake,  20  C.  P.   (Can.)    173; 

if  it  does  not  so  provide.     Jacoby  In    re    Reubottom,    42    Upp.    Can. 

V.  Dallis,   115   Ga.   272;    41    S.   E.  358;  In  re  Johnson,  40  Upp.  Can. 

611.     But  see  Lehman  v.   Porter.  297;     Walker    v.    Mobley     (Tex.), 

73  Miss.  216;   18  So.  920.  103   S.   W.   490;    Richter  v.   State 

6">  On  these  statements,  see  gen-  (Ala.),    47    So.    163;    Winston    v. 

erally  People  v.  Pierson,  35  N.  Y.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  59;   22  S. 

Misc.   Rep.   40C;    71   N.    Y.    Supp.  W.    138;    King   v.    State,   33    Tex. 

093;  order  affirmed,  '64  X.  Y.  App.  Cr.  Rep.  547;  28  S.  W.  201. 

Div.   624;    72   X.   Y.   Supp.    1123;  ei  Farrington      v.     Turner,      53 

Hagens  v.   Police  Jury    (La.),   46  Mich.    27;    Dale   v.    Irvin,    78    111. 

So.  676;  Shields  v.  State,  38  Tex.  170;     Preston    v.    Culbertson,    58 

Cr.  App.  252;  42  S.  W.  398;  In  re  Cal.   198. 

Bell    [1907],    13   App.   Ont.   L.   R.  62/,;  re  Salter  [1902],  4  Ont.  L. 

R.  — . 


895 


LOCAL   OPTION.  §  532 


of  record  in  the  county,  or  city,  or  town  fixing  a  polling  place 
under  that  law  for  holding  elections,  then  the  election  should 
be  held  there.  The  court  or  board  ordering  the  election  may 
or  may  not  direct  who  shall  conduct  the  election,  that  de- 
pending on  the  terms  of  the  statute.  Where  a  general  stat- 
ute provided  that  the  county  board  of  elections  should  annu- 
ally appoint  election  officers  for  precincts  who  should  "hold 
their  offices  for  one  year,  and  until  their  successors  were  ap- 
pointed and  qualified,"  and  the  local  option  law  provided  that 
elections  under  it  should  be  held  "by  such  officer  as  would  be 
qualified  to  hold  elections  for  county  officers,  and  they  shall 
be  selected  in  the  same  way,"  and  all  elections  thereunder 
should  ' '  be  held  in  accordance  within  the  provisions  of  the  gen- 
eral election  laAvs,  *  *  *  except  that  they  shall  not  be 
held  on  the  same  day  with  any  regular  political  election," 
but  it  did  not  require  the  officers  appointed  to  hold  other  elec- 
tions in  those  precincts,  it  was  held  that  special  election  offi- 
cers must  be  appointed  to  hold  the  local  option  election.*''' 
In  Texas  it  is  held  that  the  commissioner's  court  may  name 
any  person  to  hold  the  local  option  election."*  Where  the 
spirit  of  the  statute  requires  a  division  of  the  election  officers 
between  the  contesting  parties,  it  is  proper  for  the  court 
or  board  to  appoint  special  officers."^  In  Texas  the  election 
officers  need  not  be  appointed  when  the  election  is  ordered, 
it  being  sufficient  to  appoint  them  afterwards.''"  The  polls 
must  be  opened  at  the  time  the  law  requires  them  to  be 
opened  and  kept  open  for  the  full  time  required  by  stat- 
ute, whether  the  election  is  controlled  by  the  local  option 
law  or  the  general  election  law.  Thus,  where  the  statute  re- 
quired the  polls  to  be  opened  at  9  a.  m.  and  kept  open  until 

B3Er\vin  V.  Benton,  120  Ky.  536;  der,   110  Ky.  263;   «1  S.  W.  277; 

87    S.    W.    291;    27    Ky.    L.    Rep  22    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1718;    Common' 

^^^-  wealth  V.    Green,    98   Kv.    21;    32 

ei  Kelly    v.    State,    36    Tex.    Cr.  S.  W.  169;    17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  579. 
App.  480;  38  S.  W.  779.  g5  Puckett    v.    Snider,    110    Ky. 

In  Kentucky  it  is  proper  to  di-  263;    01    S.    W.    277;    22    Ky,    L. 

rect   the  order  of  election   to   the  Rep.  1718. 

sherifl"   <if   the   county,   wlio   gives  co  Jones  v.  State,  21   Tex.  App. 

notice    thereof.      Puckc(t    v.    Sni-  353;   17  S.  W,  422. 


§  533  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  896 

sundown,  and  the  election  board  opened  them  on  time,  closed 
them  in  thirty  minutes,  destroyed  the  ballots  cast,  opened  them 
again  at  10  a.  m.  and  finally  closed  them  at  4  p.  m.,  the  elec- 
tion was  held  void/'^  The  fact  that  a  full  election  board  was 
not  appointed  to  hold  the  election  will  not  vitiate  it  if  it 
otherwise  be  fair  and  a  correct  result  be  attained."''  The  fail- 
ure to  SAvear  an  election  officer  is  not  such  an  irregularity 
as  will  require  the  election  to  be  set  aside;  "^  nor  is  a  failure 
to  have  the  statutory  number  of  election  officers.^"  Thus 
where  two  election  inspectors  elected  one  of  their  number 
clerk,  instead  of  electing  a  third  person  clerk,  the  election 
was  not  void.*^  A  substantial  compliance  with  the  election 
law  is  all  that  is  required.^-  If  the  election  be  held  at  a  general 
election,  the  use  of  a  separate  ballot  box  for  the  local  option 
ballots,  although  no  statute  provides  for  it,  will  not  avoid  the 
otherwise  valid  result.^' 

Sec.  533.     Qualifications  of  election  officers. 

If  the  statute  fixes  the  qualifications  of  the  election  officers, 
then  persons  should  be  chosen  who  meet  those  qualifications, 
but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  election  is  void,  or  should  be 


CTiState  V.  Drake,  83  Wis.  257;  G20;    In    re    Cress,    15    Manitoba 

53  N.  W.  496.     If  there  is  a  fair  528;    Puckett  v.   Snider,    110   Ky. 

expression  of  the  will  of  the  peo-  263;  61  S.  W.  272;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

pie,  failure  to  open  on  time  is  not  1718. 

fatal.     Hoover  v.  Thomas,  35  Tex.  The    order    for    the    election,    it 

Civ.  App.  535;   80  S.  W.  859.  has  been  held,  need  not  show  the 

«8  State  V.  Swearinger,   128  Mo.  name  of  the  presiding  election  of- 

App.  605;   107  S.  W.  1.  ficer.      Fitze    v.    State     (Tex.    Cr. 

69  State    V.    Swearinger,    supra;  App.),  85  S.  W.  1156. 

Jassey  v.   Speer,   107   Ga.  828;   33  An  election  held  by  defacto,  but 

S.  E.  718.  not   dejure   officers   is    valid;    and 

70  Snead  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  the  fact  that  one  was  called  "man- 
App.  2'62;   49  S.  W.  601.  ager   of    the    election"    instead    of 

71  People  v.  Pierson,  64  N.  Y.  "pi;esiding  officer"  is  immaterial. 
App.  Div.  624;  72  N.  Y.  Supp.  Ex  parte  Mayes,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
1123;    affirming    35    N.    Y.    Misc.  36;  44  S.  W.  «31. 

Rep.  406;    71   N.  Y.  Supp.   993.  73  Donovan   v.   Fairfield   Co.,   60 

72  In  re  Carswell,    15   Manitoba  Conn.  339 ;  22  Atl.  847. 


897  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  534 

set  aside  because  they  did  not."^*  Where  a  statute  provided 
that  upon  a  petition  presented  for  an  election  the  question 
should  be  submitted  at  the  next  regular  State,  town,  city  or 
county  election,  a  local  option  election  for  a  city  held  by  the 
sheriff  or  coroner  of  the  county  at  a  State  election  was  de- 
clared to  be  void,  because  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Leg- 
islature that  in  a  city  or  town  the  local  option  election  was 
to  be  taken  at  a  general  or  town  election  under  its  own  munic- 
ipal officers.'"' 

Sec.  534.     Ballots. 

If  a  local  option  statute  provides  the  form  of  the  ballots  to 
be  used  in  voting  upon  the  question  of  the  adoption  of  the  law, 
that  form  or  one  substantially  like  it  must  be  used,  or  the 
election  will  be  held  to  be  invalid.  For  instance,  if  a  statute 
provides  that  the  ballot  shall  be  ''for  license"  and  "against 
license,"  a  ballot  marked  "no  whisky"  will  not  be  sufficient 
and  cannot  be  counted  in  determining  the  question.^"  And 
likewise  is  an  election  void  where  a  ballot  is  marked  "For  the 
sale"  and  "Against  the  sale,"  without  the  addition  of  any 
printed  statement  of  the  matter  submitted  to  be  voted  on,  when 
the  statute  requires  that  the  ballot  shall  contain  such  additional 
matter.'"  If  the  statute  simply  provides  that  the  vote  shall 
be  taken  by  ballot,  but  does  not  direct  how  the  ballot  shall 
be  taken,  a  ballot  upon  the  question  may  be  cast  at  a  town 
meeting  when  officers  are  being  voted  for  at  the  same  time, 
and  it  will  not  be  void  because  not  placed  in  a  separate  box. 
Nor  will  the  fact  that  the  ballot  is  placed  in  the  same  en- 
velope with  a  ballot  for  such  officers  have   any  effect  upon 

74  In    Texas    the     chairman     of  ed  the  day  the  order  for  the  elec- 

a  political  executive  committee  of  tion  is  made.     Jones  v.  State,  21 

the   county    does   not   hold   an   of-  Tex.  App.  353;   17  S.  W.  422. 
lice  of  profit  and   trust  where  the  75  Commonwealth     v.     King,     86 

-statute  forbids   anyone  serving  as  Ky.  436;    6  iS.  W.   124. 
an    election   officer   who    holds    an  ^o  Prestwood  v.  Borland,  92  Ala, 

office    of    profit    and    trust.      Ex  599;   9  So.  223. 
-parte  Anderson,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  77  Lehman   v.    Porter,    73    Miss. 

239;    102  S.  W.   727.  216;    18  ;So.  920. 

The  officers  need  not  be  appoint-  i 


§  534  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  898 

a  ballot  for  or  against  licenses.  The  object  of  such  meeting 
is  to  discover  the  wishes  of  the  voters,  and  if  such  wishes  can  be 
discovered  it  will  be  made  effective  unless,  some  positive  provi- 
sion of  law  has  been  broken  or  disregarded  in  expressing  it." 
And  if  the  statute  does  not  provide  how  the  vote  as  to  the  adop- 
tion of  the  provision  of  the  statute  shall  be  taken  by  the  inhab- 
itants of  the  district  voting  upon  the  question,  an  election  will 
be  held  to  be  valid  if  the  vote  is  taken  "by  hand"  and  not  by 
ballot,  even  though  the  manner  of  holding  the  election  was  not 
previously  detennined  by  a  formal  vote."  The  statute  pro- 
viding for  the  use  of  the  "Australian  ballot"  at  general  elec- 
tions does  not  apply  to  a  local  option  election,  for  the  reason 
that  the  ballots  under  that  law  provides  for  the  election  of- 
ficers only  and  not  for  the  submission  of  questions  to  voters.*" 
The  fact  that  the  law  prescribes  such  a  form  of  ballot  that 
those  voting  "no"  vote  in  favor  of  saloons,  and  those  voting 
"yes"  vote  against  them  cannot  be  said  to  be  misleading.^^ 
The  statute  concerning  devices  on  the  tickets  of  political  par- 
ties has  no  application  to  local  option  elections;  but  if  used 
the  election  for  that  reason  will  not  be  vitiated.*-  If  the  law 
does  not  prescribe  the  size  or  form  of  the  ballot,  then  the  size 
or  form  used  is  not  a  question  of  contest.*^  Where  a  statute 
failed  to  prescribe  the  form  of  the  ballot,  and  the  question  to 

78  Donovan  v.  Fairfield  Co.,  State,  23  Ohio  €ir.  Ct.  Rep.  392; 
Conn.  339;  22  Atl.  847;  Hubbard  Walker  v.  Mobley  (Tex.  Civ. 
V.  Commonwealth,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  App.),  105  S.  W.  fil;  Ex  parte 
(abstract)    G83.  Anderson   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  102  S. 

79  Commonwealth  v.  Doe,  108  W.  727;  Hash  v.  Ely,  45  Tex. 
Mass.  418.  In  South  Carolina  it  Civ.  App.  259;  100  S.  W.  980; 
is  held  that  the  constitutional  re-  Walker  v.  Mobley  (Tex.),  103  S. 
quirements    as    to    ballots    applies  W.  490. 

to   local   option   ballots.      State  v.  siPeople    v.    McBride,    234    111. 

State  Board,  78  S.  C.  461;   59   S.  146;   84  N.  E.  865;  State  v.  Har- 

E.  145,  and  so  in  Florida.     H.  W.  ris  (S.  D.),  115  N.  W.  533. 

Metcalf    Co.    v.     Orange     County  82  Erwin   v.     Benton,     120     Ky. 

(Fla.),  47   So.  363.  536;    87    S.    W.    291;    27    Ky.    L. 

80  State   v.    Janesville,    90    Wis.  Rep.  909. 

157;    62  N.   W.  933;    In  re  New-  ss  Hunter  v.  Senn,  61  S.  C.  44; 

burgh     (N.    Y.    Misc.     Rep.),    89       39  S.  E.  235 
N.     Y.     Supp.      1065;      Stick     v. 


899  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  534 

be  voted  on  was  "prohibition"  or  "no  prohibition,"  a  ballot 
containing  the  words  "for  prohibition"  and  "against  prohi- 
bition" sufficiently  indicated  the  voter's  wish.®*  Where  the 
question  submitted  to  the  voters  was,  "Shall  any  corporation, 
association,  copartnership  or  person  be  authorized  to  traffic 
in  liquors,  but  only  in  connection  with  the  business  of  keeping 
a  hotel,  if  the  majority  of  the  votes  cast  on  the  question  of 
selling  liquors  are  in  the  negative?"  and  there  was  omitted 
from  the  ballot  the  clause.  "If  the  majority  of  the  votes  cast 
on  the  question  of  selling  liquors  are  in  the  negative,"  it  was 
held  that  the  ballot  was  sufficient,  and  did  not  tend  to  deceive 
the  voters.^^  Admitting  that  the  Australian  law  applied  to 
local  option  elections,  to  the  fact  that  ballots  should  be  headed 
"Official  Ballots,"  and  one  ticket  only  used  with  the  words, 
"For  prohibition"  and  "Asainst  prohibition,"  it  was  held  in 
Texas  that  the  omission  of  the  words,  "Official  Ballot,"  and 
the  use  of  one  ticket  "For  prohibition"  and  another  "Against 
prohibition"  did  not  avoid  the  election.''*'  In  New  York  there 
must  be  printed  on  the  ballot  the  four  questions  submitted, 
numbered  consecutively,  to  each  of  which  must  be  prefixed  a 
caption  stating  concisely  the  effect  of  the  question.  It  was 
held  that  the  failure  to  print  on  the  slip  placed  in  the  voting 
machine  this  caption  immediately  preceding  each  question 
to  be  submitted  did  not  invalidate  the  election."  In  this 
same  case  it  was  held  that  the  failure  to  number  the  ballots 
or  slips  from  one  to  four,  inclusive,  as  the  statute  required,  did 
not  affect  the  election."^  Where  the  statute  required  the  pre- 
siding election  officer  to  write  his  name  on  the  blank  side  of 
the  official  ballot  before  delivering  it  to  the  voter,  and  pro- 
hibited the  counting  of  any  ballot  not  so  endorsed,  it  was 
held  that  a  ballot  not  so  endorsed  was  void  and  could  not  be 

8*  Police    Jury   v.    Descant,    105  sc  Haniia   v.   State,   48   Tex.   Cr. 

La.    512;    29    So.    976;    Stick    v.  App.  269;   87  S.  VV.  702;  Hash  v. 

State,  23  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  392.  Ely,  45  Texas  Civ.  App.  259;   100 

85 /n  re  Arnold,  32  N.  Y.  Misc.  S.  W.  980. 

Rep.    439;    66   N.   Y.    Supp.    557;  ^^  In  re  Merow,  112  N.  Y.  App. 

Gayle  v.  Owen  Co.  Court,  83  Ky.  562 ;  99  N.  Y.  State  9. 

61.  88  In  re  Merow,  supra. 


§534 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


900 


eoiinted.^^  A  statute  authorized  the  submission  of  four  ques- 
tions to  the  voters,  each  calling  for  a  distinct  method  of  con- 
trolling the  traffic  in  liquors.  Number  one  related  to  liquors 
to  be  drunk  on  the  premises  and  number  four  to  the  sale 
of  liquors  by  hotel  keepers,  "but  only  in  connection  with  the 
business  of  keeping  a  hotel  in"  a  town  if  a  majority  of  the 
votes  cast  on  question  number  one  be  in  the  negative.  Ques- 
tion number  four  was  so  changed  as  to  read  "as  a  keeper  of 
a  hotel  in  the  town  of  Volney, "  and  this  change  was  held  to 
invalidate  the  election.''"  AVhere  the  question  ordered  sub- 
mitted be  as  to  a  sale,  the  ballots  cannot  be  so  drawTi  as  to 
submit  the  question  of  gift  or  exchange/'^  The  ballot  must 
be  marked  in  the  manner  the  statute  requires,  and  where  the 
ballot  is  "for  license"  or  "against  license,"  a  ballot  marked 
"no  whisky"  cannot  be  counted.^- 


89  Brigance  v.  Horlock  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  97  S.  W.  1060;  Par- 
vin  V.  Wimberg,  130  Ind.  561; 
30  N.  E.  790.  But  see  Walker  v. 
Mobley  (Tex,  Civ.  App.),  105  S. 
W.  61,  and  Ex  parte  Anderson 
(.Tex.  Civ.  Ajsp.),  102  S.  VV. 
727. 

90  People  V.  Mosso,  30  N.  V. 
Misc.  Rep.  164;  63  N.  Y.  Supp. 
588.  iSee  Grubbs  v.  Griffin 
(Miss.),  25  So.  663. 

91  Steele  v.  State,  19  Tex,  App. 
425. 

92  Prestwood  v.  Borland,  92  Ala. 
599;    9   So.  223. 

Under  the  New  York  statute, 
where  the  names  of  the  four  ques- 
tions were  printed  on  tlie  ballots, 
but  not  the  questions  themselves, 
the  election  was  held  so  invalid 
that  a  resubmission  of  the  ques- 
tions was  ordered.  In  re  Gibson 
(N.  Y.),  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  485. 

Immaterial  variance  between  the 
order  and  the  questions  as  voted 
on  or  submitted  to  the  voter  is  not 


fatal.  O'Neal  v.  Minary,  125  Ky. 
571;  101  S.  W.  951;  30  Ky.  L. 
Rep.   888. 

If  prohibition  already  prevails 
in  a  part  of  the  territory  voting, 
it  is  sullicient  to  submit  the  ques- 
tion therein  whether  liquor  shall 
be  sold.  This  is  on  the  ground 
that  as  that  a  vote  in  favor  of  the 
sale  is  of  necessity  a  vote  in  favor 
of  tlie  existing  law  coming  into 
force.  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  59  S.  W.  482;  22  Ky.  L. 
Rep.   1003. 

Where  a  statute  requires  the 
words  "For  Prohibition"  and 
"Against  Prohibition,"  to  be  used 
on  the  ballots,  the  words  "For  Lo- 
cal Option"  and  "Against  Local 
Option"  cannot  be  used;  and  if 
used  the  ballots  cannot  be  count- 
ed. Griffin  v.  Tucker  (Tex.),  119 
S.  W.  338. 

Ballots  having  written  or  print- 
ed on  one  side  of  them  either  "For 
Selling"  or  "Against  Selling,"  on 
separate  lines,  were  held  valid.  H. 


901  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  535 

Sec.  535.    Who  may  vote. 

The  statute  determines  who  may  vote.  In  the  section  on 
who  may  petition  for  an  election  is  in  a  measure  discussed 
the  subject  matter  of  this  section,  and  what  is  there  said  is 
applicable  here.  If  the  local  option  law  does  not  define  who 
may  vote,  but  uses  the  term  "voters"  or  "electors,"  then  the 
Constitution  and  general  election  laws  of  the  State  must  be 
examined  to  determine  who  are  "voters"  and  "electors.""^ 
The  voter,  of  course,  must  be  a  voter  of  the  district  where 
the  question  of  license  or  no  license,  of  sale  or  prohibition  is 
an  issue,  and  those  not  residing  therein  may  not  vote.  The 
Legislature,  however,  has  the  power  to  determine  who  shall 
vote,  and  its  decision  on  the  question  is  not  to  be  questioned.^* 
In  the  case  of  petitioners  it  has  been  seen  that  youths  not  yet  of 
age  might  be  petitioners,  and  girls  over  eighteen  years  of  age 
might  also  be;  and  there  is  no  reason  why  the  Legislature 
could  not  have  extended  to  them  the  right  of  franchise.  Of 
course,  if  the  right  of  a  proposed  voter  is  challenged,  then  the 
election  board  must  determine  his  qualifications,  and  he  must 
present  the  necessary  statutory  proof  of  his  qualifications, 
w^hether  the  course  to  be  pursued  is  provided  for  by  the  local 
option  statute  or  the  general  law.  If  a  statute  provides  that  only 
those  who  voted  at  the  last  preceding  election  may  vote,  then 
the  poll  books  and  registration  lists,  if  there  be  any,  are  the  best 
evidence  of  their  qualifications.^^  If  the  election  be  in  a  city, 
then  those  entitled  to  vote  are  those  entitled  to  vote  at  city 

W.  Metcalf  Co.  v.  Orange  County  9i  Gayle  v.   Owen  Co.  Court,  8.3 

(Fla.),   47   So.   303.  Ky.  61. 

Where  the  printed  ballots  were  95  State  v.  Pressman,  103  Iowa 
not  such  as  the  statute  required  449 ;  72  N.  W.  600. 
and  could  not  be  counted;  but  A  statute  requiring  a  petitioner 
some  of  the  electors  changed  theirs  for  a  prohiljition  of  sales  upon  pe- 
so as  to  conform  to  the  law,  yet  tition  by  a  majority  of  the  adult 
the  unchanged  printed  ballots  were  inhabitants  is  not  complied  with 
a  majority  of  those  cast,  the  elec-  if  such  majority  is  made  out  by 
tion  was  declared  void.  Grif-  signers  having  a  fixed  place  of 
fin  V.  Tucker  (Tex.),  119  S.  W.  abode  within  the  district  for  a  def- 
338.  inite  time  only.     Wilson   v.   Law- 

93  Willis     V.     Kalmback     (Va.),  rence,  70  Ark.  545;   09  S.  W.  570. 
64  iS.  E.  342. 


§536 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


902 


elections.""  If  illegal  votes  were  cast,  it  must  be  shown  that 
they  changed  what  would  otherwise  have  been  the  result  to  set 
aside  the  election."' 

Sec.  536.     Canvass  of  ballots  and  return  of  result. 

Usually  the  ballots  are  canvassed  and  returns  of  the  result 
made  by  the  election  officers,  the  same  as  in  a  general  election. 
Mere  irregularities  in  making  the  canvass,  not  resulting  in 
the  production  of  any  material  change  in  the  result  are  im- 
material. Thus  where  the  supervisor  of  a  town  took  no  part 
in  the  canvass  of  the  vote,  though  he  was  present  and  un- 
authorizedly  signed  the  statement  in  relation  thereto,  it  was 
held  that  this  did  not  avoid  the  election,  nor  did  the  fact  that 
the  inspectors  inclosed  the  void  ballots  in  a  sealed  package  and 
filed  it  with  their  returns,  and  did  not  state  how  many  bal- 
lots were  invalid."'^     Where  a  local  option  statute  provided 


9c  In  re  Craft,  17  Ont.  App.  21. 
The  fact  that  persons  residing 
outside  the  district  voted  will  not 
prevent  tlie  granting  of  licenses 
in  the  district  if  authorized  to  do 
so  by  the  result  of  the  election. 
Bardwell  v.  State,  77  Ark.  161 ; 
91  S.  W.  555. 

97  Hoover  v.  Thomas,  35  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  535;  80  S.  W.  859; 
State  V.  Board,  78  S.  C.  461;  59 
S.  E.  145;  People  v.  Hasbrouck, 
21  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  188;  47  N. 
Y.  Supp.  109. 

If  the  general  election  law  re- 
quires a  person  to  have  paid  his 
poll  tax  before  ho  can  vote  at  a 
general  election,  he  must  have 
paid  it  before  he  can  vote  at  a 
local  option  election,  unless  tlie 
latter  statute  provides  specifically 
who  may  vote.  McCormick  v.  Jes- 
ter (Tex.),  115  S.  W.  278;  H. 
W.  Metcalf  Co.  v.  Orange  Couniy 
(Fla.).   47  So.   3G3. 

A   statute   requiring  cities    hav- 
ing 2,500  "inhabitants"  to  be   ex- 


cluded from  participation  in  a 
county  local  option  election  does 
not  mean  2,500  "voters."  State  v. 
Rinke    (Mo.),   121   S.  W.   159. 

Where  a  petition  must  be  signed 
by  a  certain  number  of  "regis- 
tered voters,"  a  finding  by  the 
court  in  submitting  the  matter  to 
an  election  that  so  many  "legal 
voters"  or  "qualified  voters"  have 
signed  it,  is  not  a  compliance  with 
the  statute,  and  the  election  is 
illegal.  Roesch  v.  Henry  (Ore.), 
103    Pac.    439. 

»8  People  v.  Pierson,  64  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  624;  72  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1123,  affirming  35  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 
406;    71   N.  Y.   Supp.  993. 

In  New  York  where  the  ballots 
were  not  properly  canvassed,  but 
a  reasonable  inference  from  the 
evidence  was  that  a  proper  can- 
vass would  not  have  changed  the 
result,  a  resubmission  was  de- 
nied. In  re  Burrell,  50  N.  Y.  Misc. 
Rep.  261:   100  X.  Y.  Supp.  470. 


903  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  536 

that  the  votes  should  "be  counted  and  returned  as  now  pro- 
vided by  law,"  and  a  subsequent  general  election  statute  pro- 
vided that  all  double  or  marked  ballots  should  be  rejected, 
it  was  held  that  double  or  marked  local  option  ballots  could 
not  be  rejected,  for  the  reason  that  the  local  option  statute 
adopted  the  genera!  election  law  as  it  stood  when  it  (the 
local  option  statute)  was  enacted,  and  the  subsequent  general 
election  statutes  did  not  apply  to  subsequent  local  option  elec- 
tions."^ Failure  to  subscribe  the  poll  lists  does  not  render 
the  election  void,^  and  so  likewise  a  failure  to  destroy  the 
unvoted  ballots,  as  the  law  renuires.-  When  a  statute  gives 
the  right  to  contest  an  "election/'  it  means  all  that  took 
place  from  the  act  of  casting  and  receiving  the  ballots  to  the 
final  canvass  of  the  votes,  and  if  it  is  sought  to  contest  it 
for  any-hing  outside  of  tb^t.  the  contest  must  fail.'  For 
things  done  prior  to  the  day  of  election,  under  such  a  stat- 
ute, no  contest  lies.*  Once  having  adjourned,  a  town  can- 
vassing board  cannot  be  compelled  to  reconvene  and  recanvass 
the  votes  and  reject  returns  from  districts  unless  such  re- 
turns are  wholly  void.^'  If  the  ballot  boxes  be  stolen  a  re- 
canvass  of  the  ballots  will  not  be  ordered."  Nor  will  a  recount 
be  ordered  if  no  different  result  would  be  reached  by  counting 
the  votes  in  the  manner  claimed  by  the  contestant.^ 

99  Fessenden  v.  Bossa,  G9  Conn.  by  showing  a  different  result  from 

335;  37  Atl.  977.  that   declared.     Savage   v.   Umph- 

1  People    V.    Pierson,    35    N.    Y.  ries    (Tex.),   118  S.  W.   893. 
Misc.   Rep.   406;    71    N.   Y.    Siipp.  3  Lowery   v.    Briggs     (Tex.    Civ. 
993.  App.),   73   S.  W.    1062. 

2  Puckett  V.  Snider,  110  Ky.  *  Norman  v.  Thompson,  96  Tex. 
261;  61  S.  W.  277;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  250;  72  S.  W.  62,  affirming  30 
1718.  Tex.    Civ.    App.    537;     72    S.    W. 

The    action    of    election    inspec-  64. 

tors  in  rejecting  a  ballot   is  min-  ^  People    v.    Pierson,    35    N.    Y. 

i-sterial,    not    judicial,    and    there-  Misc.   Rep.    406;    71    N.   Y.   Supp. 

fore  not  reviewable  on  certiorari.  993;   affirmed   64  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

State    v.    Sundquist     (Wis.),    118  624;    72  N.  Y.   Supp.   1123. 

N.  W.  '836.  8/n  re  Bertrand,  40  N.  Y.  Misc. 

The  canvass  of  the  ballots  may  Rep.  536;  82  N.  Y.  Supp.  940. 

not    be    impeached    by     oral     te.s-  " //(    re    Bcrlriuid,    supra;    Sav- 

timony    of    those    present    as    to  age    v.    Umphries    (Tex.),    118    S. 

how  the   members   of   the   election  W.  893. 

board  performed  their  duty,  there-  The  canvassing  board  cannot  re- 


§  537  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  904 

Sec.  537.    Majority  vote,  what  is — When  not  defeated. 

In  cases  where  the  question  of  local  option  is  made  to  de- 
pend upon  a  "majority"  vote,  the  general  rule  is,  in  the 
absence  of  any  statutory  regulation  to  the  contrary,  that  a 
majority  of  those  voting  at  the  election  on  the  particular  ques- 
tion controls.^  In  so  deciding  upon  a  like  question,  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Tennessee  said,  "How  can  we  know  how  many 
legal  voters  there  are  in  a  county  at  any  given  time  ?  We  can- 
not judicially  know  it.  If  it  were  proved  that  the  vote  was 
much  larger  in  the  last  preceding  political  election,  or  by  the 
last  census,  by  the  official  returns,  or  the  examination  of  the 
witnesses,  it  would  only  be  a  circumstance,  certainly  not  con- 
clusive that  such  was  the  case  at  the  time  of  the  election. 
But  we  put  our  decision  of  the  question  upon  a  more  fixed 
and  stable  ground.  When  a  question  of  an  election  is  put  to 
the  people,  and  is  made  to  depend  on  the  vote  of  a  majority, 
there  can  be  no  other  test  of  the  number  entitled  to  vote  but 
the  ballot  box.  If,  in  fact,  there  be  some  or  many  who  do 
not  attend  and  exercise  the  privilege  of  voting,  it  must  be  pre- 
sumed that  they  concur  with  the  majority  Avho  d'o  attend, 
if  indeed  they  can  be  known  at  all  to  have  an  existence.  Cer- 
tainly it  would  be  competent  for  a  Legislature  to  prescribe  a 
different  rule.  But  when  they  simply  refer  a  question  to  the 
decision  of  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  a  county,  it  cannot 

fuse    to    receive    the    election    re-  **  St.    Joseph   Tp.   v.    Rogers,    16 

turns  on  the  ground  that  the  hiw  Wall.  (U.  S.)  644;  County  of  Cass 

is   unconstitutional,    they    holdino-  y.  Johnson,  95  U.  S.  360;   Bridge- 

their   offices    under    the   very   law  port     v.     Railroad     Company,     15 

they  claim  to  be  invalid.     Frank-  Conn.  475;   People  v.  Warfield,  20 

lin  Co.  V.  State,  24  Fla.  55;  3  So.  111.   163;   People  v.  Gamer,  47  111. 

471;    12  Am.   St.   183.  246;  People  v.  Wiant,  48  111.  263; 

An   election   was   ordered    for   a  Talbott  v.  Dent,  9  B.  Mon.   ( Ky. ) , 

county   as    a   whole,   withovit    any  526,    539;     Taylor    v.    Taylor,    10 

reference  to  an  election  in  a  city  Minn.    107;    State   v.   Mayor,   etc., 

therein,  and  it  was  held  that  the  37   Mo.   270;    State   v.   Binder,   38 

election  officers  must  canvass  and  Mo.  450 ;  Reiger  v.  Commissioners, 

certify   to   the   election    as   to   the  etc.,    70    N.    C.    319;    Norment   v. 

whole  county.     O'Xeal  v.  Minary,  Charlotte,    85    N.    C.    3S7:    Gilles- 

125  KJ^  571;    101   S.   W.   951;    30  pie  v.  Palmer,  20  Wis.  544. 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  888. 


905  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  538 

be  that  they  mean  more  than  those  who  see  fit  to  exercise  the 
privilege.""  In  determining  the  result  of  a  county  local 
option  election,  illegal  returns  by  election  officers  from  cer- 
tain townships  in  the  county  will  not  defeat  such  election,  if 
without  such  returns  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  the 
county  is  in  favor  of  the  adoption  of  the  local  option  law.^* 
A  failure,  however,  on  the  part  of  the  election  officer  to 
perform  the  duties  required  of  them  in  the  furtherance  of 
such  an  election  will,  if  the  election  be  a  special  one,  render 
it  nugatory  and  void,  if  thereby  electors  sufficient  to  have 
changed  the  result  were  deprived  of  the  right  to  vote  at  such 
election." 

Sec.  538.     Vote  necessary  to  adopt  local  option. 

If  a  statute  requires  a  majority  vote  either  to  accept  or 
reject  the  provisions  of  a  local  option  law,  a  tie  vote  Avill 
not  comply  with  its  provisions,  but  will  leave  the  matter  as 
it  stood  before  the  election. ""^^  And  if  a  statute  in  substance 
provides  that  at  each  general  election  there  shall  be  submitted 
to  the  electors  of  each  county  the  question  whether  licenses 
shall  or  shall  not  be  granted  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors,  and 
that  if  at  such  an  election  the  votes  cast  shall  be  not  "for 
license,"  then  it  shall  be  unlawful  to  grant  such  a  license,  but 
if  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  shall  be  "for  license,"  then  it 
shall  be  lawful  to  grant  them,  and  such  an  election  is  held, 
and  the  electors  in  a  city  do  not  vote  upon  the  question 
within  the  city,  but  go  without  its  limits  and  vote  with  the 
electors  of  the  township,  it  will  not  be  lawful  for  the  county 
court  of  the  county  in  which  such  election  was  held  to  grant 
a  license  to   any  person   to  keep  a  place  where  intoxicating 

s>  Louisville,  etc.  R.   Co.  v.  Dav-  for   or   against    prohibition,   there 

idson   Co.,    1    Sneed    (Tenn.),   637,  is  no  election,  and  a  party  is  not 

692.  entitled  to  have  certified  any  facta 

10  Giddings  v.  Wells,  99  Mich.  concerning  the  same.  Erwin  v. 
221;    58    N.    W.    64.  Benton,    120    Ky.    536;    87    S.   W. 

11  ^a?    parte    Kennedy,    23    Tex.  291;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  909. 

App.  77;  3S.  W.  114.  12  Fennick    v.    Ovvings,    70     Md. 

If  the  canvassing  board  certify       246;   16  Atl.  719. 
it    is    unable    to    find    a    majority 


§  538  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  90G 

liquors  are  sold  within  the  limits  of  the  city  until  after  a 
general  election  has  been  held  at  which  the  electors  have 
voted  upon  the  question  ^vithin  the  city.^^  And  in  Alabama 
it  has  been  held  that,  where  a  statute  provided  that  licenses 
should  not  be  issued  unless  a  majority  of  the  voters  voted 
in  favor  of  the  granting  of  such  licenses,  that,  although  a 
majority  of  the  votes  Avere  not  cast  "against  license,"  yet  that 
licenses  could  not  be  granted  unless  a  majority  of  the  votes 
were  east  "for  license."  Tt  was  also  held,  where  the  re- 
turns showed  that  252  votes  were  cast  at  an  election  and 
that  121  of  them  were  "for  license,"  one  for  "no  license" 
and  the  remainder  of  them  were  so  informal  that  they  could 
not  be  counted,  that  there  was  no  such  majority  as  would 
authorize  the  issuing  such  licenses.^*  Whether  a  majority  of 
votes  had  been  cast  in  favor  of  granting  a  license,  must  neces- 
sarily depend  upon  the  wording  of  the  statute  under  which 
an  election  is  held."  Informality  in  the  wording  of  ballots 
cast  at  such  an  election  will  not  make  the  result  of  the  elec- 
tion void,  if  by  the  ballots  used  the  voters  are  informed  that 
they  are  voting  at  such  election  either  "for  the  sale"  or 
"against  the  sale"  of  intoxicating  liquors.^*^ 

i3Erb    V.    State,    35    Ark.    638;  272;    41    S.    E.    611;    Chamlee    v. 

Siloam  'Springs   v.   Thompson,    41  Davis,  115  Ga.  266;   41  S.  E.  691. 

A.rk.  456.  So   in   Maryland.      Walker   v.   Os- 

14  Prestwood  v.  Borland,  92  Ala.  wald,  68  Md.  11  Atl.  711. 

599;  9  South  223.  A  deposited  but  rejected  bailot 

15  Chalmers  v.  Funk,  76  Va.  717.  cannot  be  counted  in  determining 

16  Lehman    v.    Porter,    73    Miss.  whether    the    requisite   nuniber    of 
216;   18  So.  920.  votes  were  cast  at  the  election.     In 

Where  a  statute  provides  that  re  Swan  River,  16  Manitoba  312. 
a  license  may  be  issued  if  there  In  South  Dakota  the  majority 
be  a  majority  vote  for  it,  but  n  j  for  license  must  be,  not  on  that 
election  is  held,  a  license  cannot  question  alone,  but  a  majority  of 
be  granted.  Siloam  Springs  v.  the  liighest  vote  cast  at  the  elec- 
Thompson,  41  Ark.  456.  tion  on  another  proposition  sub- 
In  Georgia  providing  that  a  lis-  mitted  or  for  candidates  for  oi- 
pensary  may  be  established  if  i*  fice.  State  v.  Stakke  (S.  D.),  117 
majority  of  the  votes  be  in  favor  N.  W.  129. 

of  it,  means  a  majority  of   those  In  Canada  it  was  held  that  lo- 

actually  cast  at  that  election  and  cal  option  must  be  adopted   by  a 

counted.    Jacoby  v.  Dallis,  115  Ga.  majority  of  all  the  electors  on  the 


907  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  539 

Sec.  539.    Declaration  of  the  result  of  the  election. 

The  determination  and  declaration  of  the  board  or  court 
concerning  the  result  of  the  election  is  final  until  set  aside 
in  a  legally  instituted  contest  proceedings.^^  Where  a  statute 
requires  the  board  of  commissioners  of  election  to  canvass  the 
return  of  the  inspectors  of  election,  determine  the  result 
and  make  a  verified  report  of  it,  they  need  not  certify  that 
they  had  canvassed  the  returns  and  the  result  was  derived 
from  such  returns.^®  Nor  is  it  necessary  for  them  to  show 
the  election  was  held  at  the  places  designated  by  the  order 
of  election  or  by  law;  for  that  is  presumed. '°  Nor  is  it  neces- 
sary in  such  certificate  that  the  officer  making  the  canvass— a 
clerk  in  this  case- -called  in  assistants,  as  the  law  required 
him  to  do.-"  It  is  sufficient  if  a  majority  of  the  board  certify 
to  the  result.-'  If  the  law  requires  the  election  board  to 
spread  upon  their  records  the  reports  of  the  election  supervis- 
ors, its  provisions  may  be  complied  with  either  at  a  general 
or  special  meeting.--     The  order  of  the  board  declaring  the 

assessment  rolls,  not  by  a  major-  that  notices  were  given;   Bence  v. 

ity   of    those   voting.      In    re    Mc-  State    (Tex.    Cr.  App.),   35   S.   W. 

Avoy,  12  Up.  Can.  99;  In  re  Rets-  383. 

bottom,   42   Up.    Can.    358;    In   re  so/,;,  ,c   Rothwell,  44  Mo.  App. 

Johnson,  40   Up.   Can.  297;    In   re  215. 

Malone,  41  Up.  Can.  159;  In  r-?  In  Kentucky  it  is  held  the  board 
Leake,  2«  C.  P.  (Can.)  173;  /;;  re  need  not  certify  that  it  had  ex- 
Boon,  24  Up.  Can.  361.  amined   the  poll   books  unless   the 

The    first    election    may    be    re-  vote    be    adverse    to    granting    li- 

pealed   by   a   majority   vote.      Mi>  censes.      Commonwealth    v.    Hoke, 

Neely    v.    Morganton,    125    N.    C.  14   Bush,    GG8, 

375;   34  iS.  E.  510.  21  Fullwood   v.    State,    C7    Miss. 

An  election  is  not  void  because  554;    7    So.     432.      ,See    State     v. 

one   of   the    precincts    of    the    dis-  Searcy,  40  Mo.  App.  421. 

trict  neglected  or  refused  to  vote.  A    failure   of    the   cleric   of    th- 

Ex    parte    Schilling,    38    Tex.    Cr.  board  to  certify  the  result  to  tlie 

App.  287;  42  S.  W.  553.  Secretary  of  State,  as  the  statute 

17  Thomas  v.   Abbott,   105   Mich.  requires,    will    not    invalid.ite    the 

687;   63  N.  W.   984.  election.      Ciddings    ^.    Wells,    99 

isPuckett    V.     State,     71     Miss.  Mich.  221 ;   58  N.  W.  64. 

192;    14   So.   452.  22  Puckett    v.    State,    71    Miss. 

i9?uckett  V.  State,  supra;  nor  192;    14   So.   452. 


§539 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


908 


result  need  not  be  in  the  words  of  the  statute.-'  A  mere 
clerical  error  in  making  the  record  is  immaterial.^*  Thus 
where  a  part  of  the  entry  declared  that  less  than  a 
majority  cast  their  votes  for  no  license,  but  other  parts 
of  it  showed  that  a  majority  did  cast  their  vote  for 
prohibition,  the  error  was  held  immaterial.-^  It  will 
be  presumed  that  before  entering  the  order  the  court 
or  board  passed  upon  all  preliminary  matters  relating 
to  its  legality.-*^  The  order  declaring  the  result  of  the 
election  need  not  follow  up  the  petition  by  inserting 
a  description  of  the  territory  described  in  the  petition,  if 
words  sufficient  be  used  to  indicate  that  the  order  is  based 
upon  such  petition.-"  The  declaration  of  the  result  of  the 
election  is  not  open  to  a  collateral  attack.-^  Nor  can  one  pros- 
ecuted for  selling  liquor  in  violation  of  the  local  option  law 
attack  the  validity  of  the  election.--"  In  Texas  the  commis- 
sioners' court  may  count  the  votes  regardless  of  the  result 
reached  by  the  election  officers,  and  so  declare  the  result.^"    It 


2.t  state  V.  Cooper,  101  N.  €. 
€84;  8  S.  E.  134;  clones  v.  State, 
21  Tex.  App.  353;    17  S.   VV.  422. 

2i  Thomas  v.  Commonweal  rb,  90 
Va.  92;    17  S.  E.  788. 

25  Ex  parte  Burrage,  26  Tex. 
App.  35;   9  S.  W.  72. 

20  Irish  V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr. 
Rep.  130;  29  S.  W.  778;  Cooper 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  65  S.  \V. 
916. 

2T  Bruce  v.  State  ( Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  35  S.  W.  383;  Fit^e  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  85  S.  W. 
1156;  Loveless  v.  State,  40  Tex. 
Cr.  App.,  131;   49  S.  W.  98. 

In  Missouri  those  called  in  to 
assist  in  the  canvass  need  not 
sign  the  declaration  of  the  re- 
sult of  the  canvass.  State  v. 
Searcy,  46  Mo.  App.  421. 

28  State  V.  Emery,  98  N.  C.  768; 
3  S.  E.  810.  See  Ex  parte  Dou 
thitt  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  63  S.  W. 
131. 


29  State  V.  Cooper,  101  N.  C. 
684;  '8  S.  E.  134;  Woodward  v. 
State,   103  Ga.  490;   30  S.  E.  522. 

If  by  error  the  election  l)oard 
has  certified  a  wrong  lesul.t  the 
contesting  board  may  correct  the 
certificate.  Lrocke  v.  Garnett 
(Ky.),  42  S.  W.  918;  19  Ky.  L. 
Rep.    1059. 

In  Alabama  it  is  not  necessary 
to  the  validity  of  the  election 
that  a  report  of  the  result  of  th-j 
election  be  posted  at  the  door  of 
the  court  house,  as  the  statute  di- 
rects. Richter  v.  State  fAla.),  47 
So.  163. 

soBurrell  v.  State  (Tex.  f>. 
App.),  65  S.   W.   914. 

In  a  proceeding  to  set  aside  a 
canvass  of  the  vote,  it  is  held  in 
New  York  that  the  town  board 
and  its  members  are  proper  par- 
ties, they  being  the  canvassing 
board.  In  re  Bertrand,  40  N,  Y. 
Misc.  536;   82  N.  Y.  Supp.  940. 


909 


LOCAL    OPTION. 


^539 


is  not  necessary  that  the  order  declaring  the  result  should 
set  out  the  vote  by  precincts,  it  being-  sufficient  to  declare  the 
total  vote  cast  in  the  voting  district,-'^  nor  need  it  show  the 
election  was  held  in  each  precinct.''"  This  declaration  is  not 
vitiated  by  an  erroneous  reference  to  the  year  in  which  the 
local  option  law  was  passed.^^  A  failure  to  enter  the  order 
declaring  the  result  within  the  time  fixed  by  statute  is  not 
fatal  to  the  election.^*  In  the  order  or  certificate  of  the  proper 
court  declaring  the  result  of  a  local  option  election  it  is  only 


siBarker  v.  State  (Tex.  C'r. 
App.),  47  S.  W.  '980;  Armstr.ng 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  47  S. 
W.    lOOG. 

32  Barker  v.  State,  supra. 

33  Barker  v.   State,  supra. 

In  Connecticut  the  county  com- 
missioners cannot  be  'compelled 
to  issue  a  license  if  the  records 
of  the  county  show  a  majority 
voted  against  the  license,  it  not 
being  their  duty,  and  they  have 
not  the  power  to  determine  the 
validity  of  the  vote.  Underwood 
V.  Fairchild  Co.,  67  Conn.  411;  35 
Atl.  274.  See  also  People  v.  Fos- 
ter, 27  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  576;  58 
N.   Y.   Supp.    574. 

34  Loveless  v.  .State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  49  S.  W.  601;  Blackwell 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky. ),  54  S.  W. 
843;  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  240;  Rawls 
v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  622; 
89  S.  W.  1071;  Oxley  v.  Allen 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),   107  S.  W.  945. 

In  Mississippi  the  failure  to  re- 
turn the  result  of  tlie  vote  under 
oath  was  held  to  avoid  the  elec- 
tion. Grubbs  v.  Griflin  ( Miss. ) , 
25  So.  663. 

In  South  Carolina  the  board  of 
commissioners  for  the  election  of 
State  and  county  officers,  and  not 
the    board    of    commissioners    for 


the  election  of  Federal  officers,  de- 
clare the  result  of  the  election. 
State  V.  Jennings,  79  iS.  C.  246; 
60   S.  E.   699. 

In  Michigan  the  board  of  coun- 
ty supervisors  have  only  admin- 
istrative and  not  judicial  powers 
in  local  option  election  matters. 
Feek  v.  Bloomingdale,  82  Mich. 
393;  47  N.  W.  37;  10  L.  R.  A. 
69. 

Where  a  statute  required  the 
board  of  commissioners  to  meet 
in  special  session  to  canvass  the 
votes  and  declare  the  result,  it 
was  held  that  the  published  order 
need  not  show  it  was  made  at  a 
special  session,  for  that  would  be 
presumed.  Neal  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  513;  102  S.  W.  1139; 
Huff  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
102  S.  W.  1144  See  also  State  v. 
Edmunds,     (Ore.),    104    Pac.    430. 

A  recital  in  the  order  that  on  a 
certain  day  the  vote  was  can- 
vassed "to  determine  whether  or 
not  the  sale  of  spirituous,  vinous 
or  malt  liquors  shall  be  prohib- 
ited," is  not  fatal  because  it  have 
the  words  "intoxicating  liquors" 
are  used  instead  of  those  of  the 
statute.  Neal  v.  State,  supra; 
Huff    V.    State,  supra. 


§539 


TRAI<^FIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


010 


necessary  to  state  the  result  as  the  canvassers  found  it,  and 
such  certificate  will  be  'prima  facie  evidence  of  the  result  thus 
shown.  In  the  absence  of  impeaching  facts,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  officer  making  the  certificate  was  justified  by 
a  legal  and  proper  canvass  of  the  votes  in  issuing  the  certifi- 
cate as  to  the  result  of  such  election.  The  well-settled  pre- 
sumptions of  the  regularity  of  official  action,  and  that  things 
required  to  be  done  have  been  rightly  done,  apply  as  in  other 
cases.  The  presumption  is,  therefore,  that  the  election  has 
been  properly  conducted,  and  that  the  officers  charged  with 
the  duties  of  ascertaining  and  declaring  the  result  have  dis- 
charged their  duty  faithfully,  and  the  failure  of  the  proper 
officer  to  make  such  certificate  within  the  time  provided  for 
will  not  affect  the  election. ^^ 


35  In  re  Bothwell,  41  Mo.  App. 
215;  State  v.  Meekin,  51  Mo.  App. 
299;  Prather  v.  State,  12  Tex. 
App.  401 ;  Coleman  v.  State,  54 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  396;  112  S.  W. 
1072. 

In  South  Carolina  the  .statute 
concerning  the  adoption  of  the  dis- 
pensary law  is  sufficiently  com- 
plied with  if  the  managers,  the  in- 
tendant  and  the  wardens  cf  the 
town  certify  in  writing  to  the  re- 
sult of  the  balloting.  Hunter  v. 
Senn,  «1  S.  C.  44;  39  S.  E.  235. 

The  finding  cannot  be  over- 
turned by  an  abstract  of  the  vote 
made  by  the  election  commission- 
ers, when  the  certificate  does  not 
cover  the  question  cf  license,  al- 
though it  does  civer  the  votes 
cast  for  a  candidate  for  office. 
State  V.  Sanger  (Ark.),  SS  S.  W. 
903. 

In  Arkansas  the  failure  cf  the 
election  commissioners  to  lay  be- 
fore the  county  court  the  returns 
of  the  election  does  not  deprive 
that  court  of  its  power  to  grant 
licenses,    if    the    actual    vote    was 


in  fav(ir  of  the  granting.  Bord- 
well  V.  State,  77  Ark.  161;  91  S. 
VV.  555. 

An  order  passed  by  the  court 
certifying  that  the  returns  showed 
1,459  "for  dispensary"  and  1,190 
"against  dispensary"  is  sufficient, 
and  puts  the  act  into  force.  Cham- 
lee  V.  Davis,  115  Ga.  266;  41  S. 
E.  691;  Hubbard  v.  Common- 
wealth, 10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract) 
683 ;  Bennett  v.  Commonwealth,  1 1 
Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)    370. 

In  Kentucky  the  certificate  of 
the  result  must  be  filed  with  the 
county  clerk  before  the  act  goes 
into  force.  Cress  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  37  S.  W.  493;  18 
Ky.    L.    Rep.    633. 

Where  the  declaration  of  the 
result  of  the  election  must  be 
signed  by  the  canvassing  board, 
tlie  signing  of  such  a  result  by 
the  town  clerk  only  is  not  suffi- 
cient. People  V.  Hamilton,  27  N. 
Y.  Misc.  Rep.  308 ;  58  N.  Y.  Supp. 
584. 

In  New  York  the  certificate  of 
the    canvassing    board    as    to    the 


911 


LOCAL  OPTION. 


§540 


Sec.  540.    The  order  of  prohibition. 

In  some  of  the  States  the  statute  not  only  provides  that 
the  court  or  board  of  commissioners  shall  declare  the  result 
of  the  election,  but  they  shaJl  enter  an  order,  if  that  be  the 
result  of  the  election,  prohibiting  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  in  the  voting  territory.  This  order  need  not  be  in  the 
words  and  form  required  by  the  statute,  but  a  substantial 
compliance  with  its  provisions  is  sufficient.^**  Thus  an  entry 
declaring  a  sale,  gift  or  barter  "is  absolutely  prohibited,  ex- 
cept for  the  purposes  and  under  the  regulations  prescribed 


result  is  conclusive.  In  re  Brown, 
38  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  157;  77  N.  Y. 
Supp.  261,  and  the  clerk  cannot 
overturn  it  by  a  statement  snow- 
ing a  diflerent  result  when  he 
came  into  office  long  after  the 
election.     Ibid. 

An  omission  in  the  order  de- 
claring the  result  without  refer- 
ence to  the  voting  box  is  not 
fatal  and  a  reference  to  it  is  un- 
necessary. Efird  V.  State,  44  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  447;    71   S.  W.   957. 

Until  the  votes  have  been  can- 
vassed the  election  has  not  been 
"properly  submitted,"  as  a  stat- 
ute requires  it  to  be.  In  re  Bur- 
rell,  50  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  261; 
100  N.  Y.  Supp.  470. 

The  failure  to  file  a  certificate 
of  the  result  with  the  municipal 
clerk  in  Ohio  does  not  prevent 
local  option  going  into  force.  Otte 
V.  State,  29  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep. 
203. 

If  the  persons  who  canvass  the 
returns  are  candidates  for  elec- 
tion at  the  same  election,  the  can- 
vass is  void.  Commonwealth  v. 
Shuck,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract) 
874. 

If  the  local  option  act  do  not 


provide  who  shall  canvass  the  vote, 
then  the  general  election  officers — 
the  local  option  election  being  held 
at  the  time  of  the  general  elec- 
tion— can  canvass  it.  Common- 
wealth V.  Shuck,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)     874. 

Where  the  action  of  the  can- 
vassing board  is  final,  mandamus 
does  not  lie  to  control  its  action. 
Haehlne  Brewing  Co.  v.  Board 
(Mich.),  121  N.  W.  202;  16  De- 
troit L.  N.    184. 

If  all  the  members  of  the  board 
assemble  and  canvass  the  result, 
it  is  immaterial  how  or  when  it 
was  called  together.  State  v.  Ed- 
munds  (Ore.),  104  Pac.  430. 

The  board  of  supervisors  or 
court  may  require  the  election  can- 
vassers to  execute  a  new  certificate 
where  the  certificate  returned  is 
defective,  but  it  can  be  corrected 
by  its  own  statements.  Thomas 
v.  Abbott,  105  Mich.  687;  63  N. 
W.  984. 

36  James  v.  State.  21  Tex.  App. 
353;  17  S.  W.  422;  Holloway  v. 
State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  246;  110 
S.  W.  745 ;  Doss  V.  Commonwealth, 
14  Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)   334. 


§  540  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  912 

by  law"  is  sufficient ;  ^'  and  such  order  need  not  give  the  date 
the  election  was  ordered.^*  Delay  on  the  part  of  the  court  in 
making  the  order  will  not  invalidate  the  election.^"  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  order  except  the  statutory  exceptions  of 
sales  for  medicinal  and  sacramental  purposes.*"  It  is  not 
necessary  for  the  order  to  state  that  proper  notices  of  the 
election  were  given/^  nor  need  it  describe  the  territorj^  by 
metes  and  bounds,  if  it  constitutes  a  political  district  of  the 
State.*^  Thus  describing  the  territory  as  "Precinct  Number 
Two"  where  the  order  was  for  an  election  in  "Justice  Pre- 
cinct Number  Two, "  of  a  named  county,  was  held  sufficient.*^ 
It  is  not  necessary  for  the  order  to  declare  that  prohibition 
w'ill  continue  in  the  district  until  it  is  invalidated  by  a  vote 
of  the  electors.**  Until  the  order  of  prohibition  is  made  there 
is  no  prohibition  in  force,  when  such  order  is  required.*^  The 
entering  of  the  order  is  prima  facie  evidence  that  all  the  pre- 
liminary steps  had  been  taken.*®  It  is  not  necessary  for  the 
court  or  board  to  state  they  "opened"  the  polls  and  counted 
the  votes,  especially  where  it  appears  from  the  record  that  it 
will  not  affect  the  election.*^  The  failure  of  the  judge  of  the 
court  to  make  an  entry  of  the  publication,  as  required  by 
statute,  will  not  invalidate  the  election,***  nor  will  his  failure 


ST  Ex   parte   Burrage,    26    Tex.  4 1  Bruce     v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

App.   35;    9   S.   W.   72;    Daniel  v.  App),  35  S.  W.  383. 

State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.   16;   21  S.  «  Bruce  v.  State,  swpra. 

W.  68;    Zollicoffer  v.  State    (Tex.  43  Loveless    v.    State    (Tex.    Cr. 

€r.  App.),   38  S.   W.   775.  App.),    49    S.    W.    601;    Efird    v. 

38  Daniel   v.    State,   supra.  State,   44   Tex.    Cr.   App.   447;    71 

39  Ex  parte  Burger,  32  Tex.  Cr.  S.  W.  957. 

Eep.  459;   24   S.  W.  289.  44  Lipari  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App. 

40  Gilbert  v.   State,  32   Tex.  Cr.  431. 

Rep.  596 ;  25  S.  W.  632 ;  Ex  parte  45  Holloway    v.    State,    53    Tex. 
Perkins,  34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  429;   31  Cr.  App.  246;    110  S.  W.  745. 
S.  W.   175;    Bruce  v.   State    (Tex.  46  £-0;    parte    Schilling,    38    Tex. 
Cr.   App.),    35  S.   W.   383;    Love-  Cr.  App.  287;  42  S.  W.  553;  Chap- 
less  V.  State    (Tex.   Cr.  App.),  49  man   v.    State,    37    Tex.    Cr.    App. 
S.  W.  601;  Truesdell  v.  State,  42  167;   39  S.  W.   113 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  544;  61  S.  W.  935;  47  Beaty   v.    State,    53    Tex.    Cr. 
People  V.  Whitney  105  Mich.  622;  App.  432;   110  S.  W.  449. 
63  X.  W .   765.  48  Beaty  v.  State,  supra , 


913 


IjOCal  option 


§540 


to  give  the  dates  of  the  publication,  where  he  certifies  that  the 
publication  was  made  "for  the  time  and  in  the  manner  re- 
quired by  law"  render  the  certificate  ineffective  as  evidence 
of  the  publication.'*''  If  an  election  under  such  a  statute 
results  in  favor  of  prohibition,  it  is  sufficient  for  an  order 
declaring  the  result  to  state  that  fact  and  to  prohibit  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquors  within  the  locality  for  which  the  elec- 
tion was  petitioned.  It  is  not  essential  to  the  sufficiency  of 
the  order  that  it  shall  declare  that  the  prohibition  shall  con- 
tinue until  such  time  as  the  qualified  voters  of  the  locality, 
by  a  majority  vote,  at  an  election  held  therefor,  shall  decide 
otherwise.  Such  limitation  is  fixed  by  law  and  cannot  be 
affected  by  the  order  of  a  court.^'*^ 


49  Harrjnnan  v.  State,  53  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  474;  110  S.  W.  -J20; 
Carnes  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
110  S.  W.  928. 

50  Ex  parte  Beeverage,  26  Tex. 
App.  35 ;  Coleman  v.  State,  54  Tex. 
€iv.  App.  396;   112  S.  W.  1072. 

In  the  discharge  of  their  duty 
'declaring  the  result  of  the  elec- 
tion and  entering  an  order  of  pro- 
hibition the  court  exercises  neither 
judgment  nor  discretion,  and  man- 
damus lies  to  compel  it  to  com- 
ply with  the  law.  State  v.  Rich- 
ardson   (Ore.),    85    Pac.    225. 

Until  the  order  be  made  there 
can  be  no  prohibition.  Holloway 
V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  246; 
110  ,S.   W.   745. 

Where  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
judge  of  the  court  to  make  an 
entiy  declaring  the  result  of  the 
election,  it  is  not  necessary  for 
him  to  write  it  in  person,  its 
transcription  by  another  being  suf- 
ficient. Coleman  v.  State,  54  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  396;  112  S.  W.  1072. 
In  this  case  the  county  clerk  en- 
tered an  order  declaring  the  re- 
sult of  the  election.  On  the  suc- 
ceeding page  was  an  order  signed 


by  the  countj^  clerk  declaring  that 
the  six  previous  pages  had  been 
read  over  in  open  court  and  were 
correct.  It  was  held  that  this  was 
an  adoption  of  the  entry  of  the 
clerk  as  the  official  act  of  the 
judge. 

An  order  of  prohibition  entered 
in  violation  of  an  injunction  or- 
der is  void.  Doss  v.  Common- 
wealth 14  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract) 
334. 

Where  a  statute  required,  on  a 
second  election  resulting  against 
prohibition,  the  court  to  enter  an 
order  setting  aside  the  previous 
order  enforcing  prohibition,  it  was 
held  not  necessary  to  enter  an  or- 
der of  any  kind  where  the  second 
election  resulted  in  favor  of  pro- 
hibition. State  V.  Edmunds 
(Ore.),   104  Pac,  430. 

Where  the  order  of  prohibition 
could  not  affect  sales  by  druggists 
and  pharmacists  selling  wine  for 
sacramental  purposes  it  was  held 
that  a  saloon  keeper  could  not  ob- 
ject to  an  order  that  did  not  ex- 
cept such  sales.  People  v.  Whit- 
ney, 105  Mich.  622;  63  N.  W. 
765. 


§§  541,  542        TR.Vl'PIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  914 

Sec.  541.     Order    for    publication    concerning    prohibition 
order. 

In  some  of  the  States  the  board  or  court  declaring  the  re- 
sult of  the  election  or  entering  the  order  of  prohibition  must 
order  that  publication  be  made  of  the  result  of  the  election 
or  the  fact  that  an  order  prohibiting  sales  had  been  made. 
This  order  for  publication  may  be  made  at  any  time  after 
the  result  of  the  election  is  declared  or  the  order 
of  prohibition  made,  unless  the  language  of  the  statute 
imperatively  requires  it  to  be  made  within  a  time  stated.^^ 
If  the  statute  requires  the  court  or  board  to  designate  or 
select  the  paper  in  which  the  notice  of  prohibition  shall  be 
inserted  it  must  make  the  selection,  but  where  the  county 
judge  was  required  to  make  the  selection,  it  was  held  not  nec- 
essary to  provide  in  the  order  that  he  should  make  such  selec- 
tion.^^ 

Sec.  542.     Publishing  notices  of  order  and  result  of  elec- 
tion. 

In  some  of  the  States  the  order  is  not  in  force  until  the 
fact  of  adoption  of  prohibition  or  "no  license"  has  been 
published  for  a  certain  length  of  time  or  so  many  publications 
of  the  result  of  the  election  has  been  made  in  a  newspaper, 
usually  so  many  weekly  publications.  When  this  is  the  case 
the  requisite  number  of  publications  must  be  made  before 
the  prohibition  of  the  order  becomes  effective. '^^    Where  three 

51  Biddy  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  land  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
App.),  108  S.  W.  689;  Rawls  v.  47  S.  W.  720;  on  rehearing  revers- 
State,  4'8  Tex.  €r.  App.  622;  89  ing  judgment.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.) 
S.  W.  1071  (eleven  months'  de-  47  S.  W.  470;  Lively  v.  State 
lay).  (Tex.  Cr.    App.),   72    S.   W.   393; 

52  Johnson  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  Chenowith  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  624;  108  S.  W.  683;  Sin-  App.  238;  96  S.  W.  19;  In  re  Coe, 
Clair  V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  24  Up.  Can.  439;  In  re  Miles,  28 
4'87;  77  S.  W.   621.  Up.  C^i.  333;   In  re  Day,  38  Up. 

53  Moss  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  Can.  528;  In  re  Wycott,  38  Up. 
App.  459;  89  S.  W.  833;  John-  Can.  533;  In  re  Hartley,  25  Up. 
son  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  89  Can.  12;  State  v.  Weeks,  38  Mo. 
S.  W.  834;  Ellis  v.  State  (Tex.  App.  566;  Ezzell  v.  State,  29  Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  89  S.  W.  974;  Strick-  App.  521;   In  re  McLpan,  25  Up. 

Can.  619. 


915  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  542 

weekly  publications  were  made,  when  four  were  required,  and 
the  fourth  was  enjoined,  and  an  appeal  from  an  order  dis- 
missing the  action  taken,  a  supersedeas  bond  having  been  giv- 
en, the  appeal  was  dismissed  by  agreement,  and  the  fourth 
publication  was  then  made  in  the  first  issue  of  the  paper  there- 
after, although  more  than  thirty  days  after  the  third  publica- 
tion had  been  made,  it  was  held  that  the  publications  were 
continuous,  the  county  judge  havinir  no  authority  to  proceed 
with  the  publication  while  the  proceedinsfs  on  anoeal  were  in 
fieri/'*  Where  the  statute  requires  a  minute  of  the  publication 
to  be  made  of  record  by  the  judge  of  the  court,  an  entry  in 
his  minutes,  that  the  result  of  the  election  was  published 
"for  the  time  and  in  the  manner  required  by  law"  is  suffi- 
cient, although  it  does  not  show  whether  the  publication 
was  made  by  posting  or  by  insertion  of  a  notice  in  the  news- 
paper.'^^ Where  a  statute  required  the  order  to  be  published 
four  successive  weeks,  a  publication  November  21st,  28th,  De- 
cember 5th  and  12th  was  a  compliance  with  its  requirements, 
where  the  minute  of  the  publication  M'^as  entered  December 
19th.^"  Where  a  statute  required  publication  for  four  succes- 
sive weeks,  but  an  injunction,  after  two  publications  had  been 
made,  for  sixteen  months  prevented  further  publications ;  but 
on  its  dissolution  two  more  publications  were  made,  it  was 
held  that  the  publication  was  not  sufficient."  A  statute  re- 
quiring the  order  declaring  that  prohibition  had  carried 
does  not  require  the  names  of  the  judges  signing  it  to  be  pub- 
lished.^*   Where  a  statute  requires  the  judge  of  the  court  to 

54  Gill  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Or.  App.  157;   Chenowith  v.  State,  50  Tex. 

517;     89    S.    W.    27-2;     Ex    parte  Cr.  App.  238;   96  S.  \V.   19.     But 

Wood    (Tex.  Cr.   App.),  81   S.  W.  see     Riggs     v.     State      (Tex.     Cr. 

529.  App.),   97   S.   W.   482. 

55Byrd    v.    State,    53    Tex.    Cr.  "-s  Hillard  v.   State,  48  Tex.  Cr. 

Rep.  507;    111   S.  W.   149;   Lively  App.   314;    87   S.   W.   821. 

V.  State    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),    72    S.  A   restraining   order   of   a    Fed- 

W.  393.  eral   court   prohibiting   the    publi- 

^^  Ex  parte   Sullivan    (Tex.  Cr.  cation  of  the  order  was  held  not 

App.),  75  S.  W.  790.  to  annul  the  election.     McHam  v. 

57  Griffin    v.    State      (Tex.     Cr.  Love,   39   Tex.  Civ.   App.   512;   87 

App.),  87  S.  W.  155;   Stephens  v.  S.  W.  875. 
State    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  87   S.  W. 


,§542  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  916 

select  a  newspaper,  and  he  forbids  the  proprietor  of  a  paper 
to  publish  the  order,  but  he  does  publish  it,  such  judge  can- 
not ratify  his  act  by  adopting  and  certifying  to  the  publi- 
cation."'''  If  the  order  misstates  the  date  of  the  election,  that 
will  not  invalidate  it.'^'^  Where  the  order  declared  that  the 
order  was  published  "for  four  successive  weeks  ending  on" 
a  certain  Saturdaj^  it  will  be  presumed,  in  order  to  avoid 
the  presumption  that  the  first  publication  was  made  on  Sun- 
day, that  the  time  of  publication  had  already  expired  on 
such  Saturday.^^  The  fact  that  the  order  was  published  an 
unnecessary  number  of  times  will  not  vitiate  the  election.^- 
While  a  statute  may  require  the  judoe  to  make  the  order  for 
publication,  yet  that  does  not  mean  that  he  shall  write  it,  it 
being  sufficient  if  he  sign  an  order  written  by  another."'  An 
order  suspending  the  operation  of  the  law  until  publication 
has  been  made  and  certified  to  by  the  judge,  and  requiring 
such  publication  to  be  for  four  weeks,  is  not  void  on  the 
ground  that  it  renders  uncertain  the  time  when  the  law  takes 
effect,  though  the  publication  be  made  for  five  weeks.**  The 
court  itself  need  not  draft  the  notice  for  publication  nor  re- 
cite it  in  the  order  for  publication."^  The  fact  that  the  notice 
was  published  in  other  newspapers  than  the  one  selected  will 
not  affect  the  election  if  it  be  published  the  requisite  num- 
ber of  times  in  the  one  selected,  but  the  full  number  of  pub- 
lications cannot  be  made  up  by  several  publications  of  the 
notice  in  different  newspapers."''     Unless  a  statute  requires 

59  Chenowith   v.    State,    50   Tex.  Tlie    fact   tliat   the   commission- 
er. App.  23'8 ;  96  S.  W.  19.  ers'  court  in  Texas  unauthorizedly 

60  Luck      V.     State      (Tex.     Cr.  signed  the  order  with  the  county 
App.),  97  S.  W.  1049.  ,i"dge     does     not     invalidate     it. 

61  Lambert  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  Hanna  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
App.  232;  39  S.  W.  299.  269;   87  S.  W.  702. 

62  Sinclair  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  65  state   v.    Hitchcock,    124    Mo. 
App.  487;   77  S.  W.  62;   Chapman  App.  101;   101  S.  W.  117. 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  167 ;  39  ee  state    v.    O'Brien,    35    Mont. 

S.  W.  113.  441;    90   Pac.   514. 

63  Coleman  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  A  skip  of  one  week  in  the  pul)- 
App.  578;   111  S.  W.  1011.  lication    was    held    not    to    invali- 

61  Tlmrmond    v.   State,    46    Tex.       date  the  election.     Carnes  v.  State, 
Cr.  App.  162;  79  S.  W.  316.  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  103  S.   W.  934. 


917  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  543 

the  publication  of  the  order  to  be  made  within  a  certain  des- 
ignated time  after  the  order  is  entered,  it  may  be  published 
within  a  reasonable  time  thereafter.'*^  If  a  statute  provides 
that  a  designated  officer  of  the  court  shall  make  proclamation 
of  the  result  of  an  election  without  providing  in  what  man- 
ner such  proclamation  shall  be  made,  a  verbal  proclamation 
made  by  him  at  the  court  house  door  that  "the  local  option 
law  had  carried,  and  that  the  majority  of  the  votes  were 
against  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquore,"  will  be  sufficient. 
Such  a  statute,  in  the  absence  of  further  explanatory  words, 
simply  requires  an  announcement  in  some  form  of  the  result 
certified  by  the  judges  of  the  election,  as  a  conclusion  of  the 
whole  matter,  and  fixing  the  period  from  which  the  law  be- 
comes assertive.  It  requires  the  officer  to  make  proclamation 
without  directing  him  how  to  do  it.  One  of  Webster's  defini- 
tions of  proclamation  is  "the  act  of  proclaiming;  a  declara- 
tion or  notice  by  public  outcry,  such  as  is  given  by  criers  at 
the  opening  and  adjourning  of  covirts.""- 

Sec.  543.     When  local  option  takes  effect. 

When  a  local  option  law  goes  into  effect  depends  very  much 
upon  the  provisions  of  the  statute  upon  that  subject.  In  one 
State  at  least,  the  statute  provides  that  it  shall  go  into  oper- 
ation .immediately  after  an  election  has  been  held  at  which  a 
majority  vote  was  cast  in  favor  of  the  adoption  of  the  law.*"* 

The    fact   that   the    commission-  made.      'Covington    v.    State,     51 

ers'  court  ordered  the  publication,  Tex.  Cr.  App.  48;    100  S.  W.  368. 

when  the  order   should   have  been  «7  Ezzell  v.   State,  29  Tex.  App. 

made    by    the    county    judge,    will  521. 

not  vitiate  the   election.      Neal  v.  ss  Macken  v.  State,  62  Md.  224. 

State,  51   Tex.  Cr.  App.  513;    102  Allegations   in  indictment  as  to 

S.    W.    1139;    Huff    v.    State,    51  publication.       Smitham    v.    State, 

Tex.    Cr.    App.    441;     102    S.    W.  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.   173;    108   S.   W. 

1144.  1183. 

Nor    will    a    suggestion    by    the  Unless  some  statute  requires  ity 

district  judge  who   tried  the  con-  there   need  be  no   return  or   proof 

test    affect    the    election.      Searcy  to    the    court    of    tlie    publication. 

V.    State,    51    Tex.    Cr.    App.    444;  State  v.  Bush,  118  S.  W.  670. 

102  S.   W.    1127.  69  Commonwealth  v.   Lillard,   10 

An    order    for    the    publication  Ky.  Law  Rep.  561 ;  9  S.  W.  710. 
does  not  show  the  publication  was 


§  543  TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  918 

But  in  Texas  it  has  been  held  that  a  local  option  law,  when 
adopted  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  electors  does  not  become 
operative  until  the  result  of  the  election  has  been  declared 
by  a  proper  order  to  that  effect,  and  if  publication  of  the 
order  is  required,  that  must  be  made,  and  the  time  provided 
for  have  fully  elapsed.  For  instance,  if  the  statute  requires 
that  the  order  must  be  published  four  successive  weeks,  the 
publication  must  be  for  four  full  consecutive  weeks,  or  twen- 
ty-eight days  from  the  day  of  its  first  publication,  and  until 
that  time  has  elapsed,  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  in  the 
community  to  be  affected,  will  not  be  a  violation  of  the  law ; 
and  where,  as  in  Alabama,  it  is  provided  that  no  penal  stat- 
ute shall  go  into  effect  until  thirty  days  after  the  adjourn- 
ment of  the  Legislature,  such  limitation  is  to  be  taken  into 
account  in  determining  when  a  local  option  law  will  become 
effective.''^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the  operation  of 
a  local  option  law  in  a  given  district  does  not  depend  upon 
the  forwarding,  without  delay,  by  the  county  clerk  to  the 
secretary  of  the  State,  when  the  statute  requires  it  to  be 
done,  of  a  certified  transcript  of  the  resolution  of  prohibition, 
and  of  so  much  of  the  journal  of  the  proceedings  of  the  board 
of  supervisors  as  pertains  to  the  election,  including  the 
tabular  statement  of  votes,  together  with  a  copy  of  the 
affidavit  of  publication  or  the  notice  of  the  adoption  of  the 
resolution,  and  that  a  failure  of  the  clerk  to  comply  with  the 
statute  in  this  regard  will  not  defeat  the  proceeding.  In  such 
case  mandamus  will  lie  to  compel  him  to  forward  such  tran- 
script, but  the  operation  of  the  law  will  not  be  made  to  de- 
pend upon  that  fact.  If  so,  the  act  of  the  individual  might 
be  corruptly  used  to  defeat  the  will  of  the  people." 

70  Phillips  V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  In  Kentucky  before  the  statute 
304;  4  S.  \V.  893;  Olivaris  v.  goes  into  force  the  certificate  of 
State,  23  Tex.  App.  305 ;  4  S.  \Y.  the  canvassing  board  must  be  filed 
903.  with  the  clerk  of  the  county  court. 

71  Olmstead  v.  Cook,  89  Ala.  Cress  v.  Commonwealth  (Kj'. ),  37 
228;  7  So.  776.  See  Richter  v.  S,  W,  493;  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  633. 
State,  156  Ala.  127 ;  47  So.  163.  Contra  in  Ohio,  Otte  v.  State,  29 

72  Giddings  v.    Wells,   99    Mich.  Ohio  Cir.  €t.  Rep.  203. 

221;   58  N,  W.  64.  In  Canada  it  was  held  that   lo- 


919  LOCAL    OPTION,  §  544 

Sec.  544.     Contesting  validity  of  election. 

The  general  rule  is  that  the  ascertainment  and  declaration 
of  the  result  of  a  local  option  election  is  prima  facie  correct, 
and  is  conclusive  until  in  a  proper  action  brought  for  that 
purpose  the  true  result  is  ascertained  and  determined 
by  a  d'rect  judicial  proceeding  instituted  for  that  purpose. 
It  would  lead  to  confusion  and  ridiculous  absurdity  to  allow 
the  result  of  such  an  election  to  be  contested  every  time  the 
result  of  it,  as  determined  by  the  election  officers,  became 
materially  collateral  in  a  litigation.  In  one  case  a  defendant 
might  be  able  to  prove  facts  showing  that  such  an  election 
was  void  for  one  cause  or  another;  in  another  a  defendant, 
charged  with  a  like  offense,  might  be  less  fortunate,  and  the 
State  might  show  that  it  was  regular  and  valid;  and  so  on 
indefinitely.  The  law  does  not  make  provision  for  such  con- 
tinual and  repeated  contests  in  every  case  that  may  arise.  It 
intends  that  one  contest,  properly  instituted  for  the  purpose, 
shall  establish  the  validity  or  invalidity  of  the  election  ques- 
tioned. If  there  are  those  who  are  dissatisfied  with  the  con- 
duct of  the  election,  or  the  result  of  it  as  declared,  they  must 
promptly  bring  their  action  to  contest  its  validity  and  the 

cal  option  goes  into  force  on  elec-  tra,   Ex   jjorlc    Farrell,    23    N.    B. 

tion  day,  and  of  this  fact  all  must  467. 

take  notice.     Smith  v.  Benton,  20  Under  the  Texas  statute  a  sale 

Ont.    344;    Regina    v.    Halpin,    12  after   the    fourth    week   by   publi- 

Ont.  330.  cation  of  the  order  of  prohibition, 

A  statute  of   Xova   Scotia   pro-  but    witliin    twenty-eight    days    of 

Added    that    if    a     vote     be     given  the  first  publication  is  not  a  vio- 

against    licensing,    then    the    stat-  lation  of  the  law.     Green  v.  State, 

ute  should  be  in  force  "upon,  from  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  466;    110  S.  W. 

and   after   the   day   on   which   the  919. 

license   for  the  sale  of   spirituous  Date    set    by    Statute,    State    v. 

liquors  then  in  force  in  such  coun-  Fulkerson    ( Ark. ) ,  83  S.  VV.  934 ; 

ty"  should  expire.     No  license  was  86  S.  W.  817;   or  by  order  of  Po- 

in  force  in  the  county  at  the  time  lice     Jury     in    Louisiana.      Police 

of  the  election,  and  none  had  been  Jury  v.  Descant,  105  La.  512;   29 

in   force   for   years.      It   was   held  So.  976.     Date  when  the  vote  may 

that  the   statute   never   went   into  be  taken.   State  v.   Wenzel,   72  N. 

force,  and  there  could  be  no  con-  H.    396;    56   Atl.    918.      Takes   ef- 

viction  for   a  sale.     Queen  v.   Ly-  feet   only   on    favorable    vote.      In 

ens,  5  R.  &  G.   (N.  S.)   201.     Con-  re  O'Brien,  29  Mont.  530;  75  Pac. 

19'6. 


§  544  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  920 

correctness  of  the  ascertained  result.'"  But  in  some  States  it 
is  held  that  if  a  statute  provides  for  the  contest  of  a  local 
option  election  within  a  given  time  after  it  is  held,  and  such 
contest  is  not  made,  this  will  not  abridge  the  right  of  a 
person  to  show  the  law  to  be  void,  at  any  time  when  it  is 
sought  to  hold  him  amenable  for  its  violation.  This  is  upon 
the  theory  that  punishment  cannot  be  inflicted  for  the  vio- 
lation of  a  void  law.'^*  Such  a  law  may  be  contested  for 
fraud,  and  a  finding  that  the  judges  of  such  an 
election  had  been  guilty  of  fraud  invalidating  the  election, 
has  been  sustained,  where  the  uncontradicted  evidence  showed 
that  the  judges  electioneered  with  the  voters  in  the  booths 
and  urged  them  to  allow  such  judges  to  prepare  their  ballots, 
that  a  large  number  of  ballots  were  prepared  by  one  of  the 
judges,  and  that  they  were  prepared  directly  contrary  to  the 
expressed  wish  of  the  voters ;  and  in  such  instances  the  voters 
were  permitted  to  contradict  their  ballots."'*  Unless  some  stat- 
ute specifically  authorizes  a  contest  of  a  local  option  election 
there  can  be  none;  and  the  question  of  its  conduct  is  not  "a 
civil  or  political  right"  within  the  meaning  of  that  phrase  as 
used  in  a  constitution."*'  If  a  statute  provides  a  complete  reme- 
dy in  equit}^  for  testing  its  validity,  then  that  method  must  be 
pursued ;  '''^  but   if  a   statute   does   not  authorize  a  court  of 

73  Commonwealth  v.  Lillard.  10  osho  (Mo.  App.),  123  S.  W.  473; 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  561;  9  S.  W.  710;  Darboume  v.  Oberlin,  121  La.  641; 
State  V.  Emerg,  98  K  C.  7&8;  3  46  So.  679;  Savage  v.  Wolfe,  69 
S.   E.   810;    State   v.    Cooper,    101  Ala.  569. 

N.  C.  684;   8  S.   E.   134.  The  contest  must  be   instituted 

74  Young  V.  Commonwealth,  14  in  the  court  having  jurisdiction 
Bush  (Ky.),  161;  Curry  v.  State,  thereof.  Oxford  v.  Frank,  30  Tex. 
28  Tex.  App.  475;  13  S.  W.  752.  Civ.  App.  343;  70  S.  W.  426;  Nor- 

75  Freeman  v.  Lazarus,  61  Ark.  man  v.  Thompson,  30  Tex.  Civ. 
247;   32  S.  W.  680;   31   So.  361.  App.   537;    72   S.  W.   62,   64;    Og- 

A   statute   authorizing   the  oon-  burn  v.  Elmore,   123   Ga.   677;   51 

testees   to   state   grounds   "to   sus-  S.    E.    641;     Kehr     v.      Columbia 

tain"   the   election   does   authorize  ( Mo. ) ,  116  S.  W.  428. 

them  to  state  grounds  to  avoid  it.  77  State    v.    Martin     ( Fla. ) ,    46 

Locke  v.  Garnett   (Ky.),  42  S.  W.  So.    424;    Puckett   v.    Snider,    110 

918;  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1059.  Ky.   261;    61    S.   W.    277;    22   Ky. 

76Hagens    v.    Police    Jury,    121  L.  Rep.   1718;    Ogburn  v.  Elmore, 

La.  634;  46  So.  676;  Haas  v.  Ne-  123  Ga.  677:  51  S.  E.  641;  Hard- 


921  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  544 

equity  to  proceed  in  sueli  a  matter  it  cannot  interfere,  even  to 
enjoin  the  publication  of  the  result,  on  the  ground  that  the 
enforcement  of  the  statute  will  destroy  the  petitioner's  prop- 
erty.^* Tf  a  statute  provides  for  a  contest,  then  the  method 
thus  provided  must  be  followed."  The  action  under  the  stat- 
ute is  a  special  proceeding,  and  the  courts  are  limited  to  such 
subjects  as  are  specified  by  the  statute.^^  The  presumption 
is  that  the  election  officers  did  their  duty,  that  the  election 
was  regular  and  lawfully  conducted,  that  a  correct  result  was 
attained,  and  he  who  asserts  the  contrary  has  the  burden  to 
overcome  this  presumption.*^  The  contestee  may  go  behind 
the  election  returns  and  show  that  illegal  votes  were  cast,*^ 
and  that  legal  votes  were  improperly  refused.*^  But  the 
acceptance  of  illegal  votes  or  the  refusal  of  legal  votes  must 
have  been  in  sufficient  numbers  to  have  changed  what  the 
result  would  otherwise  have  been.**  Where  the  registrar's 
books  were  not  kept  open  for  the  election  the  full  length 
of  time,  it  was  held  that  before  the  result  of  the  election 
would  be  set  aside,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  result 
would  have  been  different  if  they  had  been  properly  kept 
open.*^  The  petition  for  a  contest  must  definitely  and  with 
certainty  point  out  the  irregularities,  and  merely  alleg- 
ing V.  McLennan  Co.,.  27  Tex.  Tiinkle  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
Civ.  App.   2g;    65  S.  W.  56;   Kidd        23   S.    W.   1114. 

V.  Truett,  28  Tex.  Civ.  App.  618;  ^-' /n  re  Clearof  [1907],  14  App. 

68  S.  W.  310.  Ont.    L.    R.    392;    In   re    Armour 

78  Merrill   v.    Savage    (Tex.   Civ.        [1907],    14   App.    Ont.   L.   R.   606; 

App.),    109    S.    W.    408;     Hill    v.       In  re  Metcalfe,  17   Ont.  357. 

Roach,   26   Tex.   Civ.   App.    75;    62  »s  Jn  re   Pounder,    19    App.   Ont. 

S.   W.   959;    Norton  v.  Alexander,       684. 

28  Te.v    Civ    App.  466 ;    67   S.  VV.  «*  In  re  Pounder,  supra.    People 

787.  V.  Hasbrouck,  21  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep. 

'9  Merrill  V.  Savage,  supra;  Fike        188;   47   N.  Y.  Supp.    109;    H.   W. 

V.    State,    25    Ohio    Cir.    Ct.    Rep.       Metcalf    Co.     v.     Orange    County 

554.  (Fla.),   47    So.   363. 

soCofield   V.    Button    (Tex.    Civ.  s^  Chamlee    v.    Davis,     115    Ga. 

App.),  109  S.  W.  493.  266;  41  S.  E.  691;  Jossey  v.  Speer, 

siPuckett    V.    Snider,    110    Ky.        107  Ga.  828;   33  S.  E.  718;  Hardy 

261;    61    S.    W.    277;    22    Ky.    L.       v.    State,    52   Tex.    Cr,    App.    420; 

Rep.  1718;  Kidd  v.  Truett  Co.,  28   107  S.  W.  547. 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  618;  68  S.  W.  310; 


§  544  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  922 

ing  the  grounds  of  the  contest  in  the  words  of  the  statute 
is  not  sufficient.^''  An  allegation  that  the  anti-prohibitionist 
paid  the  poll  tax  of  five  hundred  voters  in  order  to  have  them 
vote  against  the  question  submitted  presents  no  question  for 
■contest,  unless  it  be  averred  that  they  or  some  of  them  voted 
against  prohibition.^'  But  the  fact  that  those  in  favor  of  pro- 
hibition— in  this  case  ladies — furnished  coffee  and  eatables 
at  the  election  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  voters  is  not 
sufficient  to  overturn  the  election,  even  though  it  might  sub- 
ject them  to  prosecution  for  a  violation  of  the  law."^  But  the 
use  by  the  election  officers  of  whisky  in  the  voting  room,  in 
many  instances  accompanying  the  elector  into  the  booth  and 
marking  or  seeing  him  mark  his  ballot,  permitting  those  not 
electors  to  be  in  the  room  during  the  election  and  canvass,  are 
such  irregularities  as  require  the  precinct  vote  to  be  re- 
jected.*® So  holding  the  election  at  a  time  not  authorized  by 
law  is  fatal  to  it.®"  In  order  to  set  aside  an  election  it  is  not 
necessary  to  find  that  the  election  officers  acted  corruptly; 
it  is  sufficient  that  their  acts,  however  innocent,  improperly 
produced  an  incorrect  result.®^  A  continuance  of  the  trial 
may  be  granted,  as  where  exceptions  to  depositions  are  sus- 
tained, necessitating  the  taking  of  new  ones.®-  The  contest 
is  triable  by  the  court  and  not  by  jury.®"  The  usual  statute 
allowing  contest  is  broad  enough  to  permit  a  citizen  of  the 
election  district  to  contest  the  result,  without  a  showing  of 
special  interest.®*  The  contest  must  be  brought  within  the 
time  the  statute  prescribes.®^     Persons  not  originally  parties 

86  Stinson   v.    Gardner,    97    Tex.  32  Locke    v.    Garnett    (Ky.),    42 

287;     78    S.     vV.    492;     Jossey    v.  S.  W.  918;    19  Ky.  L.  Rep.   1059. 

Speer,  107  Ga.  828;  33  S.  E.  718.  93  Dye    v.    Angus     (Iowa),    110 

87,Stinson  v.  Gardner,  supra.  X.  W.  323. 

88  In  re  Clipperly,  50  X.  Y.  Misc.  s*  Norton  v.  Alexander,  28  Tex. 
Rep.  266;   100  N.  V.  Supp.  473.  Civ.  App.  466;   67  S.  W.  787. 

89  Banks  v.  Sargent.  104  Ky.  95  Desroches  v.  Cote,  11  Rev. 
843;   48  S.  W.   149.  Leg.   386:   Alexander  v.   State,   53 

90  Early  v.  Rains,  121  Ky.  439;  Tex.  Cr.  App.  504;  111  S.  W. 
89  S.  W.  289;  28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  145.  (In  this  Texas  case  it  was 
415.  held  that  a  defendant  indicted  for 

91  Drake  v.  Drewry,  112  Ga.  a  violation  of  the  liquor  laws 
308;  37  S.  E.  432.  could    not,    after    the    time    for    a 


923  LOCAL   OPTION.  §  544 

to  the  contest  proceedings  cannot  come  in  at  the  hearing  and 
file  a  counter  protest.""  If  the  contestor  must  first  give  notice 
to  the  contestee  of  his  intention  to  contest,  such  notice  is  a 
prerequisite  to  his  standing  in  court ;  ^~  and  by  answering  the 
contestee  does  not  waive  his  right  to  the  notice.*^^  Wliere  the 
grounds  of  contest  w'ere  that  the  polls  were  unlawfully  closed 
for  an  hour  and  thereby  a  large  number  of  electors  were 
deprived  of  the  right  to  vote,  it  was  held  that  the  names  of 
these  electoi-s  must  be  given,  or  a  valid  excuse  alleged  for  not 
giving  them.^"  The  validity  of  the  election  law  as  a  whole 
cannot  be  raised  on  a  contest  under  its  provisions.^  Failure 
to  produce  evidence  on  the  presentation  of  the  petition  for  an 
order  for  election  that  the  requisite  number  of  voters  had 
signed  it  is  not  such  an  error  as  will  reverse  the  result  of 
the  election,  w^here  the  judge  to  whom  it  was  presented  said 
he  knew  most  of  the  signers  and  also  knew  enough  electors 
had  signed  it.-  AVhere  a  voter  presenting  his  ballot  is  also 
required  to  exhibit  his  tax  receipt  showing  his  right  to  vote, 
a  failure  of  the  election  officers  to  require  its  presentation 
will  not  avoid  the  election  unless  it  be  shown  that  its  presenta- 
tion would  have  produced  a  different  result,  by  showing  that 
those  so  voting  were  not  entitled  to  vote.-^     Where  the  result 

contest     had     expired,     raise    the  99  Oxley    v.     Allen      (Tex.    Civ. 

question    of    the    validity    of    the  App.),   107  S.  VV.  945. 

election      proceedings.)       Cole      v.  Illegal  proceedings  at  a  previous 

•Commxjnwealth    (Ky.),    98    S.    W.  illegal    election    are     immaterial. 

1002;   30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  3'85;   Hardy  Oxley  v.  Allen,  supra. 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  488 ;  107  i  Harris    v.    Sheffield,     12«    Ga. 

S.  W.  547;  Wilson  v.  State   (Tex.  299;   57   S.  E.  305;   59  S.  E.  771. 

Civ.  App.),   107  S.  W.  818.  Ihe    court    cannot    try    matters 

9c  Miller  V.  Drake,  113  Ga.  347;  beyond    the    scope    prescribed    by 

38  S.  E.  747;   Douglass  v.  Hamil-  the   statute.      Harris   v.   Sheffield, 

ton    (Ark.),    120  S.   W.,  387;   Mc-  supra. 

Cormick  v.  Jester    (Tex.),   115  S.  2  Howard   v.   Stenfil    (Ky.),   102 

W.  278.  S.  W.  831;   31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  207. 

97  Norton  v.  Alexander,  28  Tex.  s  Hash  v.  Ely   (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

Civ.    App.    466;    67    S.    VV.    787;  100  S.  W.  980. 

Drake    v.    Drewry,    112    Ga.    308;  A  court  or  board  cannot  refuse 

37  S.  E.  432;   Messer  v.  Cross,  26  to   count   the  vote   on  the  ground 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  34;    63  S.  W.   169.  that  the  election  was  not  held  in 

9s  Norton  v.  Alexander,  supra.  accordance  with  the  law  and  that 


§544 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


:^24 


of  the  election  was  in  favor  of  issuing  licenses,  a  contest  was 
begun  which  was  dismissed  by  the  court,  a  license  was  then 
issued,  afterwards  an  appeal  taken  to  the  circuit  court  and 
the  election  declared  void,  and  then  on  appeal  taken  to  a 
court  of  appeals  and  a  supersedeas  issued;  it  was  held  that 
the  license  was  valid  and  that  the  licensee  could  sell  under  it 
during  its  life  or  until  the  disposal  of  the  appeal.* 


on  contest  a  court  would  decree 
that  the  election  was  void.  T5urks 
V.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ) ,  10:5 
S.    W.    Hot). 

4  Commonwealth  v.  Weisen- 
burgh,  126  Ky.  «;  102  S.  W.  84li; 
31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  449. 

A  collateral  attack  cannot  be 
made  on  an  election  in  a  criminal 
prosecution.  ('(mimonwealth  v. 
Jones  (Ky.),  84  S.  W.  305;  27 
Ky.  L.  Rej).  Ut;  Barton  v.  State, 
43  Fla.  477;  31  So.  361;  State  v. 
Rinke  (Mo.),  121  S.  W.  159, 
unless  the  proceedings  are  A'oid 
for  want  of  jurisdiction.  State  v. 
Mitchell  (Mo.),  115  S.  W.  1098. 
As  to  appeal  see  In  re  McCul- 
lough,  51  Ark.  159;  10  S.  W. 
259. 

Where  a  statute  required  tlie 
contest  to  be  begun  within  thirty 
days  after  the  return  day  of  elec- 
tion, and  the  result  was  declared 
June  22d,  but  the  contest  was  be- 
gun July  22d,  it  was  held  that 
it  was  begun  in  time.  McCormick 
V.  Jester    (Tex.),   115   S.   W.   278. 

Where  a  statute  provided  that 
objections  to  the  capacity  of  the 
contestors  must  be  raised  by  a 
sworn  plea  in  abatement,  the  al- 
legation in  the  petition  that  the 
contestors  are  resident  citizens  and 
property  owners  of  the  county,  as 
the  statutes  required  them  to  be, 
cannot  be  controverted.  McCor- 
mick V.  Jester,  supra. 


A  jury  trial  cannot  be  dcnuuul- 
(■(1.      McCormick    v.    Jester,    supra. 

By  bringing  an  action  to  secure 
an  injunction  restraining  the  pub- 
lication of  the  result,  one  does  not 
bar  himself  from  contesting  sucli 
proceedings,  after  the  restraining 
order  is  dissolved.  Savage  v. 
Umphries  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  118 
S.  W.  893. 

Upon  a  proceeding  to  enjoin  the 
publication  of  the  result  of  an 
election,  it  is  not  enough  to  aver 
that  the  petition  for  calling  an 
election  did  not  have  a  suiRcient 
number  of  signatures  where  the 
statute  required  it  to  be  signed 
by  not  less  than  ten  per  cent,  of 
the  registered,  voters  of  the  coun- 
ty, but  in  no  event  should  it  be 
necessary  to  obtain  more  than  five 
hundred  petitioners  who  are  legal 
voters.  Roesch  v.  Henry  (Ore.), 
103  Pac.  439. 

An  injunction  to  restrain  the 
board  from  promulgating  the  re- 
sult of  the  election  cannot  be  se- 
cured before  the  result  of  the 
election  as  been  ascertained. 
Ponchatoula  v.  Tangipahoa,  120 
La.   292;    46   So.    16. 

A  temporary  restraining  order 
will  be  dissolved  on  the  coming  in 
of  the  answer  squarely  denying 
the  allegations  of  illegality  in  the 
election  proceedings,  the  presumj)- 
tion  being  in  favor  of  the  regular- 
ity   of    the    election.      Wallace    v. 


925 


LOCAIi    OPTION. 


^545 


Sec.  545.  Mandamus,  when  not  a  proper  remedy. 

If,  by  a  local  option  law,  authority  is  vested  in  an  officer, 
for  'instance,  an  ordinary,  to  consolidate  the  returns  and 
decide  all  questions  and  contests  arising  under  elections  held 


Salisbury,   147   X.  K.  .")H;   GO  S.  E. 
713. 

Injunction  will  not  lie  where 
proceedings  by  contest  will  afford 
the  relief  prayed,  even  upon  an 
allegation  of  irreparable  injury  to 
plaintiir's  property  if  publication 
be  made.  Robin>on  v.  Weingale. 
3(i  Tex.  Civ.  App.  ()■};  83  S.  W. 
182. 

[Citing    Ed-    parte    Towles,     48 
Tex.  413;   Williamson  v.  Lane,  52 
Tex.   33.5;    Ex  parte  Whitlow,   59 
Tex.   273;    State   v.   De   Gress,    53 
Tex.  387;    City  of  Fort  Worth  v. 
Davis,  57  Tex.  225;  Gibson  v.  Tem- 
pleton,    62    Tex.    55G;    Jennett    v. 
Owens,    63    Tex.    264;      Odell     v. 
Wharton,  87   Tex.   173;    27   S.  W. 
123;    Norman  v.   Thompson    (Tex. 
Sup.),    72    S.    W.    62;    Wright   v. 
Fawcett,   42   Tex.   206;    Rogers   v. 
Johns,    42    Tex.    340;    McAllen   v. 
Rhodes,   65   Tex.   348;    Buckler   v. 
Turbeville,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  120; 
43  S.  W.  810;  Peck  v.  Weddell,  17 
Ohio  St.  271;   Bynum's  Case,   101 
N.  C.  412;  8  S.  E.  136;  Garrigue's 
Case,  28  Pa.  9;  70  Am.  Dec.  103; 
Moulton    V.    Reid,    54     Ala.     320; 
Harding  v.   Commissioners,   65   S. 
W.  56;  3  Tex.  Ct.  Rep.  162;   Sum- 
mer V.  Crawford,  91  Tex.   132;   41 
S.    W.    994;    Hill    v.    Roach    (Tex. 
Civ.    App.),    62    S.    W.    959;    Mc- 
Daniel  v.  State,  23  S.  W.  989;  Ex 
parte  Mayes,   39   Tex.   Cr.   R.   36; 
44  S.  W.  831;   Norton  v.   Alexan- 
der,   67    S.    W.    787;    4   Tex.   Ct. 
Rep.  723,] 


See  also  Ogburn  v.  Elmore,  121 
Ga.  72 ;  48  S.  E.  702. 

Contra  H.  W.  Motcalf  Co.  v. 
Orange  (Fla.),  47  So.  363  (by 
statute  1 . 

A  statute  providing  that  the 
court  in  which  the  contest  is 
brought  shall  have  "final  juris- 
diction" to  hear  and  determine 
the  contest,  cuts  off  an  appeal 
from  its  decision.  Saylor  v.  Duel, 
236  111.  429;  86  N.  E.  119.  (The 
statute  is  constitutional.) 

If  no  statue  gives  an  appeal, 
none  lies.  Haynes  v.  Cass  Coun- 
ty  (Mo.),  115  S.  W.  1084. 

A  mere  taxpayer  cannot  make 
himself  a  party,  nor  appeal. 
Haynes  v.  Cass  County,  supra; 
Kehr  v.  Columbus  (Mo.).  116  S. 
W.  428. 

The  validity  of  an  election  can- 
not be  raised  on  habea,s  corpus  pro- 
ceedings. Ex  parte  Thulmeyer 
(Tex.),  119  S.  W.  1146. 

Facts  not  pleaded  cannot  be 
proven,  as  that  unnumbered  bal- 
lots had  been  cast  and  counted  for 
prohibition.  McCormick  v.  Jester 
(Tex.),  115  S.  W.  278. 

As  to  service  of  notice  of  con- 
test on  deputy  instead  of  on  his 
principal,  see  McCormick  v.  Jes- 
ter, supra. 

If  a  statute  does  not  require  a 
security  to  be  given  by  the  con- 
testors,  none  can  be  required.  Mc- 
Cormick V.  Jester,  sitpra. 

Upon  an  order  to  a  board  to 
purge    the   poll    books    of    illegal 


§545 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


926 


by  virtue  of  the  law,  and  the  law  further  provides  a  remedy 
if  such  officer  fails  to  do  so,  or  acts  unfairly,  the  remedy 
thus  provided  must  be  pursued,  and  the  constitutionality  of 
the  law  cannot  be  tested  by  mandamus,  for  the  reason  that 
such  an  election  and  the  supervision  thereof  by  such  an  officei- 
is  an  exercise  of  the  political  and  police  power,  and  it  is  not 
at  all  or  in  any  sense  judicial,  unless  where  the  act  itself  con- 
fers judicial  jurisdiction.  When  such  a  law  operates  upon  the 
private  property  of  an  individual  and  it  is  seized,  destroyed 
or  confiscated,  or  an  individual  is  indicted  for  a  violation  of 
it,  he  may  assail  the  portion  thereof  affecting  his  private 
property  or  personal  liberty  as  unconstitutional,  and  the 
courts  will  make  such  adjudication  as  will  maintain  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  law  as  a  whole,  if  possible,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  protect  the  citizen  against  any  unconstitutional  or  illegal 
portion  of  the  law,  if  there  be  such.  The  courts  will  never 
blot  out  the  existence  of  a  great  police  and  moral  enactment 


votes,  the  contestors  cannot  com- 
plain that  it  met  within  seven 
days  after  the  order  was  entered. 
Robertson  v.  Moore,  15  Ky.  L. 
Rep.    (abstract)    240. 

A  writ  of  certiorari  cannot  be 
used  as  a  substitute  for  an  appeal 
for  the  correction  of  mere  irreg- 
ularities, as  to  quash  an  order 
of  the  court  for  an  election,  on 
the  ground  that  the  majority  of 
adult  inhabitants  had  petitioned 
for  an  election.  Douglass  v.  Ham- 
ilton (Ark.),  120  S.  W.  387.  See 
State  V.  Sundquist  (Wis.),  118 
N.  VV.  836. 

Xor  can  a  lower  court,  where  it 
acts  judicially,  be  compelled  to 
omit  a  certain  city  from  the  oper- 
ation of  'ts  order.  State  v.  Mal- 
heur County,  46  Ore.  519;  101 
Pac.   907. 

The  court  in  a  contest  is  not 
lx)und  to  have  certain  cliallenged 
ballots    removed    from    the    boxes 


and  then  direct  the  clerk  to  count 
the  remaining  ballots  and  an- 
nounce the  result.  Savage  v. 
Umpliries  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  118 
S.  \V.  893. 

If  no  appeal  lies,  the  action  of 
the  lower  court,  wliere  its  judg- 
ment is  final,  cannot  be  controlled 
by  mandamus.  People  v.  Can- 
non, 236  111.  179:  86  N.  E.  215. 

The  statute  must  be  strictly  fol- 
lowed in  order  to  put  the  law  in 
force.  GrifRn  v.  Tucker  (Tex. 
App.),  119  S.  W.  338. 

In  a  prosecution  for  a  viola- 
tion of  the  local  option  statute, 
the  proceedings  for  its  adoption 
cannot  be  attacked,  for  this  is  a 
collateral  attack.  Reno  v.  State 
(Tex.),  117  S.  W.  129;  Jerue  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  123  S.  W. 
414;  Wesley  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.).  122  S.  W.  550;  Trinkle  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  123  S.  W. 
1114. 


927  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  546 

of  this  character,  on  the  ground  that  parts  of  it  are  attacked 
as  unconstitutional,  in  a  general  onslaught  upon  it  all.  On 
the  contrary,  they  will  preserve  it  all,  if  possible,  giving  the 
benefit  of  doubts  to  the  co-ordinate  branches  of  Government, 
even  when  a  legitimate  case  of  individual  suffering  in  person 
or  property  is  brought  before  them,  and  will  never  decide 
laws  unconstitutional  if  cases  can  be  otherwise  adjudicated. 
They  will  always  wait  until  the  law  is  attempted  to  be  put  in 
operation,  and  then  act  against  the  officer  who  executes  or 
attempts  to  execute  it,  and  not  against  the  lawmaking  branch 
in  the  general  scope  of  its  power."'  If  it  he  sought  to  compel 
the  lower  court  to  make  an  entry  putting  the  prohibition  or 
licensing  vote  into  force,  the  petition  for  the  writ  must  show 
each  necessary  step  for  the  election  was  duly  taken,  and 
that  it  was  legal  when  taken."  ^Mandamus  will  not  lie  to 
secure  a  new  election  for  a  part  of  a  county  whereby  the 
publication  of  the  result  of  a  previous  election  for  the  entire 
county  would  produce  the  desired  result  for  that  part.'^  The 
duties  of  the  court  to  be  coerced  by  the  writ  of  mandamus 
must  be  ministerial  and  not  discretionary  or  the  writ  will  not 
be  granted.* 

Sec.  546.    Prior  laws,  how  affected  by  local  option. 

A  local  option  law  enacted  under  a  mandatory  provision 
of  the  Constitution  of  a  State,  while  in  one  sense  it  may  be 
said  to  be  a  general  statute,  still  in  its  operation  it  is  confined 
to  the  localities  which  may  adopt  it,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  a 
special  statute  and  will  be  given  the  effect  as  such,  and  be 
held  to  set  aside,  and,  during  its  operation,  suspend  all  laws 

SiScoville    V.     Calhoun,    7G    Ga.  lie   to   control   its   action.      People 

263.  V.  Cannon,  23G  111.  179;   86  N.  E. 

Mandamus  will  not  lie   to  com-  215. 

pel   a   recount  of  the  A'otes   when  6  State  v.  Jlolheur   Co.,  46   Ore. 

another  election  can  be   called   to  519;   81   Pac.  368. 

determine    the    result.      People    v.  7  Adams    v.    Kelley     { Tex.    Civ. 

Mosso,   30  N.   Y.   Misc.  Rep.    164;  App.),   44   S.   W.  529. 

63  N.  Y.  Supp.  588.  s  state    v.    Richardson,    48    Ore. 

If     the     action     of     the     lower  309;   85  Pac.  225. 
court  is  final,  mandamus  will  not 


§  546  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  928 

and  regulations  in  conflict  with  it,  and  will  have  effect,  when 
adopted  in  a  particular  locality,  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  in  that  locality  by  any  person,  without  regard 
to  whether  any  such  person  has  been  licensed  by  the  State, 
county,  city  or  town  to  sell.  By  its  adoption  all  such  licenses 
are  abrogated.-'  As  a  rule,  the  suspension  of  such  general 
laws  docs  not  tliereaftor  prevent  the  prosecution  and  punish- 
ment under  them  of  anyone  who  may  have  previously  violated 
them;^'*  but  when  a  local  oi)ti()n  law  takes  effect  in  a  given 
locality  it  becomes  operative  as  a  whole  and  one  violating 
its  provisions  mu.st  be  prosecuted  and  punished  under  its  pro- 
sions  and  not  under  the  general  law.^^  The  rule  is  different, 
however,  where  the  effect  of  adoption  of  a  local  option  law  is 
to  repeal  all  former  laws  regulating  the  traffic  in  such  liquor. 
The  proposition  is  an  old  one  and  a  plain  one  that  after  the 
repeal  of  a  law  no  penalty  can  be  enforced  for  a  violation 
of  its  provisions  committed  while  it  was  in  operation,  unless 
provision  be  made  for  that  purpose.  The  repeal  of  a  statute 
is  a  remission  of  penalties  inflicted  by  it  because  of  the 
absence  of  authority  to  punish  when  the  law  has  ceased  to 
exist.  But  where  a  law  is  not  repealed  but  is  merely  sus- 
pended, it  still  has  vitality  to  authorize  punishment  for  its 
violation  before  its  suspension.  A  repeal  makes  the  law  as  if 
it  had  never  been.  Suspending  its  operation  for  a  time  leaves 
it  operative  as  to  the  past,  and  in  all  respects  wherein  it  is 
not  abrogated  by  the  new.     A  repealed  statute  is  dead  and 

9  Butler  V.  Stato.  25  Fla.  347;  6  Lynn,  19  Tex.  App.  293;  State  v. 
So.  67;  Stringer  v.  State,  32  Fla.  Smith,  26  Fla.  427;  7  So.  848. 
239;  13  So.  450;  Carson  v.  State,  lo  People  v.  Wade,  101  Mich. 
37  Fla,  331;  20  So.  547;  Tatum  69;  59  X,  W.  438;  Hearn  v.  Bro- 
V.  State,  79  Ga,  17'6;  3  S.  E.  907;  gan,  64  Miss.  334;  1  So,  246;  Win- 
Garner  V.  State,  8  Blackf .  ( Ind. ) .  terton  v.  State,  65  Miss.  238 ;  3  So, 
368;  State  v.  Cook,  24  Minn.  247;  735;  Ex  parte  Swann,  96  Mo.  44; 
31  Am.  Rep.  344;  State  v.  Emery.  9  S.  W.  10;  State  v.  Beam,  51 
98  N.  C.  768;  3  S.  E.  810;  State  Mo.  App.  360;  Commonwealth  v. 
V,  Smiley,  101  X.  €.  709;  7  S.  E.  CK-erby,  107  Ky.  169;  53  S.  W. 
904;  State  v.  Carter,  28  S.  C.  1;  36;  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  843. 
4  S.  E.  790;  Robertson  v.  State,  n  Young  v.  Commonwealth,  14 
12  Tex.  App.  541;  Donaldson  v.  Bush  (Kj-.)  161;  State  v.  Bev- 
State,  15  Tex.  App.  25;  Ex  parte  ans,  51  Mo,  App.  368. 


929 


liOCAL    OPTION. 


546 


no  sting  can  be  inflicted  by  it;  but  one  which  still  lives, 
although  displaced  for  a  time  as  to  its  full  effect,  is  not 
without  power  to  vindicate  its  suspension.  Being  still  a  law 
there  is  no  want  of  authority  to  punish  under  it  for  such 
violation  of  it.^-  In  harmony  with  this  general  statement  of 
the  law,  it  has  been  held  that  if  a  county  or  a  minor  division 
thereof  adopts  a  local  option  law  and  afterwards  rescinds  it, 
there  is  no  legal  authority  for  the  punishment  of  a  person 
Avho  sold  liquor  in  the  county,  or  in  such  minor  division 
while  such  local  option  law  was  in  force,^^  and  that  the  same 
rule  maintains  if  the  law  is  rescinded  during  an  appeal.  By 
such  repeal  a  conviction  under  the  repealed  law  is  annulled.^* 


12  Regina  v.  Denton,  16  Q.  B. 
832;  18  Q.  B.  761;  83  E.  C.  L. 
761 ;  United  States  v.  6  Fermenting 
Tubs,  1  Abb.  (U.  S.)  268;  Car- 
lisle V.  State,  42  Ala.  523 ;  People 
V.  Tisdale,  57  Cal.  104;  Hirsch- 
biirg  V.  People,  6  Colo.  145;  Hig- 
genbotham  v.  State,  19  Fla.  557; 
Bank  v.  State,  12  Ga.  475;  White- 
horse  V.  State,  43  Ind.  473 ;  State 
V.  Mason,  108  Ind.  48;  8  N.  E. 
716;  Speckert  v.  Louisville,  78 
Ky.  287;  State  v.  O'Connor,  13 
La.  Ann.  486;  Herald  t.  State, 
36  Me.  62;  Annapolis  v.  State,  30 
Md.  112;  Commonwealth  v.  Pat- 
tee,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  501;  Peo- 
ple V.  Hobson,  48  Mich.  27; 
Wheeler  v.  State,  64  Miss.  462;  1 
So.  246;  Winterton  v.  State,  65 
Miss.  238;  3  So.  735;  State  v. 
Patrick,  2  Mo.  App.  Rep'r  1149; 
Lewis  V.  Foster,  1  N.  H.  61;  Den 
V.  DuBois,  16  N.  J.  L.  285;  Hast- 
ing V.  People,  22  N.  Y.  95;  State 
V.  Wise,  66  N.  C.  120;  Cakins  v. 
State,  14  Ohio  St.  222;  Genkin- 
ker  V.  Commonwealth,  32  Pa. 
99;  State  v.  Fletcher,  1  R.  I.  193; 
State  V.  McCord  (S.  C),  1; 
Brother  v.  State,  2  Cold.   (Tenn.) 


201;  Greer  v.  State,  22  Tex.  588; 
State  V.  Meader,  62  Vt.  458;  20 
Atl.  730;  Lecftwiche's  Case,  5 
Rand.  (Va.)  657;  State  v.  Inger- 
soll,  17  Wis.  631;  Book  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 107  Ky.  605;  55  S. 
W.  7;  21  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1342;  Dean 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  249; 
92  S.  W.  38. 

isHalfin  V.  State,  5  Tex.  App. 
212;  Monroe  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 
212;  Boone  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App. 
184;  Fitze  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App. 
372;  Treese  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App. 
31;  Pinchard  v.  State,  13  Tex. 
App.  373. 

14  Prather  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App. 
453;  Wasenhut  v.  State,  18  Tex. 
App.  491;  White  v.  State,  24  Tex. 
App.  230;  5  S.  W.  857;  Dawson 
V.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  670;  8  S. 
W.  820. 

The  Legislature  may  provide 
that  the  repeal  of  local  option 
shall  not  release  penalties  incurred 
thereunder  while  in  force.  Ezzell 
V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  521.  See 
Thomas  v.  Commonwealth,  90  Va. 
92;  17  S.  E.  788;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hoke,  14  Bush  668. 


§  547  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  930 

Sec.  547.    Former  laws,  when  not  repealed. 

The  general  rule  is,  that  when  the  provisions  of  a  local 
option  have  been  adopted  and  put  in  force  in  a  given  locality, 
it  then  becomes  the  exclusive  regulation  for  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  in  that  locality,  and  has  the  effect  to 
suspend  during  its  continuance  all  other  laws  which  are  in- 
consistent with  its  terms.^^  And  it  has  been  held  that  a  local 
option  law  was  operative  in  a  city  which  had  adopted  it, 
notwithstanding  the  city  by  its  charter  had  the  exclusive 
power  to  license  and  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors. 
In  this  instance  the  local  option  law  was  passed  subsequently 
to  the  city  charter  which  provided  that,  "All  other  acts, 
whether  special  or  general,  so  far  as  they  conflict  with  the 
provisions  of  this  act,  are  hereby  repealed."^**  It  also  has 
been  held  that  a  special  local  option  law  is  not  repealed  by  a 
local  general  option  law,  where  the  general  repealing  clause  of 
the  latter  act  applies  only  to  laws  in  conflict  with  it  and  pro- 
vides for  exemption  from  its  operation  of  localities  governed 
by  other  prohibitory  laws,  for  the  reason  that  a  later  general 
afifirmative  law  does  not  abrogate  an  earlier  special  one  by 
implication.^"  In  ]\Iissouri,  however,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
adoption  of  a  local  option  law  by  a  city  or  county  did  not 
have  the  effect  to  repeal  the  druggist's  and  pharmacist's  law 
of  that  State,  and  that  the  latter  might  be  invoked  by  a  drag- 
gist  as  a  defense  to  a  criminal  prosecution  under  the  local 
option  law.^^     But  if  a  local  option  election  results  in  favor 

15  Bolt  V.  State,  60  Ark.  600;  wealth,  78  Pa.  490;  Minnehaha  Co. 
31  S.  W.  460;  Young  v.  Common-  v.  Champion,  5  Dak.  397;  41  N. 
wealth,  14  Bush  (Ky.)    161;  Com-       W.  754. 

monwealth  v.  Jarrell,  9   Ky.  Law  i"  McGruder    v.    State,    83    Ga. 

572;  5  S.  W.  563;  State  V.  Yewell,  616;    10    S.    E.    281;    Zarresseller 

63  Md.  120;   Wheeler  v.  State,  64  v.  People,   17  111.   101. 

Miss.    462;     1    So.    632;    State    v.  ^»  Ex  parte  Swain,  «6   Mo.   44; 

Weeks,   38   Mo.   App.   566;    Raneh  9  S.   W.   10;    State  v.   Moore.    107 

V.  Commonwealth,  78  Pa.  St.  493;  Mo.   78;    16   S.   W.   937;    State   v. 

Commonwealth  v.  Mueller,  SI  Pa.  Williams,  38  Mo.  App.   37;    State 

St.  127;  Robertson  V.  State,  5  Tex.  v.    Kaufman,    45    Mo.    App.    656:- 

App.  155.  State  v.  Bevans,  52  Mo.  App.  130; 

16  Olmstead  v.  Crook,  89  Ala.  Fitzgerald  v.  Hurley,  180  Mass. 
228;  7  So.  776;  Ranch  v.  Common-  151;  61  N.  E.  815;  Smith  v.  Pat- 


931 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§517 


of  licensing  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  it  will  have  no 
effect  on  any  prior  law,  for  a  general  liquor  law  of  the  State 
cannot  be  abrogated  by  merely  holding  a  local  option  elec- 
tion.^'' And  if  a  local  option  law  when  adopted  makes  no 
provision  for  inflicting  penalties  for  its  violation,  such  viola- 
tions, if  repugnant  to  the  general  laws  of  the  State  governing 
the  sale  of  such  liquors,  may  be  punished  under  such  general 
laws.""  So  where  a  local  option  law  provides  that ' '  in  addition 
to  the  penalties  now  prescribed  by  law"  unlawful  sales  may 
be  enjoined,  this  has  the  effect,  by  implication,  to  continue  in 
force  and  incorporate  the  penalties  referred  to.-^  In  other 
words,  it  may  be  stated  as  true  that  a  special  local  option  law 
does  not  vary  a  prior  general  law  touching  the  granting 
of  a  license  to  retail  intoxicating  liquors;  for  the  reason 
that  the  one  relates  to  the  prohibition  of  sales  altogether, 
and  the  other  to  regulations  of  sales,  or  making  them  unlawful 
under  certain  conditions." 


ton,  103  Ky.  444;  45  S.  VV.  459; 
20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  165;  Storms  v. 
Commonwealth,  105  Ky.  619;  49 
S.  W.  451;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1369; 
Lawson  v.  Commonwealth  (  Ky. ) , 
66  S.  W.  1010;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1983  (requiring  druggists  to  reg- 
ister sales,  still  in  force). 

19  State  V.  HoUingsworth,  100  N. 
C.  535;   6  S.  E.  417. 

20  Winerton  v.  State,  65  Miss. 
238 ;  3  So.  735 ;  Territory  v.  O'Con- 
nor, 5  Dak.  397;  41  N.  W.  746; 
3  L.  R.  A.  355 ;  Grantham  v.  State, 
89  Ga.  121 ;   14  S.  E.  892. 

21  Territory  v.  O'Connor,  5  Dak. 
397;  41  N.  W.  746;  Aaron  v. 
State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  103;  29 
S.  W.  267. 

22  Bell  V,  State,  91  Ga.  227;  16 
S.  E.  207;  Redding  v.  State,  91 
Ga.  231;  18  S.  E.  289;  Vallance 
V.  King,  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  548; 
Grantham  v.  State,  89  Ga.  121;  14 
S.  E.  892. 


Statutes  not  infrequently  pro- 
vide that  the  adoption  of  local  op- 
tion shall  not  affect  licenses  then 
in  force.  Menken  v.  State,  78  Ga. 
6(5i8;  2  S.  E.  559;  Griffin  v.  State, 
78  Ga.  679;  4  S.  E.  154;  State  v. 
Smith,  26   Fla.   427;    7  So.  843. 

When  special  local  option  laws 
are  in  force.  Crabb  v.  State,  88 
Ga.  584;  15  S.  E.  455;  Knight  v. 
State,  88  Ga.  590;  15  S.  E.  457; 
Stahl  V.  Lee,  71  Kan.  511;  80  Pac. 
983;  Farris  v.  Commonwealth,  111 
Ky.  236;  63  S.  W.  615;  23  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  580. 

When  license  law  does  not  ap- 
peal general  law  prohibiting  sales. 
State  V.  Van  Vliet,  92  Iowa  476; 
61  N.  W.  241;  Commonwealth  v, 
Weller,  14  Bush  218;  29  Am.  Rep. 
407 ;  when  it  does,  Commonwealth 
V.  Bogie,  1  S.  W.  532;  8  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  350;  Engle  v.  Commonwealth, 
1  S.  W.  593;  Taber  v.  Lander,  94 
Ky.  237;  21  S.  W.  1056;  Laffarty 


548 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


932 


Sec.  548.     Changing-  boundary  of  district. 

The  adoption  or  rejection  of  a  loeal  option  law,  as  a  rule, 
is  effected  by  the  majority  vote  of  a  county,  city,  town,  or 
other  political  division  in  favor  of  or  against  the  granting  of 


V.  Huffman,  9!)  Ky.  80;  3.5  S.  W. 
123;  32  L.  R.  A.  203;  Common- 
wealth V.  Hardin  Co.,  99  Ky.  L88 ; 
35  S.  W.  27.5;  Yunger  v.  State, 
7«  Md.  574;  28  Atl.  404;  Boswell 
V.  State,  70  Miss.  395;  12  So. 
446;  In  re  Clement,  187  N.  Y. 
274;  79  X.  E.  1003;  Common- 
wealth V.  Lemon  ( Ky. ) ,  76  S. 
W.  40;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  522. 

A  local  option  law  declaring 
that  it  shall  not  be  so  construed 
as  to  prevent  the  sale  of  wine  for 
medicinal  or  sacramental  pur- 
poses, nor  to  prohibit  a  pharma- 
cist furnishing  alcohol  for  mechan- 
ical, scientific,  art  or  medical  pur- 
poses, does  not  repeal  the  usual 
druggists'  and  pharmacists'  law. 
Ex  parte  Swann,  96  Mo.  44 ;  9  S. 
W.  10. 

When  general  local  option  law 
repeals  special  city  or  town  char- 
ter. State  V.  Hutton,  39  Mo.  App. 
410,  and  when  general  law  does 
not  repeal  local  law.  Crigler  v. 
Commonwealth,  120  Ky.  612;  87  S. 
W.  276;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  918;  87 
S.  W.  280;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  925, 
926,  927;  87  S.  W.  281;  Clark  v. 
Riddle,  101  Iowa  270;  70  N.  W. 
207;  Kennon  v.  Blafckburn,  127 
Ky.  39;  104  S.  W.  968;  31  Ky. 
L.  Rep.   1256. 

When  local  option  adoption  an- 
nuls licenses.  Ranch  v.  Common- 
wealth, 78  Pa.  490. 

When  local  option  statute  re- 
fers only  to  incorporated  towns. 
Tummings  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
App.    117;   22   S.   W.   409. 


When  an  act  subsequent  to  local 
option  law  repeals  the  latter  so 
far  as  to  sales  of  nnti\e  wines. 
Kahlbunner  v.  State,  67  :\liss.  368 ; 
7  So.  288 ;  Hearn  v.  Brogan,  64 
Miss.    334;    1    So.    246. 

When  the  period  of  prohibition 
is  limited  by  a  subsequent  stat- 
ute. Commonwealth  v.  Kervill, 
108  Mass.  422. 

When  statute  is  for  a  resub- 
mission of  question  of  local  op- 
tion and  does  repeal  act  for  local 
option.  Kirkpatrick  v.  Common- 
wealth, 95  Ky.  326;  25  S.  W. 
113. 

An  amendment  to  a  statute  pro- 
hibiting the  holding  of  local  op- 
tion election  within  four  years  ot 
another  local  option  election  ap- 
plies to  a  local  option  election 
witliin  the  four-year  period  held 
before  its  adoption.  Wynne  v.  Wil- 
liamson, 94  Ga.  603;  20  S.  E. 
436. 

Where  a  county  local  option 
statute  deprives  a  city  therein  of 
its  power  under  the  special  char- 
ter to  regulate  sales  of  liquors. 
Turner  v.  Forsyth,  78  Ga.  683; 
3  S.  E.  649;  Cooper  v.  Shelton, 
97  Ky.  282;  30  S.  W.  623;  In  re 
O'Brien,  29  Mont.  530;  75  Pac. 
196. 

Where  a  city  having  power  to 
adopt  local  option  is  precluded  by 
the  county's  adopting  it.  Tatum 
V.  State,  79  Ga.  176;  3  S.  E.  907; 
Tangilpahoa  v.  Campbell,  106  La. 
464;    31   So.   49. 

A   vote   for    no   licensing  taken 


933 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§548 


a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  li(iuors  in  such  political  division 
for  a  period  of  time  fixed  by  law.  Sometimes  the  majority 
is  ascertained  by  ballot  and  sometimes  by  petition  or  remon- 


after  an  application  for  a  license 
is  made  precludes  the  granting 
of  the  license  thereafter.  Dearen 
V.  Taylor  Co.,  98  Ky.  135;  32  S. 
W.  402;  Bonacker  v.  State,  42 
Fla.  348;   29  So.  32  L 

If  a  part  of  a  city  lies  in  a 
county,  adoption  of  local  option 
prohibition  by  the  county  pro- 
hibits sales  in  such  portion  of  the 
city.  Garrett  v.  Aby,  47  La.  Ann. 
618;    17  So.  238. 

The  adoption  of  a  no-license  pro- 
vision revokes  licenses  then  in 
force.  State  v.  Cooke,  24  Minn. 
247;  31  Am.  Rep.  344;  Robert- 
son V.  State,   12  Tex.  App.  541. 

Voting  for  a  license  will  not 
authorize  a  license  in  that  part 
of  the  district  voting  for  it  that 
is  within  a  distance  of  two  miles 
of  a  church  when  another  statute 
absolutely  forbids  a  license  with- 
in such  distance.  State  v.  Hol- 
lingsworth,  100  X.  C.  535;  6  S. 
E.  417;  Barnesville  v.  Means 
(Ga.),   57    S.   E.   422. 

Laws  regulating  taverns  not  re- 
pealed by  adoption  of  local  option. 
Vallance  v.  King,   3  Barb.   548. 

License  law  not  repealed  by  lo- 
cal option,  and  a  sale  in  violation 
of  it  is  punishable.  State  v.  Smi- 
ley, 101  X.  C.  709;   7  S.  E.  904. 

A  sale  under  a  license  after  lo- 
cal option  is  adopted  cannot  be 
justified.  Commonwealth  v.  Muel- 
ler,* 81  Pa.  St.  127;  Robertson 
V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  541;  Bon- 
aker  v.  State,  42  Fla.  348;  29  So. 
321;  Richter  v.  State,  156  Ala. 
127;  47  So.  163.     Ex  parte  Pratt, 


17  N.  S.  VV.  L.  R.  295;  Ex  parte 
Thompson,  16  N.  S.  VV.  L.  R.  42. 
Those  two  last  cases  relate  to 
renewals. 

Nor  can  a  liquor  tax  be  col- 
lected. Robertson  v.  State,  5  Tex. 
App.  155 ;  Rathburn  v.  State 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  32  S.  W.  45; 
Tangipahoa  v.  Campbell,  106  La. 
404;  31  So.  49;  Snearly  v.  State, 
40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  507;  52  S.  W. 
547;   53  S.  W.  696. 

Nor  penalties  inflicted  for  of- 
fenses incurred  under  prior  li- 
cense laws.  Boone  v.  State,  12 
Tex.   App.   1'84. 

Prohibition  in  a  justices's  pre- 
cinct in  a  county  is  not  repealed 
by  the  failure  of  a  county  to  sub- 
sequently vote  for  prohibition. 
Ex  parte  Cox,  28  Tex.  App.  537; 
13  S.  W.  8'62;  Aaron  v.  State,  34 
Tex.  €r.  Rep.   103;   29  S.  W.  267. 

If  prohibition  carry,  the  old  law 
is  abrogated  without  an  express 
provision  to  that  eiTect  inserted 
in  the  court's  order.  State  v. 
Harvey,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  691; 
33  S.  VV.  885. 

A  statute  prohibiting  the  hold- 
ing of  a  second  election  "within 
the  same  prescribed  limits,  in  less 
than  two  years  after"  such  elec- 
tion is  held  does  not  prevent  the 
holding  of  an  election  in  a  sub- 
division carved  out  of  the  terri- 
tory previously  voting  within  that 
time.  Ex  parte  Brown,  35  Tex. 
Cr.   Rep.   443;    34  S.   V^.   131. 

When  the  county  adopting  lo- 
cal option  does  not  prevent  a  city 
therein    issuing    a    license.      Ken- 


§548 


TKAFTIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS, 


934 


strance.  In  Indiana  the  statute  provides  that  no  license  shall 
be  granted  for  a  period  of  two  years,  if  three  days  before  the 
time  when  an  application  therefor  must  be  filed,  a  remonstrance 


non  V.  Blackburn,  127  Ky.  39; 
104  S.  W.  9&8;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1256;  see  Rensliaw  v.  Lane,  49 
Ore.  526;  89  Pac.  117;  Cole  v. 
•Commonwealth,  101  Ky.  151;  39 
S.  W.  1029;  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  324, 
and  where  it  does.  O'Neal  v.  Min- 
ary,  125  Ky.  571;  101  S.  W.  951; 
30   Ky.   L.    Rep.    8S8. 

Ex  parte  Fields,  39  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  50;  46  S.  W.  1127;  Williams 
V.  Davidson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  70 
S.  W.  987;  Evans  v.  Police  Jury, 
114  La.  771;  38  So.  555;  Ex  parte 
Douthitt  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  63  S. 
W.  131;  Police  Jury  v.  Mansura, 
107  La.  201;  31  So.  650;  Wal- 
lace v.  Cubanola,  70  Ark.  395;  63 
S.  W.  485;  State  v.  Iliekerson 
(Mo.  App.),  109  S.  W.  108; 
Adams  v.  Kelley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
45  S.  W.  859;  Doss  v.  Moore,  69 
Ark.  258 ;  63  S.  W.  66. 

When  the  question  of  local  op- 
tion is  submitted  to  a  justice's 
precinct  and  at  the  same  time  to 
the  entire  county,  anu  the  pre- 
cinct adopts  and  the  county  does 
not,  or  vice  versa,  efTect.  Baxter 
v.  State,  49  Ore.  353;  88  Pac. 
677;    89  Pac.    369. 

That  the  right  to  license  is  only 
suspended  by  local  option  and  not 
repealed.  Mernaugh  v.  Orlando, 
41  Fla.  433;  27  So.  34;  People  v. 
Brush,  41  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  56; 
83  N.  Y.  Supp.  607;  Eastham  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  49  S.  W. 
795;  Tompkins  v.  State,  49  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  154;  90  S.  W.  1019; 
Commonwealth  v.  Powell  (Ky.), 
62  S.  W.  19;   22  Ky.  L.  R.   1932. 


Adoption  of  local  option  law 
suspends  all  inconsistent  laws — 
see  Butler  v.  State,  25  Fla.  347; 
6  So.  07 ;  Cason  v.  State,  37  Fla. 
331;  20  So.  547;  Mernaugh  v. 
Orlando,  41  Fla.  433;  27  So.  34; 
Tatum  V.  Staie,  79  Ga.  176;  3  S. 
E.  907;  Young  v.  Com.,  14  Bush 
161;  Stat«  V.  Hauley,  25  Minn. 
429;  Norton  v.  State,  65  Miss. 
297 ;  iState  v.  Vandenburg 
(Miss.),  28  So.  835;  Ex  parte 
Swann,  96  Mo.  44;  9  S.  W.  10; 
State  V.  Beam,  51  Mo.  App.  368; 
Ranch  v.  Com.,  78  Pa.  490;  Rath- 
burn  V.  State,  88  Tex.  281;  31  S. 
\^■.  189;  Ex  parte  Lynn,  19  Tex. 
App.  293;  Gibson  v.  State,  34 
Tex.  Cr.  R.  218;  29  S.  W.  1085; 
People  V.  Bush,  92  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  611;  '86  N.  Y.  Supp.  1144; 
41  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  56;  83  N.  Y. 
Supp.  607. 

Where  a  prohibition  territory 
again  adopts  prohibition  while  the 
first  adoption  is  in  force,  the  first 
remains  in  force  and  not  the  lat- 
ter. Leftwich  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  55   S.  W.  571. 

A  vote  by  covmty  is  a  vote  as 
a  unit,  and  a  majority  vote  car- 
ries it,  although  some  of  the  pre- 
cincts vote  the  other  way.  Ex 
parte  Fields,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
50;    46  S.  W.   1127. 

Druggist  not  entitled  to  a  li- 
cense. Eastham  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  49  S.  W.  795;  20 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1639;  People  v.  Hen- 
wood,  123  Mich.  317;  82  S.  W.  70. 

A  city  cannot  so  amend  its 
charter    as   to   avoid   the   prohibi- 


935 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§548 


in  writing,  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters  of  the 
township  or  ward  for  which  such  license  is  asked  shall  be 
filed  with  the  auditor,  against  the  granting  of  such  license, 


tion  voted  for  in  the  county.  Bax- 
ter V.  State  (Ore.),  88  Pac.  677; 
89  Pac.  369;  and  in  Texas,  owing 
to  the  prohibition  clauses  in  the 
Constitution,  the  Legislature  can 
not  grant  a  city  a  charter  exempt- 
ing it  from  the  local  <^tion  law. 
Fox  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
150;  109  S.  W.  370. 

General  statute  prohibiting  li- 
cense repealing  statute  prohibit- 
ing issuing  license  in  a  particular 
city.  In  re  McGonneii,  24  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  642. 

Local  option  in  force  remains 
in  force  on  adoption  of  a  consti- 
tutional prohibitory  provision. 
White  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
50  S.  W.  678;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1942. 

A  second  adoption  of  local  op- 
tion by  a  county  annuls  a  license 
vote  taken  by  a  city  therein  to 
begin  when  the  first  county  local 
option  had  expired.  Police  Jury 
v.  Mansura,  107  La.  201;  31  So. 
650. 

When  city  not  voting  is  bound 
by  result  in  county.  Bowman 
v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  14;  40 
S.  W.  796;    41  S.  W.  635. 

Where  prohibition  is  in  force 
in  a  city  in  a  local  option  coun- 
ty, a  vote  of  tne  city  that  the 
local  option  law  should  become 
inoperative  in  a  certain  precinct 
of  it  is  equivalent  to  a  vote  that 
liquors  therein  might  be  sold.  C. 
B.  George  &  Bro.  v.  Winchester, 
lis  Ky.  429;  80  S.  W .  lloS;  2ti 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  170. 

A   local    option   statute   prohib- 


iting sales  of  spirituous,  vinous 
or  malt  liquors  does  not  conflict 
with  a  later  statute  prohibiting 
the  sale  of  any  '"intoxicating  bev- 
erage, liquid  mixture  or  decoc- 
tion." Rush  V.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  47  S.  W.  586;  20  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  775. 

Where  subsequent  city  govern- 
ment act  repeals  county  local  op- 
tion act  within  a  city.  Jett  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky. ),  49  S.  W. 
786;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1619. 

Where  amendment  of  local  op- 
tion laws  will  not  afl'ect  terri- 
tory in  Avhicli  the  law  is  then  in 
force.  Ex  jiarte  Elliott,  44  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  575;    72  S.   W.  837. 

When  both  local  and  general 
prohibition  law  in  force  in  a  city. 
Locke  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
74  S.  W.  654;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  76. 

Brewery  license  cannot  be  is- 
sued. Hager  v.  Jung  Brewing  Co. 
(Ky.),  92  S.  W.  573;  29  Ky.  L. 
Rep.    176. 

A  local  option  law  making  it 
an  ofi'ense  to  bring  liquors  into 
the  district  adopting  prohibition 
does  not  apply  to  those  whose 
license  has  not  expired.  Sheehan 
V.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  (Ky.), 
101  S.  W.  380;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
113. 

Effect  of  adoption  of  county  lo- 
cal prohibition  on  city  dispensary. 
Bamesville  v.  Means,  128  Ga.  197 ; 
57   S.   E.   422. 

When  county  and  not  city  the 
local  unit.  O'Nual  v.  Miuary, 
125  Ky.  571;  101  S.  W.  951;  30 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  886;    Yates  v.  Nun- 


§548 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


936 


and  that  the  majority  of  the  voters  shall  be  determined  by 
the  aggregate  vote  cast  in  the  township  or  ward  where  the 
business  is  to  be  conducted  for  candidates  for  the  highest 


nelly,    125    Ky.    664;     102    S.    W. 
292;    30  Ky.   L.  Rep.  984. 

When  cHy  and  county  not  en- 
titled to  separate  elections  on 
same  day.  Washington  v.  Gid- 
dens  (Ky.),  103  S.  W.  321;  31 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  647. 

In  Kentucky  the  adoption  of 
constitutional  provisions  on  local 
option  did  not  repeal  local  laws 
then  in  force.  Commonwealth  v. 
Hurst  (Ky.),  62  «.  W.  1024;  23 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  365;  Mullins  v.  Lan- 
caster (Ky.),  63  ,S.  W.  475;  23 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  436;  Farris  v.  C!om- 
monwealth,  111  Ky.  2.36;  63  S. 
W.  615;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  580; 
Stamper  v.  Commonwealth,  102 
Ky.  33;  42  S.  W.  915;  19  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  1014;  Thompson  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 103  Ky.  68IS;  45  S. 
W.   1039;    46  S.  W.  492. 

The  adoption  of  local  option 
by  a  city  suspends  all  its  licens- 
ing ordinances.  Mayhew  v.  Eu- 
gene (Ore.),  104  Pac.  727;  but 
not  an  ordinance  declaring  a  place 
in  the  city  maintained  for  the  sale 
of  liquor  to  be  a  nuisance.  May- 
hew    V.    Eugene,    supra. 

A  statute  of  April  21,  1-908, 
changed  the  beginning  of  the  li- 
cense year  from  May  1st  to 
October  1st,  and  provided  that  the 
statute  at  the  time  the  local  op- 
tion was  taken  should  not  be 
changed  until  October  1st  fol- 
lowing. In  November,  1907,  a 
license  town  voted  for  no  li- 
cense. It  was  held  that  the 
right  to  a  license  existed  un- 
til   October    1,    1908.      People    v. 


Bashford  (N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.),  112 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1143;  affirmed  128 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  351;  112  N.  Y. 
Supp.   502. 

County's  right  to  take  away 
from  city  under  special  charter 
its  right  to'  grant  a  license.  Evans 
v.  Commonwealth,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract;  681;  Commonwealth 
v.  Brown,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (ab- 
stract),   407. 

Druggists  are  not  exempted 
from  operation  of  statute.  State 
v.  Moore,  107  Mo.  78;  16  S.  W. 
937. 

The  adoption  of  local  option 
merely  suspends  and  does  not  re- 
peal the  liquor  licensing  laws. 
Brewer  v.  Commonwealtli,  14  Ky. 
L.    Rep.     (abstract)     270. 

When  the  Legislature  prohibits 
the  sale  in  a  district,  but  per- 
mits the  citizens  by  vote  to  per- 
mit sales  of  liquors,  the  vote  does 
not  repeal  the  prohibitory  stat- 
ute, but  simply  permits  sales  un- 
til the  citizens  shall  vote  that  they 
may  not  be  made.  Commonwealth 
V.  Hoke  &  Yokum,  14  Bush  66S. 

Part  of  a  town  cannot  permit 
sales  when  the  town  as  a  whole 
has  prohibited  them.  Common- 
wealth V.  King,  8  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
( abstract )     608. 

Where  the  Legislature  may 
adopt  local  laws,  it  may  take  a 
city's  territory  out  of  a  local  op- 
tion law.  Hall  V.  Dunn  ( Ore. ) , 
97  Pac.  811;  State  v.  Cochran, 
(Ore.),  104  Pac.  420;  State  v. 
Malheur  -County  (Ore.),  101 
Pac.  907. 


937  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  548 

office  at  the  last  election  preceding  the  filing  of  such  remon- 
strance. In  construing  this  statute  it  was  said  that  its  mani- 
fest purpose  was  to  permit  the  legal  voters  of  the  particular 
district  at  the  time  of  filing  of  the  remonstrance  to  say 
whether  such  license  should  be  issued,  and  that  it  was  not 
contemplated  by  the  Legislature  that  between  an  election  and 
the  filing  of  an  application  for  a  license,  a  ward  should  be  re- 
districted,  nor  would  it  be  a  reasonable  interpretation  of  the 
statute  to  hold  that  such  action  by  a  common  council  would 
deprive  the  resident  voters  of  the  ward  of  the  right  to  express 
their  will  in  the  premises.  Accordingly,  where  such  a  re- 
districting  had  occurred,  remonstrants  no  longer  residents  of 
the  new  ward  were  not  entitled  to  be  considered;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  they  were  not  permitted  to  remonstrate  they 
were  not  to  be  counted  in  the  aggregate  of  legal  voters  when 
it  affirmatively  appeared  that  they  were  no  longer  voters  of 
the  ward  affected.-^  The  general  rule  is  that  whenever  an 
election  has  been  held  under  and  in  conformity  with  the  pro- 
visions of  a  local  option  law  in  a  parish  or  county,  and  the 
vote  cast  is  against  granting  licenses  for  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  such  vote  will  preclude  a  minor  subdivision  of 
such  parish  or  county  from  subsequently  holding  another 
election  for  such  minor  portions  upon  such  question.  The 
former  vote  will  control  the  entire  parish  or  county,  including 
its  minor  subdivisions,  for  the  period  of  time  for  which  the 
election  was  held;  and  if  a  new  district  is  carved  out  and 
created  with  a  new  name  from  a  district  which  has  already 
adopted  a  local  option  law,  such  law  will  be  enforced  in  the 
new  district  upon  the  theory  that  all  qualified  voters  of  such 
new  district  have  had  a  right,  and  were  called  upon,  to  vote 
at  the  election  held  in  the  old  district  for  or  against  the 
adoption  of  the  law,  and  the  result  of  that  election  subjects 

Census   to  show   status   of  city.  Where  a  vote  is  essential   to  a 

State  V.   Cass  County    (Mo.),   119  grant     of     a     license.     State     v. 

S.  W.    1010,   1014.     '  Stakke    (S.   D.),    117    S.   W.    129; 

Violation    of    license    law    may  118   S.   W.   703. 

be    prosecuted    after    adoption    of  23  Abbot  v.  Inman,  35  Ind.  App. 

local     option.       Cohens    v.     State  262;   72   N.  E.   284. 
(Tex.),  116  S.  W.  571. 


§548 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


938 


the  entire  population  of  the  new  district  to  the  provisions  of 
the  law  for  the  period  of  time  covered  by  such  election.-' 
At  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  which  such  election  was 
held  a  minor  or  new  division  may  hold  such  an  election,  and 
if  the  majority  vote  is  not  for  the  adoption  of  local  option 
such  determination  will  be  binding  for  a  like  term  and  cannot 
be  defeated  by  a  general  election  of  the  parish  or  county  upon 
the  same  subject  for  the  time  designated  in  the  statute.-^ 


24  Ashurst  V.  State,  79  Ala.  276; 
Prestwood  v.  State,  88  Ala.  235; 
7  So.  259;  Commonwealth  v. 
King,  86  Ky.  436;  6  S.  VV.  124; 
Cooper  V.  Shelton,  97  Ky.  282; 
30  S.  W.  623;  Garrett  v.  Mayor, 
et  al,  47  La.  Ann.  618;  17  So. 
238;  Higgins  v.  State,  64  Md. 
419;  1  Atl.  876;  Whisenhurst  v. 
State,  18  Tex.  App.  491;  Wood- 
lief  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  412;  2 
S.  W.  812. 

25  Whisenhurst  v.  State,  18  lex. 
App.  491;  Woodlief  v.  State,  21 
Tex.  App.  412;  2  S.  W.  812;  Par- 
ker V.  State,  126  Ga.  443;  55  S. 
E.  329;  Medford  v.  State,  45  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  180;  74  S.  W.  7C8; 
Nelson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
75  S.  W.  502;  Jones  v.  State, 
67    Md.    256;    10    Atl.    216. 

If  a  local  option  county  be  di- 
vided and  an  entirely  new  one 
be  created  local  option  continues 
in  force  in  the  new  county.  Par- 
ker V.  State,  126  Ga.  443;  55  S. 
E.  329;  Moore  v.  State,  126  Ga. 
414;  55  S.  E.  327;  Amerker  v. 
Taylor,  81   S.   C.   163;    62   S.  E.  7. 

The  addition  of  new  territory 
to  the  local  option  district  does 
not  annul  the  former  result  nor 
authorize  a  new  vote  for  the 
whole  new  territory  before  the 
expiration  of  the  statutory  time 
for  a  new  vote.  Ex  parte  Fields 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),   86  S.  W.   1022. 


As  to  presumption  that  boartl  in 
ordering  election  did  not  include 
territory  where  an  election  was 
unauthorized.  Cofield  v.  Brittou 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  109  6.  VV.  493 
(town  charter  lapsed  or  forfeit- 
ed). 

"Dry"  territory  taken  into 
"wet"  territory  remains  "dry." 
In  re  Cunningham,  21  Can.  Prac. 
459;  Ex  parte  ]S;agle,  30  N.  B.  77; 
King  V.  McMuUian,  9  Can.  Cr. 
Cas.  531;  Ex  parte  McCleaver,  21 
N.  B.  315;  Regina  v.  Monteith, 
15  Ont.  290;  Regina  v.  Shovelear, 
11  Ont.  727;  Ex  parte  Pollard,  51 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  488;  103  S.  W. 
878;  Regina  v.  Higgins,  18  Ont. 
148;  Oxley  v.  Allen  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  107  S.  W.  945;  Ex  parte 
Dalton,  27  N.  B.  426;  Ex  parte 
Brennan,  30  N.  B.  91;  King  v. 
MoMullan,  38  Nova  Scotia  129; 
In  re  Anderson,  14  Manitoba  535; 
Prestwood  v.  State,  88  Ala.  235; 
7   So.   259. 

So  if  a  portion  of  a  "wet"  dis- 
trict "be  taken  into  a  "dry"  mu- 
nicipality, that  portion  continues 
"wet,"  and  licenses  issued  there- 
for are  in  force.  Ex  parte  Mc- 
Cleaver, 21  N.  B.  315;  but  if 
the  portion  thus  taken  be  created 
into  an  entirely  new  municipal- 
ity, it  may  repeal  the  by-law 
granting  local  option  prohibition, 
although     the     old     municipality 


939 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§549 


Sec.  549.  Repeal  of  local  option  by  vote — Second  election  in 
subdivisions. 

Not  infrequently  statutes  require  the  question  of  local 
option — whether  for  prohibition  or  license — to  be  submitted 
periodically  to  the  voters,  and  other  statutes  provide  for  an 
election  on  the  question  when  a  petition  is  presented  for  that 
purpose.  But  nearly  all  of  them  provide  that  a  certain 
period  of  time  must  elapse  before  the  question  can  again  be 
submitted  for  a  vote;  and  when  that  is  true  an  election  held 
before  that  period  has  elapsed  will  result  in  a  nullity  or  void 
election.-®  And  the  statute  cannot  be  evaded  in  part  by  sub- 
mitting the  question  to  a  subdivision  of  the  district  voting  on 
the  question  ^^  unless  the  statute  provides  for  it.-^  Nor  can 
the  voting  district  be  combined  with  a  larger  district  and  a 
vote  thus  taken  within  the  prohibited  time.-^  In  determining 
whether  the  requisite  time  has  elapsed  the  time  is  reckoned 
from  the  date  of  the  election  and  not  from  the  date  of  the 
publication  of  the  result.^"     It  is  the  duty  of  the  coiTrt  or 


could,  not  if  such  territory  had 
remained  tlierein.  Doyle  v.  Duf- 
ferien,  S  Manitoba  280;  In  re 
Henderson,  14  Manitoba,  535;  yet 
prohibition  continues  in  force  un- 
til set  aside  by  a  vote  of  the  new 
municipality.  Higgins  v.  State, 
64  Md.  419;  1  Atl.  876;  Jones  v. 
State,  '67  Md.  256;   10  Atl.  216. 

Additional  territory  added  on 
election  day  will  not  affect  the 
election.  Ex  parte  Curlee,  51  Tex. 
€r.  App.  614;    103  S.  W.  896. 

26Tousey  v.  Stites  (Ky.),  66 
S.  W.  277;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1738; 
Commonwealth  v.  Nelson  (Ky.), 
57  S.  W.  495;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  414; 
Savage  v.  Wolfe,  69  Ala.  569  (pe- 
tition showed  election  had  been 
held  within  prohibition  time,  pro- 
ceedings void )  ;  Hancock  v.  Bing- 
ham   (Ky.),    102    S.    W.    341;    31 


Ky.  L.  Rep.  427;  Oxley  v.  Allen, 
(Ky.),   107   S.  W.  945. 

27  Tousey  v.  Stites,  supra;  State 
v.  Hickerson  (Mo.  App.),  109  S. 
W.  10'8;  Caldwell  v.  Grider,  88 
Ala.  421;    7   So.  203. 

28Eggen  v.  Offutt,  128  Ky.  314; 
108  S.  VV.  333;  32  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1350;  Citizens,  etc.  v.  Board,  49 
La.  Ann.  641;  21  So.  742;  Police 
Jury  v.  Mansfield,  49  La.  Ann. 
796;  21  So.  598;  Commonwealtli 
v.  Bottoms  (Ky.),  50  S.  W.  084; 
20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1929;  Oxford  v. 
Frank,  30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  343; 
70  S.  W.  426;  Whisenhunt  v. 
State,  18  Tex.  App.  491;  Wood- 
lief  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  412; 
2   S.   W.   812. 

29  Ex  parte  Randall,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  519;    98  S.   W.  870. 

^oEx  parte  Smith,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  350;    88  S.  W.  245. 


§  549         TRAPTIC  IN  INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  940 

board  to  refuse  to  order  an  election  on  the  question  of  repeal 
where  a  sufficient  length  of  time  has  not  elapsed.^^  The  fact 
that  a  city  decided  for  a  license  when  the  county  decided  for 
prohibition  will  not  authorize  the  city  to  vote  before  the 
requisite  period  has  expired.''-  "Where  a  city  lying  over  cer- 
tain population  and  lying  within  a  county  voting  for  pro- 
hibition was  authorized,  within  less  than  the  period  that  the 
second  election  could  be  submitted  to  the  county,  to  hold  its 
own  separate  election  on  the  question,  it  was  held  that  if  the 
city  did  not  have  the  requisite  population  at  the  time  of  the 
county  election  it  could  not  claim  the  right  to  vote  before  the 
county  period  had  elapsed  on  the  ground  that  its  population 
had  increased  to  the  requisite  amount."^  If  the  second  elec- 
tion in  a  city  is  held  too  soon,  but  results  in  prohibition  which 
was  the  result  of  the  prior  county  election,  a  conviction  for 
the  violation  of  the  local  option  law  as  adopted  in  such  city 
will  not  be  reversed,  for  local  option  on  the  county  election 
was  in  force  when  the  offense  was  committed.^*  If  ''dry" 
territory  be  added  to  a  "wet"  political  division  of  the  State, 
an  election  cannot  be  ordered  or  held  within  such  division 
until  the  requisite  time  has  elapsed  for  holding  an  election  in 
the  political  division  from  which  such  "drj'"  territory  was 
taken.^^     If  the  time  for  the  county  second  election  has  ex- 

siKidd  V.  Truett,   28  Tex.  Civ.  53  Tex.   Cr.  App.  339;    109  S.   VV. 

App.  618;  68  S.  \V.  310;  Roper  v.  936;    Wade   v.  State,  52   Tex.   Cr. 

McKay,    29    Tex.    Civ.    App.    470;  App.    608;    109    S.    W.    191,    192; 

69   S.   W.   459.  Woods  v.   State    (Tex.   Cr.   App.), 

32  Commonwealth     v.      Bottoms  75    S.    W.    37.      Contra,    Byrd    v. 

(Ky.),  57   S.   W.  493;   20   Ky.   L.  State,  51   Tex.  Cr.  App.  539;    103 

Rep.  1929,  reversing  57  S.  W.  495.  S.   W.    863. 

Mandamus  will  not  lie  to  com-  33  State    v.    Robinson,    129    Mo. 

pel    a    recount    of    the   vote   when  App.  147;   108  S.  W.  619. 

another     town     election     can     be  34  Lyon    v.    State,    42    Tex.    Cr. 

called.      People    v.    Mosso,    30    N.  App.  506;   61   S.  W.   125. 

Y.  Misc.  Rep.  164;  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  ^^^  Ex    parte    Fiekls     (Tex.     Cr. 

588.  App.),    86   S.    W.    1022.      Contra, 

If     a     second     prohibition     be  Doyle    v.    Dufferien,    8    ^Manitoba 

"dopted,  a  conviction  for  a  viola-  286;    In,  re   Henderson,    14   Mani- 

i,ion    during   the   first   prohibition  toba   535. 
may   be   had.      Johnson   v.    State, 


941 


LOCAL    OPTION. 


§549 


pired,  and  a  city  is  authorized  to  hold  its  own  election,  it 
can  then  do  so,  although  the  county  has  not  called  a  second 
election.^**  A  territory  after  adopting  prohibition  cannot  be 
subdivided  and  then  an  election  be  called  within  the  pro- 
hibited period  for  one  of  the  smaller  territorial  districts.^'^ 
Where  a  statute  provided  that  if  there  was  a  majority  vote 
for  license  a  second  election  might  be  called,  it  was  held  that 
if  the  result  of  the  election  for  license  was  a  tie  vote  there 
could  be  no  second  election  called.^^  If  a  county  has 
voted  upon  the  question  of  prohibition,  no  subdivision  voting 
upon  it  thereafter — although  it  might  lawfully  so  vote — can 
deprive  the  county,  at  the  end  of  the  prohibition  period,  or 
at  any  time  thereafter,  from  voting  on  the  question  a  second 
time,^^  for  the  statute  with  reference  to  a  second  election  has 


36  state  V.  Jackson,  105  La. 
436;   29  So.  870. 

37^/0?  parte  Elliott,  44  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  575;   72  S.  W.  837. 

On  the  reversal  of  a  phohib- 
itory  vote  the  privilege  granted 
under  a  license  to  sell  is  revived, 
unless  the  holder  has  by  some  act 
abandoned  it,  or  it  by  limitation 
has  expired.  People  v.  Bnish,  41 
N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  56;  83  N.  Y. 
Supp.  607 ;  affirmed  92  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  611;   86  X.  Y.  Sunp.   1144. 

See  Price  v.  Board,  98  Md.  346; 
57  Atl.  215. 

Where  prohibition  continues  in 
force  until  repealed,  and  the  re- 
sult of  a  second  election  is  not 
in  force  until  published,  the  State 
may  rely  upon  the  first  election 
where  the  ofl'ense  is  committed  af- 
ter the  second  election  and  be- 
fore the  result  is  published,  (liv- 
ens V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
267;  91  S.  W.  1090,  1091.  See 
Thompson  v.  Commonwealth,  103 
Ky.  635;  45  S.  W.  1039;  Decker 
V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  20;  44 
S.  W.  S45;  State  v.  Foreman, 
121  Mo.  App.  502;   97  S.  W.  269. 


A    freeholder    held    to     have    a 
light    to    intervene    and    insist    a 
second    election    would    be    void. 
Coldwell   V.   Guider,   88   Ala.   421; 
7   So.  203. 

38Temmick  v.  Owings,  70  Md. 
246;   16  Atl.  719. 

Where  statute  shortening  the 
prohibition  period  does  not  apply 
to  previous  elections.  Dawson  v. 
State,  25  Tex.  App.  670;  8  S.  W. 
820. 

In  Kentucky,  until  the  certifi- 
cate of  the  result  of  the  second 
election  is  recorded,  there  is  no 
change  in  the  status  of  the  liquor 
question.  Commonwealth  v. 
Weisenburgh  (Ky.),  102  S.  W. 
846;    31    Ky.   L.   Rep.   449. 

If  the  accused  claims  the  sec- 
ond election  was  void  because 
brought  on  too  soon,  he  must 
show  that  as  a  fact.  Holland  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  147;  101 
S.  W.   1002. 

39  Hancock  v.  Bingham  (Ky. ), 
102  S.  W.  341;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
427;  Police  Jury  v.  Mansura,  119 
La.  300;  44  So.  23;  119  La.  306; 
44   So.   25;    Smith  v.   Patton,    103 


§§  550,  551        TEAPFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  942 

referouLC  to  llic  identical  territory  covered  by  the  former 
election/''  If  the  first  election  be  void,  not  voidable,  then  the 
prohibitive  period  does  not  apply  to  the  second  election.*^ 

Sec.  550.    Local  option  ordinance,  when  not  invalid. 

An  ordinance  duly  passed  by  the  authorities  of  a  municipal 
corporation  prohibiting  the  keeping  of  intoxicating  liquors  for 
the  purpose  of  a  local  sale  will  not  conflict  with  the  statute 
of  the  State  which  provides  that  if  a  majority  of  the  votes 
cast  at  any  election  held  under  a  general  local  option  law 
shall  be  against  the  sale,  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  any  person, 
within  the  limits,  of  a  municipal  corporation  where  an  election 
is  held,  to  sell  or  barter  for  a  valuable  consideration,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  or  to  give  away  to  induce  trade  at  any 
place  of  business,  or  to  furnish  at  other  places  of  business, 
any  intoxicating  liquors  or  intoxicating  beverages,  or  other 
drinks,  which  if  drunk  to  excess,  will  produce  intoxication. 
Such  an  ordinance  and  statute  are  not  inconsistent  with  each 
other.*-  And  it  has  been  held  that  when  a  city  by  ordinance 
has  adopted  the  local  option  law  of  a  State,  a  penalty  affixed 
to  the  ordinance  of  not  less  than  $300  and  not  more  than 
$1,000  for  the  violation  of  its  terms  is  not  unreasonable  and 
may  be  enforced.*^ 

Sec.  551.     Eminent  domain,  power  of  not  involved. 

A  local  option  law  rests  in  no  degree  upon  the  power  of 
eminent  domain.     It  does  not  contemplate  either  the  taking 

Ky.   444 ;    45   S.   W.   459 ;    20   Ky.  first  election  went  into  force,  and 

L.  Rep.  165.  not    from    the    date    of    the    elec- 

40  Board  v,  Soott,  125  Ky.  545;  tion.     (Seary  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr. 

101   S.   VV.   944;    30   Ky.   L.   Rep.  App.  444;    102  ,S.  W.   1127. 

§94;    Oxley    v.    Allen     (Tex.    Civ.  If    the    second    election    be    in- 

App.),  107  S.  W.  945.  valid    because    held    too   soon,    its 

In  Louisiana  an  election  result  validity    may    be    tested    coUater- 

continues  in   force   until   a  second  ally.      Oxley    v.   Allen    (Tex.   Civ. 

one   is   called    and    the    result   re-  App.),  107  S.  W.  945. 

versed   or    changed.      Police    Jury  ^i  Oxley  v.   Allen,  supra. 

V.  Mansura,   119  La.  300;    44  So.  42  Mason    v.    Atlanta,     77     Ga. 

23;   119  La.  306;  44  So.  25.  662. 

In  Texas  the  prohibitive  period  43  Warrensburg  v.  McHugh,  122 

begins  to  run  from  the  date  the  Mo.   649. 


943  LOCAL  OPTION.  §§  552, 553 

or  damaging  of  anything.  It  is  the  exercise  of  the  police 
power  of  a  State  or  Connnonwealth,  pure  and  simple.  The 
incidental  effects  upon  the  value  of  property  that  has  been 
used  for  the  manufacture  or  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
result  not  from  any  interference  with  the  property,  but  solely 
from  the  inability  of  the  owners  of  the  property  to  adjust 
their  old  business  to  the  new  law.  The  effect,  if  they  can 
be  a  damage  at  all,  is  damnum  ahsqim  injuria.  The  law  does 
not  take  or  damage  the  property  of  such  owners  for  the  public 
use,  but  only  prevents  them,  to  a  certain  limited  extent,  from 
taking  or  damaging  the  public  for  their  use.  Such  is  their 
real  grievance,  and  for  that  they  have  no  remedy.  Where 
business  and  law  conflict,  it  is  the  business  that  must  give 
Avay  and  not  the  law.*^ 

Sec.  552.    Cost  of  election. 

Unless  the  statute  imposes  the  cost  upon  them,  those  peti- 
tioning for  the  election  are  not  liable  for  the  costs  of  the 
election,  nor  anyone  else,  nor  can  they  be  required  to  make  a 
deposit  to  cover  the  costs.'*^  But  a  statute  m^y  require  them 
to  do  so,  especially  the  expenses  up  to  the  calling  of  the 
election.*" 

Sec.  553.    Consent  of  local  authorities. 

In  Iowa  a  statute  required  as  a  condition  to  the  issuance 
of  a  license  that  a  written  statement  of  general  consent  of  a 
certain  percentage  of  the  voters  at  the  last  general  election  be 
presented  to  the  board  of  supervisors,  who  should  canvass  it 
and  enter  its  finding  as  to  the  results  in  its  records.  But 
under  this  law  if  the  consent  was  given  by  the  voters  of  a 
township  that  would  not  authorize  the  granting  of  a  license 
to  sell  in  a  town  within  the  township,*^  and  where  a  town  was 

« Menken    v.    City    of    A-tlanta,  Ky.   146;    103  S.  W.  251;    31   Ky. 

78  Ga.  668;   3  S.  E.  414.  L.  Rep.   597. 

*5  O'Neal   V.    Minary,     125     Ky.  47  Hill    v.    Gleisner,     112     Iowa 

571;    101    S.   W.   951;    30   Ky.   L.  397;     84    N.     W.     511;     West    v. 

Eep.  888.  Bishop,   110   Iowa  410;   81   N.  W. 

46  Butler   V.    Fiscal    Court,    126  (596;   Meyer  v.  Hobson,   116  Iowa 

349;    90  N.   W.  85. 


§  554  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.  944 

incorporated  after  the  canvass  was  made  and  the  record 
signed,  a  canvass  must  then  be  as  to  the  town  before  a  license 
to  sell  in  the  town  could  be  granted.*^  The  canvass  is  made 
from  the  poll  books  of  the  last  previous  election ;  but  if  they 
be  destroyed,  then  the  board  must  ascertain  the  facts  as  well 
a-s  it  can.*^ 

Sec.  554.    Juror's  qualifications  in  local  option  cases. 

Upon  the  trial  of  a  person  charged  with  an  offense  against 
a  local  option  law,  a  juror  is  not  disti-ualified  who,  upon  his 
voir  dire,  states  that  he  voted  for  the  local  option  law,  or 
that  he  is  in  favor  of  the  law  and  its  enforcement,  or  that 
he  is  opposed  to  the  saloon  business,  or  believes  in  prohibition, 
or  that  he  has  conscientious  scruples  against  the  saloon  busi- 
ness. It  would  be  a  strange  rule  that  would  disqualify  a 
juror  because  he  is  in  favor  of  an  existing  law,  believe  in  its 
enforcement,  and  is  opposed  to  a  business  w^hich,  if  carried 
on  at  all,  is  carried  on  in  direct  violation  of  a  statutory  pro- 
hibition. The  question  to  be  tried  in  such  case  is  not  the 
policy  of  the  law,  but  whether  or  not  the  party  charged  has 
b'een  guilty  of  its  violation.  Nor  is  a  juror  dis([ualified  in 
such  case  who  states  that  he  understands  the  local  option  law 
to  be  in  force,  or  that  he  knows  that  a  local  option  election 
■was  held,  and  knows  the  result  of  the  election  was  to  super- 
sede and  suspend  the  general  jaws  of  the  State  respecting  the 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.  Although  the  existence  of  the 
law  is  a  fact  to  be  proven,  the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of 
the  proof  is  a  matter  for  the  court  and  not  for  the  jury.^** 
In  such  case,  however,  it  would  be  error  to  refuse  to  permit 
a  juror  to  be  asked  which  way  he  would  give  a  verdict  if  the 

4S  Schimeman    v.    Sherman,    118  Certiorari    to     review     proceed- 

lowa  230;  91  N.  W.  1064.  i  igs.     Darling  v.  Boesch,  67  Iowa 

49  West    V.    Bishop,     110     Iowa  702;    25   N.   W.   887. 

410;     81    IST.    W.    696;    Wilson    v.  How     requisite     percentage     of 

Bohstedt,    135   Iowa   457;    110    N.  voters    ascertained.      Cameron    v. 

W.  898.  Fellows,  109  Iowa  534;   80  N.  W. 

Proof  of  filing  of  contest.     Mc-  567. 

Conkie  V.  District  Court,  117  Iowa  so  People    v.    Keefer,    97    Mich. 

334;  90  N.  W.  716.  15;  o6  N.  W.  105. 


945 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§555 


evidence,   as  between  the  people  and   defendant,  should  be 
equally  balanced.'^^ 

Sec.  555.     Local  prohibitory  or  local  option  statutes. 

In  the  past — and  even  in  a  few  States  at  the  i^resent  day — 
liquor  statutes  have  been  frequently  adopted  for  particular 
localities,  and  the  question  frequently  arises  what  is  the  effect 
of  a  subsequent  general  statute  for  the  entire  State  covering 
the  same  subject.  Where  no  provision  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  State  forbids  local  letrislation  such  statutes  are  valid, 
being  enacted  under  the  State's  general  police  power  to  regu- 
late the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors.^^  Necessarily  the  ques- 
tion whether  a  local  law  was  repealed  by  a  general  law  on 
the  same  subject  must  depend  upon  the  intent  of  the  Legis- 
lature as  expressed  in  the  latter  act.  There  are  many  cases 
where  it  is  held  that  the  local  act  is  not  repealed,  and  con- 
sequently prosecutions  must  be  based  upon  its  provisions ;  ^^ 
while  on  the  contrary  it  has  often  been  held  that  the  gen- 
eral law  repeals  the  local  statute.^*  In  matters  of  this  kind, 
however,  the  general  rule  that  repeals  by  implication  are  not 
favored  prevails.^^     But  if  a  local  law  is  enacted  for  a  par- 


si  Monaghan  v.  Insurance  Co., 
53  Mich.  246;  18  X.  VV.  797;  Ot- 
sego Lake  Tp.  v.  Kirston,  72  Mich. 
1 ;  40  N.  VV.  26 ;  Theisen  v.  Johns, 
72  Mich.  285 ;  40  N.  W.  727 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Keefer,  97  Mich.  15;  56  X. 
W.  105. 

52  Stickrod  v.  Commonwealth, 
S6  Ky.  285;  5  S.  W.  580;  9  Ky. 
L.  Rep.   563. 

C3  Blackburn  v.  Commonwealth, 
15  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  239; 
Wooton  V.  Commonwealth,  15  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  (abstract)  495;  Common- 
wealth V.  Weller,  14  Bush  218;  29 
Am.  Rep.  407;  Bodgett  v.  State 
(Ala.),  48  'So.  54;  Rice  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  61  S.  W.  473; 
22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1793;  Bailey  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  64  S.  W. 
995;  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1223;  Cranor 


V.  Albany,  43  Ore.  144;  71  Pac. 
1042;  State  v.  Piner,  141  N.  C. 
760;  53  S.  E.  305;  Hail  v.  State, 
48  Tex.  'Cr.  App.  514;  90  S.  W. 
503;  People  v.  Mulkins,  25  N. 
Y.  Misc.  Rep.  599 ;  54  N.  Y.  Supp. 
599. 

54  Albright  v.  Commonwealth,  7 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract),  762; 
Kemp  V.  State,  120  Ga.  157;  47 
S.  E.  548;  Tinsley  v.  State  (Ga.), 
35  S.  E.  303;  Blake  v.  State,  118 
Ga.  333;  45  S.  E.  249;  Common- 
wealth V.  Duncan,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
( abstract )  402 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Warren,  10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (ab- 
stract) 490;  Mueller  v.  People, 
24   Colo.  251;    48   Pac.  965. 

55  Commonwealth  v.  Weller,  14 
Bush  218;    29   Am.   Rep.   407. 


§  555  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  946 

ticular  district,  then  it  supersedes  the  general  statute  as  to 
such  district. ^°     Such  a  statute  containing  a  provision  that 
the  violation  of  its  provisions  shall  be  punished  according  to 
existing  laws  for  the  illegal  sale  of  whisky  is  valid  and  capable 
of  enforcement."    If  a  local  act  be  unconstitutional  that  will 
leave   the   general   statute    on   the   same   subject    in    force.^* 
"Where  sales  within  four  miles  of  any  schoolhouse  were  pro- 
hibited, and  the  statute  was  so  amended  as  to  extend  its  pro- 
visions to  towns  not  having  over  two  thousand  inhabitants, 
but  several  s'llpsj  made  bv  persons  having  licenses  "at  the  date 
of  the  passage  of  that  act  during  the  time  for  which  such 
licenses  were  granted,"  which  was  for  a  year,  and  four  years 
subsequently  this  amendment  was  so  amended  as  to  require 
the  number  to  be  five  thousand,  it  was  held  that  the  latter  act 
did  not  re-enact  the  first  amending  statute  or  revitalize  its 
provisions  so   as  to  except   from   its  operations   sales  made 
under  licenses  in  force  at  the  time  the  act  was  passed,  and 
licenses  which  had  expired  before  the  last  amendment  was 
made  were  no  protection  for  sales  thereafter  made,  not  being 
saved  by  the  later  act.^°  A  few  eases  may  be  noted  in  this  con- 
nection   concerning    those    statutes    prohibiting   sales   within 
certain  distances  of  schools  and  the  like,  for  they  are  strictly 
local  prohibition  statutes.     A  statute  of  this  character  pro- 
hibited sales  within   three   miles  of   any  schoolhouse   if  the 
proper  steps  were  taken  to  put  it  in  force.     A  schoolhouse 
was  located  within  less  than  three  miles  of  a  State  line,  but 
it  was  held  that  the  statute  was  not  for  that  reason  void  or 
inapplicable,  and  that  the  inhabitants  living  in  such  other 
State  but  within  the  three  mile  limit  were  not  to  be  counted 
nor  their  consent  required  in  determining  if  the  requisite 
numher       in       the       county       had       voted       for      local 

58'Commomvealth  v.  Anderson,  s7  Commonwealth  v.  Edinger,  7 
10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  307;  Gifford  v.  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  442;  Berg- 
Commonwealth,  2  Ky.  L.  Rep.  meyer  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Ky. 
(abstract)  437;  Commonwealth  v.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  823. 
Bogie,  7  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  ss  Tinsley  v.  State  (Ga.),  35  S. 
601;  Collins  V.  State,  114  Ga.  70;  E.   303. 

39  S.  E.  916;  Cotton  v.  State,  62  59  Webster  v.  State   (Tenn.),  75 

Ark,  585;   37  'S.  W.  4S.  S.  W.  1020. 


947  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  555 

option.®"  Under  such  a  statute  where  the  num- 
ber required  by  statute  petitions  for  a  prohibitory  order, 
it  is  the  imperative  duty  of  the  board  or  court  petitioned 
to  make  the  order.''^  The  sole  question  before  the  court  is  to 
determine  if  the  requisite  number  of  persons  have  signed  the 
petition.*'-  Where  local  prohibition  within  three  miles  of  a 
schoolhouse  was  established,  and  three  years  afterwards  a 
new  schoolhouse,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  first  school- 
house,  was  built,  and  a  new  prohibition  order  was  entered, 
and  thereafter  at  a  general  county  election  a  majority  of  the 
votes  were  cast  for  licenses  and  the  court  revoked  the  first 
order  prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquors  within  the  prohibitory 
district,  it  was  held  that  the  overlapping  of  the  areas  of  the 
prohibitory  orders  did  not  make  the  second  one  invalid,  and 
that  the  revoking  of  the  first  order  did  not  have  any  effect 
upon  the  second  oneand,therefore,thedefendant  was  not  pro- 
tected after  such  county  had  voted  for  licenses.*'^  A  recital 
in  the  order  which  locates  the  schoolhouse  at  a  wrong  place 
does  not  invalidate  the  order,  it  not  being  necessary  to  locate 
it.®*  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  which  schoolhouse 
was  in  question  where  there  were  two  buildings  used  for 
school  purposes  within  the  district.""'  An  order  revoking  a 
prohibitory  order  is  self-executing,  and  remains  in  force  until 
set  aside  or  superseded.  An  appeal  from  the  order  of  revoca- 
tion does  not  suspend  it.®®  A  petitioner  for  prohibition  has 
such  an  interest  in  the  matter  that  he  may  appeal  from  a 
denial  to  enter  an  order  as  prayed  for  in  the  petition,®^ 

soLindley  v.  State    (Ark.),   120  64  Lindley  v.  State,  supra. 

S.    W.    987;     Thomas    v.    Burke  es  Thomas  v.  Burke   (Ark.) ,  121 

(Ark.),    121   S.  W.   1061.  S.   W.    lOGO. 

61  Bridewell    v.    Ward,    72    Ark.  ea  Bordwell    v.    State,     77     Ark. 
187;    79   S.   W.   762.  161;   91   S.  W.  555. 

62  Douglass  V.  Hamilton  (Ark.),  st  Thomas  v.  Burke   (Ark.),  121 
120  S.   W.   387.  S.   W.   1060. 

63i^indley  v.  State    (Ark.),   120 
S.  W.  9S7. 


§556 


TRAFFIC    IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


948 


ARTICLE  II.     VIOLATION  OF  LOCAL  OPTION  LAW. 


SECTION. 

556.  Sale  of  liquors. 

557.  Shipping    liquors    into    local 

option    territory. 

558.  Bringing  liquors  within  local 

option  territory. 

559.  Soliciting    orders     in     local 

option   district. 
SCO.     Sale  under  license. 


SECTION. 

561.  Time    for     license     expiring 

or   lapsing. 

562.  Transportation      of      intoxi- 

cating  liquors. 

563.  Under    wliat    statute    pros- 

ecutions to  be  brought. 

564.  Proof  that  local  option  was 

in  force. 


Sec.  556.     Sale  of  Liquor. 

"When  local  option  has  been  adopted  and  has  gone  into  force 
sales  or  gifts  of  liquors  thereafter  in  the  territory  adopting 
it  are  unlawful.  What  is  and  what  is  not  a  sale  has  been 
elsewhere  discussed,  and  what  is  there  said  need  not  be  re- 
peated in  this  connection.  Whatever  transaction  amounts  to 
a  sale  or  gift  is  forbidden  by  these  statutes,  and  all  such 
transactions  are  punishable  by  fine  or  imprisonment.''*  Thus, 
where  a  defendant  kept  liquor  at  his  house  in  a  prohibition 
county,  and  on  being  solicited  to  sell  he  and  the  solicitor  took 
the  desired  amount  of  liquor,  rowed  across  a  river  into  another 
county  where  the  liquor  was  delivered  and  the  money  therefor 
received,  and  they  then  returned,  it  was  held  that  the  sale  was 
brought   about    by    a    subterfuge    within   the   meaning   of    a 


ssstoval  V.  state  (Tex.  Cr. 
App. ) ,  97  S.  W.  92 ;  Brookman  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  277;  96  S. 
W.  928;  Ball  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  99  S.  W.  326;  30  Ky.  L. 
Eep.  600;  Oxford  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  97  S.  W.  484;  Polk 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  97  S. 
W.  467;  Commonwealth  v.  Mc- 
Dermott  (Ky.),  96  S.  W.  475;  29 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  752;  Jackson  v.  State, 
49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  248;  91  S.  W. 
574;  Pike  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  613;   51   S.  Vv^.  395;   Walker 


V.   State,   52   Tex.    Cr.   App.    293; 
106   S.   W.   376. 

In  Kentucky,  under  the  stat- 
utes, it  is  held  a  brewer  may  sell 
his  beer  in  the  local  option  county 
where  his  brewery  is  located. 
Lexington  Brewing  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 124  Ky.  476;  99  S. 
W.  618;  30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  758;  New 
South,  etc.  Co.  V.  Commonwealth, 
123  Ky.  443;  96  S.  W.  805;  29  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  873;  but  not  in  another 
local  option  county.  F.  W.  Cook 
Brewing  Co.  (Ky.),  99  S.  W.  354, 
355;   30  Ky.  L.  Rep.  598,  600. 


949 


LOCAL    OPTION. 


§557 


statute  making  all  sales  by  trick  or  device  illegal."^  An  intent 
not  to  violate  the  local  option  law  is  not  material."*^  But  an 
express  agent  of  a  carrier  delivering  the  liquors  and  collect- 
ing the  amount  due  on  them  cannot  be  charged  with  having 
sold  them.'^  Sales  by  wholesale  are  prohibited  by  local  option 
laws  as  well  as  by  retail."-  But  these  statutes  do  not  prevent 
a  distiller  selling  out  to  his  partner  his  interest  in  the  dis- 
tillery or  its  manufactured  product. '^^ 


Sec.  557.    Shipping  liquors  into  local  option  territory. 

Sales,  with  some  very  restricted  exceptions,  are  universally 
made  illega-l  in  local  option  territory.  It  is  difficult  at  times 
to  say  with  exactness  just  where  the  sale  takes  place.  In  an 
instance  of  shipping  liquors  into  a  local  option  county  by 
common  carrier,  under  a  contract  of  sale,  the  point  of  ship- 
ment is  the  place  where  the  sale  is  consummated,  even  though 
the  liquor  is  sent  C.  0.  D.^*     In  such  an  instance  it  matters 


69  Merritt  v.  Commonwealth,  122 
Ky.  669;  92  S.  W.  611;  28  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  184;  Lemore  v.  Common- 
wealth, 127  Ky.  4-80;  105  S.  W. 
930;  32  Ky.  L.  Rep.  387. 

See  where  'a  gift  of  liquor  is  not 
a  violation  of  a  local  option  stat- 
ute preventing  a  sale.  Common- 
wealth V.  Dieker.son  (Ky. ),  76  S. 
W.  1084;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  104'3. 

70  Williams  v.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  477;  77  S.  W.  215;  Jolly  v. 
State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  484;  110 
S.   W.  749. 

71  State  V.  Cairns,  64  Kan.  782; 
68  Pac.  621. 

72  Greiner  v.  Kelley  Drug  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  75  «.  W.  536. 

73  Stamper  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  103  S.  W.  "386;  31  Ky.  L. 
Rep.    707. 

74  Freshman  v.  State,  37  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  126;  38  S.  W.  1007: 
Joseph  V.  State  ( Tex.  Cr.  App. ) , 
86   S.   W.   320;    Lester    v.     State 


(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  86  S.  W.  326; 
Green  v.  State  ( Tex.  Cr.  App. ) , 
87  S.  W.  1043;  Weil  v.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  603;  90  S.  W.  644; 
McDermott  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  96  S.  W.  474;  29  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  750;  Doores  v.  Common- 
wealth, 121  Ky.  226;  89  S.  W. 
161;  28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1*92;  89  S. 
W,  104;  28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  196; 
Kearns  v.  Commonwealth,  15  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  (abstract),  332;  Blasin- 
game  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
582;  85  S.  W.  275;  Harris  v. 
State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  588;  85 
S.  W.  284,  1198;  Queen  v.  Cahill, 
6  Can.  Cr.  Cas.  204;  35  K  B.  240; 
Hirsch  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App, 
1;  96  S.  W.  40;  James  v.  State, 
45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  592;  78  S.  W. 
951 ;  State  v.  Cairns,  64  Kan.  782; 
68  Pac.  621 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Price,  etc.  Co.  (Ky.),  105  S.  W. 
102;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1350;  Weath- 
ered   V.    State     (Tex.    Cr.    App.), 


§557 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


950 


not  that  the  order  for  the  liquor  was  taken  in  the  local  option 
county.^'*  And  one  to  whom  the  liquor  is  shipped  to  deliver 
to  the  purchaser,  in  turning  it  over  to  him  does  not  violate 
the  law.^"  But  where  a  person  telephoned  to  a  liquor  dealer 
outside  the  prohibition  territory  to  send  him  some  liquor, 
which  the  dealer  did  by  his  wagon,  and  in  order  to  evade 
the  statute  the  driver  refused  to  accept  pay  for  the  liquor 
unless  the  purchaser  would  go  with  him  across  the  line  of  the 
prohibited  territory,  it  was  held  there  was  a  clear  violation  of 
the  statute."^  And  where  the  liquor  is  to  remain  the  property 
of  the  seller  until  taken  out  of  the  express  office  by  the  pur- 
chaser, then  the  seller  is  guilty  of  shipping  liquor  into  the 
county  under  a  statute  prohibiting  it/^    Where  the  order  was 


60  S.  W.  876;  Commonwealth  v. 
Current,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (ab- 
stract) 764;  Commonwealth  v. 
Russell,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract) 
576 ;  Mullen  v.  State,  30  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  Rep.  251;  Beard  v.  State 
(Tex.),  115  S.  W.  592;  Jones  v. 
Dermott  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
96  S.  W.  474;  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
750. 

75  Joseph  V.  State,  sujpra ;  Lus- 
ter V.  State,  supra;  Fosliee  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  87  S.  \V. 
820;  Owens  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  '634;  85  S.  W.  794;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Current,  11  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  (abstract)  7'64;  Bennett  v. 
Commonwealth,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)    370. 

76  Harris  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  588;  85  S.  W.  284,  1198; 
Glass  V.  State,  ^8  Ark.  266 ;  57  S. 
W.  793;  James  v.  State,  45  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  592;  78  N  .W.  951 ;  Queen 
V.  Cahill,  35  N.  B.  240;  6  Can. 
Cr.  Cas.  204. 

77  Commonwealth  v.  Adair,  121 
Ky.  689;  89  S.  W.  1130;  28  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  657 ;  Merritt  v.  Common- 
wealth, 122  Ky.  €69;  92  S.  VV.  611 ; 
28  Ky.  L.  Rep.  184.    See  also  Hall 


V.  Commonwealth,  13  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)    399. 

In  Kentucky  it  would  seem  that 
if  the  liquor  is  sent  C.  0.  D.  t'.ie 
law  fixes  the  place  of  sale  at  the 
place  where  the  carrier  delivered 
the  goods  to  the  purchaser,  but  if 
not  sent  C.  0.  D.,  then  the  stat- 
ute does  not  apply.  Doores  v. 
Commonwealth,  121  Ky.  226;  89 
S.  W.  162,  1J34;  28  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
192,   196. 

Soliciting  orders  within  a  local 
option  county  and  afterward  ship- 
ping the  liquor  pursuant  to  the 
orders  received  cannot  be  regarded 
a  trick  or  device  to  evade  the  stat- 
ute, within  the  prohibition  of  a 
statute  making  all  sales  by  trick 
or  device  unlawful.  Doores  v. 
Commonwealth,  121  Ky.  226;  89 
S.  W.  162,  164;  28  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
192,   196. 

When  sales  of  native  wine  are 
prohibited  and  when  not  in  local 
option  counties.  Bates  v.  State,  81 
Ark.   336;    99  S.  W.  388. 

78Hirsch  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  1 ;  96  S.  W.  40. 

Statutes  sometimes  make  the 
place  where  the  money  is  paid  for 


951  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  557 

solicited  in  a  prohibition  territory  by  an  agent  of  a  foreign 
dealer,  the  order  taken  and  the  money  for  the  liquor  then  and 
there  paid,  it  was  considered  that  the  method  adopted  was  a 
mere  trick  to  evade  the  statute  and  the  transaction  was  an 
illegal  sale."  Where  A  received  in  a  local  option  county  from 
B  money,  and  agreed  to  send  him  whisky,  which  he  did,  it 
w^as  held  that  he  was  more  than  an  agent,  that  he  sold  the 
liquor  to  B,  and  had  violated  the  law.^*'  But  a  right  to 
return  the  liquors  if  they  do  not  correspond  with  the  sample 
does  not  change  the  place  of  sale  from  the  place  of  shipment 
to  the  place  of  consignment.*'  Where  A  received  money  from 
B  in  a  local  option  county  to  buy  him  whisky  in  a  non- 
local option  county,  which  he  did  and  sent  it  to  B  by  the 
hand  of  a  person  not  under  his  control  nor  acting  as  his 
agent,  it  was  held  that  he  had  not  violated  such  local  option 
law,**^  So  a  filling  of  a  telephone  order  in  a  non-prohibition 
county  to  ship  liquor  by  carrier  into  a  local  option  county,  is 
not  a  violation  of  the  law  in  the  latter  county.^^  When  the 
evidence  showed  that  the  accused  shipped  two  packages  of 
liquors  by  express  "C.  0.  D."  to  E  in  a  local 
option  county  to  be  delivered  by  the  express  agent  to 
anyone  who  had  an  order  signed  by  E,  upon  payment  of 
the  charges,  and  upon  some  one  telling  G  if  he  wanted  liquor 

the  liquors  the  place  of  sale.    Hy-  State,    82    Ark.    405 ;     101    S,    W. 

ser  V.  Commonwealth,  1L6  Ky.  410;  1152;   l^iord  v.  State,  82  Ark.  603; 

76  S.  VV.  174;  25  Ky.  L.  Rep.  60S;  102  S.  VV.  1196. 

Buckman    v.    Commonwealth,     11  si  Gill    v.    Kaufman,    16     Kan. 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  526.  571. 

79  (State  V.  Small   (S.  €.),  60  S.  In  Georgia  a  sale  by  mail  order 

E.  676.  to   minor,   shipped   to  him   in   an- 

Some   States    by     statute     have  other  county,  can  be  prosec»ited  in 

made  the  place  of  delivering  in  the  either   the   county  of  shipment  or 

local   option   county   the   place   of  of  -the  consignment.     'Newsome  v. 

sale.     State  v.  Herring,  145  K  C.  State,    1    Ga.  App.   7'GO.;    5^  S.   E. 

418;    58    S.    E.    1007;    Newson   v.  71. 

State,    1   Ga.   App.   790;    5'8   S.   E.  82  Beard  v.  State   (Tex.),  115  S. 

71;  State  v.  Patterson,  134  N.  C.  W.   592. 

612;  47  S.  E.  808.  ss  McDermott  v.   Commonwealth 

soMcDermott  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),   96   S.   W.   474;    29  Ky.  L. 

(Ky.),  100  S.  W.  830;   30  Ky.  L.  Rep.    750. 
Rep.    1227.     But  see   Anderson  v. 


§§  558,  559        TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  952 

F  would  give  an  order  upon  the  express  agent,  which  F  did. 
and  received  an  order  upon  which  he  got  the  liquor,  paying  its 
cost  and  the  amount  of  the  transportation  charges,  and  the 
agent  said  F  had  ordered  him  to  deliver  "any  and  every 
package"  received  by  him,  it  was  held  that  there  was  suffi- 
cient evidence  to  send  the  case  to  the  jury  on  the  question 
M^hether  E  and  F  were  acting  merely  as  the  accused's  agents.®* 

Sec.  558.    Bringing  liquors  within  local  option   territory. 

Under  the  usual  local  option  statutes  it  is  an  offense  to 
bring  intoxicating  liquor  within  the  local  option  territory, 
even  for  one's  own  use,  where  it  is  shipped  by  express 
C.  0.  D.^^  Where  a  foreign  dealer  solicited  an  order  for 
liquors  in  a  local  option  county,  shipped  those  ordered  to  an 
adjoining  county  that  was  not  a  local  option  county,  and  they 
were  then  transported  into  the  local  option  county  by  wagon, 
it  was  held  that  the  presumption  was  the  wagon  was  the 
buyer's,  and  that  the  sale  was  consummated  in  the  non-local 
option  county.*'' 

Sec.  559.     Soliciting  orders  in  local  option  district. 

In  most  of  the  States  it  is  made  a  penal  offense  to  solicit 
orders  for  intoxicating  liquors  in  local  option  territory.  It 
was  found  essential  to  the  integrity  of  the  local  option  law 
that  statutes  forbidding  the  solicitation  of  orders  for  liquors 
should  be  adopted.  Thus,  where  a  dealer  having  his  place  of 
business  in  Louisiana  solicited  orders  in  Mississippi,  to  be 
delivered  in  the  former  State  to  an  express  company  for  the 
purchaser,  it  was  held  that  he  had  violated  a  statute  of  the 
latter  State  making  it  a  misdemeanor  to  act  as  the  agent  of 

84  Current  v.  Commonwealth,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  720;  Jackson  v.  State, 
Ky.  L.  Rep.    (abstract)    764.  49   Tex.   Cr.  App,   24-8;    91   S.   W. 

85  Young    V.     State      {Tex.     Cr.       574. 

App.),    66    S.    W.    567;    Hoyt    v.  se  Pabst    Brewing    Co.    v.    Com- 

State    (Tex.   Cr.  App.),   89   S.   W.  monwealth,   (Ky.),  107  S.  W.  728, 

1082 ;  Pecaria  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  729;    32   Ky.   L.   Rep.    1010,    1013. 

App.   352;   90  S.   W.  42;    Randall  So  where  he  sends  it  to  his  agent 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  a61;  90  to   deliver    them.      People     v.     De 

S.  VV.  1012;  McGuire  v.  Common-  Groot,    111   Mich.  245;    69   N.   W. 

wealth    (Ky.),  99  6.   W.   612;    30  248;    3  Det.  L.  N.   619. 


953  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  559 

either  the  seller  or  purchaser  in  making  a  sale  in  local  option 
territory.'*^  An  advertisement  of  liquors  for  sale  and  soliciting 
orders  for  them  is  not  a  violation  of  a  statute  forbidding  the 
solicitation  of  orders  in  a  local  option  district ;  ^^  nor  is  mail- 
ing printed  circulars.^"  Under  a  statute  making  an  offense 
to  sell  or  furnish  intoxicating  liquors  in  the  Indian  Territory, 
one  who  sends  his  agent  into  that  territory  and  solicits  orders 
for  liquors  and  then  fills  the  order  by  shipping  the  liquor 
ordered  into  the  territory  is  guilty  of  violating  the  statute."'^ 
A  statute  prohibiting  the  solicitation  of  purchases  of  liquors 
applies  to  a  single  solicitation  and  by  one  not  engaged  in  the 
sale  of  liquors  or  in  the  liquor  business."^  To  constitute  the 
offense  of  soliciting  orders  for  liquors  to  be  shipped  into  a 
prohibition  district  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  liquors  be 
shipped,"-  nor  an  order  be  received.**"  Where  a  statute  pro- 
hibits personal  solicitation  of  orders  for  liquor,  a  solicitation 
by  mail  is  a  violation  of  its  provisions.^^  "Where  a  statute 
made  it  an  offense  to  solicit  orders  "by  an  agent"  in  a  pro- 
hibition   territory,   and   a   person   solicited   and   obtained   an 

8T  Hart  V.  state,  87  Miss.  171;  In  Texas  it  was  held  that  a  stat- 
39  So.  523;  Blasingame  v.  Sta+e,  ute  making  it  an  offense  "to  solicit 
47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  582 ;  85  ,S.  W.  an  order  for  the  sale"  of  liquor  in 
275;  Winslow  v.  'State  (Tex.  Cr.  a  local  option  district  was  uncon- 
App.),  98  S.  W.  241;  Mills  v.  stitutional,  as  to  interstate  ship- 
State,  148  Ala.  633;  42  So.  816;  ments,  being  a  violation  of  the 
Williams  v.  State,  107  Ga.  693;  interstate  commerce  act.  Ex  parte 
33  S.  E.  641.  iMassey,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App.  60;   92 

88  Carter  v.  State,  SI   Ark.   37;  S.    VV.    1086;    Ex    parte    Hackney 

08  S.  W.  704.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  92  S.  W.  1092; 

80  State   V.    Wheat,    48    W.    Va.  Carter  v.  State   (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

259;   37  S.  E.  544.  92  S.  W.   10D3. 

90  Taylor  v.  United  States,  6  92  Levy  v.  State,  133  Ala.  190; 
Ind.  T.  350;  98  S.  W.  123.  31  So.  805. 

91  Mills  V.  State,  148  Ala.  633 ;  93  State  v.  Wheat,  48  W.  Va. 
42  So.  816.  259;  37  S.  E.  544. 

The  phrase  "solicit  or  order"  has  9t  Rose  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  588; 

been    construed    to    mean    "solicit  62  S.  E.  117;   State  v.  Wheat,  48 

order   for,"  the   statute  using  the  W.  Va.  259;  37  S.  E.  544. 

language    "to   solicit   or   order   or  The  offense  is  not  committed  un- 

sell  goods,  wares,"  etc.     Republic  til    the    message    is    received,    and 

of   Hawaii   v.   Warbel,    11    Hawaii  then  it  may  be  prosecuted  in  the 

221.  county  in  which  it  is   received. 


§§  560,  561        TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  954 

order,  and  then  went  to  the  defendant,  a  deaJer,  not  revealing 
that  he  had  solicited  an  order,  but  bought  of  him  liquor  to 
fill  the  order,  it  was  held  that  the  defendant  was  not  liable, 
for  he  did  not  solicit  the  order  "by  agent"  or  otherwise.®^ 

Sec.  560.    Sale  under  license. 

If  liquor  may  be  sold  in  such  territory  uinder  a  license,  then 
the  fact  of  a  sale  under  a  license  is  one  of  defense,  and  the 
State  need  not  prove  that  the  accused  had  no  license ;  ^'^  but 
if  the  statute  is  so  worded  as  to  require  the  State  to  prove 
that  the  accused  had  no  license,  then  the  custodian  of  records 
of  the  licensing  board  or  court  may  testify  that  he  has  ex- 
amined the  records  and  found  no  license  had  been  issued."^ 

Sec.  561.     Time  for  license  expiring  or  elapsing. 

Where  licenses  in  a  district  adopting  local  option  have  a 
certain  time  to  run  after  its  adoption,  during  which  time  sales 
thereunder  may  be  made,  and  it  appears  that  the  defendant 
held  a  license  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  then  the  prosecution 
must  show,  if  it  does  not  otherwise  appear  in  evidence,  that 
a  sufficient  time  had  expired  between  the  date  of  the  adoption 
of  local  option  and  the  date  of  the  sale  for  the  license  to  have 
expired,  in  order  to  secure  a  conviction-^** 

95  State  V.  Earles,  84  Ark.  479 ;  in   another    State   making  an   ex- 

106  S.  W.  941.  elusive  business  arrangement  with 

These  statutes  apply  only  to  pro-  a  person  in  the  State  for  the  pur- 

hibition  territory.     Rose  v.  State,  chase  and  sale  of  his  beers,  with- 

1  Ga.  App.  596;  58  S.  E.  20.  out   taking   out    a     license.      New 

A  statute  making  it  an  offense  York  Breweries  Corp.  v.  Baker,  68 

to   "solicit  orders"   has   no   appli-  Conn.  337;   36  Atl.  785. 

cation  where  one  "takes  or  accepts  oo  Robinson   v.    State    (Tex.   Cr. 

orders,"  there  being  no  solicitation.  App. ) ,  75  S.  W.  526. 

Kanderfur-Julian  Co.  v.   State,   72  97  Holton    v.     Bimrod,    8    KaiL. 

Ark.   11;    77   S.  W.  596.  App.  265;   55  Pac.  505. 

A   statute   forbidding   sales   "by  98  Ex  parte  McDonald,  20  N.  B. 

samples,   by   soliciting   or    procur-  542;    Ex  parte  Russell,  20   N.   B. 

ing    orders    or    otherwise,    within  536;   Regina  v,   Risteen,  22  N.  B. 

the   State,   without   taking   out   a  51. 
license"  does  not  prevent  a  brewer 


955  LOCAL  OPTION.  §  562 

Sec.  562.    Transportation  of  intoxicating  liquors. 

In  some  of  the  States  statutes  have  been  enacted  forbidding 
common  carriers  or  any  person  carrying  liquors  into  local 
option  territory,  and  inflicting  penalties  if  they  do.  These 
statutes  are  often  made  applicable  by  their  terms  to  instances 
where  the  liquors  are  received  by  a  carrier  in  another  State 
and  deliverd  in  the  State  enacting  them ;  "^  but  in  this  respect 
they  are  invalid.'  A  statute  providing  that  "no  person 
*  *  *  shall  bring  into  this  State,  or  transport  from  place 
to  place  within  this  State,  by  wns-on,  cart,  or  other  vehicle, 
or  by  any  other  means  or  mode  of  carriae;e,  any  liquors," 
applies  to  one  carrying  liquors  on  his  person  from  place  to 
place,  that  being  a  "means  or  mode  of  carriage,"  and  the 
finding  of  liquors  in  the  possession  of  a  person  who  is  selling 
them  in  a  prohibition  territory  raises  the  presumption  that  he 
carried  them  there.-  But  the  general  rule  is  that  such  statutes 
apply  only  to  common  carriers  or  carriers  for  hire.'  A  statute 
which  makes  it  unlawful  to  carry  liquors  for  unlawful  use  to 
any  "place  or  county,"  makes  it  an  offense  to  carry  them 
for  an  unlawful  use  from  place  to  place  within  a  connty;  and 
whether  or  not  the  transportation  was  for  an  unlawful  use  is 
a  question  for  the  jury."  The  carrier  cannot  escape  on  the 
ground  that  it  believes  the  acts  of  the  consignor  are  legitimate 
acts  of  interstate  commerce.^  If  there  be  no  statute  for- 
bidding the  transportation  into  prohibition  territory,  then  the 
carrier  cannot  be  convicted  of  a  sale  who  merely  carries  the 

09  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Com-  portation  in  a  wagon  by  a  person 

monwealth,    126   Ky.   563;    104   S.  not   a   common   carrier.      State   v. 

W.    394;    31    Ky.   L.    Rep.    9'54.  Campbell,  76  Iowa  122;  40  N.  W. 

1  American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Common-  100. 

wealth,   206    U.    S.    139;    27   Sup.  3  McGuire      v.      Commonwealth 

Ct.  609;   51  L.  Ed.  993.  reversing  (Ky.),  99   S.   W.   612;    30  Ky.  L. 

(Kv.),  97  S.  W.  807:  30  Ky.  207;  Rep.  720. 

Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  200  4  state  v.  Arnold,  80  S.  C.  383; 

U.  S.  12«;  27  Sup.  Ct.  <306.  61  S.  E.  &91. 

2  State  V.  Pope.  79  S.  C.  87;  =  Adams  Express  CJo.  v.  Com- 
60  S  E  2M;  State  v.  Reillv,  108  monwealth  (Ky.),  92  S.  VV.  932, 
Iowa  735;   78  N.  W.  680.      '  935,    936;    29    Ky.    L.    Rep.    224, 

Such  a  statute  applies  to  trans-       230,  231. 


§562 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


956 


property  of  the  consignee  and  delivers  it  to  him."  Where  a 
statute  prohibits  the  transportation  of  intoxicating  liquors, 
the  mere  carrying  from  a  wholesale  house  to  a  retail  dealer 
in  the  same  town  or  city  is  a  violation  of  its  provisions.''  If 
the  transportation  is  within  the  State,  and  it  is  made  by  a 
common  carrier,  it  is  no  defense  that  the  law  required  the 
carrier  to  carry  the  goods,  for  the  law  does  not  require  the 
performance  of  an  illegal  act."  If  a  statute  is  against  the 
"receiving  for  convej-ance  liquors  unlawfully  sold  or  in- 
tended for  unlawful  sale,"  it  is  an  offense  to  merely  receive 
the  liquors  for  conveyance,  in  case  a  sale  has  been  made,  this 
completing  such  sale,  regardless  of  the  intention  of  the 
carrier."  Where  it  is  ncessary  to  show  that  the  carrier  re- 
ceived the  liquor  to  carry  it  to  a  certain  place  under  a  reason- 
able belief  that  it  was  intended  to  be  sold  in  violation  of  law, 
the  general  reputation  of  the  consignee  as  a  liquor  seller  may 
be  put  in  evidence,  as  M'ell  as  the  discoveries  made  on  a  search 
warrant  for  liquors  at  the  place  of  the  consignee.^''  But  a 
carriage  of  boxes  without  a  knowledge  they  contain  liquors 
does  not  render  the  carrier  liable."  The  carrier  must  act  in 
good  faith,  and  if  it  know  the  liquor  is  contraband  it  will  be 
liable,  though  the  shipper  inform  it  the  box  does  not  contain 
liquors.^- 


0  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  State 
107  Ga.  670;  33  S.  E.  637. 

A  statute  torbidding  "any  com- 
mon carrier  or  person"  carrying 
liquor  into  local  option  territory 
applies  to  an  individual  taking  it 
there.  iState  v.  Reilly,  108  Iowa 
735;  78  X.  W.  680.  But  a  stat- 
ute forbidding  a  railroad  corpora- 
tion or  a  person  or  corporation  reg- 
ularly and  lawfully  conducting  a 
general  express  business  to  carry 
liquors  except  in  vessels  with  cer- 
tain marks  vipon  them,  does  not 
apply  to  a  person  not  conducting 
a.  general  express  business.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Beck,  187  Mass,  15; 
72  N.  E.  357. 


7  State  V.  Campbell,  76  Iowa 
122;  40  N.  W.  100;  Common- 
wealth V.  Walters,  11  Gray  81. 

8  State  V.  Goss,  59  Vt.  266;  9 
Atl.   829. 

9  Commonwealth  v.  Locke,  114 
Mass.  288. 

10  Commonwealth  v.  Harper,  145 
Mass.  100;  13  X.  E.  459. 

11  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  112  S.  W.  577; 
33  Ky.  L.  Rep.  967. 

12  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, supra. 

See  Robert  Porter  Brewing  Co. 
V.  Southern  Express  Co.  (Va.),  63 
S.  E.  6. 


957 


LOCAL    OPTION. 


§  363 


Sec.  563.    Under  what  statutes  prosecutions  to  be  brought. 

Under  what  statutes  prosecutions  for  violation  of  local  option 
laws  are  to  be  brought  the  cases  are  not  at  one  with  each 
other.  In  some  States  it  is  held  that  the  prosecution  may 
be  for  selling  liquor  without  a  license,  since  the  general 
licensing  laws  still  remain  in  force  notwithstanding  they  have 
no  application  to  the  territory  adopting  local  option,  or  the 
prosecution  may  be  brought  for  a  violation  of  the  specific  pro- 
visions of  the  local  option  law,  at  the  election  of  the  prosecu- 
tion.^^ But  in  other  States  it  has  been  held  that  the  local 
option  law  supersedes  the  general  law,  and  prosecutions  must 
be  under  it.^*  As  a  rule,  a  general  local  option  takes  the 
place  of  a  special  local  option  law.^^  If  two  local  option 
elections  have  been  held,  a  prosecution  may  be  maintained 
under  either,  if  both  resulted  in  favor  of  prohibitioin.^°  But 
where  the  local  option  law  provides  no  penalty,  then  prosecu- 
tions under  the  general  liquor  statute  for  a  sale  without  a 
license  may  be  maintained.^' 


*3  Commonwealth  v.  Barbour, 
121  Ky.  689;  89  S.  W.  479;  28  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  433;  Commonwealth  v. 
VVeller,  14  Bush  218;  29  Am.  Rep. 
407;  State  v.  Swanson,  85  Minn. 
112;  88  N.  W.  410;  State  v.  Darl- 
ing, 77  Vt.  67;  58  Atl.  974;  State 
V.  Scampini,  77  Vt.  92;  59  Atl. 
201;  State  v.  Arbes  (Minn),  73  N. 
N.  W.  403 ;  State  v.  Holt,  05  Minn. 
423 ;  72  N.  Y.  700 ;  Swift  v.  State, 
108  Tenn.  610;  69  S.  W.  326; 
Wooten  V.  Commonwealth,  15  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  (abstract)  495;  Wells  v. 
State,  119  Ga.  556;  45  S.  E.  443; 
State  V.  Ely  (S.  D.),  118  X.  W. 
687. 

Instate  V.  Vandenburg  (Miss.). 
28  So.  825;  Edwards  v.  State,  123 
Ga.  542;  51  S.  E.  630;  Stamper 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  103  S.  W. 
286;  31  Ky.  L.  Rep.  707;  Holland 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  547; 
103  S.  W.  631;  Commonwealth  v. 


Anderson,    10    Ky.    L.    Rep.    307; 

Harp  V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  61 

S.  W.  467;   22  Ky.  L.  Rep.   1792; 

Allen    V.    Commonwealth,    10    Ky. 

L.  Rep.    (abstract)   280;  Young  v. 

Commonwealth,     14     Bush,     161; 

Batty  V.  State,  114  Ga.  79;   39  S. 

E.  918;    State  v.  Graves,   135  Mo. 

App.  171;   115  S.  \Y.  1054. 

15  Bailey  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),   64  S.  W.   995;    23   Ky.  L. 

Rep.  1223. 

10  Weathered  v.  State  (Te.K.  Cr. 
App.),  60  S.  W.  876.  But  see 
where  the  precinct  local  option 
was  held  merged  in  the  county  lo- 
cal option.  Roby  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  57  S.  W.  651. 

IT  Green  v.  Commonwealth,  15 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  (abstract)  297.  It 
is  sometimes  expressly  so  provid- 
ed. Pitner  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  268 ;  39  S.  W.  662. 


§564 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


958 


Sec.  564.    Proof  that  local  option  was  in  force. 

Where  courts  do  not  take  notice  whether  or  not  local  option 
has  been  adopted  in  the  territory  where  it  has  been  charged 
the  offense  was  committed,  there  can  be  no  conviction  unless 
the  fact  of  adoption  be  shown.'*  And  mere  proof  by  parol  is 
not  sufficient. '°  The  proof  should  be  made  by  record,  and  when 
this  is  done  the  court  may  charge  the  jury  that  the  law  in  the 
particular  locality  is  in  force.-**  If  the  d<>fendant  claims  that 
the  local  option  law  has  been  repealed  by  vote,  he  has  the 
burden  to  show  that  fact  if  he  desires  to  avail  himself  of  it  as 
a  defense.-^  But  where  a  statute  provides  that  it  shall  be 
presumed  the  law  was  in  force,  unless  that  fact  is  denied  by 
a  plea  filed,  then  no  question  is  presented  in  the  absence  of  a 
plea.--    In  the  absence  of  such  a  statute  the  State  must  prove 


18  Bottoms  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  73  S.  W.  16,  20,  903;  Crad- 
dick  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
385;  88  S.  W.  347;  Allen  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  98  S.  W.  869; 
Armstrong  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  47  S.  VV.  981;  Loveless  v. 
State,  40  Texas  Cr.  App.  221 ;  49 
S.  W.  892;  Nichols  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  87  S.  W.  1072;  27 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1176,  reversing  86  S. 
W.  513;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  690;  Bar- 
ker V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  47 
S.  W.  980;  McGovern  v.  State,  49 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  35;  90  S.  W.  502; 
Ladwig  V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
'585;  51  S.  W.  390;  State  v.  Bol- 
lencbeck,  98  Minn.  480;  108  N.  W. 
3;  Shilling  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  51  S.  W.  240;  Tatum 
V.  Commonwealth  (  Ky. ) ,  59  S.  W. 
32;  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  927;  Davis  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  107  S.  W. 
632,  839. 

laMalone  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  51  S.  W.  381. 

20  Johnson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),    55    S.    W.    968;    Webb   v. 


State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  58  S.  W. 
82;  Segars  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  577;  51  S.  W.  238;  Shilling 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  51  S.  W. 
240;  Carnes  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  437;  103  S.  W.  934;  New- 
bury V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  44 
S.  W.  843;  Benson  v.  State,  39 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  56;  44  S.  W.  167, 
1091;  State  v.  O'Brien,  35  Mont. 
482;  90  Pac.  514;  Wiginton  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  492;  102 
S.  W.  1124;  Neal  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  513;  102  S.  W.  1139; 
Huff  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
441;   102  S.  W.  1144. 

21  Loveless  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  49  S.  W.  601. 

22  Kehoe  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  89  S.  W.  270;  Cantwell  v. 
State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  511;  85 
S.  W.  19;  Powell  v.  State,  50 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  592;  99  S.  W.  1002; 
6nead  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
262 ;  49  S.  VV.  597 ;  Piper  v.  State, 
53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  485;  110  S.  W. 
898;  Bruce  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  53;  39  S,  W.  683;  Harryman 


959 


LOCAL   OPTION. 


§564 


the  adoption  of  local  option  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.-^ 
In  some  States,  however,  the  courts  take  judicial  notice  in 
what  counties  local  option  ?r  prohibition  prevails,  and,  of 
course,  in  such  instances  proof  of  its  adoption  is  not  neces- 
sary.-* And  it  also  will,  when  it  is  proven  to  have  been 
adopted,  take  judicial  notice  how  long  it  will  continue  in 
foree.-^ 


V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  474; 
110  S.  W.  926;  Jordan  v.  State,  37 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  222;  38  S.  W.  780; 
39  S.  W.  110;  Wright  v.  State,  37 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  3;  35  S.  W.  150;  38 
S.  W.  811;  Kelly  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  480;  38  S.  W.  779. 

23  Stick  V.  State,  23  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  Rep.  392.  Contra,  Allen  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  .vpp.),  '59  S.  W. 
264. 

24  State  V.  Arnold,  80  S.  C.  383 ; 
61  S.  E.  891 ;  Crigler  v.  Common- 


wealth, 120  Ky.  512;  87  S.  W. 
276,  ^'BO,  281;  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  918, 
925,  926;  Ball  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  99  S.  VV.  326;  30  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  <iOO ;  Combs  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  104  S.  W.  270;  31  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  822;  Irby  v.  State,  91  Miss. 
542;  44  So.  801;  Bass  v.  State, 
1  Ga.  App.  728,  790;  57  S.  E. 
1054. 

2>  State   V.   Hall,    130   Mo.  App. 
170;    108  S.  W.  1077. 


CHAPTER    XVL 
WHAT  LIQUORS  ARE  PROHIBITED. 


565.  Statutory  provisions. 

566.  Intoxicating    liquors. 

567.  Intoxicating     liquors,      con- 

tinued. 

568.  Spirituous. 

569.  Ale  and  beer — Malt  liquors. 
670.  Wine — Vinous  liquors. 


SECTION. 

571. 

Cider. 

572. 

Fruit    preserved    in    intoxi- 

cating liquors. 

573. 

Drugs  or  medicines. 

574. 

Manufacture. 

575. 

Whether     liquor    is     intoxi- 

cating   a    question    for    tho 

jury. 

Sec.  ,565.     Statutory  provisions. 

It  is  altogether  a  matter  of  statutory  provision  what 
liquors  it  is  illegal  to  sell,  either  without  a  license  or  under  a 
prohibitory  clause.  In  the  earlier  statutes  on  the  subject 
of  licenses  and  sales  without  them  the  term  "intoxicating 
liquors'" was  frequently  used, but  there  soon  came  into  use  the 
words  "spirituous,"  "vinous"  and  "malt"  liquors.  But  as 
new  devices  were  used  to  evade  those  statutes,  the  Legis- 
latures descended  into  details,  specifying  each  particular 
liquor  that  was  prohibited  and  concluding  with  a  general 
term  intended  to  cover  any  liquor  that  had  been  omitted  in 
the  enumeration.  The  English  statute  declares  that  the  term 
intoxicating  liquor  "means  spirits,  wine,  beer,  porter,  cider, 
perry  and  sweets,'^  and  any  fermented,  distilled  or  spirituous 
liquor  which  cannot,  according  to  any  law  for  the  time  in 


1  By  statute  "sweets"  include 
any  liquor  made  by  fermentation 
from  fruit  and  sugar,  or  from  fruit 
and  sugar  mixed  with  another  ma- 
terial, and  which  has  undergone  a 
process  of  fermentation  in  its  man- 
ufacture.    52  and   53   Vict.  c.  42, 


sec.  28.  It  includes  made  wines, 
mead  and  metheglin.  33  and  34 
Vict.  c.  29,  sec.  3 ;  43  and  44  Vict, 
c.  20,  sec.  40.  Cider  includes  perry, 
beer  includes  cider,  and  wine  in- 
cludes sweets.  43  and  44  Vict.  c. 
20,  see.  40 

960 


961  WHAT    LIQUORS    ARE    PROHIBITED.  §  566 

force,  be  legally  sold  without  a  license  from  the  Commissioners 
of  Inland  Revenue."-  By  statute  it  is  also  provided  that 
"any  fermented  liquor  containing  a  greater  proportion  than 
forty  per  cent,  of  proof  spirits  shall  be  deemed  and  taken 
to  be  spirits. ' '  ^'  By  another  statute  the  word  beer  ' '  shall  in 
all  cases  be  deemed  to  include  beer,  ale  and  porter ;  and  the 
word  cider  shall  in  all  cases  be  deemed  to  include  cider  and 
perry."*  By  the  statute  of  1880  beer  "includes  ale,  porter, 
spruce  beer  and  black  beer,  and  any  other  description  of 
beer. ' ' "  These  quotations  in  a  measure  will  show  to  what 
extent  legislation  has  gone. 

Sec.  566.    Intoxicating  liquors. 

Alcohol  when  used  as  a  beverage  is  an  intoxicating  liquor 
within  the  provisions  of  a  statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquor  without  a  license."  It  includes  all  liquids, 
under  whatever  name,  kind  or  quality,  which  are  capable  of 
producing  drunkenness  when  drank  as  a  beverage.^  In  Rhode 
Island,  by  statute,  intoxicating  liquor  is  defined  to  be  any 
liquor  containing  two  per  cent,  of  alcohol.^  In  the  Massachu- 
setts statute  of  1885,  "ale,  porter,  strong  beer,  lager  beer, 
cider,  and  all  wines"  are  considered  intoxicating.®  In  Iowa 
a  statute  defining  intoxicating  liquor  as  a  liquor  containing 
alcohol  includes   a   liquor  containing   alcohol,   however  small 

2  35  and  36  Vict.  c.  94,  §  74.  it.     Leah  v.  Minns,  47  J.  P.   198; 

3  23  and  24  Vict.  c.  27,  §21.  but  since  then  the  act  above  quo- 
British  wine  which  contains  a  ted  was  enacted,  a  license  is  re- 
large  proportion  of  alcohol  is  treat-  quired  for  its  sale.  Howarth  v. 
ed  as  fermented  liquors.  Harris  Minns,  51  J.  P.  7;  56  L.  T.  316. 
V.  Jenns,  22  J.  P.  807;  9  C.  B.  6  Winn  v.  State,  43  Ark.  151. 
(N.  iS.)    152;   30  L.  J.  M.  C.  183;  See  State  v.  Witt,  39  Ark.  216. 

3  L.  T.  408;  9  W.  R.  36.  7  Moore  v.  State,  96  Tenn.  544; 

4  1    Will.   4,    c.   64,   sec.   32;    32       35  S.  W\  556. 

and  33  Vict.,   c.  27,  sec.  2.  8  state  v.  Hughes,  16  R.  I.  403 ; 

5  43    and    44    Vict.    c.    20,    §2;        16  Atl.  911. 

and  48  and  49  Vict.  c.  51,  §  4.     In  It   was   held    that   that   statute 

an  early  decision  it  was  held  that  could  not  be  given  a  retroactive  ef- 

botanic  beer  or  liquor  brewed  from  feet  so  as  to  make  a  liquor  intox- 

sugar   and   water,   though   it  con-  icating  which  was  not  so  formerly, 

tained    two    per    cent,    of    spirit,  9  Commonwealth     v.     Sliea,     14- 

did   not   require   a   license   to   sell  Gray,  386. 


§  567  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  962 

may  be  the  amonnt.'"  In  Alabama  it  is  held  that  "intoxi- 
cating drinks"  are  not  necessarily  "spirituous,  vinous  or 
malt"  liquors.'^  The  mere  fact  that  a  gallon  of  beer  may 
contain  as  much  as  a  pint  of  alcohol  is  not  conclusive  that  it 
is  intoxicating.'-  If  beer  be  classed  by  statute  among  intoxi- 
cating liquors,  then  it  is  error  to  permit  a  witness  to  answer 
the  question  that  if  a  person  would  drink  enough  of  it,  it 
would  intoxicate  him,  though  the  error  is  harmless.^^  Strong 
beer  is  an  intoxicating  liquor."  Lager  beer  has  been  classed  by 
statute  as  an  intoxicating  liquor.^'  A  statute  forbidding  a 
sale  of  a  particular  kind  of  liquor  as  a  beverage,  does  not 
require  the  liffuor  to  be  intoxicating.^** 

Sec.  567.    Intoxicating  liquors,  continued. 

Statutes  requiring  licenses  usually  specifically  designate 
what  liquors  re(iuire  a  license  to  sell  them,  such  as  "spiritu- 
ous, vinous  or  malt  liquors."  When  such  is  the  case  there  is 
little  trouble  on  the  question  whether  the  liquor  sold  is  one 
that  a  license  is  necessary  to  sell  it.  But  many  statutes  in 
the  past  have  simply  used  the  term  "intoxicating  liquor," 
and  this  has  afforded  scope  for  a  large  number  of  decisions 
as  to  what  was  included  therein  by  its  use.  If  the 
liquor  is  intoxicating,  then  the  extent  of  its  intoxicating  effect 
is  not  a  subject  of  inquiry  except  as  incidental  to  a  deter- 
mination whether  or  not  it  is  an  intoxicating  liquor 
within     the     terms     of     the     statute.'"     Evidence     which 

loiState  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors,  from   the   provisions   of   a  statute 

76  Iowa  243;   41   X.  W.    6;    2   L.  forbidding  a  sale  of  strong  beer. 
R.    A.    408.      See    also    Merkle    v.  m  State  v.  Rush,  13  R.  I.  198. 

State,  37  Ala.  139.  le  Merkle  v.  State,  37  Ala.   139. 

11  Roberson  v.   State,    100    Ala.  It   has    been   held    in    Arkansas 
123-   14  So.  869.  that  alcohol  is  neither  ardent  nor 

12  Commonwealtli    v.    Bios,     116  vinous    liquor.      State    v.    Martin, 
Mass.  56.  34   Ark.    340.      See    also   State   v. 

13  Kerkow  v.  Bruer,  15  Neb.  150;  Witt,  39  Ark.  216. 

18  N.  W.  27.  17  Wadsvvorth    v.     Dunam,     117 

i4Rau  V.  People,  63  X.  Y.  277;  Ala.   661;    23   So.   699;    Frickie  v. 

Markle  v.  Akron,  14  Oliio  586.  State,   40   Tex.   Cr.    App.  626;    51 

See  Johnston  v.  State,  23  Ohio  S.  W.  394;  Pike  v.  State,  40  Tex. 

St.  556,    where   ale   was   excepted  Cr.  App.  613;  51  S.  W.  395;  Peo- 


963  WHAT    LIQUORS   ARE    PROHIBITED.  §  567 

shows  that  the  liquor  actually  drank  produced  intoxication 
is  sufifieient  to  support  the  charge  that  it  was  intoxicating ;  ^* 
but  evidence  that  other  liquor  procured  at  another  place  and 
sold  by  the  same  name  produced  intoxication  is  not  sufficient 
to  show  that  the  specific  liquor  sold  was  intoxicating,  when 
the  name  given  it  does  not  import  an  intoxicating  liquor/^ 
So  a  sale  of  peppermint  essence  containing  fifty  per  cent,  of 
alcohol,  although  generally  used  as  a  carminative,  but  which 
may  be  and  is  used  as  a  beverage  to  the  vendor's  knowledge, 
is  an  offense.-"  Under  a  statute  requiring  a  license  for  sale 
of  all  distilled  or  rectified  spirits  or  fermented  or  malt  liquors, 
sales  of  a  liquor  containing  between  .74  per  cent,  and  1.18 
per  cent,  in  volume  of  alcohol  requires  a  license,  especially 
w'here  it  is  intended  as  an  evasion  and  to  defeat  the  statute.'^ 
But  liquor  sold  as  a  beverage  cannot  be  classed  as  intoxi- 
cating where  a  statute  declares  that  the  term  "intoxicating 
liquor"  shall  include  liquors  that  will  produce  intoxication, 
regardless  of  the  percentage  of  alcohol  it  contains,  for  the 
percentage  may  be  so  small  as  to  not  produce  intoxication.-^ 
Where  intoxicating  liquors  are  declared  by  statute  to  include 
any  malt  liquor,  then  proof  of  a  sale  of  beer  shows  a  violation 

pie   V.    Cox,   45   N.   Y.   Misc.   Rep.  i9  Kemp     v.     State      (Tex.     Cr. 

311;   92  N.  Y.   Supp.   125;   Goode  App,),    38    S.    W.    937     (Hughes' 

V.  State,  87  Miss.  618;  40  So.  12;  Lemon  Ginger)  ;    Malone  v.  State 

Greiner-Kelly    Drug    Co.    v.    Tru-  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  51  S.  W.  381. 

€tt  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  75  S.  W.  536.  20  state  v.  Kezer,  74  Vt.  50;  52 

isFricke   v.   State,   40   Tex.   Cr.  Atl.    116. 

App.  626;   51   S.  W.  394;   Pike  v.  21  People  v.  Cox,  106  N.  Y.  App. 

State,   40   Tex.    Cr.   App.   613;    51  Div.    299;    94   N.    Y.    Supp.    526; 

S.   W.  395;   Baker   v.  State    (Tex.  affirming  45  N".  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  311; 

'Cr.  App.),  47  S.  W.  980;  State  v.  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  125;   State  v.  Cal- 

Good,   56   W.   Va.    215;    49   S.    E.  vin,    127    Iowa    632;     103    N.    W. 

121;  State  V.  Reynolds  (Kan.),  47  068;      Locke      v.      Commonwealth 

Pac.  573;  Taylor  v.  State,  44  Tex.  (Ky.),   74   S.  W.   654;   25   Ky.  L. 

Cr.  App.  437;  72  S.  W.  181;  Mat-  Rep.   76;    United  'States   v.   Cohn, 

kin&  V.  State    (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  62  52  S.  VV.  38;  State  v.  Morehead,  22 

S.    W.    911;     McDaniel     v.     State  R.   I.   272;    47   Atl.   545;   State  v. 

(Tex.   Cr.  App.),  65  S.   W.   1068;  Gillispie,   63    W.    Va.    152;    59    S. 

kerr   v.   'State,    63    Neb.    115;    88  E.  957. 

JSr.  W.  240.  22  state  v.  Virgo,  14  N.  D.  293; 

103  N.  W.  610. 


§567 


TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


964 


of  the  statute.^'  Blackberry  cordial,  if  intoxicating,  is  pro- 
hibited,-* and  so  is  Jamaica  ginger.-'^  Whether  or  not  "hop- 
ale"  or  "hop- jack"  is  intoxicating  is  a  question  for  the 
jury.-*'  If  a  statute  provides  that  the  sale  of  liquor  contain- 
ing a  certain  per  cent,  of  alcohol  shall  not  be  made  without  a 
license,  it  is  immaterial  whether  or  not  it  is  intoxicating.-" 
Peach  brandy  is  an  intoxicating  li()uor,  and  the  jury  may  be 
so  told.-^  If  a  li(iu()r  may  be  drank  in  such  quantities  as  prac- 
tically not  to  produce  intoxication,  then  it  cannot  be  classed 
as  an  intoxicating  liquor;  but  it  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  say 
to  the  jury  that  "if  drank  in  reasonable  quantities"  it  would 
not  produce  intoxication  it  cannot  be  classed  as  an  intoxi- 
cating liquor.-"  Under  a  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
alcohol  it  is  immaterial  that  it  is  not  intoxicating.^"  Liquor 
which  requires  the  drinking  of  excessive  quantities  in  order  to 
produce  intoxication  is  not  usually  classed  as  intoxicating 
liquors.''^     If  a  statute  provides   for  the  licensed  sale  of   a 


23  Douglass  V.  State.  21  Ind. 
App.  302;  52  N.  E.  238;  State  v. 
Besheer,  69  Mo.  App  72;  State  v. 
Currie,  8  N.  D.  545;  80  N.  W. 
475;  'Cullinan  v.  McGovern,  94  N. 
Y.  Supp.  525;  Williams  v.  'State, 
72  Ark.   19;   77   S.  W.   597. 

2*  Pike  V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
613;  '51  S.  W.  395. 

25  Mitchell  V.  Commonwealth, 
100  Ky.  002;  51  S.  W.  17;  21  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  222. 

-6  Daniel  v.  State,  149  Ala.  44; 
43  So.  22;  Rutherford  v.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  431;  88  S.  W.  810; 
Costello  V.  State,  130  Ala.  143; 
30  So.  376. 

27  State  V.  York,  74  N.  H.  125; 
65   Atl.  685. 

It  includes  cider.  Common- 
wealth V.  McGrath,  185  Mass.  1 ; 
69  X.  E.  340;  Commonwealth  v. 
Wenzel,  24  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  467; 
Eaves  v.  State,  113  Ga.  749;  39 
S.  E.  318. 


See  also  People  v.  Cox,  45  N.  \. 
Misc.  Rep.  311;  92  N.  Y.  Supp. 
125. 

2'*  Howell  V.  State,  124  Ga.  698; 
52  S.  E.  649;  fereiner- Kelly  Drug 
Co.  V.  Truett  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  75 
8.  W.  536. 

29  Murray  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  128;  79  S.  W.  568;  Fawcett 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  73  S. 
W.  807 ;  Racer  v.  State  ( Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  73  ,S.  W.  807. 

30  Commonwealth  v.  Wenzel,  24 
Pa.  Super.  €t.   467. 

31  State  V.  Reynolds  (Kan. 
App.),  47  Pac.  573;  Mason  v. 
State,  1  Ga.  App.  534;  58  S.  E. 
139;  Davis  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  393;  37  S.  W.  435;  Hewitt 
V.  People  (111.),  57  X.  E.  1077, 
affirming  87  111.  App.  367;  Malone 
V.  State  (Tex.),  51  S.  W.  381; 
State  v.  Parker,  139  X.  C.  586;  51 
S.  E.  1028;  Walker  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  98  S.  W.  265;   Heint^s 


965 


WHAT    LIQUORS    ARE    PROHIBITED. 


§568 


particular  liquor,  its  sale  is  legal  though  intoxicating,  and 
although  a  statute  forbids  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.^- 
A  sale  of  liquor  that  contains  a  mere  "trace"  of  alcohol  is 
not  an  intoxicating  liquor.^''  If  the  liquor  be  intoxicating,  it 
is  immaterial  that  the  vendor  sold  it  as  a  medicine ;  ^*  but  if 
it  be  doubtful  whether  the  liquor  sold  can  be  used  as  a  bev- 
erage, and  it  has  never  been  so  used,  its  sale  is  not  a  violation 
of  the  statute.^^  The  fact  that  the  seller  believed  the  liquor 
he  sold  was  not  intoxicating,  and  that  he  purchased  it  as 
such,  is  no  defense.^'' 

Sec.  568.     Spirituous. 

Spirituous  liquors  mean  distilled  and  fermented  liquors 
under  the  Tennessee  code,^'  and  wine  and  ale ;  ^^  and  in 
Pennsylvania  it  need  not  be  intoxicating.^"  In  North  Carolina 
it  includes  wine  and  beer.*°  Under  the  Mississippi  Act  of  1842 
neither  alcohol  nor  wine  was  a  spirituous  liquor."  "Spiritu- 
ous liquors"  does  not  include  beer,*^  but  if  beer  be  mixed  with 


V.  LcPage,  100  Me.  542;  62  Atl. 
605;  Henderson  v.  State,  49  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  269;  91  S.  W.  569. 

32  Armour  v.  Mpridian  ('Miss.), 
24  So.  533. 

In  Georgia  in  1901  native  wine 
could  not  be  sold.  Hancock  v. 
State,  114  Ga.  439;   40  S.  E.  317. 

33  State  V.  Parker,  139  N.  C. 
686;  51  S.  E.  1028. 

Othei-wise  if  slightly  intoxicat- 
ing. Queen  v.  McDonald,  24  Nov. 
Sco.  45. 

34Colwell  V.  State,  112  Ga.  75; 
37  S.  E.  129. 

35  Mackall  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 16  App.  D.  C.  301. 

A  malt  tonic,  not  intoxicating, 
may  be  sold  in  a  prohibition  dis- 
trict. Reisenberg  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  84  S.  W.  585. 

Where  a  liquid  was  shown  to 
contain  one  ounce  of  alcohol  in 
every  four  ounces  it  was  treated 


as  a  wine,  though  there  was  no 
statutory  definition  of  wine.  Har- 
ris V.  Jenns,  9  C.  B.  (N  S.),  152; 
30  L.  J.  M.  C.  183;  3  L.  T.  408; 
9  W.  L.  36. 

36  Bascot  V.  State  ( Miss. ) ,  48 
So.  228;  Cotton  v.  State  (Tex.), 
120  S.  W.  432;  Ware  v.  State 
(Ga.),  65  S.  E.  333,  But  see  Dead- 
wilier  V.  State  (Tex.),  121  S.  W. 
864. 

37  Fritz  V.  State,  1  Baxt.  15. 

38  State  V.  Sharrer,  2  Coldvv. 
323. 

39  Commonwealth  v.  Reyburg, 
122  Pa.  299;  16  Atl.  351;  23  W. 
X.  C.   151;   2  L.  R.  A.  415. 

40  State  v.  Gierseh,  98  N.  C.  720; 
4  S.  E.  193. 

41  Lemly  v.  State,  70  Miss.  241 ; 
12  So.  22;  20  L.  R.  A.  645. 

4.:  Tinker  v.  State,  90  Ala.  647 ; 
8  So.  855;  State  v.  Brindle,  28 
Iowa  512. 


§500 


aRAI-'FIC    fiV    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


960 


spirituous  liquors,  and  sold  as  beer,  a  sale  of  the  mixture  is  a 
violation  of  the  statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  spirituous 
liquors,*^ 

Sec.  569.    Ale  and  beer — Malt  liquors. 

Under  a  statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  malt  liquors  there 
may  be  a  conviction  on  proof  of  a  sale  of  beer.**  Beer  is 
neither  a  spirituous  nor  a  vinous  liquor ;  *^  but  a  sale  of 
spirituous  liquor  with  which  beer  has  been  mixed  is  covered 
by  a  charge  of  a  sale  of  spirituous  liciuors.**"'  Strong  liquor 
covers  a  sale  of  strong  beer,'^  but  not  ale.***  Where  a  statute, 
without  defining  beer  gave  a  city  power  to  prohibit  its  sale, 
and  the  city  adopted  an  ordinance  in  the  terms  of  the  statute, 
it  was  held  that  the  beer  sold  need  not  be  intoxicating  to 
constitute  a  sale  a  violation  of  the  ordinance.*"  But  in  this 
same  State  it  has  been  held  not  sufficient  to  merely  charge  a 
sale   of   beer   without   alleging   it    was    intoxicating. '^^     If    a 


^"' Commonwealth  v.  Bathwick, 
a  Cush.  247. 

A  city  charter  provided  for  an 
election  to  determine  the  question 
of  license  or  no  license  for  the  re- 
tailing of  spirituous,  vinous  or 
malt  liquors.  That  section  of  the 
•charter  making  it  the  duty  of  the 
town  trustees  to  grant  licenses  in 
the  event  of  a  majority  of  the 
votes  was  cast  in  favor  of  a  li- 
cense omitted  the  word  "spiritu- 
ous." It  was  held  that  the  omis- 
sion of  this  word  was  evidently  a 
mistake,  and  that  the  trustees 
were  not  confined  merely  to  the 
licensing  of  vinous  or  malt  liquors. 
Caldwell  v.  Grimes,  7  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
(abstract)    601. 

44Adler  v.  State,  55  Ala.  16; 
Watson  V.  State,  55  Ala.  158; 
State  V.  Lemp,  16  Mo.  380;  State 
V.  Rush,  13  R.  T.  108. 

45  Tinker  v.  State,  00  Ala.  647; 


8    So.    855;    State    v.    Brindle,    28 
Iowa  512. 

46  Commonwealth  v.  Bathrick,  6 
Cush.  247;  Walker  v.  Prescott, 
44  X.  H.  511. 

47  Nevin  v.  Ladue,  3  Denio  43, 
437;  1  Code  Rep.  43;  People  v. 
Wheelock,  3  Park.  Cr.  Rep.  9; 
Tompkins  Co.  v.  Taylor,  21  N.  Y. 
173;  19  Plow.  Pr.  2-59;  People  v. 
Hawley,    3    Mich.    330. 

48  People  V.  Crilley,  20  Barb. 
246;  Cayuga  Co.  v.  Freoff,  17 
How.  Pr.  442;  Contra,  Tompkins 
Co.  V.  Taylor,  21  N.  Y.  173;  19 
How.    Pr.    259. 

49  Kettering  v.  Jacksonville,  50 
111.    39. 

As  to  "near"  beer,  see  Campbell 
V.  Thomasville  (Ga.),  64  S.  E. 
815. 

50  Hansberg  v.  People,  120  111. 
1;  8  N.  E.  857;  60  Am.  Rep. 
549. 


967  WHAT   LIQUORS    ARE   PROHIBITED.  §§  570,  571 

statute  prohibits  the  sale  of  malt  liquors  it  is  immaterial  that 
they  are  not  intoxicating.^^ 


Sec.  570.    Wine — Vinous  liquors. 

A  statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  vinous  liquor  means  a 
liquor  made  from  the  juice  of  the  grape.^-  It  is  an  intoxi- 
cating ^^  or  spirituous  liquor.^*  Blackberry  wine  is  an  alcoholic 
liquor.^^  Under  a  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  vinous  liquors 
the  wine  sold  need  not  be  intoxicating  to  violate  its  provi- 
sions."^ Beer  is  not  a  vinous  liquor,  and  a  statute  forbidding 
the  sale  of  vinous  liquors  does  not  include  beer,*^^  nor  alcohol.^^ 

Sec.  571.     Cider. 

Under  a  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  "alcohol,  or  any 
spirituous,  ardent,  vinous,  malt  or  fermented  liquor,"  fer- 
mented cider,  being  an  alcoholic  beverage,  cannot  be  sold.^® 
But  cider  does  not  come  under  the  terms  of  a  statute  pre- 
venting the  sale  of  spirituous,  malt  or  vinous  liquor,®"  but 
it  does  under  one  preventing  a  sale  of  "all  intoxicating  liquors 


51  State    V.    O'Connell,    99    Me.  120  Pa.  395;    14   Atl.   151. 

Gl;   58  Atl.  59;   Dinkins  v.  State,  "Tinker  v.  State,  90  Ala.  647; 

149    Ala.  49;    43  So.   114;    Langel  8    So.    855;    State    v.    Brindle,    28 

V.    Bushnell,    197    111.    20;    63    N.  Iowa  512. 

E.    1086,    affirming    96    111.    App.  bs  Lemly  v.  State,  70  Miss.  241 ; 

618;    Lambie    v.    State,    151    Ala.  12  So.  22;  20  L.  R.  A.  645. 

86;  44  So.  51;  Markle  v.  State,  37  A  statute   permitting  a  sale  of 

Ala.    169.  native    wine    made    in    the   State 

52  Adler  v.  State,  55  Ala.   16.  means    wine    made    in    the    State 

53  Wolf  V.  State,  59  Ark.  297 ;  and  not  wine  made  in  any  other 
27  S.  W.  77;  43  Am.  St.  34;  State  State  or  country.  Commonwealth 
V.  Page,  66  Me.  418.  v.    Petranich,    183    Mass.   217;    66 

5*  State     V.     Moore,    5     Blackf.  N.  E.  807. 

1  IS ;   Jones  v.  Surprise,  64  N.  H.  59  Eureka    Vinegar    Co.    v.    Ga- 

243;    9  Atl.  384.  zette    Printing  -Co.,    35    Fed.    570; 

Contra,     Caswell     v.     State,     2  People   v.    Foster,   64    Mich.    715; 

Humph.  402.  31   N.  W.  596;   Commonwealth  v. 

55  Reyfelt    v.    State,     73      Mi.^s.  llue.^e,  1  Wilcox   (Pa.,!,  253. 

415;    18  So.   925.  eo  Feldman      v.      Morrison,       1 

58  Hatfield     v.      Commonwealth,  Bradw.    (111.),  460. 


§572 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


968 


whatevpr,""^  and  especially  "hard  cider,"  which  the  court 
takes  judicial  notice  that  it  is  intoxicating.'-  Under  a  statute 
prohibiting  a  sale  of  "cider  or  fermented  liquor"  is  included 
any  cider,  whether  fermented  or  not ; ""  l)ut  one  prohibiting  the 
sale  of  "spirituous  liquors,  wine,  porter,  ale,  or  beer,  or  any 
drink  of  like  nature,"  has  been  held  not  to  cover  crab  eider 
or  cider."*     Cider  made  from  grapes  is  a  fermented  liquor.*'' 


Sec.  572.     Fruit  preserved  in   intoxicating   liquors. 

The  sale  of  a  bottle  containing  six  peaches  and  one  gill  of 
brandy  to  preserve  the  peaches  does  not  come  within  the  pro- 
visions of  a  statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors ;  ••"  nor  does  extract  of  lemon  though  it  may  produce 
intoxication."^  But  whether  or  not  brandied  cherries  was  a 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  was  deemed  a  question  of  fact, 
and  if  sold  in  a  bottle  containing  liquor  that  could  be  drunk 
and  would  intoxicate,  then  an  offense  against  the  statute  was 
committed."^ 


61  state  V.  Hutchinson,  72  Iowa 
561;    34  N.  W.  421;   State  v.  Mc- 
Namara,    69    Me.     1.33;    State    v. 
Roach,     75     Me.     123;     Common- 
wealth V.  Dean,  14  Gray  99;   Her- 
tel    V.    People,    78    111.    App.    109; 
State   V.  Robinson,   61    S.  C.    lOG; 
39    S.    E.    247;    Commonwealth   v. 
Mahoney,    152    Mass.    493;    25   N. 
E.  833;  State  v.  Crawley,  75  Miss. 
919;   23  So.  '625;   State  v.   White, 
72  Vt.  108;   47  Atl.  397;   State  v. 
Thornburn,    75    Vt.     18;     52    Atl. 
1039;   Matkins  v.  State    (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),    58    S.    W.    108;    Common- 
wealth V.  McGrath,   185  Mass.   1; 
■69   N.   E.    340;    Hewitt   v.    People 
(111.),  57  X.  E.  1077,  affirming  87 
111.    App.    367;    Matkins   v.    State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.)  ;   62  S.  W.  911. 

Contra,    Guptill    v.    Richardson, 
62  Me.   257. 

62  State  V.  bchaefer,  44  Kan.  90 ; 
24  Pac.  92. 


63  State  V.  Spanieling,  61  Vt. 
505;    17  Atl.  844. 

64  State  V.  Oliver,  2G  W.  Va. 
422;   53  Am.  Rep.   79. 

<i^  Barker  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  47   S.   \V.   980. 

Under  its  general  welfare  clause 
a  town  has  power  to  impose  a  li- 
cense tax  on  persons  selling  cider, 
as  cider  to  some  extent  is  intox- 
icating. Pikeville  v.  Huffman,  112 
Ky.  360;  65  S.  W.  794;  23  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  1692. 

ceRabe  v.   State,  39  Ark.  20. 

G7  Holcomb  V.  People,  49  111. 
App.    73. 

esPetteway  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  97;  35  S.  W.  64€;  Royal 
V.  State,  78  Ala.  410;  United 
States  V.  Stafford,  120  Fed.  720; 
Musick  V.  State,  51  Ark.  165;  10 
S.  W.  225. 


969 


Y/HAT    LIQUORS    ARE    PROHIBITED. 


§573 


Sec.  573.    Drugs  or  medicines. 

Whisky  cannot  be  classed  as  a  medicine  in  order  to  escape 
the  penalty  for  an  unlawful  sale.««     If  a  liquid  is  primarily 
intended  and  used  as  a  medicine  and  not  as  a  beverage,  and 
it  contains  medicinal  properties  rather  than  such  properties 
as  prevail  in  liquor  drank  as  a  beverage,  then  the  sale  is  not 
illegal  unless  some  statute  specifically  makes  it  so.'°     Thus, 
lemon  ginger  and  Empire  Tonic  Bitters,  shown  to  be  one- 
third  alcohol  and  the  remainder  distilled  water  and  extracts 
from  herbs,  and  no  more  alcohol  was  used  in  the  preparation 
than  was  necessary  to  preserve  the  herbs,  were  held  not  to 
come  within  the  provisions  of  the   statute  when  sold   as   a 
medicine.^'     But  if  the  article  may  be  used  as  an  intoxicating 
beverage,  it  is  a  violation  of  the  statute  to  sell  it."     Yet  if 
the  liquor  cannot  be  used  as  an  intoxicating  beverage,  and 
the  alcohol  is  a  necessary  preservative  for  the  herbs,  then  no 
offense  is  committed  by  its  saleJ^    Under  a  statute  making  it 
unlawful  to  manufacture  "any  intoxicating  decoction,  mix- 

a  sale  of  half  pint  bottle  of  rock 
candy,  ginger,  glycerine  and  whis- 
ky in  equal  parts  is  in  violation  of 
its  provisions.  State  v.  Sharpe, 
119  Mo.  App.  386;   95   S.  W.  298. 

72  Carl  V.  State,  87  Ala.  17; 
6  ,So.  118;  4  L.  R.  A.  380;  Carl 
V.  State,  89  Ala.  93;  8  So.  156; 
Davis  V.  State,  50  Ark.  17;  6  S. 
W.  388;  Heintz  v.  Le  Page,  100 
Me.  542;  62  Atl.  605;  Colwell  v. 
State,  112  Ga.  75;  37  S.  E.  129; 
State  V.  Reynolds,  5  Kan.  App. 
515;    47    Pac.    573. 

73  Carl  V.  (State,  87  Ala.  17;  6 
So.  18;  4  L.  R.  A.  3S0;  Carl  v. 
State,  89  Ala.  93;  8  So.  156; 
Davis  V.  State,  50  Ark.  17;  6  S. 
W.  388;  Russell  v.  State,  33  Vt. 
656;  Kincaid  v.  State,  49  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  303;  02  S.  W.  415;  State 
V.  Williams,  14  N.  D.  411;  104 
N.  W.  546;  State  v.  Krinski, 
78  Vt.  162;  62  Atl.  37. 


09  Gault  V.  State,  34  Ga.  533. 

70  United  States  v.  iStubblefield, 
40   Fed.   454;    State   v.   Williams, 
14    N.    D.    411;    104    N.    W.    646; 
Carl   V.   State,   87   Ala.   17;    6   So. 
118;    4   L.    R.    A.    380;    Goode   v. 
iState,  87   Miss.    495;    40   So.    12; 
Carl  V.   State,   89   Ala.   93;    8  So. 
156;   Chven  v.  Armstrong,  13  Juta 
408 ;  Russell  v.  Gloan,  33  Vt.  656 ; 
State  V.   Krinski,  78  Vt.   162;   62 
Atl.   37;    State   v.    Skillicorn,    104 
Iowa  97;   73  N.  W.  503;   Bradley 
V.   State,    121    Ga.   201;    48   S.   E. 
■891;    Walker    v.   'State    (Tex.   Cr. 
App.),    98    S.    W.    265;    State   v. 
Costa    (Conn.).  62  Atl.  38;   State 
V.  Gregory,   110  Iowa  624;   82  N. 
W.    335;    Chapman    v.   State,    100 
Ga.  311;   27  S.  E.  789. 

71  United  States  v.  Stubblefield, 
40  Fed.  454. 

Where  a  statute  forbids  a  drug- 
gist   to    sell    intoxicating    liquors, 


§  573  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  970 

ture,  compound  or  bitters  whatever,  in  any  quantity  or  for 
any  use  or  purpose"  within  a  certain  district,  a  decoction 
sold  as  a  medicine  which  contained  sufficient  alcohol  to  in- 
toxicate a  person  drinking  it  was  held  prohibited/*  Even 
though  only  an  immoderate  use  of  it  is  necessary  to  produce 
intoxication,  its  manufacture  or  sale  is  prohibited.'^^  Thus, 
a  sale  of  a  "cordial"  containing  twenty-two  per  cent,  of 
alcohol  is  a  violation  of  the  statute/"  But  in  determining 
whether  the  sale  of  a  particular  liquor  is  prohibited  by  the 
liquor  statutes  it  must  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  these 
statutes  do  not  prevent  the  sale  of  medicines/^  Thus,  under 
a  statute  defining  intoxicating  liquors  as  "all  liquors  and 
mixtures,  by  whatever  name  called,  that  will  produce  intoxi- 
cation," it  w^as  held  that  medicines  and  toilet  articles  not 
ordinarily  used  as  beverages  did  not  come  within  its  provi- 
sions. Such  was  said  to  be  tincture  of  gentian,  bay  rum  and 
essence  of  lemon.  But  Avhether  it  embraced  "Sherman's 
Prickly  Ash  Bitters,"  and  "iMcLean's  Strengthening  Cordial 
and  Blood  Purifier  "^ — the  latter  composed  of  whisky,  syrup 
of  tulu,  and  syrup  of  wild  cherry — was  held  to  be  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury.'^^  A  statute  may,  however,  be  so  j^ositive 
in  its  terms  as  to  absolutely  prohibit  the  sale  of  medicinal 
preparations,"^  and  the  fact  that  the  United  States  revenue  laws 
require  no  license  for  their  sale  or  manufacture 
is  no  defense.'*''  ]\Iedieated  bitters  producing  intoxi- 
cation are  such  intoxicating  liquors  as  a  constitu- 
tional provision  declares  that  the  liCgislature  "shall 
enact  a  law  whereby  the  qualified  voters  of  any 
county     *     *     *     jiiay  determine  whether  the  sale  of  intoxi- 

TiCompton    V.    Stata,    95    Ala.  Kan,  751 ;  37  Am.  Rep.  284;  State 

25;  11  So.  69.  v.  Oregory,   110   Iowa  624;   82  N. 

See  State  v.  Costa    (Conn.),  62  W.    335;    Mason    v.    State,    1    Ga. 

Atl.  38.  App.  534;    58  S.   E.  139. 

TsWodsworth     v.     Dunnam,     98  t9  state  v.  Lillard,  78  Mo.   136; 

Ala.  610;    13  Sa.  597.  State    v.     Wilson,     80    Mo.    303; 

76Gostorf  V.  State,  39  Ark.  450.  State   v.  Neese,   3S  S.  C.   261;    16 

77  Davis  V.  State,  50  Ark.  17;  6  S.  E.  893;   Bradshaw  v.  State,  76 

S.  W.  388.  Ark.  562;  89  S.  W.  1051. 

78 /»  re  Intoxicating  Liquors,  25  so  State  v.  Lillard,  78  Mo.   136. 


971 


WHAT    LIQUORS    ARE   PROHIBITED. 


§573 


eating  liquors  shall  be  prohibited"  thorein.^^  Wliere  a 
statute  prohibited  the  sale  of  all  mixtures  "known  as  bitters 
or  otherwise,  which  will  produce  intoxication,"  a  sale  of  gmm 
camphor  and  alcohol,  mixed  by  the  vendor  and  sold  as  a  medi- 
cine is  not  prohibited.**-  If  the  sale  be  le^^al,  no  act  of  the 
purchaser  can  render  it  illegal.  Thus,  Avhere  liquor  was  law- 
fully sold  as  a  medicine  and  in  the  condition  in  which  it  was 
sold  it  could  not  be  used  as  a  beverage,  and  the  purchaser 
mixed  it  with  water,  and  in  that  condition  drank  it  as  a  bev- 
erage, it  was  held  that  the  seller  had  committed  no  offense.^" 
The  sale  of  a  non-intoxicant  malt  tonic  is  not  an  offense." 
A  sale  of  an  article  as  medicine,  made  in  good  faith,  under  a 
belief  that  it  is  a  medicine,  is  usually  a  good  defense;®^  and 
if  it  be  doubtful  whether  the  liquor  sold  could  be  used  as  a 
beverage  there  must  be  an  acquittal.**^  If  the  sale  was  other- 
M'ise  legal  when  made,  the  fact  that  the  compound  separated 
when  left  standing  for  a  while,  and  the  alcohol  could  be 
drained  off  and  drank,  does  not  make  the  sale  an  infringement 
of  the  statute.®'^ 


81  James  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
353;    17    S.  W.  422. 

82  State  V.  Haymond,  20  W.  Va. 
18;   43  Am.  Rep.  787. 

83  Bertrand  v.  State,  73  Miss. 
51;  18  So.  545;  Walker  v.  Daily, 
101   111.  App.   575. 

8*  Reisenberg  v.  State  ( Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  84  S.  W.  585;  Ex  parte 
Gray  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  83  S.  W. 
628. 

85  Goode  V.  State,  87  Miss.  495 ; 
40  So.  12;  Murry  v.  State,  46  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  128;  79  S.  W.  '568; 
Walker  v.  Daily,  101  111.  App.  575. 

Contra,  Colwell  v.  State,  112  Ga. 
75;   37  S.  E.   129. 

86  Mackall  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 16  App.  D.  C.  301;  State  v. 
Costa   (Conn.),  62  Atl.  38. 

A  statute  forbade  the  sale,  with- 
out a  license,  of  "any  vinous,  spir- 


ituous or  malt  liquors,  wine,  rum, 
gin,  brandy  or  other  ardent  spir- 
its, or  any  composition  of  which 
any  of  the  said  liquors  shall  form 
the  chief  ingredient,  except  as 
such  as  shall  be  compounded,  by  a 
less  measure  than  a  quart."  It 
was  held  that  the  exception  in 
the  statute  related  only  to  com- 
positions of  which  one  or  more  of 
the  liquors  specified  in  the  earlier 
part  of  the  section  formed  its 
chief  ingredient.  State  v.  Marks, 
m  N.  J.  L.  84 ;  46  Atl.  757 ;  State 
V.  Terry,  73  N.  J.  L.  554;  64  Atl. 
113,  affirming  72  N.  J.  L.  375; 
61   Atl.   148. 

87  Parker  v.  State,  31  Ind.  App. 
050;  68  N.  E.  912. 

On  trial  for  a  sale  of  Peruna, 
it  has  been  held  that  the  defend- 
ant cannot  escape  by  showing  the 


§§  574,  575        TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 


972 


Sec.  574.    Manufacture. 

A  statute  prohibiting  the  manufacture  of  intoxicating 
liquor  applies  to  one  distilling  such  liquor  for  his  own  use, 
as  cider  brandy.*^  Where  a  statute  prohibited  a  distillation 
of  spirituous  liquors  from  corn,  beer  made  of  com  obtained 
by  running  it  through  the  process  of  distillation  once  is  a 
violation  of  its  provisions.*®  Statutes  of  this  kind  apply  both 
to  oorporations  and  individuals."" 

Sec.  575.  Whether  liquor  is  intoxicating  a  question  for 
the  jury. 
Whether  or  not  liquor  is  intoxicating,  when  the  statute 
does  not  define  what  shall  be  deemed  an  intoxicating  liquor, 
is  a  question  for  the  jury  under  the  evidence,  and  if  there  be 
a  reasonable  doubt  on  the  question,  the  defendant  must  be 
acquitted;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  so  charge  the 
jury."^  The  burden  is  on  the  State  to  show  that  the  liquor 
was  intoxicating,"-  and  an  instruction  wiien  the  evidence  is 
conflicting,  as  to  whether  the  liquor  sold  was  intoxicating, 
and  defining  "intoxicating  liquor"  should  be  given  the  jury."^ 

sale  was  made  in  good  faith  and  si  Rutherford   v.    State,  48  Tex. 

in  the  honest  belief  it  was  to  be  Cr.  App.  431;  88  S.  W.  810;  State 

used    as    a    medicine.       Stelle    v.  v.    Piche,    98    Me.    348;     56    Atl. 

State    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  92  S.   W.  1052;  State  v.  Bussamus,  108  Iowa 

530.  11;     78     N.     W.     700;     State     v. 

If  the   intoxication  is  produced  Wold,  96   Me.    401;    52   Atl.   909; 

by   the   drugs    in    the    liquor    and  Commonwealth  v.  Beldham,  15  Pa. 

not   by    the   liquor,   no    offense    is  Super  Ct.  33. 

committed     in    making    the    sale.  9-  Rutherford  v.   State,   48   Tex. 

Pcarce  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  Cr.  App.  431;  88  S.  W.  SIO;   Hall 

352;  88  S.  W.  234.  v.    State,    122   Ga.    142;    50   S.    E. 

88  State  V.  Lovell,  47  Vt.  493.  59. 

?9  State    V.    Summey,   60    N.    C.  93  Uloth    v.    State,    48    Tex.    Cr. 

496.  App.    295;    87    S.    W.    822;    Hen- 

But   one   who   leases   his    distill  drick   v.   State,   47   Tex.    Cr.   App. 

house  and  has  no  interest   in  the  371;    83    S.    W.    711. 

liquor    distilled,    does    not   violate  But  not  when  it  is  alcohol.     Se- 

the  statute.     Ibid.  bastian  v.  State,  44  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

90  Commonwealth  v.  Certain  In-  508 ;  72  S.  W.  849. 
toxicating  Liquors,  115  Mass,  153. 


973  WHAT    LIQUORS   ARE    PROHIBITED.  §  575 

If  the  defendant  claims  that  the  sale  was  of  eider  made  of 
the  juice  of  grapes   (scuppernong,  in  this  instance),  Ijut  a 
witness  testifies  it  was  wine  and  was  intoxicating,  the  court 
cannot  say  to  the  jury  that  the  court  judicially  knows  such 
wine  is  an  intoxicating  liquor,  but  miLst  leave  the  question 
for  the  jury  to  determine.'-**     But  under  a  statute  defining 
"intoxicating  liquor"  to  mean  alcohol  and  all  other  intoxi- 
cating liquors  whatever,  that  will  produce  intoxication,  it  is 
error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  any  liquor  which  contains  any 
percentage  of  alcohol  is  an  intoxicating  liquor  when  sold  as 
a  beverage."''     The  court  cannot  say  to  the  jury  that  liquor 
containing  three  per  cent,  and  over  of  alcohol  is  intoxicating 
and  that  liquor  containing  less  than  that  is  not  intoxicating."*' 
The  court  should  not  instruct  that  the  liquor  sold  must  have 
produced  intoxication.     The  only  question  at  issue  is  whether 
or  not  it  was  intoxicating."'     If  a  statute  prohibits  the  sale 
of  malt  liquors  it  is  immaterial  whether  or  not  it  is  intoxi- 
cating, and  the  jury  may  be  instructed  that  they  need  only 
"consider  the  evidence  as  to  whether  the  liquor  was  intoxi- 
cating in  determining  whether  it  was  a  malt  liquor.""^    It  is 
error  to  charge  that  all  lager  beer  is  intoxicating  where  the 
evidence  shows  the  beer  sold  contained  not  to  exceed  two  per 
cent,  alcohol  and  it  would  not  intoxicate.""     The  court  may 
instruct  the   jury  that  whisky   is  intoxicating.'     The  court 
may  tell  the  jury  that  if  there  be  a  reasonable  doubt  whether 
the  liquor  sold  contained  sufficient  alcohol  to  intoxicate  they 
must  acquit.- 

94  Hall   V.    State,    122   Ga.    142;  99  Eaves  v.  State,   113  Ga.  749; 
60  S.   E.   59.  39    S.   E.    318;    Crawford  v.   Sate, 

95  State  V.  Virgo,   14  K  D.  29;  (59  Ark.  360;  63   S.  W.  801;   Cos- 
103  N.  W.  610.     °  tello   v.    State,    130   Ala.    143;    30 

90  State   V.   Piclie,   98   Mo.   348 ;  So.  376. 

56   Atl.    1052;    State   v.   Page,    60  i  Douthitt    v.    State     (Tex.     C'r. 

Me.   418;    Commonwealth  v.   Bios,  App.),  61    S.  W.   404. 

116  Mass.  56.  2  Bailey     v.     State      (Tex.     Cr. 

oTMatkins   v.   State     (Tex.     Cr.  App.),    60    S.    W.    780;    Beaty    v. 

App.),  62  S.  W.  911.  «tate,  53  Tex.  Cr.   App.  432;    110 

98  Eaves  v.  State,  113  Ga.  749;  S.  W.  449. 
39  S.  E.   318. 


CHAPTER    XVIL 
ABATEMENT  AND  INJUNCTION. 


SECTION. 

SECTION. 

676. 

Statute  necessary   to  secure 

585. 

Parties   plaintiff. 

an  injunction. 

d86. 

Parties  defendant. 

577. 

Grounds  for  abatement. 

587. 

Pleading — Complaint. 

•578. 

•Statutory  offense. 

588. 

Pleading — Answer. 

579. 

Offense  which  authorizes  an 

589. 

Evidence. 

abatement  or  granting  of 

590. 

Trial. 

injunction. 

591. 

Judgment. 

580. 

No  intention  to  violate  the 

592. 

Bond  for  continuance  of  use 

statute. 

of  premises. 

581. 

Grounds  for  injunction. 

593. 

Violation     of      injunction — 

•582. 

Temporary  injunction. 

Punishment. 

583. 

Process — Notice. 

594. 

Appeal — Review. 

584.     Defenses.  595.     Costs — Attorney  fees. 

Sec.  576.    Statute  necessary  to  secure  an  injunction. 

Equity  affords  no  romed.y  to  abate  a  liquor  nuisance  nor  to 
enjoin  one,  unless  the  person  seeking  the  injunction  has 
suffered  a  damage  peculiar  to  himself.  ' '  No  person  can  main- 
tain a  private  action  for  a  mere  public  or  common  nuisance, 
for  the  reason  that  the  exercise  of  such  a  right  would  lead 
to  a  great  multiplicity  of  suits  and  endless  interminable  liti- 
gation. ' '  ^  But  where  an  individual  suffers  a  wrong  peculiar 
to  himself — suffers  a  damage  over  and  above  what  the  gen- 
eral public  suffers — he  may  maintain  suit  for  an  injunction 
if  his  damage  be  irreparable  or  falls  within  the  rules  of 
equity  where  a  party  will  be  awarded  an  injunction  rathf^ 
than  be  compelled   to  resort  to   a  court  of  law  to   recover 

iHaggart   v.    Stehlin,    137    Ind.        Fla.    712;    36    So.    363;    Territory 
43;   35  N.  E.  997;   P>rown  v.  Per-       v.    Robertson,    19    Okla.     149;    92 
kins,   12   Gray  89;    Christensen  v.       Pac.  144;  Depree  v.  State   (Tex.), 
Kellogg,    etc.    Co.,    110    111.    App.       119  S.  W.  301. 
61;     Strickland     v.     Knight,     45 

974 


975  ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION.  §  f)?? 

damages.  Such  was  the  case  where  the  owner  of  a  lot  adjoin- 
ing a  private  residence,  in  a  part  of  a  city  devoted  entirely 
to  residences,  located  a  saloon  thereon  within  ten  feet  of  the 
door  of  plaintiff's  residence.- 

Sec.  577.    Grounds  for  Abatement. 

Under  an  Ohio  statute  '•  on  conviction  of  the  proprietor  of 
having  illegally  sold  liquor,  the  premises  will  be  abated  as  a 
matter  of  course  unless  it  appears  that  he  has  voluntarily 
and  permanently  stopped  the  sale.*  Under  this  statute  it 
was  the  business  and  not  the  place  where  it  was  carried  on 
that  constituted  the  offense,  and  hence  if  the  business  had 
ceased  no  decree  of  abatement  could  be  entered,  for  the 
decree  had  to  be  directed  against  the  business  and  not  against 
the  place  where  it  had  been  carried  on.^  A  single  sale  did 
not  make  the  place,  or  the  seller  a  "keeper"  of  a  nuisance.*' 
The  discharge  of  a  clerk  who  made  illegal  sales  is  not  such  a 
cessation  of  the  business  as  will  be  a  sufficient  defense,  espe- 
cially if  subsequent  sales  be  shown. ^  Under  the  West  Virginia 
Code  **  there  could  be  no  abatement  until  the  o-wner  or  keeper 
had  been  convicted  of  an  illegal  sale,  and  then  a  bill  in  equity 
filed  wherein  the  conviction  was  set  up  as  a  reason  for  the 
abatement.^ 

zHaggart   v.    Stehlin,    137    Ind.  Hargett   v.   Bell,    134   N.    C.   394; 

43;   35  N.  E.   997.  46  S.  E.  749. 

(The  opinion  in  29  N.  E.   1073  As    to    conflict    between    a    city- 
was   set   aside.)      State   v.   Uhrig,  charter    and    the    general    law    on 
14   Mo.   App.   413   Tron   v.   Lewis,  the   question   of    local   option,   see 
31   Ind.   App.   178;    66  N.  E.  490;  Paul    v.    State    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 
Gowan     v.     Smith     (Mich.),     122  106  S.  W.  448. 
N.   W.    286;    12    Det.   L.    N.    365;  3  Act  May  1,  1854. 
Detroit  Realty  Co.  v.  Barnett,  156  *  State    v.    Sundry    Persons,     2 
Mich.  385;  120  N.  W.  804;  16  Det.  Ohio   Dec.   435. 
L.  N.  107.  5  Miller  v.  State,  3  Ohio  St.  475. 

In    North    Carolina    it    is    held  6  Miller  v.  State,  3  Ohio  St.  475. 

that  the  question  whether  a  liquor  ^  Elwood  v.  Price,  75  low^a  228 ; 

dealer   has   violated    the    loo-l   op-  39   N.   VV.    281. 

tion  law,  wherein   is  involved   the  «  Code,  c.  32,  §  18. 

validity  of  a  license  he  holds,  he  ^  Hartley    v.    Henrietta,    35    VV. 

cannot  be  tried  in  equity,  but  re-  Va.   222;    13   S.   E.    375.     Contra, 

sort   must   be   had    to   a   court  of  Cowdery   v.   State,    71    Kan.   450; 

law  where  a  jury  can  be  secured.  80  Pac.  953. 


§  578  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS  DIG 

Sec.  578.     Statutory  offense. 

In  recent  years,  in  order  to  cope  adequately  with  the  liquor 
traffic  in  a  number  of  States,  public  opinion  has  demanded 
the  adoption  of  statutes  giving  to  courts  of  equity  power  to 
suppress  it  under  certain  circumstances,  or  equity  powers  in 
this  particular  have  been  given  to  courts  of  law  for  a  like 
purpose.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  statutes  of  Maine, 
New  Hampshire,  "West  Virginia,  Ohio,^°  Florida,  Georgia, 
Iowa  and  Kansas.  The  remedy,  as  a  rule,  is  to  enjoin  an 
act  declared  to  be  a  nuisance;  it  is  not  to  punish  for  past 
criminal  acts,  nor  to  enjoin  the  commission  of  them  in  the 
future.  Its  scope  is  to  prevent  the  continuance  of  a  nuisance 
already  in  existence."  It  is  a  cumulative  remedy,  and  is 
available  even  though  other  remedies  be  within  themselves 
adequate  and  complete.^-  In  Maine,  upon  petition  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  legal  voters  the  Supreme  Court  has  been  given 
power  to  abate  a  liquor  nuisance.^ ^  Where  a  statute  made  a 
place  where  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold  in  violation  of  law, 
or  where  kept  in  violation  of  law,  or  M'here  persons  are  allowed 
to  resort  for  the  purpose  of  drinking,^*  it  was  held  the  keep- 
ing of  the  place  where  these  things  were  done  was  the 
nuisance  and  not  the  selling  or  resorting  to  the  place  for  the 
purpose  of  drinking.'^    And  where  a  boarder  in  a  hotel,  with- 

10  At  least  at  one  time.  the  difficulty  of  enforcing  prohibi- 

11  Davis  V.  Auld,  96  Mo.  559;  tion  laws  by  the  use  of  juries 
53  Atl.  118;  State  v.  Roberts  (N.  and  even  by  the  use  of  local 
H.),  69  Atl.  722;  Devanney  v.  courts.  The  death  of  one  of  the 
Hanson,  60  W.  Va.  3;  53  S.  E.  petitioners  is  no  abatement  of 
■603.  the  cause  of  action,  because  in  its 

i-Legg    V.    Anderson,    116    Ga.  nature   is   is   criminal.      Beebee  v. 

401;    42   S.  E.   720;    State  v.   Col-  Wilkins    (N.  H.),  29  Atl.  693. 

lins,   74  Vt.  43;   52  Atl.  69;   Paul  i*  N.      D.      Rev.      Codes      1899, 

V.    State     (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    106  §7605. 

S.  W.  448;   In  re  Rancour,  66  N.  i5  state  v.  Nelson,  13  N.  D.  122; 

H.  172;  20  Atl.  930    (a  civil  pro-  99  X.  W.   1077. 

ceeding.)       Hammer     v.     Dunla\'y  The   word   "place"   was   held   to 

(Iowa),  121  N.  W.   1024.  mean    the    particular    room,    tene- 

13  Davis   v.   Auld,   96   Me.    559 :  ment     or     apartment    where     the 

63  Atl.   118.  liqv.or  is  kept  or  sold,  or  the  un- 

This    Maine    statute    illustrates  lawful  business  done. 


977  ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION,  §  579 

out  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  proprietor  kept  liquor 
in  his  room,  and  on  three  or  four  occasions  sold  it,  it  was 
held  that  the  court  could  not  adjudge  the  entire  hotel  a 
nuisance  but  only  the  particular  room,  and  that  it  could  not 
do  so  unless  the  particular  room  was  definitely  ascertained.^" 
A  social  club,  formed  and  conducted  in  clear  evasion  of  the 
law,  may  have  its  club  rooms  abated.^^  Actual  sales  are  not 
always  necessary  to  the  commission  of  the  offense,  it  being 
sufficient  to  show  that  liquors  were  kept  in  violation  of  the 
statute.^^  As  the  action  is  quasi  criminal  in  its  character,  the 
facts  claimed  to  constitute  a  nuisance  must  clearly  fall  within 
the  provisions  of  the  statute,  even  though  the  action  is  brought 
and  maintained  by  an  individual/'' 

Sec.  579.  Offenses  which  authorize  an  abatement  or  grant- 
ing of  injunction. 
Before  an  abatement  of  a  place  as  a  nuisance  can  be 
decreed  or  an  injunction  be  issued,  some  violation  of  the  law 
must  be  shown.  But  although  a  person  may  be  authorized  to 
sell  liquor,  yet  if  he  persistently  sell  it  in  a  manner  which 
is  a  violation  of  the  law,  his  act  will  render  his  business  or 
place  a  liquor  nuisance.  Thus,  if  a  druggist  has  a  permit  to 
sell  liquors,  yet  if  he  sells  them  in  a  manner  which  is  illegal  or 
to  persons  to  whom  he  is  prohibited  at  the  time  from  selling — 
as  sales  without  a  physician's  prescription  when  prescriptions 
are  required — his  place  may  be  abated  as  a  liquor  nuisance.^" 
Such  a  place  need  not  be  kept  in  a  disorderly  manner  to 

Instate   V.   Nelson,   supra.  criminal      proceedings,      and      the 

17  Cohen  v.  King  Knob  Club,  55  maintenance    of    a    saloon    would 
W.  Va.   108;   46  S.  E.  799.  not  be   enjoined.      State  v.   Craw- 

18  State    V.    Dominisse     (Iowa),  ford,   28   Kan.   726;    42   Am.   Rep. 
m  N.  VV.  561.  182. 

19  Jones  V.  Mould,  138  Iowa  683;  20  state    v.    Donovan,    10   X.    D. 
116  N.  W.  733.  203;    86    N.    W.    709;    McCoy    v. 

Under  former  Iowa  statutes  the  Clark,  104  Iowa,  491;  73  N.  W. 
proceedings  partook  of  a  criminal  1050;  State  v.  McGrier,  9  X.  D. 
character.  State  v.  Greenway,  92  566;  84  N.  W.  363;  Rizer  v.  Top- 
Iowa  472;  61  N.  W.  239;  State  v.  per,  133  Iowa  628;  110  N.  W. 
Van  Vliet,  92  Iowa  476;  61  X.  1038. 
W.    241,      In    Kansas    they     were 


§  579  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  978 

constitute  it  a  nuisance.-^  Although  the  liquors  be  not  drunk 
upon  the  premises  where  illegally  sold,  yet  the  penalty  of  the 
statute  will  be  incurred  as  effectually  as  if  they  were  drunk 
there.--  A  city  may  be  empowered  to  declare  that  a  place 
where  ale  containing  alcohol  in  sufficient  amount  to  produce 
intoxication  is  sold  shall  be  a  nuisance.-^  And  it  has  been 
held  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  the  liquor  .sold  was 
intoxicating  in  order  to  decree  an  abatement  of  the  place.-* 
But  in  Georgia  where  a  dispensary  was  operated  in  good 
faith,  and  liquors  likewise  sold  in  violation  of  the  law,  it  was 
held  that  it  was  not  a  "blind  tiger,"  Rubject  to  be  abated  or 
enjoined.-'^  In  Iowa  the  statute  r^^nlies  not  only  to  places  of 
retail  but  also  to  places  of  wholesale  and  manufacture.-'' 
Irregularities  in  the  grantincr  of  a  license  to  sell  will  not 
authorize  the  abatement  of  the  place  where  the  liquor  is  sold, 
nor  will  the  fact  that  the  defendant  has  sold  or  is  selling 
liquor  illegally  in  another  place  justify  the  granting  of  an 
injunction,  where  the  statute  provides  that  the  place  where 
the  illegal  sale  takes  place  and  not  the  place  itself  shall  con- 
stitute the  nuisance.-^  Under  a  statute  declaring  that  "all 
buildings,  places  or  tenements  used  for  the  illegal  keeping  or 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquor  .shall  be  deemed  common  nuisances," 
a  hotel  is  a  "place"  and  may  be  abated.-^  Where  a  landlord 
incurs  the  penalty  of  the  statute,  if  he  leases  his  premises  for 
the  liquor  traffic  or  permits  his  tenant  to  carry  on  the  traffic 
in  violation  of  the  statute,  if  the  tenant,  without  his  knowl- 
edge carries  on  an  illegal  traffic,  a  judgment  abating  such 
premises  will  not  be  given  -"  especially  if  the  illegal  traffic 
has  ceased  before  the  action  is  brought.^"     Where  a  licensee 

21  Howard  v.  State,  6  Ind.  444.        Iowa,  598;  43  N.  W.  606. 

22  State  V.  Fraser,  1  N.  D.  425;  27  Clark    v.    Riddle,     101     Iowa 
48  N.  W.  343.                                             270;   70  N.  W.  207. 

23Langel    v.    Buslinell,    197    111.  28  Commonwealth  v.  Purcell,  154 

20;    63   N.    E.    1086,   affirming   96  Mass.    388;    28    N.    E.    288.      See 

111.  App.   618.  State  v.  Nelson,  13  N.  D.  122;  99 

24  State  V.  Hughes,  16  R.  I.  403;  N.   W.    1077. 

16  Atl.  911.  29  state  v.  Stafford,  67  Me.   125. 

25  Cannon    v.    Merry,     116     Ga.  3o  Merrifield  v.  Swift,  103  Iowa 
291;  42  S.  E.  274.                                       167;    72   N.   W.   444. 

28  Craig     V.     Werthmueller,     78 


979  ABATEMENT    AND   INJUNCTION,  §  579 

just  before  the  expiration  of  his  license  entered  into  an 
arrangement  with  a  person  to  add  to  his  [the  licensee's]  stock 
large  quantities  of  liquors,  and  then  executed  to  him  a  mort- 
gage thereon,  and  permitted  this  mortgage  to  be  foreclosed, 
and  under  an  execution  issued  on  such  decree  was  proceeding 
to  sell  and  continue  the  sale  of  such  liquors  in  retail  quan- 
tities, from  day  to  day,  the  purpose  of  the  mortgagor  and 
mortgagee  being  to  evade  the  statute  concerning  the  liquor 
traffic,  the  court  enjoined  the  sale,  holding  that  the  sale  was 
an  abuse  of  the  process  issued  on  the  decree.^^  If  a  party 
is  openly  violating  the  law  he  cannot  avoid  an  injunction  by 
bringing  his  business  into  conformity  with  the  law  before  a 
hearing  is  had  but  after  the  suit  is  begun. ^-  And  although 
the  defendant  may  have  ceased  to  violate  the  statute  before 
suit  brought,  yet  if  he  be  still  in  the  liquor  business,  and 
there  is  a  fair  presumption  that  the  violation  of  the  statute 
will  be  resumed  in  the  future,  an  injunction  will  be  awarded,^' 
So  where  a  saloon  keeper  habitually  sells  liquor  by  the  keg, 
and  those  purchasing  it  take  it  into  the  street  in  front  of  the 
saloon  and  there  treat  the  crowd,  or,  when  several  purchasers 
drink  the  liquor  and  repeatedly  become  intoxicated  and  con- 
duct themselves  in  sn  disordprlv  a  manner  that  people  avoid 
passing  along  the  street,  a  nuisance  is  maintained  upon  the 
saloon  premises  which  will  be  abated.^*  And  if  a  statute  re- 
quires sales  to  be  made  upon  M-ritten  requests  and  a  sworn 
report  of  such  sales  made  to  an  officer,  and  the  sales  are  made 
upon  insufficient  or  blank  requests,  which  are  afterwards  filled 
out  by  the  salesman,  and  no  reports  of  sales  are  made,  the 
maintenance  of  the  saloon  will  be  enjoined."^'     A  dispensary 

31  Fears  v.  State,  102  Ga.  274 ;  injunction  or  an  abatement  of  the 
29  iS.  E,  463.  nuisance.  Long  v.  Joder,  129  Iowa 

32  Donnelly  v.   Smith,   128   Iowa       471;    116  N.  W.   1063. 

257;    103   N.   W.   776;    McCracken  3*  Jung   Brewing    Co.     v.     Com- 

V.   Miller,   129   Iowa   623;    106  X,  momvealth,  123  Ky.  507;  96  S.  W. 

W.  4.  595;   29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  939. 

33  McCracken  V.  Miller,  129  Iowa  ss  Peak  v.  Bidinger,  133  Iowa 
'623;  106  N.  W.  4;  Bohstedt  v,  127;  110  N.  W.  292;  Lofton  v. 
Shanks,  136  Iowa  686;  116  N.  Collins,  117  Ga.  434;  43  S.  E, 
\V.  S12.  A  promise  not  to  vio-  708;  61  L.  R.  A.  150;  State  v. 
late  the  statute  in  the  future  will  Estop,  66  Kan.  416;  71  Pac.  857. 
not    prevent    the    granting   of    an 


§§  580,  581        TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  980 

authorized  by  a  State  law,  but  operated  illegally  may  be 
abated.^"  So  au  arrangement  of  the  saloou  which  is  a  viola- 
tion of  a  statute  providing  liow  it  shall  be  arranged  is  a 
sufficient  cause  for  its  abatement.''^  Sales  of  liciuor  on  an 
election  day  authorizes  a  decree  abating  the  saloon,  although 
the  sales  took  place  only  on  one  of  such  days.^*  A  pharmacist 
in  Iowa  cannot  escape  on  the  ground  that  the  illegal  sales 
were  not  made  by  him  personally  but  by  his  brothers  and 
sisters  in  the  store  without  his  authority.^^  Upon  the  accused's 
claim  that  he  distributed  the  liquors  among  members  of  a  club 
and  that  the  transactions  were  not  sales,  it  was  held  that  he 
could  not  complain  of  an  instruction  authorizing  a  conviction 
if  he  used  rooms  for  the  sale  of  liquors  therein,  or  kept  such 
rooms  for  the  unlawful  purpose  of  distributing  the  liquors  to 
the  members  of  such  elub.*° 

Sec.  580.     No  intention  to  violate  the  statute. 

If  a  person  has  in  fact  violated  the  statute,  the  fact  that 
he  had  no  corrupt  intention  to  do  so  is  no  defense.*^ 

Sec.  581.     Grounds  for  injunction. 

An  injunction  cannot  be  maintained  to  prevent  a  liquor 
dealer  selling  liquor  to  the  plaintiff's  employes;*-  nor  will 
it  lie  to  prevent  a  violation  of  the  law  unless,  as  previously 
stated,  the  plaintiff  has  suffered  a  peculiar  damage.*^  This 
is  true,  even  though  the   illegal  act  is  a  public  nuisance.** 

36  state  V.  Riddock    (S.  C),  61  ^ogtate    v.    Johns    (Iowa),    118 

S.  E.  207;  State  v.  German  Rifle  X.  W.  295. 

Club,  80  S.  C.  126;  61  S.  E.  208;  4i  Rizer    v.     Tapper,     133    Iowa 

State   V.   Charleston,   etc.    Co.,   80  628;   110  N.  W.   1038. 

S.  C.   116;  61  S.  E.  209;   State  v.  42  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Wha- 

Riddock,    80   S.   C.   118;    61   S.   E.  len,  3  Wash.  T.  452;   17  Pac.  890. 

210.  -13  Manor    v.*    State     (Tex.    Civ. 

37 State    V.    Gifford,     111    Iowa  App.),    34    S.    W.    769;    Campbell 

648;   82  N.  W.   1034.  v.    Schofield,    29    Leg.    Int.    325; 

38  Hammond  v.  King,  137  Iowa  State  v.  Schweickerdt,  109  Mo. 
548;    114   N.   W.    1062.  496;    19  S.  W.  47. 

39  Wilmot  V.  Johnson  (Iowa),  **  State  v.  Uhrig,  14  Mo.  App. 
123   N.   W.   336.  413;  State  v.  Wood,  155  Mo.  425; 

66  S.  W.  474;  48  L.  R.  A.  596. 


981  ABATEMENT    AND   INJUNCTION.  §  582 

And  even  thongli  a  statute  provide  for  an  injunction  to- 
restrain  an  illegal  act  or  maintenance  of  a  series  of  acts,  yet 
if  the  act  has  been  fully  performed  or  the  series  of  acts  have 
been  discontinued,  an  injunction  will  not  issue ;  *''  nor  will 
it  if  the  illegal  acts  have  been  performed  on  the  premises 
without  the  accused's  knowledge  or  consent.***  But  if  the 
illegal  maintenance  of  the  nuisance  has  been  discontinued  after 
suit  brought,  then  a  decree  enjoining  it  will  be  entered.*'^ 
To  justify  the  issuance  of  an  injunction  restraining  the  carry- 
ing on  of  the  liquor  traffic  a  statute  authorizing  its  issuance 
is  necessary ;  but  such  a  statute  does  not  cover  an  instance  of 
a  probabilit}'  that  there  will  be  a  violation  of  the  law  if  an 
injunction  be  not  issued.^^  Where  defendant  was  enjoined 
maintaining  a  liquor  nuisance  on  his  premises,  and  after- 
Avards  another  was  enjoined  maintaining  a  like  liquor  nuisance 
on  another  lot  in  the  same  block,  and  then  the  defendant 
purchased  the  house  condemned  and  moved  it  onto  his  own 
lot,  in  which  he  sold  liquor,  it  was  held  a  new  injunction 
would  issue  abating  the  building  in  its  new  location/'* 

Sec.  582.    Temporary  injunction. 

A  conviction  of  unlawful  sales  is  not  necessary  to  the 
securing  of  an  injunction ;  even  a  temporary  injunction  may 
be  granted  without  such  a  conviction.^'"    But  where  the  lessee 

45  state  V.  Saunders,   &6  X.  H.  48  pike    County    Dispensary    v. 

39;  25  Ati.  588;   18  L.  R.  A.  64{);  Brundige,    130    Ala.    193;    30   So. 

Eckhert   v.   David,   75    Iowa   302;  451. 

39   N.    W.    513;    State    v.    Strick-  The  running  of  a  saloon  is  not 

ford,  70  N.  H.  297;   47  Atl.  262;  a  nuisance  per  se,  and  municipal 

Sharpe  v.  Arnold,   108  Iowa  203;  authorities    cannot    single    out     a 

78  N.  W.  819;  Merrifield  v.  Swift,  particular   saloon   and    arbitrarily 

103  Iowa  107;   72  N.  W.  444.  declare  its  nuisance  and  close  its 

48  State    V.    Severson,    88    Iowa  doors.      De   Blanc   v.   New   Iberia, 

714;     54    N.    W.    347;    Drake    v.  100   La.   680;    31   So.   311. 

Kingsbaker,   72   Iowa   441;    34   X.  49  Hill  v.   Dunn-   (Iowa),   :^3   X. 

W.   199.  W.   705. 

*-  Halfman  v.   Spreen,   75   Iowa  so  Littleton    v.    Fritz,    65    Iowa 

309;     39    N.    W.    517;     Judge    v.  488;    22  N.  A.   641;    54  Am.  Rep. 

Kribs,    71    Iowa,    1-83;    32    N.    W.  19;     Pontius    v.    Winebrenner,    65 

324;    Donner    v.    Hotz,    7A    Iowa  Iowa  =591;    22    X.    W.    646;    Don- 

389;    27    N.    W.    969.  uelly  v.  Smith,  128  Iowa  257;   103 


§  583  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  982 

has  created  the  nuisance,  and  the  lessor  in  good  faith  has 
sought  to  abate  it,  a  temporary  injunction  will  not  be 
granted.°^  If  the  plaintift'  is  entitled  to  a  temporary  in- 
junction it  is  error  to  refuse  it.  Such  is  the  case  where  the 
complaint  and  affidavit  in  support  of  it  makes  out  a  primo 
facie  case.  In  such  an  instance  it  is  error  to  grant  the  de- 
fendant's application  for  a  continuance  without  granting  a 
temporary  injunction.^-  On  appeal  from  a  temporary  in- 
junction a  supersedeas  will  not  be  granted  even  though  a 
bond  for  it  be  filed,  for  the  reason  that  if  it  be  granted  the 
nuisance  will  be  continued,  to  the  detriment  of  the  community 
when  the  temporary  injunction  bond  affords  ample  protection 
to  the  defendant  if  the  case  be  reversed. ^"^ 

Sec.  583.     Process — Notice. 

Notice  to  the  person  whose  property  it  is  sought  to  abate 
is  absolutely  necessary,  just  as  it  is  when  it  is  sought  to 
enjoin  the  maintenance  of  a  nuisance.  But  a  statute  may 
provide  for  notice  to  a  non-resident  of  the  State  by  publica- 
tion, and  such  a  statute  will  apply  even  to  a  non-resident 
trustee  in  bankruptcy.^*  The  notice  of  a  hearing  for  a  tem- 
porary injunction,  three  days'  notice  being  required,  must 
have  the  formalities  of  a  notice  required  in  any  other  form  of 
action  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction.^^  Thus,  where  the  plain- 
tiff was  required  to  give  three  days'  notice  that  at  a  particular 

X.  W.  776;  Pontius  v.  Brumen,  66  5?,  Jacoby  v.  Shoemaker,  26  Fla. 
Iowa  88;  23  X.  W.  277;  State  v.  502;  7  So.  855. 
Patterson,  13  X.  D.  70;  99  X.  \Y.  If  the  accused  admitted  that  the 
67  Powers  v.  Winters,  106  Iowa  allegations  of  the  petition  were 
751;  77  X.  W.  509;  McCoy  v.  true,  it  was  held  that  the  grant- 
Clark,  104  Iowa  491;  73  X.  W.  ing  of  a  preliminary  injunction 
1050;  Barckell  v.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  was  within  the  discretion  of  the 
App.),  106  S.  W.  190.  court.       Carelton     v.     Rugg,     149 

51  Shear  v.  Brinkman,  72  Iowa  Mass.  550 ;  22  X.  E.  55 ;  55  L.  R. 
698;  34  X.  W.  483.  A.    193;    14  Am.    St.   446. 

52  Tibbetts  v.   Burster,   76  Iowa  54  Radford  v.  Thoruell,  81  Iowa 
176;    40    X.    W.    707;    Sawyer    v.  709;   45  X.  W.  890. 
Termohlen      (Iowa),     Ml    X.    W.  55  Beck   v.    Vaughn,     134     Iowa 
921.  331;    111   X.   W.  994. 

See    Powers    v.      Winters,      106 
Iowa  751;  77  X.  W.  oi^ 


983  ABATEMENT    AND   INJUNCTION.  §  584 

time  he  would  file  his  petition  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the 
court  for  a  temporary  injunction,  a  notice  that  at  a  particular 
time  he  would  make  application  to  the  judge  of  the  court  on 
a  petition  for  a  temporary  injunction,  was  held  to  give  the 
court  no  jurisdiction  of  the  matter.  Such  a  notice  must  state 
the  name  of  the  judge  to  whom  the  application  will  be  made 
and  the  place  where  he  may  be  found.  So  such  a  notice  is 
insufficient  if  it  state  that  the  action  is  brought  by  the  county 
attorney  when  it  should  have  been  brought  by  the  State.^** 

Sec.  584.    Defenses. 

An  injunction  to  restrain  a  defendant  from  maintaining  a 
nuisance  throughout  the  judicial  district  does  not  prevent  the 
bringing  of  a  second  action  when  a  second  nuisance  is  main- 
tained ; "  but  such  a  judgment  is  a  bar  to  a  second  action 
brought  by  another  party  seeking  the  same  relief.^^  The 
motive  with  which  the  action  is  brought  is  no  defense."^ 
Where  the  owner  of  premises  leased  them  for  a  lawful  purpose 
with  the  privilege  of  erecting  a  building  thereon  for  use,  but 
the  lessee,  without  his  knowledge  opened  a  saloon  in  such 
building,  and  after  a  preliminary  hearing  had  been  heard  and 
a  temporary  injunction  been  granted,  the  owner  served  notice 
on  the  lessee  to  vacate  the  premises  and  brought  an  unsuc- 
cessful action  to  oust  him,  a  refusal  to  restrain  him  and  a  dis- 
missal of  the  action  as  to  him  was  held  not  error.*"'  The 
validity  of  an  ordinance  requiring  the  closing  of  saloons  may 
be  raised  by  the  defendant."^  It  is  no  excuse  for  him  that  he 
violated  the  law  by  mistake.*^-     Where  it  hax^pened  that  the 

56  Beck  V.  Vaughn,  134  Iowa  •'"'S  Dickinson  v.  Eicliorn,  78  Iowa 
331;    111    N.   W.   994.                                 710;    43    X.    VV.    620;    6   L.    R.    A. 

In  Kansas  it  has  been  held  that  721. 

a  notice  of   an   application   for   a  ^^  Hemmer  v.  Bonson,  139  Iowa 

preliminary    injunction    need    not  210;    117   N.   W.  257,  260. 

be    given,    as    none    is    required.  ^^  Morgan  v.  Koestner,  83  Iowa 

State    V.    Jepson,    76    Kan.    644;  134;    49    X.   W.   80. 

92    Pac.     600;     State    v.    Hunter  ei  McNulty    v.    Toopf,    116    Ky. 

(Kan.),  92  Pac.  603.  202;    7o    S.    W.    258;    25    Ky.    L. 

57  Carter     v.     Steyer,     93    Iowa  Rep.   430. 

533;  m  N.  W.  956.  62 state    v.    Gifford,     111     Iowa 

648;   82  N.   VV.  1034. 


§  585  TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  984 

defendant  had  sold  out  his  business,  was  not  then  engaged  in 
the  business,  and  did  not  intend  to  engage  in  such  business, 
the  injunction  was  refused.*'^  But  a  discontinuance  of  the 
business  after  the  granting  of  a  preliminary  injunction  is  not 
sufficient  to  secure  the  dismissal  of  the  proceedings."*  If 
there  has  been  sales  in  violation  of  law  a  license  to  sell  is  no 
protection,  and  that  is  true  where  there  has  been  such  dis- 
orderly conduct  permitted  on  the  premises  as  to  injuriously 
affect  adjacent  property  when  the  proprietor  of  such  adjacent 
property  brings  the  suit  for  an  injunction  on  the  ground  that 
he  is  suffering  an  irreparable  injury  because  of  the  continua- 
tion of  such  conduct.**''  Where  a  statute  provides  that  the 
suit  might  abate  if  the  property  owner  paid  the  costs  and 
gave  a  bond  conditioned  for  the  abatement  of  the  nuisance, 
it  was  held  not  applicable  to  a  defendant  who  had  maintained 
the  nuisance,  but  had  abated  it,  who  was  not  the  ovMier  of  the 
premises.*"*  But  on  the  property  owner  complying  with  such 
statute  the  action  abates.**^ 

Sec.  585.     Parties  plaintiff. 

Usually  the  statute  points  out  who  shall  bring  the  action 
for  an  abatement  or  an  enjoining  of  the  nuisance,  and  that 
statute  must  be  followed.  Thus,  in  Georgia  the  action  is 
brought  on  behalf  of  the  public  by  the  solicitor  general  of  the 
judicial  district  where  the  violations  of  the  statute  have  taken 
place."^  But  there  are  statutes  which  authorize  ' '  any  citizen ' ' 
of  a  county  to  institute  and  maintain  an  action  to  enjoin  a 
liquor  nuisance.  Under  these  statutes  the  person  prosecuting 
the  action  must  have  the  necessary  qualifications,  for  if  he 

63  Eidley   v.    Greiner,    117    Iowa  st  Morris    v.    Lowry,    113    Iowa 

679;   91   N.   W.    1033.  '544;  8.5  N.  W.  788;  Morris  v.  Con- 

64Drummond   v.   Richland   City  nolly,    113    Iowa,   544;    85   N.   W. 

Drug   Co.,   133   Iowa  266;    110   N.  789. 

W.    471;     State    v.    Donovan,    10  es  Walker  v.    MeXelly,    121    Ga. 

N.   D.   610;    88   N.   W.   717.  114;  48  S.  E.  718. 

65  Kissel  V.  Lewis,  156  Ind.  233 ;  Substitution  on  revenal.  Saw- 
59  N.  S.  478.  yer  v.  Termohlen    (Iowa),  122  N. 

66  Patterson  v.  Nicol,   115   Iowa  W.  924. 
283;   88  N.   W.   323. 


985  ABATEMENT   AND   INJUNCTION.  §  585 

have  not,  he  has  not  such  an  interest  as  enables  him  to  main- 
tain the  action.     If  he  has  such  qualifications  he  may  prose- 
cute the  action  both  as  a  citizen  and  as  an  attorney  for  the 
State.*"'     He   acts   in   a  representative   capacity   and   cannot 
assent  to  any  action  of  the  court  which  will  operate  either  as 
a  license  or  permit  to  the  maintenance  of  a  liquor  nuisance ; 
and  if  he  does  so  assent  any  other  citizen  may  have  a  review 
of  the  decree,  on  certiorari,  especially  if  such  other  citizen's 
consent  to  the  location  of  the  saloon  constituting  the  nuisance 
was  necessary  before  it  could  be  located  at  the  place  it  occu- 
pies.^''   By  the  prosecutor  removing  from  the  county,  the  case 
cannot  be  dismissed."'     But  after  suit  brought  by  a  citizen  of 
the  county,  no  other  citizen,  so  long  at  least  as  he  is  prose- 
cuting it,  has  a  right  to  intervene  and  thereby  in  any  way 
control  the  action.'-     "While  the  word  citizen  is  usually  con- 
strued to  mean  a  ' '  citizen  of  the  county, ' '  ^"  yet  this  has  been 
held  to  cover  an  instance  of  a  Methodist  clergyman  residing 
in  the  county  until  removed  by  his  conference  to  another  loca- 
tion.^*   In  Iowa  the  qualifications  of  the  plaintiff  to  maintain 
the  action   is  not  raised  by  the   general   denial,   nor  by  an 
answer  denying  knowledge  or  information  sufficient  to  form 
a  belief  as  to  whether  he  is  a  citizen  of  the  county.'"'    A  statute 
authorizing  any  citizen  of  the  county  to  maintain  the  action 
in  the  name  of  the  State  does  not  require  him  to  obtain  the 
consent  of  the  State's  attorney  or  attorney  general  to  bring 
it.^^     But  in   Kansas   the  proper   officer   must    institute   the 

89  State  V.  Sioux  Falls,  et*.  Co.,  ''^•i  Fuller  v.  McDonnell,  75  Iowa 

2  S.  D.   363;    50  N.  W.  629;   De-  220;    39  N.   W.   277. 

vanney  v.  Hanson,   60  W.  Va.  3 ;  ''^  Craig  v.  Hasselman,  74  Iowa 

53   S.   E.   603;    Lofton  v.  Collins,  538;    38   N.   W.   402. 

117   Ga.    434;    43    S.    E.    708;    61  restate    v.    Bradley,    10    N.    D. 

L.  R.  A.  150.  157;  86  N.  W.  354. 

70  Hemmer  v.  Bonson,  139  Iowa  [Citing    Littleton    v.    Fritz,    65 
210;   117  N.  W.  257,  260.  Iowa  488;   22  N.  W.  641;  54  Am. 

71  Judge  V.  Kahl,  74  Iowa  486;  Rep.  19;  Conley  v.  Zerber,  74  Iowa 
»8  N.  W.   173.  699;    29    N.   W.    113;    Maloney   v. 

T^  Conley    v.    Zerber,     74     Iowa  Traverse,  87  Iowa  306 ;   54  N.  W. 

699;   39  N.   W.   113.  155;   McQuade  v.  Collins    (Iowa), 

73Devanney   v.    Hanson,   60    W.  61  N.  W.  213;  State  v.  Sioux  Falls 

Va.  3 ;  53  S.  E.  603.  Brewing  Co.    ('S.    D.),   50  N.   W. 


§  586  TRAFFIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  986 

action  in  behalf  of  the  public,  and  the  fact  that  the  statute 
declares  the  place  to  be  a  public  nuisance  will  not  justify  a 
citizen  abating  it  without  process  of  law/^  Where  the  statute 
authorized  public  officers  to  maintain  a  civil  action  to  abate 
a  liquor  nuisance,  it  was  held  that  a  municipal  corporation 
coidd  maintain  an  action  to  enjoin  the  illegal  sale  of  liquors 
in  such  a  place,  although  no  vote  had  yet  been  taken  to  deter- 
mine whether  a  local  option  law  should  be  put  in  force  for- 
bidding the  sale  of  liquors."  When  citizens  bring  the  action 
and  describe  themselves  as  the  "mayor  and  councilmen"  of 
the  city,  this  dosci-iption  is  mere  surplusage  and  may  be 
stricken  outJ" 

Sec.  586.     Parties  defendant. 

The  person  who  violates  the  liquor  law  is  the  person  who 
is  to  be  enjoined  or  whose  premises  or  liquor  is  to  be  abated. 
If  he  hold  a  license,  and  yet  sell  in  violation  of  the  law,  the 
statute  applies  to  him  and  to  his  property.***  If  the  nuisance 
to  be  abated  is  the  house  vi^here  the  liquors  were  unlawfully 
sold,  and  the  house  is  owned  in  partnership,  then  all  the 
partners  must  be  made  defendants;  for  if  only  one  be,  then 
no  decree  ordering  it  be  abated  can  be  entered,  for  an  effort 
to  abate  the  interest  of  the  partner  made  a  party  would  lead 
to  vexatious  and  unnecessary  litigation.**'     Any  person  who  is 

Testate  V.  Stark,  03  Kan.  52!);  plaintifT  for  the  superintendent  of 

66  Pac.  243;  54  L.  K.  A.  910,  cit-  police  of  a  city,  who  has  brought 

ing    Jones    v.    Chanute,    63    Kan.  the  action  and  asks  leave  to  with- 

243;   65  Pac.  243;    Brown  v.  Per-  draw  the  petition.  State  v.  Lynch, 

kins,    12    Gray     89;      Corthell    v.  72  N.  H.  185;  55  Atl.  553. 
Holmes,  87   Me.   24;    32   Atl.   715.  The  fact  that  another  employed 

iSee   also    Lee    Comity    v.    Hooper,  the   attorney   conducting   the   case 

128  Ga.  99;  56  N.  E.  997.  for   plaintiff   does    not   warrant   a 

'I's  Britton    v.    Guy    (8.    U. ) ,    97  dismissal  of  the  action,  where  such 

N.  W.   1045.  plaintiff    fully    ratified     the    em- 

79  Legg    V.    Anderson,     116     Ga.  ployment  and  took  active  part  in 

401;  42  S.  E.  720.  the   trial.      Eizer    v.    Tapper,    133 

In  North   Dakota  the   action   is  Iowa,  628;    110   N.   W.    1038. 
brought  by  the  State  on  the  rela-  so  State    v.     Webber,     76     Iowa 

tion     of     the      attorney     general.  686 ;  39  N.  W.  286 ;  State  v.  Davis, 

State  V.   Donovan,    10   X.   D.   203;  44  Kan.  60;  24  Pac.  73. 
86  N.  W.  709.  SI  Shear  v.  Green,  73  Iowa  688 ; 

In    New    Hampshire    the    State  36  N.  VV.  642;   State  v.  Douglass, 

solicitor    may    be    substituted    as  75  Iowa  432;  39  N.  W.  686. 


OS- 


ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION.  §  586 


in  possession  and  control  of  the  premises  and  liquor,  if  he 
manage   them   unlawfully   may  be   made   a   defendant,   even 
though  he  be  not  the  owner;  **'-  but,  of  course,  this  would  not 
be  the  case  with  om-  who  is  a  mere  servant  of  the  owner  or 
keeper.^^  All  concerned  in  the  keeping  of  the  premises  may  be 
joined,   except   mere   servants.^*     But  the   action   cannot   be 
maintained  against  parties  where  the  nuisance  has  been  created 
by  mere  trespassers,  by  erecting  a  building  or  tent  on  the 
premises   and    illegally    selling   liquors   therein    without    the 
knowledge  of  the  owner  of  such  premises.^^     If  the  premises 
are  occupied  by  a  tenant,  then  both  he  and  his  landlord  may 
be  made  parties,  for  the  landlord  has  the  power  to  eject  his 
tenant  from  the  premises  as  soon  as  he  creates  a  nuisance 
thereon ;  and  whether  he  leased  the  premises  for  a  lawful  or 
an  unlawful  purpose,  as  soon  as  the  nuisance  is  created  the 
premises  are  subject  to  abatement.'^*'     But  unless  the  owner 
be  made  a  party,  and  an  opportunity  be  given  him  to  be  heard, 
no  decree  will  be  entered  against  him."     If  the  party  in  pos- 
session be  a  tenant  for  life,  he  has  absolute  control  of  the 
premises,  and  only  his  interest  therein  can  be  abated.'"    Where 
a  statute  provided  that  the  owner  and  all  persons  interested 
in  the  premises,  including  the  keepers  of  them,  might  be  made 
parties,  and  they,  their  servants,  agents,  lessees,  tenants  and 
assigns  enjoined  from  maintaining  a  nuisance  thereon,  it  was 
held  that  an  owner  who  was  a  resident  in  another  State,  but 
who  maintained  the  place  by  an  agent,  could  be  joined,  if  he 
had  reason  to  know  his  agent  kept  a  liquor  nuisance  thereon.'^ 

s2Schultz  V.  State,  32  Ohio  St.  Iowa  432;  39  N.  W.  686;  iState  v. 

276.  Riddock    (S.   €.),   '61    S.    E.    207; 

83  State    V.    Gravelin,    16    R.    I.  McCracken    v.    Miller,     129    Iowa 
407;   le  Atl.  914.  623;     106    N.    W.    4;     Morgan    v. 

84  Martin    v.    Blatter,    68    Iowa  Koestner,  83  Iowa  134;   49  N.  W. 
286;    25    N.    W.    131:    27    N.    W.  80. 

244.  8'  State   v.   Marston,   64    N.    H. 

85  State  V.  Lawler,  85  Iowa  564;  603;   15  Atl.  222;  Banner  v.  Hotz, 
52   N.  W.   490.  74  Iowa  389;   37  N.  W.  969. 

86  Martin    v.    Blatter,    68    Iowa  ss  Danner  v.  Hotz,  74  Iowa  389; 
286;  25  N.  W.  131;  27  N.  W.  244;  37  N.  W.  969. 

Bell'v.  Glaseker,  82  Iowa  736;  47  §9  State  v.    Collins,    74   Vt.    43; 

N.  W.  1042;  State  v.  Douglass,  75       52  Atl.  69. 


§  587  TR^VFPIG    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  988 

If  the  premises  to  be  abated  be  in  the  control  of  a  bankrupt 
court,  they  may  still  be  abated,  for  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
bankrupt  court  is  not  such  as  to  prevent  the  entering  of  a 
decree  against  them.'"'  Where  a  statute  provided  that  "per- 
sons interested"  might  be  made  defendants,  it  was  held  that  a 
mortgagee  could  not  be  made  a  party  unless  he  had  possession, 
or  some  right  to  the  possession  or  control  of  the  property."^ 

Sec.  587.    Pleading — Complaint. 

The  complaint  or  petition  must  show  that  the  place  sought 
to  be  enjoined  or  abated  is  within  the  State,^-  and  likewise 
show  it  lies  within  the  terrtory  over  whch  the  court  wherein 
the  proceedings  are  brought  has  jurisdiction.  Where  a  private 
person  may  bring  the  action  it  need  not  be  alleged  that  notice 
had  been  given  to  the  prosecuting  officer  before  suit  was 
brought,  unless  the  statute  specifically  requires  it.^^  Where 
it  is  sought  to  hold  the  owner  of  the  premises  because  he 
permitted  a  nuisance  to  be  maintained  thereon,  it  must  be 
alleged  he  had  notice  of  its  maintenance;  but  an  allegation 
that  it  was  maintained  with  his  permission  is  equivalent  to 
an  allegation  that  he  knew  of  its  maintenance.''*  If  it  is 
made  an  offense  to  use  any  building  for  the  illegal  sale  or 
keeping  of  liquor,  a  petition  is  fatally  defective  which  merely 
alleges  that  the  building  is  occupied  by  its  owner  for  the 
purpose  of  selling  and  keeping  therein  liquors  for  sale,"  be- 
cause it  does  not  state  that  the  building  was  actually  used 
for  that  purpose."''  The  petition  must  allege  that  the  liquors 
were  kept  and  sold  by  the  defendants,  and  not  that  the  build- 
so  Radford  V.  Thorncll,  81  Iowa  394;  51  N.  W.  22;  15  L.  R.  A. 
709;   45  N.  W.  890.  187. 

91  State  V.  Massey,  72  Vt.  210;  93  Wood  v.  Baer,  91   Iowa  475; 
47  Atl.  834.                                                  59   N.   W.    289;    Lewis   v.   Hogan, 

In  this  case  it  was  held  that  if  91   Iowa   734;   59  N.   W.  290. 

the   tenant   created    the   nuisance,  o*  Gray  v.  Stienes,  69  Iowa  124; 

it  must  be  alleged  that  the  land-  28  N.   VV.  475 ;    Commonwealth  v. 

lord,  if  made  party,  knew  of  the  Brusie,   145   Mass.    117;    13  N.  E. 

nuisance.  378. 

92  Buck    V.    Ellenbolt,    84    Iowa  95  State   v.    Martin,    C4    N.     H. 

603;    15   Atl.   2z2. 


980 


ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION.  §  '"'^T 


ing  occupied  by  the  defendant  ''is  a  place  where  spirituous 
liquors    are    unlawfully   kept    and   sold,    and    is    a   common 
nuisance.""*'    An  allegation  that  the  defendant  "is  guilty  of 
keeping  and  maintaining  a  certain  tenement"  is  equivalent 
to  the  charge  that  he  "did  keep  and  maintain  a  certain  tene- 
ment," and   is  in  that  respect  sufficient."     Where  the  pro- 
ceedings were  required  to  be  made  upon  the  petition  of  twenty 
legal  voters,  it  was  held  that  the  signature  of  the  twentieth 
man  might  be  added  after  the  petition  was  filed.''^     The  peti- 
tion must  allege  specifically  wherein  the  law  has  been  violated 
which  will  justify  an  abatement  of  the  places  as  a  nuisance, 
and  if  it  does  not,  the  defendant  may  move  that  it  be  made 
more  specific  in  that  respect.^'"  A  petition  which  in  one  respect 
gives   an   inaccurate  description  of  the  place,   yet  such  in- 
accuracy does  not  mislead  the  accused,  is  not  bad  because  of 
such  inaccuracy.^     Where  the  statute  provided  that  an  in- 
formation must  be  filed  in  a  court  of  equity  for  the  abatement 
of  the  nuisance  upon  a  conviction  of  the  keeper  in  a  court  of 
law  of  having  illegally  kept  or  maintained  it,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  aver  that  at  the  time  of  filing  the  information  in  the 
court  of  equity  it  had  been  maintained  from  the  time  of  such 
conviction  until  the  time  of  such  filing.^    Under  an  allegation 
that  the  owner  knew  a  nuisance  was  kept  on  the  premises, 
proof  is  admissible  that  his  agent  knew  or  had  reason  to 
know    it    was    so   maintained,    and    it    is    not    a    variance.^ 
Where  the  statute  required  the  petition  for  an  injunction  to 
"state   the   facts   on   which"   the   allegations  of  a  violation 
of  the  law  "are  based,"  it  was  held  that  it  could  not  be  based 

no  state  v.  Batcliellor,  GG  N.  H.  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 

145-  20  Ail.  931.     See  Our  House  State. 

V    State,  4  Greene    (Iowa)    172.  99  Abrams     v.     Sandholm,      119 

9T  Commomvealth    v.    Gallagher.  Iowa,  583;  93  N.  W.  563. 

145  Mass.  104;   13  X.  E.  359.  ^  State   v.    Reno,   41    Kan.   674; 

osiState  V.  Collins,  68  N.  H.  46;  21  Pac.  803. 

36  Atl.  550.  estate  v.   Massey,   72  Vt.   210; 

This    was    where    the    proceed-  47  Atl.  834. 

inss    were   begun    as   an   original  3  state  v.  Collins,  74  Vt.  43;  52 

^  Atl.  69. 


§588 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


990 


on  information  and  belief.*  So  an  information  charging  that 
the  defendant  sold  liquors  at  a  certain  place  contrary  to  law 
is  deficient  in  not  alleging  in  what  manner  they  were  sold 
contrary  to  law.''  In  pleading  the  nuisajiice  facts  must  be 
alleged  showing  that  the  nuisance  existed,  and  mere  conclu- 
sions to  the  effect  tliat  a  nuisance  had  been  created  is  not 
sufficient.** 

Sec.  588.     Pleading — Answer. 

If  the  place  where  the  liquor  was  sold  was  a  drug  store, 
and  liquor  can  be  there  lawfully  sold,  then  that  fact  is  a 
matter  of  defense.^  Where  a  statute  was  in  force  which  pro- 
vided that  if  one  sue  in  a  representative  capacity  and  if  his 
capacity  to  so  bring  the  suit  be  not  controverted,  it  will  be 
taken  as  true ;  and  to  question  the  i-ight  it  must  be  specifically 
controverted;  a  general  denial  was  hold  not  to  raise  the 
question  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  a  citizen  of  the  county 
when  he  had  alleged  that  fact."    So  an  answer  denying  knowl- 


4  Wheaton  v.  Slattery,  96  X.  Y. 
App.  Div.  102;  88  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1074. 

[Citing  Matter  of  Peck,  107  N. 
Y.  391;  GO  N.  E.  775;  58  L.  R.  A. 
888;  Hoorman  v.  Climax  Cycle 
Co.,  9  App.  Div.  579.585,  41  K  Y. 
S.  710;  People  ex  rel.  J.  B.  Lyon 
Co.  V.  McDonough,  7G  App.  Div. 
257;  78  N.  Y.  S.  462;  Matter  of 
Hunter,  34  Misc.  Rep.  389;  69  N. 
Y.  S.  908,  affirmed  59  App.  Div. 
620;  €9  N.  Y.  S.  1137;  People  v. 
Windholz,  68  App.  Div.  552; 
74  N.  Y.  S.  241.] 

^  Cohen  v.  King  Knob  Club,  55 
W.  Va.  108;  46  S.  E.  799. 

In  Kansas  it  is  not  necessary 
to  aver  that  the  place  where  the 
liquors  were  kept  was  not  a  dwell- 
ing house,  that  apparently  being 
a  defense.  Ft.  Scott  v.  Dunker- 
ton,  78  Kan.  189;  90  Pac.  50.  See 
also  as  to  a  drug  store  in  Wash- 


ington. Kirkland  v.  Ferry,  45 
Wash.  003;    88  Pac.   1123. 

In  Elaine  the  proceedings  in 
equitj-  are  not  governed  by  the 
strict  rules  of  ecpiity  procedure, 
and  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege 
that  the  defendant  intends  to  con- 
tinue the  illegal  use  of  the  prem- 
ises. Wright  v.  O'Brien,  98  Me. 
196;   50  Atl.  647. 

«Bowen  v.  Hale,  4  Clarke  (la.) 
430.  As  to  what  is  not  a  sufficient 
showing  of  information  and  belief, 
see  State  v.  Union  Social  Club, 
82  S.  C.  142;   63  S.  E.  545. 

7  Kirkland  v.  Ferry,  45  Wash. 
663;   88  Pac.  1123. 

8  Shear  v.  Green,  73  Iowa  688; 
36  N.  W.  642;  Kaufman  v.  Dos- 
tal,  73  Iowa  091;  36  X.  W.  643; 
Littleton  v.  Harris,  73  Iowa  167; 
34  X.  W.  '800;  Bloomer  v.  Glen- 
dy,   70   Iowa   757;    30  X.   W.  486. 


991  ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION.  §  589 

edge  or  information  sufficient  to  form  a  belief  that  the  plain- 
tiff has  the  requisite  qualifications  to  bring  the  action  is 
equivalent  to  a  general  denial  and  raises  no  issue  on  that 
question.''  If  the  defendant  does  not  deny  the  maintenance 
of  the  nuisance,  the  allegations  of  the  petition  or  complaint 
will  be  taken  as  true/"  So  if  the  action  is  against  the  owner 
of  the  premises,  where  it  is  charged  his  tenant  maintained 
the  nuisance  with  his  knowledge,  if  lack  of  knowledge  be  not 
alleged  in  the  answer,  the  allegation  in  the  complaint  will  be 
taken  as  if  it  were  proven.'^  If  the  answer  does  not  deny 
the  nuisance,  and  the  nuisance  consists  of  sales  without  a 
license,  an  answer  alleging  that  after  the  suit  was  brought 
the  defendant  obtained  a  license  for  the  place  where  the  sales 
had  been  made  is  demurrable.^-  To  an  answer  alleging  that 
the  action  was  brought  in  bad  faith  and  to  annoy  the  defend- 
ant, no  reply  is  necessary.^^ 

Sec.  589.     Evidence. 

The  burden  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  prove  a  sufficient  amount 
of  the  allegations  in  the  complaint  to  constitute  a  cause  of 
action.^^  A  mere  preponderance  of  the  evidence  is  sufficient 
to  sustain  the  complaint. ^^  Where  the  action  was  against  the 
owner  for  permitting  a  nuisance  to  be  kept  on  the  premises 
by  his  tenant,  proof  that  on  several  searches  liquors  were 
found  on  the  premises  in  an  ordinary  saloon  with  places  for 
concealing  them,  and  that  such  owner  had  been  subpoenaed  as 

9  Craig  V.  Hasselman,  74  Iowa  i*  Bowen  v.  Hale,  4  Clarke 
538;  38  N.  W.  402.                                    (Iowa)    430;    Jones   v.    Byington, 

10  Bloomer  v.  Glendj',  70  Iowa  128  Iowa  397;  104  N.  W.  473; 
7'57;  30  N.  W.  486;  Peisch  v.  Lin-  Sickinger  v.  State,  45  Kan.  414; 
der,  73  Iowa  766;   33  N.  W.   133.  25  Pac.  868;  State  v.  Reymann,  48 

11  Overton  v.  Schindele,  85  Iowa  W.  Va.  307;  37  S.  E.  591;  State 
715;    50  K  W.  977.  v.   Jepson,   76   Kan.    644;    92  Pac. 

12  Halfman  v.  Spreen,  75  Iowa  600,  603.  Evidence  showing  aban- 
309;  39  N.  W.  512;  Tibbetts  v.  donnient  of  liquor  business.  Bhs- 
Burster,  76  Iowa  17'6;  40  N.  W.  tedt  v.  Terefel  (Iowa),  106  N. 
707;    Rice    v.    iSchlopp,    78    Iowa  W.  513. 

753;    41   N.  W.  603.  i- Davis   v.   Auld,   98   Me.    559; 

i3McQuade  v.  Collins,  93  Iowa  53  Atl.  118;  -State  v.  Collins,  68 
22;    61   N.   W.   43.  N.  H.  299;   44  Atl.  495. 


§  589  TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  992 

a  witness  in  a  former  prosecution,  was  held  sufficient  to 
justify  a  decree  abating  the  nuisance,  although  the  tenant's 
lease  provided  he  should  sell  no  liquors  on  the  premises,  and 
the  owner  denied  all  knowledge  of  the  unlawful  use  of 
them.'"  Statutes  often  make  the  finding  of  liquors  on  the 
premises  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  nuisance,  but  these  statutes 
are  usually  strictly  construed.  Thns,  under  the  North  Dakota 
statute  the  finding  must  be  by  an  officer  acting  under  the  power 
of  a  search  warrant,  and  not  other^v^se,  to  raise  the  pre- 
sumption of  illegality,  and  the  proceedings  must  be  instituted 
by  an  indictment. ^^  But  where  the  statute  raises  the  pre- 
sumption of  illegality  or  of  a  nuisance  on  proof  of  sales,  then 
the  burden  is  on  the  defendant  to  show  they  were  legal. ^'^ 
The  accused  may  show  that  ho  had  ceased  selling  liquor  before 
the  action  was  brought.^^  Where  husband  and  wife  were 
jointly  indicted  for  maintaining  a  nuisance,  and  the  evidence 
showed  that  a  customer  applied  to  the  husband  for  liquors 
and  he  said  he  had  none  but  his  wife  did,  which  she  kept  for 
private  use;  and  thereupon  the  husband  got  the  liquor  from 
his  wife  and  handed  it  to  the  customer,  it  was  held  that  she 
could  not  be  convicted  of  an  illegal  transaction. -°  Where  the 
action  was  brought  by  an  individual,  and  the  plaintiff  put  in 
evidence  an  affidavit  that  he  was  an  employe  of  the  defend- 
ant's saloon  and  that  the  defendant  was  conducting  such 
saloon  in  compliance  with  the  law,  it  was  held  that  he  was 
bound  thereby,  except  where  the  evidence  showed  statements 
in  the  affidavit  were  untrue.-^  Statutes  are  sometimes  in 
force  permitting  the  giving  in  evidence  the  reputation  of  the 
saloon,--  but  usually  such  evidence  is  not  admissible  without 

16  Littleton    v.   Harris,   73   Iowa  as   to   wliat    is   sufficient   evidence 
167;   34  N.  W.  800.  lo   justify  a  decree  of  abatement. 

17  State    V.    Nelson,     13     N.    D.  21  Hawks   v.   Fellows,    108   Iowa 
122;   99  N.  W.   1077.  133;    78   N.   W.   812. 

18  Shear  v.  Green,  73  Iowa  G8S;  22  Farley  v.  O'Malley,  77   Iowa. 
36  N.  W.  642.  531;    42    N.    W.     435;      State    v. 

19  Sharp    V.    Arnold,    108    Iowa  Mathieson,  77  Iowa  485;  42  K  W. 
203;    78   N.   W.   819.  377;  Hall  v.  Coffin,  108  Iowa  466; 

20  State   V.   Mathieson,   77   Iowa  79  X.  W.  274. 
486;  42  N.  W.  377.     See  the  case 


993  ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION,  §  589 

the  aid  of  a  statute.  Keputation  that  the  business  at  the 
place  was  conducted  lawfully  is  overcome  by  evidence  showing 
actual  violations.-^  Where  a  statute  makes  the  possession  of 
a  United  States  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  prima  facie 
evidence  of  illegal  sales,  and  the  accused  claims  the  liquor 
actually  sold  was  non-intoxicating,  he  has  the  burden  to  show 
it  was  not,  and  the  fact  that  he  took  out  the  license  to  sell 
the  particular  liquor,  because  the  United  States  Government 
claimed  it  was  necessary  on  account  of  its  alleged  intoxicating 
qualities,  is  to  be  considered  as  an  admission  on  the  part  of 
the  accused  that  it  was  intoxicating,  though  not  conclusive.-* 
If  the  proceeding  is  against  the  landlord  to  abate  a  nuisance 
on  his  premises  maintained  by  his  tenant  with  his  knowl- 
edge, statements  that  he  made  to  tenants  before  he  rented 
them  if  they  should  take  them  they  w^ould  have  to  sell  liquor, 
was  held  admissible  to  show  a  knowledge  of  sales  made  at 
subsequent  tiraes.-^  The  evidence  need  not  show  any  par- 
ticular number  of  sales  ;^"  nor  that  they  covered  any  par- 
ticular period  of  time;  sales  for  half  an  hour  will  make  the 
premises  a  nuisance.^^  Where  a  landlord  made  no  effort  to 
stop  sales,  except  to  serve  upon  his  tenant  notice  to  vacate  the 
premises,  but  permitted  him  to  remain  several  days  during 
which  sales  were  made,  it  was  held  that  the  evidence  showed 
he  acquiesced  in  their  being  made.-^  Evidence  is  admissible 
that  one  of  several  defendants,  on  the  day  the  defendant  was 
on  trial  for  having  sold  the  liquors,  claimed  the  seized  liquors, 
is  admissible  as  an  admission  of  his  ownership  of  the  place. -^ 
Of  course,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  liquors  kept  or  sold  were 

23 Hall  V.  Coffin,  108  Iowa  466;  28, state  v.  Grime,  S5  Iowa  415; 

79  N.  W.  274.  52  N.  W.  351. 

24  State  V.  Schultz,  79  Iowa  29  state  v.  Collins,  68  N.  H. 
478;   44  N.  W.  713.  299;   44  Atl.  495. 

25  State  V.  Davis,  69  N.  H.  350 ;  Effect  of  passage  of  Act  of  Con- 
41  Atl.  267;  Bell  v.  Glaseker,  82  gress  known  as  the  Wilson 
Iowa  736;   47   N.   VV.   1042.  Bill     upon     liquors     as     evidence 

26  Craig  V.  Plunkett,  82  Iowa  when  found  on  the  premises  which 
474;  48  N.  W.  984;  Pottenger  v.  were  brought  there  before  its  pas- 
State,  54  Kan.  312;   38  Pac.  278.  sage.     State  v.  Severson,  88  Iowa 

27  State  v.   Lord,   8   Kan.   App.  714;  54  N.  W.  347. 
257;   55  Pac.  503. 


§  589  TR.\FFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  994 

intoxicating  liquors,-''"  and  ille<?al  sales  must  be  shown  in  the 
place  sought  to  be  enjoined  or  abated. ^^  If  the  nuisance  is 
shown  to  have  existed  before  the  action  was  brought,  it  will 
be  presumed  it  existed  at  the  time  of  beginning  the  action,  so 
that  actual  sales  up  to  its  commencement  need  not  be  shown. ^- 
Evidence  of  a  bar,  glasses,  bottles,  a  bartender,  men  drinking 
at  the  bar,  and  barrels  in  which  accused  said  there  was  liquor, 
is  admissible.^''  Whether  or  not  the  defendant  knew  liquor 
was  being  sold  by  his  tenant  or  co-owner  on  the  premises  is  a 
question  for  the  jury.^*  So  it  may  be  shown  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  notice  to  the  landlord  defendant,  that  the  leased  prem- 
ises were  notoriously  used  by  his  tenant  as  a  saloon,  and  that 
written  notice  of  that  fact  was  left  at  his  home.^^  A  con- 
viction of  one  of  the  defendants  alone  of  illegal  sales  may  be 
shown,  when  connected  with  testimony  that  he  had  no  place 
of  business  other  than  the  one  described  in  the  petition.^® 
Even  though  a  statute  permits  the  reputation  of  the  place  to 
be  given  in  evidence,  that  fact  w^ill  not  overcome  positive  evi- 
dence that  the  landlord  defendant  had  no  knowledge  of 
his  tenant's  illegal  acts  in  making  the  leased  premises  a 
nuisance ;  ^^  but  evidence  that  such  a  reputation  prevailed, 
coupled  with  evidence  that  the  accused  lived  in  the  building 
used  illegally  by  his  tenant,  and  that  he  was  seen  frequently 
in  and  about  the  premises,  is  sufficient  to  show^  he  had  knowl- 
edge of  such  illegal  usage.^^     Admission  of  evidence  of  other 

30  state  V.  Gegner,  88  Iowa  748 ;  34  state  v.  Collins,  08  X.  H. 
&6  N.  W.  182;  In  re  Hunter,  34  299;  44  Atl.  495;  State  v.  Wil- 
N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  389;  69  N.  Y.  liams,  90  Iowa  513;  58  N.  W.  904. 
Supp.  908.  35  Hamilton   v.   Baker,   91    Iowa 

31  State   V.     Frahm,     109     Iowa  100;   5-S  N.  W.   1080. 

101 ;  SO  N.  W.  209.  36  state    v.    Collins,    d8    N.    H. 

32  McCoy    V.    Clark,     109     Iowa       299;  44  Atl.  495. 

464;  80  N.  W.  538;  Contra,  In  re  37  state  v.   Price,  92  Iowa   181; 

Hunter,  34  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  389;  60  N.  W.  514. 

69  N.  Y.  Supp.  908.     See  Nichols  As    to    sufficiency    of    evidence, 

V.  Thomas,  89  Iowa  394 ;  56  N.  W.  see  McCracken  v.  Miller,  129  Iowa 

540;   State  v.   Williams,   90   Iowa  623;    106  N.  W.  4. 

513;  58  N.  W.  904.  38  Carter    v.     Steyer,    93     Iowa 

33  State    V.    Collins,    68    N.    H.  533;  61  K  W.  956. 
299;   44  Atl.  495. 


995  ABATEMENT   AND   INJUNCTION.  §  589 

illegal  sales  is  not  such  an  error  as  will  Gall  for  a  reversal  of 
the  ease  where  the  testimony  fully  discloses  the  fact  that  iho 
offense  of  keeping  a  nuisance  has  been  eommitted.^^  In  Iowa 
one  who  is  entitled  to  sell  liquors  under  certain  circumstances 
has  the  burden  to  show  that  fact,  in  order  to  relieve  himself 
from  the  presumption  that  the  sale  proven  to  have  been  made 
was  illegal.*"  "Where  the  defendant  testified  he  had  kept  no 
whisky  during  a  certain  year,  it  was  held  admissible  on  cross- 
examination  to  ask  him  if  he  had  not  kept  other  intoxicating 
liquors,  and  if  he  had  not  bought  whisky  during  the  spring 
of  that  year.*^  In  Vermont  it  is  held  evidence  that  the  accused 
was  in  the  possession  of  the  premises  and  had  a  United 
States  liquor  license  to  sell  liquors  was  sufficient  to  authorize 
the  enjoining  of  the  maintenance  of  his  place  as  a  nuisance.*" 
For  the  purpose  of  showing  the  landlord  defendant  had  notice 
of  the  illegality  of  the  business  his  tenant  was  carrying  on, 
an  agent  in  charge  of  the  premises  may  be  asked  if  he  had 
not  read  accounts  in  the  newspaper  of  searches  and  seizures 
on  the  premises  and  of  the  conviction  of  the  tenant.*^  Proof 
that  liquors  kept  in  another  building  than  the  one  alleged|to 
be  abated  were  brought  into  the  latter  and  there  sold  doesi 
not  constitute  a  variance,  although  the  statute  required  the 
liquors  to  be  kept  in  the  building  where  served.**  A  ease 
may  be  made  out  by  circumstantial  evidence,  as  an  unusual 
use  of  a  dwelling  house.*'"'    Unofficial  certificates  showing  pur- 

30  state    V.     Wheldon,     6  Kan.            A  statute  providing  that  the  ev- 

App.   650;   49   Pac.  780.  idence  may  be  "in  the  form  of  affi- 

40  Ritchie  v.  Zalesky,  98  Iowa  davits"  does  not  violate  a  consti- 
589 ;  67  N.  W.  399.  See  also  tutional  provision  that  in  crim- 
State  V.  Sundry  Persons,  2  Ohio  inal  cases  the  accused  shall  liave 
Dec.  435.  the   right   "to  meet   the  witnesses. 

41  State  V.  Hibner,  115  Iowa  against  him  face  to  face."  State 
48;  87  N.  W.  741.  v.   Mitchell,   3    S.    D.   223;    52   N. 

42  State  V.  Lincoln,  73  Vt,  221;  W.  1052. 

51  Atl.  9.  Depositions    m.ay    be    used.      In 

43  State  V.  Lundergan,  74  Vt.  re  Rencour  {N.  H.),  52  Atl.  930. 
48;   52  Atl.  70.  45  Commonwealth   v.    Kane,    150 

44  State  V.  Lundergan,  supra-  Mass.  294 ;  22  N.  E.  903. 


§590 


TKAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


996 


chases  of  liquors  from  the  defendant  may  be  put  in  evidence.*" 
Expressions  by  the  defendant  that  he  would  not  lease  any 
premises  unless  he  could  sell  liquors  therein — even  if  embodied 
in  a  letter — are  admissible  to  show  his  intent  in  taking  the 
premises  described  in  the  complaint.*^ 

Sec.  590.     Trial. 

Where  the  action  is  a  civil  proceeding  to  enjoin  the  main- 
tenance of  a  nuisance,  the  court,  without  the  intervention  of 
a  jury,  tries  the  ease  as  in  any  ot"her  suit  to  obtain  an  in- 
junction.'*'* But  the  court  may  submit  the  question  whether 
or  not  the  premises  are  a  nuisance  to  the  determination  of  a 
jury,  and  if  found  in  the  affirmative,  enjoin  their  further 
use  for  such  purposes.'"     The  fact  that  the  defendant  plead 


*6  state  V.  Huff,   7G   Iowa  200; 

40  N.  W.  7-20. 

Evidence  held  suflicient.  State 
V.  Jepson,  7'6  Kan.  644;  92  Pac. 
600;  State  v.  Hunter,  77  Kan. 
850 ;  02  Pac.  603. 

47  State  V.  Davis,  69  N.  H.  350; 

41  Atl.  267. 

When  a  detective  does  not  rep- 
resent a  town  in  purchasing  liquor 
in  order  to  secure  evidence  of 
guilt.  People  v.  Chipman,  31 
€olo.  90;  71  Pac.  1108. 

Proof  that  the  liquors  were  con- 
signed to  the  defendant,  with  his 
knowledge,  raises  the  presumption 
he  owned  them.  State  v.  Johns 
(Iowa),  118  N.  W.  203. 

Where  the  liquors  were  traced 
to  the  room  described  in  the  com- 
plaint which  were  shown  to  have 
been  consigned  to  him  with  his 
knowledge  and  it  was  also  shown 
that  some  of  the  liquors  were 
there  disposed  of  to  the  prose- 
cuting witness  while  the  defenda- 
ant  was  present  in  the  room,  and 
that  the  witness  paid  an  assess- 
ment for  some  purpose,  it  was 
held  that  there  was  sufficient  evi- 


dence to  sustain  a  conviction  of 
tlie  accused  of  having  used  the 
room  for  unlawful  purpose.  State 
V.   Johns,  supra. 

Where  it  is  shown  that  the  ac- 
cused used  the  premises  for  un- 
lawful purposes  up  to  the  par- 
ticular date,  and  there  is  no  ev- 
idence to  show  he  was  not  doing 
so  after  such  date,  it  will  be 
presumed  his  illegal  conduct  con- 
tinued thereafter  until  the  date  of 
bringing  the  action.  State  v. 
Johns,  supra. 

Incriminating  circumstances  may 
be  shown.  State  v.  Johns,  supra. 
Strommert  V.  Johnson  (Iowa),  123 
Pac.  337. 

48Cowdery  v.  State,  71  Kan. 
450;    80    Pac.    953. 

49  State  V.  Harrington,  69  N.  H. 
496;  45  Atl.  404. 

It  would  seem  in  Iowa  that  on 
a  continuance  the  mode  of  trial 
must  be  designated,  Elwood  v. 
Price,  73  Iowa  84;   34  N.  W.  318. 

As  to  what  was  a  decree  by 
consent,  see  Geyer  v.  Douglass,  85 
Iowa  153;    52  N.   W.   111. 


997  ABATEMENT    AND   INJUNCTION.  §  591 

guilty  and  consented  to  a  temporary  injunction  was  held  not 
to  deprive  the  court  of  the  jurisdiction  to  enter  a  permanent 
injunction  two  years  later.'"  If  the  court  so  instruct  the 
jury  that  they  may  find  the  defendant  guilty  on  facts  not 
charged  in  the  complaint,  it  is  reversible  error/'^  Where  the 
defendant  told  a  witness  he  was  the  owner  of  the  saloon  and 
he  intended  to  keep  on  running  it  and  selling  liquors,  and 
seven  months  later  he  was  still  running  it,  it  was  held  not 
error  to  instruct  the  jury  the  evidence  was  competent  to  be 
considered  with  other  facts  that  were  shown  by  testimony  in 
order  to  determine  whether  the  place  described  in  the  com- 
plaint was  a  nuisance  occasioned  by  sales  of  liquor  therein.^- 
The  statute  with  reference  to  the  trial  and  granting  injunc- 
tions is  liberally  construed  in  order  to  further  its  object. ^'^ 

Sec.  591.     Judgment. 

The  judgment  must  follow  the  complaint  or  petition.  Thus, 
upon  a  bill  to  restrain  the  defendant  from  selling  and  keep- 
ing liquors  with  intent  to  sell  them  an  injunction  cannot 
be  entered  prohibiting  him  manufacturing  liquor.'^*  Under  an 
Iowa  statute  ■'■'  deelarino;  the  premises  where  illegal  sales  are 
carried  on  to  be  a  nuisance,  it  is  proper  to  enter  a  decree  both 
against  the  premises  and  their  owner.''®  In  the  same  State  the 
statute  requires  the  court  to  decree  that  th(!  premises  be  closed 


^0  Cunningham  v.  Gaynor,  87  of  its  injury  to  his  adjacent  prop- 
Iowa,  449;  54  N.  W.  248.  erty,  it  was  held  proper  to  enjoin 

51  State  V.  Gofi",  62  Kan.  104;  the  defendant  from  conducting  the 
61  Pac.  683;  reversing  10  Kan.  saloon  and  selling  liquors  thereon 
App.   2'8<);   fil   Pac.   680.  instead   of  merely  enjoining  their 

52  State  V.  Durein,  70  Kan.  1  :  use  in  an  unlawful  manner.  Kis- 
80  Pac.  987;  affirmed  208  U.  S.  sell  v.  Lewis,  150  Tnd.  233;  59 
613;  28  Sup.  Ct.  567;  52  L.  Ed.  N.  E.  478. 

i»3  State     V.     Jepson,     70     Kan.  54  Kaufman   v.   Do.-tal,   73   lowii 

644;    92  Pac.   603:    State  v.  Hun-  691;  36  N.  W.  643;  State  v.  Piper, 

ter,  74  Kan.   850;    92   Pac.  603.  70    N.   H.   282;    47    Atl.    703;    55 

Where   the  action   was    brought  Code,   §  2384. 

by  a  private  person,  to  enjoin  the  ""i  Carter    v.    Bartel,    110    Iowa 

maintenance   of   a    saloon   hccauso  211;  81  N.  W.  462. 


§  591  TRABTIC   IN   INTOXICATING   LIQUORS.  998 

for  a  year,  and  a  judgment  that  prohibits  the  use  of  the 
place  for  the  sale  of  liquors  for  a  year  "but  not  as  against 
other  use,"  is  erroneous.'^^  But  where  the  action  is  against  a 
tenant,  and  his  landlord  is  not  a  party  to  it,  while  a  decree 
will  be  entered  closing  the  premises  for  a  year,  yet  if  his 
tenancy  expire  before  the  year  terminates  the  decree  becomes 
thereafter  inoperative.^^  If  the  accused  dies  the  cause  of 
action  abates,  and  as  the  destruction  of  the  liquors  and  the 
closing  of  the  premises  are  incidental  to  the  judfrment  of 
conviction,  no  judgment  can  be  entered  ordering  their  destruc- 
tion or  the  closing  of  the  premises.''''  It  is  not  error  for  the 
court,  in  a  proper  case,  to  decree  an  abatement  of  the  nuisance, 
a  destruction  of  the  liquors,  and  a  closing  of  the  premises.*"^ 
Subsequent  lessees  or  purchasers  are  bound  to  take  notice  of 
the  judgment  closing  the  premises. *^^  The  judge  in  chambers 
cannot  order  the  liquor  destroyed  and  permanently  enjoin  the 
opening  of  the  premises;  that  must  be  done  in  open  court."" 
Where  the  statute  simply  provided  for  an  injunction  restrain- 
ing the  use  of  the  premises  illegally,  it  was  held  that  no  order 
to  enforce  the  judgment  could  be  issued,  because  the  decree 
acted  upon  the  person  and  an  order  to  an  officer  to  enforce  it 
was  unnecessarj'.^^  In  such  a  case  the  decree  operates  upon 
the  person  and  not  upon  the  property."*  A  subsequent  modi- 
fication of  the  statute  is  not  sufficient  to  authorize  a  modifica- 
tion of  a  judgment  previously  rendered.®"    Upon  a  complaint 

57MeCoy    v.    Clark,     109     Iowa  es  Miller    v.    State,    3    Ohio    St. 

464;  80  X.  W.  538;  Lewis  v.  Bren-  475;   Scliultz  v.  State,  32  Ohio  St. 

nan   (Iowa),  117  N.  W.  279.  276. 

58  Danner  v.  Hot/,,  74  Iowa  3S9;  The    order    to    close    the    prem- 
37  N.  W.  969.  ises  may  be  made  at  any  day  of 

59  State  V.  Mcilaster,   13  X.  D.  the  term  after  a  plea  of  guilty  is 
58;   99  X.  W.  58.  entered  or  conviction  had.      State 

60  McClure   v.   BranifT,   75   Iowa  v.    Sundry    Persons,    2    Ohio    Dec. 
38;  39  X.  W.  171;  Dash  v.  United  435. 

States  Express  Co.   (Iowa),  99  N.  c4Schultz  v.  State,  32   Ohio   St. 

W.  298.  276. 

81  Buhlman    v.     Humphrey,    S.l  65  Denby  v.  Fie,   106  Iowa  299; 

Iowa,  597;  53  X.  W.  318.  76  X.  W.  702.  See  State  v.  Thom- 

62/71  re  Harmer,   47  Kan.   262;  as,  74  Kan.  360;  86  Pac.  499. 
27  Pac.    1004. 


999 


ABATEMENT    AND   INJUNCTION. 


§591 


seeking  to  abate  "billiard  and  pool  rooms"  in  a  hotel,  a  find- 
ing that  a  nuisance  was  maintained  as  alleged  therein  and  a 
decree  enjoining  the  defendant  from  maintaining  the  nuisance 
"in  said  building  and  land"  extends  only  to  the  billiard  and 
pool  rooms  and  not  to  the  entire  hotel.***^  If  a  temporary  in- 
junction has  been  granted,  and  the  State  does  not  promptly 
prove  its  case  on  answer  filed,  such  injunction  will  be  dis- 
solved.*^^ Where  the  statute  required  the  court  to  order  the 
premises  closed  for  a  year,  upon  conviction,  a  judgment  fol- 
lowing the  words  of  the  statute  ordering  it  then  closed  for  one 
year  was  construed  to  mean  a  closing  for  all  purposes  and  not 
merely  a  closing  for  the  sale  of  liquors."^  If  an  injunction  be 
granted,  at  the  suit  of  a  citizen,  enjoining  a  place  as  a 
nuisance,  that  is  a  bar  to  a  subsequent  suit  by  another  citizen.^^ 
An  injunction  obtained  by  collusion  with  the  accused  for  the 
purpose  of  allowing  it  to  remain  without  enforcement  is  not 
a  bar  to  a  second  one.^'*  If  the  action  is  to  close  certain 
described  premises,  the  court  cannot  order  closed  premises  not 
described  in  the  complaintj^ 


CO  state  V.  Massey,  72  Vt.  210; 
47  Atl.  834. 

6T  State  V.  Reyman,  48  W.  Va. 
307;  37  S.  E.  591. 

Promptness  is  required,  because 
the  temporary  injunction  is  a  re- 
flection upon  the  reputation  of  the 
place. 

68  State  V.  Brennan  (Iowa),  117 
N.  W.  279. 

A  re-enactment  of  an  ohl  stat- 
ute does  not  release  one  who  has 
violated  the  old  statute,  as  a  rule, 
for  the  old  statute  is  merely  con- 
tinued in  force.  State  v.  Prouty, 
102  Iowa  105;  84  N.  W.  670. 

«9  Steyer  v.  McCauley,  102  Iowa 
105;   71   N.  W.  194. 

Statements  made  by  the  slieriflF 
of  the  county  which  induced  tl.e 
accused  to  make  default  do  not 
constitute  such  a  fraud  as  author- 


izes a  vacation  of  the  judgment. 
Seddon  v.  State,  100  Iowa  378; 
69   N.   W.   671. 

70  Cameron  v.  Tucker,  104  Iowa 
211;   73  N.  W.  601. 

n  State  v.  Piper,  70  N.  H.  282; 
47  Atl.  703. 

If  the  court  lias  no  jurisdiction 
the  decree  may  be  assailed  in  any 
court.  Beck  v.  Vaughn,  134  Iowa 
331;    111   N.  W.  994. 

A  final  judgment  will  not  be  re- 
versed because  a  temporary  in- 
junction was  granted  without  no- 
tice. State  V.  Douglass,  75  Iowa 
432 ;  39  N.  W.  6SG. 

What  was  not  an  abuse  of  dis- 
cretion where  the  court  inflicted 
a  fine  of  $1,000  when  the  accused 
cijrainitlcd  t'  e  or.'oii.-.f  befuic  the 
statute  was  declared  constitution- 
al, and  while  its  validity  was  un- 


§§592,593        TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS.  1000 

Sec.  592.    Bond  for  continuance  of  use  of  premises. 

In  Iowa  the  statute  provides  that  the  premises  shall  be 
closed  for  all  purposes  for  one  year,  but  if  the  owner  of 
them  will  give  a  bond  conditioned  that  he  will  immediately 
abate  the  nuisance  and  prevent  its  being  established  therein 
within  a  year,  the  court  may  order  the  premises  delivered  over 
to  him  and  cancel  the  judgment  of  abatement  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  the  premises.^-  A  similar  statute  is  in  force  in 
Ohio,  and  the  accused  is  entitled  to  avail  himself  of  its  provi- 
sions as  a  matter  of  course." 


Sec.  593.     Violation  of  injunction — Punishment. 

All  parties  defendant  to  the  proceeding  must  obey  the  in- 
junction entered  against  them.  Proceedings  lie  to  punish  them 
for  a  violation  of  it,  which  are  criminal  in  their  nature, 
though  issued  in  an  equity  action.''^  In  proceedings  to  punish 
for  contempt  oral  evidence  may  be  heard,  which  may  be 
embodied  in  a  transcript  for  appeal  the  same  as  in  any  other 
case.^^  As  a  rule,  a  fine  may  be  inflicted,  the  usual  statute 
providing  for  it.'"  It  is  brought  in  the  name  of  the  State  in 
Iowa,  and  need  not  be  instituted  in  the  name  of  the  plaintiff 
in  the  original  proceedings,  and  is  an  independent  action. '^^ 
The  reception  of  evidence  without  ruling  on  an  objection  to 


der   question.      State    v.   Maloney,  N.  W.   1131;   Sehultz  v.  State,  :)'! 

78  Iowa  598;   43  N.  W.  606.  Ohio   St.   276. 

If  the  nuisance  has  been  abated  ''^  Goetz   v.   Stutsman,    73    Iowa 

before   the   time   for   entering   the  693;     36    N.    W.    644;     Drady    v. 

decree,    the    court   may    refu-e    to  Polk   Co.,    126   Iowa   345;    102   N. 

make  a  temporary  injunction  per-  W.    115;    Davis    v.    Auld,    96    Me. 

petual.      Sawyer    v.    Termohland,  559;  53  Atl.  118. 

(Iowa),  122  iS.  W.  924.  '^o  Jordan    v.    Wappello    County, 

72  Lewis  V.  Brennan  (Iowa),  69  Iowa  177;  28  N.  VV.  548;  Goetz 
117  N.  W.  279.  V.   Stutsman,   73   Ind.   693;    36  N. 

73  Weaver  v.   State    (Ohio   St.),  VV.  644. 

77  N.  E.  273.  7-  Fisher    v.     Cass     County,    75 

74  Grier  v.  Johnson,  88  Iowa  99 ;  Iowa  232 ;  39  N.  W.  283.  But 
55  N.  W.  80;  Brennan  v.  Roberts,  see  Cameron  v.  Kepinos,  89  Iowa 
125    Iowa   615;     101    N.    W.    460;  561;   56  N.  W.  677. 

Johnson   v.    Roberts    (Iowa),    101 


1001  ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION.  §  593 

its  reception  is  error.'^'*  Anyone  who  knows  of  the  violation 
of  the  injunction  may  make  the  affidavit  for  the  prosecution.'^* 
The  facts  constituting  the  violation  of  the  injunction  must 
be  set  forth  in  the  information,  but  evidential  facts  need  not 
be  set  forth,  such  as  who  were  the  purchasers  of  the  liquors 
or  giving  a  description  of  the  building  where  the  liquors  were 
sold.***  A  failure  to  aver  that  the  action  was  pending  at  the 
time  the  information  is  filed  is  cured  by  an  allegation  that  the 
injunctional  order  had  not  been  dissolved  or  modified.^^  De- 
fects in  the  information  may  be  cured  by  admissions  of  the 
accused  at  the  trial.^-  A  copy  of  the  decree  need  not  be  set 
out  in  it.^^  "V\niere  the  injunction  operates  in  rem,  a  lessee  of 
the  premises  who  maintains  a  nuisance  thereon,  in  ignorance 
of  such  injunction,  mav  be  punished.^*  Belief  that  the  sales 
are  legal  is  no  excuse ;  ^^  nor  is  the  fact  that  the  judge  of  the 
court  orally  advised  the  sheriff  to  close  the  premises  tem- 
porarily only.*"^  Nor  is  it  any  defense  that  the  person  who 
has  violated  the  injunction  was  enjoined  under  another  name.^^ 
If  the  injunction  is  to  prohibit  anyone  keeping  liquors  on  the 
premises,  the  defendant  owner  is  liable  if  it  is  kept  there  with 
his  knowledge  and  assent.^®     A  makeshift  sale  of  the  prem- 

78  McGlasson  V.  Scott,  112  Iowa  597;    53    X.    \V.    318;     and    New- 

289;  83  N".  VV.  974.  comer    v.    Tucker,    89    Iowa    486; 

T9  Fisher    v.     Cass    County,    75  56   X.    W.    499 ;    Pearson   v.   Cass 

Iowa  232;  39  X.  VV.  283.  Co.,  90  Iowa  756;   57  N.   W.  871. 

80  McGlasson  v.  Scott,  112  Iowa  In  the  last  three  cases  persons 
289;  83  X.  W.  974;  Pumphrey  v.  not  parties  to  the  injunction  pro- 
Anderson    (Iowa),  119  X.  W.  528.  ceedings   were   held   not  guilty   of 

81  State  V.  Markuson,  5  X.  D.  contempt,  they  being  distin- 
147;  64  X.  W.  934.  guished   from  the  first  case  cited. 

82  Brennan  v.  Roberts,  125  Iowa  But  see  State  v.  Porter,  76  Kan. 
615;  101  X.  W.  460;  Jolmson  v.  411;  91  Pac.  1073;  13  L.  R.  A. 
Roberts    (Iowa),   101  X.  W.   1131.  (X.  S.)    462. 

83  Brennan  v.  Roberts,  supra;  ss  State  v.  Bowman,  79  Iowa 
Johnson  V.  Roberts,  supro.  566;   44  X.  W.  813. 

See    Sawyer    v.    Oliver    (Iowa),  86  Lewis  v.  Brennan  (Iowa).  117 

122  X.  W.  950.  X.  W.  279. 

84  Silvers  v.  Traverse,  82  Iowa  S7  Peck  v.  Conner,  82  Iowa  725; 
52;    47   X.   W.   888;    11   L.  R.  A.  47  X.  W.  977. 

804;  Sweeney  v.  Traverse,  82  Iowa  ss  England  v.  Johnson,  86  Iowa 

720;    47    X.     W.     889.      But    see       751 ;  53  X.  W.  268. 
Buhlman   v.    Humphrey,   86    Iowa 


§593 


TRAFFIC    IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


1002 


ises  and  a  re-purchase  of  them  will  not  enable  the  defendant  to 
evade  the  decree  or  escape  punishment.^"  A  punishment  for 
contempt  does  not  bar  a  proceeding  for  an  act  done  before 
the  time  of  the  performance  of  the  act  for  which  he  was 
punished,  for  as  to  that  act  there  is  no  res  judicata/'^  If  the 
defendant  relies  upon  the  existence  of  facts  which  suspend 
the  operation  of  the  prohibitory  statutes,  he  must  allege  and 
prove  those  facts  as  a  defense."^  INIere  irregularity  in  the 
injunction  decree  is  no  defense  in  a  prosecution  for  its  viola- 
tion.^- A  jury  trial  cannot  be  demanded. "•''  The  place  to 
which  the  injunction  relates  and  the  place  where  the  alleged 
act  of  violation  took  place  may  be  identified  as  the  same  by 
anyone  having  knowledge  of  their  identity.^^  Where  the  in- 
junction is  a  perpetual  one,  it  does  not  lapse  and  become 
non-enforceable."''  A  fine  of  $400  for  a  violation  of  an  in- 
junction and  $15  attorney  fees  has  been  held  not  an  abuse  of 
discretion.""  A  general  allegation  of  sale  in  violation  of  law 
is  sufficient."^  Good  faith  in  making  the  sale  is  no  defense 
to  the  contempt  proceedings."®    If  the  evidence  shows  a  viola- 


89  Wagner  v.  Holmes,  88  Tnd. 
728;    55  N.   W.   473. 

90  Rosenthal  v.  Hobson  ( Iowa ) , 
77   N.  W.   488. 

Operation  of  injunction  through- 
out judicial  district.  McGlasson 
V.  Johnson,  86  Iowa  477;  53  N. 
W.  267 ;  Sloan  v.  Jolinson.  86  Iowa 
750;   53  N.  W.   268. 

91  West  V.  Bishop,  110  Iowa 
410;  81  N.  W.  696. 

92  Ohlrogg  V.  Wortli  County 
(Iowa),  99  K.  W.  17'8. 

93  State  V.  Markuson,  7  X.  D. 
155;   73  N.  W.  82. 

94  Ver  Straeten  v.  Lewis,  77 
Iowa  130;  41  N.  W.  594. 

As  to  sufficiency  of  evidence  to 
show  a  violation  of  the  injunction, 
see  Wagner  v.  Holmes,  88  Iowa 
728;  55  N.  W.  473;  Barton  v. 
Mahasker  Co.,  90  Iowa  749;  57 
N.  W.  611;  Octant  v.  Hobson,  98 


Iowa  318;  67  N.  W.  255;  Landt 
V.  Remley,  130  Iowa  227;  85  N. 
W.  783;  State  v.  Plamondon,  75 
Kan.  269;  89  Pac.  23,  and  what 
was  not.  Hinklo  v.  Smith,  90 
Iowa  7<)1;  57  N.  W.  891;  State 
V.  Thompson,  130  Iowa  227;  106 
X.  W.  515  (merely  finding  liquors 
on  premises  enjoined). 

95  State  V.  Durein,  40  Kan.  -695 ; 
27  Pac.  148. 

98  Beatty  v.  Roberts,  125  Iowa 
619;   101  N.  W.  462. 

97  Pumphrey  v.  Anderson 
(Iowa),  119  N.  W.  528. 

98  Barber  v.  Brennan  ( Iowa ) , 
119  N.  W.  142;  Pumphrey  v.  An- 
derson   (Iowa),   119  N.   W.  528. 

In  Iowa  a  sale  anywhere  within 
the  judicial  district  is  a  violation 
of  the  injunction.  Schlo^ser  v. 
Mould   (Iowa),  121  N.  W.  520. 


1003  ABATEMENT    AND    INJUNCTION.  §  594 

tion  of  the  injunction,  the  court  has  no  discretion  in  Iowa, 
but  must  convict  the  person  in  contempt,  and  if  it  do  not, 
the  proceedings  for  a  contempt  will  be  reversed.®^  Where  the 
injunction  prohibited  sales  of  intoxicating  liquor  in  a  certain 
building-,  it  was  held  no  defense  that  the  defendant  did  not 
know  the  liquors  he  sold  were  intoxicating/  Merely  showing 
the  accused's  tenant  or  his  sub-tenant  sold  liquor  in  violation 
of  the  injunction  is  not  enough,  because  the  accused  was  not 
bound  to  assume  that  he  or  either  of  them  would  violate  the 
law.- 


Sec.  594.    Appeal — Review. 

The  granting  of  a  temporary  injunction  without  notice  is 
not  such  an  error  as  will  reverse  the  case  on  appeal  from  the 
granting  of  a  final  decree.''  A  judgment  will  not  be  reversed 
on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.*  An  appeal  lies  from  pro- 
ceedings to  hold  the  defendant  in  contempt  of  court,  and 
such  proceedings  may  be  reviewed ;  ^  and  if  an  appeal  be  not 
taken  therefrom  they  are  binding  although  erroneous.^  An 
order  fixing  the  amount  of  attorney  fees  at  $25  will  not  be 
disturbed,  since  the  amount  is  within  the  discretion  of  the 


99  Barber    v.    Brennan     (Iowa),  1034;   State  v.  Elad,  8  Kan.  App. 

119  N.  VV.  142.  625;  56  Pac.  153. 

1. State    V.    H.     Ilgner     &      Co.  4  Drake  v.  Freelan,  80  Iowa  768; 

(Kan.),    105    Pac.    14.  45  N.  W.  576;   Sickinger  v.  State, 

Agreed   statement  of  facts,  suf-  45  Kan.  414;   25  Pac.  868;   State 

ficiency.     Sawyer  v.  Oliver  ( Iowa ) ,  v.  Bowman  ( Iowa ) ,  82  N.  W.  493 ; 

122  N.   VV.   950.  State  v.  Davis,  69  N.  H.  350;   41 

In  this  case  the  beer  was  drawn  Atl.    267 ;    State    v.    H.    Ilgner    & 

by    a    faucet   on    a    pipe    running  Co.,  105  Pac.  15. 

down    into    the    cellar    below,    to  s  State    v.    Markuson,    5    N.    D, 

which  there  was  no  passage  from  147;    64   N.   W.   934;    Brennan  v. 

the  room  in  which  the  injunction  Roberts,  125  Iowa  615;   101  N.  W. 

forbade  the  keeping  of  liquor.  460;    Johnson  v.   Roberts,   101   N. 

2  Sawyer  v.  Mould    (Iowa),   122  W.  1131. 

N.   W.  813.  «  Ex  parte  Keeler.  45  S.  C.  537; 

3  State    V.    Douglass,    75    Iowa  23    S.    E.    865;    55    Am.    St.    785; 
432;   39  N.  W.  686;   State  v.  Gif-  31  L.  R.  A.  678. 

ford,    111    Iowa    648;     82    N.    W. 


§595 


TRAFFIC   IN    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS, 


100-4 


trial  court.^  An  appeal  lies  from  a  refusal  to  grant  the  Avrit.® 
The  presumption  is  that  the  judgment  is  correct,  and  the 
party  appealing  has  the  burden  to  show  it  is  erroneous." 

Sec.  595.     Costs — Attorney  fees. 

The  Iowa  statute  allows  the  plaintiff  attorney  fees,  and  this 
statute  also  applies  to  actions  prosecuted  bj'^  the  county  attor- 
ney in  the  name  of  the  State.^°  In  the  absence  of  evidence 
of  their  value,  $25  is  allowed  as  a  matter  of  course ;  ^^  but 
if  there  be  contention  over  the  amount,  the  court  will  hear 
evidence  and  fix  what  they  shall  be.^-  If  the  fees  cannot  be 
collected  from  the  defendant,  then  the  county  pays  them, 
although  the  attorneys  were  not  appointed  by  the  State.^* 
The  statute  allows  the  county  attorney  ten  per  cent,  of  the 
amount  of  a  fine  recovered  in  contempt  proceedings,  but  that 
does  not  render  the  county  liable  to  an  attorney  who  assisted 
him.^*  The  costs  are  a  lien  upon  the  premises  abated,  and  in 
case  of  a  dwelling  house  they  are  a  lien  on  the  cellar  if  the 


7  Campbell  v.  Manderscheid,  74 
Iowa  708;   39  N.  W.  82. 

8  Donnelly  v.  Smith,  128  Iowa 
257;    103  N.  W.  776. 

As  to  appeals  in  North  Dakota, 
see  State  v.  Donovan,  10  N.  D. 
610;  88  N.  W.  717. 

As  to  what  is  not  an  abuse  of 
discretion  in  imposing  a  fine,  see 
Beatty  v.  Roberts,  125  Iowa  619; 
101   N.   W.   4'62. 

9Barckell  v.  State,  106  N.  VV. 
190. 

10  State  V.  Douglas,  75  Iowa 
439;  39  N.  W.  686;  Farr  v.  Sew- 
ard, 82  Iowa  221;    48  N.  W.  67. 

11  Farley  v.  Geisheker,  78  Iowa 
4>53;  43  N.  W.  279;  6  L.  R.  A. 
533;  Campbell  v.  Manderscheid, 
74  Iowa  708 ;  39  N.  W.  92 ;  Drum- 
mond  V.  Richland,  etc.  Co.,  133 
Iowa  266;  110  N.  W.  471;  Plank 
V.  Hertha,  132  Iowa  213;  109  N. 
W,  732;  Carter  v.  Bartel,  110  Iowa 
211;  81  N.  W.  462;  State  v.  Gif- 


ford,    HI     Iowa    648;     82    N.    W. 
1034. 

12  Craig  V.  Werthmueller,  78 
Iowa  598;  43  N.  W.  606;  State 
V.  Plamondon,  75  Kan.  269;  89 
Pac.  23. 

13  Newman  v.  Des  Moines  Coun- 
ty, So  Iowa  89;  52  N.  W.  105. 

As  to  amounts  in  various  cases, 
see  Farley  v.  O'Malley,  77  Iowa 
531;  42  N.  W.  435  ($350);  Nich- 
ols V.  Thomas,  89  Iowa  394;  56 
N.  W.  540  ($100);  Hamilton  v. 
Baker,  91  Iowa  100;  58  N.  W. 
1080  ($40);  State  v.  Plamondon, 
75   Kan.  269;    89   Pac.  23. 

14  Sims  V.  Pottawottamie  Coun- 
ty, 91  Iowa  442;  59  N.  W.  68. 
Ten  per  cent,  must  be  taxed  for 
the  county  attorney  in  such  an 
instance.  Brennan  v.  Roberts,  125 
Iowa  615;  101  N.  W  460;  John- 
son V.  Roberts  (Iowa),  101  N.  W. 
1131. 


1005  ABATEMENT   AND   INJUNCTION.  §  595 

liquors  were  stored  there,^^  In  an  action  to  enjoin  the  enforce- 
ment of  a  decree  abating  a  nuisance,  and  the  injunction  is 
awarded,  judgment  for  costs  will  be  rendered  against  the 
person  who  was  the  active  party  in  obtaining  the  injunction 
to  abate  the  nuisanee.^^  But  in  the  action  to  abate  the  nuisance 
the  costs  of  the  proceedings  cannot  be  taxed  to  the  plaintiff 
unless  the  action  was  brought  maliciously.^^ 

15  Cameron  v.  Guinder,  89  Iowa  it  Clark    v.    Riddle,    101    Iowa 
298;  56  N.  W.  502.                                 270;  70  N.  W.  207. 

16  Beck   V.    Vaughn,     134    Iowa 
331;   HI  N.  W.  994. 


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